H9 ESTRADA vs Desierto

Facts: (consolidated with Estrada vs. Arroyo) This is a petition to question the legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos assumption of the presidency of the Philippines, filed by her immediate predecessor Joseph Estrada. What actually happened: May 11, 1998: Estrada wins the presidency with an overwhelming lead. Arroyo is elected as Vice-President. October 4, 2000: Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson starts publicly accusing Estrada and his family of receiving jueteng payoffs. October 5, 2000: Echoes of Singsons accusations resound in both the Senate and House of Representatives, mainly through opposition members /members of the Minority. October 11-November, 2000: Several advisers resign, including Department of Social Welfare and Development Secretary Arroyo. Estradas allies in the Majority defect to the other camp. Past presidents and Archbishop Cardinal Sin call for Estradas resignation. November 13, 2000: House Speaker Manuel Villar transmits the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. November 20, 2000: the Impeachment Process formally starts, with 21Senators as judges, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. presiding. December 7, 2000-January 11, 2001: the Impeachment trial proper. Presentation of evidence. On January 11, 11 senators vote against the opening of the second envelope, which allegedly contains evidence to prove that Estrada indeed kept a secret bank account worth 3.3 billion pesos under the name Jose Velarde. These 11 outnumbered the 10 senators who wanted to have the envelope opened. January 17, 2001: Public prosecutors resign, and the impeachment proceedings, postponed indefinitely. January 18, 2001: Hundreds of people march to EDSA in a mass movement calling for Estradas resignation (dubbed the EDSA II Movement). January 19, 2001: the Military withdraws support from Estrada, and more members of the Executive branch resign. Estrada agrees to holding a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. January 20, 2001: Estradas and Arroyos advisers start negotiations on a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, th only to be cut short by Arroyos oathtaking as the 14 President of the Philippines. That same day, Estrada and his family leave Malacaang. Estrada releases a statement which said that he was leaving Malacaang for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He also sends a letter to both chambers of Congress saying that he *is+ unable to exercise the powers and duties of *his+ office. January 22, 2001: Congress issues a Resolution recognizing and expressing support for the Arroyo presidency. Other countries expressed the same. February 6, 2001: Sen. Teofisto Guingona is nominated by Arroyo to be her Vice-President February 7, 2001: Senate passed Resolution No. 83 terminating the Impeachment Court. What the parties to this case did:

February 5, 2001: Estrada files a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ or preliminary injunction to enjoin Ombudsman Desierto from continuing the probe on the criminal cases filed against him (OMB Case No. 0-001629,1754-1758), supposedly until his term as President is over. February 6, 2001: Estrada files another petition, this time a quo warranto petition, against Arroyo. He wanted to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines and Arroyo only as temporary / acting president until he is able to resume his duties. February 24, 2001: Respondents file their replies to Estradas consolidated petitions. 1.Petitioners Arguments: He has not resigned as President yet, and so Arroyos presidency was void since the position was not vacant at the time she was sworn in. He is only temporarily unable to fulfill his duties as President, and that he is merely on leave. Given the above arguments, Estrada is still President, especially since he was never impeached, and he thus enjoys Presidential Immunity from all kinds of suit. The Ombudsman has to stop the investigation since he had already developed a bias against him (Estrada) from the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. 2. Respondents Argument: The cases pose a political question ( the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration ) and are therefore out of the Courts jurisdiction, especially since Arroyo became president through people power, and has already been recognized as such by other governments. They compare the present case with Aquinos revolutionary government (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino). Issue: Whether or not Estrada is merely a President on leave, which makes Arroyo just an Acting President. (Whether Estrada resigned from his position) Held: Estrada resigned from his position. There are two elements that must be present to consider someone to have resigned: first, the intent to resign, and second, the act/s of relinquishment. Both elements were evident in Estradas actuations before he left Malacaang, and so he must be considered to have resigned. Using the Totality Test (i.e., the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevance on the issue), the Court found that Estradas acts to be tantamount to his resignation. For intent: the Court mainly used Angaras Diary, Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in order to intuit Estradas intent. The Diary, which was published in a major publication, described Estradas acts following the massive withdrawal of support by former Estrada allies. Here, Estrada is quoted to have proposed a snap election of which he would not be a part. He was also shown to have conceded to the idea that he had to resign. For acts of relinquishment: the Court enumerated five. a. Estrada acknowledged Arroyos oath-taking as President of the Republic. b. He said he was leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of peace but did not say that he would return or that he was leaving only temporarily. He did not specify what kind of inability it was that prevented him from discharging his presidential duties at that time. c. He thanked the people for the opportunity to serve them. The Court took this as a past opportunity.

