Development of Abhidharma Theory of Citta and Caitasika

DEVELOPMENT OF ABHIDHARMA THEORY OF CITTA AND CAITASIKA
BSTC6039 ESSAY 2 M B ORSBORN ( )

ID# 2006936639
2006/11/7
Able to wander afar, wandering alone, Incorporeal, asleep in the cave One who regulates and tames this mind, Will be freed from much fear and terror. Dhammapada, III, 37
Development of Abhidharma Theory of Citta and Caitasika
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3 MIND AND ITS ROLE IN BUDDHISM: .................................................................................... 3 CITTA AND CAITASIKA: ........................................................................................................... 3 SARVSTIVDA: ...................................................................................................................... 4 ABHIDHARMA: ........................................................................................................................ 5 A BRIEF SURVEY OF SARVSTIVDA ABHIDHARMA LITERATURE .............. 7 THE TEXTS OF THE SARVSTIVDA ABHIDHARMA:................................................................ 7 SUMMARY OF THEIR CONTENTS:............................................................................................ 8 VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA IN EARLY BUDDHISM .......................................... 10 THREE TERMS FOR MIND: .................................................................................................. 10 CITTA MIND:...................................................................................................................... 12 MANAS MENTALITY:.......................................................................................................... 13 VIJNA CONSCIOUSNESS: ................................................................................................ 14 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 15 VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA IN THE ABHIDHARMA......................................... 16 DISTINCTIONS IN THE THREE ................................................................................................ 16 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 24 VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA IN THE KOA AND MANUALS.......................... 26 ONE OR THREE?.................................................................................................................... 26 CLASSIFICATION:................................................................................................................... 28 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 31 CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN EARLY BUDDHISM....................................................... 32 DEPENDENT ORIGINATION OF MIND: .................................................................................. 32 SPECIFIC CAITASIKA:............................................................................................................. 33 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 36 CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN THE ABHIDHARMA ..................................................... 37 CLASSIFICATION OF MIND AND MENTAL FACTORS: ............................................................ 37 PROOFS BY REASON:............................................................................................................. 40 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 43
CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN THE KOA AND MANUALS ...................................... 45 SIMULTANEITY AND CONJOINING:........................................................................................ 45 CAUSALITY AND ARISING: .................................................................................................... 47 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 52 VEDAN, SAJ AND SASKRA: .......................................................................... 54 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: ................................................................................................... 54 VEDAN SENSATION:......................................................................................................... 54 SAJ PERCEPTION:........................................................................................................ 62 ASAJ-SAMPATTI IDEATIONLESS ATTAINMENT: ........................................................ 63 SASKRA CONDITIONINGS:............................................................................................. 64 SUMMARY: ............................................................................................................................ 67 CONCLUSIONS:.................................................................................................................. 69 VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA ............................................................................................... 69 CITTA AND CAITASIKA: ......................................................................................................... 69 VEDAN, SAJ AND SASKRA: ..................................................................................... 71 ABHIDHARMA THEORY OF MIND: ........................................................................................ 72 ABHIDHARMA IN THE BROADER BUDDHIST CONTEXT:........................................................ 72 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 73 PRIMARY SOURCES TRIPIAKA: ......................................................................................... 73 SECONDARY SOURCES: ......................................................................................................... 74
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an investigation of the development of the theory of citta (mind) and caitasika (mental factors) throughout the Abhidharma literature of the Sarvstivda and associated schools. This includes a study of the use of the notion of citta, as well as other related terms such as manas and vijna, and also the different categories and ways of understanding the various caitasika, from the stra literature through to the later Abhidharma texts. This study will examine not only the use of such terms and concepts, but also touch upon how their development related to other theories propounded by the Sarvstivda. Thus, a general understanding of the Sarvstivda Abhidharma theory of citta and caitasika, both in explaining key concepts in early Buddhism, and also in defence of their own developed theories from the objections of others, shall be obtained.
Mind and Its Role in Buddhism:

It is fair to state that from the earliest records of the Buddhas teachings, up to modern developments and presentations of Buddhism, the notion of citta is a very important aspect of Buddhist theory. The word citta is itself based on cit to think, and there are two other terms, manas (thought) and vijna (consciousness), which are either regarded as synonyms or at least over-lapping in meaning. Regards Buddhist doctrine, a cursory look at the Four rya Truths will reveal that the red thread running through them all is dukha (suffering or dissatisfactoriness), which itself is explained as a subjective mental experience, its origin, its cessation and the path to that cessation. The Eightfold rya Path contains five limbs, (excluding only Right Speech, Right Action and Right Livelihood), that are all basically mental in nature. Yet even the remaining three limbs have their roots within the mental sphere. Thus, even from the outset of Right View and Right Intention, a correct and thorough understanding of mind, and all that it entails, is essential for correct cultivation and realization of the path and fruits of the Buddhas dispensation.
Citta and Caitasika:

Citta and its activities are very complex phenomena. In order to clarify and systematize the understanding of citta and its workings, the notion of caitasika was developed. Sourced in the stras, yet with original development through analysis and reasoning, the Sarvstivda found it necessary to spend much time in the further elucidation of not only citta itself, but also of those dharma that were considered functions, aspects, and elements of citta, known as caitasika. The word caitasika is derived from the same root cit + ika, making it an adjectival form, ie. mental. This too, became an important aspect, or even proof, of many other doctrines that the Sarvstivda school developed. These include perception, simultaneous arising and 3
conditionality, attainment of the holy path, the status of holy persons, and so forth. Here, some attention will be given to the relationship, interaction and status of both citta and the various caitasika.
Sarvstivda:
Sarvstivda is a Sanskrit term, meaning literally those who teach that that all exists. Although there is some dispute over how the word sarvstivda is to be analyzed, 1 the general consensus is that it is made of three parts: sarvstivda = sarva all / every + asti exist + vda speak / theory. This equates perfectly with the Chinese term, shuo1yi1qie4you3 bu4, literally the sect that speaks of the existence of everything, as translated by Xuanzang and others. As such, it is a thesis that became the name of this particular school. This thesis can be described as the existence of all dharma in the past, present and future. The Abhidharma Koa-bhya, a somewhat later work, defines this as: He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods [past, present and future] is held to be a Sarvstivdin. 2 Although the Sarvstivda themselves claim that their teaching of all exists is a direct teaching of the Buddha himself, as shown by their attributing the earliest Abhidharma texts to direct disciples of the Buddha, the school in its entirety is more rightly to be considered as part of the age of scholastic Buddhism. By this, it is meant the period of composition of various commentarial works on the early Buddhist canon. During this scholastic period, they take their name in contradistinction to the Vaibhajyavda school those who teach of distinction (vibhajya) ie. those who make a distinction as to which dharma do and do not exist, in the past, present and future. The Koa-bhya states this difference as: Those who affirm the existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are regarded as Vibhajyavdins; [they do not belong to the Sarvstivdin School]. 3 Although the various Sarvstivdins were united with regards to their central thesis of sarvsti, there were different theories on how this was actually to be explained and
1 2
See Willemen, Dessein & Cox: Sarvstivda Buddhist Scholasticism, (Brill, 1998). pg. 16. de la Vallee Poussin, Pruden: Abhidharma-koa-bhym, (Asian Humanities Press, 1988). Pg. 807, verses 25c-d. Ibid, pg. 807.
understood. There were also many other sub-theories and issues, all inextricably related, that different Sarvstivda leaders and scholars, debated and discussed with earnest intent. The Koa-bhya describes the four main sarvsti theses: 25d. There are four types of Sarvstivdins accordingly as they teach a difference in existence (bhvnyathtva), a difference in characteristic (lakanyathtva), a difference in condition (avasthnyathtva), and mutual difference (anyonyathtva). 4 The Bhya elucidates each in further detail. Later Sarvstivda takes a combination of the first and third theses as its model. It was on this basis, that the schools various doctrines were defended in the face of growing internal and external criticism.
Abhidharma:
The theories and doctrines of the Sarvstivda were presented in their Abhidharma literature. This is a separate tradition from the Pli Abhidhamma tradition, though both have seven key texts. From studies of those surviving texts, they appear to have been written in Sanskrit. However, the most complete source for the study of this Abhidharma literature at present is those texts that were translated into Chinese. The majority were translated by Xuanzang, and this provides a high degree in uniformity of translational terms and phrases. The term abhidharma has many meanings and connotations, though two basic meanings are predominant: The first is that of clear, decisive discernment and ascertainment. The second that of being direct, face to face to dharmas and nirva in particular: 5 A dharma is that which is able to sustain its own characteristic. If this dharma is able to face towards, or able to have direct observation of the paramartha-dharma, that is nirva, the characteristic of dharma, and realization of the Four rya Truths this is known as abhidharma. 6 A dharmas own characteristic (Skt: svalakana) is that by which a dharma is cognized or known. It is through this that the existence of all dharmas is thus empirically
4 5
Ibid, pg. 808. Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2002). pg. 10. Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0001b09~b11
verifiable, via the medium of the mind. 7 The mind is thus the window or lens upon the world, through which everything is known. This own characteristic is also synonymous with own nature (Skt: svabhva), in that apart from the characteristics and aspects of a dharma which appear to, and are cognizable by mind, there is no other nature or aspect of that same dharma that is knowable. To have a characteristic or nature, is to exist. One could posit other natures to a particular dharma, but as far as these are beyond the scope of cognition, they are irrelevant to the bhidhrmika. That own characteristic is own nature, and thus existence, is also accepted by most Buddhist schools too, though the Madhyamika may argue that a dharma has an appearance (characteristic) that can be cognized, but ultimately no own nature or existence. This does not rule out inductive or deductive knowledge entirely, though the Sarvstivda does attempt to prove a theory of direct perception. In general, the Sarvstivda can be considered as bhidhrmikas, ie. Those who uphold the Abhidharma as the criteria for understanding the stras, and thus the Buddha Dharma. This idea of the Abhidharma being a collaboration of the words of the Buddha is well expressed by: Without the exposition of the abhidharma, the pupil is unable to examine the dharma-s. however, it was spoken by the Fortunate One in a scattered manner. The Venerable Ktyyanputra and others, having collect it, established it [as the abhidharma] just as the Venerable Dharmatrta made the Udna-varga [by collecting the scattered sayings of the Buddha]. 8 As the Sarvstivda and their Abhidharma developed, the reliance of Abhidharma over stra became an important issue. There were, however, several important leaders of the Sarvstivda, who relied more on the stras. It was from these leaders, that various other schools developed from within the Sarvstivda itself. Most notable are the Dntika (from dr to point out the users of similes) and Sautrntika (from stra those who rely on stra) movements. The actual amount of the Abhidharma literature of the Sarvstivda school is quite staggering in size. Studies of these texts in English have barely scratched the surface at present. Although this paper makes an attempt to investigate these texts and their doctrines with as much reference to the Chinese translations as possible, it is recognized that a huge amount of material is left uncovered. Anything that is presented in this paper is thus subject to further investigation, research and review.
Note however, that this empiricism is not the empiricism of various modern philosophical traditions or science, as it includes accepts as valid forms of higher knowledge not accepted by the latter. Quoted from Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2002.) pg. 6.
A BRIEF SURVEY OF SARVSTIVDA ABHIDHARMA LITERATURE

There are many texts in the Sarvstivda Abhidharma corpus, which in their entirety were written over the course of many centuries. The reader is recommended to refer my first essay Sarvstivda Abhidharma for a more complete survey of the individual texts, their contents and basic doctrinal positions.
The Texts of the Sarvstivda Abhidharma:

In general, the texts involved can be divided into several groups according to time period and format: Treatises of the earliest period: 1. Abhidharma Dharma-skandha-stra 2. Abhidharma Sagti-paryya-stra 3. Abhidharma Prajapti-stra These three texts are really just arrangements of selected parts from the stras themselves, rather than original texts. Later, more developed texts: 4. Abhidharma Jnaprasthna-stra 5. Abhidharma Vijnakya-stra 6. Abhidharma Prakaraapda-stra 7. Abhidharma Dhtukya-stra This group of four texts starts the more systematic presentation of the Sarvstivda school and its doctrines. These first two groups, comprise the seven canonical treatises of the Srvastivda Abhidharma, and are together known as the body the Jnaprasthna, and its six legs the remaining six. The Vibh compendia: There are several larger texts which are intended to be summary commentaries on the core seven Abhidharma works. This includes the very important Mahvibh, the summary of the above seven, and key text for the orthodox Vaibhika Sarvstivda, based in Kamr.. Sarvstivda manuals: 1. The Abhidharma Hdaya manuals 2. The Abhidharma Koa and Bhya 3. The Vibhika responses to these The various systematized and shorter texts, including the Hdaya heart or essence manuals, the very popular but somewhat controversial Koa and Bhya by Vasubandhu, with its oft-times Sautrntika views, and the repudiations thereof by the Vaibhikas, in particular the crya Saghabhadra. 7
Summary of Their Contents:

From this vast array of texts, one can begin to see the complexity of the Sarvstivda as an entire movement within Buddhism, from the early to medieval periods. Closer examination of each text, in terms of its own contents, and relation to the other texts, is required, lest gross generalizations blur correct understanding of the reasons and implications of the movement as a whole. Sarvstivda is not a system that sprouted fully formed into existence, like Athena from Zeus brow, but is rather a large prgressively developed system, with many points of departure and even internal dissention. The first Abhidharma texts followed formats similar to the riputra Abhidharma, an ancient root-text that can neither be considered exclusively Sarvstivda nor Vibhajyavda. This, along with the Sagti-pariyya and Dhtu-skandha-pda, were rehearsals of key teachings from the stras. These teachings were arranged either by number, or by their place within the practice of the Buddhist path to liberation. Following these are texts which begin to arrange by dharma type, and give further categorization of dharma. Beginnings of different views as to these appear, as do doctrines regarding the existence of dharma in past, present and future; the pudgala; and whether caitasika and citta-viprayukta dharma are distinct entities or not. The Sarvstivda appears as a loose group based on the common acceptance of the theory of sarvsti all [dharma] exist [in past, present and future], as opposed to vibhajja discrminating [what dharma exist and do not exist]. Abhidharma becomes the authority for understanding the Buddhas Dharma, as a means of explicating the Buddhas teachings which were strewn throughout the stras. The first seven texts, the body and the six legs are the Sarvstivda Abhidharma per se. Larger texts developed, culminating in the various Vibha compendia. These contained all the various Sarvstivda doctrines within the seven Abhidharma texts, and formed the basis of Sarvstivda orthodoxy, the Kmri Vaibhika. Methods by logical argument and reasoning become more formalized, and more widely used, as the school introduced more ideas not seen in the stras to establish and prove their notions of sarvsti, momentariness, simultaneous conditionality, and the like. Well presented smaller texts also begin to appear at this time, outside the main Kmr center, refuting some of the orthodox positions, or at least more liberal and less dogmatic in perspective. These smaller texts involve less polemical discussion and rhetoric, and return to the use of Abhidharma as a guide for spiritual praxis. They can be seen as having a format conforming to the Four rya Truths, albeit implicitly. The first two chapters on dhtu and saskra correspond to suffering, the next two chapters on karma and sajoyana correspond to the oigin, the chapters on the ryas and jna are cssation, the two chapters on samdhi and stra constitute the 8
Path, with the miscellany and so forth covering other topics. The three Hdaya texts, as well as the Koa and those commentaries on it, follow this format in general. Their key points are presented in concise verse form, followed by a brief commentary and explanation, usually in a rhetorical question and answer style. The most acclaimed of these shorter, liberal works was Vasubandhus Abhidharma Koa (treasury) and subsequent Bhya (commentary). It drew criticism from the Vaibhika orthodoxy, on the grounds of misrepresenting the Sarvstivda viewpoint, and for upholding Sautrntika views. As such, we see it as an important text for its style and format, its comprehensive yet concise coverage of key points, and as symbolic of the Sautrntika emerging as an independent system of though from within the Sarvstivda orthodoxy. Enduring criticism, the Koa and Bhya has remained a key text during a very important and exciting time for the development of Buddhist thought, for the Sarvstivda and other schools besides. In the two main northern Buddhist traditions, the Chinese and Tibetan, it was and still is, considered as the the presentation of non-Mahyna doctrines, par excellence.
VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA IN EARLY BUDDHISM

