Middle East

Jul 25, 2012 Israel stirs on the eve of Middle East war By Victor Kotsev Perhaps the most ominous words uttered in recent months by Ehud Barak, the influential Israeli defense minister, came in the form of a paradoxical reassurance. "I believe and hope that there will be no war this summer, but that is all that can be said at this time," he said in a televised interview on Friday. Conventional wisdom has it that the louder the Israeli threats of war, the less likely that a war is imminent - and, in certain situations such as the present one, vice versa. Earlier this year, threats were flying - Barak was talking about the Iranian nuclear program entering an "immunity zone" by the end of the summer but more recently this has changed dramatically. As Reuters observed two months ago, Israeli officials have gone into an ominous "lock down." [1] Now comes Barak's statement. The million-dollar question is, which war. From a narrow Israeli perspective, war may in fact be avoidable and all the threats - Barak is certainly aware of the ripple effect of his words - could be primarily defensive in nature. With the entire region in flux and its home front underprepared (only 53% of Israelis, for example, are equipped with gas masks), Israel might ideally prefer to save its shots. From a broader regional perspective, the civil war in Syria is already a fact, and it looks as if the violence, both there and elsewhere, can only explode further. At some point in the near future, somebody will likely feel compelled to intervene, if not against the Iranian nuclear program, then against the Syrian chemical and biological weapons, if not through a full-scale attack then by a "surgical strike". If not Israel, this would most likely be the United States, though other regional players also stand ready to weigh in. In many ways, it's a war of nerves as much as it is a diplomatic bazaar, and it is hard to tell who will blink first and what deals will be struck. Barak's words come at a particularly sensitive time, when the Israeli army is on

high alert near the northern border and the Israeli leadership is reportedly preparing for a spillover of violence from the Syrian conflict. One scenario that is particularly worrisome and has attracted a lot of attention is that, as the Syrian regime collapses, some of its missiles tipped with chemical weapons could fall into the hands of either Sunni Muslim extremists or Hezbollah in Lebanon. This danger, of course, could be used for propaganda purposes, in order to justify a pre-emptive strike on Syria backed by the US and other Western powers; this is a tempting hypothesis, but it carries significant hidden risks and costs. Most importantly, any Israeli intervention, save perhaps for a very brief and pointed strike, could rally popular support behind Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and thus backfire spectacularly. Other Arab states might face public pressure to shift their stance as well, and the coalition against Assad may come under strain. (During the First Persian Gulf War, former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sought to exploit this dynamic by firing Scud missiles at Israel.) Also, Syria's response to an Israeli incursion could escalate much more quickly and to much more gruesome levels than that against other aggressors. As the Syrian foreign ministry spokesman put it on Monday, "These [chemical and biological] weapons are stored and secured by Syrian military forces and under its direct supervision and will never be used unless Syria faces external aggression." [2] It should be noted that the Syrian regime is almost as unlikely to use weapons of mass destruction against another Muslim country as it is against its own population, which leaves Israel the main target of its current threats. It is true that, among the regional countries, Israel is best equipped to deliver a blow to Syria - after all, it successfully deceived the Syrian air defenses in 2007, when it bombed an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor. By contrast, the other regional heavy weight, Turkey, lost a plane on a reconnaissance mission near the Syrian border this year. It is also widely believed that among all Israeli politicians, Barak, in particular, is itching for action, and it is possible that some American officials would rather see him engaged in Syria than in Iran, particularly prior to the US presidential elections in November. It is easy to imagine, however, an outcome in which the negative consequences of such action far outweigh the positive ones.

Surprises are possible, and Saudi Arabia is one corner from which we can expect them. Recently, the kingdom made a remarkable choice of a new spy chief, in the face of the "peasant-prince" Bandar bin Sultan. He is a familiar personality in international diplomatic circles, having served for over two decades as the Saudi ambassador in Washington, but for a number of years he had been sidelined. John Hannah, writing for Foreign Policy Magazine, discussed his return to diplomacy last year, [3] and now, it seems, he has re-assumed his spot at the center of the action.