d. He also said he was ready for any future challenge, and the Court took to mean a future challenge after occupying the *presidency+. e. He called on his supporters to join efforts at reconciliation and solidarity. The Court said that these would not be possible if Estrada refuses to give up the presidency. Estrada also argues that he could not have resigned as a matter of law, since Section 12 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) prohibits the resignation or retirement of any public officer pending a criminal or administrative investigation for any case filed against him under RA 3019 or the Revised Penal Codes provisions on bribery. The Court interpreted this provision according to the intent of the lawmakers, and that is that the provision was included supposedly to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under *RA 3019+ Estrada therefore cannot invoke this provision to violate the very practice it was supposed to prevent. The petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

H 10 RUBRICO vs MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals. * The writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The petition and its attachments contained the following allegation: (1) Lourdes D. Rubrico, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan was abducted by armed men belonging st to the 301 Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City. Release at Cavite, after made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. Harassment continues in two different places (Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran, Pasay City) by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets (2) P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez, in absence of Lourdes, asking Mary Joy (daughter) about the karapatan an alliance of human rights organizations. (3) A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo, was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching them. (4) Lourdes has filed Office of The Ombudsman (1) criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct (2) threats and harassment incidents at Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. Against: (1)Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), (2)Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro) (3)Jimmy Santana (Santana) and st (4)a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301 AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City

Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government agents in civilian clothes. (5) Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes, that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a mission order which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF. The petition prayed: (1) That a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners. (2) Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. (3) Damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. Respondents: (1) President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, (2) Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, (3) Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) (4) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, (5) Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, (6) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the (7) OMB o Filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. o OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information o President may not be sued during her incumbency. o Petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following: (1) Gen. Esperon he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes. Manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation, even including military personnel. (2) P/Dir. Gen. Razon an investigation he immediately ordered, and that a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appeal in police records. Findings Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo. (3) P/Supt. Roquero observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with relevant information (4) P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP (5) Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by the OMB. Petitioners pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. Also asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them. Petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan. CA dropped the President as respondent in the case

Denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners Effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. CA decision DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation.

ISSUE WON the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. o o Petitioners claims that the presidents immunity is not valid, 1987 constitution has removed it. Petitioners are mistaken, its still valid. In jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. And no need to provide it in law, for the reason (1) degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such (2) he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.

This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB. Their names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay of April 2007. The same goes for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/orKaragdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean and Mary Joy. CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. Writ of Amparo must be denied against them, simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence. As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.

Command Responsibility: o o o o o As a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. Responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. There is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. As legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. CA inappropriate to apply this doctrine, for its a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo.

Petitioners as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes.

Statement of Maj. Paul Ciano and a staff of 301 AISS none of the 301 AISS are abductor of Lourdes, Neither were member of any unit. Verification with the personnel accounting and Information System of the PNP yield that information that except Darwin Reyes y Muga, is same with Maj. Darwin Reyes/Darwin Sy. Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors to the military or the police establishment. Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. Evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security. P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez According to Court - they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. Refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, They do not trust the government agencies to protect them. In the cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied None No basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. Petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. Notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Underlying petition for a writ of amparo without: (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as to them Petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review. In all the complaints, Petitioner fails to submit or to show facts to prove there allegations. two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case: (1) a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. (2) Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule In filing as Amparo petition should a criminal action have in the meanwhile, been commenced Sec 23 Petition shall consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises.

st

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RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision: Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo; Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence

Required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following: Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court; Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428 Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them.

