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January 1992

STAFF Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment......................................................................................COL Patrick O'Neal Brigade S-2...........................................................................MAJ Steven G. Swanson Editor-in-Chief..................................................................................Mr. Allen E. Curtis Managing Editor.........................................................................SPC Evelyn G. Jewell

RED THRUST STAR is published for the U.S. Forces Command OPFOR Training Program by S-2, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031. The purpose of the RED THRUST STAR is to publish timely, authoritative information on OPFOR training to increase the knowledge and understanding of OPFOR training throughout the Armed Forces. Articles published reflect views of the authors and should not be interpreted as official opinion of the Department of the Army, or of any branch, command, or agency of the Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to RED THRUST STAR and to the author(s), except where copyright is indicated. Articles, photographs, and new items of interest on all facets of OPFOR training are solicited. Direct communication is authorized to : Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, ATTN: AFZJ-AC-RT, Fort Irwin, CA 92310-5031, tel. (619)380-5289, or DSN 470-5289, FAX: (619)380-5127. Subscriptions are available to battalion size or larger units, as well as to training and readiness staffs, from the same address. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. RED THRUST STAR is published quarterly. This medium is approved for the official dissemination of OPFOR related material. By Order of the Secretary of the Army: GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Official THOMAS F. SIKORA General, U.S. ARMY The Adjutant General Distribution: Special
BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. 2. Greetings Comrades by Colonel Patrick O'Neal The Opposing Force's Future by Colonel Patrick O'Neal Commander 177th Armored Brigade A Future Threat Model For Training The Force by LTC Lester W. Grau Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Soviet Operational Level Defense: An Overveiw by Mr. Charles J. Dick Soviet Studies Research Center Camberly, UK Smoke Operations by SSG David Zilinski Senior Intelligence Analyst 177th Amored Brigade Corrections Krasnovian OPFOR Organization at NTC by CPT Kenneth Bullock Assistant S-2 177 th Armored Brigade




6. 7.

Greetings Comrades
by Colonel Patrick O'Neal
With the beginning of the new calendar year, we have seen the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Soviet threat is a matter of historical record. However, as I have noted in previous issues, the Army leadership has given us clear guidance for our training focus: the former Soviet armed forces will remain the model for our "global" opposing force model. It is only prudent to ensure that our Army is trained against a worldclass, challenging opponent. I have laid out my own rationale for this conclusion in the lead article in this issue, along with some thoughts about the direction we will take to continue to modernize and upgrade the National Training Center opposing force. LTC Les Grau, from the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, also argues for the maintenance of the Soviet model in his article. We held our last Threat Tactical Workshop at the National Training Center in October 1991. Mr. Charles Dick, from the British Armys Soviet Studies Research Center, presented us with an overview of Soviet operational defense. Our next threat workshop, for those of you that are interested, will be a departure from the ones we have held in the past. Because we have recently had significant turnover in the NTC OPFOR leadership, I wanted to ensure that the OPFOR leaders possess current and consistent knowledge of Soviet tactical military art. I wanted to focus less on the broader perspective than on the detailed knowledge and skills the OPFOR commanders need to creatively challenge rotational units with all the tools available to a Soviet commander. Thus, we have structured the next workshop as a comprehensive review of Soviet defensive tactics; a future workshop will do the same for the offense. The instructors for this workshop will be the same subject-matter experts whose presentations we have been pleased to present over the last two years, from the Foreign Military Studies Office and the Soviet Studies Research Center. The students will be, as I said, the OPFOR leaders, along with the NTC Operations Group scenario writers and intelligence trainers. In the past, we have welcomed a number of guests to the workshops. Because of the constraints of the number of students and the tutorial nature of this workshop, we will not be able to accommodate any guests this time. But I wanted to let you know what we are doing, and to assure you that we will continue to disseminate the key presentations from the workshop through this bulletin. The NTC threat manager recently prepared a doctrinal support package on Soviet smoke operations, to supplement the limited information available in unclassified threat products on this subject. This package has been validated for use at NTC, and appears in this issue. Finally in this issue, we have a snapshot of the current status of the NTC OPFOR and its modernization efforts. Since the last time the bulletin published a comprehensive review of the OPFORs assets was over two years ago, many of you will be interested to see the upgrades we have achieved and are continuing to develop.

The Opposing Force's Future

by Colonel Patrick O'Neal Commander 177th Armored Brigade
In order for tactical training to be effective, each training event must have three components: a dedicated objective observer (observer and controllers), some method of determining who did what to whom (MILES and instrumentation), and a trained opponent (the opposing force, or OPFOR). Each component is critical to setting the conditions for training. Given this important role for the OPFOR, the purpose of my comments is to discuss briefly our continued use of a Soviet-style OPFOR and how I see the future OPFOR developing. It is critical that we maintain a tough OPFOR, but how and in what form?

With the formation of a Commonwealth in place of the former Soviet Union, why keep the Soviet doctrine for the OPFOR? This is a fundamental question and deserves a complete and unemotional answer. There is one central and rarely discussed reason to retain Soviet doctrine for the Krasnovian OPFOR model. There is no other doctrine in the world capable of supplying the OPFOR with the richness, depth, and completeness of tactical operations for a battlefield framework. In the early 1980s, we began using the Soviet model for three reasons. First, the Soviets were our most potent opponent. Second, they had the most complete and dramatically different doctrine from our own; we could learn from them. Finally, they were exporting their doctrine. Until November of 1991, we had only used the first reason as our justification for building a Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment. We now must understand the other two-most important-reasons and help educate both the military and the American public concerning our need to maintain the Soviet foundation. From a practitioners viewpoint, when we place a large force onto the training battlefield in a free-play environment, the key to operating tactically is a logical linkage between the doctrinal sub-systems. To be of use, the doctrine must have compatibility between all sub-components. It must be whole. For example, the artillery sub-system must logically link to the reconnaissance sub-system. The approach to maneuver must logically link into the approach to counter-mobility. From this linkage, the equipment and organization must also support the rapid tempo and pace of battle called for by the doctrine. The only way to achieve this critical linkage is to develop the doctrine from the top to the bottom. This is precisely the method we used in developing AirLand Battle. Likewise, the Soviets have spent fifty years and three wars developing, modifying, and updating their doctrine. Soviet doctrine therefore reflects the rich and graphic history of the experiences of their Army and political landscape. This is an important quality, and one that is almost impossible to replicate. Some have suggested blending the various aspects of United States, German, British, and Soviet doctrine. While on the surface this is an appealing alternative, this poses a critical problem in the linking of doctrinal sub-systems. (Can you imagine using British linear defense tactics with our AirLand Battle offensive tactics?) This sort of patchwork quilt seems to be unworkable. At the practitioner level of tactics we would be unable to artificially blend the two different approaches. Each would demand a unique organization and set of equipment. A final concern for changing doctrinal foundations rests on the competitive nature of our training battlefield. By creating this free-play and competitive environment, we challenge the OPFOR to crawl into the corners of the Soviet writings and pull out techniques and procedures. In so doing, we build a portfolio of often radically different (from U.S.) approaches to tackling similar tactical problems. We learn from this process. Indeed, many of these Soviet techniques have been folded into the U.S. Armys new FM 71-1, -2, and -3 manuals. I believe that our future OPFOR must continue to be based on the Soviet approach. While the Soviet system has been replaced by the Commonwealth, certainly its components approach to military education and writing of doctrine will continue to reflect their past and current experiences. These experiences will most likely cause them to focus on the downsizing of their forces, performing tactical operations with more precision weapons, and probably restructunng their forces. However, they will continue to have a profound effect on the doctrine and equipment of many other countries. The future of our OPFOR must capture these developments and keep pace with the proliferation of these doctrinal capabilities. Over the next six months we at NTC, we intend to updatc our motorized rifle regiment to reflect a more recent Soviet structure. We will incorporate more BMP-1Ps, upgunned T-72M1 tanks, and an antitank battalion with BRDM-2/AT-5s and MT-12 antitank guns. Also, we will include some smoke systems, artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles (ACRVs), and command and control vehicles. Together, these upgrades will build a more complete structure. Over the next two years and after some careful study, we may more fully develop some other models. Currently we are examining the degree of Soviet influence on a group of ten other countries. Our belief is that the Soviets, through foreign equipment sales and bringing outsiders through their military educational system, have significantly influenced the operational doctrines of many countries. We want to know the degree of this influence. We will keep you posted. Our Red Thrust mission remains to insure that we keep you current with the development of the OPFOR, provide a laboratory for the tactical intelligence community, and provide an opportunity for professional exchange of ideas and observations. We want to know how we can help you. I encourage you to remain in communication with our Red Thrust staff.

A Future Threat Model For Training The Force

by LTC Lester W. Grau Foreign Military Studies Office Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Since 1945, the Soviet military has posed the primary threat to the United States. It was not until 1983, however, that the U.S. Army began systematically and specifically to train against the Soviet military model for mid- and high-intensity conflict. Then, the realization that the Soviet model possessed a unique and applicable validity combined with a revolution in training techniques to produce new training methods, warfighting doctrine and intellectual introspection. Since 1983, three Army Field Manuals dealing with the tactical Soviet Army (FM 100-2-1, FM 100-2-2 and FM 100-2-3) have been written and widely distributed throughout the force. These manuals have served as the primary threat documents for all training center, school and unit threat training. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) studied Soviet operational art and its graduates incorporated and inculcated these concepts into the force. AirLand Battle Doctrine (ALB) and AirLand Battle Future (ALBF) adapted much from Soviet operational thought as they prepared the force to combat a Soviet threat both operationally and tactically. Students in the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) studied Soviet tactics and trained to fight a Sovietstyle threat. Division and corps commanders and their staffs were trained to meet and defeat a Soviet-model opposing force through the state-of-the-art Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). New battalion and brigade commanders fought a Soviet-model foe in sophisticated, interactive computer play in the Tactical Command Development Course (TCDC). Entire battalions and brigades were trained to fight against a tough, skilled surrogate Soviet-model motorized rifle regiment during intense, grueling rotations through the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. The United States Army, well prepared to meet the armed forces of the Soviet Union, was likewise ready to meet a wide range of other opponents on a future battlefield. Now that the Soviet threat appears to have diminished and Cold War rhetoric has ceased, the United States Army seems to have lost its threat model. The Soviet model was credible, disciplined, directed and the product of an authoritarian, militarized society. If the U.S. Army selects a new model, it should retain those attributes of the Soviet approach to war which have undergirded our present military effectiveness.

