A BLAST AND BALLISTIC RESILIENT AIR-BEAM SHELTER SYSTEM

D.V. Ritzel1, S.A. Parks2, J. Crocker3, H.A. Warner4 Dyn-FX Consulting Ltd., 19 Laird Ave. North, Amherstburg, Ontario N9V 2T5, Canada; ORA Inc., 71 Commerce Pkwy, Suite 107, Fredericksburg, Virginia 22406, USA; 3Martec Ltd., 1888 Brunswick St., Suite 400, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3J 3J8, Canada; 4Dynamic Air Shelters Ltd., 220 4441 76 Ave. S.E., Calgary, Alberta T2C 2G8, Canada
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ABSTRACT
Lightweight temporary shelters such as tents and work-trailers are sometimes required by armed forces, civil authorities, or emergency responders in areas at risk from enemy action, terrorist attack, or accidental explosions. An extensive program of full-scale trials, computational modelling, and component testing has been conducted to develop and validate a novel deployable shelter system based on air-beam technology having high resilience to blast and ballistic threats. The shelter has no hard framing, paneling, or shear connections in its construction but is self-supporting by means of air-beam arches of large diameter polyester-fabric tubing which are lightly airpressurized. Free spans to 40m can be enclosed. Such a structural system flexes and rebounds when subjected to blast, impact, or seismic action ultimately taking loads as membrane and tensile stresses for which the materials are inherently strong. The mode, rate, and extent of wall deflection can be largely controlled by flexing lateral supports. An optional self-supporting geotextile curtain-wall can be incorporated with the shelter which has been designed to provide high ballistic protection using minimal local soil fill. The integration of the airbeam structure, flexural support system, and ballistic curtain-wall is the basis for the Integrated Blast Resilient Shelter (IBRS) concept. The IBRS design is modular to meet a range of requirements and constraints. Due to the highly responsive nature of the fabric surfaces under blast, computational modelling of the blast encounter requires an approach using fluid-structure interaction (FSI). FSI modeling which links the FE code LS-DYNA with the blast CFD code CHINOOK has been applied to analyze the complex response dynamics and optimize the IBRS design. Full-scale blast field trials including the use of instrumented manikins have validated the blast resilience and occupant protection of the current IBRS prototype to blast levels of 40kPa x 36ms. Field trials have proved the standard geotextile curtain-wall will withstand the combined blast/fragmentation from 155mm artillery at 5m standoff as well as military 50-cal rounds using only 300mm thickness of soil fill.

INTRODUCTION Lightweight relocatable shelters (LRS) include a wide range of both soft- and hard-skinned structures such as trailers, tents, and various pre-fabricated field-assembled structures intended for expedient environmental protection of personnel or materiel during temporary deployments. Such shelters are used extensively at expeditionary military camps, industrial/ commercial sites under construction or maintenance, and during emergency response operations. LRS are applied in wide-ranging roles including accommodations, offices, workshops, messing, vehicle-bays, and stores; specially adapted units are used for field hospitals or housing specialized equipment including aircraft. Large tents, such as those of the pavilion style, are also used for social functions or displays at public venues. In historical military applications, LRS were intended for use behind lines beyond risk of combat threats; in general, such shelters are deployed with the primary consideration being to provide expedient environmental protection during short-term operations. However, in modern applications LRS are often required in areas at risk from explosions, ballistic impacts including military small-arms fire, accidental impact from industrial equipment or vehicles, or seismic actions. For the military, even homeland bases can no longer be considered behindlines from terrorist attack. Military expeditionary camps are at risk from attack by enemy

explosive munitions or insurgent truck-bombing; such camps also have risks from explosive accidents at their own ammunition or fuel-storage compounds. Emergency response operations require LRS for field hospitals, accommodations, and stores; however, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, these shelters may be vulnerable to second hit bombing or small-arms attack specifically targeting responders. In deployments to earthquake-stricken areas, temporary shelters are at risk from after-shocks. Although LRS are usually designed for some nominal wind or snow-load capacity, their primary design criteria focuses on transportability, breakdown size/weight, and the ease and speed of setup. Therefore, such structures are typically highly vulnerable to blast since they present large surface areas relative to their lightweight, low-rigidity framework in combination with weak ground fixity. A weak incident blast of 10kPa overpressure, which would not inflict serious ear-drum injury to personnel in the open [1], will impart peak reflective loading exceeding 10-fold that from a 200km/hr wind and cause serious damage to LRS. Even with the benefit of continuous full-sized framing elements and rigid fixture to concrete foundations, standard steel-framed light industrial buildings will typically fail catastrophically when subjected to long-duration blasts of 25kPa [2], hence blast failures for LRS can be expected at a fraction of this level. Extensive defence-research studies conducted in the US [3] and Canada [4] investigated the blast response dynamics and injury risk to occupants for a range of military LRS designs and confirmed this vulnerability. Figure 1 shows a typical deployment of tents at a military encampment and frames from internal highspeed imaging of the response dynamics to low-level blast [4].