Be Completed: Six months from receipt 30 days after completion of the investigation AFP and PNP submit reports to Court, CA, the OMB and petitioner This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP. Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.

H11 Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts: Noriel Rodgriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.

For a week , he was tortured and was forced to confess being a member of NPA. The soldiers also repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him unless he identified his whereabouts location and an NPA camp. September 13, 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced. September 16, 2009, the soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him. When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramils medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum. Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media. September 17, 2009, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took photographs of his bruises. Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card. They were able to arrive home safetly. September 19, 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture. Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.26red The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security. b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses. c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5thInfantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought. d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5thInfantry

Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009. e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. December 15, 2009, the respective writs were GRANTED. January 8, 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition. In their Return, respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as Ka Pepito by former rebels the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51red Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52red Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of errors: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order. b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: (H)owever, given the nature of the writ ofamparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioners right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner. c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility. On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo andhabeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparoand the rule on the writ of habeas data. the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51red Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52red Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of errors: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order. b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: (H)owever, given the nature of the writ ofamparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioners right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner. c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility.

Issues: I. II. III. IV. WON the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor. WON former P. Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. WON the rights to life, liberty and prosperity of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by rspondents in G.R. No. 191805

Rulings: I. (Not relevant to topic) II. WON FORMER P. ARROYO SHOULD BE DROPPED AS A RESPONDENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency. Former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. A president cannot have executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts.

III. WON THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CAN BE USED IN AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA CASES Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. Command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. a. Command responsibility of the President o Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commanderin-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. o The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo o While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. IV. (Not relevant to topic)

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit. This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision. In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court. SO ORDERED.

H12 Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary (1991)

FACTS: 2 petitions consolidated. The petitioners (CLV, Anti-Graft League of the Phil. Inc./ Crispin T. Reyes) are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and

government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. ISSUES: 1) Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB? NO. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution "must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. 2) Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity? NO The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.

3) Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284? NO During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "incases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them. Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987Constitution itself. PETITIONS GRANTED Executive Order No. 284 declared null and void and was accordingly set aside.

H13 Public Interest Center. Inc. vs. Elma

FACTS: Petitioners files a complaint to declare the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Governance) and CPLC (Chief Presidential Legal Counsel) null and void on the ground that it contravenes Sec. 13 Art. VII and Sec. 17 par. 2 Art. IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: WON the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of CPCL. RULING: Petition is partly Affirmed. Sec. 13 Art. VII and Sec. 17 par. 2 Art. IX-B of the 1987 Constitution Contains prohibition against multiple offices (see p. 59 of your case) As should be construed: Sec. 17 par.2 Art. IX-B meant to lay down the general rule to hold more than one office is applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees.

*Quimson vs. Ozaeta: There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatability. INCOMPATABILITY of two offices is present when one office has the right to interfere with the other. Therefore there is incompatability between the positions of PCGG chairman and the CPLC because the actions of the PCGG are subject to the review of CPLC. Sec. 13 Art VII exception applicable only to the President, the V-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

*US vs. Mouat: The persons cited in the constitutional provision are the members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the heads of the

executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby. Therefore this prohibition is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman and the CPCL because neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor assistant secretary, even of the former may have the same rank as the latter positions. Despite non-applicability of Sec. 13 Art VII to the respondent, he remains covered by the general prohibition under Sec. 17 par.2 Art. IX-B. His appointments are thereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.

H14 Flores vs. Drilon

Petitioners herein are taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic, Zambales questioned the constitutionality of Sec.13 (d) of RA 7227 otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 under which respondent Gordon was appointed as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA. The said st legislative act infringes the constitutionality and statutory provisions of Sec.7 (1 par.) Art IX-B of the Constitution, Sec.16 Art VII of the Constitution and Sec. 261 (par. G) of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: WON Sec.13 (d) of RA 7227 otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 violates the constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. Petitioners also assail the encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. RULING: Petition is Granted. Appointment of Gordon was declared null and void. Sec.13 (d) of RA 7227 unconstitutional. Sec.7 Art IX-B of the Constitution (see p.573 of your case) Paragraph 2 - This section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with the dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. Public office is a Full-time job. *Anti-graft League of the Phil., Inc. vs. Philip Ella C. Juico: a public officer or employee should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Paragaph 1 - basic idea really is to prevent a situation where local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.

