Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 2008, Vol. 34, No.

6, 14121429

Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association 0278-7393/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0013016

The Effects of Environmental Context on Recognition Memory and Claims of Remembering

William E. Hockley
Wilfrid Laurier University
Recognition memory for words was tested in same or different contexts using the remember/know response procedure. Context was manipulated by presenting words in different screen colors and locations and by presenting words against real-world photographs. Overall hit and false-alarm rates were higher for tests presented in an old context compared to a new context. This concordant effect was seen in both remember responses and estimates of familiarity. Similar results were found for rearranged pairings of old study contexts and targets, for study contexts that were unique or were repeated with different words, and for new picture contexts that were physically similar to old contexts. Similar results were also found when subjects focused attention on the study words, but a different pattern of results was obtained when subjects explicitly associated the study words with their picture context. The results show that subjective feelings of recollection play a role in the effects of environmental context but are likely based more on a sense of familiarity that is evoked by the context than on explicit associations between targets and their study context. Keywords: episodic memory, recognition, environmental context, recollection, familiarity

It has long been assumed that the context in which learning occurs plays an important role in determining memory performance in both animals (e.g., Carr, 1917; see Spear, 1978, for a review) and humans (e.g., Dulsky, 1935; Melton & Irwin, 1940; see Smith, 1988, and Smith & Vela, 2001). The general view is that reinstating the original learning context at the time of retrieval produces optimal performance, and changes in context between study and test have deleterious effects on memory. This result has been demonstrated with a variety of different manipulations of context, including environmental changes (e.g., Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978), state-dependent effects (see Eich, 1980), differences in mood states (e.g., Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977; Eich, 1985; Eich & Metcalfe, 1989), changes in the script of the stimuli (e.g., Reder, Donavos, & Erickson, 2002), and semantic context (e.g., Humphreys, 1976; Light & Carter-Sobell, 1970; McKenzie & Tiberghien, 2004; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). One problem associated with the study of the effects of context on memory is defining or specifying the elements of the learning situation that constitute the context. The boundary between the context and the to-be-remembered (TBR) event is not always clear. Investigators have distinguished between two general types of context that have been characterized in various ways: local versus global (Dalton, 1993), interactive versus independent (Baddeley, 1982), integrated versus nonintegrated (Eich, 1985; Murnane,

This study was supported by a discovery grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to the author. Experiments 3, 4A, and 4B were carried out by Benjamin Glicksman for his honors thesis. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to W. E. Hockley, Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada. E-mail: whockley@wlu.ca 1412

Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999), context alpha versus context beta (Wickens, 1987), and nonincidental versus incidental (Smith & Vela, 2001). Local, interactive, integrated, nonincidental, and context alpha refer to aspects of the episode that are processed during encoding and can influence the meaning or representation of the TBR event. Local context is usually associated with only one or a few TBR items. The role of local context is well illustrated by Tulving and Thomsons (1973) demonstration of the effects of semantic context on word recognition. As an example, the word jam is encoded quite differently when presented in the pair trafficJAM than when studied in the pair strawberry-JAM. Global, or environmental, context, on the other hand, generally refers to aspects of the surroundings or background in which learning takes place, but includes drug and mood states as well. Global context is usually associated with many TBR items and is incidental in that it is independent of the TBR information, should not influence the manner in which the TBR items are interpreted when encoded, and is not predictive of a correct response (Bjork & Richardson-Klavehn, 1989). Global context manipulations have included such environmental changes between study and test as different rooms (e.g., Dalton, 1993; Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985; Smith, 1979, 1985, 1986; Smith et al., 1978), different background colors (Dulsky, 1935; Weiss & Margolius, 1954; Murnane & Phelps, 1993, 1994, 1995), and much more dramatic changes, such as underwater versus on land (Godden & Baddeley, 1975, 1980) or on a boat (Emmerson, 1986). The present study is principally concerned with the effects of this type of context on recognition memory. Although a number of studies have demonstrated the influence of global or environmental context on tests of recall, this effect has been far more inconsistent and elusive for recognition memory (see Bjork & Richardson-Klavehn, 1989; Smith, 1988; Smith & Vela, 2001). Although some investigators have found effects of context in tests of recognition (e.g., Dalton, 1993; Geiselman & Bjork, 1980; Geiselman & Glenny, 1977; Murnane & Phelps,

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1993, 1994, 1995; Smith, 1986; Smith & Vela, 1992), others have not (e.g., Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985; Godden & Baddeley, 1980; Jacoby, 1983; Smith, 1986; Smith et al., 1978). Murnane and Phelps (1993, 1994, 1995) provided a series of demonstrations of the effects of global context on recognition using unique combinations of foreground color, background color, and location on a computer screen in within-subject and within-list manipulations of context. Murnane and Phelps (1993) noted that several studies that have failed to observe context effects in recognition have used between-subjects manipulations of context, and they suggested that such a design allows subjects to adopt different decision criteria for the different context conditions, which may attenuate the effects of context. Murnane and Phelps (1994) went on to show that the nature of the new context also influences context effects. They compared a completely new context not seen at study with a context that was seen at study but was not paired with the same item at test. The different-but-familiar context condition produced an effect of context similar to the same-old context condition. That is, it behaved as an old context. Murnane and Phelps (1993, 1994, 1995) proposed a global matching model account of their effects of context. In this view, item recognition is based on the degree to which information in the retrieval cue matches information stored in memory. Memory is activated in response to both the item information and the context information contained in the test presentation. A target presented in the same context at study and test would have a high degree of activation, because both item and context information would match the stored information. A target presented in a new context would have a lower degree of activation because only the item itself would match with information stored in memory; the nonmatching context would serve to decrease the overall familiarity value of the probe. Murnane et al. (1999) extended this global matching view of context effects in their ICE (item, context, and ensemble information) model. In ICE, item information is information vital to the cognitive task performed, whereas context information is peripheral information in the processing environment. Ensemble information represents the integration of item and context information. In ICE, the nature of the effects of context depend on how context information is encoded at study and test. Matching global context at study and test will increase both the hit rate and the false-alarm rate without necessarily influencing discrimination. In contrast, local context, or context that is integrated or associated with the item information in an ensemble, will affect both familiarity and discrimination. In support of this view, Murnane et al. (1999) examined the effects of both simple contexts (foreground and background colors) and enriched contexts (line drawings where the TBR items are shown in a congruous situation, such as a classroom with words written on a blackboard). Hit and false-alarm rates were both higher when items were tested in either type of old context compared to new contexts. In contrast to simple contexts, discrimination as measured by d was greater for items tested in an old enriched context. Murnane et al. argued that subjects were more likely to integrate the TBR items with their context in the rich context condition producing an effect of context dependent discrimination. Macken (2002) has more recently proposed a dual-processing account of context effects in recognition memory. Macken combined Murnane and Phelpss (1993) context manipulation with Tulvings (1985) remember/know response procedure. In this response procedure, subjects are asked to classify their old recogni-

tion decisions as being based on the recollection of specific details of a prior experience (remember responses), or on a strong sense of familiarity in the absence of the recollection of any specific details (know responses). Macken found that the effects of context were seen only in recognition judgments identified by participants as based on recollection. Macken proposed that global context effects are due to the encoding and retrieval of specific itemcontext associations. Thus, context can affect recognition decisions that are accompanied by conscious recollection of details of the study episode (i.e., remember responses), but not decisions based only on familiarity (i.e., know responses). The results of Perfect, Mayes, Downes, and Van Eijk (1996) provide support for this view in that they showed that memory for contextual information is greater for items that were accompanied by a recollective experience than for items deemed only familiar. Macken (2002, Experiment 3) examined the effects of testing items in their same study context, an old but different (switched) context, or a new context and found an effect of context that was seen only in remember responses. The proportion of remember responses was greater in the old context condition compared to both the switched and the new context conditions. The latter two conditions did not differ. In comparison, familiarity-based responses estimated from corrected know responses using Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) independence remember/know (IRK) procedure1 did not vary with the context condition. Macken also found that context influenced discrimination for recollectionbased but not familiarity-based responses. Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Masson (2007) extended Mackens (2002) findings to face recognition. They paired faces with different unique pictures during study. At test, old faces were shown in their same-old context, a different or switched old context, or a new picture context. New faces were tested in old or new contexts. Hit rates were higher for faces tested in their same-old context compared to different-old or new contexts, and this difference was seen only in remember responses. Familiarity-based correct old responses estimated from IRK-corrected know responses did not vary with context. In addition, context-dependent discrimination was observed for remember responses but not for familiarity-based responses. Gruppuso et al.s pattern of results is largely consistent with Mackens (2002) findings and support similar conclusions. Figure 1 presents a schematic of the pattern of hit and false-alarm rate differences between the context conditions examined by Murnane and Phelps (1994), Murnane et al. (1999), Macken (2002, Experiment 3), and Gruppuso et al. (2007). Figure 2 shows the corresponding comparisons of discrimination between the context conditions. Two common findings are readily apparent in Figure 1. First, overall hit rates and hits identified as remember responses are systematically greater for a target tested in its same-old study context compared to a
Based on the assumption that recollection (R) and familiarity (F) are independent processes, the proportion of know (K) responses underestimates the value of F because of the instances when both recollection and familiarity support an old decision and the subject responds (appropriately) remember. Jacoby et al. (1997) proposed that an estimate of F that is independent of recollection can be derived from the equation: F K/(1 R). R can be estimated directly from the proportion of remember responses. Both Macken (2002) and Gruppuso et al. (2007) used this estimation procedure in their analyses of recollection and familiarity for context effects.
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Hit Rat es Same Old vs New Murnane & Phelps (1994) Simple context Murnane et al. (1999) Simple context Rich Context Macken (2002, Exp. 3) Remember Know Know (IRK) Grupposo et al. (2007) Remember Know Know (IRK) > > > > < = > < = > < = > < = = = = > = = Same Old vs Different Old = Different Old vs New >

HOCKLEY
F alse Al arm Rates Different Old vs New > > > > > > > > >

to the nature of the distinction between remembering and knowing. As will be seen, however, the present results do have implications for the interpretation of these responses. To examine the relationship between the effects of environmental context and reports of recollection, context was manipulated in different ways across the five experiments that are reported. In Experiment 1, items were tested in their same-old study context, a context consisting of a new arrangement of old context elements (foreground and background color and screen position) or a new context. If the effect of context is based on an explicit association between the target and its study context, then context effects should be seen in remember responses when targets are tested in their same-old context but not in remember responses for targets tested in other context conditions.