Figure 1. (Upper) Typical deployment of tent accommodations at a military expeditionary camp. (Lower Left and Right) Blast effects within a military tent installed with manikins and fittings typical of habited shelters (1: clip-on fan; 2: clip-on lamp; 3: helmet; 4: circuit panel; 5: lamp fixture; 6: 5KW heater). The deflecting framework, projected items and whipping wires present a significant injury risk to occupants (from [4]).

Typical LRS framing is not designed for severe side-loading, especially applied as a shock or step function, and frame members often fail at their fixtures or joints if not buckled or broken outright. Blast-induced deflections, break-up and projection of structural elements or wall attachments, and ultimately structural collapse will usually present far greater injury risk to occupants than had they been exposed to the blast in the open. Whereas humans can survive a free-field blast exposure of about 100kPa overpressure [1], standard hard-framed LRS structures such as tents or work-trailers are typically destroyed at blast conditions 1/5th that level. This injury risk became tragically highlighted by the casualties of the Texas City petrol-chemical blast accident in 2005 blast in which all 16 fatalities and seriously injuries were inflicted on occupants of work trailers within the blast-hazard zone [5]. Similarly, by virtue of their primary basis for design, standard LRS are intrinsically vulnerable to ballistic threats. Although appliqu ballistic panels have been proposed for LRS [6], these are typically expensive, limited in protection to non-military threats, and in fact can increase injury risk and damage form blast. When deployed to areas at risk of significant ballistic threats, LRS will usually be enclosed by a separate ballistic barrier wall of concrete segments or earthworks such as shown in Fig. 2 which demand considerable resources and time for their installation and ultimately for dismantling or relocation. INITIAL STUDIES The recognition that injuries to LRS occupants from blast events were inflicted primarily by the impact or projection of the hard framing or hard sheathing of the shelter itself led to the investigation of a novel alternative air-beam shelter for deployments having blast risks, effectively a soft-framed soft-sheathed structure. Figure 2 shows two models as commercially available at the onset of the study in 2007 designated as the DSI-10 and DSI-19. As shown in the figure, the structures are formed from large columns of reinforced vinyl tubing formed into arches and lightly pressurized by low-power air blowers. The system of arches is tied together by cross-cabling and the entire assembly is enclosed by a tough fly covering. Although the shelter is self-supporting, guy-lines run from hug-straps around the girth of each column at various points along each arch to ground stakes in order to provide lateral restraint from wind action. In fact, the shelter is stabile in winds exceeding 100km/hr using ground stakes at the column base alone. The DSI shelters have been well-proven in industrial applications including extended performance in arctic conditions.

Figure 2. The original DSI-10 and DSI-19 air-beam shelters.