Then the distinction is clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. The phrase shall be appointed clearly shows to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Congress attached the SBMA posts of the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. Congress therefore intended the post to be appointive. RA 7227 nevertheless limits the appointing authority of the President to only one eligible which is the incumbent Mayor of the Olongapo City. Here, the president is precluded or limited from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. This legislative act was a pure encroachment on Presidents prerogative. Ineligibility does not directly realted with forfeiture of office. Gordon remains as the Mayor of Olongapo, however his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void, he may be considered as a de facto officer. Allowances and emoluments received by the respondent were upheld.

H-15 G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
Facts: -Petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. -Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this suit. -The Court allowed the Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. -Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.

-It involves a conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution. -The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, that: The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. -The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. -Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution- Presidents power to appoint; Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, and 1973 Constitution (Care to look for the content on your case) -It should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Summary of Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission onAppointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint. (1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution, (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are the present bone of contention. Issue: WON the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the president with or without the consent/confirmation of the CA Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointment with hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the

President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required. The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of the President. WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.

H 16 CALDERON vs CARALE
Controversy of the Sec 16 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution Section 16 states: o President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. o Appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. o Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 16, Art. VII Power of the Commission on Appointment (CA) o 1935 Consent of the CA was needed in appointing head of bureau o !987 Consent not needed in appointing head of bureau o Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. Appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights: o Not Included in the first sentence of Sec 16 Art 17 o Appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CA o Appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission. o Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint." o And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CA over appointment by the President of sectoral representatives in Congress: o Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Doctrines are deducible:

o o o

First sentence of Sec 16 Confirmation of CA is required Second sentence of Sec 16 Confirmation is not required When Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided.

RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13: o The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. Appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. Questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. Calderon (petitioner) insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity, RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution. Petitioner state, Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for in the case at bar. President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requiresthe confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments Solicitor General contend that the RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. Mison Case: Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. Allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Three points should be noted regarding sub-section 3 of Section 10 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as proposed in Resolution No. 517. o First, in both, the appointments of heads of bureaus were required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. o Second, in both, the appointments of other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint, are expressly made subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. o Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word "nominate" qualifies the entire Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article VII This is only true of the first group enumerated in Section 16, but the word nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the president's appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd sentences needs no confirmation.

ISSUE:

WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. NO RA 6751 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the commission on appointments of the chairman and members of the NLRC is declared unconstitutional Court Stated at Mison Case: o 4 groups President shall appoint: (1) heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law (3) whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. o Mison opined - Section 16, there were two major changes proposed and approved by the Commission (1) The exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (2) exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the same requirement o NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. o RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: (1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (2) amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets out to enact legislation and it must take into account the relevant constitutional prohibitions. Its not that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.

H17 Manalo vs. Sistoza

FACTS: Manalo the petitioner who is a taxpayer questioned the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by the former Pres. Aquino to the 15 respondents who were senior officers of the PNP promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Consti and RA 6975 or the Local

Govt. Code of 1990. Former Sec. of DBM, Salvador M. Enriquez became also as one of the respondents for his authorization of the disbursements for salaries and other emoluments. ISSUE: WON the appointments were not valid under Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Consti and RA 6975 or the Local Govt. Code of 1990; and that PNP is akin to AFP where the Constitution requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. RULING: Petition is dismissed. Appointments are valid. Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of certain appointments issued by the President contemplates a system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of the government. *But along experience when almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the Commission on appointments (as indicated on the 1935 Consti) the commission became venue of horse-trading (political vote trading) or similar malpractices. On the other hand, placing absolute power to make appointments in the Pres. with hardly any check by the legislature (as indicated in the 1973 Consti) leads to abuse of power. So the framers of the 1987 Constitution deemed it imperative to subject certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and to allow other positions within the exclusive appointing power of the President. Clearly that under this, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President (see p. 247 of your case). The appointments of the respondent officers are not within the first category therefore need not to be confirmed by the Commission on appointments.