Figure 1. A schematic showing the direction of the differences in the hit and false-alarm rates for old, remember, know, and corrected know (independence remember/know, IRK) responses between the different comparisons of the context conditions examined by Murnane and Phelps (1994), Murnane et al. (1999), Macken (2002, Experiment 3), and Gruppuso et al. (2007).

Experiment 1
As can be seen in the pattern of results depicted in Figure 1, Murnane and Phelps (1994) found no differences between the effect of context when items were tested in (a) their same-old context and in (b) a context that, although different from that in which they had been studied, had itself been present during the learning phase. In contrast, Macken (2002) and Gruppuso et al. (2007) both observed a decrease in recollection when items were tested in an old context that was different from the context they were shown in at study compared to the same-old context condition. In Experiment 1 two different new test contexts were compared: a new context in which all of the individual elements had not been present at study and a context that consisted of a rearrangement of previously seen context elements creating a new (not seen before) combination of old context elements. This differs from Murnane and Phelpss (1994) procedure in that the rearranged contexts were context combinations not used during study, whereas Murnane & Phelps tested items in an intact context that a different item was presented in at study. If an effect of context only occurs for the original or studied context condition and this effect is seen in remember and not familiarity-based responses, it would lend support to Mackens (2002) view that context effects arise due to specific associations

new context, whereas familiarity-based responses estimated from IRK-transformed know responses do not differ between these two context conditions. Second, all types of old responses are higher to lures presented in an old study context compared to a new context (although the false-alarm rates for remember responses were quite low). Two differences between the studies are also notable. Murnane and Phelps (1994) found that a different-old context produced similar effects as a same-old context in their tests of yes-no recognition, whereas Macken (2002) and Gruppuso et al. (2007) both found that a different-old context produced results similar to a new context condition when recognition is conditionalized on responses identified as remembered. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 2, Murnane and colleagues did not find that overall discrimination varied with manipulations of simple context, whereas Macken and Gruppuso et al. found that the sensitivity of remember responses was greater in the same-old context condition compared to both different-old and new context conditions. The present study was designed to further examine the roles of recollection and familiarity in the effects of environmental context on recognition memory. Following Macken (2002) and Gruppuso et al. (2007), the remember/know response procedure was used in each experiment. It should be noted, however, that there is considerable controversy concerning this subjective response procedure. Remember and know responses have been assumed to reflect mutually exclusive processes (e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990), two independent processes (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997), or different cutoffs on a single strength dimension (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004). There is also debate as to whether recollection is an all-or-none process (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994) or a continuous variable (e.g., Higham & Vokey, 2004; Wixted & Stretch, 2004). Questions concerning the relationship between remember and know responses also raise issues concerning the appropriate method to analyze know responses (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1997). The remember/ know procedure is used in the present study to compare the degree to which the effects of the manipulations of context are reflected in remember responses so that the present results can be compared to previous findings. Remember responses are assumed to reflect the subjects phenomenology of their retrieval without a commitment

Context Condition Comparisons Same Old vs Same Old vs Different Old vs New Different Old New Murnane & Phelps (1994) Simple context Murnane et al. (1999) Simple context Rich Context Macken (2002, Exp. 3) Remember Know (IRK) Grupposo et al. (2007) Remember Know (IRK) = = > > = > = > = > = = = = = = =

Figure 2. A schematic showing the comparisons of discrimination between the context conditions examined by Murnane and Phelps (1994), Murnane et al. (1999), Macken (2002, Experiment 3), and Gruppuso et al. (2007).

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between items and their study context. Word frequency was also manipulated in Experiment 1. Studies of verbal associative memory have generally found better recall performance for high frequency (HF) compared to low frequency (LF) words (e.g., Clark, 1992; Clark & Burchett, 1994; Gregg, 1976; Kinsbourne & George, 1974; see Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984, for a review). Thus, the finding that context effects are greater for HF than for LF words would also be consistent with Mackens (2002) proposal that context effects are based on the encoding and retrieval of specific item-context associations.

Method
Subjects. Participants in each experiment were enrolled in Introductory Psychology and received course credit for participation. There were 32 students in Experiment 1. Stimuli and Apparatus. In all experiments, presentation and response recording were controlled by IBM-compatible laboratory computers equipped with 17-in., flat screen color monitors. Words in Experiment 1 were randomly selected without replacement for each subject session from Glanzer and Adamss (1990) pool of 248 high-frequency words (mean frequency of 177.3 per million, according to the Kucera & Francis, 1967, norms) and 248 lowfrequency words (mean Kucera-Francis frequency of 11.2). Context elements consisted of four different possibilities for each of foreground color, background color, and screen position. The background colors were yellow, pink, purple, and orange; and foreground colors were blue, green, red, and magenta. Screen locations were the top right-hand, top left-hand, bottom right-hand, and bottom left-hand corners of the monitor. Thus, there were 64 unique combinations of the different context elements. The elements for the new context condition at test were white text on a black background in a center screen position. Procedure. The experimental session consisted of six study/ test cycles. Subjects initiated each study list by pressing one of the response keys. Following Murnane and Phelpss (1993, 1994) procedure, words were presented in pairs in order to reduce the tendency for participants to associate the current study item with a previous study item as such a rehearsal strategy might attenuate the effects of context by associating words from different contexts. There were 24 random word pairs in each study list. Half of the pairs consisted of two high frequency (HF) nouns and half were two low frequency (LF) nouns. Words were not repeated across cycles. Each word pair in a list was presented in its own context consisting of a unique combination of a foreground color, background color, and screen position. The first and last four word pairs were not tested and served as buffers for the effects of primacy and recency. Pairs were presented for 3 s with a 500 ms interval between presentations in which the screen was blank. Participants were instructed to try to relate or associate the words of each pair, as this is an effective strategy for remembering the individual words. The study instructions emphasized memory for the word pairs but did mention that the words would be shown in different colors and screen locations. The study list was followed by a signal shown for 5 s indicating the start of the test phase. The test list consisted of 32 single words. One word from each of the 16 critical study pairs (excluding the first and last four word pairs) was tested. These 16 targets were drawn randomly from study pairs with the constraint that they

were equally divided between the first and second members of the study pairs. One-half of the targets were HF words and one-half were LF words. In addition, there were 8 LF and 8 HF new words. Half of the targets from each list were tested in their study context (same-old context condition) and the remaining half were tested in a new context condition. New context conditions were of two forms. The first was a new context consisting of context elements that were not presented in the study phase. The second type of new context was a rearranged context condition that consisted of new combinations of old context elements used at study. A unique new combination of old context elements was used for each item tested in this condition. Half of the new context presentations were of each form. An equal number of HF and LF targets were tested in the same and new test contexts. Half of the new words were tested in one of the learning contexts of an old word that was not tested in its study context. The remaining new words were tested either in the new or a rearranged-new context. The presentation order of the events in the study and test lists was determined randomly for each subject. Participants made their recognition decisions for each test word using Tulvings (1985) remember-know response procedure using instructions adopted from Rajaram (1993). These instructions asked subjects to make an old/new discrimination for each test probe. If their decision was old, they were also asked to give the basis of their decision by indicating if they recollected any detail or details of the prior experience of the word in the study list (remember response), or if their decision was based on a strong sense of familiarity in the absence of recollection (know response). There was a 1 s blank interval between a response and the presentation of the next test. Participants used the Z key, the comma key, and the slash key on the lower row of the keyboard to make their respective new, old-know, and old-remember decisions. They were asked to make their decisions as accurately as possible.