Attributes of the Soviet Model

The Soviet model provided a real, believable antagonist against which commanders, staffs and units could be measured in mid-level to high-intensity combat. The Soviet systematic approach to the study of war produced a coherent, advanced, "scientifically substantiated" theory of warfighting which was significantly different from Western models. It incorporated a challenging, decision-making model which provided an analytical approach to planning, a comprehensive correlation of forces and means methodology, and a mathematical method for modeling operations which helped cut through the fog of war. Challenged by this model at the NTC, in TCDC, BCTP or in field exercises, U.S. commanders were forced to deal effectively with a heavy, combined-arms opposing force in terms of mass, space and time. The Soviet model developed U.S. Army professionalism and thought by providing realistic stress during simulations and exercises. The Soviet model posed the most challenging threat that the U.S. Army might expect to meet, and by training to beat the best, the overall readiness and competence of the force improved. The proof of the value of this comprehensive training approach was not garnered against a Soviet force or that of a Soviet surrogate. Operation "Desert Storm" pitted coalition forces against a partially Soviet-trained and partially Soviet-equipped force, but the defeat of the Iraqi army was hardly the defeat of Soviet methodology. The planning and execution of Desert Storm, however, was an overwhelming endorsement of the U.S. Army's decision to invest considerable time and resources training to fight the most realistic threat-the Soviet armed forces. It provided the rigor, scope of vision and planning process which led to overwhelming operational success. Although the Soviet military was characterized by virtually unlimited resources, a low level of tactical proficiency and a large defensive buffer zone of Warsaw Pact states, these attributes are not necessary to the incorporation of the Soviet model in training.

From Specific to "Krasnovian"1 Threat

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and a reduction of Soviet forces in the western Soviet Union removes a serious threat but does not provide protracted stability in a complex and interdependent world. As the world shifts from a bi-polar to a multi-polar orientation, instability will increase. In Yugoslavia, Europe is now experiencing its first war in forty-five years. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict where U.S. forces might next be committed for peacekeeping or combat duties, the U.S. Army needs to remain capable of deploying and fighting in all regions and climates. Although the Soviet Union (and its successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States) is no longer the primary threat to the United States, its large standing army, nuclear might and the potential for civil war still present a clear danger. U.S. national interests are global and the threats to peace more complex and numerous. Other, antidemocratic nations, trained on the Soviet model, often have goals and ambitions inimical to those of the United States. Although these nations lack the virtually unlimited resources of the old Soviet military, they remain credible threats. Thus, military power will remain part of U.S. national power. It seems reasonable that the efforts expended to develop the Soviet model should not be abandoned. The approximate algorithms have been incorporated into the various training programs to provide a smart, feasible, disciplined "world-class" antagonist who will still challenge our best commanders and units. Rather than returning to a generic, mythical "threat" (such as the Circle Trigon force of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s) or training to go after a less capable force, the U.S. Army needs to continue to pit itself against the toughest competition. Some proposals have postulated a Nicaraguan, Cuban or North Korean threat model; however, these models do not provide a real mid- to high-intensity threat, and their political fortunes are open to grave doubt. Moreover, these threats are the responsibility of theater commanders who must prepare for contingencies. The U.S. Army cannot afford to reinvent a threat annually or train exclusively against a second-string opponent. The Army must prepare for the highest threat and that threat is still best replicated by the Soviet model. Therefore, the U.S. Army does not need a new threat model. The Soviet model, adjusted to meet contemporary circumstances, remains the optimum model, even though geopolitical and economic circumstances have markedly changed our relationship with that nation and the potential for armed conflict. Even if the successor states to the Soviet Union and the United States move to total cooperation or alliance, the United States Army needs to measure its performance against a system which both poses the greater challenge and provides a valid framework for U.S. understanding of operations. This can be done with no notion of antagonism, but rather with professional respect, a sense of tactical deterrence and, even, interoperability. The evolving Soviet model provides both the system and the measure.

Reference 1."Krasnovian" is derived from the Russian word for "red" and "beautiful". It is the Soviet model as incorporated into U.S. training at the NTC and TCDC. NTC has also employed "Atlantican" and "Samaran" models based on Latin American and Iraqi forces.

Soviet Operational Level Defense: An Overview

by Mr Charles J. Dick Soviet Studies Research Center Camberly, UK

The views expressed here are those of the author. They should not necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.

Soviet Attitudes to Operational Defense

Soviet interest in operational, indeed, even in strategic level, defense revived around 1980 after being dormant for about three decades. That is to say, it preceded M.S. Gorbachev's accession to power, never mind his proclamation of a "new", defensive military doctrine, by several years. There were sound military reasons for this resurgence of study (see Figures 1 and 2). The late seventies saw the acceptance by the Soviets that future war would begin with a probably prolonged conventional phase, or even remain

conventional throughout. In these circumstances, a strategic offensive operation would, of necessity, involve defensive operations by higher formations (i.e., by armies, and even fronts). The reasons are clear. In nuclear war, breakthroughs would be guaranteed on multiple axes by the concentration of nuclear strikes onto chosen sectors. These would inflict such damage and so alter the correlation of forces that the need for (nuclear vulnerable) concentrations of ground forces would be obviated; the latter would, in effect, become exploitation forces, advancing on all available axes. In a conventional war, by contrast, it is considered necessary to mass a superiority of 3-4:1 on those operational sectors chosen for the breakthrough and to maintain that superiority throughout the drive to the objective of the operation. Inevitably, this requirement for concentration would entail leaving long passive sectors on which groupings would be equal or inferior in strength to those of the enemy, and on which action would be primarily defensive. Even formations acting on the offensive would also have occasion to transition to defense, whether to fend off strong counter-blows, or as a result of excessive losses, or following defeat in a meeting engagement, or to hold the designated objective when achieved (see Figure 3). This requirement for defensive action during the course of a strategic offensive was underlined by the perceived adoption by NATO of the U.S. AirLand Battle concept, in which allied forces would not limit themselves to the operational

Aims and Mission of Operational Defense Aims

Determinants mission and concept of senior commander missions of adjacent formations relative strengths Usual Aims repel attacks inflict maximum casualities retain important lines or ares establish favorable conditions for mounting a counter-offensive Mission Stated as holding a given line and preventing penetration on a given direction or directions Figure 1

Conditions for the Adoption of Defense Deliberate Adopted out of contact (e.g., prior to invasion or when preparing defenses in depth) Characteristics defender well balanced (center of gravity to rear?) time to organize cooperation, engineer preparation and alternative plans for different axes of attack Hasty/Forced Adopted in contact (e.g., as a result of defeat or in face of an unexpected attack) Characteristics defender unbalanced (center of gravity forward, possibly on wrong axis) limited time to organize cooperation, carry out engineer preparation possible need for regrouping, or even limited offensive action to seize a favorable line Figure 2
defensive but endeavor to recover the initiative through aggressive actions conducted well into the enemy's depth. The study of defense has, of course, been given additional impetus by the declared adoption of a defensive strategy. As the draft "Military Doctrine of the USSR" points out: "delivery of a first, pre-emptive strike by the Soviet Armed Forces is totally ruled out. Defense is the principal form

Circumstances in Which Operational Defnse is Adopted

Deliberate adoption of strategic defense When politically imperative To wear down and unbalance the enemy as a prelude to a counter-offensive/offensive When the enemy holds the initiative during the initial period of war Protect administrative and economic centers and communication hubs Cover the mobilization, concentration, and deployment of the main forces Economy of force measure, to enable the concentration of superior, offensive forces on another direcion Repulse of a strong enemy counter-offensive. At the conclusion of an offensive operation Consolidation of gains acheived Cover regrouping and resupply for a fresh offensive Cover the exposed flank of an offensive grouping After defeat in an offensive or meeting engagement, or after a mass nuclear/high precision attack Figure 3

of military operations from the outset of aggression. Subsequent operations... will be determined by the nature of the enemy's military operations and depend on the means and methods of waging war."2 In other words, at least initially, operational defense will be the norm for higher formations and not, as it was seen in the past, a forced form of combat action. If the General Staff gets its way, the defense will, however, continue to be temporary for many formations; the operational counterattack and the strategic counteroffensive are seen as essential elements of defense. This political direction is undoubtedly causing some consternation among Soviet generals, conditioned as they are to viewing defense as more difficult and vulnerable than the offensive. True, they accept, the defender has many advantages (see Figure 4). He chooses the ground on which to fight. He can prepare the terrain to enhance its defensive properties and protect his troops. He can conceal his forces more easily. All these positive factors have grown in importance since 1945, thanks to the developments which have taken place in weaponry since then. They are, however, outweighed in Soviet eyes by the concomitant disadvantages. The attacker enjoys the priceless asset of the initiative. He can choose the time and the place to initiate the offensive. He can always be sure of a breakthrough if he uses nuclear weapons, though the repercussions attendant on such a course are likely to deter him from doing so. In future war, however, he may be able to inflict a similar level of damage through the strikes of a plethora of high precision weapons with improved conventional warheads and targeted by sophisticated, real-time reporting surveillance means. Moreover, the great mobility and flexibility of modern forces make it possible to avoid tell-tale forward