Sec. 26 and 31 of RA 6975 or the Local Govt Code of 1990 Empowers the Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed is clearly unconstitutional. But declaring these provisions of the law as unconstitutional doesnt make the whole provisions of the law void. PNP akin to AFP This contention is wrong because under Sec. 4 Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution, PNP is separate and distinct from the AFP.

H-18 [G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002] MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.

The Case:

-Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. -Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections ; and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners. -Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the COMELECs Education and Information Department. The Facts: -February 2, 1999: the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. -February 15, 2000: then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a Temporary capacity. -February 15, 2001: Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a Temporary capacity. -March 22, 2001: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. -Benipayo, Borra and Tuason took their oaths of office and assumed their positions. -Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments. -June 1, 2001: President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. -Took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. -Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. -June 8, 2001: President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. -The Office of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew. -Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. -COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. -Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner. -April 16, 200: petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. -Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001. -Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration. Citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000 -Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001. -Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001. -During the pendency of her complaint, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.

-Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. -Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. -Petitioner, questions the legality of the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Officer-inCharge Gideon C. De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and other emoluments. -September 6, 2001: President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo and Borra and Tuason for a term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008. Summary of Facts: COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Such appointment was renewed in temporary capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments. The Issues: The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows: 1. WON the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases; 2. WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, WON the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 4. WON Benipayos removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body; 5. WON the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELECs Finance Services Department, in continuing to make disbursements in favor of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in excess of jurisdiction. RULING: Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. ...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any

time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process. How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees. Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC Was the renewal of appointment valid? There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim

appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

H19 Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ermita

FACTS: The Congress commenced their regular session on July 26, 2004 and adjourned on Sept. 24, 2006. Commission on Appointments composed also by members of the Congress was constituted on Aug. 25, 2006. Petitioners, as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines declare that the ad interim appointments issued by Pres. Arroyo through Exec. Sec. Ermita on Sept. 23, 2006 to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. ISSUE: WON Pres. Arroyos appointments of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission of appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional. RULING: Petition is Denied. Appointments were constitutional. Power of appointment is Executive in nature. -Legislatures interference is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive official. Commission on Appointments -Its powers is executive and not legislative. Although it is composed of the members of the Congress, its powers emanate directly from the Constitution. Its function is purely executive in nature.

Petitioners claim of standing in the present case as members of the Congress under Commission on Appointments is erroneous. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena have standing in this case. Sec. 17 Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 the president mat temporarily designate an officer already in the govt. service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Appointments in acting capacity distinguish from Ad interim appointments Ad Interim are extended only during recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended anytime there is a vacancy. They should be submitted to the Commission on Appointments while; Appointments in acting capacity are a way of temporarily filling important offices, need not to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments, but if abused, theycan also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

H20 Rufino vs. Endriga Case

FACTS: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectively known as the RUFINO group seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration. CAs decision (to be set aside) 1. Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected by the CCP board up to expiration of 4-year term. 2. Ousting respondents (Rufino group) except respondent Z. Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding them therefrom 3. Dismissing case against Tantoco Tantuco had expressed utter lack of interest in the case since she did not take her oath of office or assumed the position of CCP trustee at any time. Second case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision. History of PD 15: 1966 - Marcos created EO 30 Creation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees were all pointed by Pres. Marcos 1972 - after declaration of Martial Law ; Pres. Marcos issued PD 15 which converted CCP into a nonmunicipal public corporation free from the pressure or influence of politics and increased 7 members to 9. EO 1058 issued in 1985 increased 9 to 11. 1986 - after People Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation and appointed new trustees to the Board. Ramos - started Endriga group Estrada - appointed 7 new trustees to CCP board with term of 4 years to replace the Endriga group, except for Tantoco. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999. Endriga vs. Estrada Endriga group files Petition for Quo Warranto questioning Pres. Estradas appointment of 7 new memberof CCP board. Alleged that under Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15, vacancies of the CCP Board shall be filled by election

by majority vote of trustees held at next regular meeting xxx. In case only when the board is entirely vacant may the President of the Phil. fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only one seat was vacant due to Ma Osas expiration term. 4-year term: Endriga group maintained that under CCP Charter, the trustees fixed 4-year term can only be terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause thus Presidents action was unnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board. Sec. 3 of PD 15 - Endriga refuses to accept CCP is under the supervision and control of the President as Sec. 3 which states that the CCP shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation xxx.

