Republic v.

CA Private respondent Jose Lopez was Assistant Director of the Child & Youth Research Center (CYRC) of DECS, when he was temporarily detailed to the then MECS Legal Office until further advice in the exigencies of the service. He was later transferred to the Planning Service Office as he was allegedly facing charges before the Legal Division. This detail was prompted by complaints of employees in the CYRC that Lopez allegedly harassed such employees. Then, respondent Lopez expressed to the Education Minister his intent to resume his official position as CYRC Assistant Director. He returned to said office despite having received no response from the Minister. In response, petitioner Luz Palattao-Corpuz, then CYRC Director, issued memoranda stating that respondent Lopez will not be recognized as an active Staff member until he first secured the prper authorization, and requesting him to submit an official order terminating his detail. Lopez insisted on his return and did not follow said memoranda. Petitioner Corpuz then withheld respondent Lopez salaries and allowances for his refusal to comply with her directive to return to the MECS Central Office (as he still did not have the authorization to return to CYRC). Respondent Lopez then filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against Corpuz. While the case was pending, the Education Minister rectified Lopez temporary detail in the Planning Service Office to temporary assignment. The trial court rendered a Partial Decision ordering Copruz to take official cognizance of Lopez attendance at the CYRC. Meanwhile, the CYRC was abolished and both parties were retired from Government but none could draw their retirement benefits in view of the pendency of the case. The CA affirmed in toto the appealed RTC judgment, hence, this petition. Issue: (1) WON petitioner Corpuz was justified in refusing to take cognizance of respondent Lopez attendance as CYRC Assistant Director and in withholding his salaries. (2) Whether respondent Lopez was detailed or reassigned. Held: (1) Yes. (2) Reassigned. Ratio: Respondent Lopez returned to the CYRC at his own instance without any authorization from higher authorities and refused to obey petitioner Corpuz directive to obtain the necessary clearance. As head of the CYRC, petitioner was thus left with no alternative but to withhold recognition of respondents attendance at CYRC. The CA affirmed the TC finding that the Education Ministers directive was defective for using the term detail instead of reassignment. Detail is the movement from one Department or Agency to another which is temporary in nature (CS Rules on Personal Actions and Policies, Rule VI, 4). On the other hand, reassignment is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same Department or Agency (id., 5). Nevertheless, the official intent of the order was clear: to move respondent Lopez away from the CYRC and locate him in the head office, in the exigencies of the service. Also, the proper rectification was made by the Education Minister. The trial and appellate court finding that the reassignment was stage-managed by petitioner Corpuz is not well taken as it was not issued by her but by the Education Minister himself. It is inconceivable that said Minister would allow himself to be used by petitioner as an unwitting tool. He must have been aware of the sick situation in the CYRC, thus prompting him to re-assign Lopez. Respondent Lopez himself caused the withholding of his salaries. He reported back to CYRC at his own instance without the proper authorization. He was directed to obtain the same but he did not comply with said directive. He was again reminded and was required to submit a record of his attendance duly signed by the Chief of the MECS Planning Services or an approved leave of absence before he could get his salary but he merely reacted by saying that the requirement was superfluous. He later complied but discrepancies were discovered between his submissions and those in the CYRC logbook.

Teotico v. Agda The Fiber Development Authority (FIDA) Administrator appointed respondent Democrito Agda as Chief Fiber Development Officer (Range 73) of the FIDA effective upon assumption of office. The appointment did not indicate any specific station or place of assignment. He was designated Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. By virtue of Special Order No.219, Agda was temporarily reassigned in the interest of the service, at the main office of the Administrator. Respondent Agda questioned before the court a quo Special Order No.219 in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order, alleging that it was null and void for violating PD 807 (CS Decree), 48 which prohibits detail or reassignment of CS personnel within 3 months before an election and BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), 261 (h) which prohibits transfer or detail of CS officers and employees within the election period except upon prior approval of the COMELEC. The election in this issue was the 18 January 1988 local election (as he was reassigned 13 November 1987). Agda also moved to cite petitioners in contempt for refusing to comply with the writ prayed for. The trial court decided in favor of Agda, however, the petitioners were not cited for contempt of court. Petitioners then filed this petition before the SC. Issue: WON respondent Agras reassignment is valid. Held: Yes. Ratio: Respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, in deliberately failing to act on the motion to dismiss, in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, and in ordering the reinstatement of Agda as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I with full backwages and allowances. Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but rather as Chief Fiber Development Officer. Respondent was not appointed to a specific station. He was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. Consequently, he could be transferred or assigned to any other place by the office head where he may be deemed to be more effective. Although termed reassignment, the personnel action involved herein is in fact a mere detail in the Office of the FIDA Administrator. The CS Decree (PD 807) allows transfer, detail and reassignment and an employee believing that the personnel action effected was not justified may appeal to the CSC. Unless otherwise ordered by the CSC, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. His detail was not done in violation of BP 881, 261 (h) because the matter was raised for the first time only in his Amended Petition. There was no showing that no prior approval was obtained by the FIDA Administrator from the COMELEC concerning his detail or that a case for violation of such law was in fact filed against the Administrator. All that respondent showed was his inquiry to COMELEC if his detail was referred to it and the alleged answer of the Manager of the COMELEC Law Department that its records do not show that the Special Order was submitted or referred to the COMELEC. This inquiry was inconclusive of the allegation that no prior authority was obtained by the FIDA Administrator for Agdas detail. No law requires the submission to the COMELEC of special orders reassigning or detailing employees within the prohibited period. What is needed is "prior authority," the request for which and its approval may be in separate documents or papers. Further, respondent Agda had not exhausted the administrative remedy available to him, specifically, that under CS Rules on Personnel Actions, Rule VI, 6.