Results and Discussion

Analyses were conducted on the proportions of overall old responses and remember responses, and estimates of familiarity based on IRK-transformed know responses (hereafter termed familiarity estimates). The proportion of know responses are reported but were not analyzed as these responses are dependent on the level of remember responding. To assess discrimination of overall recognition performance, signal detection theory estimates of d (discrimination) and c (criterion placement) were calculated.2 Following Macken (2002), discrimination of remember responses was assessed by calculating estimates of q, a measure of sensitivity

The single-point estimates of both d and c were calculated based on an equal variance detection model. In calculating the estimates of d and c for each participant in each condition, hit rates of 1 were replaced by 1 (1/2n) and false-alarm rates of 0 were replaced by 1/2n where N is the maximum number of hits and false alarms that the participant could make in that condition (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).

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based on a single high threshold model.3 Signal detection theory measures of d and c were used to assess the discrimination and bias of the estimates of familiarity. The .05 level of significance was used to interpret all analyses. The mean proportions of old, remember, and know responses, and IRK estimates of familiarity for LF and HF words in each context condition are summarized in Table 1. A mirror effect for word frequency (cf. Glanzer & Adams, 1985) is seen in the higher hit and lower false-alarm rates for LF compared to HF words. Effects of context are seen in terms of higher proportions of old responses in the old context conditions compared to the new context condition. A 2 (old vs. new test probe) 2 (LF vs. HF) 3 (old, rearranged, and new context) analysis of variance (ANOVA) based on the overall proportion of old responses revealed that the hit rate exceeded the false-alarm rate, F(2, 31) 372.3, MSE .117, partial eta2 .923, p .001. The main effect of word frequency was not reliable, F(2, 31) 2.49, MSE .013, partial eta2 .074, p .125, but the Frequency Test Probe interaction was significant, F(2, 31) 9.98, MSE .015, partial eta2 .244, p .004. This interaction reflects a mirror effect pattern for word frequency. The overall hit rate was significantly greater for LF (.86) than for HF (.81) words, t(31) 3.45, p .002. The overall false-alarm rate was also less for LF (.15) than for HF (.17) words, but this difference was not reliable, t(31) 1.24, p .224. The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of context, F(2, 31) 16.86, MSE .012, partial eta2 .352, p .001. Context did not interact with test probe, F(2, 62) 1.47, MSE .012, partial eta2 .045, p .237, or word frequency, F(2, 62) 1. The Test Probe Word Frequency Context interaction was also not significant, F(2, 62) 1. Paired sample t tests based on the proportion of old responses collapsed across word frequency showed that the hit rate was greater in the same-old (.87) compared to the new (.78) context condition, t(31) 4.57, p .001, and greater in the rearranged-old (.86) compared to the new context, t(31) 3.47, p .001. The false-alarm rate was also greater in the same-old (.17) compared to the new (.12) context condition, t(31) 3.59, p .001, and greater in the rearranged-old (.18) compared to the new context, t(31) 2.65, p .013. The hit and false-alarm rates did not differ between the old and rearranged context conditions (ts 1). The corresponding ANOVA based on the proportion of remember responses revealed significant effects of test probe, F(2, 31) 138.7, MSE .182, partial eta2 .817, p .001, word frequency, F(2, 32) 8.35, MSE .018, partial eta2 .212, p .007, and their interaction, F(2, 32) 14.57, MSE .010, partial eta2 .320, p .001. The overall proportion of correct remember responses was higher for LF (.59) than for HF (.52) words, t(31) 3.37, p .002, but did not differ for incorrect responses to LF (.04) and HF (.04) words. The main effect of context was also significant, F(2, 31) 7.32, MSE .012, partial eta2 .191, p .001, as was the context by test probe interaction, F(2, 31) 6.15, MSE .011, partial eta2 .166, p .004. No other interaction approached significance. The proportion of hits for remember responses collapsed over word frequency was greater in the same-old (.60) compared to the new (.50) context condition, t(31) 3.45, p .002, and greater in the rearranged-old (.56) than in the new context, t(31) 3.45, p .023, but did not differ reliably between the

same-old and rearranged-old contexts, t(31) 1.89, p .068, although there was a trend favoring the same-old context condition. The false-alarm rates for the remember responses did not differ between the same-old (.04), rearranged-old (.05), and new (.04) context conditions. The same ANOVA based on the proportion of IRK familiarity responses revealed main effects of test probe, F(1, 31) 130.7, MSE .151, partial eta2 .808, p .001, and context, F(2, 31) 8.32, MSE .046, partial eta2 .212, p .001. Estimated familiarity was greater for hits in the same-old context (.66) than in the new context (.49), t(31) 3.54, p .001. The difference between the rearranged-old context (.59) and new context conditions did not reach significance, t(31) 1.85, p .074. The familiarity estimates did not differ between the same-old and rearranged context conditions, t(31) 0.61, p .548. Estimated familiarity was also greater for false alarms in the same-old context (.14) than in the new context (.09), t(31) 3.54, p .001, and in the rearranged-old context (.15) compared to the new context, t(31) 2.58, p .015, but did not differ between the same-old and rearranged context conditions, t(31) 1.32, p .195. The main effect of frequency and all interactions between these variables were not reliable. Mean signal detection theory estimates of discrimination (d ) and criterion placement (c) based on the overall hit and false-alarm rates for HF and LF words in the same-old, rearranged-old, and new context conditions are given in Table 2. A 2 (word frequency) 3 (context condition) ANOVA based on estimates of d revealed only a main effect of word frequency, F(2, 31) 9.28, MSE 1.07, partial eta2 .230, p .005. Overall discrimination was greater for LF than for HF words. The same analysis based on estimates of c showed only a main effect of context, F(2, 31) 15.56, MSE .176, partial eta2 .334, p .001. Collapsed over frequency, criterion placement was significantly more liberal in the same-old (.40), t(31) 5.25, p .001, and in the rearranged-old (.55), t(31) 4.15, p .001, contexts relative to the new context (.98), and did not differ reliably between the same-old and rearranged-old context conditions, t(31) .19, p .851. Mean estimates of q, the high-threshold measure of discrimination for remember responses, and estimates of d and c for familiarity responses are given in Table 3. An ANOVA based on the estimates of q produced main effects of frequency, F(2, 31) 10.13, MSE .028, partial eta2 .246, p .003, and context, F(2, 31) 6.97, MSE .025, partial eta2 .184, p .002, with no significant interaction (F 1). Discrimination was greater for LF (.57) than HF (.49) words. The discrimination of remember responses was greater in the sameold (.58) compared to the new (.47) context condition, t(31) 3.54, p .001. Discrimination was also greater in the rearranged-old (.54) compared to the new context condition, and this difference bordered on significance, t(31) 2.03, p .051. The difference between the same and rearranged context conditions was not reliable, t(31) 1.76, p .088.
If remember responses reflect recognition decisions based on recollection, then it is reasonable to assume that remember responses are based on a discrete, threshold process. As such, measures of discrimination based on a single high threshold detection model, such as q (HR FA)/(1 FA), are appropriate. The false-alarm rate represents the response bias associated with this measure of sensitivity.
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Table 1 Mean Proportions of Old, Remember, and Know Responses and Independence Remember/Know (IRK) Estimates of Familiarity for Low (LF) and High (HF) Frequency Words in the Same Old, Rearranged Old, and New Context Conditions of Experiment 1
False alarms LF Context Same-old Response Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK M .16 .03 .12 .13 .17 .05 .12 .13 .12 .04 .08 .09 SE .03 .01 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 M .18 .05 .13 .15 .20 .05 .15 .17 .13 .03 .10 .10 HF SE .03 .02 .02 .02 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .01 .02 .02 M .89 .64 .26 .67 .90 .60 .30 .61 .80 .54 .26 .47 LF SE .02 .05 .04 .05 .02 .05 .05 .07 .03 .05 .04 .06 M .85 .57 .28 .65 .82 .52 .30 .57 .75 .46 .29 .51 Hits HF SE .03 .04 .03 .04 .03 .05 .04 .06 .04 .05 .04 .06

Rearranged

New

Finally, an ANOVA based on the d estimates of familiaritybased responses showed no effects of frequency, context, or their interaction (all Fs less than 1.08). The same analysis based on estimates of c for familiarity-based responses revealed a main effect of context, F(2, 31) 8.86, MSE .643, partial eta2 .222, p .001. The main effect of frequency, F(2, 31) 1, and the Context Frequency interaction, F(2, 31) 1, were not significant. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old, t(31) 4.45, p .001, and in the rearranged-old context, t(31)

2.76, p .01, compared to the new context condition, and did not differ between the two old contexts, t(31) 1.07, p .293. The results of Experiment 1 show the mirror effect pattern for word frequency as the hit rate was greater and the false-alarm rate lower for LF compared to HF words. Consequently, overall discrimination was significantly greater for LF words. This effect was largely seen in terms of remember responses for hits and know responses for false alarms replicating past findings (Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder et al., 2000). The effects of word frequency

Table 2 Mean Estimates of Discrimination (d ) and Criterion Placement (c) for the Different Context Conditions of Each Experiment
d Experiment Experiment 1 Context condition Same-old (HF) Rearranged-old (HF) New (HF) Same-old (LF) Rearranged-old (LF) New (LF) Same-old Different-old New Unique-old Repeated-old New Same-old Similar New Same-old Different-old New Same-old Different-old New M 2.39 2.26 2.46 2.82 2.96 2.70 1.56 1.49 1.46 2.24 1.85 1.49 1.28 1.32 1.19 2.73 2.71 2.72 2.53 2.15 2.22 SE .22 .19 .22 .23 .23 .27 .13 .13 .13 .19 .20 .19 .16 .16 .13 .23 .27 .20 .18 .20 .20 M 0.03 0.06 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.66 0.66 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.55 0.54 0.38 c SE .08 .11 .12 .07 .11 .08 .07 .09 .08 .13 .11 .10 .08 .08 .10 .16 .15 .14 .11 .13 .15

Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4A Experiment 5A Experiment 5B

Note.