Balance of Advantages Between Offense and Defense Attacker's Advantages Defender's Advantages

1.Choice of ground 2.Engineer preparation of the battlefield 3.Relative ease of concealing groupings 4.Ability to hold an attack at odds of 2:1 or greater in the attackers favor

1.Ability to deliver surprise first strike to weaken defensive grouping 2.Possession of the initiative (the choice of the time, sector and axis of the offensive) 3.The ability to suprise the defender as to the timing, axis and strength of the Offensive* 4.The ability to thwart the defenders efforts to respond effectively to a surprise attack by conducting deep operations

*"In World War II, an offensive usually began from a position of close contact...In the plans of NATO, the principal method of going over to the offensive is the offensive on the move...of troops deploying forward from the immediate operational depth to ensure surprise" (Gayvoronskiy, Evolution of Military Art 1987)." The factor of surprise is elevated almost to the rank of an absolute condition for achieving victory in NATO's doctrinal guidelines and strategic and operational-strategic concepts" (Lushchan, "Surprise in the Defensive", VM 1/1990). Figure 4
concentrations, but instead to achieve surprise by attacking from a "flying start", marching from dispersed locations in the operational depth and converging rapidly on the chosen sectors to attack from the line of march. "In World War II, an offensive usually began from a position of close contact with the defending enemy....In the plans of NATO, the principal

method of going over to the offensive is the offensive on the move, coupled with the movement of troops deploying forward from the immediate operational depth in order to ensure the element of surprise."3 This element is perceived to be of crucial importance. "The factor of surprise is elevated almost to the rank of an absolute condition for achieving victory in NATO's doctrinal guidelines and strategic and operational-strategic concepts."4 While the breakthrough is being accomplished, the attacker can also greatly impede and slow the defender's reactions through the simultaneous conduct of deep battle and operations with air and missile interdiction and the employment of airborne, heliborne and sea desants and diversionary activity. To stem an offensive, the defender must be able to concentrate his main forces against the enemys principal strike groupings before the integrity and the balance of the defense is shattered and the attack has gained momentum. This requires early, if not prior identification of the direction of the enemy main axis. Both in 1941, and again in 1942, the Red Army signally failed to anticipate the Germans' main strategic axes, and, as a result, huge swathes of territory and numbers of troops were lost. In future war, the Soviets believe that such forecasting will be very much more difficult, given the directions that force development are taking. Given their concerns about the weakness of defense, and the psychological truth that the offensive is "genetically encoded" into the minds of Soviet generals,5 it would not be surprising, once (or if) the current problems besetting the Soviet Armed Forces are overcome, the General Staff were to demand a reversion to an offensive strategy to implement a defensive military doctrine. A defensive strategy may be seen to make

Lessons of the Failures of 1941 (Colonel AD. Borshehov, VM 3/1990)

Defense policy must be formulated objectively, with a realistic appraisal of the threat. Economic and sociopolitical aspects of the threat must be considered as well as the military. The armed forces must be held at such a level of readiness as to ensure their organized entry into war in even worse circumstances than those of 1941: Forces for the conduct of first defensive operations should be kept at the highest state of readiness. Forces of border military districts musi be capable of executing thier missions without additional reorganization or redeployment. The advance preparation of threaters of military operation is improtant to increase readiness. Combat training and political work must maintain forces at a level capable of coping with a surprise attack. Forces must be stationed in their wartime deployment areas, and be prepared to act autonomously in the event of surprise attack. The enemy may "creep up" to war, using pretexts to mobilize, concentrate and deploy. When enemy forces increase readiness, covering force commanders must have the right to react independentiy. Lessons of the past are valuable, but must not be used uncritically. Figure 5

sense if the forward edge is on the Elbe or the Oder-Neisse line, where the towns destroyed and the territory lost in the initial stages will be German or Polish. This was the case when the new military doctrine was first aired in 1987. Now, however, the Warsaw Pact no longer exists. The defensive glacis has gone, and any defense must start, as in 1941, on the state frontier. The memories of the disasters of 1941-42 are very long (see Figure 5), and there may well be an appreciation that a pre-emptive, spoiling blow against a perceived threat would be preferable to waiting and trying to ride out the enemy's onslaught. Interestingly, the General Staff did an appreciation on the feasibility of just such a limited offensive against the German build-up in Poland in 1941.

The Nature and Principles of Operational Defense (see Figure 6)

At the operational and tactical levels, at least, the debate about offensive versus defensive is now becoming somewhat arid and indeed, misconceived. As has already been pointed out, even in the eighties it was accepted that there would be defensive action, often extensive, within the context of an offensive. In the future, the distinction between the offensive and the defensive will become progressively blurred and unreal. The future battlefield will be characterized by significantly lower force densities than hitherto. Even if the CFE agreement does not stand the test of time, the spiraling cost and complexity of weaponry is bound to compel armies to fight with smaller numbers. This will be true even in the Soviet Army, which has reluctantly recognized that quality may well be able to negate quantity. Moreover, the presence of high precision weapons,

improved ammunition and real-time intelligence gathering and reporting systems on the battlefield of tomorrow must impose a considerable degree of dispersion on all combatants. These factors will combine with the high maneuverability of forces to produce a fluid, non-linear zone of combat and operations tens, perhaps scores of kilometers deep, in which there will be no secure flanks or rear areas. A high-speed, surprise attack coupled with simultaneous actions in the enemy's depth will no longer be repulsed by purely positional defense. Both sides will be compelled to adopt a frequently changing mix of offensive and defensive action. At first sight, these developments may be thought to favor the attacker. In the future, however, weapons development may solve what was hitherto the most intractable of the defenders problems-wresting the initiative into his own hands. A dispersed, concealed and protected defender may be able to initiate the

Soviet Principles of Operational Defense

Concentration and dispersal Concentration of fire Dispersal laterally and in depth Activeness and Maneuver Pre-emption Maneuver Counterattacks/strokes Steadfastness Engineer preparation Surprise Avoid stereotype Counter-reconnaissance False forward edge Counter-preparation Maneuver Air defense Anti-desant defense Deep operations Figure 6
engagement, using high-precision weaponry so effectively against an advancing force as to alter in his favor the correlation of forces during the advance to contact. He can then transition to the attack himself and destroy the depleted and disrupted enemy in a meeting engagement.6 Even if the enemy does succeed in breaking through, long-range, highly accurate and destructive weapons can be used by formations being outflanked as well as by those deployed in depth to hit his columns as they attempt to drive deep, and to interdict the forward march of the enemy reserves that will be required to maintain the favorable correlation of forces required to maintain momentum. "Modern defense", an authoritative source states, "must be aggressive and stable, especially in anti-nuclear, antitank, antiair and anti-desant respects."7 These requirements are, however, to an extent contradictory. The concentration required to halt a strong armored attack is likely to be vulnerable to nuclear destruction. Even in conventional conflict, massing may be just as dangerous, given the almost nuclear effectiveness of precision weapons. "The intensity of an attackers conventional fire can be so high that combat effectiveness may be lost in a short time, not merely by units but by formations as an ordinary phenomenon of defense."8 The Soviets identify several answers to these problems. The defender must practice the resolute retention of key positions, combined with increased use of maneuver and aggressiveness. He must practice controlled dispersion, deploy in greater depth than hitherto, and strive to deceive the attacker and achieve surprise. All these elements must be utilized to ensure that the tactical zone of defense, for example, the first 60-70 kilometers (excluding any security zone that is established), is not penetrated (see Figure 7). There is some disagreement and a lot of

vagueness about several aspects of defense, but theoreticians seem to be unanimous that "holding the tactical defense zone will be of decisive importance in determining the outcome of an operation, particularly in the initial period of war."9 Any aggression must be repelled without major loss of territory. Success in this will depend on the struggle for the tactical zone, for only if it is retained will the invasion be stopped and the conditions for a counteroffensive be established. So important is this aspect of defense that army and even front second echelons and reserves will be committed to prevent a breakthrough of the tactical zone. This preoccupation presumably stems from both Great Patriotic War experience and contemporary Soviet planning for offensive operations. During the war, both the Red Army, and later the Germans, generally found it impossible to stem an offensive tide that had breached the first operational echelon of the defense. In the seventies and eighties, the Soviets built on this experience and evolved a credible concept for the conduct of a deep and rapid conventional strategic offensive operation which fully took into account and exploited post-war technological developments. Impressed with their own theories, and the somewhat similar American Airland Battle concept, the Soviets would appear to have concluded that an advance that achieves a momentum of 30-50 kilometers per day is virtually unstoppable, and that the best way to deny that momentum is to conduct a firm, positional defense of the tactical The structure that the tactical zone must be held is thus not an obsession with ground per se. Ground is held, not for its own sake, but only when doing so will contribute to the fundamental aim of any detertsive action, the destruction of the enemy and the resulting seizure of the initiative. This must be borne in mind when contemplating the frequent assertions that Stalin's famous "not a step backwards" order has not lost its relevance today.10 It must not be interpreted too literally. The Soviets accept that any defense will be penetrated. Indeed, they design defensive systems to be penetrated-but at a cost in time, casualties and disruption that the attacker cannot afford and that will, in consequence, create the necessary preconditions for his destruction by defense of some areas, even when the result will be the eventual loss or encirclement of the forces concerned. Certainiy regulations still stipulate the impermissibility of withdrawal except on the orders of the senior