The prince's exploits are legendary - in the 1980s, for example, he reportedly arranged the delivery of Chinese medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia under the nose of the US administration, sparking a diplomatic crisis. His resourcefulness is likely being put to use in Syria. As a Saudi analyst told Reuters on Friday, "Bandar is quite aggressive, not at all like a typical cautious Saudi diplomat. If the aim is to bring [Syrian President] Bashar [al-Assad] down quick and fast, he will have a free hand to do what he thinks necessary. He likes to receive an order and implement it as he sees fit." [4] Yet, while coordinating a surprise move with the Israeli "enemy" may well be within Bandar bin Sultan's (and Saudi Arabia's) repertoire, it is hard to imagine that the Saudis would be comfortable with an Israeli intervention in a predominantly Sunni Muslim country. In fact, Prince Bandar is known as a hawk on Israel, and his earlier diplomatic downfall is rumored to have been caused in part by his aggressive support for the Palestinians during the Second Intifada (Palestinian uprising). A damning 2002 quote, which is widely attributed to him and slams the US policy of supporting the Jewish State, goes: It is a mistake to think that our people will not do what is necessary to survive, and if that means we move to the right of [late al-Qaeda leader Osama] bin Laden, so be it; to the left of [former Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi, so be it; or fly to Baghdad and embrace Saddam like a brother, so be it. It's damned lonely in our part of the world, and we can no longer defend our relationship to our people. Syria, similarly to the Palestinian territories, might be unpalatable for the Saudis as a target for an Israeli intervention, but Shi'ite Iran is a different matter

altogether. In fact, for several years now credible rumors have circulated about the alleged Saudi-Israeli cooperation against the Iranian nuclear program, even claiming that Saudi Arabia has offered its air space as an attack route to the Israelis. As a side note, this year the Iranians chose to start the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on a different date than Saudi Arabia, in a fresh affront to Riyadh. For Israel, too, Iran is a much more urgent target than Syria (the Lebanese militant organization Hezbollah also likely ranks higher than Syria, though not as high as Iran). In fact, since the start of the unrest in their northern neighbor the Israelis have generally preferred as much stability in their immediate neighborhood as possible, and have been skeptical about the Syrian rebels' ability to guarantee that. In the Iranian nuclear program, on the other hand, they see an urgent threat accompanied by the long-term danger of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Right now, Israel seems content to wait as tensions in the Persian Gulf rise by the day, both in order to increase international pressure on Iran and in hopes that the US might get drawn into the fray. Most recently, over half of the Iranian parliament reportedly backed a bill calling on the military to block the Strait of Hormuz. This is a red line for the US, yet the move is mostly symbolic, since final authority over the matter rests with the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At the same time, however, an aide to Khamenei reportedly threatened that Iran would increase uranium enrichment levels to over 50% fissile material in response to the international pressure, while a computer virus that is attributed to the Islamic Republic has been making rounds in the Middle East. The code, dubbed "Mahdi," is believed to be Iran's response to cyber warfare waged against it by the West, and has reportedly infected a number of computers in Israel and other countries. [5] Finally, both Israel and the US pointed a finger at Iran for the terror attack which claimed five Israeli lives in Bulgaria last week, as well as for a similar plot foiled in Cyprus earlier this month. Both are doing their best to sell their narrative

to the international community, and to prepare world public opinion for hostilities. The main difference is in their time frames, and a long string of top American visitors in Jerusalem (Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in the last couple of weeks) is widely interpreted as an ongoing American campaign to restrain Israel for another few months. The Israelis, however, are growing increasingly restless, as are the Saudis. Barring substantial progress against Iran and its allies soon, the Americans might not get their wishes. Some analysts have speculated that an American-led campaign in Syria might postpone an Israeli strike on Iran, not least because the Assad regime is a key element of Iran's influence on the Levant. [6] However, in order for this strategy to work (assuming it would), the Americans would need to assume responsibility for Syria themselves. This is where the bargaining gets really tricky. Both the Israelis and the Americans would prefer to do as little of the heavy lifting themselves, and to reap as many of the benefits as possible. Each country has a different calculus of its goals and capabilities, and each may find itself compelled to act under different circumstances. Needless to say, the actions of each influence the other. On the Israeli side, domestic political considerations also weigh in. Last week, the largest party in the Israeli Knesset (parliament), Kadima, left the coalition, which it had joined barely two months ago. While this was due to a domestic intrigue, it will most likely lead to elections early next year, and will put pressure on Barak and his ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to deliver on their promises to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Moreover, the exit from the top decision-making panel of Kadima's head, Shaul Mofaz, can be seen as conducive to rash military action. Mofaz, a Persian Jew born in Iran and a former chief of staff of the Israeli army, was widely perceived as a moderating influence when it comes to Iran. Overall, it is hard not to agree with the acclaimed economist Nouriel Roubini, who predicted earlier this month that a "perfect [economic] storm scenario" was "unfolding," in part due to the high likelihood of large-scale violence in the Middle

East. While it is not yet completely clear who the main actors would be - and whether Israel would be directly involved - the likelihood that the various diplomatic negotiations will succeed grows slimmer with each day that passes. Conversely, the danger of a regional war increases.