The estimates for Experiment 1 are shown separately for high (HF) and low (LF) frequency words.

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Table 3 Mean Estimates of Discrimination q Based on Remember Responses, and Estimates of d and c Based on IRK Familiarity Estimates for Each Context Condition of Each Experiment
q Experiment Experiment 1 Context condition Same-old (HF) Rearranged-old (HF) New (HF) Same-old (LF) Rearranged-old (LF) New (LF) Same-old Different-old New Unique-old Repeated-old New Same-old Similar New Same-old Different-old New Same-old Different-old New M .53 .50 .45 .62 .58 .50 .45 .39 .28 .57 .49 .32 .42 .39 .25 .77 .76 .69 .79 .63 .44 SE .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .07 .05 .05 .04 .06 .06 .05 .05 .06 .05 .05 .05 .05 .04 .07 .06 M 1.85 1.44 1.78 2.03 1.86 1.68 1.05 1.02 1.18 1.57 1.42 1.32 0.78 0.98 1.15 1.49 1.35 1.44 1.84 1.37 1.22 d SE .22 .29 .31 .27 .38 .34 .28 .22 .19 .34 .30 .23 .15 .23 .19 .45 .38 .32 .49 .34 .21 M 0.42 0.49 0.90 0.38 0.61 1.16 0.22 0.23 0.99 0.08 0.06 0.34 0.30 0.47 0.67 0.59 0.66 0.60 0.24 0.45 0.52 c SE .12 .18 .17 .13 .19 .15 .13 .15 .11 .22 .19 .11 .09 .11 .11 .27 .23 .21 .22 .22 .15

Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4A Experiment 5A Experiment 5B

Note. IRK

The estimates for Experiment 1 are shown separately for high (HF) and low (LF) frequency words. independence remember/know.

and environmental context were statistically independent. To the extent that the HF advantage for verbal associative memory (e.g., Clark, 1992; Clark & Burchett, 1994; Gregg, 1976; Kinsbourne & George, 1974) extends to word-context associations, this result does not support the prediction that the effects of context would be greater for HF than for LF words. The results for word frequency are, however, consistent with the finding that context effects are unaffected by the memory strength of the target item (Dougal & Rotello, 1999). The results of Experiment 1 also replicated Murnane and Phelpss (1993, 1994, 1995) overall effects of environmental context both the hit and false-alarm rates were higher for tests presented in an old study context compared to a new test context. The signal detection analyses based on the overall results showed there was no difference in discrimination between old and new items tested in old and new contexts. Conceptually, the results of Experiment 1 provide a replication of Murnane and Phelpss finding that different-old contexts produce similar effects as the same-old context in that both an old-different context and a new rearrangement of old context elements are types of old contexts that were not shown with the test item. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, Macken (2002, Experiment 3) and Gruppuso et al. (2007) obtained a different pattern of results from Murnane and Phelps (1994) when remember and familiarity-based responses are considered. Macken and Gruppuso et al. found that the proportion of remember responses was greater for items tested in their same-old context compared to a new context, whereas remember responses did not differ between the different-old and new context conditions. Familiarity estimates were not influenced by context. In contrast, in Experiment 1 the proportion of remem-

ber responses and the familiarity estimates were both greater in the old and rearranged-old context conditions compared to the new context condition. Moreover, the discrimination of remember responses was greater in both old context conditions compared to the new condition and did not significantly differ between the two old context conditions. One possible reason for this discrepancy could be that Macken (2002) presented single words at study, whereas in Experiment 1 pairs of words were shown following Murnane and Phelpss (1994) procedure. Presenting pairs of words with instructions to associate the two words of each pair may limit subjects ability to associate the words with their study context. A second possible reason for this discrepancy is that in both Experiment 1 and in Murnane and Phelpss 1994 experiment, subjects completed a series of studytest cycles, whereas participants in Mackens experiment were only tested with one studytest cycle. Multiple studytest cycles based on the same context manipulations may reduce subjects ability to encode or retrieve associations between targets and contexts. In the following experiments, only single words were shown during the study phase, and there was only one studytest cycle.

Experiment 2
Similar to Gruppuso et al. (2007), pictures of real-world scenes were used as the global context in Experiment 2. Pictures are more tightly integrated stimuli than the context elements used in Experiment 1 and, presumably, should provide a richer and more meaningful basis for associating the item to its context and, thus, provide a stronger basis for supporting recollection. Each study

EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

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word was presented in the center of a different picture. At test, old words were shown in their same-old context, in a different-old context that had been shown with another study item, or in a new context. New words were shown in an old or new context.

Table 4 Mean Proportions of Old, Remember, and Know Responses in the Same-Old, Different-Old, and New Context Conditions of Experiment 2
False alarms Context Same-old Recognition Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK M SE M .83 .52 .31 .59 .81 .47 .34 .58 .61 .33 .27 .39 Hits SE .02 .04 .05 .05 .03 .05 .05 .05 .03 .03 .03 .04

Method
Subjects. Thirty-two students participated in Experiment 2. Apparatus and Stimuli. The words were selected from a pool of 120 common two-syllable nouns derived from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/ uwa_mrc.htm). The words had ratings of 250 to 350 in concreteness, imagability, and familiarity, and 30 to 100 for word frequency. A set of 58 pictures was used as the study contexts. The pictures were different scenes of natural landscapes, seascapes, buildings, and the like. An attempt was made to select pictures that were not highly similar to each other. They did not contain images of people or any verbal content (e.g., signs, etc.). The pictures filled the computer screen. Words were presented in the center of the pictures in black, bold, 32-point Times New Roman font in a white text box. The new context condition at test was a white background with the probe presented in red, bold, 32-point Times New Roman font. The experimental program was written using Super Lab Pro (Version 2.0) software. The test list consisted of 96 presentations of which 48 were old and 48 were new tests. Procedure. The experimental session consisted of one study list and one test list. Subjects initiated the study list by pressing one of the response keys. The study list consisted of 58 words presented against 58 different pictures. The first and last five presentations of each study list served as buffers for primacy and recency effects and were not tested. Words were presented for 3 s with a 1 s interval between presentations in which the screen was blank. At the conclusion of the study list, a message appeared on the screen that instructed subjects to Please call the experimenter, at which point they were given the instructions concerning the rememberknow response procedure. One-quarter of the old tests were presented with their same study list context, one quarter with a different-old study list context, and the remaining half in the new context. Half of the new test probes were presented in an old study context and half in the new context. A given study context picture was only shown with one test probe. The order of test presentations was randomized for each participant. The presentation rate of the test list was subject-paced with a 1 s blank interval between a response and the presentation of the next test display.

Different-old

New

.36 .13 .23 .26 .17 .07 .10 .11

.02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02

Note.

IRK

independence remember/know.

Results and Discussion

The mean proportions of old, remember, and know responses and IRK estimates of familiarity for old and new test items in each context condition are presented in Table 4. One-way ANOVAs were used to examine the effect of context on hit rates. There was a significant effect of context on the overall proportion of old responses, F(2, 62) 31.34, MSE .016, partial eta2 .503, p .001, the proportion of remember responses, F(2, 62) 11.63, MSE .026, partial eta2 .273, p .001, and the proportion of familiarity estimates, F(2, 62) 8.70, MSE .049, partial eta2 .078, p .001. Paired sample t tests showed that the proportion of

old responses was significantly greater in the same-old, t(31) 6.90, p .001, and the different-old context, t(31) 6.33, p .001, compared to the new context, and was statistically equivalent in both types of old contexts, t(31) .839, p .408. Similarly, the proportion of remember responses was also reliably greater in the same-old, t(31) 5.06, p .001, and the different-old context, t(31) 3.21, p .003, relative to the new context, and equivalent in both of the old contexts, t(31) 1.34, p .191. Similarly, the estimates of familiarity were greater in the same-old, t(31) 4.04, p .001, and the different-old context, t(31) 3.93, p .001, relative to the new context, but did not differ between the same and different-old contexts, t(31) .856, p .911. The false-alarm rates for overall old responses, t(31) 8.14, p .001, remember responses, t(31) 3.46, p .002, and familiarity estimates, t(31) 6.04, p .001, were also greater in an old context compared to the new context. The mean signal detection theory estimates of d and c based on overall old responses are given in Table 2. Context did not have a significant effect on d , F(2, 62) 0.15, MSE .478, partial eta2 .005, p .862, but did reliably affect estimates of the decision criterion, F(2, 62) 58.01, MSE .124, partial eta2 .652, p .001. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old, t(31) 9.20, p .001, and a different-old context, t(31) 8.27, p .001, compared to the new context condition, and did not differ reliably between the two old contexts, t(31) .442, p .662. Finally, estimates of q based on remember responses and d and c based on familiarity estimates are given in Table 3. The effect of context condition on the estimates of q was significant, F(2, 62) 6.33, MSE .035, partial eta2 .170, p .003. Discrimination was greater in the same-old context than the new context condition, t(31) 3.83, p .001, and greater in the different-old context compared to the new context condition, t(31) 2.11, p .043. The difference in discrimination between the two old context conditions was not reliable, t(31) 1.26, p .219. Context did not reliably influence estimates of d based on familiarity, F(2, 62) 1, but did affect the corresponding estimates of c, F(2, 62)