commander. Such areas will, however, be vital ground, the retention of which will slow and disrupt the enemy, tie down his forces, and compel him to bare his flank so that he loses his momentum and becomes vulnerable to aggressive countermoves. (So, at least, goes the theory as it is developing. In practice, Soviet commanders are still likely to hold doggedly on to any ground for which they are responsible unless specifically ordered to abandon it.) It is thus clear that positional defense does not imply passivity. All Soviet theorists stress that it involves a great deal of maneuver, of aktivnost' (literally, activeness). There is seen to be a growing mutual dependence between steadfastness and activeness to impart a resilience to the defense. "Holding firmly to key areas (positions, lines) on the sector of the main blow creates the necessary prerequisites for timely and effective maneuver to destroy groupings pinned down in front of defended positions. The mix of stubborn ground holding and maneuver will vary from sector to sector. In some, there will be solid retention of occupied lines coupled with counterattacks; in others, maneuver; in others, a combination of the two."11 In other words, the more aggressive the defense, the more stable it will be. The clearest expression of this principle is the Soviet enthusiasm for pre-emption. "The principal method for wrecking (Russian: sryv) an offensive or weakening a blow from an attacking enemy continues to be the counter-preparation and the counter-strike against a grouping preparing for offensive operations."12 The only reason that major ground forces were not launched on a spoiling attack in the Great Patriotic War, the author goes on to state, was lack of adequate strength. The desirability of the pre-emptive thrust to destroy enemy strike groupings is, however, well established. Where that proves impossible, it is at least desirable to hit the enemy when he is still forming up with a massive, surprise, air and artillery offensive. Much favorable comment has been passed on such a counter-preparation carried out just prior to the German attack at Kursk (though its results are often exaggerated). Warnings are, however, issued that in modern conditions, such a blow will be difficult to deliver effectively, given that the enemy is likely to attack, not from a position of close contact but off the line of march from assembly areas in the deep rear.13 This will make it difficult to identify the enemy main axis in sufficient time to concentrate onto it reconnaissance, artillery, air defense, electric warfare assets, and the necessary command and control and ammunition reserves. Artillery which has fired a counter-preparation will, moreover, be vulnerable when it subsequently attempts to return from temporary to its primary fire positions. U.S. sources claim, for instance, that 80-84 Apache helicopters will destroy up to 300 guns during a half-hour long move. In future, the counterpreparation may perforce consist only of air and missile strikes and electronic attack. "Maneuver lies at the root of defense....Troops that defend passively in modern warfare run the risk of instant destruction, since the attackers reconnaissance means will rapidly detect their dispositions and his powerful weapons will rapidly dispose of them. To avoid disaster, the defenders combat formation must be arranged in a variety of patterns, avoiding stereotypes, and dispersed in width and depth."14 These words were written almost two decades ago and reflect the fear of the attackers nuclear capability. The old concept of anti-nuclear maneuver has not, however, lost its relevance, even in a conventional war. It is equally applicable in combat with an enemy armed with precision weapons, combined with reconnaissance means a lot more sophisticated than those of the seventies. These are said to possess the same destructive power as small nuclear weapons. Units and formations, particularly those in the second echelon or reserve, will have to move frequently and covertly in order to survive. Maneuver will also be essential to create counter-concentrations adequate to check the enemys main effort. Because the enemy will attack from the march, only converging on the chosen breakthrough sectors at the last minute, it will not be possible to determine the main axis and generate such a counter-concentration beforehand. Forces will have to be redeployed from passive sectors, where the threat is less pressing, to reinforce the more crucial axes. The maneuver of fire has been described as "a measure of the degree of activeness of the defense" and "the principal content of counterattacks, with combined arms units exploiting its effects." 15 The lengthening range of indirect fire weapons, combined with steadily improving surveillance and fire control, enables fire to be concentrated rapidly from widely dispersed fire units. Airpower, both fixed and rotary wing, can also be speedily deployed onto threatened sectors. This high degree of reactivity is very important, given the enemy's ability to concentrate quickly and by surprise on selected breakthrough sectors. He must be met with massed fire strikes to destroy his nuclear and precision weapons, suppress his artillery, disrupt the command and control system, inflict casualties on and separate his tanks and infantry, and break up the attack. Currently, the role of artillery is seen to be somewhat diminished compared with the past. "In World War II, when the battlefield was dominated by unarmored targets, fire was delivered primarily by artillery and air strikes against area targets. But now that most targets are armored, aimed fire...has begun to play the primary role, though the significance of massed artillery has not been lost, principally as a means of delivering fire against unarmored or lightly armored targets." 16 In future war, however, improved conventional ammunition and terminal guidance will enable artillery to engage armor effectively with indirect fire. Especially valuable to the defender will be reconnaissance fire and strike complexes, thanks to their reliable ability to inflict attrition on armored forces at long range: 17 "the U.S. 'Assault Breaker', for example, is intended to detect and destroy groups of armored a rate of 150-300 tanks or APCs in one hour with a kill probability of 0.85-0.9....out to 30-50 kilometers beyond the line of contact."18

Nowadays, too, artillery can not merely cover obstacles with fire but create them as well. Remote mining (which can also, of course, be done by aircraft) is seen as a significant contributor to the stability of the defense. Whether it is executed in the enemy's depth, to fill breaches in formal minefields, or indeed in the defensive system, on areas occupied by command posts, second echelons and reserves or on high-precision weapons, the sudden, surprise appearance of mines is certain to disrupt and delay the attacker. Of course, the ultimate expression of activeness, indeed the very basis of a successful defense is seen to be the counterattack and the counterstrike (see Figure 8). "The goal of counterattacks," it is said, "cannot be limited to recovering a lost position, as has been the case in the past, but it must also include the destruction of enemy forces which have achieved penetration and the capture of a favorable line for the mounting of subsequent offensive operations." 19 Similarly, the counterstrike is described as an operational level concept in which the aim is stated to be, not merely the destruction of the penetrating force, but the creation of conditions for the assumption of a counter-offensive: it is thus "the most important act of a defensive engagement."20 In other words, aggressive counter-moves are intended to be undertaken with decisive aims in mind. They are complicated actions, mounted at the climax of an operation, the time when both sides are usually committing their every last available resource into the fray (see Figure 9). Given that the defender is generally inferior in overall strength, he will not usually get another opportunity if he squanders his second echelon/reserve on a counterattack that fails. For this reason Soviet authors say: "In a developing situation, it stands a good chance of success. If he lacks confidence as to the outcome of a counterattack, it must never be launched, for it is likely to do more harm than good." 21 The Soviets identify several preconditions, most of which have to exist for success to be assured. The enemy advance should have been stopped, his strength largely spent, but

Counterattacks (Strokes)
Role The counterattack is essential to the maintenance of the stability and integrity of the defense. It may be employed to: destroy or wear down enemy forces retake lost groung, restoring the integrity of the defense delay the development of the enemy offensive and win time for defensive maneuver Prerequisites for Sucess Firm retention of lines before which the enemy is halted. The enemy's advance should have been slowed down, or preferably halted. The advancing enemy should have been disrupted and worn down. Reserves should either have been committed or sucessfully interdicted. Surprise, as to axis and/of timing is essential. Counterattacks will usually be delivered to the enemy's flank or rear. Local superiority, largely created by maximum possible fire support, must be created in the counterattack area. Thorough preparation is essential. Counterattacks are pre-planned for several axes, planning being updated as the situation develops. Routes and deployment lines are pre-prepared. Reliable air defense is sine qua non. The reaction of the counterattack force must be rapid, and the tempo of execution high. Figure 8
ideally he should still be grouped and deployed for offensive action. If he has already transitioned to defense, balanced his forces, and secured his flanks, the counterattack will face a much more formidable challenge. His local reserves should already have been committed and deeper reserves either stopped or seriously delayed by interdiction. Ideally, too, his forces and command and control should have been seriously disrupted. The counterattacker must achieve fire superiority to suppress the enemy and have sufficient numerical superiority (3-4:1 operationally and 5-6:1 tactically) to ensure a decisive outcome and not merely to make a dent in the enemy penetration. He must also enjoy at least local and temporary air superiority and achieve a degree of surprise. It is clear that a very nice sense of timing is crucial to success, requiring operations to be preplanned in several variants. An analysis of eleven operational counterattacks in defensive engagements from Stalingrad (1942) to Lake Balaton (1945) revealed that only two were successful, five were partially so and four were complete failures. The main reasons for failure were miscalculations as the timing and (what amounts to something very similar) inadequate preparation time. 22

In the future, too, the danger of arriving late (and depleted and disrupted) on the line of departure will be much greater than before. Enemy precision weapons, ground attack aircraft and helicopters, and remote mining will be capable of inflicting heavy casualties and delay, especially if the air situation in unfavorable and covertness has not been achieved. When the enemy advance still retains momentum and the correlation of forces does not guarantee success, it is not considered desirable to counterattack. In these circumstance, it is better to deploy for counter-penetration and halt the enemy by defensive action. It may well prove necessary to utilize the combined arms reserve, and even the second echelon, but this is undesirable as these forces will not then be available for counterattacks later on. For this reason, the Soviets form special antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments (POZs) at every unit and formation level. The POZs maneuver to carry out rapid mining, ditching, and demolitions on threatened axes, and the antitank reserves deploy behind the new obstacle belt to halt the enemy. Thus, for instance, the POZ of 57th Army in the Balato Defensive Operation met each of five or six German changes of axis with a new minefield, laying 26,570 antitank and 41,500 anti-personnel mines and demolishing forty bridges over a twelve-day period. Each penetration was successfully sealed off, until tank losses forced the Germans to abandon their offensive. The action of POZs can, of course, be supplemented today by minelaying helicopters and artillery delivered mines. Timing is just as important in the deployment of counter-penetration forces as it is for the attack. Likely lines are identified beforehand and deployments to them are preplanned: some of these lines, ideally prepared for defense, will also be the lines of corn mittal for counterattack forces, giving the commander a counter-penetration positions only just before the arrival of the enemy, however. The surprise laying of minefields and appearance behind them of strong antitank groupings is believed likely to upset enemy plans, catch him at a disadvantage and thus cause extra delay. Editors note: The second part of this article will continue in the next issue of the Star. In it, Mr. Dick discusses maneuver defense, densities of forces, depth in the defense, the security zone, and other issues.