Notes:
1. Iran attack decision nears, Israeli elite locks down, Reuters, May 17, 2012 2. Syria says could use chemical arms against foreign intervention, Reuters, July 23, 2012 3. Bandar's return, Foreign Policy, April 22, 2011 4. Saudi Prince Bandar: a flamboyant, hawkish spy chief, Reuters, July 20, 2012 5. 'Mahdi' virus stole data on national infrastructure, Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2012 6. The Real Reason to Intervene in Syria, Foreign Policy, June 4, 2012.

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Al-Qaeda emerges as Bulgaria bomb suspect By Kaveh Afrasiabi As the Israeli government seizes on last week's suicide bombing of a bus carrying Israeli tourists in Bulgaria as an opportunity to discredit Iran and Hezbollah, the on-going investigation in Bulgaria is increasingly pointing the finger at a different culprit - al-Qaeda. As reported in Lebanese media, an al-Qaeda cell has taken responsibility for the suicide bombing that took the lives of five Israeli vacationers, as well as a bus driver and a suicide bomber. [1] This has been corroborated by Bulgarian media reports that focus on two individuals, an American and a former Guantanamo inmate from Sweden with ties to al-Qaeda. Although the DNA evidence is still under investigation, on Thursday when Bulgarian media began identifying the suspected suicide bomber as Mehdi Ghezali, US officials quickly rejected this and insisted that "there was no evidence" linking him with the bomb. The same "anonymous" US officials simultaneously told the New York Times that this was a "tit-for-tat" Hezbollah job launched by Iran in revenge for Israel killing Iranian nuclear scientists. Emboldened by the US government's endorsement of his allegations against Hezbollah, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted no time in appealing to the European Union to add Hezbollah to its list of terrorist organizations, while vowing massive retaliation for the attack. Citing Iran's "global terror campaign against Israel," Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have insisted there is "rock solid" evidence linking Iran and Hezbollah to the bus attack, despite Bulgarian officials finding no conclusive evidence of such a link. Netanyahu's comparison of this bus attack and bombings aimed at the Israeli interests, elsewhere, such as in India, is contradicted by the fact that the suicide bombing method used in this instance is markedly different to the

"sticky bombs" used on cars in previous attacks. Israel has no dearth of enemies - Palestinians and even Turkey's Kurdish insurgents are unhappy with Israel's cooperation with Ankara in the latter's counterinsurgency efforts. But above all there is al-Qaeda, which has been resurrecting itself in the volatile Arab world. Troubling questions At this point, much depends on the objectivity of the investigation by Bulgaria. However, the country's police failed to conduct extensive interviews of Israeli witnesses before they were rushed out of the country by the Israeli Defense Force. The IDF also quickly sent bodies back home before Bulgarian authorities had any chance to conduct an autopsy. Bulgarian police also shouldn't have allowed the Israeli emergency workers to approach the scene of crime and collect bodies, as the various photos displayed in the Israeli media clearly show. Close scrutiny of those photos reveals that two white buses were badly damaged by the bombing, one had broken windows and was relatively intact while the main target bus was completely gutted by the explosion and fire. Somehow, the photos of victims from the adjacent bus surprisingly show almost no sign of serious injuries: several are shown walking or on stretchers, some with only bandaged hands or feet, likely attributable to their attempt to jump down the broken windows. [2] Given the sharp contrast between the image of inferno in the main bus [3] and the light injuries suffered by the majority of passengers, it is only logical to conclude that the 30 or so wounded were from the other bus, thus raising the question of what happened to the passengers of the main bus, given related reports that say some 172 Israelis had just landed and were taking three to four buses? Is it possible that we are dealing with explosion at an empty bus that merely impacted the adjacent bus, particularly since the photos do not show any

evidence of piled luggage at or near the main bus? This is a question of pure mathematics, in the light of "32 wounded" reported by the Bulgarian police. How did, then, five Israelis end up dead, along with the bus diver? There are, unfortunately, other troubling questions raised as well, such as how some Israeli passengers ended up telling Israeli media that those who were killed were sitting in the back of the bus, while the driver at the front was killed by the explosion? While awaiting the result of further investigation in Bulgaria, it seems clear that there is no way so many passengers would escape with little or no injuries - with many rushing to the airport "without clothes and shoes" - if they were from the same bus that was exploded and then filled with smoke and fire.

