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Author: A Ennis Hazardous Area Classification An investigation of hazard ranges using gas dispersion modelling

ABSTRACT
Experience in the application of Hazardous Area Classification across a wide range of industries and applications has suggested that some of the hazard ranges suggested in the guidance are excessively large in comparison to the ranges predicted by gas dispersion modelling. An investigation has been carried out comparing the zone distances contained in the available guidance: BS EN 60079-10 Institute of Petroleum IP 15 Institution of Gas Engineers IGE/SR/25 A number of common situations have been examined in order to provide a range of data. The cases examined include: Tank venting Bund full of flammable liquid Gasket leak Pump seal leak These have been modelled under typical worst-case wind / weather conditions (Category F2) for a range of fluids and pressures. Since gas dispersion is a statistical model, the lower limit for ignition is taken to be half the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL/2) Results indicate that, under some circumstances, the guidance predicts excessively large hazardous zones. The limitations of gas dispersion are discussed, as are the implications for hazardous area classification guidance.

INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (Ref.3) there has been increased interest in Hazardous Area Classification. Previously,

Area Classification had been widely practiced by the chemical and allied industries and only sparingly adopted by the non-chemical industries. The guidance for area classification was generally limited and most companies used the applicable British Standard (BS EN 60079-10 : 1996). This standard is now obsolete and has been replaced by the 2005 edition (Ref.1). The amount of information and number of examples in the guidance has increased each time. One common result of this was that many plants were simply blanket classified and whole plant areas were classified as Zone 1. The reasoning behind this was generally that it was simpler and easier to manage the whole of the plant as a single zone. A common electrical equipment standard could then be applied across the whole of the plant and the additional costs were considered to be minimal for doing this. DSEAR is, however, a risk-based approach and blanket classification is not now considered acceptable in many situations. Additionally, there is further guidance available on the detail of hazardous area classification from the Energy Institute (Ref.2) and the Institution of Gas Engineers (Ref.3). These give detailed guidance on the estimation of hazard ranges for a wide range of scenarios, which cover the vast majority of commonly found situations. During the authors experience in applying the various guidance, it became apparent that some of the distances quoted in Reference 2 appeared to be far greater than ranges calculated by gas dispersion modelling for similar scenarios (which had been modelled for other purposes). Also, a number of issues arose as a result of these hazard ranges, where zones impinged on areas that had previously been regarded as non-hazardous. This was particularly apparent in relatively crowded environments such as oil refineries, where following the guidance meant that the zoned area sometimes crossed roadways and impinged upon switch houses. It was, therefore, decided to examine some typical cases under UK average wind and weather conditions and compare the calculated gas dispersion model output against the guidance. BS EN 60079-10 offers only a limited range of direct examples to compare and hence IP15 was used for benchmarking purposes.

IGNITION HAZARD CRITERIA

In order to assess the minimum concentration for the gas dispersion, it is necessary to identify the lowest concentration at which ignition of the cloud is just possible. In order to do this, it is necessary to consider the nature of the dispersion model. All of the popular dispersion models use some form of statistical model and hence there is a significant risk of a flammable concentration occurring outside of the model LFL isopleth. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to assume that pockets of gas above the LFL may occur down to the half LFL (LFL/2) boundary. On this basis, a cut-off limit of LFL/2 has been used as the minimum credible concentration for ignition.

CHOICE OF EXEMPLAR MATERIALS

In order to provide a direct comparison with the guidance in IP15, which was originally intended for use in the fuel and energy industry, the gasoline mixture defined in IP15 was used. This composition is:

Component Propane (C3) Butane (C4) Pentane (C5) Hexane (C6) Heptane (C7) Octane (C8) Nonane (C9) Decane (C10)

Mol % 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 27.0 25.0 38.0

Total 100.0 * This equivalent to a Category C fluid.

GAS DISPERSION MODEL

For the gas dispersion, it is essential that an appropriate model be used which gives an accurate representation of the dispersion under the range of scenarios being modelled. There are several models available from the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), however, many of these are relatively old and / or not suitable for the variety of cases being modelled. Several gas dispersion models were considered for this work e.g HGSYSTEM7, ALOHA8. After due consideration, PHAST (Ref.5) was chosen due to the use of the Unified Dispersion Model which can handle a variety of releases including dense gases. PHAST has been used successfully in the past for the modelling of flammable gas dispersion scenarios, in particular for COMAH cases.

MODEL PARAMETERS
For the purposes of the modelling, a number of assumptions were made regarding wind and weather conditions. These were as follows: Parameter Wind Speed Atmospheric stability category Atmospheric temperature Surface roughness Liquid temperature Value 1.5 m/s F 0C 0.951m 10C Comments Worst case for gas dispersion, low wind speed. (Wind speed at 10m elevation) Worst case for gas dispersion, very stable atmospheric conditions Typical UK daytime temperature under F1.5 weather conditions Measure of the roughness of the ground. Value used for industrial site Typical reservoir temperature

Parameter Atmospheric temperature Surface temperature

Value 0C 0C

Comments Typical UK daytime temperature under F1.5 weather conditions Typical UK daytime temperature under F1.5 weather conditions

The parameters selected represent typical worst-case conditions for gas dispersion and might typically occur in the UK for about 1% of the time (Ref.6). These weather conditions would relate to a cold winters day with little wind discernable at ground level and a temperature inversion. The combination of low wind speed with Pasquill-Gifford category F atmospheric turbulence and relatively low ambient temperatures means that the gas dispersion from the release is very limited. This is due to a combination of low molecular diffusion and low atmospheric mixing.