1420

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18.21, MSE .342, partial eta2 .370, p .001. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old, t(31) 6.01, p .001, and in the rearranged-old contexts, t(31) 4.81, p .001, than in the new context condition but did not differ between the two old contexts, t(31) 1. Pictures of real-world scenes were used in Experiment 2 as they provide a rich, integrated, and a more ecologically valid manipulation of context. The effects of context using pictures were indeed found to be greater in absolute terms than the context effects seen in Experiment 1, where background and foreground color and screen position were varied. Nevertheless, a similar pattern of results was observed. Overall hit and false-alarm rates were higher when test probes were shown in an old study context compared to a new context condition. This difference was seen in both the proportion of remember responses and familiarity-based responses. Importantly, the same pattern was also found when old tests were presented in a different-old context. Remember responses in this condition could not be based on any association between the studied items and their picture contexts because the items and the pictures were not shown together at study. In Experiment 1, the context elements were repeated across study contexts, whereas in Experiment 2 each study item was presented in a unique, once-presented context. Murnane and Phelps (1994) and Macken (2002) also repeated contexts during the study phase. In Experiment 3 the effect of repeating a study context was evaluated.

Stimuli and Apparatus. The apparatus, word pool, and picture contexts were the same as in Experiment 2. Procedure. The study list consisted of 44 words. The first and last two words were buffer items that were not tested. The buffer presentations and 20 of the critical study presentations were shown with unique pictures. The remaining 20 study presentations were shown with the same picture. Order of presentation was random for each subject. The test list consisted of 80 words, 40 new and 40 old. Ten old words were shown with the same unique pictures as at study, 10 were shown with the same repeated picture as at study, and 20 were shown in the new context. Ten new words were shown with a once-presented study picture, 10 with the repeated study picture, and 20 in the new context. All other aspects of the procedure were the same as in Experiment 2.

Results and Discussion

Mean proportions of old, remember, and know responses, and estimates of familiarity for the new, once-presented old, and repeated-old context conditions are shown in Table 5. A 2 (test probe) 3 (context condition) ANOVA based on the overall proportions of old responses revealed significant main effects of test probe, F(1, 31) 231.4, MSE .052, partial eta2 .882, p .001, and context, F(2, 62) 23.4, MSE .018, partial eta2 .430, p .001. The Test Probe Context Condition interaction approached significance, F(2, 62) 2.84, MSE .013, partial eta2 .084, p .066. Paired sample t tests showed that the hit rate was greater in the single-old context, t(31) 5.98, p .001, and repeated-old context, t(31) 5.58, p .001, compared to the new context condition, whereas the hit rates in the single- and repeatedold conditions did not differ reliably, t(31) 1.43, p .163. The false-alarm rate was also greater in the single-old context, t(31) 2.68, p .012, and repeated-old context, t(31) 3.68, p .001, compared to the new context condition and did not differ between the single- and repeated-old conditions, t(31) 1.14, p .263. The effect of context was numerically greater for hits than false alarms, leading to a trend toward an interaction. The same analysis based on the proportion of remember responses also showed significant effects of test probe, F(1, 31) 84.7, MSE .052, partial eta2 .732, p .001, and context, F(2, 62) 15.2, MSE .018, partial eta2 .329, p .001, and their interaction, F(2, 62) 9.97, MSE .013, partial eta2 .243, p .001. The remember hit rate was greater in the single-old context,

Experiment 3
Study items were presented in one of two types of contexts. Words were presented in either a once-presented context or in a context that was shared with different words. In the repeated context condition, different words were presented with each repetition of the context so as to not confound context and item repetitions. At test, targets and distractors were presented in either a once-presented or repeated-old context or in a new context. Repeating a context should increase the general familiarity of that context but make it more difficult to retrieve specific item-context associations (i.e., the fan effect; cf. Reder et al., 2002).

Method
Subjects. Thirty-two students participated.

Table 5 Mean Proportions of Old, Remember, and Know Responses and IRK Estimates of Familiarity for the New, Old-Unique (1X), and Old-Repeated (20X) Context Conditions of Experiment 3
False alarms New Response Old Remember Know IRK Note. IRK M .27 .08 .19 .21 SE .03 .01 .03 .04 M .36 .12 .25 .30 Old 1X SE .04 .02 .03 .04 M .40 .14 .26 .31 Old 20X SE .04 .02 .03 .04 M .74 .39 .35 .58 New SE .03 .04 .03 .04 M .92 .62 .30 .70 Hits Old 1X SE .02 .06 .05 .06 M .89 .58 .31 .69 Old 20X SE .02 .05 .04 .05

independence remember/know.

EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

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t(31) 4.82, p .001, and repeated-old context, t(31) 4.88, p .001, compared to the new context condition, and did not differ reliably between the two old conditions, t(31) .88, p .388. The false-alarm rate was greater in the repeated-old context compared to the new context condition, t(31) 2.56, p .015, but did not differ significantly between the single-old and new context, t(31) 1.68, p .104, nor between the single-old and repeatedold contexts, t(31) 1.11, p .274. Estimates of familiarity were greater for hits than false alarms, F(1, 31) 88.56, MSE .079, partial eta2 .741, p .001. The main effect of context was also reliable, F(2, 62) 4.16, MSE .054, partial eta2 .118, p .020. The Test Probe Context interaction was not significant (F 1). The familiarity-based hit rate was greater in the single-old context and in the repeated-old context compared to the new context condition, but these differences were not reliable, t(31) 1.62, p .116, and t(31) 1.72, p .095, respectively. The difference between the two old conditions was also not significant, t(31) .17, p .863. The false-alarm rate was reliably greater in the single-old context t(31) 2.61, p .014, and in the repeated-old context, t(31) 2.84, p .008, compared to the new context condition, but did not differ between the two types of old contexts, t(31) 0.44, p .663. The mean estimates of d and c for overall old responses are given in Table 2. Context had a significant effect on d , F(2, 62) 7.47, MSE .607, partial eta2 .194, p .001, and on estimates of criterion placement, F(2, 64) 29.09, MSE .145, partial eta2 .484, p .001. Discrimination was greater in the oncepresented old context compared to the new context condition, t(31) 4.54, p .001, but did not differ reliably between the repeated-old context compared to the new condition, t(31) 1.87, p .072, and between the once-presented old context compared to the repeated-old context, t(31) 1.77, p .087. Criterion placement was more liberal in the once-presented, t(31) 6.05, p .001, and the repeated-old context, t(31) 6.47, p .001, compared to the new context condition but did not differ significantly between the two old contexts, t(31) .023, p .981. Mean estimates of q for remember responses and d and c for familiarity estimates are given in Table 3. Context had a reliable effect on the discrimination of remember responses, F(2, 62) 13.07, MSE .040, partial eta2 .297, p .001. Discrimination was greater in the single-old context, t(31) 5.26, p .001, and in the repeated-old context, t(31) 3.52, p .001, compared to the new context, but did not reliably differ between the two old context conditions, t(31) 1.51, p .140. Context did not reliably influence d based on familiarity, F(2, 62) 1. The corresponding estimates of c were more liberal in the unique- and repeated-old contexts compared to the new context condition, but this difference only approached significance, F(2, 62) 2.96, MSE .604, partial eta2 .087, p .059. Experiment 3 replicated the standard effects of context in that the hit and false-alarm rates were higher for probes tested in an old context compared to a new context. More interestingly, the results of Experiment 3 also showed that similar results were found in terms of the patterns of hit and false-alarm rates for items tested in an old context presented 20 times at study compared to items shown in a unique context. In contrast to the previous experiments, the unique context manipulation in Experiment 3 produced a significant difference in

overall discrimination, as d was greater in the once-presented context condition compared to the new condition. This result is in contrast to the results of Experiment 2, which did not show a difference in d between the once-presented and new context conditions. Whether this aspect of the results of Experiment 3 is spurious or due to the relatively fewer number of items presented in a unique context in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2 is not clear. Nevertheless, the important conclusion from Experiment 3 is that repeated contexts produced largely similar increases in the hit and false-alarm rates as did once-repeated contexts and these increases were seen in the proportion of remember responses. One possible reason that there was relatively little difference between the once-presented and repeated context conditions of Experiment 3 might be that subjects did not have a very vivid or accurate memory for the picture contexts and thus failed to fully appreciate the distinction between once-presented and repeated contexts. If memory for the pictures is largely incidental, then memory for the pictures could be quite general or incomplete. This possibility was examined in Experiments 4A and 4B.