Notes:
1. Previously unknown group claims Burgas attack, Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2012 2. Israel Says Iran Behind Deadly Blast in Europe, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2012 and Attack on Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria kills 7, Kansas City Star, July 21, 2012 3. 7 dead, 3 critical after attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, Times of Israel, July 18, 2012

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in

Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here.

He is author of Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) and his latest book, Looking for rights at Harvard, is now available. (Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

THE ROVING EYE Syrian blood etches a new line in the sand Pepe Escobar Once upon a time, early in the previous century, a line in the sand was drawn, from Acre to Kirkuk. Two colonial powers - Britain and France - nonchalantly divided the Middle East between themselves; everything north of the line in the sand was France's; south, it was Britain's. Many blowbacks - and concentric tragedies - later, a new line in the sand is being drawn by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Between Syria and Iraq, they want it all. Talk about the return of the repressed; now, as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Gulf Cooperation Council compound, they're in bed with their former colonial masters. Blow by blow No matter what militarized Western corporate media spins, there's no endgame in Syria - yet. On the contrary; the sectarian game is just beginning. It's 1980s Afghanistan all over again. The over 100 heavily armed gangs engaged in civil war in Syria are overflowing with Gulf Cooperation Council funds financing their Russian RPGs bought on the black market. Salafi-jihadis cross into Syria in droves - not only from Iraq but also Kuwait, Algeria, Tunisia and Pakistan, following enraged calls by their imams. Kidnapping, raping and slaughtering pro-Assad regime civilians is becoming the law of the land. They go after Christians with a vengeance. [1] They force Iraqi exiles in Damascus to leave, especially those settled in Sayyida Zainab, the predominantly Shi'ite neighborhood named after Prophet Muhammad's granddaughter, buried in the beautiful local mosque. The BBC, to its credit, at least followed the story. [2] They perform summary executions; Iraq's deputy interior minister Adnan alAssadi told AFP how Iraqi border guards saw the Free Syrian Army (FSA)

take control of a border outpost and then "executed 22 Syrian soldiers in front of the eyes of Iraqi soldiers". The Bab al-Hawa crossing between Syria and Turkey was overrun by no less than 150 multinational self-described mujahideen [3] - coming from Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Chechnya and even France, many proclaiming their allegiance to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). They burned a lot of Turkish trucks. They shot their own promo video. They paraded their al-Qaeda flag. And they declared the whole border area an Islamic state. Hand over your terrorist ID There's no way to understand the Syrian dynamics without learning that most FSA commanders are not Syrians, but Iraqi Sunnis. The FSA could only capture the Abu Kamal border crossing between Syria and Iraq because the whole area is controlled by Sunni tribes viscerally antagonistic towards the alMaliki government in Baghdad. The free flow of mujahideen, hardcore jihadis and weapons between Iraq and Syria is now more than established. The idea of the Arab League - behaving as NATO-GCC's fully robed spokesman - offering exile to Bashar al-Assad may be as ridiculous as the notion of the CIA supervising which mujahideen and jihadi outfits may have access to the weapons financed by Qatar and the Saudis. At first, it might have been just a bad joke. After all, the exile offer came from those exact same paragons of democracy, the House of Saud and Qatar, who control the Arab League and are financing the mujahideen and the antiSyria jihad. Baghdad, though, publicly condemned the exile offer. And the aftermath - in fact on the same day - was worthy of The Joker (yes, Batman's foe); a wave of anti-Shi'ite bombings in Iraq, with over 100 people dead, duly claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qaeda's local franchise. Spokesman Abu Bakr alBaghdadi energetically urged the Sunni tribes in Anbar and Nineveh to join

