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GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989 FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner, vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: In a civil action for recovery of damages filed by the petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the following judgment was rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan: xxx (1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00 as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, plus costs and to appropriate through its Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said purpose; (2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and
(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of Dagupan and defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco, for lack of merit.

supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3, 1978 (or for a period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 (Exh. H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced; during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident. Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. On the other hand, Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. A, B, C and sub-exhibits) on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1 1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms. deep (see Exhs. D and D-1).

The facts found by the trial court are as follows: It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and

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Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd., admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance Engineer. In his answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as exofficio Highway Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident happened. On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard. The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan. After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those of the appellate court, as well as the arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of the trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the petition. In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors assigned by the petitioner to a single issue: whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties: Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties: xxx (j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system. xxx The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed

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has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at bar. The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works." The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he exercises control or supervision over the said road. But the city can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary from the city government substantially exceeds the honorarium. We do not agree. Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096, respectively." This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer. There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear. Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination of the amount is discretionary on the court.13 Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven. However, in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into consideration: (1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts. (2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages. (3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from attending social and civic activities. Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages, the moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis, resulting in exhorbitant amounts. Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court under preceding jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to 20,000.00.

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As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed out the basis: To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians. Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents. Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the trial court to the appellate court, the petitioner was able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from the then presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also denied. We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court pending appeal was premature. We do not find any good reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even before the expiration of the time to appeal. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as regards the amounts awarded: (1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of 15,924 (namely 8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; 7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year and 450.00 as bonus); 20,000.00 as moral damages and 10,000.00 as exemplary damages. The attorney's fees of 3,000.00 remain the same. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, (Chaiperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. FIRME G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991 MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-BANIA, IAUREANO BANIA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIA, MONTANO BANIA, ORJA BANIA, AND LYDIA R. BANIA, respondents. MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Bania, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras, et al." dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979; September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot. The antecedent facts are as follows:

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Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union. While private respondents Juana Rimando-Bania, Laureano Bania, Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia R. Bania are heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-Bg before the aforesaid court. At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision. In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following questioned orders, to wit: (1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot; (2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction; (3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial; (4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time; (5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976; (6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's direction; and (7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross examination. On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Bania, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Bania Jr., Sor Marietta Bania, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Bania, Orja Bania and Lydia B. Bania the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Bania Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.

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The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time. Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. (Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.) The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 644, 654.) Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid) Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39) A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be

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sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." (United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660) Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.) It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.) In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.) In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities." After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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TORIO vs. FONTANILLA G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978 LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents. G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978 MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS,respondents. On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5- meters by 8 meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts 4 in a row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side with bamboo braces. The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one

MUOZ PALMA, J.: These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality. A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members. The following facts are not in dispute:

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for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968, the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V. Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or is it or a private or proprietary character? 1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial private and corporate. As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally a difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence, for instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks have set down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of attending circumstances. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private (socalled) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916, thus: Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private. proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995) In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice Grant T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or proprietary

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in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, [For instance, Civil Code provides "Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. "] nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function the construction and maintenance of roads and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex delicto. Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ... xxx xxx xxx The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. Sec. 1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514) 3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the ho of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. fiesta may be held in each municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later date in the same year, by resolution of the council. This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service. As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental

11
in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.
[[ We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven et al, was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants' negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence, in i lie performance 4t which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connection held inter alia. Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public governmental' duties, Illness made liable by statute ... "A municipal corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statue, concluded a public Court of July celebration, including a display, of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which Jailed to explode until it reached the ground and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51) This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented. At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from ttis excerpt: July 4th. or, when that date tails upon Sunday, July 5th. is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. 'Throughout the country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompartied by a musical program including patriotic airs sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the. general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. ... Ibid p. 52) ]]

4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitionermunicipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . . On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. That being the case, it

12
becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence. At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stags for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise observe that although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest? The Court of Appeals thus concluded The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the additional weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993) The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a gross misapprehension of facts." Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the circumstances of the case." Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the participants. We agree. Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for Damages in favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California, heldinter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion. Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed

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Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. ... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879) 5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee. The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty. If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not invoked in petitioners' brief. In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case. The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. xxx xxx xxx The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he Must be shown to have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt 11, p. 207) Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it, but because of some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. ... (pp. 207208, Ibid.)