The initial investigation of the blast response of air-beam shelters and the development of concepts leading to the current Integrated Blast Resilient Shelter system have been described in previous reports [7,8,9,10], but will be summarized here for completeness. Although the original DSI shelters had not been designed for blast, an exploratory full-scale blast trial was conducted in September 2007 to test the DSI-10 for blast response dynamics. The shelter was subjected to the blast from a 2000kg TNT-equivalent charge at 100m standoff, yielding an incident blast wave of 30.6kPa amplitude, 45ms positive-phase duration, and 570kPa-ms impulse. From previous studies it was known a blast of this severity would have catastrophically damaged a conventional LRS design. As reported in detail in [7], the shelter performed remarkably well and rebounded fully from the blast after deflecting in a mode of elastic buckling action; the air-beam columns intruded 14% into the primary habitable internal space at their maximum deflection. The wall deflection would not have inflicted serious impact injuries, although occupants in the path of the air-columns would certainly have been knocked to the ground. A diminished and distorted pressure wave was transmitted into the interior space of lesser severity than had been measured for tents [4]. The main conclusions from the exploratory trial were as follows: The DSI air-beam shelters demonstrated strong potential for further development towards a military-grade blast-resilient LRS Certain components required upgrading to survive the high-acceleration conditions imparted by the blast loading in most cases involving elimination of stress concentrations, distributing loads, or introducing shock-absorbing connections Significant revision of the tethering system was required to control the mode, rate, and extent of wall deflection and reduce the required ground footprint New measures would be required to ensure ballistic protection for the shelter as well as ensure a safe-fail backup capacity to support the arches in some diminished mode even if all pressurization was lost Modular component design was required such that levels of blast and ballistic protection can be adjusted depending on particular user requirements and constraints. Due to the highly responsive nature of the fabric surfaces, an FSI (fluid-structure interaction) approach was required in the computational modeling by which the solution for the structural response dynamics is coupled in time with that for the compressible gas-dynamics of the blast-wave flow Since the structure rebounds from blast through actions of elastic buckling and irregular flexure, a new performance criteria was required to assess designs based on injury potential rather than one based on traditional structural or material failure INTEGRATED BLAST RESILIENT AIR-BEAM SHELTER SYSTEM Following the initial exploratory blast trial, an intensive 3-yr R&D program was initiated to develop an advanced Integrated Blast Resilient Shelter (IBRS) system to meet the objectives identified above. Aided by the development and application of specialized FSI modeling [7], working prototypes of the necessary upgrades were developed and validated in full-scale blast and ballistic trials and use of large-scale blast simulator facilities. In the development and appraisal of various design upgrades both from computational and experimental studies, a new performance criteria or measure-of-effectiveness was required as noted in the last item of the previous section. That is, since the structure largely responds elastically and ultimately rebounds despite sometimes large irregular deformations, traditional engineering design criteria based on limiting rotation of shear connections, beam deflection,

or material failure are inappropriate. Since injury risk to personnel or damage to housed materiel is affected most by the extent and rate of wall deflection into the occupied space, a performance criteria based on the maximum cross-sectional area intrusion of the deflecting wall into the primary habitable space was adopted as depicted in Fig. 3. This criteria was also used to define the iso-damage curves for the P-I diagrams generated from the computational studies; that is, rather than having a pass/fail iso-damage curve, a family of curves was generated by which any user can define an unacceptable level of elastic intrusion of the air-beam columns. The three primary upgrade developments are described in the following subsections with regard to their incorporation in baseline DSI-19 model. However, all concepts can be applied equally well to both larger and smaller DSI shelter models. Tethermast The key upgrade for the IBRS involves an entirely revamped tethering system including the use of a line of tethering masts or tethermasts along the wall of the shelter as shown in Fig. 3. The tethermast has several critical roles in the enhanced capabilities of the IBRS. The exact design and materials for the tethermast to optimize its performance under blast load when coupled to the air-beam column are IPsensitive (Intellectual Property) and will not be detailed here. In the computational simulations shown, the tethermasts are external to the shelter wall and in-line with the air-beams; however, this is only one option for the tethermast array and convenient for illustration purposes. For most installations the tethermasts will be set between the columns and beneath the fly such that they are within the profile and normal architectural lines of the shelter as shown in Fig. 4. The introduction of tethermasts to replace the original ground guy-lines greatly improves the effectiveness and control of wall deflection as well as reducing the ground footprint of the shelter installation. The line of tethermasts allows incorporation of an auxiliary curtain-wall for the shelter which serves as a barrier for blast and fragmentation protection. Although the design details and materials of the revised tethering system and curtain-wall are proprietary, Fig. 3 shows that blast deflections can be reduced by factors of 5-fold by the upgrades; the pressure wave transmitted to the interior is also greatly diminished in severity compared to the case without the curtain-wall. The tethermasts are modular and can be broken-down to five components for ease of shipping and handling. Each of the primary components, such as the base-flexure unit, has variants or adjustments which can be substituted to meet particular performance, cost, or weight constraints. A final optional role for the tethermasts is to allow a safe-fail mode for suspension of the arch roof in the unlikely event of total loss of pressure to the entire system. Although each air-beam column is independently pressurized and incorporates a check valve, it is possible (for reasons not evident at this time) that all air-beam arches might abruptly and simultaneously lose pressure. In such an event, the deflating air-beam arches will be restrained from total collapse by the use of cross-cables spanning the width of the shelter as shown in Fig. 4. For the configuration shown, the cross-cable acts as a catenary between the tethermasts across the shelter and will maintain head-room of over 2m at the centre of the shelter to nearly 3m at the inner wall. The internal cross-cables also allow the option of suspending lightweight partitions to divide work-spaces within the shelter interior. Air-Beam Restraint The original method of tether attachment and lateral restraint of the air-beam columns had been by means of the hugstrap connection described from Fig. 2. This attachment is in fact extremely ineffective for load transfer under impulsive forces in particular. The hugstrap restraints were revised to a hugsheet arrangement as shown in Fig. 5.