Experiment 4A
In Experiment 4A the effect of the similarity of old and new contexts on item recognition was investigated. New test contexts that are similar, but not identical, to old contexts should provide a degree of familiarity but be less able to support the retrieval of specific item-context associations. If participants are encoding only a few dominant details of the context, or a gist-like representation of the picture, then a new context that is similar to an old context in terms of dominant features or theme should have a similar effect on recognition as an old context. To manipulate context similarity, pictures from six different categories (e.g., the Costa Rican central rain forest) were collected. The pictures in each different category shared a theme, and the physical similarity of the pictures was greater within than between the different categories.

Method
Subjects. Thirty-three students participated. Apparatus and Stimuli. The word pool was the same as used in Experiments 2 and 3. A new set of 90 pictures was assembled. There were 15 pictures from each of six different categories: buildings, public gardens, rain forest, sunsets, seascapes, and the Grand Canyon. The pictures of each category were representative of the category, but were also discriminable from each other. An additional four pictures unrelated to the six categories were used for the buffer items. Procedure. The study list consisted of the presentation of 58 words randomly selected from the word pool. The first two and last two presentations were used to control primacy and recency effects and were not tested. The critical 54 presentations consisted of different words shown with nine pictures from each of the six different picture categories. The words and pictures were shown for 3 s with no interstimulus interval. The test list consisted of 54 old and 54 new item presentations. Eighteen old words were shown with the same picture they were presented with at study and 18 new words were shown with a picture presented at study (old context condition). Eighteen other

1422

HOCKLEY

old and new words were shown with a different new picture taken from the same six categories that the study pictures were taken from (similar context condition), and 18 old and new words were shown in the new context condition used in Experiments 2 and 3. The order of the critical study and test presentations was randomly determined for each participant. The test list was subject-paced with a subsequent test item appearing 1 s after a response.

Results and Discussion

The proportions of old, remember, and know responses, and estimates of familiarity for old and new tests in each context condition are shown in Table 6. A 2 (old vs. new tests) 3 (old vs. similar vs. new) ANOVA based on the overall proportion of old responses confirmed main effects of test probe, F(1, 32) 128.1, MSE .062, partial eta2 .800, p .001, and context, F(2, 64) 9.65, MSE .015, partial eta2 .232, p .001. The interaction between these variables was not significant (F 1). Paired sample t tests showed that the hit rate was greater in both the old context, t(32) 2.68, p .012, and the similar context, t(32) 2.60, p .014, compared to the new context condition. Hit rates in the old and similar context conditions did not significantly differ, t(32) .310, p .756. The false-alarm rate was reliably greater in an old compared to a new context, t(32) 2.89, p .007. The false-alarm rate in the similar context condition did not differ significantly from the false-alarm rates in the old, t(32) .962, p .342, and the new, t(32) 1.577, p .125, context conditions. The same ANOVA based on the proportion of remember responses yielded main effects of test probe, F(1, 32) 74.8, MSE .070, partial eta2 .700, p .001, and context condition, F(2, 64) 7.97, MSE .013, partial eta2 .199, p .001, and their interaction, F(2, 64) 9.52, MSE .011, partial eta2 .229, p .001. The proportion of remember responses was greater in both the old context, t(32) 3.93, p .001, and the similar context conditions, t(32) 3.44, p .002, compared to the new context, whereas there was no reliable difference between the old and similar context conditions, t(32) 1.19, p .243. The false alarms classified as remembered did not differ between the context conditions. Estimates of familiarity were greater for hits than false alarms, F(1, 32) 70.19, MSE .054, partial eta2 .687, p .001, and varied with context, F(2, 64) 3.385, MSE .025, partial eta2 .096, p .040. These variables did not interact (F 1). The

familiarity-based hit rates did not differ significantly between the old and new context conditions, t(32) 1.09, p .284, between the similar and new context conditions, t(32) .66, p .514, or between the old and similar context conditions, t(32) .69, p .492. The false-alarm rate was reliably greater in the old context condition than in the new condition, t(32) 3.58, p .001, but did not differ reliably between the similar and new contexts, t(32) 1.85, p .073, or between the old and similar context conditions, t(32) .981, p .334. The mean estimates of d and c for overall old responses are given in Table 2. Context did not have a significant effect on d , F(2, 64) 1, but did reliably affect estimates of criterion placement, F(2, 64) 11.74, MSE .097, partial eta2 .268, p .001. Criterion placement was more liberal in the old context, t(32) 4.06, p .001, and the similar context condition, t(32) 3.54, p .001, compared to the new context condition, but did not differ reliably between the old and similar contexts, t(32) 1.23, p .226. Finally, the mean estimates of q for remember responses and d and c for familiarity estimates are given in Table 3. The discrimination of remember responses varied with context, F(2, 64) 8.03, MSE .032, partial eta2 .201, p .001. Discrimination was greater in the old context, t(32) 3.46, p .002, and in the similar context, t(32) 2.68, p .012, compared to the new context, and did not reliably differ between the old and similar contexts, t(32) 1.09, p .284. Context did not reliably affect estimates of d based on familiarity, F(2, 64) 1.20, MSE .908, partial eta2 .036, p .31, but did influence the corresponding estimates of c, F(2, 64) 5.12, MSE .212, partial eta2 .138, p .009. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old context compared to the new context condition, t(32) 2.88, p .007. There were no reliable differences between the same-old context and a similar context, t(32) 1.65, p .110, or between the similar and the new context conditions, t(32) 1.75, p .089. Experiment 4A provides a further replication of the context effect that is evidenced with higher hit and false-alarm rates when items are tested in an old compared to a new context. More interestingly, new picture contexts that were physically and categorically related to the old contexts produced a similar pattern of effects. This suggests that subjects do not have a very accurate or specific memory for the picture contexts, as they treated similar new contexts in much the same fashion as the same-old contexts. Even more striking is the fact that the effects of old and similar

Table 6 Mean Proportions of Old, Remember, and Know Responses and IRK Estimates of Familiarity in the New, Similar, and Old Context Conditions of Experiment 4A
False alarms New Response Old Remember Know IRK Note. IRK M .28 .13 .15 .18 SE .04 .02 .03 .03 M .33 .13 .20 .24 Similar SE .04 .03 .03 .03 M .35 .13 .22 .26 Old SE .03 .02 .02 .03 M .66 .36 .29 .47 New SE .03 .03 .03 .04 M .75 .49 .26 .51 Hits Similar SE .03 .04 .03 .04 M .76 .51 .25 .53 Old SE .04 .04 .03 .05

independence remember/know.

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contexts were both seen in increases in the proportion of remember responses. Thus, new contexts not seen at study, but similar to old contexts, elicited a similar proportion of remember responses as did the old contexts. The effects of context on recognition judgments represent an indirect measure of subjects memory for the contexts. Experiment 4B was designed to directly assess participants incidental memory for the old contexts used in Experiment 4A. In Experiment 4B, after the study phase, subjects were asked to discriminate between old context pictures, new pictures similar to the old context pictures, and new pictures unrelated to the old pictures.

Experiment 4B
This experiment examined participants incidental memory for the picture contexts. The study phase of Experiment 4A was repeated with a different set of participants. Following study, participants were tested for their ability to discriminate between the old context pictures, new pictures similar to the old context pictures, and unrelated new pictures.

Method
Subjects. Twenty-five students participated. Apparatus and Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 4A except that an additional 18 pictures unrelated to the categorized pictures were added to the picture pool. Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4 except for the following changes to the test procedure. The test list consisted of the 54 pictures shown in the study phase and 54 new pictures. Thirty-six of the new pictures consisted of 6 pictures from the same six categories that were used for the study pictures, and 18 pictures were new pictures that were not related to the six picture categories. For each picture, participants were asked to make a yes/no recognition decision indicating whether or not the picture had been presented during the study phase. The presentation order of each test list was uniquely randomized for each participant. Participants used the Z key to signify a new recognition response and the question mark key to make an old response for each test. The participants were given the instructions for the test after the study list was shown.

cantly greater for old pictures compared to new pictures, t(24) 17.03, p .001, and old pictures compared to similar pictures, t(24) 5.69, p .001. The false-alarm rate was also greater for similar pictures than for new pictures, t(24) 11.67, p .001. Overall discrimination as measured by d was significantly greater between old and new pictures (M 1.79, SE .12) than between old and similar pictures (M .29, SE .05), t(24) 11.32, p .001. Estimates of c indicated a significantly more conservative criterion placement for old versus unrelated new pictures (M 0.87, SE .10) than for old versus similar new (M 0.11, SE .09) pictures, t(24) 11.32, p .001. The low false-alarm rate for new pictures shows that subjects could discriminate the new pictures from the sets of categorized pictures indicating that subjects had a reasonable appreciation of the different picture categories. Subjects also showed some ability to discriminate between the old pictures and the similar, but new, pictures from these categories. However, the overall level of this discrimination was very modest. It is reasonable to conclude that memory for the pictures was indeed incidental and that, whereas subjects memory for the old picture categories was quite good, their memory for the specific pictures shown at study was relatively poor. The results of Experiment 4B suggest that subjects did not explicitly try to associate the studied words with their specific picture contexts. The purpose of Experiment 5 was to compare the effects of context on recognition performance when subjects focused their attention on the study words (Experiment 5A) versus when they were explicitly instructed to consider the study words in relation to their specific context (Experiment 5B).