With a general understanding of the historical and doctrinal development of the various Abhidharma texts, we can now systematically investigate how they deal with the issue of mind, in a textual manner. As such, we shall begin from early Buddhism, with the stras themselves. One may question the use of the Pli canon here, as opposed a Sanskrit canon, from which the Sarvstivda school developed. This is certainly a valid question. However, in the light of there being little development and translation in the English language regards those remnants of the Sanskrit gamas that remain in the present day, yet a wide range of complete and accurate English translations from the Pli Nikyas, the author has chosen to cite the Pli sources in this case. As per the Sanskrit gamas, likewise the argument for use of the Chinese or Tibetan canons. The Buddha did not undertake his teaching of the Dharma through giving defintions of words, but rather, taught in accordance with the given situation. The result of such pragmatic pedagogy is a wide range of teachings, covering various different aspects of any given topic. However, for subsequent researchers, particularly those of favouring a philological methodology, the lack of rigid defintions can seemingly pose problems. How are we to understand the words that the Buddha used? Are those words of like meaning to be understood as synonymous? Different aspects of the same phenomena? Or even different phenomena? How often is the same term or word used used with a quite different meaning, as dictated by the circumstances of the particular teaching? One needs to keep in the mind the second of the four reliances rely on the meaning, do not rely on the words [alone].
Three Terms for Mind:

Let us first have a brief look at some of the terms and words used for mind in the suttas from the Pli canon, along with any early definitions that were given:
DN 1: Brahmajla Sutta:
2.13. [Wrong view #8] But what is called thought, or mind or consciousness, that is a self that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, the same for ever and ever! 9
Maurice Walshe: Brahmajla Sutta, in The Long Discourses of the Buddha. (Wisdom Publications, 1995). pg. 78.
10
Translators note: thought citta: more or less synonymous with mano mind, but often used much like heart in English (to know in ones heart, etc.) The Brahmajla Sutta is the first sutta in the five Pli Nikyas, and contains the first reference to mind. As this stra defines Right View, it can be regarded as exercising a position of authority as to what is, and what is not, the Dharma. We see here the use of three terms: 1. citta translated as thought; 2. mano translated as mind; and 3. vina (Skt: vijna) translated as consciousness. Although the text is clear in indicating that grasping to this is indeed a wrong view, it is not totally explicit as to whether these three terms are three different names for the same thing, or individual names for three different things, though the former seems more probable. We can at least, establish that citta, manas and vijna are neither permanent, nor stable, nor eternal, nor not subject to change. Also, that their being discussed together in such a manner, indicates a certain degree of proximity in meaning, if they are in fact different entities. Continuing further investigation of these three terms, we find:
SN II: Nidnavagga, Nidnasayutta, VII:

But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind and mentality and consciousness the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it. For what reason? Because for a long time this has been held to by him, appropriated, and grasped thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self. 10 Translators Note: Spk says these are all names for the mind base (manyatana). The as to that which is called seems a fair indication of citta, manas and vijna being considered as synonymous, a singular that and it for three different names. This is also supported by the commentary (Spk), though manas is the key term here rather than citta. We must note that this is a different commentarial tradition to that used by the Sanskrit bhidhrmikas however, and thus not pay it undue attention. There are also many other instances where the words citta, manas and vijna are used individually in the Nikyas. We shall thus focus on those instances which provide some kind of definition, or further elucidation, on their meaning.
10
Bhikkhu Bodhi: Nidnavagga, Nidnasayutta, in The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. (Wisdom Publications, 2000). pg. 595.
11
Citta Mind:
First we shall look at the use of the word citta. Apart from citta as a cognizer, it obviously has other functions besides this. Following are two references which shed some light on the relation between citta itself, modes or aspects of citta, and afflicting mental states, in the context of mental development through mindfulness (sati):
MN 10: Satipahna Sutta:

34. And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide contemplating mind as mind? Here a bhikkhu understands mind affected by lust as mind affected by lust, and mind unaffected by lust as unaffected by lust, hate delusion contracted mind exalted mind surpassed mind concentrated mind liberated mind 11 Translators note: Mind (citta) as an object of contemplation refers to the general state and level of consciousness. Since consciousness itself, in its own nature, ist he bare knowing or cognizing of an object, the quality of any state of mind is determined by its associated mental factors, such as lust, hate, and delusion or their opposites, as mentioned by the sutta. The sutta states that various afflictions affect citta, which implies that they are not citta per se. On the other hand, that citta itself may be contracted, exalted, surpassed, concentrated and / or liberated, implies that these states are aspects of citta itself. Bhikkhu Bodhis comments that the quality of any state of mind is also very relevant citta is bare cognition, mental factors supply the psychic content. Yet, this too is influenced by his use of Theravda commentarial and Abhidhamma material. Furthermore:
MN 78: Samaamaik Sutta:

What mind? Though mind is multiple, varied, and of different aspects, there is mind affected by lust, by hate, and by delusion. 12 This statement also supports the above distinction between aspects and other factors, although the aspect-states and afflictions are reversed in order of presentation. We
11
12
Bhikku amoli and Bhikku Bodhi: Satipahna Sutta, The Foundations of Mindfulness, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikya, (Wisdom Publications, 2001). pg. 150. Ibid, Samaamaik Sutta, Samaamaikputta. pg. 650.
12
shall see later on, how the etymological idea of citta being varied is used by the bhidhrmikas, as the term citrena or variegated, also has the same root of cit.
Manas Mentality:
If citta is thus used as mind in general, what is the role of manas, also often translated as mind or mentality? Etymologically, manas can be understood as thought, as mentioned above. This is not the only explanation however, and more clarification is needed to understand how it differs, if at all, from mind. We see its appearance as the mental faculty here:
MN 28: Mahhatthipadopama Sutta:

37. If, friends, internally the mind is intact but no external mind-objects come into its range, and there is no corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. If internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range, but there is no corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. But when internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range and there is the corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. 13 Translators Note: I. MA identifies mind (mano) in this passage with the life continuum consciousness (bhavangacitta). II. MA illustrates this case by the minds preoccupation with a familiar object when it does not notice the familiar details of that object. The corresponding class of consciousness here is mind-consciousness (manovina), which takes non-sensuous objects as its sphere of cognition. Setting aside the Theravda Abhidhamma idea of mano as bhavangacitta, we see Bhikkhu Bodhis translation of manas as mind (which is also his usual translation of citta), and how this indicates manas as the mental faculty or organ. Hence, when the corresponding sense object, dharma, is in range, mano-vijna arises. We shall see how this definition of manas as the sense organ becomes formalized during the Abhidharma period. This same passage is also discussed later with regards the dependent origination of mano-vijna.
13
Ibid, Mahhatthipadopama Sutta, The Simile of the Elephants Footprint (Greater). pg. 284
13
Vijna Consciousness:
Of the three terms viewed individually, vijna appears to be the most commonly used within the stras. Etymologically, the word vijna is derived from vi + j, distinct cognition. In this way, it is etymologically more closely related to other forms of knowledge, such as praj (understanding or knowledge) or jna (gnosis), which are the means and aims of the spiritual path. We see in the stras:
MN 43: Mahavedalla Sutta:

Consciousness, consciousness is said. With reference to what consciousness said? is
It cognizes, it cognizes, friend; that is why consciousness is said. What does it cognize? It cognizes: [This is] pleasant; it cognizes: [This is] painful; it cognizes: [This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It cognizes, it cognizes, friend; that is why consciousness is said. Wisdom and consciousness, friend are these states conjoined or disjoined? And is it possible to to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them? Wisdom and consciousness, friend these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them. For what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands 14 Here we have a clear definition of vijna: that which cognizes. In particular, it is said to cognize the three types of vedan. We shall investigate this relation between vijna and vedan later, in the section on citta and caitasika. It is also stated that it is conjoined with wisdom (praj), indicating the shared root of j (to know). If we view this statement in the light of the comments regarding citta above, wherein citta is affected by delusion, one could interpolate that although qualities such as either delusion or knowledge, and so forth, are not mind per se, they affect mind, and are inseparable from it. One cannot make a clear delineation of the bounds of either. This does not prevent the later bhidhrmikas from considering the two as having distinct characteristics however, and thus being two distinct dharmas. Another stra indicates the range of such a definition of vijna as one of the skandhas (aggregates):
14
Ibid, Mahvedalla Sutta, The Greater Series of Questions and Answers. pg. 388.
14
MN 109: Maha-punnama Sutta:

Bhikkhu, any kind of material form whatever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near this is the material form aggregate. Any kind of feeling whatever Any kind of perception whatever Any kind of formations whatever Any kind of consciousness whatever 15 This passage clearly indicates that as far as the definition of any skandha are concerned, past, present and future instances are all included. This applies to the first four skandhas, as much as to vijna-skandha. Such statements becomes particularly important when dealing with the sarvsti thesis, ie. the existence of all dharma in the past, present and future. The Sarvstivda consider is as the Buddhas own declaration that past and future dharmas, in particular, are still existents.
Summary:
The original suttas define mind as that which cognizes, that which knows. Often, the terms citta, mano and vijna are used as synonymous in this regard. They are neither permanent, nor self, and as such, should not be grasped at. However, the three terms are also used within their own, specific contexts: 1. Citta as mind, which may take on different and multiple aspects or modes, as well as being affected by mental states, such as the defilements. 2. Manas as the mental faculty, which on contact with mental objects, is a condition for the arising of mano-vijna. The sense faculty of manas is distinct from the other five sense faculties, in that it itself, as well as its objects, are non-physical in nature. No specific physical location is thus given for this manas faculty in the stras. 3. Vijna as cognition with regards to any sense object, be it external or internal. It is conjoined with wisdom (discerning knowledge of an object), and is inseparable from it. The totality of these states, whether past, present or future, is considered the skandha of vijna. This is sixfold, based upon the respective sense base of the arisen vijna. The Buddha thus uses specific terms and words in a variety of senses, in a variety of ways and contexts. It is thus important to understand how any given term is used in its own context. Overlooking the boundaries of terms and their meanings, may not only obscure understanding, but may also lead to seeming contradictions between specific instances, where no contradictions actually are present.
15
Ibid, Mahpuama Sutta, The Greater Discourse on the Full-Moon Night. pg. 888.
15
VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA IN THE ABHIDHARMA

As stated in the survey above, the early Abhidharma works are mainly confined to systematic arrangement of the stras, rather than any new doctrines or theses. As such, they are also an important source for the Buddhas own statements on citta, manas and vijna, that may have been overlooked previously, or statements included wihin the (Sarvstivda) Sanskrit gamas, that have since been lost.
Distinctions in the Three