References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. G.D. Wardak and G.H Turbiville, Lecture Materials from the Voroshilov Staff Academy (to be published). Special issue of Voyennaya mysl' (hereafter referred to as VM). December 1990. p. 16. F.F. Gayvoronskiy et al., The Evolution of Military Art-Stages, Tendencies, Principles (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), p. 206. S.L. Lushchan, "Surprise in the Defense," VM 1/1990. A.A. Kokoshin and V.V. Larionov. "Military Doctrine in the Service of Peace," Komnuinist 15/1990. S. Koziej, "Anticipated Directions for Changes in Ground Forces' Tactics," Polish Ground Forces Review. 9/1986. V.G. Reznichenko et al., Taktika (Moscow: Vovenizdat, 1987), p. 331. Ye. G. Korotchenko, "On Problems of the Struggle for the Tactical Zone of Defense," VM 7/1990. A.S. Kulikov and A. Nefedov, "Positional and Maneuver Operations: Roles and Place in Defensive Operations," VM 3/1990. NKO Order No. 227 of July 1942 promised commanders and commissars who conducted unauthorised withdrawals transfer to penal units where death was all but certain. "Blocking detachments" were created to arrest or shoot personnel going to the rear without proper orders. This order is credited with checking the panic that was burgeoning within the Red Army, and thus contributing to an increased firmness in defense. I.F. Rachok and V.M. Tolmachev, "Basic Tendencies in the Development of Operational Defense," VM 2/1990. Reznichenko, op. cit., p. 376. Reznichenko. op. cit., p. 376. Ye. Novikov and F. Sverdlov, Maneuver in Modern Land Warfare (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), pp. 100101. Kulikov and Nefidov, op. cit. Gayvoronskiy, op. cit., p. 207. Reconnaissance fire and strike complexes (respectively, at the tactical and operational levels) combine real time surveillance and target acquisition with high precision weapons, coordination being accomplished by a dedicated, largely automated contgrol system, to conduct reconnaissance and destruction missions practically in real time. Reznichenko, op. cit., p. 24. Reznichenko, op. cit., p.389. A.I. Radziyevskiy, A Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965). Novikov and Sverdlov. op. cit., p. 127. 22. Korotchenko. op. cit.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Smoke Operations
by SSG David Zilinski Senior Intelligence Analyst 177th Armored Brigade

This training support package reflects validated doctrine. This information has been approved by the Combined Arms Command Threats Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,for use at NTC.


Open-source information on Soviet organizations dedicated to smoke production is limited. A smoke battalion exists at army and front levels. However, no further information on the battalion table of organization and equipment is available at the unclassified level.


The Soviet Army has always emphasized using smoke in large quantities due to the lack of terrain cover over much of its area of operations. The value of smoke has increased in recent years to protect against the growing range and accuracy of modern antitank systems. Considerable effort is currently being devoted to developing smoke for defeating modern surveillance and sighting systems such as thermal imagery. Infrared defeating smoke is already in service. Smoke screening is defined as the creation and maintenance of an obscuring cloud for a specified period to make it impossible for the enemy to fire at targets, conduct observation, and determine the true disposition of troops. Smoke screens are employed in a linear array or over a wide surface area.


Virtually all combat units and many support units have obscurant-generating assets of some kind. However, large area smoke-generating devices are handled primarily by the chemical troops. This effectiveness will depend on meteorological conditions.

Vehicle Engine Exhaust Smoke System (VEESS)

The most available means of smoke delivery to maneuver commanders are tanks and BMPs. They can generate dense quantities of smoke by injecting fuel into the exhaust system. VEESS-generated smoke lasts four to six minutes. The smokelaying vehicle may or may not be protected depending on the environmental conditions. A tank or BMP platoon using VEESS can cover a battalion assault formation. Additionally, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles may be fitted with forwardfiring smoke grenade projectors which can be fired 150-200 meters ahead to provide cover for the vehicles advance.

Specialized Vehicles
Vehicle smoke assets would probably be used to support the Soviets' main effort, but this support might be direct (camouflaging) or indirect (decoying). The smart Soviet commander would not reveal his intentions by always giving smoke assets solely to his main effort. He would employ these assets in a variety of ways to deceive the enemy as to the size, composition, and location of the main effort. This may mean hiding part of the main forces to make them look smaller or hiding part of the supporting effort to make it look bigger. The location of the smoke assets themselves does not indicate the Soviets main effort. The TMS-65 is a truck-mounted jet engine used primarily for equipment decontamination. However, the TMS-65 can also lay smoke in a secondary role. Two TMS-65s moving slowly can produce a 1.5-kilometer screen four hundred meters high, lasting five minutes. A TMS-65 can lay smoke on the move at fifteen to twenty kilometers per hour. It carries up to 2,650 liters of agent. This vehicle would be used for emplacing camouflaging and decoying smoke screens over large areas in the rear and also would provide similar screens for forces moving two or more kilometers behind the forward edge. The TMS-65 is too vulnerable to be used closer than this to the front lines because:

If the vehicle were within rifle range, an incendiary round could be fired into the fuel tanks and possibly ignite the vehicle. There is no protection for the crew. The VK-lA engine which generates the smoke provides a large infrared signature.

The TDA-M is a smoke generator mounted on a GAZ-66 chassis. It can lay one kilometer of smoke with a three meter per second wind while moving at up to twenty kilometers per hour. Its tank holds 1,200 liters of agent; the generator uses 300800 liters per hour. The Soviet use of the TDA-M vehicle smoke generators is probably similar to that of the TMS-65. Despite different technical capabilities in generation, they are both wheeled, thin-skinned vehicles which will probably be used to provide camouflaging, decoying, and protective screens in Soviet rear areas two or more kilometers behind the forward edge. Even for highly important operations such as river crossings, these vehicles would not be employed where they could be taken under direct fire by enemy ground-based weapons systems because of their vulnerability. The ARS-12 and ARS-14 decontamination vehicles can also generate smoke. Their capabilities are less than either the TMS-65 or the TDA-M. A modified version of the ARS44 has been equipped with two AGP smoke generators. These generators can be dismounted.

Smoke Pots
The Soviets use smoke pots, which are emplaced by hand, dropped off the backs of vehicles, or dropped by helicopter. Characteristics of smoke pots are shown in Table 1.

Smoke Pots Characteristics DM-11 Weight (kg) Intensive smoke generating time in (mins) Length, impenetrable screen (m)* 2.4 5-7 up to 50 DMKh-5 2.7 5-7 up to 50 DSKh-5 7.5 15-17 up to 70 BDSh-5 40 5-7 250-300 BDSh-15 48 5-7 350-450 BDSh5Kh 41 15-17 125-150 BDSh15Kh 49 15-17 200-250

* The data provided in this chart assumes average conditions. Also be aware that the actual length will depend on meteorological conditions.

Table 1

Seven to ten percent of artillery and mortar fires are allocated to smoke

Caliber (mm) Wind direction Gun 76 Head or tail Flanking 6 4 85 6 2 122 2 1 Mortar 82 6 4 120 3 2

Table 2
operations. Normally, they are used to lay blinding rather than camouflage screens. When used to create a screen, the munitions expenditure shown in Table 2 is necessary to produce a one kilometer screen for fifteen minutes. Artillery fires can also create obscuration through dust. A bombardment will reduce the effectiveness of the antitank sights such as infrared and image intensification. The use of artillery high explosive rounds creates dust which will act as a bispectral agent and degrade thermal sights. The use of white phosphorus smoke rounds will enhance this effect.

Ground attack aircraft can deliver smoke bombs. The Soviets also consider the helicopter an ideal platform for rapidly deploying an obscurant screen. They have equipped some Mi-8 helicopters with an inclined tray designed for dropping up to twenty-four BDSh-5 or BDSh-15 smoke barrels. The best altitude for dropping smoke barrels is fifty to sixty meters flying at 150 to 210 kilometers per hour. The Soviets use the formula in Table 3 to determine the ejection rate of smoke barrels from a helicopter.

16.6=coefficient for converting km/h to m/s V=speed of helicopter I=interval between pots (previously determined based on pot type and meteorological conditions) ejection rate=16.6V/I

Table 3
Thus a helicopter carrying twenty-four smoke barrels can lay a screen up to five kilometers long in two minutes. A screen of the same size created by ground troops could require dozens of men.

Tank, motorized rifle, air defense, engineer, and other combat and support units have smoke grenades in addition to the VEESS in their combat vehicles. As mentioned above, tanks generally have eight to twelve smoke grenade launchers, whereas BMPs and BTRs have six launchers. Other smoke devices such as grenades and small smoke pots can be acquired by maneuver and support units, usually through the unit's chemical officer. Individual vehicle, platoon, and company commanders may create screens expedient to the battlefield situation; however, larger smoke screens (to be used by a battalion-sized unit or larger) are to be coordinated with the units chemical officer.