Figure 3. Computational modelling of maximum air-beam shelter deflections subjected to a 20kPa blast of 100ms duration, comparing results for standard ground tethering, tethermast support, and tethermast with fabric curtainwall.

Figure 4. Sketches of optional configurations for tethermasts set between the air-beam columns for the cases without and with external geotextile curtain-wall. The curtain-wall option provides ballistic shielding or ballast as required.

Figure 5. Revision of the air-beam restraint from hugstrap to a hugsheet configuration such that the columns are restrained as if in a lateral sling. The line-of-action of the forces and the load distribution at the connection reduce stresses over 1000-fold as depicted at right. Curtain-Wall As described previously, the line of tethermasts allows incorporation of an optional geotextile curtain-wall to provide ballistic protection, enhanced blast mitigation, as well as stabilizing ballast for deployments not having other means of secure ground fixture. The same curtainwall design can be configured in various modes to meet a range of performance specifications. Although specialized curtain-walls are being devised for requirements such as protection from rocket-propelled grenade attacks, the standard design has a tapered side profile with a nominal 600mm base, 300mm width at the top, and height of 2400mm. Although generally intended to be a geotextile wall, that is, filled with local soil, gravel, or crushed stone as available, the simple fabric curtain-wall provides a high degree of ballistic protection against severe nonmilitary threats such as tornado-borne debris. Figure 6 shows an image sequence from testing of the empty curtain-wall conducted to validate protection level for the highest kinetic-energy threat specified in ASTM E1886 for tornado-borne debris.

Figure 6. Impact of a 6.8kg steel bar at 35m/s on an unfilled prototype curtain-wall as part of testing to validate protection from explosion-borne debris due to accidental explosions at petrol-chemical sites. The projectile is highlighted in the first frame as it was launched by means of a specially designed gun-barrel. No damage was inflicted to the curtain-wall in this test due to the combined membrane action of the fabric and flexure of the supports.

Once filled as a geotextile barrier, the curtain-wall has been designed to provide maximum ballistic protection for its thickness of fill using a simple but effective new technique to restrict the cavity growth from high-speed projectiles. Due to the incorporation of the curtainwall with the tethermast supports, the combined system is highly resilient to the synergistic effects of combined blast and ballistic loading from close-proximity detonations of military munitions. As shown in Fig. 7, arena tests proved the performance of the standard curtainwall against near-field explosions of military munitions to the severity of a 155mm artillery shell at 5m standoff. NATO STANAG 4569 specifies qualification testing for fragmentation from 155mm shells at 25m standoff, since it is generally not expected that ballistic panels also perform well in blast resilience. In separate tests, 50-cal BMG rounds (Federal American Eagle XM33C, 42.8gm, steel-core) fired at 30m standoff with nominal muzzle velocity 884m/s were successfully stopped by the curtain-wall; this performance significantly surpasses STANAG 4569 Level 3 ballistic protection intended to cover Russian AK rounds. As previously noted, this level of ballistic protection is afforded by the standard geotextile curtain-wall tested at its minimal 300mm thickness. A double-wall barrier with burster-screen is being developed to defeat the shaped-charge warhead of a rocket-propelled grenade including follow-through effects of its spent motor casing.