Prakaraa stra:
What is citta? It is said to be citta, manas and vijna. What is this? It is the six-fold vijna-ka, which is eye vijna, ear vijna, nose vijna, tongue vijna, body vijna and mano-vijna. 16 Here we see the term citta being used to include all three terms, and defined as six-fold, one for each sense organ. All are subsumed within vijna. We see elsewhere in this text, that citta, manas and vijna is only (merely?) citta. 17 By being both six-fold and a kya (body, group, or collection, similar in meaning here to skandha or aggregate), there is the indication that it is not as much an entity, as a generic term for all that is involved in the process or action of cognition. Furthermore, as a faculty, five points are given:
Dharmaskandha stra:
What is known as the manas faculty? [1] It is, manas itself correctly knows dharmas and their co-existent factors. This is known as the manas faculty. [2] Moreover, manas itself predominates in developing mano-vijna, [which] itself correctly cognizes dharmas and their co-existent factors. This is known as the manas faculty. [3] Moreover, manas itself actually contacts dharmas and their co-existent factors. This is known as the manas faculty. [4] Moreover, manas itself correctly acts through dharmas and their activities (sabhga). In such a manner, all past, future and present manas are known as the manas faculty; [which is] also named the known, etc. the fully realized. 18
16 17 18
Abhidharma Prakaraa-pda: T26n1542_p0692b27~b29 Abhidharma Prakaraa-pda: T26n1542_p0736a18 Abhidharma Dharma-skandha: T26n1537_p0499b03~b08
16
There are four defintions here, given as the functions of manas: 1. knowing; 2. predominating; 3. contacting; and 4. acting. The first has been covered above. The second is more the definition of any faculty, and is not restricted to manas. It supports the view of manas as the mental faculty, mentioned previously. Thirdly, the character I have translated as contacting is ai4, literally obstruct or block. The sense here, as one of the six faculties towards its respective sense object, seems more likely to mean spara ( chu4), contact or striking against. I am rather unsure of the fourth, which seems to imply that the dharmas and their activities, are the activity of manas itself. Each of the four functions is with respect to dharmas which are both the objects of the mind, and also its activities or functions (sabhga). As such, it is interesting that the defintion of the manas faculty as including past, present and future, refers to passive objects, the known () and the realized () as names for manas, rather than active functions of the mental organ as a knower () and a realizer (). The fifth point is more detailed: [5] In addition to this, what [else]? It is said to be citta, mano and vijna. From the hells, through the antara-bhva (intermediate state), or that accomplished through wisdom (?): all names and appellations, description and designation, perception and ideation, conceptional projection, words and speech, are known as manas, are known as the manas-yatana, are known as mano-dhtu, are known as the manas faculty, are known as the path of names, and so forth etc., are known as this shore. Thus this manas faculty is subsumed within the internal yatanas. 19 Here, manas is said to include citta, mano and vijna, as referring to both actual mental objects and events, and also nominal designations and concepts, throughout all of the realms of existence. A broad definition of psychological phenomena indeed! These five points show that the Dharmaskandha includes manas as both 1. as including citta, mano and vijna; 2. mind and mental factors; and 3. as designated concepts. This is an important point to consider, when investigating later Abhidharma views regards whether certain dharmas are real entities with substance, or are merely conceptually designated events, especially the citta-viprayukta-dharmas (dharmas dis-associated with mind). From the above reference, it would appear that at this stage, the three terms are still being used interchangeably, with any one term including the other two. This is the Abhidharma technique of subsumption
19
Abhidharma Dharma-skandha: T26n1537_p0499b08~b12
17
(sagraha), wherein several terms are reduced to a single dharma entity, with a unique svabhva. 20 That the antara-bhva (intermediate state) is mentioned here is also noteworthy. This is a doctrine of the Sarvstivda that appeared early in most of their Abhidharma texts, and continued through the Mahyna in general, a theory that was rejected by the Theravda Abhidhamma. Also, given that all are in reference to this shore, ie. sasra, one wonders about the status of manas in a liberated rya saint. By the time of the later Abhidharma Mahvibha, we see a much more developed and systematic presentation of citta, manas and vijna. It includes reasoned argument, based on various qualities of other dharmas, in this case sound. All the various ways of distinguishing these three are presented together in this passage:
Mahvibha stra:
Although [each] sound is distinct, there is no difference in their substance. [1] Therefore, the stras state that the three citta, manas and vijna, are [just like] sound, [in that each individual sound] is distinct, yet there is no difference [in their substance]. [2] Furthermore, some claim that the three [dharmas] of citta, manas and vijna do have differences, which are: Difference in name, as there is a difference in the name citta, the name manas and the name vijna. [3] Furthermore, [that] there is a difference in temporality. Which is that the past is known as manas, the future is known as citta, and the present is known as vijna. [4] Furthermore, there is a difference in designation. Which is that citta is designated as [being] within the dhtus; manas is designated as [being] within the yatanas; and vijna is designated as [being] within the skandhas. [5] Furthermore, there is a difference in [etymological] meaning. Which is that citta has the meaning of gotra (lineage); manas has the meaning of entrance to arising; and vijna has the meaning of accumulating and aggregating. [6] Furthermore, there is a difference in activity. [a] Which is that wandering afar is the activity of citta. As a krik [from the 21 Dhammapada] states:
20
21
See Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004.) pg. 14. Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0371b02~b10
18
Able to wander afar, wandering alone, Incorporeal, asleep in the cave. One who regulates and tames this citta, [Will be] freed from much fear and terror. 22 [b] The aforementioned wandering is (also?) the activity of manas. another krik [from the Dhammapada] states: 23 All dharmas are lead forward by manas, Ruled by manas, guided by manas. Speech and action through defilement [or] purity of manas, [Bring] suffering and happiness, just as ones shadow follows one. 24 [c] Continuity of [re]birth is the activity of vijna. As a stra states: During entry to the mothers womb, if vijna is not present, the kalala (fertilized embryo) and so forth, can not be accomplished. Therefore, know that continuity of [re-]birth is the activity and function of vijna. [a] Moreover, variegation is the activity of citta. As the stras state: Bhikus, you should know that the destiny of animals is due to the variegation of the citta, with many various colors [of karma]. [b] Acting as a resort is the activity of manas. As the stras state: Bhikus, you should know that these five faculties each have their own activity, each have their own objects and sphere [of function]. The manas faculty is the overseer and receiver of their [respective] activities, objects and spheres. They resort to manas to perform [their] activities. [c] Discrimination and cognition is the function of vijna. As the stras state: Bhikus, you should know that vijna is able to discriminate and cognize many, various objects and events. [a] Moreover, to nourish and augment is the activity of citta. [b] To contemplate and weigh up is the activity of manas. [c] To discriminate is the activity of vijna. The Venerable Parva [also] says: [a] To nourish and augment, discriminate and separate is the activity of citta; [b] to contemplate and reflect is the activity of manas; [c] and to discriminate and cognize is the activity of vijna. One should understand that here nourish and augment is the citta with arava (outflows), [whereas] discriminate and As
22 23 24
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0371b11~b12 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0371b13 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0371b14~b15
19
separate is the citta without arava; to contemplate is manas with arava, [whereas] reflect is manas without arava; to discriminate is vijna with arava, [whereas] to cognize is vijna without arava. These are said to be the differences in the three citta, manas and vijna. 25 Here we begin to see clear distinctions made between the three citta, manas and vijna. However, the three are still subsumed within the one svabhva, and are thus one dharma. As we would expect from such an encyclopedic work as the Mahvibh, various explanations of the three are presented. There are six distinctions, with the sixth function or activity being discussed in greatest detail: 1 Distinct, but not different in substance, which is established by reason of analogy with sound. The use of the term substance here is interesting. Previous texts tend to use own nature (svabhva) when discussing the distinctive characteristics of the a dharma, and use substance when referring to an entity. This is one of the first instances of referring to mind as a substance, or entity. Difference in name. One could claim that difference in name and difference in etymology (below), are basically the same thing. For example, the definition of citta as variegation should fall under etymology, as this is a play on the words citta consciousness, and citrena to variegate or to color. 26 Temporal differences. Temporarlly, the three are: 3.1 Citta future. 3.2 Manas past. 3.3 Vijna present. This is useful for more detailed discussions of the conjoined and / or sequential arising of dharmas, in that it avoids the use of laborious phrases like past mind, present mind and future mind, which could be confusing. Classificational differences. Again, to reduce confusion when using different systems of analysis. 4.1 Citta dhtu (sphere). 4.2 Manas yatana (element). 4.3 Vijna skandha (aggregate). One could argue that this is unnecessary, as the term rpa for example, is used in all three systems, with different sense and meaning. Difference in etymology. The etymology of the terms is derived from their Sanskrit roots. It could be said that taking this as a definitive method of analysis can be misleading, as the use of words offers differs from their technical etymological derived basis. The Buddhas use of words in stras, tends to
25 26
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0371b16~b29 Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon: http://webapps.uni-koeln.de/tamil/
20
conform more to conventional usage, rather than linguistic analysis or philology. It is interesting that here, vijna is given the attribute of accumulating, whereas later, it is citta that becomes the accumulator, based on upacita to accumulate. (In this sense, it is a precursor to the later Yogcara notion of citta as laya-vijna, the accumulated store or receptacle consciousness of karmic seeds.) Difference in activity. Here we see citations from stras being turned into defintions: 6.1 Citta wandering away, continuity of birth, variegation; nourishing and augmenting. 6.2 Manas leading and guiding, acting as a resort; contemplating and weighing up. 6.3 Vijna continuity of rebirth (more about this below), discrimination and cognition; discriminating and cognizing. It seems somewhat out of place to cite the Dhammapada here, as it is generally regarded as more a collection of pithy Dharma sayings, rather than a set of definitive statements about dharmas, such as the various Vedalla or Vibhanga stras.
In the Mahvibha we also see reference to the views of the four great Sarvstivda cryas. In particular, Buddhadeva uses citta as a generic term, and then delineates the various faculties and dhtus, which includes manas, within this: [The Venerable Buddhadeva establishes the skandhas, yatanas and dhtus thus:] Within citta, is the faculty supported by the eye faculty, etc. to, is the faculty supported by the manas faculty. That supported by the eye faculty, is established as the eye-vijna-dhtu, etc. to, that supported by the manas faculty, is established as the manas-vijna-dhtu. It is just this six-fold vijna-kya [which] continually ceases [and rearises], that is established as the manas-dhtu. Due to the modifications of citta, there is that which is named vedan, that which is named saj, that which is named cetan, and that which is named vijna. 27 This is a somewhat different view to the aforementioned. The idea that vedan, saj, cetan and vijna are modifications, seems more akin to the previously discussed stra notion of citta having various aspects, though in reference to different mental events. The passage does not relate the distinctions regards the three terms from other notable cryas Dharmatrta, Vasumitra or Ghoaka. It does indicate however, that they all based their considerations of the relationship between citta and caitasika upon the relationship between the mahbhtas and rpa. We shall return to this in the subsequent chapter.
27
Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0661c29~0662a02
21
There are also various views regarding the activity of vijna in continuity of rebirth by the various cryas, in addition to that mentioned above. They include: Vasumitra states thus: Why does the citta of relinking vijna return and rejoin? Because vijna delights in abiding in the abode of vijna. Which is to say, vijna does not want to abandon the abode of vijna. The abode of vijna is just nma-rpa. Therefore, after observing vijna, return and observe nma-rpa. [He] also says, Because vijna and nma-rpa are mutual conditions. The Bhadanta [Dharmatrta?] states: Why does the citta of relinking vijna return and rejoin? Because the link [in dependent origination] of vijna [which] crosses-over [between two lives?] has no object. It is just as a caterpillar walks on a blade of grass, [on reaching] the top it has no further basis, so turns and descends. On observing citta, [one sees] it is likewise. It should only go as far as vijna, and becaue nothing else is its object, it thus returns. The Venerable Parva 28 says: because its object returns and rejoins. This is as the aforementioned statement, that vijna conditions with nma-rpa. But here it goes further in stating that nma-rpa [also] conditions vijna. In the former it is the cause, now [the latter] is changes to a result. Because the object returns, the citta also returns. The Venerable Ghoaka states thus: because vijna is the root of the many sufferings of birth and death. That is, [akyamuni] bodhisattva had revulsion for the sufferings of birth and death, he fled from the city to renunicate the lay life, to seek What is the root of the mundane sufferings of aging, sickness and death? It is from citta that arises from the bonds. He thought back, This citta is brought about due to what? It is from karma from the defilements from rtha (?) from citta that arises from the bonds. He further thought, This citta that arises from the bonds, has forever been the root of the various sufferings of birth and death. It is most detestable. To untie (?) this, I should cultivate correct antidotes. The Venerable armandhata(?) 29 states: one can infer knowledge of it through the [the fact that there are] future lives. Which is to say, when on first observes that there is birth, due to the condition of becoming, one
28 29
Fo Guang Buddhist Dictionary: Prva in p. 3642 . Attempt at reconstructed Sanskrit from she4mo4da2duo1. Could this possibly be another name for the Sarvstivda crya Devararman, due to similarity of she4mo4 as arman?
22
can know that present birth is the root of the many sufferings. Then, one further observes that nma-rpa is conditioned by vijna, and knows that past birth is the root of the many sufferings. One then conceives the thought: The many sufferings of present and past birth and death, have birth as their root. The future will be likewise. Therefore, one does not need to observe other objects. Therefore, the citta of relinking vijna returns, and due to the limb of becoming, the three time periods all exist. The Venerable Pra, 30 establishes it through his theory, which states: Ignorance and saskra are positioned within the present and past. That these two limbs are present is explained in the stra as: The Buddha told the bhikus At that time, I conceived the thought: With the non-existence of what, is there the non-existence of old age and death? With the cessation of what, is there the cessation of old age and death? After conceiving this thought, I arose the direction perception (abhisaaya?) Due to the non-existence of birth, there is the non-existence of old age and death. Due to the cessation of birth, there is the cessation of old age and death. And so forth, until I further conceived the thought: With the non-existence of what, is there the non-existence of saskra? With the cessation of what, is there the cessation of saskra? Due to the cessation of ignorance, there is the cessation of saskra. Due to the cssation of saskra, there is the cessation of vijna. And so forth, in detail. 31 The notion of continuity of re-birth as an activity of vijna, is a translation of the Chinese qi2shi4. Although this term appears elsewhere in the Taisho, the majority is in post-Mahvibha commentarial literature, and only appears only once in the earlier gamas. 32 Here in the Mahvibha, on linguistic evidence, it perhaps refers to the dna-vijna (appropriating consciousness) or vipkaphala-vijna (retribution consciousness). Previous to this, there were other schools teaching similar notions under different terms, such as the bhavnga-vijna (member-of-existence consciousness), mla-vijna (root-consciousness) and sasrika-skandha (element which lasts until the end of Sasra). It appears less likely to be the an sasrika-skandha (element which last until the end of sasra), or ekarasa-skandha (the aggregate of a single flavour). 33 There is no clear evidence that
30 31
32 33
Fo Guang Buddhist Dictionary: Prna in p. 6126 . Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0124c06~0125a09 I am a little hesitant on my understanding and thus translation of some parts of this passage. Sayuktgama: 12(CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 80, c3) See Lamotte E. & Pruden L: Karmasiddha-prakraa - The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu, (Asian Humanities Press, 1987). pg. 29~33, 65~71.
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the above cryas views correspond exactly to any of these formulations. All of these are types of proto-lya-vijna theories, and the citation above may have even used another original Sanskrit term. Whatever the case or term used, it is refering to the action of vijna as the link between subsequent re-birth. In particular, in the vijna between saskra and nma-rpa in the formulation of the twelve nidnas of prattya-samutpda. There are still several interesting points. Firstly, several statements are worded as the citta of vijna, indicating again the use of citta in the generic, and vijna as a specific case. Also, in general this vijna is considered distinct from, albeit mutually conditioned with and by, saskra and nma-rpa, the preceding and proceding limbs. Saskra refers to the that of the past life. As nma-rpa includes at least the three skandhas of vedan, saj and saskra, it would indicate that these cannot be considered as modfications of vijna. As they are often considerations modifications of citta however, it would correct to say that by some, citta is the general term, and vijna, and these other skandhas, are parts thereof. Secondly, that vijna is the root of sasra, as indicated in the cycle of dependent origination. This vijna here, is the defiled citta, born of bonds. In this sense, could vijna refer to the minds of ordinary living beings, an citta not be limited by this defintion? Ghoakas statement is also substantiated later, when he uses citta to refer to the liberated mind, 34 though he is not 100% consistent in such usage. Such a position would also be contrary to the earlier stra notion of liberated or non-liberated both being aspects of citta. Thirdly, the statement by armandhata does indicate that some were inclined to use rational inference and the like, to arrive at their conclusions. Logically though, his statement of fact commits the fallacy of begging the question.
Summary:
Through the early Abhidharma texts, we see that citta, manas and vijna are considered as a single dharma with the svabhva of cognition. However, the three are also distinguished in separate roles. By the time of the Mahvibha, the entire range of various differences presented by different bhidhrmika leaders are given, each with their own subtle differences and emphasis. However, no out and out debate seems in progress, nor is their much polemical discussion in defense of these views. Such a presentation is not surprising from this tome, which is more a collation of the various views of the time.
34
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0141c11
24
Looking at these three through Abhidharma methodology, it appears that relative to other dharmas, the svalakana of the three is cognition; and their smnya-lakana is their being mental, and not material, and so forth. Relative to each other, their svalakana is their specific temporality, classification, and so forth; and their smnya-lakana is cognition. With such a relativity in the distinction of svalakana and smnya-lakana, how can the Sarvstivda be so sure of their assigning all three to the same dharma entity? Likewise, in the discussion of several topics, we see a range of usage. The discussion on vijna and citta within the context of the twelve limbs of prattya-samutpda and rebirth, uses the two rather arbitrarily. Given that this is a particularly important subject, which became a major bases for the development of various karma and lya-vijna theories, which became in turn the disputed points over which the Sarvstivda broke up later into different systems, all we can say at this point is still under discussion!
25
VIJNA, MANAS AND CITTA