Principal Uses for Smoke

Camouflage Smoke Screen

A camouflage smoke screen is a linear screen dispensed either directly in front, on the flank, or in the rear of friendly troop dispositions. Smoke-generating vehicles, smoke generators, smoke pots, and grenades are used. These screens are employed up to the point where forces deploy into attack formation. Depending on terrain, weather, and the tactical operations conducted, the number, size, and location of camouflage smoke screens vary. Soviet literature has described a battalion-level exercise in which four separate camouflage screens were established over a distance of three kilometers to cover the battalions deployment into company columns, movement toward the enemy defense line, and final deployment in combat formations (see Figure 1). Smoke screens are employed in a linear fashion when concealing the combat actions of troops from enemy ground-based observers. They must be two or three times larger than the front that the troops occupy. The line on the ground on which obscurant-disseminating resources are disposed and activated is called the smoke-generation line. A smoke generator or a group of smoke pots disposed on the ground and prepared to release an obscuring cloud are called smoke points. The number of men manning the smoke points depends on the type of obscurant-filled device used; smoke points may be unmanned if remotely ignited smoke pots are used. Area smoke screens are also used for camouflage. Covering a wide surface area occupied by fixed or semifixed facilities or mobile facilities or units that are to remain in one location for extended periods of time is accomplished by area smoke screens. Objects screened by area smoke screens include radar sites, command posts, field depots, river crossings, assembly areas, etc. Several basic principles are to be followed when generating area smoke screens:

The object and surrounding terrain or manmade features must be screened so as to deny enemy reference points. The installation must not be in the center of the screen. The smoke points must not disclose the outer contours of the object. Screening must be initiated in a timely manner so that the area is blanketed by the time of attack. If possible, decoy smoke screens should be used. Depending on the size of the object being screened, the screen should be anywhere from

at least twice as large as the object (for larger objects such as airfields and troop concentrations) to at least fifteen or more times as large (for depots, small crossing points, radar sites, etc). Depending on terrain, smoke points are set up within a "checkerboard" pattern or in a circle that covers the area to be screened. A "checkerboard" pattern is a rectangle which is divided into two squares (four square kilometers in area) with smoke points distributed evenly within each square. A "checkerboard" pattern is used if the terrain is contoured or covered with buildings, trees, or other obstructions which prevent the precise distribution of smoke points (see Figure 2).

On relatively flat, featureless terrain a circle or set of concentric rings of smoke points is used (see Figure 3). Generally, the distance between the target and the first obscurant generation ring is 100 to 250 meters. The distance between smoke release points within each ring varies between 20 and 100 meters, depending on the obscurant device being used and the meteorological conditions. These methods are used together when objects three to four kilometers apart are to be screened simultaneously. The rings of smoke-generation lines are placed around each object that is to be screened, and these rings are placed within the squares of a "checkerboard" (see Figure 4).

Blinding Smoke Screen

A blinding smoke screen is dispensed either directly on or in front of enemy positions. Artillery, mortars, or air-delivered smoke bombs or spray tanks are used for blinding screens. The intent of such a screen is to blind enemy gunners (tanks, antitank guided missiles [ATGMs], artillery, etc.), observation posts, and forward observers so as to restrict the enemy's ability to engage friendly forces effectively. Friendly troops operate outside of a blinding screen. Obscurant-filled projectiles are used typically to lay blinding screens on the following targets: enemy weapon batteries (particularly antitank guns), command posts, and observation points. If ever used for camouflaging, they probably would be limited to combat (for example, a meeting battle) which might require smoke screening more quickly and in greater amounts than could be afforded by VEESS, smoke pots, or grenades. Obscurant-filled rounds are particularly useful when targets cannot be located and destroyed. However, they are not used against targets near friendly forces when a head wind is blowing or when the wind velocity is greater than seven meters per second. In addition, the effectiveness of smoke rounds is cut in half when they land in a snow cover greater than thirty centimeters deep. Favorable conditions for using smoke rounds include a cross wind velocity of no more the five meters per second, an absence of convection, and soil of medium hardness in the impact area. The creation of a smoke screen begins with a continuous fire of four to six rounds per gun. Table 4 provides smoke ammunition expenditure norms for maintaining a smoke screen on a

Wind Direction** Weapon Head or Tail 1btry 1220-mm mortar 1btry 122-mm howitzer 450 300 Oblique (45%) 350 220 Flank 250 150

*This chart assumes a wind speed of 3 to 5 meters per second with supporting weather conditions (i.e., cloud cover and temperature).

Table 4
100-meter front for one minute. If the smoke screen begins to dissipate, then another four to six rounds per gun are fired rapidly. Wind direction and speed relative to the enemy's front line are taken into account when laying a blinding smoke screen. If there is a strong flank wind, a converged sheaf is used and the midpoint of the impact points will be:

50 to l00 meters in front of the target when the wind is blowing toward the target In the vicinity of the target with the wind blowing from the enemy. 50 to 100 meters toward the direction of the wind adjacent to the enemy line with a flanking wind.

Except with a head wind, obscurant-filled projectiles may also be used simultaneously with fire-for-effect high-explosive fragmentation projectiles during an attack. However, a deliberate smoke screen would be placed only against those sectors in which enemy antitank weapons, command posts, and observation points were grouped. The number of obscurant-filled rounds used is determined by the equation in Table 5.

N=RFT N=Total number or rounds required. R=Number of rounds as required in Table 4.

F=Width of front in hundreds of meters. T=Duration of the smoke screen, in minutes.

Table 5

Decoy Smoke Screen

A decoy smoke screen is essentially a camouflage smoke screen (linear or area) set up in areas of simulated activity to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of friendly forces and the probable direction of attack, thus preventing him from concentrating his defenses against the main axis or axes. The site and location of the decoy screen or screens depends upon the type of operation, time available, terrain, and weather conditions. An example would be a river-crossing operation in which several possible crossing sites are screened simultaneously. Depending on the screen size, a few personnel or a small unit are sent to the area of the decoy screen. Noisemakers and tape recordings simulating tactical activity are broadcast over loudspeakers. If the enemy delivers artillery, mortar, rocket, or aerial ordnance into the decoy screen area, fires and grenades producing a black cloud will be ignited to simulate burning equipment.

Protective Screens
Eastern European authors have discussed in numerous articles the effectiveness of smoke screens, particularly screens of black smoke, in protecting troops against the light emissions and thermal radiation of nuclear blasts outside the blast radius. A 1975 Polish article acknowledges Western tests that demonstrated that a screen using 440 to 620 liters of fog oil per square kilometer reduces the effects of thermal radiation by 65% to 90%. Although the type of obscurant screen used (linear or area) was not discussed in detail, the article mentioned that it would take a concentration of obscurants 1.5 to 2 times higher than that used in camouflaging operations. It is unclear, however, whether the Soviets would generate a screen with the sole purpose of protection against a nuclear strike or whether it would merely be a desirable side effect of a screen generated for maskirovka.

Signaling Smoke
Eastern European countries also have smoke grenades which emit smoke of various colors for making and signaling. In exercises, artillery smoke shells have frequently been used for target ranging.

Other Uses Of Smoke

One method of using obscurants is to fire artillery or mortar obscurant-filled projectiles to generate a smoke screen fifty to one hundred meters behind the enemy lines and then fire illumination rounds about two hundred meters behind the screen. This creates a whitish curtain which silhouettes enemy vehicles and makes it easier to determine range. This method is recommended for use when enemy armor targets are made invisible by a dark backdrop such as trees or buildings. Another method of attempting to illuminate the enemy is by using obscurants to generate a cloud over the battlefield and then directing searchlights against the cloud from concealed positions. Although this method can increase the ambient light in an area, it is not entirely satisfactory. In 1982, a Soviet source stated that, when feasible, obscurant-filled shells should be fired into areas of enemy artillery units to force them to turn on their reconnaissance radar, thus enabling friendly units to pinpoint their position. Soviet authors have also spoken of damaged tanks or BMPs using their VEESS to persuade the enemy to think he has totally destroyed the vehicle, thus giving the crew time to escape or withdraw the vehicle for repairs. In an exercise, a decoy smoke screen was laid down by a platoon which attracted enemy artillery fire into the false sector. The platoon immediately ignited black smoke grenades, simulating destroyed vehicles and enhancing the deception, thus drawing even more artillery fire.