CAs decision: declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and ousting Rufino group from board. Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional. Rufinos Motion for Recon: asserted, by Section 16 of Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, that the law could only delegate to the CCP board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than trustees of Board which is in conflict with Sec. 6 of PD 15 CCP trustees has the authority to appoint or elect fellow officers of equal rank not of lower.

CA: denied Rufinos Motion and also denied Endrigas motion for immediate execution of decision.

ISSUES: 1st case WON Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 in which gives authority to CCP trustees to elect or appoint fellow officers of equal rank, is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec.16 of Article 7, that only the President has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments) Important Issues related to lesson: 1. Invalid delegation of the Presidents appointing power under the Constitution. 2. Deprives Presidents constitutional power of control and supervision over CCP 2nd case WON a writ of quo warranto involving public office should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4 of the rules of court.

RULING: Wherefore, we grant the petition in 1ST case (G.R. no. 139554). We declare unconstitutional, Section 6(b) and (c) of P.D. no. 15, as amended, insofar as it authorizes remaining trustees to

fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in G.R. no. 139554, we find it unnecessary to rule on GR no. 139565. RATIONALE/DOCTRINE: Presidential Decree no. 15 (PD 15) Created the CCP Created Board of trustees to govern CCP Mandates the board to draw up programs and projects that: Cultivate an enhance public interest in, and appreciation of Philippine art Discover and develop talents connected with the Philippine cultural pursuits Create opportunities for individual and national self-expression in cultural affairs Encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural exhibitions

Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 Sec. 6 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP board to fill up vacancies in the CCP board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. Makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. Board of trustees has the power and authority of the corporation. Vacancies shall be filled by election of majority vote by the trustees. Only can the President exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirely vacant.

Section 16 of Article 7 of Constitution source of presidents power to appoint gives President legislature authority to delegate power to appoint However, Congress may, by law, vest upon the appointment of other officers lower in rank (as contended in Rufinos MOC) President appoints 5 groups of officers: 1. Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments) 2. Authorized by law to appoint (and 3. without consent of Commission of Appointments) 3. Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declared unconstitutional) 4. Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by the law, vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. 5. Appointments vested by Constitution in Supreme Court and Constitutional Commission Appointment of Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Boards 1. Appointing powers belong to President, with: Congress - share such authority as to appointing inferior or lower in rank than those vested by law Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officers 2. Power to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace.

3. Presidents power is self-executing vested by Constitution thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. Sec. 8 PD 15 - Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP 1. Chairperson, with confirmation from the Board, has the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center 2. The CCP may elect membership in Govt. Service Insurance System (GSIS) those elected will have same rights and privileges and obligations 3. Exempted from coverage of Civil Service Law and Rules Sec. 3 - Duties of Chairperson 1. Appoint, remove, discipline all officers and personnel2. Perform duties until Board, by majority vote, shall elect another Chairperson CCP head is Chairperson and has power to appoint lower ranked officers CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus not an agency Sec. 6 (b) (c) vs. Sec. 16 of Article 7 Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional While Sec. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board, allowing them to elect fellow trustees... Sec. 16 allows only the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint only officers lower in rank. Sec. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with the Presidents power to appoint the two systems of appointing powers are recurring anomalies and controversies in appointment every time new President assumed office. CCP Created by PD no. 15 CCP is under the Executive branch, as stated in Revised Admin Code of 1987 ( any agency, not placed or order creating them under specific department falls under Office of President) President controls CCP Sec. 17 of Art. 7 - CCP performs executive and not legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Presidents Power to Control Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branch Power to control - the power to revise or reverse acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving exercise of discretion Supervision and Control - includes authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation of subordinate Executive branch is unitary thus only the President had executive power exercising control over entire Executive Branch. Legislature cant validly enact law outside control of President.