IN THE KOA AND MANUALS One or Three?
In the later Koa and Abhidharma manuals, we mainly see only slight further refinement of the stance put forward by the Mahvibha regards citta, manas and vijna. The proof by similarity seen in the Mahvibha is accepted. That is, citta, manas and vijna are different aspects of one entity, in the same manner that various sounds are different aspects of the one dharma entity of sound, or, in the same manner in which rpa is merely modifications of the mahbhtas. The notion of the simultaneity and conjoining of citta and caitasika is discussed. First from the earlier manuals:
Hdaya-vykhy:
The manas-yatana is citta, manas and vijna. They are designated by name, meaning, activity and temporality. One should understand the differences in their names and activities. [1] By name: citta means accumulate and arise; manas means reflect and weigh up; and vijna means distinguish and cognize. [2] By activity: citta is knowledge from afar; manas is knowledge of the previous; and vijna is continuity. Citta is future; manas is past; and vijna is present. 35 This is the most complete definition in the smaller manuals, by name, activity and temporality. It also indicates that they are designated separated into dhtu, yatana and skandha respectively. The two other Hdaya texts only mentions that they are different in name, but of one substance. 36 There is the use here of citta as accumulation, which is an etymologically derived meaning, from upacita accumulated. 37 We see in Asagas Abhidharma-samuccaya, the description of citta as: What is the mind (citta)? It is the storeconsciousness of all the seeds.38
35 36 37
38
Abhidharma Hdaya-vykhy: T28n1552_p0872b10 Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1551_p0836c14 & Abhidharma Hdaya-stra: T28n1550_p0810b28 Waldon, William S: The Buddhist Unconscious, (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.) Pg. 27, karma is accumulated (upacita) and passed on, as a function of citta. Walpola, Rhula, trans. by Sara Boin-Webb: Abhidharma Samuccaya, (Asia Humanities Press, 2001). Pg. 21.
26
Although obviously the transition to the laya-vijna theory does not take place on a merely etymological or linguistic basis.
Koa-bhyam:
The issue of citta, manas and vijna appears early in the Koa-bhyam, along with a brief entry into a related matter, that of citta and caitasika (see next chapter). As for the cittas and caitasikas, in the stras, many various names and terms are established according to the meaning [of those dharmas]. Now we shall discuss the various different names and meanings. The krik states: Citta, manas and vijna are of one substance. Citta and the caitasika-[dharmas] have [the same] support, Have [the same] object, and [the same] activity [of cognizing] characteristics (kra). There are five aspects of association. Bhya states: Because it arises as a group, it is known as citta. Because it reflects and weighs up, it is known as manas. Because it cognizes and discriminates, it is known as vijna. [Srvastivda:] There is [another] further explanation which says: Because of all the various differences in the spheres of purity and impurity, it is known as citta. Because just this [when] this acts supported by the other, it is known as manas. Because it acts as the supporter, it is known as vijna. Therefore, from the definitions of the three names of citta, manas and vijna, although each meaning is different, the substance is one. 39 It also begins with the outright statement that they are one substance, one entity, ie. one unique dharma. The three are again distinguished due to name, using an etymological root for each of the three terms. Ie. citta from cit; manas from man; and vijna from vi + j. The spheres of purity and impurity may be a development of Parvas notion relating the three to the ravas, but is exclusive to citta, and is similar to Ghoakas statement in the Mahvibha. The description for manas and vijna seem more related to their respective roles within the round of dependent origination, ie. nma-rpa and vijna as supported and supporter. Earlier there is also a reference as to their temporal differences, relating it seems to the verse from the Dhammapada where the Buddha refers to taming the citta. It is
39
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0021c16~c22
27
stated that: If the manas-dhtu should only be in the past period, the six vijna only in the present and future, this would run contrary to the [Sarvstivda] schools thesis that the eighteen dhtus are all existent within the three periods of time. 40 This is also evidence for the Sarvstivda, Vasubandhu and other Sautrntika views regards the sarvsti of skandha, yatana and dhtu. The Nynnusr agrees with the first basic defintions in the Koa-bhyam regarding name, etymological derivation, function and designation. Continuing from the same krik, it also has some further elaborations:
Nyynusr stra:
Or, [due to] differences in the growth and continuation of seeds arisen through karma. These are the [various] such categories, due to the differences in their meanings, the three names of citta, manas and vijna are explained as different in meaning, [yet] of one substance. As such, the three names of citta, manas and vijna are described as different in meaning, [yet] of one substance. 41 The statement regarding the growth and continuation of seeds arisen through karma is interesting, given that the seed (bja) theory of karma was not preferred by Saghabhadra. There is a somewhat dogmatic feel to the repeated statements of their being one substance, as there is little argument as to the exact criteria that makes them a single substance as opposed to individual substances, given that with regards name, temporality, function, and so forth, they are distinct.
Classification:
Koa-bhyam:
Regarding their classification as skandha, yatana and dhtu the Koa-bhyam adds: Now vijna-skandha shall be explained, along with its position [with regards to the] yatana and dhtu [systems]: Vijna is said to be [that which] individually discriminates and cognizes; This is just [that] known as the manas-yatana,
40 41
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0009c27~c28 Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0394c20~c22
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And seven dhtus. One should know that The six [forms of] vijna [all] resort to [one] manas. 42 The stra states: As each one discriminates and cognizes its own objective dhtu, and apprehends the general characteristics of the object, they are thus known as vijna-skandha. This is further differentiated into the sixfold vijna-kya, which is [from] the eye-vijna-kya; up to, the mano-vijna-kya. One should know that the so stated vijna-skandha is positioned within the manas-yatana in the yatana [system]; and positioned within seven dhtus in the dhtu [system], that is to say, of the eye-vijna-dhtu, up to, mano-vijna-dhtu, [and the manas-dhtu]. It it just these six vijnas that transform into the manas-dhtu. 43 [Explanation:] Thus, the five skandhas as stated here, are just the twelve yatanas and the eighteen dhtus. That is to say, apart from avijapti, the remainder of the rpa-skandha is known as just the [first] ten yatanas, and also known as the [first] ten dhtus. The skandhas of vedan, saj and saskra, [as well as] avijpti and the asaskta, are collectively known as the dharma-yatana, and also known as the dharma-dhtu. One should know that vijna-skandha is just that known as manas-yatana, and also known as seven [of the] dhtus, which are the six vijna-dhtus along with manas-dhtu. 44 The Koa clearly assigns the term vijna as the one manas-yatana, and seven dhtus the six sensory vijnas, plus the dhtu of manas. It also indicates that the systems of skandha, yatana and dhtu are simply different systems which cover the same phenomena. We shall leave aside Vasubandhus discussion avijapti-rpa here. The Nynnusr has quite a different stance to the same verses:
Nynnusra stra:
[The eye cognizes and apprehends the general characteristics, only of form, and not other objects.] ... Other acryas state: Nominally speaking of an actor with regards to the nature of dharmas, is in order to refute the conception of a knower other than vijna. Where else other than with regards to the nature of dharmas, is it seen that there is the designation of an actor? [Just as when] one speaks of a presently seen shadow as a mover. When this [shadow] arises immediately subsequent and in
42 43 44
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a18~a20 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a21~a25 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a25~b02
29
another location [to the actual moving object], although there is no action of movement, one speaks of a mover. Vijna is likewise: When it arises immediately subsequent in a dhtu other than the object [itself], although there is no action of movement, one speaks of a cognizer, ie. because it is able to cognize the object. Thus, there is no fault [in this statement]. [Objection:] How is one to know that this is so? [Answer:] Because the present seeing is in another location, which refutes [the notion of] an actor. As the Bhagavt told Phalgna: I have never spoken of a cognizer. Furthermore, some claim: Being kanika (momentary) is known as the nature of dharmas, continuity is known as the actor. 45 This is a very interesting passage. It seems as though there is an objection to the idea of vijna as a distinct entity that cognizes, on the grounds that the Buddha has rejected the notion of a cognizer in the stras. Saghabhadra states that this action of cognizer is designation, as the object and cognition are in separate dhtus. The Samayapradpiks comments on the same verses adds no further perspective.
Koa-bhyam:
How could the vijna-skandha not be merely the sixfold vijna-kya? Apart from [such an] explanation, where is there another manas-vijna? There is no further dharma amongst these. The krik states: Due to just this sixfold vijna-kya, [Due to] its uninterrupted-cessation it is [known as] manas. The Bhya: Because in uninterrupted sequence after the cessation of the sixfold vijna-kya, it is able to [re-]generate the subsequent [moment of] consciousness, it is known as manas-vijna. That is to say, just as the son of this [person], is known as the father of another. Also, just as the fruit of this [tree], is known as the seed of another. [Objection:] If that is the case, then the actual dhtus should only be seventeen [without manas-vijna], or only twelve [without any of the vijnas], due to the six vijnas and manas being mutually inclusive. 46 Vijna is further identified with the six-fold vijna, divided with respect to the six sensory organs. Manas-vijna is able to [re-]generate the subsequent [moment of] consciousness, in uninterrupted sequence, which suggests the Sarvstivda theory of kritra as that which generates the subsequent moment of a given dharma, and
45 46
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1562_p0342a22~a29 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004b03~b07
30
distinguishes between a dharma in the present, rather than in the past or future. not termed function in this case. The objection is countered by stating that: In order to establish a support of the sixth [vijna], One should understand the eighteen dhtus. 47
It is
Which suggests that the division is made on a designated, conceptual basis, rather than due to any distinct svalakana or svabhva. A support is needed for vijna, by definition, and thus one is established by designation. This is acceptable, because in the Koas system of distinct dharmas, only the faculties and sense objects are considered as distinct dharmas, and the dharma of citta can include all the vijnas in the dhtus.
Summary:
The Hdaya manuals and the Koa Krik commentaries tend to agree with the Mahvibha on the characteristics and classification of citta, manas and vijna. They are three different names for the same substance or entity. Its basic function or activity is to cognize and know the object. Each has its unique etymology and meaning, depending on the the different context that it is in, and which classification system is under consideration. It is for this reason why these texts are rightly considered manuals, rather than texts establishing the doctrinal position of the Sarvstivda. Bhikkhu Dhammajoti describes this as the new development of a liberal attitude in the selection of material with the emphasis on organization and conciseness was continued in a series of manuals, in which a succeeding one partly inherited and readjusted with new addition, the form and content of the preceding one. 48 However, it seems that in the process, various novel theories propounded by several of the Sarvstivda cryas, have been discarded. The reasons for rejecting these theories are often not mentioned, and we are often left to surmise the events taking place between the Mahvibha and the time of the Koa and manuals.
47 48
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004b08 Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004.) pg. 72.
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CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti writes that the term caitasika (Pli: cetasika) occurs simply as an adjective in the Stras, and as such there is therefore no indication of the abhidharmic theory of caitasika in the stras. 49 The key point here is no Abhidharmic theory, using the methodology of subsumption, unique and common characteristics, and so forth, rather than no caitasika theory at all. Given that the most commonly accepted caitasika are the skandhas other than vijna itself, (as previously discussed), let us then examine how the stras present the relationship between vijna and the three skandhas of which are also nma, ie. vedan, saj and saskra.
Dependent Origination of Mind:

One important factor in establishing the relationship between citta and caitasika is that of causality. The stras give many examples of the causal relationships between the two, particularly with regards the twelve links of dependent origination.
MN 28: Mahhatthipadopama Sutta:

37. If, friends, internally the mind is intact but no external mind-objects come into its range, and there is no corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. If internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range, but there is no corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. But when internally the mind is intact and external mind-objects come into its range and there is the corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. 50 Translators Note: I. MA identifies mind (mano) in this passage with the life continuum consciousness (bhavangacitta). II. MA illustrates this case by the minds preoccupation with a familiar object when it does not notice the familiar details of that object. The
49
50
Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004). pg. 162. Bhikkhu namoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi: Mahhatthipadopama Sutta, The Simile of the Elephants Footprint (Greater), in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, (Wisdom Publications, 2001). pg. 284
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corresponding class of consciousness here is mind-consciousness (manovina), which takes non-sensuous objects as its sphere of cognition. This is the specific situation of the arising of vijna given for mano-vijna non-senuous consciousness. It shows that manas is the mental-organ, which is a condition for the arisal of mental-vijna, the result. This lends credence to the Abhidharma notion of manas as past citta, though only if the arising of vijna is subsequent. This would not apply to the Sarvstivda thesis of the simultaneous arising of vijna, as at this moment the manas would not yet be a past dharma. However, as one is a faculty and the other a vijna, would this have an influence upon the notion of manas and vijna being one substance? The Koa avoids this quandry by considering the first eleven faculties excluding manas as distinct dharmas, and including the manas-faculty together with all the vijnas as being the dharma known as citta.
Specific Caitasika:
The simplest division of an individual is two-fold, nma mind and mental elements, and rpa physical materiality. It is from this, and the dependent relationship between the two, that we can first derive some basic understanding of citta and caitasika.
SN II: Nidnavagga, Nidnasayutta, VII:

Name-and-form, friend Kohita, is not created by oneself, nor is it created by another, nor is it created both by oneself and by another, nor has it arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another; but rather, with consciousness as condition, name-and-form [comes to be]. Consciousness, ; but rather, with name-and-form as condition, consciousness [comes to be]. 51 Name-and-form (nma-rpa) and consciousness (vijna) are respectively the first four rpa, vedan, saj and saskra, and fith vijna skandha. Although the term caitasika is not used, this passage uses the four-cornered method to refute incorrect views of the causal relation between vijna, other mental factors, and rpa. That is, it reveals that they are mutual conditions to one another, rather than
51
Bhikkhu Bodhi: Nidnavagga, Nidnasayutta, VII, in The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Sayutta Nikya, (Wisdom Publications, 2000). pg. 608.
33
creation, which is rejected. No indication of either the four-fold or six-fold system of conditions used by the Abhidharma is given. We see evidence from the stras as to why the bhidhrmikas use the relationship between the mahbhtas and rpa as an analogy for their understanding of the relationship between citta and caitasika, from the definition of conditioned arising:
MN 9: Sammdihi Sutta:
(Mentality-materiality) 54. And what is mentality-materiality, what is the orign of mentalitymateriality, what is the cessation of mentality-materiality, what is the way leading to the cessation of mentality-materiality? Feeling, perception, volition, contact, and attention these are called mentality. The four great elements and the material form derived from the four great elements these are called materiality. So this mentality and this materiality are what is called mentality-materiality. With the arising of consciousness there is the arising of mentality-materiality. With the cessation of consciousness there is the cessation of mentality- materiality. 52 Here, mentality is given as having four elements, ie. saj, cetan, spara and manaskra. We know that these are four elements rather than three names for the same element, (as shown in early views on citta, manas and vijna), due to saj and cetan being considered as separate skandha. Here, the causal relation between this nma-rpa and vijna is given as one way only, ie. vijna as a condition for nma-rpa. This is at least for the above context, being the twelve links of dependent origination. The Mahnidna stra gives another formulation however, whereby vijna and nma-rpa are shown to be mutually conditioning. Earlier we encountered the Mahavedalla sutta with its definition of consciousness as that which cognizes. In addition, is discusses in the idea of conjoining, with regards to cognition the activity of vijna, and discernment.
MN 43: Mahavedalla Sutta:

Wisdom and consciousness, friend are these states conjoined or disjoined? And is it possible to separate each of these states from the other to describe the difference between them?
52
Bhikkhu namoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi: Sammdihi Sutta, Right View, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. (Wisdom Publications, 2001). pg. 141.
34
Wisdom and consciousness, friend these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them. For what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands. That is why these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them. Discernment & consciousness, friend: Are these qualities conjoined or disjoined? Is it possible, having separated them one from the other, to delineate the difference between them? 53 Discernment here is from praj, understanding or knowledge. They are conjoined, that is to say, are present together, inseparable and non-delineable. This notion is further expanded upon by the Abhidharma later. However, they are not expressly stated as either one or two substances. The same stra also states that: Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible, having divided them, to describe their separateness. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognizes... 54 So given that the three are classified as separate skandhas, they are still inseparable and presumably also unable to be distinctly delineated. The bhidhrmikas later take up these descriptions, considering them to be the unique svalakana of each, and thus their svabhva. As all three are still within the sphere of nma, their being mentality is their common smnya-lakana. However, as Bhikkhu Dhammajoti states, this type of theory is not at all stated in the stras themselves. The following stra provides another example that Bhikkhu Dhammajoti mentions with regards the specific term caitasika in the stras:
MN 44: Cuavedalla Sutta:

Perception and feeling are mental, these are states bound up with the mind; that is why perception and feeling are the mental formation. 55 Again, bound up indicates a close relationship, one inseparable and mutually reliant.
53 54 55
Ibid, Mahvedalla Sutta, The Greater Series of Questions and Answers. pg. 388. Ibid, Mahvedalla Sutta, The Greater Series of Questions and Answers. pg. 389. Ibid, Cuavedalla Sutta, The Shorter Series of Questions and Answers. pg. 399.
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Summary:
We can see that the stras present the mutual conditionality of the four mental skandhas of vedan, saj, saskra and vijna. These are also conditionally related to the skandha of rpa. In addition to vijna and these skandhas, when discussing mentality, the Buddha also speaks of such factors such as spara, praj, cetan and manaskra. Praj is discernment or wisdom, and shares not only a similar linguistic root with vijna, but has a similar, yet deeper function regarding cognition and knowledge. Spara is the coming together of the object, organ and vijna. Cetan and manaskra are spoken of in the context of mental action, and are related to karma. These skandhas, as well as other mental states, such as praj, are said to be inseparable from each other, as they perform their particular task or function. Due to their mutually conditioned existence, delineation of their individual boundaries is rather arbitrary, if not inappropriate. These mental state are neither stated categorically as being either identical or unique with respect to either each other, nor with respect to citta in general.
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CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN THE ABHIDHARMA