Although use of obscurants is emphasized during an offensive to help reduce losses, the Soviets also recognize the dangers inherent in such use. It may hinder their control, observation of the battlefield, and ability to hit targets. In addition, enemy force may take advantage of friendly smoke screens in order to shield their own maneuvers or to carry out a surprise counterattack. A smoke screen is successful when the attackers maintain their assigned axis of advance and retain sight of the objective. Studying the terrain and meteorological conditions and selecting highly visible reference points ahead of and behind the axis of attack allow the smoke screen to aid the attacker. To prevent the obscurants from interfering with friendly maneuvering troops, it is important that the planned location and duration of the smoke generation lines be coordinated with the plan of troop actions. Obscurants may be used in any of the three types of offensive warfare: attack against a defending enemy, pursuit, and meeting engagement or battle. Of the four phases of fire support, obscurants may also be used during the preparatory, attack, and pursuit phases. In an attack from the march, a camouflage smoke screen is used during the preparatory fire support phase to conceal combat formations that are advancing and maneuvering towards the enemy's line of defense. One example of this was a Soviet exercise in which a motorized rifle battalion advancing from a wooded area in platoon formation used VEESSequipped tanks and smoke grenades in an attack from the march against an enemy strongpoint (two infantry platoons) on a hill. The tanks, after turning on their VEESS and while firing on visible targets, advanced towards the enemy's leading defensive position. Motorized riflemen equipped with smoke grenades followed on foot behind the extended line of tanks. As gaps developed in the smoke screen, they would approach and hurl grenades or fire ZDPs (incendiary smoke charges which produce smoke for about one minute and can be fired to a range up to 560 meters) into them. Besides concealing troops on the march from ground based observation, a camouflage smoke screen may also be used to provide cover against aerial observation for units moving in rear areas. A smoke company is described by one Soviet writing as using AGP aerosol generators mounted on ARS-14s and the TDA-M smoke generator to create a forty- to fifty-meter smoke "arch" over a gorge for an advancing march column on a mountain slope. During smoke generation from the halt, the AGPs were removed from the vehicles and set up at thirty- to forty-meter intervals. Moving in a manner similar to a tank, a TMS-65 can create a four hundred meter-high obscuring cloud, under proper meteorological conditions, for units advancing to an attack. The effect of achieving such heights is to increase the depth of area behind the smoke screen (the dead zone), which cannot be observed by enemy attack helicopters. Reportedly, the smoke cloud on a tanks VEESS can achieve a height of forty meters under the effect of rising air currents (convection). During the support of the attack fire phase, both camouflage and blinding smoke screens may be used. An exercise in a 1985 Soviet writing illustrates an attacking motorized rifle company's use of camouflage obscurants, followed by a blinding smoke screen. The line for going over to the attack for a motorized rifle company was established at five hundred meters from the enemys forward edge. Simultaneously launches of twenty-five ZDPs were planned. The first launch of ZDPs fell short of the forward edge by fifty to one hundred meters because of a head wind. In thirty seconds after the salvo, a dense camouflage smoke screen was formed along a six hundred-meter front. The company negotiated two hundred meters without losses. Once the smoke began to clear, a second volley of ZDPs was launched; these fell on the enemy's first trench line scattering from one hundred to two hundred meters in depth and forming a blinding smoke screen. Enemy weapons that had not been destroyed during the fire preparation phase of the attack delivered fire at random without seeing the attacking troops. The attacking troops were then able to cross the enemys forward edge and, as soon as visibility improved, again used the ZDPs in the depth of the enemy defense. Typically, when attacking from the march, the Soviets may use both camouflage and blinding smoke screens. When attacking through units in direct contact a commander has more opportunity to plan and prepare smoke operations. A camouflage smoke screen may be used to prevent observation of advancing troop columns. As the advancing force nears its departure line for the attack, the defending line opposite the enemy may set up a camouflage smoke screen using smoke pots, grenades, and VEESS of forward deployed armored vehicles. In addition, obscurant-filled projectiles may also be fired at enemy strongpoints while the attacking force negotiates minefields along enemy defensive positions. For example, in one Soviet exercise a camouflage smoke screen generated from DM-11 smoke pots was laid by the forces in contact. By the time the second echelon or counter-attacking forces moved to attack, the obscuring cloud dispersed, allowing artillery and mortars in support of the attack to detect targets in enemy strongpoints. Then, on the commanders signal, the artillery and mortars laid blinding smoke screens on weapon positions in the depth of the enemy's defense line. During the course of the battle, smoke rounds were also laid on an enemy ATGM subunit that had moved within 1.5 to 2 kilometers of the attacking tanks. The tanks advanced to the range of effective fire and, after the cloud over the target had dissipated, opened fire. Using obscurant-filled shells against ATGMs is considered especially important by the Soviets when not all ATGMs can be detected and destroyed or neutralized by conventional ammunition. Both blinding and camouflaging smoke screening may be used in pursuit of a retreating enemy. Continuing with the exercise described above, the motorized rifle company pursued the retreating "enemy". The company then reached a water obstacle, on the far side of which the enemy had moved reserves up from the depth and consolidated their forces. The motorized rifle company laid a smoke screen on the far bank by means of three consecutive group launches of ZDPs delivered by one platoon at intervals of two minutes. This blinded the enemy for a period of seven to eight minutes. Thirty seconds after the release of smoke, the company crossed the river while mounted on amphibious armored

personnel carrier. After the soldiers disembarked on the other side, the cloud began to clear, they conducted a swift attack and captured the enemy line. During a pursuit, camouflage screens both on the flank and front may be necessary due to actual or possible enemy counterattacks on the flanks. In another exercise example, the platoon on the right flank of an advancing tank company maintained a moving smoke screen (generated by using VEESS) against aimed fire by enemy ATGMs. When the company deployed into combat formation, two or more screens were generated using smoke pots in front of the line of departure for the attack and on the left flank. The frontal screen was laid by helicopter, a towed minelayer (PMZ-4) laid the smoke pots on the left flank.

In the defense, smoke screens can be used for camouflaging the maneuvers of friendly subunits of tanks, infantry, and artillery; concealing engineer activities from enemy observation; screening replacements of first-echelon units and subunits under conditions of good visibility; camouflaging the approach of friendly subunits for the counterattack; screening the movements of defending units between strongpoints; flank and maneuver security; and misleading the enemy on the disposition of reserves and planned counterattack directions. In the defense, front-line elements would remain to hold the defensive line until second-echelon elements provided relief or assumed the counterattack. Because a completely obscured environment tends to aid an attacker more than a defender, the defense must use obscurants to minimize the enemy's vision while allowing the defender a fairly clear view of the enemy's location. Smoke from artillery and mortar shells is the most effective means of blinding an advancing enemy while keeping friendly forces out of the obscured area. VEESS, smoke pots, and smoke grenades would be used only in defense while in contact with the enemy, to change positions, or begin a withdrawal from contact.

An exercise described in an 1987 article gives an excellent example of how the Soviets would use obscurants to screen an orderly withdrawal in order to draw an attacking enemy into an ambush (see Figure 5). A motorized rifle battalion posts a platoon near the Malaya Grove in order to reconnoiter the enemy advance and, subsequently,

to lay screens to obscure his approach. The remaining elements of the battalion deploy in a concave position. with the 3d Motorized Rifle Company in the center.

Upon contact with the enemy, the detached platoon conducts an orderly withdrawal, laying a smoke screen of fifty-five smoke pots (ignited in two phases between 0610 and 0619) along a five hundred-meter front. At 0620 the platoon lays another five hundred-meter smoke screen of twenty-seven smoke pots behind the first smoke screen. These smoke screens hinder the vision of the enemy and slow his advance. After the enemy advances to a depth of 400 meters between the 1st company (in the north) and the 2d Company (to the south) the 3d Company launches a counterattack, routing the enemy. An obscuring cloud created by VEESS or smoke pots can also be used during an antinuclear maneuver in the defense prior to enemy nuclear strikes. A camouflage smoke screen can allow a withdrawal to an area where subunits can promptly prepare to repel the enemy attacks. However, only a portion of the subunits would be allowed to relocate. It is advised that a small number of tanks remain to maintain firing activities to confuse the enemy.

Meeting Battle
A meeting battle occurs when the opposing forces are both attacking. The aim is to rout the enemy in a short time and seize the initiative. A meeting battle can take place on the march, during an offensive when repelling counterattacks or exploiting successes, and in the defense when counter-attacking or eliminating enemy airborne or amphibious forces. Meeting battles, because they are spontaneous and fluid, offer the least opportunity to carefully plan coordinated obscurant use. Because of the constantly changing conditions, obscurant use is often planned and executed after the engagement has begun. Although use in the offensive dominates Eastern European countries examples of obscurant warfare, obscurants are hardly mentioned in connection with the meeting battle. The best example involves an attacking Soviet motorized rifle battalion using two camouflage and one decoy smoke screen to divert the enemys attention from the true direction of the attack (see Figure 6). The motorized rifle battalions attack was made in the direction of the advancing enemy's right flank and camouflaged by a smoke screen. The screening was conducted by a tank company of the battalion using their VEESS. The distance between the tanks was set at one hundred meters to create a continuous aerosol cloud. This distance was calculated on the basis of meteorological conditions and the fact that a smoke screen can extend three hundred to four hundred meters from a

VEESS and still remain impenetrable to vision. Meanwhile, a decoy smoke screen was laid, facing the enemy's left flank, by a

motorized rifle company of the battalion. This was done to divert the enemys attention from the true direction of the attack, which would also be smoke screened.

One hundred twenty DM-11 smoke pots were laid along a 1,500-meter line at intervals of twenty to twenty-five meters for a total burning time of six minutes. The work was divided among the companys three platoons, each

NLT=approxiamate number of DM-11 smoke pots needed. N=Normal expenditure rate of DM-11 smoke pots. L=Length of the smoke line in km. T=Time for which the smoke screen is required, in hours. The following calculation was then made: 800 smoke pots/km 1.5 km 0.10 h=120 pots.

Table 6
being responsible for laying pots along five hundred meters of the line. The calculation for this problem was based on the normal expenditure rate of eight hundred DM-11 smoke pots along a one-kilometer front with a tail wind. The algebraic formula in Table 6 was used to calculate the approximate number of smoke pots required: Table 7 shows the number of DM-11 smoke pots required to screen one kilometer of front for one hour in various wind conditions and directions. After maneuvering, the motorized rifle battalion attacked the enemys right flank, using a salvo of ZDPs to create a frontal camouflage smoke screen. Another example from Soviet literature of smoke screening in the meeting battle is the use of frontal camouflage and blinding smoke screens at the same time during an enemy counterattack. Following an artillery attack against the enemy advancing for a counterattack, artillery projectiles filled with an obscurant were laid directly in front of the advancing enemy lines as well as in front of the advancing Soviet battalion's ATGMs. Once the smoke screen on the enemy dissipated, the

Meteorological Conditions Wind direction Flanking Oblique Frontal or tail Favorable 300 500 600 Moderate 400 600 800 Unfavorable 600 900 1200

Table 7

Soviet ATGMs and tanks opened fire against the enemy.