Experiments 5A and 5B
Experiments 5A and 5B were based on the procedure of Experiment 2 in which words were tested in their same-old study context, a different-old study context, or a new study context.

Method
Subjects. Eighteen different students participated in Experiments 5A and 5B. Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as used in Experiment 2. Procedure. The procedure was the same as Experiment 2 except for one change in the study phase. In Experiment 5A subjects were asked to rate how easy it was to generate a mental image of each study word. This task was intended to focus subjects attention on the study word. In contrast, subjects in Experiment 5B were asked to rate how easy it was to associate the study word with its picture background. This task was similar to that used by Gruppuso et al. (2007) and was intended to encourage associations between the study words and their contexts. Subjects were prompted immediately after each study presentation to make their respective ratings on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all easy) to 7 (extremely easy) using the numeric keypad on the keyboard. The next study presentation immediately followed each rating response.

Results and Discussion

The purpose of Experiment 4B was to assess incidental memory for the picture contexts. The proportions of old responses to the new, similar, and old pictures are shown in Table 7. Paired sample t tests showed that the proportion of old responses was signifiTable 7 Mean Proportions of Old Responses to New, Similar, and Old Pictures in Experiment 4B
False alarms New picture M .07 SE .01 Similar picture M .41 SE .03 M .51 Hits Old picture SE .03

Results and Discussion

Subjects rated the study words as relatively easy to image (M 4.35, SE .14) and rated the ease of associating the words with

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their contexts as moderate (M 3.5, SE .23). The mean proportions of old, remember, and know responses and estimates of familiarity for old and new test items in each context condition for each experiment are presented in Table 8. Each experiment was analyzed separately.

difference approached significance, F(2, 34) 3.14, MSE .012, partial eta2 .156, p .056. Context did not reliably influence estimates of d or criterion placement based on familiarity, Fs 1.

Experiment 5B
One-way ANOVAs revealed that context influenced the overall proportion of old responses, F(2, 34) 14.397, MSE .014, partial eta2 .459, p .001, the proportion of remember responses, F(2, 34) 29.08, MSE .020, partial eta2 .631, p .001, but did not significantly affect the IRK estimates of familiarity, F(2, 34) 1. Both the proportion of old and remember responses were significantly greater in the same-old than in the new context t(17) 4.65, p .001 and t(17) 7.51, p .001, and also greater in the same-old than in a different-old context, t(17) 2.31, p .034 and t(17) 3.298, p .004. Both old and remember responses were also greater in the different-old than in the new context condition, t(17) 3.27, p .005, and t(17) 4.24, p .001, respectively. The false-alarm rates for overall old responses, t(17) 4.02, p .001, and remember responses, t(17) 2.68, p .016, were greater in an old context compared to the new context. In contrast, the IRK familiarity estimates did not differ with context, t(17) 1. The mean signal detection theory estimates of d and c based on overall old responses are given in Table 2. Discrimination was greater in the same-old compared to the different and new context conditions, but this difference was not significant, F(2, 34) 1.797, MSE .419, partial eta2 .096, p .181. Context did reliably affect estimates of the decision criterion, F(2, 34) 29.99, MSE .174, partial eta2 .638, p .001. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old, t(17) 5.62, p .001, and a different-old context, t(17) 6.71, p .001, compared to the new context condition, and did not differ reliably between the two old types of context, t(17) 1. Estimates of q based on remember responses and d and c based on estimates of familiarity are given in Table 3. The effect of

Experiment 5A
One-way ANOVAs were used to examine the effect of context on hit rates. Context influenced the proportion of remember responses, F(2, 34) 3.276, MSE .012, partial eta2 .162, p 05, but did not significantly affect the overall proportion of old responses, F(2, 34) 1.06, MSE .008, partial eta2 .059, p .357, or estimates of familiarity, F(2, 34) 1. The proportion of remember responses was significantly greater in the same-old, t(17) 2.80, p .012, compared to the new context. Remember responses did not differ between the same-old and different-old context conditions, t(17) .458, p .653. The difference in the proportion of remember responses in the different-old and new context conditions was also not significant, t(17) 1.751, p .098. The false-alarm rates for overall old responses, t(17) 2.92, p .01, and remember responses, t(17) 2.84, p .011, were greater in an old context compared to the new context, and the IRK familiarity estimates did not differ, t(17) 1. The mean signal detection theory estimates of d and c based on overall old responses are given in Table 2. Context did not have a significant effect on d , F(2, 34) 1, but did reliably affect estimates of the decision criterion, F(2, 34) 3.86, MSE .176, partial eta2 .185, p 031. Criterion placement was more liberal in the same-old, t(17) 2.72, p .02, and in the different-old contexts, t(17) 2.00, p .06, compared to the new context condition, and did not differ reliably between the two old contexts, t(17) 1. Estimates of q based on remember responses and d and c based on familiarity responses are given in Table 3. Discrimination of remember responses was greater in the same-old and different-old context conditions compared to the new context condition, and this

Table 8 Mean Proportions of Old, Remember, and Know Responses and IRK Estimates of Familiarity in the Same-Old, Different-Old, and New-Context Conditions of Experiments 5A and 5B
Experiment 5A False alarms Context Same-old Response Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK Old Remember Know IRK independence remember/know. M SE M .90 .78 .12 .51 .89 .77 .12 .49 .86 .69 .17 .53 Hits SE .03 .05 .04 .09 .03 .06 .04 .08 .03 .05 .04 .07 M False alarms SE M .94 .81 .13 .60 .87 .67 .20 .50 .73 .46 .27 .50 Experiment 5B Hits SE .02 .03 .03 .09 .03 .06 .05 .08 .04 .06 .05 .05

Different-old

New

.20 .05 .15 .16 .12 .02 .10 .16

.04 .01 .03 .03 .11 .01 .02 .03

.26 .12 .14 .16 .13 .04 .09 .17

.04 .03 .02 .03 .03 .02 .02 .03

Note.

IRK

EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT

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context condition on the estimates of q was significant, F(2, 34) 26.90, MSE .020, partial eta2 .613, p .001. Discrimination was greater in the same-old context than in the new context condition, t(17) 7.91, p .001, greater in the same-old context than in the different-old context condition, t(31) 3.48, p .003, and greater in the different compared to the new context condition, t(17) 3.61, p .002. Context did not reliably influence discrimination or criterion placement of the familiarity estimates, Fs 1. The two orienting tasks used in Experiments 5A and 5B produced results that differed in important respects. When subjects attention was directed to the study words, the pattern of context effects replicated the principal findings from the previous experiments and those of Murnane and Phelps (1994). That is, the hit and false-alarm rates for old and remember responses were greater in an old context compared to the new context condition and did not significantly differ between the same-old and different-old context conditions. In contrast, when subjects made explicit associations between the study words and their individual contexts, the effects of context were similar to those observed by Macken (2002) and Gruppuso et al. (2007). The hit and false-alarm rates for both old and remember responses were greater in the same-old context condition compared to both the different-old and the new context conditions.

General Discussion
The results of Experiments 1 to 4A replicated the primary effects of environmental context on recognition memory reported by Murnane and Phelps (1993, 1994, 1995). The overall hit and false-alarm rates were higher for items tested in an old context compared to a new context with little difference in overall discrimination between the old and new context conditions. These effects were seen both when context was manipulated by varying the background and foreground colors and screen location of the study words, as Murnane and Phelps did, and when the words were presented against pictures of real-world scenes. In addition, different-old contexts and contexts similar in appearance and theme to old contexts had comparable effects on recognition performance as the same-old context. Finally, the differences between the effects of unique study contexts and repeated contexts were very modest. The results of Experiments 1 to 4A pose problems for Mackens (2002) dual-processing account of global context effects. In Mackens view, context effects are due to the encoding and retrieval of specific item-context associations. The results of the present study showed, as did Macken, that the increase in hit rate for items tested in their old study context was seen in the proportion of subjects remember responses. Similar results, however, were also seen for contexts that consisted of a new combination of old context elements (Experiment 1), old picture contexts that were paired with a different study item (Experiment 2), and new picture contexts that were similar to old contexts (Experiment 4A). The effects of context in these conditions cannot be based on the retrieval of specific item-context associations because these contexts were not paired with the test item at study. Furthermore, compared to unique-old contexts, repeating contexts with different study items did not substantially change the effects of context at test, although