Cario v. Daoas Petitioner Cristina Jenny Cario was appointed Accountant III of the Office of the Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC), now known as the National Commission for Indigenous People. She was reassigned by respondent ONCC Executive Director David Daoas to the position Technical Assistant of the Socio-Economic Division of the ONCC. Petitioner Cario alleged that her reassignment was due to her refusal to sign a Disbursement Voucher for the travel expenses to Indonesia of ONCC Regional Director Rosalina Bistoyong. She also claims that the position to which she was reassigned was inexistent. She was directed to report to ONCC Region II office, and not to the Region I office to which she was working. She inquired with the CSC Regional Director the propriety and legality of her reassignment. The Director rendered a legal opinion that it was not in order. Respondent David and Bistoyong appealed the holding of the CSCRO to the CSC. Cario requested that her reassignment be deferred and inquired on the possibility of her going on leave but such was denied. Petitioner Cario still reported on Region I, instead on Region II as directed. She was then considered Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and was consequently dropped from the rolls for AWOL for more than 30 days. The CSC dismissed Carios appeal and affirmed her dropping from the rolls. The CA denied Carios petition and motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, hence this petition. Issue: WON petitioner Carios reassignment and subsequent termination was valid. Held: No. Ratio: The validity of petitioner Carios reassignment was already settled by the CSC to the effect that it was not valid as she could not be transferred to another region without her consent. Reassignment of personnel without consent is proscribed if the officer was appointed- not merely assigned- to a particular station, as in this case, where petitioner Cario was appointed as Accountant III in Region I. Thus, could not be reassigned to another station or region without her consent and doing so would amount to a removal. Also, petitioner is justified in not heeding her reassignment order as her basis was not merely her firm belief that it was illegal but the legal opinion of the CSCRO which found that her reassignment was not in order and that her present assignment at the ONCC Regional Office No. 1 must not be disturbed. Thus, the CSC resolution quoted by the CA to the effect that a reassigned employee who does not agree with the order must nevertheless comply until its implementation is restrained or it is declared to be not in the interest of the service or have been issued with grave abuse of discretion does not find application in this case. THE CSCRO must be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of its duties. Therefore, its legal opinion regarding petitioners reassignment must be considered in order and should be respected pending appeal by respondents. Petitioner Cario should therefore not be considered AWOL as she was in fact reporting for work in Region I until Bistoyong issued a memorandum ordering her to refrain from reporting for work therein.

Pastor v. City of Pasig Petitioner Remedios Pastor was appointed Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. It was confirmed by the DBM. Then newly-elected respondent Mayor Vicente Eusebio relieved petitioner from her position as Municipal Budget Officer and reassigned her to the Office of the Municipal Administrator of Pasig pending investigation on her alleged issuance of Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. Said investigation was not conducted. Petitioner complained before the CSC and in response, the City Mayor alleged that the reassignment was in view of her long years of experience in finance and [that she had been] tasked to conduct studies best suited to her qualifications; that instead of being suspended for issuing Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections, she was reassigned for her professional productive growth [and for the benefit] of the city; that her reassignment was in the best interest of the service and did not involve any diminution of salary or rank as a department head; and that the deletion of petitioners name from the payroll for October 15, 1995 was due to a management directive that every personnel should be in the payroll of actual office assignment and that in fact petitioner received her salary for that period and continued to receive the salary and benefits attached to her position. The CSC decided in Pastors favor. Petitioner Pastor was later designated as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex, apparently in compliance with the CSC Resolution in favor of petitioner. This, the CSC did not find in compliance with its earlier decision and held that the Pasig City Hall Annex was not a department of the City Government of Pasay but a mere extension of the City Hall. Respondents appealed to the CA which court set aside and recalled the earlier CSC ruling, hence this petition. Issue: WON petitioner Pastors reassignment was valid. Held: No. Ratio: EO 292 (Adm. Code), Bk.V, Title I, Subtitle A, 26 (7) provides: Reassignment. - An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary. A reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and salary is a constructive removal from service (Bentain v CA, 209 SCRA 644 [1992]). As in this case, the reassignment of petitioner to different offices of the Pasig City Government was indefinite. She had been given virtual floating assignments which amount to a diminution of her rank. Her reassignment pednign investigation of her alleged issuance of Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections began in 1992 but no investigation had been made. The City Mayors justification of Pators continuing reassignment allegedly due to petitioners long years of experience in finance fitted for her studies regarding the citys revenues is unavailing as per the Courts ruling in the similar case of Gloria v. CA, 388 SCRA 5 (2000). Her reassignment lasts already for 10 years as of the date of this decision should be considered as more than a temporary one, hence is removal without cause as Budget Officer of Pasig City. Her duties in her assignment as Pasig City Hall Annex head show that her assignment was more than temporary. She also suffered a diminution in her rank as can be seen from the fact that her budget proposal as Pasig City Hall Annex Head will be subject to review by the City Budget Officer. Also, the former was created merely by ordinance while the latter position was created by statute.