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xxx xxx xxx Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.) On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. 6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court. Petitioner-municipality assails the award. Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees, the records show however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just cause. We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a matter of judicial discretion. The amount of 1,200.00 is fair and reasonable. PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993). Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED, Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur. PROVINCE OF CEBU vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 72841 January 29, 1987 PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ATTY. PABLO P. GARCIA, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court in A.C. G.R. CV No. 66502 entitled "Governor Rene Espina, et. at v. Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr., et. al, Atty. Pablo P. Garcia v. Province of Cebu" affirming with modification the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VII, granting respondent Pablo P. Garcia's claim for compensation for services rendered as counsel in behalf of the respondent Province of Cebu. The facts of the case are not in dispute. On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province. owned lots all located in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio. According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its public improvement projects. The City of Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within which to dispose of the donated lots. Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the

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patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu. To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective municipalities) along with some taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null and void. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs were filing it for and in behalf of the Province of Cebu in the nature of a derivative suit. Named defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials responsible for the donation of the province-owned lots. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-8669 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and assigned to Branch VI thereof. Defendants City of Cebu and City Mayor Osmea, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiffs did not have the legal capacity to sue. Subsequently, in an order, dated May, 1965, the court dismissed Case No. R-8669 on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest in the case. Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion was denied by the Court. Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. announced that he would borrow funds from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and would use the donated lots as collaterals. In July, 1965, the City of Cebu advertised the sale of an the lots remaining unsold. Thereupon, Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu, decided to go to court. He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu. Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which application was granted on the same day, August 6, 1965. The complaint was later amended to implead Cebu City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon as additional defendant in view of Fiscal Numeriano Capangpangan's manifestation stating that on September 9, 1965, Sergio Osmea, Jr. filed his certificate of Candidacy for senator, his position/office having been assumed by City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon. Sometime in 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the Provincial Attorney, Alfredo G. Baguia, to enter his appearance for the Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial Board in this case. On January 30, 1973, Alfredo G. Baguia, Provincial Attorney of the Province of Cebu, entered his appearance as additional counsel for the Province of Cebu and as counsel for Governor Osmundo Rama, ViceGovernor Salutario Fernandez and Board Members Leonardo Enad, Guillermo Legazpi, and Rizalina Migallos. On January 31, 1973, Atty. Baguia filed a complaint in intervention stating that intervenors Province of Cebu and Provincial Board of Cebu were joining or uniting with original plaintiff, former Governor of Cebu, Rene Espina. They adopted his causes of action, claims, and position stated in the original complaint filed before the court on August 6, 1965. On June 25, 1974, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of Cebu and the city of Cebu. On July 15, 1974, the court approved the compromise agreement and a decision was rendered on its basis. On December 4, 1974, the court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the decision dated July 15, 1974, to wit: 1. Ordering the City of Cebu to return and deliver to the Province of Cebu all the lots enumerated in the second paragraph hereof; 2. Ordering the Province of Cebu to pay the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) to the City of Cebu for and in consideration of the return by the latter to the former of the aforesaid lots; 3. Declaring the retention by the City of Cebu of the eleven (11) lots mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the compromise agreement, namely, Lot Nos. 1141, 1261, 1268, 1269, 1272, 1273, 917, 646-A, 646A-4-0 and 10107-C;

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4. Ordering the City of Cebu or the City Treasurer to turn over to the Province of Cebu the amount of P187948.93 mentioned in Annex "A" of the defendants manifestation dated October 21, 1974; 5. Declaring the City of Cebu and an its present and past officers completely free from liabilities to third persons in connection with the aforementioned lots, which liabilities if any, shall be assumed by the Province of Cebu; 6. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu to cancel the certification of titles in the name of the City of Cebu covering the lots enumerated in the second paragraph of this order and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the name of the Province of Cebu. For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed through counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated April 14, 1975, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through counsel, its opposition dated April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province. A rejoinder to this opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge Alfredo Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30, 1979, in favor of private respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00. Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In the case of private respondent, however, he appealed only from that portion of the decision which fixed his attorney's fees at P30,000.00 instead of at 30% of the value of the properties involved in the litigation as stated in his original claim On October 18, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court that the private respondent is entitled to recover attorney's fees but fixing the amount of such fees at 5% of the market value of the properties involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of the claim in 1975. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, except for the aforementioned modification that the compensation for the services rendered by the Claimant Atty. Pablo P. Garcia is fixed at five percent (5%) of the total fair market value of the lots in question, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the fixing of his attorney's fees at 5% instead of 30% of the value of the properties in litigations as prayed for in his claims. However, the private respondent later withdrew his petition in G.R. No. 72818 with the following explanation: That after a long and serious reflection and reassessment of his position and intended course of action and, after seeking the views of his friends, petitioner has come to the definite conclusion that prosecuting his appeal would only result in further delay in the final disposition of his claim (it has been pending for the last 10 years 4 in the CFI and 6 in the Court of Appeals, later Intermediate Appellate Court) and that it would be more prudent and practicable to accept in full the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court. Hence, only the petition of the Province of Cebu is pending before this Court. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals(108 SCRA 728). Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality, or municipal district