the jihad and topple the "infidel" government in Baghdad. The mujahideen/jihadi back and forth between Syria and Iraq has been more than confirmed by Izzat al-Shahbandar, a senior member of Iraq's Parliament and close aide to Prime Minister al-Maliki. Baghdad even has updated lists. The crossover could only spawn more frenetic Orwellian newspeak, nailed by the website Moon of Alabama. [4] Mujahideen and jihadis active in Iraq are now "Iraqi insurgents". And mujahideen and jihadis active in Syria remain the usual "Syrian rebels". They have been all decommissioned as "terrorists". Under this logic, the Colorado Batman shooter may also be described as an "insurgent". Follow the money As it stands, the romanticized Syrian "rebels" plus the insurgents formerly known as terrorists cannot win against the Syria military - not even with the Saudis and Qataris showering them with loads of cash and weapons. Nor is there any evidence the regime is contemplating a retreat to the Alawite mountains in northern Syria, as evoked by this collective foreign policy blog discussion. After all the "rebels" do not control any territory. What's certain is who would profit from Syria being progressively balkanized. The House of Saud and Qatar would love nothing better than to have the civil war exported to Iraq and Lebanon; in their very narrow calculations, that would eventually yield fellow Sunni regimes. So expect Saudi and Qatari funds buying every well-connected Syrian regime apparatchik in sight - even while the urban Sunni bourgeosie still has not abandoned the ship. And as the civil war spreads out, a tsunami of weapons will keep inundating Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and of course Turkey, boosting assorted guerrilla outfits, Kurdish included - yet one more facet of now ostracized neo-Ottoman Turkey impotently watching nation states carved out of that 1920s colonial line in the sand being smashed.

Strategically, this will always be a war by proxy; essentially Saudi Arabia vs Iran - with the House of Saud behind hardcore Islamists of all colors compared to Qatar supporting "its" Muslim Brotherhood. But most of all this is the US-NATO-GCC vs Iran. Israel's motives go way beyond the Saudi/Qatari sectarian lust. Israel's Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has just excavated a Bushism - calling IranSyria-Hezbollah an "axis of evil". What Tel Aviv wants in the long run is clear; for Washington, Obama administration or not, to bring down the axis. Meanwhile, this long-term goal does not prevent Defense Minister Ehud Barak from getting crazy - speculating on an invasion of Syria based on a hypothetical transfer of Syrian anti-aircraft missiles or even chemical weapons to Hezbollah. Washington for its part would love at least a pliable/puppet Sunni regime in Damascus to turbo-charge the encircling of Iran - without increasing Israel's substantial fears. Meanwhile, what passes for "smart power" is no more than glorified wishful thinking. Here in detail is how pro-Israel functionaries in the US are designing post-Assad Syria. [5] Meet the new Bane For all its production values, NATO's jihad - in conjunction with al-Qaeda affiliates and copycats - still has not delivered regime change. UN Security Council sanctions won't be forthcoming, as Beijing and Moscow have already stressed three times. So Plan Bs keep surfacing all the time. The latest is straight from the Iraq playbook; Damascus will attack civilians with chemical weapons. This lasted only for a few news cycles. Russian President Vladimir Putin has already made it clear; regime change is anathema, especially for a reason that eludes most in the West - jihadis at the gates of Damascus means they are a stone's throw from the Caucasus, the possible new pearl in a lethal collar bound to destabilize Muslim Russia. Blowback meanwhile is ready to strike like the Medusa. What is for all

practical purposes NATO-GCC mujahideen/jihadi death squads will be more than happy to bleed Syria across sectarian lines - in the sand and especially in urban areas. It's hunting season now, not only for Alawites but also Christians (10% of the population). A foreign policy that privileges Sunni jihadis formerly known as terrorists to create a "democratic" state in the Middle East seems to have been conjured by Bane - the Hannibal Lecter meets Darth Vader bad guy in The Dark Knight

Rises, the final chapter of the Batman trilogy. And yes, we are his creators.
While the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity, a masked Sunni jihadi superman is slouching towards Damascus to be born.

Notes:
1. http://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/en/homepage /worldnews/detail/articolo/siria-syria-15868/ 2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18930876 3, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/22/227739.html 4. http://www.moonofalabama.org/2012/07/nyt-terrorists-are -nowinsurgents.html#comments 5. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/20/ inside_the_secret_effort_to_plan_for_a_post_assad_syria

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is

Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His most recent book is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009). He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com (Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)