Figure 7. Arena tests of the prototype standard curtain-wall have verified protection against the combined blast/fragmentation effects of the munitions as shown. The specifications shown are nominal values for design as provided in US DoD manuals [11]; the asterisk denotes that the designated wall thickness relates to protection against ballistic penetration without consideration of blast effects. BLAST TESTING 12RQ Full-Scale Field Trials By arrangement with the Suffield laboratory of Defence R&D Canada (DRDC), a full-scale configuration of a prototype blast resilient shelter system was deployed in blast field trials being staged under the DRDC 12RQ Defence Research program. The blast trials were conducted on the Experimental Proving Ground of DRDC Suffield in Alberta SeptemberOctober 2009 under direction of the 12RQ program manager Dr. J. Anderson. A series of three tests of escalating blast intensity were conducted subjecting the prototype shelter to the blast conditions summarized in Table 1. The instrumentation layout for the trials is depicted in Fig. 8 and included both H-III and H-II ATDs (Anthropomorphic Test Devices). The H-III was fitted sensors for assessment of head/neck injury due to impact of the air-beam columns, while the un-instrumented H-II was used to assess gross motions from airbeam impact. At the time of the trials, a complete prototype curtain-wall was not ready for deployment around the shelter, hence a crude simulation of its effect was made by suspending

the equivalent layers of fabric material from the tethermasts as shown in Fig. 8. Therefore, it was not possible in these trials to assess the full efficacy of the curtain-wall for blast attenuation, including its optimal soil-filled (geotextile) mode. Table 1. Summary of 12RQ blast field-trial test conditions. Trial Charge P (kPa) 1 2 3 165kg TNT Eq 500kg TNT Eq 1000kg TNT Eq 12.4 20.7 40.6 Incident Blast Conditions Duration (ms) 24 40 36 Impulse (kPa-ms) 150 330 690

Figure 8. Instrumentation layout for the 12RQ blast trials. Key results from the trials are shown in Figs. 9-11 for which the incident blast, transmitted overpressure, and wall deflection into the internal space are presented for each trial. Being the case of most severe blast, further detailed results from Trial 3 are presented in Figs. 12 &13. The main conclusions from the trials were as follows: The response of the prototype shelter met or exceeded expectations for controlled wall deflection and minimized injury risk to occupants. For Trial 2 (20kPa x 40ms), the maximum extent of air-beam intrusion was less than 1% of the habitable space; for Trial 3 (40kPa x 36ms), the maximum intrusion was 4% of the habitable space. The shelter fully rebounded from all blasts, although several non-structural seams and connections of the covering fly were torn in the final test. It should be considered that the same structure was exposed to all blasts in succession without intermediate repairs, hence incipient damage was likely accumulated from the prior tests. In both tests yielding measurable wall deflection, only the zone immediately adjacent to the wall was affected such that personnel, or their furnishings they occupy, would have to be abutted directly against the air-beam column for any significant effects. Partly due to the yielding nature of the air-beam impact, a seated manikin in a chair with its back abutted to the wall was imparted an average velocity less 0.7m/s. The pressure transmitted to the interior was significantly diminished in effect as quantified by its amplitude, impulse, and rise-time. The degree of amplitude reduction increased with blast strength to 50% for the strongest blast; impulse reduction decreased with incident blast strength from 38 to 28%. Very importantly, in all cases

the shock front of the incident blast became diminished to a less-injurious compression or set of staggered shocks spanning about 4ms of rise-time. Although not affecting occupants, unexpected damage was sustained by some equipment due to the significant upward rebound of the shelter well after the passage of the blast itself (~ 200ms). Ultimately, much of the elastic energy stored from the blast encounter with the shelter is recovered as a powerful upward rebound of the airbeam columns. Straightforward measures were identified to secure the column bases against this action, as well as introduce shock absorption, flexure, and reduced mass of attachments at the base of the air-columns.

Component Testing Certain components, fittings, and seams were identified from the most severe 12RQ blast test of 40kPa as warranting further assessment and possible modification. Although not damaged by the blast itself, the heavy and rigid blower fitting attachments to the base of the air-beam columns were damaged by the powerful and abrupt late-time vertical rebound action of the columns. The blower bulkhead assembly was redesigned to minimize its mass and stiffness and allow for flexing action with its various connections. In addition, a check-valve was introduced such that in the event of a failure of the blower attachment or any rupture of external feed lines, pressure is not lost from the columns. The revised blower assembly was subsequently re-qualified in tests using a large-scale blast simulator as shown in Fig. 14.

Figure 9. Summary of key results from 12RQ Trial 1, 12.4kPa x 24ms blast. (Upper left and right) Overview of the trial layout showing the fireball shortly after detonation and comparison of incident blast and transmitted overpressure waveforms. (Lower left and right) Interior view of the shelter immediately prior to blast arrival and at time of maximum air-beam deflection at 36ms. The seated and propped manikins shown abutted to air-beam columns were unaffected by the blast.