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thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality, or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it (De Guia v. The Auditor General 44 SCRA 169; Municipality of Bocaue, et. al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932) as when he represents the province against a municipality. The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its court cases by a government lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the local government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the interests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's interests, and that, as civil service employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty (See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra). However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity, as well as the exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar, require a departure from the established rule. The petitioner anchors its opposition to private respondent's claim for compensation on the grounds that the employment of claimant as counsel for the Province of Cebu by then Governor Rene Espina was unauthorized and violative of Section 1681 to 1683 in relation to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code and that the claim for attorney's fees is beyond the purview of Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It is argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial Board, through a board resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P. Garcia as counsel of the Province of Cebu. Admittedly, this is so. However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that the rule cannot be applied. The Provincial Board would never have given such authorization. The decision of the respondent court elucidates the matter thus: ... The provisions of Sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplate a normal situation where the adverse party of the province is a third person as in the case of Enriquez v. Auditor General, 107 Phil 932. In the present case, the controversy involved an intramural fight between the Provincial Governor on one hand and the members of the Provincial Board on the other hand. Obviously it is unthinkable for the Provincial Board to adopt a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ Atty. Garcia to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for the purpose of filing and prosecuting a case against the members to the same Provincial Board According to the claimant Atty. Garcia, how can Governor Espina be expected to secure authority from the Provincial Board to employ claimant as counsel for the Province of Cebu when the very officials from whom authority is to be sought are the same officials to be sued, It is simply impossible that the Vice-Governor and the members of the Provincial Board would pass a resolution authorizing Governor Espina to hire a lawyer to file a suit against themselves. xxx xxx xxx

18
Under Section 2102 of the Revised Administrative Code it is the Provincial Board upon whom is vested the authority "to direct, in its discretion, the bringing or defense of civil suits on behalf of the Provincial Governor ___." Considering that the members of the Provincial Board are the very ones involved in this case, they cannot be expected to directed the Provincial Fiscal the filing of the suit on behalf of the provincial government against themselves. Moreover, as argued by the claimant, even if the Provincial Fiscal should side with the Governor in the bringing of this suit, the Provincial Board whose members are made defendants in this case, can simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case or by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation. ... Consequently, there could have been no occasion for the exercise by the Provincial Fiscal of his powers and duties since the members of the Provincial Board would not have directed him to file a suit against them. A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf of the Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the very members of the body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A strict application of the provisions of the Revise Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below of redress for a valid grievance. The provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of special counsel becomes an impossibility. The decision of the respondent court is grounded in equity a correction applied to law, where on account of the general comprehensiveness of the law, particular exceptions not being provided against, something is wanting to render it perfect. It is also argued that the employment of claimant was violative of sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code because the Provincial Fiscal who was the only competent official to file this case was not disqualified to act for the Province of Cebu. Respondent counsel's representation of the Province of Cebu became necessary because of the Provincial Board's failure or refusal to direct the bringing of the action to recover the properties it had donated to the City of Cebu. The Board more effectively disqualified the Provincial Fiscal from representing the Province of Cebu when it directed the Fiscal to appear for its members in Civil Case No. R-8669 filed by Atty. Garcia, and others, to defend its actuation in passing and approving Provincial Board Resolution No. 186. The answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board members filed in Civil Case No. R-8669; (Exhibit "K") upholds the validity and legality of the donation. How then could the Provincial Fiscal represent the Province of Cebu in the suit to recover the properties in question? How could Governor Espina be represented by the Provincial Fiscal or seek authorization from the Provincial Board to employ special counsel? Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility). Neither could a prosecutor be designated by the Department of Justice. Malacaang had already approved the questioned donation
lwphl@i t

Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule that an attorney cannot recover his fees from one who did not employ him or authorize his employment, is subject to its own exception. Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. (Republic v. Philippine Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an attorney is employed by an unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan Lua v. O' Brien, 55 Phil. 53). The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officials in allowing respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to believe his services were still necessary. We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent

19
of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193): The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation specified in the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure of recovery. The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability. The trial court discussed the services of respondent Garcia as follows: ... Thus because of his effort in the filing of this case and in securing the issuance of the injunction preventing the City of Cebu and Sergio Osmea, Jr., from selling or disposing the lots to third parties, on the part of the members of the Provincial Board from extending the date of the automatic reversion beyond August 15, 1965, on the part of the Register of Deeds from effecting the transfer of title of any of the donated lots to any vendee or transferee, the disposition of these lots by the City of Cebu to third parties was frustrated and thus: saved these lots for their eventual recovery by the province of Cebu. Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and Mayor Osmea. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer, Still Atty. Garcia is entitled to compensation. To deny private respondent compensation for his professional services would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329). We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and conclude that 30% or even 5% of properties already worth (P120,000,000.00) in 1979 as compensation for the private respondent's services is simply out of the question. The case handled by Atty. Garcia was decided on the basis of a compromise agreement where he no longer participated. The decision was rendered after pre-trial and without any hearing on the merits. The factual findings and applicable law in this petition are accurately discussed in the exhaustive and well-written Order of then Trial Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice Alfredo Marigomen We agree with his determination of reasonable fees for the private lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. The trial court fixed the compensation at P30,000.00 and ordered reimbursement of actual expenses in the amount of P289.43. The petitioner alleges that although they do not deny Atty. Garcia's services for Governor Espina (who ceased to be such Governor of Cebu on September 13, 1969) and the original plaintiffs in the case, "it cannot be said with candor and fairness that were it not for his services the lots would have already been lost to the province forever, because the donation itself he was trying to enjoin and annul in said case was subject to a reversion clause under which lots remaining undisposed of by the City as of August 15, 1965 automatically reverted to the province and only about 17 lots were disposed of by August 15, 1965." We quote respondent counsel's comment with approval: xxx xxx xxx While it is true that the donation was subject to a reversion clause, the same clause gave the Provincial Board the discretion to extend the period of reversion beyond August 15, 1965 (see paragraph 3 of donation). With the known predisposition of the majority of the members of the Provincial Board, there would have been no impediment to the extension of the reversion date to beyond August 15, 1965. Once the date of reversion is extended, the disposition of an the donated lots would be only a matter of course.

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WHEREFORE, the questioned October 18, 1985 decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside. The Order of the Trial Court dated May 30, 1979 is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Alampay, Paras and Padilla JJ., concur. Bidin J., took no part. under Section 10, paragraph (P) (2) of said municipal tax ordinance from 1975 to 1984, inclusive, in the amount of P12,120.00, plus such amount of the same fee as may accrue until final determination of the case; (4) sanitary inspection fee in the amount of P1,010.00 for the period from 1975 to 1984, plus the amount of this fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; and (5) the costs of suit. On June 3, 1991, in G.R. No. 90776 this Court affirmed the aforesaid judgment, with the modification that business taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC because the same have prescribed, and that storage fees are not also to be paid by PPC since the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by the municipality and, therefore, cannot be the bases of a charge for service by the municipality. This judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution. On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal* for the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended. On October 21, 1991, defendant corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. Accordingly, on October 31, 1991 the court below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment in question had already been satisfied. Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order of October 31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff municipality amounted to P24,176,599.00, while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor could not waive the balance which represents the taxes due under the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million. On

MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994 MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents. REGALADO, J.: Petitioner questions and seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 27504 dated March 31, 1992, dismissing the petition for having been filed by a private counsel, as well as its succeeding resolution dated June 9, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The records show that on March 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of plaintiff, now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against defendant, now herein private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC, for short), ordering therein defendant to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983, inclusive, plus such amount of tax as may accrue until final determination of the case; (2) storage permit fee in the amount of P3,321,730.00 due from the defendant under Section 10, paragraph Z(13) (b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance for the period from 1975 to 1986, inclusive, plus the amount of said fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; (3) mayor's permit fee due from the defendant

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January 28,1992, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality, filed a petition for certiorari with us, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and was docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 27504. On March 2, 1992, respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. Consequently, on March 31, 1992 respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of June 9, 1992. Petitioner is once again before us with the following assignment of errors: 1. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to consider private respondent's new issue raised for the first time on appeal, as it could no longer be considered on appeal, because it was never been (sic) raised in the court below. 2. It is an error for the Court of Appeals in dismissing (sic) the instant petition with alternative remedy of filing similar petition as it is a departure from established jurisprudence.
3. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the filing of the instant petition by the private counsel is in violation of law and jurisprudence.

where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. ^^^ The Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292) provides: Sec. 9. Provincial/City Prosecution Offices. The Provincial and City Fiscal's Office established in each of the provinces and cities pursuant to law, is retained and renamed Provincial/City Prosecution Office. It shall be headed by a Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor, as the case may be, assisted by such number of Assistant Provincial/City Prosecutors as fixed and/or authorized by law. The position titles of Provincial and City Fiscal and of Assistant Provincial and City Fiscal are hereby abolished. All provincial/city prosecution offices shall continue to discharge their functions under existing law. All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.

We find the present petition devoid of merit. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their

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lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel, Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality. The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had been duly executed. Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim". A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law and under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings, and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. Even the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement. The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition, considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative, is not only conjectural but without factual basis. Contrary to his pretensions, there is presently a manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the "Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned. WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.