retrieving specific item-context associations should be substantially more difficult for repeated contexts. It should be noted, however, that although rearranged, different, and similar old contexts produced largely similar statistical effects as the same-old contexts shown at study, in each experiment these effects were somewhat more modest in absolute terms. This aspect of the pattern of results suggests that specific associations between items and their study context may play a role in the effects of context on recognition decisions, although this role was relatively modest in the present experiments. The results of Experiments 5A and 5B provide a possible explanation for the differences in the results of Experiments 1 to 4A of the present study and Mackens (2002) findings. In Experiment 5A subjects attention was directed to the study words. Thus, subjects in Experiment 5A had less opportunity and motivation to attend to the background picture and to make any explicit associations between the study words and their context. The results of Experiment 5A were similar to the principal findings of Experiments 1 to 4A, suggesting that subjects in these experiments also did not pay particular attention to the background context. This would explain why subjects had a relatively poor memory for the specifics of the background pictures (Experiments 4B) and why they would treat rearranged and different-old contexts (Experiments 1 and 2) and new contexts similar to old contexts (Experiment 4A) in a similar fashion as an old context. It also explains why similar effects were seen for unique and repeated contexts (Experiment 3). In Experiment 5B, subjects were instructed to consider the association between the study word and the picture context. The results of this experiment were similar in nature to those found by Gruppuso et al. (2007) and Macken (2002). Indeed, Experiment 5B can be considered a replication of Gruppuso et al., as both studies used a similar orienting task at study that emphasized the association between the study item and its context. When subjects make associations between the study item and its context, discrimination and remember responses are greater when targets are tested in their same-old context compared to different-old and new contexts. The orienting task used by Gruppuso et al. (2007) and adopted in Experiment 5B, however, is arguably a manipulation of local rather than global context. Orienting tasks that emphasize the processing of both the study item and the context would promote the relational encoding of the item and its context. In essence, this procedure is a paired-associate learning task, and therefore it should not be surprising that accuracy and reported levels of recollection would be greater for targets tested in their same-old context rather than in a different-old or a new context. Indeed, it is widely believed that recall or recollection plays an important role in associative recognition (e.g., Cameron & Hockley, 2000; Hockley & Consoli, 1999; Rotello & Heit, 2000; Verde & Rotello, 2004; Westerman, 2000; Yonelinas, 1997). It is not clear, however, why Macken (2002) would find a similar pattern of results when he did not use such an orienting task at study. It is relevant to note in this regard that Tsivilis, Otten, and Rugg (2001) also did not use an associative orienting task and observed similar effects of context on old and remember responses. Tsivilis et al. examined recognition for pictures of objects presented in different locations against pictures of landscapes. Perhaps subjects in their experiment spontaneously made associations between the visual objects and their picture contexts

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because of the nature of the stimuli. It is less obvious why Mackens subjects would spontaneously make associations between study words and contexts that consisted of a particular foreground and background color and screen location, whereas subjects in Experiment 1 of the present study did not. In Experiment 1, each study item was presented in a unique combination of these context elements. In contrast, Macken used two different study contexts and a third set of context elements at test. Repeating a small number of contexts would allow the arbitrary context elements to become better integrated, which would facilitate the encoding of associations between the study items and their contexts. Nevertheless, it is not clear why subjects might spontaneously adopt such an encoding strategy. The context manipulation used by Murnane and Phelps (1994); Macken (2002), and Tsivilis et al. (2001) share similarities with the manipulation of context in visual search tasks that have supported the contextual cueing effect (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1998, 1999, 2003). In both tasks, a target appears in different spatial locations in different contexts. In Chun and Jiangs (1998) seminal demonstration of contextual cueing, observers searched for a rotated T shown among rotated Ls. Over trials, a subset of the same search fields was repeated. Search times for the target in the repeated displays became faster compared to search time in new displays. The learning of target locations in repeated contexts was implicit; the observers were not aware that displays were repeated, and they did not have explicit memory for target locations. Similar results have been found with arrays of two-dimensional and threedimensional shapes (Chua & Chun, 2003; Chun & Jiang, 1999). Brockmole and Henderson (2006; Brockmole, Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006) extended the contextual cueing effect to searching for letter targets in naturalistic displays (3-D renderings of rooms and household areas). In contrast to visual search in artificial displays, contextual cueing was greater when the global context (the entire scene) was repeated compared to repetitions of local context (objects near the target). Furthermore, the learned association between target location and context was explicit. Observers recognized repeated naturalistic scenes more accurately than scenes presented only once, and they could better recall the target positions in the repeated scenes. In both Mackens (2002) and Tsivilis et al.s (2001) manipulations of context, the location of the study items differed in the different contexts. Thus, based on the studies of contextual cueing in visual search, subjects in Mackens and Tsivilis et al.s experiments may have acquired some form of memory for the association between the study item and its location in a given context. Tsivilis et al.s manipulation of context is similar in respects to Brockmole and Hendersons (2006) manipulation of context, and thus similar associations between the study item, context and target location may have occurred. If Mackens manipulation of context is more similar to the richer contexts used by Brockmole and Henderson rather than the artificial displays used Chun & Jiang (1998), then Mackens subjects may have also benefited from associations between the target and its context and location. The degree of relation between contextual cueing effects in visual search and context effects in recognition memory represent an interesting question for future research. Whereas the results of Experiment 5B are consistent with Mackens (2002) and Gruppuso et al.s (2007) dual processing account of context effects, the results of Experiments 1 to 5A pose prob-

lems for the generality of this account and for the interpretation of remember responses that are used to support the dual process view. Murnane and Phelpss (1993, 1994, 1995) familiarity-based global matching model of context effects provides a reasonable description of the principal findings of these experiments. In this view, old contexts and new contexts that share matching aspects of the old contexts provide a source of familiarity that is combined with the familiarity associated with the test probe. Thus, old and new items tested in such contexts will have a higher overall level of familiarity than items tested in a new context, resulting in an increase in hits and false alarms with little difference in overall discrimination. To account for the pattern of remember and know responses in such a model, one needs to assume that subjects employ two decision criteria that bisect the familiarity continuum (see Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & Master, 1997). Familiarity values below the lower criterion will be classified as new items, whereas familiarity values above the higher criterion produce remember responses. Intermediate values are given know responses. Thus, according to this account, the increase in hit rate is seen in the proportion of remember responses because a greater proportion of targets are above the second criterion when tested in an old context compared to a new context. Similarly, the increase in the false-alarm rate is seen in the proportion of know responses because a greater proportion of distractors fall above the lower criterion when tested in an old context. Xu and Bellezza (2001) and Rotello, Macmillan, Hicks, and Hautus (2006) provide quantitative support for such an interpretation of remember-know responses. They showed that variables that influence response bias affect both old and remember responses and that signal detection models provide a better overall description of these effects than do dual process models. Wixted and Stretch (2004) have also proposed a model of remember-know judgments that is consistent with a signal detection theory framework. In their view the dimension of evidence is not a single dimension of familiarity, but rather an aggregate strength variable that consists of a combined recollection and familiarity signal (p. 617). As above, two criteria are assumed to bisect the aggregate strength dimension to distinguish remember from know and know from new responses. The assumption that recollection can vary and that it is combined with familiarity is intuitively appealing in light of the present results. Rearranged and different-old contexts and new contexts that are similar to old contexts would have an aggregate strength based on partial recollection and familiarity. If their total strength value is similar to the aggregate strength of targets in their old contexts, then all of these context conditions would have similar effects on overall old/new recognition performance and on the distribution of remember and know responses. An alternative to strength-based interpretations of the effects of environmental context on recognition memory is a response bias explanation (Feenan & Snodgrass, 1990). In this view, rather than assuming that an old context increases the familiarity or strength of the test probe, an old context (or a context perceived to be old) is assumed to lead subjects to adopt a more liberal recognition decision criterion. Context could provide subjects with a basis for changing their criterion, and a more liberal criterion for old contexts would result in an increase in hits and false alarms in the old context condition without a change in overall discrimination. The pattern of the estimates of criterion placement in each of the

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present experiments is generally consistent with such an account. It is typically very difficult to distinguish between strength-based and criterion-shift accounts, as both views predict concordant increases in hit and false-alarm rates without a change in overall discrimination. For the present results, however, strength-based accounts have the advantage of providing a more plausible explanation of the increase in the proportion of old and remember responses in old contexts. It is generally assumed that subjects adopt a more liberal response criterion in tasks or situations where discrimination is more difficult (e.g., Clarke, 1960; Healy & Jones, 1973; Hockley & Niewiadomski, 2007; see Hicks & Marsh, 1998, for a discussion of this issue). Why then would subjects adopt a more liberal decision criterion for their old and remember responses when items are tested in an old context, a condition that would seem to make recognition easier rather than more difficult? As noted previously, the interpretation of remember and know responses is controversial. Whereas some researchers have proposed that these responses reflect qualitatively different bases of recognition memory decisions (e.g., Gardiner & RichardsonKlavehn, 2000; Joordens & Hockley, 2000; Reder et al., 2000; Yonelinas, 1994), others have argued that they reflect different levels of confidence on the same dimension of evidence (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Hirshman & Master, 1997; Stretch & Wixted, 2004). In the present experiments, subjects gave similar high proportions of remember responses to target items shown in their old study context and to test items presented in a new configuration of old context elements (Experiment 1), to items shown in an old but different study context (Experiments 2 and 5A), and to items shown in a new context that was similar to an old context (Experiment 4A). Old contexts and their variations gave rise to a greater phenomenological sense of remembering, but a sense of remembering that was not wholly veridical with past experience. Thus, the present results are more consistent with accounts that equate remember responses with a higher level of confidence (e.g., Dunn, 2004) or a higher strength value based on an aggregate of familiarity and recollection (e.g., Wixted & Stretch, 2004) rather than accounts that assume that remember responses are a separate basis of recognition (e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990). At the very least, the present results provide a further demonstration that there is a variable relationship between subjects claims of remembering and their actual past experience.

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Received August 21, 2007 Revision received May 27, 2008 Accepted May 29, 2008