Figure 10. (Upper left and right) Overview of the Trial 2 layout showing the fireball shortly after detonation and comparison of incident blast and transmitted overpressure waveforms. (Lower left and right) Interior view of the shelter immediately prior to blast arrival and at time of maximum air-beam deflection at 37ms. The seated manikin shown abutted to the air-beam column was unaffected by the blast.

Figure 11. (Upper left and right) Overview of the Trial 3 layout showing the fireball shortly after detonation and comparison of incident blast and transmitted overpressure waveforms. (Lower left and right) Interior view of the shelter immediately prior to blast arrival and at time of maximum air-beam deflection about 80ms after blast arrival. The manikin shown seated in the chair abutted to air-beam columns slid from the chair at about 0.7m/s.

Figure 12. Deflection of the inner wall of the central air-beam column during the first 100ms of the blast encounter. The initial shape is shown in blue with the deformation tracked at 10ms intervals. In the final stages of the response, the base of the columns rebounded backwards and upwards. The general mode of elastic buckling closely followed computational predictions as previously shown in Fig. 3.

Figure 13. Prostrate manikin on cot abutted to air-beam column in Trial 3 comparing positions pre- and post-blast (upper and lower respectively). The manikin itself was not displaced, although the cot was shifted about 15cms beneath it by the action of the air-beam column on its frame.

Figure 14. 1.8m Blast Tube facility used to qualify IBRS components such as the revamped air-blower configuration and air-beam check valves. From lower-left to right: installation of the test column and blower fittings; setting of the concrete-wall closure; and view from inside the Tube after the test column has been strapped to the reflecting wall.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Lightweight relocatable shelters such as tents, trailers, and pre-fabricated huts are intended for rapid deployments with the primary role of providing weather protection for personnel or equipment during temporary operations spanning weeks to a few years. However, in many applications these shelters are at risk from severe loadings such as due to blast or ballistic threats including terrorist bombings or small-arms attacks, accidental explosions, extreme winds, or seismic action such as earthquake aftershocks. Ironically and tragically, it is most often the shelter in these events which inflicts the gravest of injuries to occupants in comparison to personnel being exposed to such threats in the open. Whereas the traditional design approach for blast or ballistic protection of structures usually involves the hardening, thickening, or stiffening of components, this is not feasible for lightweight deployable shelters. In this regard a novel approach has been taken to allow significant but controlled flexure in the event of severe loads where this deformation is readily absorbed by the materials and can be exploited to maximize the overall resilience of the system and ultimately minimize injury risk to occupants or damage to materiel being housed. The development of the Integrated Blast Resilient Shelter system has been described involving a comprehensive 3yr R&D program involving advanced computational modelling full-scale field trials, and component testing. The basis of the design is an underlying lowpressure air-beam structure with flexing lateral supports such that shock and impact loads are taken by membrane and tensile stresses for which the materials are inherently strong and energy-absorbing. The air-beam arches allow open spans of 40m to be enclosed offering large working areas for equipment or as required for assembly areas such as lunchrooms. In the case of blast loading, although some degree of intrusion of the air-beam wall into the internal space is incurred, this deflection can be tailored to present very low injury risk to occupants. Overpressure is transmitted to the interior, although the amplitude, impulse, and rise-time of the transmitted wave are greatly mitigated; all blast levels of consideration here are non-lethal to personnel in the open. A geotextile curtain-wall is incorporated into the shelter system which has been specially designed to maximize performance of local soil as fill for ballistic protection. The standard curtain-wall of nominal 300mm thickness has been field-tested against a range of munitions including 155mm artillery detonation at 5m standoff and 50-cal rounds; the ballistic protection can be readily increased as required. The curtain-wall is also functional as a separate rapidly deployable stand-alone barrier to protect other structures or areas. The combined shelter system meets all the normal criteria for a lightweight deployable shelter yet has many attributes of traditional hardened bunkers including blast protection exceeding 35kPa overpressure and ballistic protection greatly exceeding NATO STANAG 4569 Level 3. R&D continues at this stage to provide optional overhead protection and defeat of special threats such anti-armour weapons including rocket-propelled grenades with shaped-charge warheads.

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