MODEL SCENARIOS
A limited range of scenarios was chosen for this study in order to provide preliminary estimates within a reasonable timescale. The scenarios chosen were: A. Release from liquid pool in bund e.g. tank bund, spill area 100m B. LPG (Propane) release from 1mm diameter hole in pressurised stock tank C. Process vent 100mm diameter, vent rate 2500 Nm/h - Heptane

RESULTS Tank Bund

Three versions of this release scenario were run, each using a different type of release model as follows: 1. Catastrophic release into bund 2. Leak through 100mm diameter hole, vertical, downwards impinging 3. Leak through 100mm diameter hole, horizontal, impinging Scenario 1 assumes an instantaneous leak of the entire tank contents into the bund. Note that no allowance is made for bund wall overtopping. The dispersion profile for this indicates an initial flash of vapour reaching 11-12m but only lasting a few seconds with a final dispersion distance of 3m to LFL/2 and no LFL concentration achieved. This can be seen on Diagrams A1a and A1b below. Scenario 2 (Diagrams A2a and A2b) illustrates the hazard ranges for the vertical release. In this case A2a is the period during liquid flow from the tank and A2b is the steady state case after the tank is emptied. Scenario 2 (Diagrams A3a and A3b) illustrates similar characteristics to scenario 2, with A3b showing the steady state case.

Propane Release from 1mm Diameter Hole

For this case, saturated liquid propane at 10C is modelled (vapour pressure = 5.37 barg). The hole is assumed to be in the vapour space at an elevation of 1m above ground level. The release is in the downwind direction, thus maximising the dispersion distance. It can be seen from Diagram B1 that this gives very small hazard ranges.

Process Vent
For this case, IP15 specifies a molecular weight of 48. Propane, (molecular weight 44) was used as the exemplar material. A vertical release from a 100mm pipe was used as illustrated in IP15. The release velocity in this case is approximately 88m/s and it can be seen that the hazard ranges are significantly less than those stated in IP15 and there is also no hazard at ground level.

SUMMARY OF HAZARD RANGES

Hazard ranges calculated using the PHAST Unified Dispersion Model were compared with the comparable scenarios from IP15. The results are summarised in the table below. Note that the figures in square brackets are for the period after release has ceased: Hazard Range Scenario IP15 15m (Zone 2) 15m (Zone 2) 15m (Zone 2) 3m (Zone 1) 3m (Zone 1) 5m PHAST LFL 8 [N/A] 8.5 [N/A] 16.5 [N/A] 0.25 1.25 1.5 LFL/2 11.5 [3] 13 [2.5] 22 [2] 0.55 2.25 3.5

A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 C1

Release from liquid pool in bund (catastrophic failure model) Release from liquid pool in bund (vertical downwards leak from tank model) Release from liquid pool in bund (horizontal leak from tank model) Propane release from 1mm diameter hole (vapour release) Propane release from 1mm diameter hole (liquid release) Process vent 100mm diameter, vent rate 2500 Nm/h - Heptane

CONCLUSIONS
There are several conclusions which may be drawn from this work: The modelling done for this paper indicates that PHAST calculates hazard ranges to LFL/2 for a number of scenarios which are considerably smaller than the zones stated in IP15 for the same scenario. If the LFL is taken as the hazard range then the reduction in hazard zone is even greater.

For the tank bund case, the hazard ranges is significantly affected by the release parameters (orientation of release etc) used In a number of scenarios, the hazard ranges (zones) quoted in IP15 may be overly conservative and thus may cause significant site issues. The following should also be noted: These results and the guidance in the current edition of IP15 are limited to wind / weather conditions in the UK since the modelling was done specifically using UK worst-case weather. Gas dispersion and release rates e.g. from pools may be significantly different under different wind / weather conditions. For locations in more temperate regions, higher temperatures may be appropriate for the liquid pool, ground and atmosphere. It was noted that, for hydrocarbon materials, relative humidity does not have a significant effect. Other gas dispersion models may give significantly different results. It is essential that an appropriate model be used for the dispersion since some models have limited applicability, whilst others may be designed for specific situations. PHAST does not model the effect of a typical 1m high bund wall and therefore the dispersion from the bund pool may be of limited accuracy and will have a high dependence on the height of the bund wall compared to the pool depth. At the time of writing the Energy Institute have a project underway to re-examine some of the hazard ranges in IP15. It is, however, clear that the results of the gas dispersion depend greatly upon the selection and application of applicable model scenarios. Further work is necessary in order to clarify the effect of these differences and ensure consistency of model application.

REFERENCES
1. BS EN 60079-10; Area Classification; 2005 2. Energy Institute; Area classification code for installations handling flammable fluids, Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 15, 3rd Edition; 2006 3. Institution of Gas Engineers; Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations; IGE/SR/25; Communication 1665 4. Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 2776; The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 5. Process Hazard Assessment software Tool; DNV Technica; London 6. Lees FP; Loss Prevention in the Process Industries; 2nd Edition; ButterworthHeinemann 7. HGSYSTEM; Shell Global Solutions, Chester, UK 8. ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA); http://archive.orr.noaa.gov/cameo/aloha.html

DIAGRAMS Diagram 1a Release catastrophic tank failure 100m bund (13s)

Diagram 1b Release catastrophic tank failure 100m bund (72s)

Diagram 2a Vertical Release Downward Impinge 100m bund

Diagram 2a Vertical Release Downward Impinge 100m bund

Diagram 3a Horizontal Release Impinge 100m bund

Diagram 3b Horizontal Release Impinge 100m bund

Diagram B1 Propane Vapour Release 1mm hole

Diagram B2 - Propane Liquid Release 1mm hole

Diagram C1 Release From Process Vent