River Crossings
Eastern European countries doctrine emphasizes the utility of all three types of obscurant screens (blinding, camouflage, and decoy) at all forced river crossings (see Figure 7). Greater planning and preparation are required river crossing than for a crossing in the rear area. Unfavorable meteorological conditions are more difficult to overcome. Friendly forces must have a tail or at least flanking wind in order for obscurant generators and smoke pots on one side to screen the crossing area. If one is facing a head wind, only an artillery-employed standing smoke screen can be placed against enemy positions on the opposite bank. Moving units across rivers amid obscurants has proven difficult, often resulting in disorientation and panic. River crossings in the rear areas also mandate the use of obscurant screens for concealment. Their importance to offensive operations and their vulnerability to both air attack and direct fire require obscurant screen employment whenever feasible. The Soviets discuss the necessity of screening not only forced river crossings at the forward edge, but also important crossing points well behind the forward edge that are crucial for supporting army and front-level operations. Radar corner reflectors are to be used to deceive radar guidance systems. As in smoke use near the forward edge, at least one or two decoy screens must be established for every actual crossing site, because an obscuring cloud in the rear attracts attention of enemy reconnaissance assets. A 1983 Soviet article described an exercise in which a smoke company utilized two smoke screens to conceal a river crossing in a mountainous area from enemy aircraft (see Figure 8).

One screen was established around the actual crossing site. Another screen was generated around a destroyed bridge, near Skalnaya, where bridge construction activity was being simulated. The operation was reportedly a success, as airstrikes proved ineffective. During periods of relative inactivity, a smoke screen of lesser density was maintained around the crossings, but it was intensified with additional smoke generators when an air raid was sounded. The entire screening operation lasted twenty-four hours.

Use of Obscurants at Night

Principal Soviet countermeasures to enemy electro-optical devices consist of either destroying them or blinding them with illumination rounds or smoke screens. Passive and active night vision and thermal imaging devices are specifically targeted for such countermeasures. The countermeasures used would depend on the type and number of devices with which the enemy is equipped. There are three ways to use obscurants and illumination as countermeasures to enemy sensors:

For active night vision devices, blind with obscurant-filled projectiles. For passive night vision devices, blind with illumination or combined use of illumination and obscurant-filled projectiles. For thermal imaging devices, camouflage friendly troops with

obscurant and illuminate enemy targets (to benefit friendly night vision devices) at the same time. In general, obscurants are used when enemy electro-optical devices cannot be destroyed or neutralized in a short period, or when the enemy has created high levels of illumination within Soviet defenses. In the judgment of one Soviet writer, battlefield illumination in night combat is more favorable to the defense. Night vision devices and infrared (IR) binoculars would be used to detect the IR illuminators of enemy active night vision devices both prior and during a Soviet attack. Depending on the importance and distance of the illuminators they would be destroyed or smoke screened. As with enemy searchlights, the smoke screen would either be placed on or in front of the enemy IR illuminators. Because active IR devices are obsolescent and have been largely replaced in Western armies by passive IR devices, Soviet emphasis on degrading active IR devices has waned. More indirect means would be used to locate passive night vision and thermal imaging devices, since neither emit light or thermal radiation (passive night vision devices, or image intensifiers, amplify incoming ambient light; thermal imaging devices detect the contrasting heat radiation among objects, their individual parts, and surrounding terrain). These indirect means include noting the direction of enemy fire unaided by terrain illumination and knowledge of enemy organization, weapons, and views on conducting night defense. Image intensifiers, operating in the visible and near-IR wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum, can be blinded by any dense smoke screen, illuminating rounds, or searchlights. Artillery or mortar illuminating rounds would be laid so that their flares would ignite just above the ground at intervals of up to one hundred meters, burning between fifty to one hundred meters from the target (see Figure 9). Ground bursts are probably used only when terrain in front of the enemy is open and relatively flat. Blinding illumination fire is conducted by rounds or volleys at a rate of one round or volley per minute for a designated time or until the prescribed amount of ammunition has been expended. Since searchlights are vulnerable to enemy fire, they would be used in brief flashes lasting between one and two seconds against individual targets in a narrow or wide beam directed at a target every ten to fifteen seconds. The blinding of enemy strongpoints, ambushes, and counterattacks is done either by using a wide beam orby shifting the direction of a narrow beam, depending on the terrain and the distance and disposition of the target.

Rear Area
The presence of reconnaissance and strike aircraft, unmanned remotely piloted vehicles, and deep-strike precision-guided munitions have forced the Soviets to rely on obscurants in areas well behind the forward edge. Area screens will be used here to screen high priority targets such as crossing points, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile sites, supply depots, and friendly troops and equipment concentrations, etc. In the rear areas, smoke generating vehicles such as the TDA-M and the TMS-65 will be used, since their lack of armor protection makes them vulnerable near the forward edge.

The development by NATO of deep-strike precision guided munitions such as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), Maverick, and FOG-M missiles has been noted by the Soviets in planning obscurant use in the rear areas. Area smoke screens will be generated either by supporting chemical units or by smoke pots, barrels, grenades, and VEESS of the targeted Soviet unit. Not only is generating an effective smoke screen a

concern of the Soviets, but also the establishing of an effective air raid warning network so that a screen can be generated in time to degrade targeting devices. This will be particularly difficult in countering weapons such as MLRS and FOG-M.


FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, Final Draft (Unedited), 18 June 1990, Appendix A. FM 100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, June 1991, pp. 4-116 thru 4-117, and pp. 5-197 thru 5-205. DST-1620S-145-90-VoL V, Smoke and Other Chemical Waifare Obscurants-Foreign (U) Vol V, Doctrine, Tactics, Training and Order of Battle (U), (S/NF/WN), 14 December 1990, unclassified extract.

Memorandum, AFZJ-ABX-S, 8 May 1991, Subject: Doctrinal Rationale for OPFOR Use of TDA-M. V.G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), translated in JPRS-UMA-88-008-L-I, 29 June 1988, pp.64-65. "USSR: Use of Smoke Weapons in the Offensive Operations of The Great Patriotic War," translation of Voyennoistoricheskiy Zhurnal [Military History Journal] 5/87, pp. 25-32. Major General of Technical Troops I. Afanasov, "Under Cover of a Smoke Screen," translation of Voyennyy vestnik [Military Herald-hereafter referred to as VV 8/72, pp. 89-94. "USSR: Laying Smoke Screens", translation of VV 1/87, pp. 62-63. Major General of Technical Troops B. Abamtsev, "Use of Smokes During an Offensive," translation of VV 8/79. Colonel (Ret) I. Prishchepov, "The Effectiveness of Smoke Screening," translation of VV 11/83, pp. 73-75. Major V. Ishchenko, "The Uses of Smokes," translation of VV 10/82, pp. 44-45. Charles J. Dick, Soviet Smoke Generation (Camberley, UK: Soviet Studies Research Center, March 1988). AST-2660Z-002-84, TMS-6S: A Large Area Smoke Generator (U), (S/NF/WN), Aug 84, unclassified extract. Defense Intelligence Staff, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, Martello Equipment Handbook (U), (S), unclassified extract. AST-2660Z-033-86, AGP Mobile Aerosol Generator (U), (S/NF/WN), 10 Jun 86, unclassified extract. DST-16205-145-87-Vol III-chg 1, Smoke and Other Chemical Warfare Obscurants-Foreign (U) Vol III, Disseminating Systems (U), (S/NF/WN), 4 May 90, unclassified extract. 61 JTCG/ME-87-l0, Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness, Handbook for Operational Testing of Electro-Optical Systems in Battlefield Obscurants, 14 Sep 87.

Occasionally, we make a mistake here at Red Thrust. We'd like to call your attention to two that occurred in the past two issues. In PB-30-91-3 (July 1991), on page 31, we listed the Red Thrust loaner classes available for units to request. An observant reader, comparing this list to his file of classes, noted that he had two classes which, from the dates, appeared to be more current than the ones we listed. He was in fact correct. The correct date for the class "Behind the Soviet War Machine" is 1 March 1988, and the date for the class "Soviet Combat Engineers" is 1 January 1988. In PB-30-91-4 (October 1991), CPT Jeff Stiliman described the Red Thrust Leader's Course. The editor managed to garble one of his key statements about course quotas for units. The third paragraph from the end of the article, on page 31, should read: "The Red Thrust Leaders Course is available to all FORSCOM units, as well as leaders from other units and services. To assist in ensuring the course is available to a wide audience, the Academy restricts the number of spaces allocated to a single unit: three (not "thence"-Editor) to each FORSCOM division or separate brigade/regiment, and two to each nonFORSCOM unit, per course. Also, units may not schedule spaces in back-to-back courses. Reserve component units must contact the NTC Reserve Component Office to coordinate spaces; their number is DSN 470-5905/5372 or commercial (619)386-5905/5372." To update those readers who may be planning to request spaces in the Leaders Course, you should know that beginning in February 1992, the course will be expanded from five to eight days. This is in response to numerous student critiques, telling us that we were packing too much information into too short a time. As a result, we have extended the course to present the material at a slower pace and provide more time for discussions.

Krasnovian OPFOR Organization at NTC

by CPT Kenneth Bullock Assistant S-2 177th Armored Brigade
The recent changes in the ground forces of the former Soviet Union structure, resulting in part from the requirements of the conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, are reflected in changes the NTC OPFOR is conducting to update the Krasnovian force structure. Table 1 summarizes the changes in numbers and types of major weapon systems in both the Soviet model and the NTC OPFOR, as of 18 February 1992. Figure 1 graphically portrays the Krasnovian model the NTC is striving to portray. Shaded symbols indicate systems the NTC OPFOR is currently able to field, as summarized above.