Classification of Mind and Mental Factors:
At this stage of the original Abhidharma literature, there is rearrangement and categorization of stra material, first bringing all the relevant stra passages on the subject together. This includes the various definitions of the material and mental dharmas given by the Buddha. Quoting directly from the stras, the Dharmaskandha accepts the basic presentation of the five skandhas with analysis as:
Dharmaskandha stra:
At one time the Bhagavt was at ravasti, abiding in the Jeta grove, in the garden of Anthapiada. At that time, the Bhagavt spoke to the bhikus: There are five skandhas? Which five? They are rpa-skandha, vedan-skandha, saj-skandha, saskra-skandha and vijna-skandha. These are known as the five skandhas. [1] What is rpa-skandha? It is all material form all that is the four mah-bhtas (primary elements), and all that is composed of the four mah-bhtas. This is known as rpa-skandha. [2] What is vedan-skandha? It is all feeling and sensation, individual sensation, of the nature of experience, subsumed within vedan. This is known as vedan-skandha. [3] Just as vedan-skandha, likewise are saj-skandha, saskra-skandha and vijna-skandha. They should be explained in such detail likewise. [4] What is saskra-skandha? It is that saskra-skandha is of two kinds: Firstly, saskra-skandha that is conjoined with citta. Secondly, saskra-skandha that is not conjoined with citta. [a] What is saskra-skandha that is conjoined with citta? It is cetan, spara and manaskra; [or] in broader sense, all that is known, perceived and observed. Furthermore, there are other dharmas of similar type that are conjoined with citta. This is known as saskra-skandha that is conjoined with citta. [b] What is saskra-skandha that is not conjoined with citta? It is asaj-sampatti, [or] in broader sense, [all those conditioned non-mental dharmas] up to vyajana-kya. Furthermore, there are other dharmas of similar type that are not conjoined with citta. This is known as saskra-skandha that is not conjoined with citta. Such saskra-skandha conjoined with citta and saskra-skandha not conjoined with citta, [are both] together known as saskra-skandha 56
56
Abhidharma Dharma-skandha: T26n1537_p0500c26~0501b23
37
Here we see the first break-down of the saskras into those dharmas that are conjoined with citta and those that are not conjoined with citta. The first category includes cetan, spara and manaskra, which are precisely the three mentioned in MN 9: Right View, Sammdihi Sutta, ie. mentality other than that already accepted as the distinct skandhas of vedan and saj. It also includes all that is known, perceived, and observed, although the specific names for these mental states are not given. The second category includes asaj-sampatti (the attainment of nonideation), and a series of unnamed saskras up to vyajana-kya (the body of phonemes the elements of language and speech as composite dharmas). We can assume that the series here is that of a preceding passage, which has a list of some sixteen mental states, three faculties, the various classification systems for the defilements, and so forth, which are all subsumed as the yatana of dharmas. Apart from being simply known as (mental) dharmas, no further classification by type of the members of this list is made. We can thus see that the saskra-skandha is already developing into a category which contains a number of various dharmas, basically bifurcated into those conjoined with citta, and those not conjoined with citta. The above basic classification is then elaborated, into a system of five categories of dharmas. It is defined in terms of the classical three-fold system of skandha, yatana and dhtu, yet is more extensive in regards citta and caitasika:
Prakaraa stra:
Question: What are the five [categories of dharmas]? Answer: They are [1] rpa, [2] citta, [3] caita[sika]-dharmas, [4] [citta-]viprayukta-saskra and [5] asaskta. [1] What is rpa? The four elements and material composed of the four elements. [a] What are the four elements? They are the dhtu of solidity, and the dhtus of fluidity, heat and gaseousness. [b] What is composed rpa? It is the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, and the body-faculty; the yatanas of the visibles, sounds, aromas, flavors, and a small art of tangibles; and avijapti (non-active) rpa. These are known as rpa-dharma. [2] What is citta? It is manas and the six vijnas. What are the six [vijnas]? Visual-vijna, audial, olfactory, gustatory, tangible and manas-vijna. These are known as the dharmas of citta. 57 The first division is rpa. The second citta itself, defined as the six-fold vijna plus the faculty of manas. This further indicates that citta is the general term, including the specifics of vijna and manas. Together they are either seven dharmas, or to be considered as one single dharma. The text here is not applying the later
57
Abhidharma Paca-vastu: T26n1541_p0627a08~a13
38
methodology of using substance as the defining qualification, but rather tradition classication systems. Any such classification system is arbitrary designation, to some degree, based on the definition given. [3] What are the caita[-sika]-dharmas? They are dharmas that are conjoined with citta. That is to say: [a:] vedan, saj, cetan, spara, manaskra, chanda, adhimoka (vimoka), smi, samdhi, praj; raddha, vrya, vitarka, vicra, pramda, apramda; [b: the three faculties of] kuala-indrya, akualaindrya, aniyat-indrya; [c: the classifications of the defilements of] all the sajoyana, bandhana, klea, upaklea, paryavasthna; [d:] whether jna, or di, or samanantara (contiguous); these and other dharmas that arise together conjoined with citta, are known as caita[-sika]-dharmas. 58 These caitasika-dharmas themselves are implicitly of three main types: 59 1 Mental states: This list of sixteen dharmas is comprised of mental states commonly used within the stras. It in turn is four-fold: 1.1 Vedan, to praj: later to become the ten mahbhmika-dharmas, in the Vaibha system and Koa. 1.2 raddha and vrya: As two of the five spiritual powers and faculties. 1.3 Vitarka and vicra: Two of the limbs of dhyna. These cannot be considered within the mahbhmikas, as they are abandoned in successively higher dhynic states. 1.4 Apramda and pramda: Here we see the beginnings of a problem that would appear later. That is, that a dharma and its opposite are both considered as dharmas. Ie. the opposite of a dharma is not merely its absence, but an opposing force. Faculties: This is categorized by moral quality. Perhaps it was these three that later became groups within this classification system as a whole. Defilements: These are various groups of the defilements, though the specific contents of each is not spelt out. 3.1 On investigating the various stras in which these are discussed, we see that many defilements appear in more than one category, eg. rga, dvea. 3.2 No mention is made as to whether, for example, rga as a sajoyana and rga as a bandhana are the same or different dharmas.
2 3
58 59
Abhidharma Paca-vastu: T26n1541_p0627a13~a20 As per Venerable Yinshun: Study of the Abhidharma, Texts and Commentators of the Sarvstivda, ( ), Zhengwen Publishing, 1968. pg. 159. Also Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004.) pg. 164.
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This is also related the later debate regarding the anuaya and klea as identical or different, and thus different dharmas or different modes of activity of the same dharmas. Miscellaneous: I am not entirely sure of this category, as to whether they are dharmas themselves, or descriptive categories of the aforementioned dharmas. The terms are very broad in meaning, in fact rather open with the statement these and other dharmas. In later texts, these same terms are often considered as aspects of praj, etc. and perhaps this category developed into either viprayukta-dharma or those dharmas considered as purely designatory.
3.3
The passage continues with [4] caitasika not conjoined with citta, and [5] saskta (the unconditioned), both are categories which are outside the scope of present discussion. The format here does help to give us an overall picture of the theory at the time. That is, a further refinement of the various dharmas, defined by a general principle, yet without the application of an exclusive number or type.
Proofs by Reason:
By the time of the Mahvibha, arguments from the stras have already been exhausted, in the sense that all sides present the texts that favour their position, and none are explicitly authoritative over the others. As such, there is more and more use of argument and reason. This then becomes the standard Sarvstivda methodology, showing just why they were also known as the Yuktivda, those who uphold reason.
Mahvibha stra:
Some uphold [the theory that] citta and caitasika-dharmas arise one by one, and that there is no principle of conjoining. [This stra is written] in order to refute their theory, to elucidate that citta and caitasikas must arise simultaneously, and the principle of conjoining. Moreover, others uphold that citta and caitasika-dharmas are sequentially conjoined. Others also uphold that the own nature [of citta] and the own nature [of caitasikas] are conjoined. [This stra is written] in order to refute their theory, to elucidate that citta and caitasikas must arise simultaneously. 60 First of all, several theories of conjoining are presented, through individual sequential conjoining, through conjoining of own nature. Each are to be rejected. The orthodox position is that citta and caitasika must arise simultaneously.
60
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0564b17
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Continuing with a line of argument from the Jnaprasthna 61 that although derived rpa and the mahbhtas are not conjoined, and their arising, abiding and cessation are sequential, the caitasikas and citta are conjoined, going through the three states simultaneously. the Mahvibha shows the views of the two prominent bhidhrmika leaders. Also: The stras are this stras basis and foundation. Yet, that which those [stras] have not explained [completely], shall now be explained, hence the compilation of this stra. Some say, in order to put a stop to the teachings of other acryas, that is, the two bhidhrmikas within this school, the first being Buddhadeva, the second being Dharmatrta. Buddhadeva claims that rpa is solely the mahbhtas, and and that caitasikas are just citta. He makes his claim [thus]: Composed rpa is just the modifications of these mahbhtas. The caitasikas are just the modifications of this citta. Why does he make such a claim? Due to basis in the stras. 62 Earlier in the Mahvibha we see these two Venerables views stated clearly as: The Venerable Dharmatrta states thus: Citta and caitasika are [merely] modifications of cetan. The Venerable Buddhadeva states thus: The substance of citta and caitasika is just citta. Both Venerables state thus: Mental states of raddha, etc. are immediately subsequent [to citta], there is no simultaneous functioning [thereof]. The five faculties of raddha, etc. are conjoined and uninterrupted. 63 Followed by the position which becomes the orthodox Vaibhika Sarvstivda (made in another context but equally applicable with regards to this methodology): Our school [states] it as such: the mental states of raddha, etc. each have their own substance, 64 Dharmatrta states that it is cetan volition that is the basic substance, and citta and caitasika are modifications of this. This would make all mental activiy cetan, or karma. Buddhadeva here is stating that the caitasikas are not separate dharmas, but rather modifications, ie. functions and activities, of citta. This shows that even in the Sarvstivda, this is still a matter of debate. Buddhadevas full argument is:
61 62 63 64
Abhidharma Jnaprasthna: T26n1544_p0984b18~b20 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0661c15~c20 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0008c07~c11 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0008c18~c19
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As the stras state: Within the fleshy sphere of the eye, that internal which is distinctly of solid nature, of solid type, such that drawing near one can experience it (?), is known as the internal element of solidity; and so forth, to: which is distinctly of moving nature, of moving type, such that drawing near one can experience it (?), is known as the internal element of gaseousness. Based upon this stra, he claims that composed rpa is just these four mahbhtas. Furthermore, the stras state: What is samdhi? It is a wholesome single pointedness of citta. Due to this, [he] claims that caitasika are just citta. 65 The first reason is proof by way of similarity, ie. caitasika and citta should be subject to the same principles as that applying to rpa and the mahbhtas. The first premise being stra based. His second reason is through his presentation of a stra defined definition of samdhi, where it is defined as a caitasika. One could add that he is also applying proof by similarity, implying that the other caitasikas should be subject to the same principles as that applied to samdhi. It is a rather straightforward reasoning, and its presentation is clear. Later, the Mahvibha continues with the Jnaprasthna argument: Question: The substance of citta and caitasika also have decrease and increase. Why do you say that they are not so? That is to say, the caitasika-dharmas within the Three Realms are of three natures, [either] with outflows [or] without outflows, and those citta [and caitasikas] that gather together [within any given moment can be] more, [or can] be less. Answer: There is a specific principle (artha) why they are not known as [being subject to] decrease or increase. If within any one [moment of] citta, [there were to be] two [distinct] saj and one [other] vedan, and so forth, then this could be said to have decrease or increase. However, because within any one [moment of] citta, there is only one saj and only one vedan, they are different from the mahbhtas. However, others claim that the mahbhtas themselves have neither decrease nor increase. 66 This is a kind of conservation of mental states theory, to adapt a modern term from physics, in that there is a set amount of citta and caitasika in any given mental moment. Although not stated, this also is related to the theory of momentariness, along with the simultaneous arising of all of the conjoined caitasikas. As such it is a principle that the bhidhrmikas need to establish to maintain these other theses of theirs. Here there is no resort to stra, but resort to a priori principles regards the activity of citta.
65 66
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0661c20~c24 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0683a05~a09
42
There is also another argument, regards the establishment of separate dharmas. Parvas defintions presented earlier of classifying citta, manas and vijna as either with, or without ravas, is continued later with: Only the Buddha has penetrated to the knowledge of the distinctions in nature, characteristics and functions of dharmas. If dharmas are able to be established as separate skandhas, then they should be established as separate skandhas. 67 This seems to suggest that nature, characteristic and function are the basis for establishing a dharma as distinct. The statement is made with regard to caitasika, but one cannot help but wonder that given the above description of citta, manas and vijna, why they are still considered as one substance. The distinctions between the three in terms of their activity, certainly border on being different characteristics and functions, if not natures. Another statement of Parva, that of the simile that citta is like a monkey, and the caitasikas are the actions of the monkey, 68 seems to suggest that he would consider caitasikas to be included as functions within the dharma of citta, after all, how could the actions of the monkey be separated from the monkey itself? Such theories also relate to later developed karit doctrines, where there is clear distinction between activity and function.
Summary:
There is a lot of development in the theory of citta and caitasika during this time. The earliest texts are simply re-presentations of the stra content by topic. Later, there are general lists of caitasika-dharmas, yet they are unsystematic and generally contain any and all mental factors and states mentioned in the stras, from a variety of contexts. Those that are specifically skandhas or yatanas in their own right are thereupon established as dharmas, and those that cannot be specifically determined into one or other of the skandhas, are merely listed. Vijna remains singular yet six-fold, and is not established as six separate dharmas as the dhtu system may imply. No specific analysis by svalakana or svabhva is made to distinguish their uniqueness. Next, with the Jnaprasthna and the Mahvibha, the question as to whether caitasikas are separate dharmas, or merely modifications of citta, takes the fore. It ends rather inconclusively, with even the orthodox bhidhrmika cryas themselves being divided, and giving different arguments for and against. The main arguments are similarity of relationship, in the same way in which the mahbhtas
67 68
Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0385a02 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0903b29
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and rpa are related. Caitasikas are certainly recognized as functions or activity of citta, but does this constitute separate and distinct dharmas? The technique of subsumption is used by at least two cryas, who propose subsuming citta and caitasika to a single dharma, albiet with a variety of modifications or functions. Such positions lead to a range of discussion, where various positions are taken based on scriptural authority or rather, the interpretation of certain stras according to one or more cryas, as well as argument through principle of previously established relations amongst dharmas. The various caryas certainly cannot simply abandon the Buddhas words as recorded in the stras, but these do not necessarily fit into easy compartments for classification. The criteria for establishing dharmas as unique, or subsuming them within other established dharmas, are not totally clear. What may be regarded as a unique characteristic in one context, may be a common characteristic in another. One is reminded of the geometric technique of establishing a mathematical equation, a formula, such that it includes all of a set of points pre-positioned upon a graph. For each additional point on the graph, the appropriate equation rises by another degree of order and complexity. Given the numerous stras taught by the Buddha, the bhidhrmikas must work very hard to come up with a kind of grand unified theory of mind, without coming into contradiction with a single stra. With each proposed theorem, an opponent raises yet another scriptural point, leading the grand theory into another degree of complexity.
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CITTA AND CAITASIKA IN THE KOA AND MANUALS

Simultaneity and Conjoining:
Within these texts, we see a formalization of the principles governing the relationship between citta and caitasika that were presented, yet not fully defined, in the earlier Abhidharma period. The texts show more polemical tendencies, as each party takes up their doctrine, and works very hard at upholding it in the face of opposition. The Hdaya, with its simple and direct style, gives a definition of conjoined caitasika in terms of three factors: support, object and time. This is reified in the Koa:
Hdaya stra,:
If citta has arising, This citta must be conjoined with The group of caitasika-dharms, etc. And the viprayukta-saskras. Citta is manas, manas is vijna. They are in fact the same, yet have different names. With [the same] support, object and time of arising, this citta arises together with the group of caitasika-dharmas, etc. 69
Koa-bhyam
As for the cittas and caitasikas, in the stras, many various names and terms are established according to the meaning [of those dharmas]. Now we shall discuss the various different names and meanings. The krik states: Citta, manas and vijna are of one substance. Citta and the caitasika-[dharmas] have [the same] support, Have [the same] object, and [the same] activity [of cognizing] characteristics (kra). There are the five aspects of association. 70 The Koa affirms the unity of substance of citta, manas and caitasika, and goes on to give the factors for association / conjoining, which are five-fold:
69 70
Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1550_p0810b26~b29 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0021c16~c18
45
Just as the definitions of the three names of citta, manas and vijna, each have a different meaning yet are of one substance, it is likewise for the names of the cittas and caitasikas [in terms of their]: 1. support, 2. object, 3. activity [of cognizing] characteristics (kra), 4. association [in time, and 5. equality of substance]. Although the name and meaning for each is unique, yet their substance is one. That is to say: 1. They are known as cittas and caitasikas due to their supporting basis and supporting faculty; 2. They are known as [cittas and caitasikas] due to the object that they apprehend and the objective condition; 3. They are known as [cittas and caitasikas] due their activity [of cognizing] characteristics, which is that with regards to the differences in the types of object, [it is able to] equally give rise to the action of [cognition] of those characteristics; 71 [4. Equality of time: This is to say that the arising, abiding, decaying and ceasing of cittas and caitasika is either simultaneous, or in the same kna.] 72 5. Equality of substance: Within one [act of] association, just as the substance of [the various types of citta] is one, likewise [is the substance of] each and every caitasika. [This] completes the detailed analysis of the meaning of citta and caitasika. 73 The first two criteria are straightforward. The third requires clarification, however. Venerable Dhammajoti describes this as: The mode of apprehending the percept must be the same; thus, if the citta apprehends greenness, the caittas too apprehend likewise. 74 This supports the above translation of (kra) as the action of [cognition of] characteristics. However, for the Sarvstivda, this is akin to the functions of saj and praj, as it is the svabhva of saj to apprehend and of praj to cognize. How then can spara or vedan be said to apprehend the object, when their respective svabhva are to contact and feel / experience the object in question? For the Sautrntika however, this kra is both the image of the object and its understanding. They accept sequential perception of an image of the object, rather
71 72
73 74
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0021c22~c29 ju4she4lun4song 4shu1lun4ben3 T41n1823_p0843c26~p0844a03 & ju4eshe4lun4ji4 T41n1821_ p0084a13~p0084a24 complement the Koa regards time. Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0021c29~p0022a04 Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004). pg. 172, 189~205.
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than direct and simultaneous perception of the object itself. Yet, in this sense of kra, how does this differ from the second condition, the sameness of object? Or, taking it as the image, how does this differ from saj? A full analysis of each schools presentation of perception may be required to distinguish exactly how kra can be apprehension or cognition of the object, distinct enough from the svabhva of saj and praj respectively, and common to all citta and caitasika, such that it can be a criteria for conjoining. Obviously, here kra is not used in the sense of the outflow-free cognition of the sixteen aspects of the Four rya Truths, which became the later Sarvstivda understanding thereof. These five criteria are not only conjoining per se, but are also related to the Sarvstivda notions of causality, in particular to saprayuktaka-hetu (conjoined cause) and sahabh-hetu (co-arising cause). The rejoinder of the Vaibhikas to the above statement is basically the same, with the further emphasis on sameness of substance:
Nynnusr stra:
What is equality? The equality of the five criteria. That is, because citta and caitasika are equal in five criteria, they are said to be conjoined. The equality of support, object, activity [of cognizing] characteristics, time and substance. The equality of substance, is that within one [act and moment of] conjoining, they have the same substance as citta. Likewise also for each and every caitasika-dharma. Some Dtntkas say that there is only citta, and no separate caitasikas, because no distinction [in their] activity [of cognizing] characteristics can be apprehended. 75 The Nynnusr supports the Bhyam, with the addition of pointing out that some Dtntikas still maintain that due to the lack of distinction in their activity, citta and caitasika are not separate. It thus appears that the Sautrntika Bhya, though borrowing at times from this liberal group within the Sarvstivda, does not accept in toto the Dntika view on this matter.
Causality and Arising:

We see here how the theory of the conjoining of citta and caitasika as a causal relationship within the context of momentariness takes predominance over the discussions. It is asked: How do dharmas arise? For dharmas which arise and cease in a single moment, the usual relationship between a preceding cause and the subsequent result, means that the two are separated in temporal sequence, and thus
75
Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0394c29~p0395a05
47
unable to act as efficient cause and effect. Thus, it is necessity that the sahabh-hetu (co-arising cause) be mutal causes of each other at the same time, to eliminate this temporal vacuum of causal efficacy. Yet, for a dharma to be able to abide for more than one moment, begs the question of then why does it not abide indefinitely? Also, the saprayuktaka-hetu (conjoined cause), whereby the conjoined dharmas mutually strengthen and rely upon one another. This is already seen in the earlier Hdaya:
Hdaya stra:
How dharmas arise shall now be discussed. Question: If dharmas are subsumed within their svabhva (own nature), they should arise due to their own power. Answer: 76 [In that way they are] ultimately unable to arise, Due to being separated from their companions. 77 All dharmas are unable to arise by themselves. For what reason? Because the nature of saskras is weak, and without power. It is just as a sick man is unable to arise due to his own strength. The reason used to refute this self-arising, is that the dharmas themselves are too weak. Being too weak suggests that the dharma have such power or causal efficacy, yet that it is insufficient. Does this mean that they have causal efficacy to arise by themselves? Such a position would be dangerously close to the Sakhya notion of arising from prakti (own power). How do dharmas which are existent throughout the past, present and future, then arise? Or rather, what is actually arising? Question: If they are unable to arise due to their own power, then how do they arise? Answer: [Due to the] power of all the various conditions, Dharmas attain [their] arising. 78 Superficially, this is simply dependent origination, ie. arising due to various conditions. But the explanation to follow adds new dimensions, resorting to the classifications of caitasika-dharmas that were established in principle, though not exhaustively, in the later Abhidharma stra period:
76 77 78
Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1550_p0810b17 Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1550_p0810b19 Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1550_p0810b23~25
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Just as a sick man can arise due to the assistance of another, these [dharmas] are likewise. Just as citta arises due to companions. This shall now be explained: If citta has arising, This citta must be conjoined with The group of caitasika-dharms, etc. And the viprayukta-saskras. Citta is manas, manas is vijna. They are in fact the same, yet have different names. With [the same] support, object and time of arising, this citta arises together with the group of caitasika-dharmas, etc. 79 Rather than simply conditions, dharmas arise from companions of several types. Thus conjoining is now the assistance to arising, and becomes a causal relationship, in addition to the previously established relationship that was merely co-temporal and thus descriptive. The exact details, however, are yet to be worked out.
Koa-bhya:
Citta and caitasika [dharmas] must be conjoined [with] Kritra, or prpti. The bhya states: Citta and caitasika [dharmas] must certainly have conjoined arising, if [the caitasikas] are subsequent [by as] little as a single moment, they will then not [be able to] arise. All saskra[-dharmas] are just all saskta [dharmas], which are [subsumed within the categories of]: 1. rpa; 2. citta; 3. caitasika; and 4. citta-viprayukta. The preceding statement must be conjoined, means [that in order for them to] continue [through time and] arrive at this [moment], when the samskra of rpa, citta and so forth arise, they must also arise conjoined with the four characteristics of conditioned [dharma]. The statement or prpti means that within saskra, only sentient dharma arise conjoined with prpti, [whereas] other dharma do not do so. Therefore or [rather than and] is stated. 80 The Koa takes the Vaibhika notion of simultaneity, causally related conjoining, momentariness, and the endowment of these dharmas with the four characteristics of conditioned phenomena, ie. arising, abiding, decay and cessation. Although these
79 80
Abhidharma Hdaya: T28n1550_p0810b23~29 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0018c29~0019a06
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dharmas are constantly arising, abiding, decaying and ceasing, their kritra of producing their next moment, and the notion of prpti, means that they do not fall into the nihilistic extreme. Commenting on the same verses of the Koa Krik, the Nynnusr adds very little. A summary is found in the Samayapradpik, where a conciliatory tone again appears, as the author tries once and for all, to establish the Vaibhika orthodox view:
Samayapradpik stra:
[others claim that] there are many types of separate citta and caitasika. [That they are] just as sugar cane juice, or a musical performer thus, there is no vedan, and so forth, as separate substances that can be apprehended. Yet [we claim that], citta and caitasika are identical [in regards to their] time, object and nature. There is no difference in their activity [of cognizing] characteristics, and perception of their distinct characteristics is difficult. 81 It first gives a brief synopsis of the theories seen as not Vaibhika orthodox views. Then states the five conditions for conjoining, despite their being non-different in activity, and difficult to perceive as different. Thus, the stras state: Citta and caitasika-dharmas are conjoined together in their development, whether vedan, or saj, or cetan, or vijna. These such dharmas are never apart from this inter-mingling, and one cannot conceive of [their] separate and distinct characteristics. However, vijna and saj each have separate and distinct characteristics, [namely], general cognition of the object being known as vijna, and apprehension of distinct [characteristics] being known as saj. Conceptualization is known as saj, due to strength of citta. All the stras state in many places, that it is like the arrival of a king, etc., [as the caitasikas] arise together with citta. Thus it is [only] said to be acting alone. 82 Given that the stras state that citta and caitasika are conjoined yet inconceivable as separate and distinct, the Vaibhikas must work hard to show that they are distinct dharma entities, as opposed to merely distinct functions or aspects. The position here is one of Abhidharma over stra, wherein the Vibhika claim that these
81 82
Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0803a29~b05 Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0803b05~09
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caitasika-dharmas have distinct characteristics, despite a stra statement to the contrary. They say that because they have distinct characteristics, they are distinct dharma entities. One could ask though, given that a dharma is that which causes a cognition, if the characteristics, ie. that by which a dharma is cognized, are indistinguishable, how does one assert such a position? It continues: Because it is difficult to understand caitasikas, there are thus many disputes and theories. But, from all these disputes and theories, could one come to the conclusion that there are none [caitasikas]? If such a conclusion was made, that too would be an error, as these bhidhrmikas all believe that there are caitasikas apart from citta. It is only with regards to how many, their amounts, their increase and decrease, that these disputes and theories prevail. This is because the stras do not state exact amounts or numbers. 83 However, due to extremely refined nature of both citta and caitasika, they are difficult to discern. As such, numerous disputes arise, particularly with regard to their actual numbers and variation thereof, (that are present in any given moment or state). The stras do not elucidate this either, one assumes therefore, that we are to rely upon the Abhidharma for the definite answers to this question. The above is a strong statement in favor of Abhidharma as pramna over stra, and respect too for the opinions of the learned bhidhrmikas and their tradition. Leaving the stras and reference to them aside, the formal Abhidharma reasoning continues: If one upholds [the theory that] vedan, etc. are modifications of citta, how can just citta be known as caitasika? Also, based on what certain principle does one state that vijna is [the same as] citta? Furthermore, due to what condition is [a dharma] known as a caitasika? If one claims that because the substance of vijna is just citta, [and that] vedan, and such dharmas are of the same type as the substance of this citta, because the continuity of citta has these dharmas, that they are known as caitasikas, then why not say that all composed rpa is just modifications of the same type as the substance of the mahbhtas, because within the continuity of solidity, and so forth, these dharmas exist, and are known as that which is composed [of the mahbhtas]? But it is not so! How is it then? Apart from the mahbhtas there are distinct [rpa dharmas which are] composed. This is as per the Nynnusr [stra], which has already examined this in detail. 84
83 84
Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0803b10~13 Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0803b13~21
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Again the argument from the Jnaprasthna through the Mahvibha, that citta is to caitasika what the mahbhtas are to rpa. Given that rpa is already accepted as distinct apart from the mahbhtas, and using the argument of similarity of relationship, he tries to prove the distinctness of the caitasikas from citta. Moreover: How does one know then, that caitasika-dharmas definitely have distinct substances apart from citta? Due to the principles of the teaching. As the stras state: With the eye and rpa as conditions, visual-vijna is produced. The joining of the three is spara, and simultaneous arising of vedan, saj and cetan. These such dharmas are of the type of citta, are supported by citta, are bound with citta. Thus they are known as caitasika. This states simultaneously arisen, and does not state immediately continuous. However, it does elucidate that caitasikas are produced simultaneously. Moreover, it is not permissible for [other] citta substances to be simultaneously produced, thus one can know that it only states that caitasikas are simultaneously arisen. Thus citta and caitasika of the arpa-dharmas have been discussed. 85 Finally, he gives a statement as to the orthodox Sarvstivda position, based on the stras 86 : Citta and caitasika are distinct as shown in the series of the dependent origination of cognition and perception, etc. They are conjoined in the sense of being simultaneously arisen, and not merely immediately continuous. Only one citta can be present at any given time, thus many caitasikas that are simultaneously produced may also be present.
Summary:
At this point, the orthodox Sarvstivda view is that citta and caitasika dharmas are distinct entities. Within any given moment of cognition, both citta and caitasika dharmas are present, which is known as being conjoined. This conjoining has five factors: 1. same faculty basis, ie. one of the sense organs; 2. same object as condition, ie. one of the sense objects; 3. same activity in regards to the object; 4. they are
85 86
Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0803b21~26 In addition to the notes in Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004), pg. 163, the quote also matches closely with sayuktgama-stra 21 (CBETA, T02, no. 99, p. 150, a29-b4) Saj and cetan are activity of manas: [they are] supported by citta, associated with citta, transform based on citta, therefore, saj and cetan are activity of manas Saj and cetan are caitasika-dharmas: [they are] supported by citta, associated with citta, transform based on citta, therefore, saj and cetan are activity of manas.
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simultaneous in arising and activity; and 5. they are equal, ie. of same substance. The last is somewhat controversial, as some maintain that caitasika are not distinct substances from citta. In order to explain the causative efficacy of these dharmas, there is the applicaton of a new model of causation, which indicates that not only are dharmas conjoined temporally by arising through a common cause and condition, but also act as mutual causes and conditions to one another causal conjoining. This is to overcome the fault of the temporal disconnection of cause and result in a system of momentary dharmas, which could fall towards the extreme of nihilism. It is also as each already existent dharma is not strong enough to arise under its own power. There is a slight conciliatory tone to some of the arguments, wherein it is acknowledged that due to the subtle nature of dharmas, the difficulty of perceiving them. This is related to the issue of dharmas being cognized through their characteristics, or through their svabhva. The Vibhika although allowing for difficulty of cognition of distinct dharmas, still recognize them as separate and distinct. There is also the fact that although the stras did not give specific numbers of which dharmas arise at what times and under what conditions, one should not totally reject the various classification methods of the dharmas. Although debates often arise by various bhidhrmika parties regards small details, all agree with the general principle.
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VEDAN, SAJ AND SASKRA:

From the above discussions it is apparent that at least vedan, saj and saskra are accepted as being distinct caitasika. The main reason being the elucidation of their respective characteristics in the stras. Let us now examine these first three caitasika before preceding with the more complex issue of the various divisions within the saskra-skandha, and the somewhat controversial citta-viprayukta-dharma.
Classification Systems:
Continuing with the three texts above, let us first look at the kriks from the Bhya, which begin with a short definition of the three, in terms of their unique substance, and follow with their respective positions within the three classification systems.
Koa-bhya:
Now, vedan and so forth [saj and saskra], shall be explained [in relation to] the three [classification systems] of skandha, yatana and dhtu. The krik states: 87 Vedan [has] receptive experience subsequent to spara [as its substance]; Saj has apprehension of the image as its substance; The remainder [from these] four are known as the saskra-skandha. In such a manner, the three of 1. vedan, etc. [2. saj, and 3. saskra]; [As well as] avijapti (unexpressed) and asaskt (the unconditioned); Are known as the dharma-yatana and dharma-dhtu. 88 Vedan and saj are a single skandha each, with the remaining caitasika-dharma in the saskra-skandha. We shall leave aside the avijapti and asaskt for discussion elsewhere. Together these are the entirety of dharma-yatana and dharma-dhtu.
Vedan Sensation:
The first is vedan, here defined as receptive exerience, and often translated into English as feeling or sensation. It arises dependent upon, and thus subsequent to spara (contact), of the supporting organ, object and consciousness. The krik at this
87 88
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0003c27 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0003c28~0004a01
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point leaves out the issue of whether spara itself is a separate substance, but this is taken up later. As receptive experience, we get an impression of its being conditioned, but passive, ie. it is a resultant and not a cause. It is also worthwhile reviewing the stra explanation of spara at this point. Although not specifically indicated as falling within any particular skandha, it appears in series of prattya-samutpda as:
MN 148: Chachakka Sutta:

Bhikkhus, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; the meeting of the three is contact; with contact as condition there arises [a feeling] felt as pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant [Likewise for the other five sense organs, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.] 89 The translation here states the meeting of the three is contact, implying that spara is a term designated upon the specific relationship of the sense, object and sense consciousness. It is then referred to as a requisite condition, which could give the impression of either an entity or a relation. Bhikkhu Bodhi in his translation of the Mahnidna Sutta 90 also mentions: Designation-contact (adhivacanasamphassa) and impingement-contact (paighasamphassa) are two terms peculiar to the present sutta. The commentary identifies the former with mind-contact, the latter with the five kinds of sense contact, but it does not explore the special meanings attached to these terms. Here contact spara is seen as extending from the impingement of the five sense organs with the respective objects, through to this becoming a mental event in the sixth sense orga, and the role of designation, naming and conceptually identifying objects of any of the six senses. The author feels that this is also a subject warranting further investigation for the eludication of the term spara. The Abhidharma was involved in much discussion regards whether spara was a separate dharma, with its own substance, or merely a designation for the co-incidence of organ, object and consciousness. Regarding vedan as the result of karma, the suttas state:
89
90
Bhikku amoli and Bhikku Bodhi: Chachakka Sutta, The Six Sets of Six, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikya, (Wisdom Publications, 2001). pg. 1134. Bhikkhu Bodhi: The Great Discourse on Causation, The Mahnidna Sutta and Its Commentaries, (Buddhist Publication Society, 2000). pg. 15~17.
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MN 136: Mahkammavibhanga Sutta:

having done an intentional action by way of body, speech, or mind [whose result is] to be felt as pleasant, one feels pleasure. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech, or mind [whose result is] to be felt as painful, one feels pain. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech, or mind [whose result is] to be felt as neither-painnor-pleasure, one feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure. 91 There is thus action as a condition, and subsequent feeling as result. The Buddha neither explicitly states that action is the sole condition, nor that feeling is the sole result, in this formulation. Later, we see the Dntika development of the notion that karma and its retribution are only cetan and vedan respectively. This is rejected by the orthodoxy, on the basis of their theory of causality:
Mahvibha:
As the Dntikas state: Apart from cetan, there is no cause of [karma] retribution. Apart from vedan, there is not result of [karma] retribution. In order to cut through the intent of such theories, and reveal that [the entirety of the] five skandhas is the result of retribution [this treastise has been composed.] 92 [Yet we] allow it that, apart from cetan there is cause of [karmic] retribution, and apart from vedan there are [other] resultant [karmic] retributions. 93 [it is rather, that] cetan is most excellent [in this process]: Cetan has the most excellent strength in effecting a desirable or undesirable fruit. 94 The last, being the orthodox Sarvstivda view, indicates that cetan is not the exclusive condition for vedan, merely predominant in strength of all the causes and conditions. There is also discussion as to whether a single act of karma results in a single resultant vedan, or multiple vedan. There would be a danger in unique causes leading to unique conditions, in the sense of strict arising from another, as
91
92 93 94
Bhikku amoli and Bhikku Bodhi: Mahkammavibhanga Sutta, The Greater Exposition of Action, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikya, (Wisdom Publications, 2001). pg. 1059. Abhidharma Mahvibh: T28n1546_p0204c13 Abhidharma Mahvibh: T28n1546_p0079c26 From Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, (Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lank, 2004), pg. 279. Source unknown.
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this was rejected by the Buddha, as opposed to multiple conditions and multiple results. The Sarvstivda sees this danger in the Dntika position on both scriptural and causal theory grounds, as not only are many other dharmas conjoined in the arising of cetan and experience of vedan, but dharmas are too weak to act alone in causation. There is also some question as to whether the three-fold division of vedan amounts to three distinct substances, or modifications of the one substance:
Koa-bhyam:
The stra states: The vedan-skandha is known to be threefold in receptive experience subsequent to spara. That is: 1. pleasant; 2. painful; and 3. neither painful nor pleasant. This is further differentiated to establish the sixfold vedan-kya, which is [from] vedan arisen [due to] visual spara, up to vedan arisen [due to] manas spara. 95 The Bhya states that it is either three-fold according to its emotional content, or six-fold according to its respective conditioning sense sphere. Both of these definitions are found in the stras, which of course do not state that either this three-fold or six-fold division constitutes unique separate substances. The Nynnusr accepts the basic premise of the Krik, but deals more with the issue of substance vis--vis vedan in its various divisions:
Nynnusr stra:
Furthermore, how is one to know that these have [their own] substance? It is said: Due to [their] three separate functions, they are able to augment and diminish the faculties and mahbhmika, and their characteristics are mutually contrary. [Thus] know that they have three [distinct] substances. Others say: Because they respectively increase lobha, dvea and moha, know that they have three [distinct] substances. 96 This is a clear statement about some views that were held, considering that the three forms of vedan each have distinct substances, due to having distinct functions. This view represents a more active aspect of vedan as a condition, not merely as a passive receiving of experience as a result, but as functioning to either augment or diminish other factors. A similar description of vedan is also given in the Majjhima Nikya:
95 96
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a02~04 Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0338c09~12
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Cavedalla Sutta:
the underlying tendency to lust underlies pleasant feeling, the underlying tendency to aversion underlies painful feeling, and the underlying tendency to ignorance underlies neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. 97 Strictly speaking however, in this sense vedan can only be considered a conditioning factor in regards the increase of the three root afflictions, and not the root cause per se, which is the underlying tendency. The Nynnusr continues:
Nynnusr stra:
Now it shall be stated in the orthodox manner, through the teachings and [through] principle: Know that the third form of vedan (ie. neutral, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) is definitely not non-existent. [1] The teachings state: Due to the severance of pleasant [sensation] and due to the severance of unpleasant [sensation], within this [state] there is only neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant [sensation]. [2. According to the] principle: Apart from vedan, citta will definitely not arise. This is because citta that is separated from pleasant and unpleasant [sensation] can be apprehended (cognized) in the present. 98 In response to these views, the orthodox Vaibhika position is stated. Firstly, the affirmation of a neutral, ie. neither-pleasant-nor-painful, vedan. This implies that some considered vedan to be only two-fold with regard to emotional content. The proof for three-fold vedan is two pronged, scriptural and reasoned argument. The last statement by principle also indicates the conjoining of dharmas as essential to arising. Rather than admit of the non-existence of certain dharmas, the Sarvstivda would rather see them as being weak, and thus unable to bring about their result. Here, it is vedan as a conjoined cause for the arising of citta. It also implicitly shows the Vaibhika attitude towards the attainment of cessation of saj and vedan, that there is no subtle citta in the absence of vedan. Furthermore: How can one know that Apart from vedan, citta will definitely not arise? This is due to the common teachings within the stras. As the stras state: With the eye and rpa as conditions, visual-vijna arises. The
97
98
Bhikku amoli and Bhikku Bodhi: Cavedalla Sutta, The Shorter Series of Questions and Answers, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Majjhima Nikya, (Wisdom Publications, 2001). Pg. 401. Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0338c18~21
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joining of the three is spara, [with] the simultaneous arising of vedan, saj and cetan. Likewise, up to: With [the faculty of] manas and dharma as [object] conditions, mano-vijna arises. The joining of the three is spara, and the simultaneous arising of vedan, saj and cetan. There is no seventh citta [beyond manas as the sixth vijna] that arises independent of vedan. Therefore, know that there definitely is a third vedan [that is neither painful nor pleasant]. 99 Regards arising of vedan, saj and cetan after spara of the faculty, object and vijna, the idea of simultaneous arising is stated explicitly. The seventh citta refers to some sort of citta that continues even when the sixth citta, ie. mano-vijna, is not present. Such a seventh citta could be used to explain both vipka from past karma, and also the re-arising of citta after emergence from the attainment of saj and vedan. Such a seventh citta is not required in the Sarvstivda system, who can attribute the re-arising of such citta and caitasika by means of existent past dharmas. Beyond the scope of the stras, we also see a new two-fold division of vedan: Moreover, it is taught in brief that vedan is of two types: Firstly, vedan of apprehension; secondly, own-nature (svabhva) vedan. Vedan of apprehension is that which is able to receive and experience its own objective condition. Own nature vedan is that which is able to receive and experience the [immediately previous] spara that it itself is subsequent to. 100 Vedan is here further analysed into apprehending and own nature. These two divisions are mentioned earlier in the Mahvibha 101 as direct and own nature vedan. The first is vedan which is temporally conjoined with the object, faculty and vijna. The second is defined as such, that it is basically immediately subsequent to the three. Such a definition gives the Sarvstivda support for their notion of conjoining and simultaneity, and also the possibility of reflection upon past states the best of both systems! This two-fold division is based on the Sarvstivda understanding of several relevant stras: Thus, the Bhagavt said: Spara of pleasant vedan, spara of painful vedan, and spara of neither-pleasant-nor-painful vedan. The distinctive characteristics of the experienced entity of spara, the experienced conditioning vedan and the singular dharma object, of these pleasant, etc. [three forms of] vedan, are difficult to cognize. As the stra
Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0338c21~25 Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0338c25~28 101 Abhidharma Mahvibha: T27n1545_p0596a25~27
99 100
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states, [it is] endowed with receptive experience, this term receptive experience is spoken of as being similar to, supported by praj. Thus, the stra continues, adding: Not experiencing further becoming, knowing as it really is. Although vedan is also able to experience the objective state, the own nature of this receptive experience is, however, difficult to cognize. Therefore, receptive experience of spara is own nature vedan, which is not [to be considered] together with other [vedan] whos distinctions are easily known. 102 The conciliatory nature of the explanation of own nature vedan is quite plain. There is an urgent need to have such an entity to explain previous doctrines, yet clear evidence acceptable to the opposition is hard to drawn upon. Regarding the state of the liberated arhat, there is no definite reason why the term vedan as it it used for receptive experience and experience (of further becoming), have to both be regarded as identical dharmas. It is not that every use of the term has to correspond with vedan as it is defined within the skandhas. The second is in quite a different context, more akin to updna or bhva as taking up or becoming. If they were identical, one could ask, why does vedan not appear twice in the twelve links of dependent origination, first as following spara, but second as between bhva and jti, ie. the taking up of further existence? Trying to expand their unifying theory of mind to include such statements is a courageous effort, but seems to cause a proliferation of new terms and concepts. Saghabhadra continues in the discussion regarding vedan and spara in the Samayapradpik:
Samayapradpik stra:
The stra states: Arisen subsequent to spara, receving and experiencing the desirable and the undesirable, possessing a characteristic, contrary to spara is known as vedan-skandha. Receiving and experiencing, is just the meaning of the function of vedan. How does this vedan receive and experience subsequent to spara? It is because vedan is a proximate resultant of spara. This term subsequent spara is in order to reveal the entity of the cause. Because it is able to conform with vedan, it is a term [that is given] in accordance with its characteristic. Characteristic means expression or appearance which is able to reveal [the existence of the dharma in question]. The cause is able to reveal the result, and is thus the name of the characteristic is established. This term that is in accordance with the characteristic has a meaning which conforms to the cause. Vedan is able to receive and experience, and is able to conform with the
102
Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0338c28~0339a05
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cause spara. Therefore it is stated that the receptive experience of vedan is subsequent to spara. 103 For understanding this passage from the Chinese source, the terms (sui2) subsequent, and (shun4) conforming or in accord with, must be carefully noted. He argues that vedan is subsequent to spara actually means that vedan conforms with, is in accord with, spara in terms of its characteristic. These two Chinese characters are often almost interchangeable in meaning, though the first usually implies a sequential order, ie. subsequent to, whereas the second implies quiescence to and non-resistence, ie. conforming to or in accord with. Whatever the case, the term conjoined is not used here, which would explicitly indicate simultaneity. Saghabhadra wants to indicate a causal relationship between spara and vedan, and not merely a temporal relationship. A temporal relationship could mean that spara is purely designatory, ie. mere designation for the co-incidence of the three factors of spara, whereas causality indicates the existence of a separate substance, ie. the coincidence of the three factors cause the dharma of spara. As the Bhagavt said: Spara conforming to pleasant vedan, spara conforming to unpleasant vedan, and spara conforming to neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant vedan this is precisely the meaning of conforming arisal of pleasant vedan, etc. Receptive experience subsequent to spara is known as svabhva-vedan. The object of receptive experience is also the characteristic of vedan, and is difficult to cognize as [having a] characteristic distinct from the dharma of one pointedness [of citta], because they are all alike in regards their object of receptive experience. When citta and caitasika apprehend and sense the object, all [these dharmas] are known as receiving and experiencing their own object. Therefore, only this is stated as receptive experience subsequent to spara, and is known as svabhva-vedan, due to the definiteness of [its] distinct characteristics. Receptive experience of the object is known as apprehending vedan. It is not [so named] due to the non-definiteness of the characteristic that it identifies. The differences in these two [forms of] vedan, should be understood as per the detailed analysis in the Nynnusra and the Paca-vastu stra (a section of the Jnaprasthna]. In general, they (vedan) are stated as three[-fold]. Specifically, they are stated as six[-fold]. This is due to the difference in the [three] time [periods of past, present and future], and the [six faculty] supports. 104
103 104
Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0783a19~24 Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0783a25~b04
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In this stra passage, because it is spara that is either subsequent to or conforming with vedan, the term used should not be understood as subsequent, as that would imply that it is vedan that is the cause of spara! He further uses the definition of an own nature vedan, as being the general sensing or experiencing of the object by all the cittas and cittasikas. Only this is considered subsequent in the strict sense intended here. One pointedness in this instance refers to samdhi, (or possibly manaskra, both) being considered as universals, and involved in every act of cognition. Thus, apprehending vedan is simultaneous with spara; own nature vedan with its meaning of sensing the object in general, is causally related and subsequent. So much for vedan.
Saj Perception:
The second of the commonly accepted caitasika is saj perception or ideation. This mental factor is listed as the third skandha, yet does not appear in the nidnas of prattya-samutpda. It is intimately related to the action of the senses and the external sense objects in its role as perception, and to subsequent understanding about this sense data in its role as ideation. Due to its ideation related to previous events, it is sometimes considered as apperception. The Koa-bhyam states the basic characteristic of saj as apprehension of the image (lakana or characteristic), and is again six-fold according to the respective perceiving sensory faculty:
Koa-bhyam:
Saj-skandha is stated as having the capability of apprehending images as its substance. This is [for example, of the eye]: being able to take up and apprehend the characteristics of blue and yellow; long and short; male and female; enemy and friend; pain and pleasure; and so forth. This is further differentiated to establish the sixfold saj-kya, which should be explained as per [the sixfold kya of] vedan. 105 Any arguments regarding the status of spara as a separate substance, due to its relationship with (simultaneous or subsequent) vedan, saj and saskra / cetan, having already been discussed previously under the subject of vedan. In response to Vasubandhus position, the Nynnusr (and Samayapradpik, which has practically an identical commentary), add very little to what the Bhyam states:
105
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a04
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Nynnusr-stra:
Saj, the third skandha, has apprehending images as its substance. That is, all [saj] are established according to their source. [For example:] the forms of blue [in color], long [in shape], etc.; the sounds of vna and conch, etc.; the scents of fresh lotus flowers, etc.; the flavors of bitter, hot, etc.; the tactiles of smooth, rough, etc.; the dharmas of arising, ceasing, etc.. It apprehends the characteristic [image] of the objective condition, as it is. Thus, it is known as saj. Therefore, this saj is named according to its qualities (guna?), and is named saj because it is able to apprehend the image. It is three-fold in general [by time past, present and future], and six-fold specifically [by faculty], which should be understood as per vedan. 106
Asaj-sampatti Ideationless Attainment:

Aside from this, the notion of saj does appear in the very important subject of asaj-sampatti (ideationless attainment), the cessation of saj and vedan, which poses some problems for all parties. For the Sarvstivda, if saj and vedan are absent, citta itself is unable to arise (as it lacks its necessary conjoined causes and strength). When one then arises from such an attainment, how is the re-arising of citta and the other caitasikas (including saj and vedan) to be explained? The Sarvstivda then resorts to past citta and caitasika, the mind of entry into the absorption (sampatti-citta), which, as still existent, still has causal efficacy. Opponents reject such a position, mainly due to their non-acceptance of the existence of past dharmas. Several avenues are then apparent: 1. The Dntika view that citta and caitasika arise from seeds dependent upon rpa (rpndriyritya implicit in certain stras). 2. The theory of the Sautrntika Vasumitra, that some form of subtle citta (skmacitta) remains, an aspect of manas. 3. Another Sautrntika view that lack of vedan and saj is merely due to lack of spara, yet when the three conditions for spara occur, then one arises from the attainment. 4. A theory of Vasubandhu the Stra-prmika, also involving subtle citta and seeds, leading into the appropriating consciousness (dna-vijna) as taught in the Sadhinirmocananma-mahyna Stra. 107 The last shows clearly the shift into Mahyna Yogcara systems, with the use of stras not admissible by the majority of the other parties.
106 107
Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0339a26 See also Lamotte E. & Pruden L: Karmasiddha-prakraa - The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu, (Asian Humanities Press, 1987). pg. 27~33 & 58~65, for more detail on this matter.
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Saskra Conditionings:
Saskra literally means together maker, construct, conditioner, and is rooted in k to make. It is very akin to the notion of saskta, the conditioned, and basically can include all those factors which act to condition, are conditioners of other dharmas. This is a very broad definition in such a dynamic system as Buddhism, wherein all but a very few phenomena are subject to the law of conditionality. From such a broad perspective, how do the bhidhrmikas understand saskra as a distinct dharma? We have seen earlier how cetan has been assigned to the saskra-skandha, along with basically all other caitasika-dharmas that cannot be relegated to either the categories of vedan or saj. This is because one way or another, any dharma can act as a conditioner to dharmas other than itself, which is the kraa-hetu efficient cause of the Sarvstivda system. In this way also, vedan and saj can bee seen as being passive results of spara and so forth, and, lacking the capacity to condition others, are not considered as saskra conditioners, despite their being saskta conditioned and still ultimately involved in mental process. The basic definition of saskra below is taken from the Koa-bhyam, ie. that the six-fold cetan is predominant in the saskra- skandha:
Koa-bhyam:
Excluding the preceding and proceding [skandhas of] rpa, vedan, saj and vijna, all the remaining saskras are known as sakra-skandha. As the Bhagavn states in the stra: 108 the sixfold cetan-kya is saskra-skandha , due to [its] predominance. How so? Saskra is known as intentional activity. Cetan is of the nature of karma, with a powerful function of intentional activity, and is therefore predominant. Therefore, the Buddha stated that: [That which is] capable of intentional construction of arava (outflow) saskta [dharmas] is known as saskraupadna-skandha (the grasping aggregate of conditioning volitions). [For that which is] not the case, the remaining caitasika dharmas and viprayukta [dharmas] are not included within this skandha. [They] should
108
This is most likely: T02n0099_p0015c28, sayuktgama-stra: What is the grasping aggregate of saskra? It is the six-fold group of cetan. Which six? They are cetan arisen from visual contact, up to, cetan arisen from mental contact. This is known as the grasping aggregate of saskra. Possibly corresponds to: Khadha-sayutta 48~53.
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not be [the truths of] dukha or samudaya, and thus are unable to be [that which] should be known and [that which] should be severed. 109 Having the function of being intentional activity and thus karma, correct understanding of cetan and thus the other saskras is very important for Buddhist praxis. It must be explained in a manner that accords with other doctrines, such as karma and vipka, and the rya truths. The last statement indicates that the aim of spiritual practice is not the severance of all caitasika-dharmas in general, but merely those conditioning saskras that are cetan-karma, which bind one to cyclic existence. In this sense, nirva is clearly not some sensationless state. As the Bhagavn stated: There is one dharma, that if it is not yet realized, not yet known, I declare [that one will be] unable to reach the extent of suffering, and declare likewise for its severance and cessation. Due to this [statement] it is certainly accepted that apart from the [other] four skandhas, the remaining conditioned saskras are all included within the saskra-skandha. 110 The Koa later details how the remaining conditioned saskras are classified and arranged within this skandha. Again, the point of whether these other saskras are distinct substances or not, continues. The Nynnusr first states the position to be refuted by the Sarvstivda, followed by the orthodox view:
Nynnusr stra:
The Elder [Dharmatrta] states: Saskra is only cetan. The others, manaskra, etc., are modifications of cetan. He also further states: Of the saskras of manaskra, etc., one cannot cognize their distinct substances apart from cetan, or apart from the other saskras. [Yet] each has a distinct part of the substance of cetan that can be apprehended. This is because although this saskra-skandha is not a single entity, it is subsumed within the single [substance] of cetan. As the stras state: Although only one [dharma known as] cetan is raised, yet it does not contradict reason. How can one further know this? The saskras of manaskra, etc., all have cetan as their own substance. Because the Bhagavt taught in the stras, that the six-fold cetan-kya is the saskra-skandha, it is said that lobha, dvea, etc., are known as mental karma. [It is] neither black nor white, neither vipka not karma, but is able to extinguish all karma. This is taking the term cetan to teach the rya-mrga.
109 110
Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a06~12 Abhidharma Koa-bhya: T29n1558_p0004a12~15
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The teaching of the dhynas, limitless [states] and arpa [absorptions], through [the principle of] white-white vipka and karma. 111 We have seen earlier that the Elder with this view is Dharmatrta. He takes substance as the criteria for determining a distinct dharma, which can have many different cognizable characteristics. Thus, he takes manaskra to be a characteristic, or even function of cetan. Linguistically, the term manaskra, literally making in the mind, does conform closely in meaning with the definition of saskra as conditioning volitions, both are -kra, showing their active quality. The caitasika-dharmas of lobha, dvea, etc. are thus moral qualities of cetan, rather than distinct entities. The orthodox Vaibha rebuttal is: [However,] one should not apply one term to explain another dharma, claiming identity [in what is] non-identical. This is spoken in error, and the Bhagavt never speaks in error. The school of this Elder [Dharmatrta] teaches thus, but the principle itself is not so. [Those premises] established in the beginning and at the end are mutually contradictory, as initially he states that saskra-skandha is only cetan yet subsequently states that saskra-skandha is not only one entity. How can one accept that singular cetan is not one entity? [How can one accept that] only the claim that because the six-fold cetan is saskra-skandha, one can know that manaskra, etc., have cetan as their substance? 112 First of all, it is interesting to note that the Elder Dharmatrta now seems to be relegated to another school (or theory zong1) for his views. So much for his past Mahvibha days as a respected Elder of the orthodox Sarvstivda! The appeal to the Bhagavts words as never spoken in error is somewhat irrelevant, as the real issue is how these words are understood by the various bhidhrmikas, not whether or not they were spoken truly. All sides try to conform to the stras, although different stras are emphasized by different parties to convey their view points. This section also contains Saghabhadras denigration of the analogies ( pi4y4) of the Elder, and it implies that Dharmatrta is now considered one of the Dntikas, though this is not directly stated here. No strong counter argument is given here, only an appeal to internal contradiction within Dharmatrtas position. Yet, as there is no prior establishment of the distinction of cetan and saskra, this is still insufficient. Dharmatrta could be first indicating saskta-dharmas in general when he states although this saskra-skandha
111 112
Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0339b14~22 Abhidharma Nynnusr: T29n1562_p0339b22~27
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is not a single entity, it is subsumed within the single [substance] of cetan, and conditioned caitasika-dharmas when he states that the saskras of manaskra, etc., all have cetan as their own substance. The two parties are using terms that are not defined by both sides in an identical manner, though such a problem would not be a first occurrence. Saghabhadra has not finished yet, however, and the Samayapradpik adds:
Samayapradpik stra:
The stras only state the six-fold cetan-kya, due to its predominance. For what reason? Cetan is of the nature of karma, it is the cause that brings about the result, and its force is the most powerful. Therefore the Bhagavt taught: Those saskta[-dharmas] which are capable of constructing outflows, are known as saskra-updna-skandha (grasping aggregates of volitions). One cannot state that only cetan is saskraskandha. The general term is established as per the dharma yatana and dhtu. [But] other than this, one should only use the term cetan, and a single dharma can be established, as per the skandhas of vedan and saj. 113 The argument here is now seems one of conforming to a classification system, rather than the original Sarvstivda principle of identification of a dharma which has its own characteristics. However, with all the other conditioned dharmas being already included within the saskra-skandha, there is a certain necessity to establish them all separately, that their various defintions, characteristics, functions and so forth can be further discussed. This is a more pragmatic matter. The Koa texts go into considerable detail with regards to this, and these classifications became important for the developments of later Buddhist systems too. This classification is necessity for the Sarvstivda, to complete their presentation of the defilements, and thus the rya truths in general. A lot is at stake! This also continues with the issue of those caitasika-dharmas which are not conjoined with mind (visaprayukta-caitasika-dharma). Unfortunately, space here is insufficient to go into this area, which is another fascinating aspect of Abhidharma philosophy.
Summary:
Based largely on the universally accepted classification system of the skandhas from the stras, the caitasikas of vedan and saj are considered as substances distinct from citta. There is some discussion as to whether further analysis and divisions of
113
Abhidharma Samayapradpik: T29n1563_p0783b12~16
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these are distinct, or merely modifications thereof. In the end, based on the principle of the similarity of nature between dharmas, it is taken that they are each one dharma, that can be seen in a three-fold manner with respect to temporality, or in a six-fold manner according to the respective sense organ that experientialy feels, or perceives the characteristics of the object. Some discussion is given on the finer points of how vedan and saj both relate to the actual act of perception. Vedan is sub-divided into apprehending and own nature vedan, due to the constraints of temporal and causal conjoining. The absence of saj in the state of ideationless attainment promotes much discussion on the relation between rpa and citta in general. To explain how such a state can be entered and exited, various theories of subtle mind and the storage of causally efficient seeds takes place. This is also related to various karma theories, and can be seen as a direct precursor to later Yogcara notions of the lya-vijna. The issue of saskra is also complex. Defintions in terms of either all saskra being subsumed within cetan, or as existing as distinct dharma substances, has a major influence over the dharma theory involved in the doctrines of karma, the paths, causality, and other areas of Sarvstivda tenets in general. The orthodox result is that all the caitasika-dharmas mentioned, but not clearly classified, in the later Abhidharma period, are then subsumed within the saskra-skandha. Their detailed classification is included within the Koa and its commentaries. Two prominent Sarvstivda elders, Buddhadeva and Dharmatrta, reject that there are any caitasika that are distinct from citta and cetan respectively. Such a large scale subsumption of dharmas runs very contrary to the orthodox Vaibhika, yet become points of departure for later developments that go beyond the sphere of Sarvstivda proper. This is seen as Dharmatrta becomes retroactively relegated to the Dntika school when his views are considered beyond the scope of the orthodoxy.
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CONCLUSIONS:
Vijna, Manas and Citta
The stras themselves often use the terms citta, manas and vijna basically as synonyms for mind, that which cognizes and knows an object. They also use the three terms in slightly different senses, vis--vis a particular context or topic. Often citta is a generic term; manas refers at times to the mental faculty; and the totality of mind, whether past, present or future, and so forth, is subsumed within the skandha of vijna. No universal defintions are given by the Buddha himself however, as each teaching is for the sake of a particular person or people, with differences in context, understanding and spiritual development. The Abhidharma texts begin to elucidate and expand upon the stra terms. They take the various stra explanations and teachings on mind, and collate them together by subject. In later texts, although citta, manas and vijna are considered as the same substance or entity, ie. dharma with its own dravya, it is said that the different terms are used to describe different temporal aspects, and modes, of this process and activity of cognition. The three are also assigned to different classification systems. Citta is future mind, and a dhtu; manas is past mind, and an yatana; and vijna is present mind, the skandha. Although different temporally, due to the sarvsti thesis, these three are all still the same existent dharma. The later post-canonical Abhidharma texts continue with these distinctions. Such definitions become a general basis for later Yogcara theory of mind, and more systematized distinction between the three, wherein three distinct dharmas and functions are recognized.
Citta and Caitasika:

Associated with the cognizing function of citta, are the caitasikas mentals or mental dharmas. In the stra period, we see descriptions of vedan and saj which constitute two distinct skandhas, and also cetan which is conditioning karma volition, as included within this category. In addition are other caitasikas, such as spara and manaskra, the taxonomical details of which are sparse. These, as well as praj for instance, are clearly stated as inseparable from the mind, ie. it is impossible to separate them as distinct entities. Mind itself, whether given as citta, manas or vijna, is bare cognition, which is affected by the caitasikas, giving it psychic content of a particular act of cognition. Other states of mind are given as aspects, without necessarily implying other dharmas. The early Abhidharma again takes the teachings of the stras and arranges them by topic. All of the stra contents are presented, and they are regarded as more or less equally authoritative, as being from the Buddha himself. Certain caitasikas are 69
grouped together, according to their appearance in the stras, and often these groups from various stras overlap. However, at this stages, the classification groups are generally unsystematic with regards to other groups, type and definition. Some terms are listed several times, as they appeared in several of the original stra lists. By the time of the later Abhidharma Jnaprasthna and Mahvibha, the main issue is whether or not these caitasikas constitute separate, unique dharmas which are known as dravya, or entities. This issue is raised, despite the stras comments regarding their being impossible to separate as distinct entities, as the general Sarvstivda criteria that whatever has a specific characteristic, function or activity, that can be an irreducible object of cognition, is a distinct dharma. In general, all those dharmas mentioned by the Buddha in the stras, (wherein they are not defined and classified in such a cut-and-dried manner), are considered as dharma entities in the Abhidharma sense. These definitions are then used to understand the stras, and in this way, the Abhidharma becomes the criteria as to what is definitive. Several notable Sarvstivda cryas have other views, subsuming many dharmas as being aspects, of other dharmas which are considered as the only real entities. Examples being, the crya Buddhadeva subsumes all caitasika to citta, the crya Dharmatrta subsumes them to cetan. Their positions are also stra based, the difference being their interpretation of the text, and emphasis on particular stra(s). By the time of the later Koa and Bhya, the commentaries thereon, and more intellectually liberal manuals, we see that more issues are at stake. With highly developed systems wherein all the doctrines fit together into a complete whole, the issue of the relation between citta and caitasika affects the doctrines regarding such issues as perception, karma and vipka, the spiritual path, and so forth. No longer are caitasika merely important as mental dharmas associated with the mind, but rather are bound together through the laws of causal and conditional relation. No longer are the stras the prime sources of authority, but rather sophisticated argument through simile and analogy, as well as doctrinal principle, interpretation and application thereof, become the primary methodological approach. In general, it is accepted that both citta and caitasika are dharma entities, though there are differences as to the specifics of exactly which caitasika. The next issue is one of their relationship and interaction. This is a progress from the analytical to the synthetical, from dharma entities to prattya-samutpda conditional relations. In particular with regards to the process of perception, from bare vijna to the content of samj, and the full apprehending cognition of a dharma in all its characteristics. The orthodox Sarvstivda then lay out a five-fold criteria defining conjunction, namely: 1. supporting faculty; 2. object; 3. activity of cognizing characteristics; 4. time; and 5. substance. The notion of #3, activity of cognizing characteristics undergoes some development, from something akin to saj involved in all cognition and perception, to the specific praj involved in knowledge 70
of the general characteristics of all dharmas in the form of the sixteen aspects of the rya truths. Debate also ensues between the orthodox Sarvstivda, liberal Sarvstivda and Sautrntika leaders, as to whether citta and caitasika arise sequentially or simultaneously. The idea of conjunction slowly moves from merely temporal conjunction, to one of simultaneous and conjoined mutual causation and conditionality. Various notions not seen in the stras are introduced to defend the Sarvstivda position from counter arguments which threaten the notion of sarvsti itself. In this way, the range of influence of such theories goes beyond perception, and into karma, purification and / or dissociated from defilements, and the like.
Vedan, Saj and Saskra:

The stra definitions of vedan, saj and saskra are one of divison into three skandhas, and also appear in teachings on prattya-samutpda and related matters, according to their specific functions and roles in within the sasric existence and liberation of a living being. They are all associated with and conjoined with mind as caitasika, and are explicitly declared as being inseparable from mind. Other caitasika such as spara and praj, and various wholesome and unwholesome states, are also treated in a similar manner, though not as extensively. These other caitasika are not defined as to which of the skandhas they belong, though they are saskra in the sense of being conditioned and conditionings. In the early Abhidharma, the stra view is accepted as the general prama, and different forms of vedan and saj are mentioned, in accordance with the stras. Discussion continues, with more attention being paid to the saskra-caitasika, as a catch-all category for all conditioning dharmas not specifically defined as being other skandhas in the stras. The caitasikas of vedan and saj are considered as entities distinct from citta. Each is one dharma, that can be seen in a three-fold or in a six-fold manner according time and sense organ. Regards perception, vedan is sub-divided into apprehending and own nature, due to the constraints of temporal and causal conjoining. Discussion on saj provides a background for the later development of Yogcara notions of the lya-vijna, from both the perspective of ideationless attainment and as the result of karma as cetan. The contents of the saskra-skandha become systematized from the earlier Abhidharma, wherein dharmas are merely listed from the stras. The orthodox Vaibhika view is that basically all other saskta-dharma mentioned in the stras, are subsumed within saskra-skandha. Opponents posit that certain dharmas are not entities as such, but as rather the absence of an entity, a merely designated dharma.
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Abhidharma Theory of Mind:

In the parlance of modern psychology and theory of mind, Abhidharma theory of mind is basically dualist with regards mind and matter, as it is neither purely mental (idealist), nor purely materialist in perspective. It maintains the reality of both, as really existent dharma entities, each of which has its own characteristics, and is thus pluralistic. There is however, commonality in relation and methodology of identification and establishment amongst mental and material dharmas. This dualism is interactional, in that the two are closely mutually interconnected, particularly in the matter of perception and cognition of external (material) phenomena which is considered possible and valid, theories of rebirth, and so forth. Each influences the other, though mind is the most important, a kind of reverse epiphenomenalism (epinoumenonism!) Such interaction is the reflection of the key Buddhist doctrine of prattya-samutpda, dependent origination, and is seen in all schools of Buddhist thought. However, unlike Descartes interactionalism, no informed Buddhist would agree with the assertion of cogito ergo sum. Perhaps simply cognized, therefore a non-self dharma may be more acceptable to the bhidhrmika!
Abhidharma in the Broader Buddhist Context:

Because the bhidhrmikas accept the Buddhas word as true, the pre-Mahyna stra teachings act as framework within which the bhidhrmikas apply their methodology. Each doctrine is accepted as it is presented in the stra and vinaya piakas. This orthodox literary approach at times leads to debates which are often linguistic and semantic in manner, because differences then arise as to the correct interpretation of the unanimously accepted Buddha-vacana. As such, the Abhidharma takes the role of being the criteria as to what is definitive, and what provisional in meaning. Also, the issue of whether all the names and terms for dharmas refer to actual entities, or are arbitrary designatory terms, plays a large role at times. The bhidhrmikas usual accept them as dharmas, though there are many exceptions. This is even taken to the point whereby an entity and the negation of the same entity, are both regarded as distinct dharmas. The nature of existence of such dharmas, became particularly important in doctrinal development after the Sarvstivda, in both polemics with the Sautrntika, and the various Mahyna schools. The Abhidharma tradition is thus a most extensive and profound record of the wisdom arisen from reflection, based on the stras, from this early period. It takes the Buddha Dharma and ponders on, reflects upon, and weighs it up, bringing all manner of contemplative methods to bear on the subject. The result is a huge range of insightful discussion, into all matters of the spiritual path. 72
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources Tripiaka:
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Dhammajoti, Bhikkhu Kuala Lumpur: Sarvstivda Abhidharma, Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lanka, 2002 & 2004. Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception, Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lanka, 2004. Abhidharma and Upadea, in Journal of Buddhist Studies, Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lanka, Vol. III, August 2005. Sarvstivda, Dntika, Sautrntika and Yogcra, in Journal of Buddhist Studies, Center for Buddhist Studies, r Lanka, Vol. IV, August 2006. Fo Guang Shan Religious Affairs Board: Fo Guang Buddhist Dictionary, Vol. III, 2003. Fo Guang gama Piaka, Vol. I, 2002. Lamotte E. & Pruden L: Karmasiddha-prakraa - The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu, Asian Humanities Press, 1987. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma, Motilal Banarsidass Publishing, 2001.
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Development of Abhidharma Theory of Citta and Caitasika - Huifeng

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