Cristobal v. Melchor Appellant Jose Critstobal was appointed private secretary in the Office of the President (OP) on 1 July 1961. Less than a year later, on 1 January 1962, he was informed by then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, through letter, that his services were terminated effective today. Five of similarly situated employees filed a civil case (Ingles, et al. v. Mutuc, et al.) against the Executive Secretary and the cash disbursing officer of the OP for reinstatement and payment of their salaries. This case was decided in their favor upon reaching, ultimately, the SC. While not a party to the said case, appellant waited for Executive Secretary Mutuc, and his successors, to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service. His request was ultimately denied and declared by the OP definitely closed on 19 May 1971. Appellant then instituted the current action against the incumbent Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and the cash disbursing officer Federico Arcala for reinstatement and payment of his salaries. The defendants, represented by the OSG, claimed that the plaintiff had no cause of action as he was deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the action within 1 year from the date of separation as per then ROC, Rule 66, 16, as he filed the suit after more than 9 years from separation. This was decided by the court a quo against Cristobal, hence this appeal. Issue: WON appellant Cristobal lost his right to seek judicial relief for failure to file his complaint within the 1 year period provided in ROC, Rule 66, 16, based on the principle of laches. Held: No. Ratio: An action for quo warranto must be instituted within a year from the time the cause of action arose. However, this rule does not find application in this case due to some circumstances. First, there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of appellant amounting to abandonment of his right to be reinstated. Upon receiving the letter of termination, he instantly pointed to the Executive Secretary his civil service eligibility with his 8 years of service in the government and thus entitled to security of tenure. His non-participation in the civil case above is not fatal to his cause as during the pendency of said case, he continued to press for his request for reinstatement. He also could be expected to rely upon the outcome of the case filed by his coemployees who protected their interests as they were in similar situations and were seeking identical reliefs. Second. It was an act of government through its officials (especially Executive Secretary Mutuc) that contributed to the delay in filing the present complaint for reinstatement. Appellant and others were assured to be reinstated by the Executive Secretary but even when Secretary Mutuc already was out of the office, his successors gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and reemployed at the opportune time. The continued promise of government officials and the ruling in Ingles v. Mutuc which he believed were in his favor led appellant to take his time and wait for the OP to fulfill its part of the bargain. It was only when his request was declared definitely closed by the OP did he see the necessity of filing this suit. Holding against appellant would be result injustice as he relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of former Executive Secretaries. The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote and not to defeat justice. It is a better rule that courts, in equity, will not be guided strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so would result in manifest wrong and injustice. Thirdly, the dismissal of appellant was contrary to the Courts ruling in Ingles v. Mutuc. The Court in that case held that one holding a primarily confidential position in the CS and that officers or employees in the inclassified as well as those in the classified service are protected by the provision of the Constitution stating that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law (Const.[1935], Art.XII, 4. There was no evidence showing that the employees therein were holding primarily confidential positions and on the contrary, their compensation was attached and the designation given thereto suggest a purely or at least mainly clerical nature of their work, and consequently their removal was illegal and contrary to law. This holding is the law of the case in this litigation.

Sabello v. DECS Petitioner Isabelo Sabello was Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also Assistant High School Principal of Talisay Barangay High School. He was authorized by the barrio council to withdraw the amount for the salaries of high school teachers which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurers Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. However, this turned out to be a grave error on his part and was charged and convicted of violation of RA 3019 to suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. He could no longer hire a lawyer due to financial difficulties to proceed to the SC. He was eventually granted an absolute pardon by the Philippine President. Consequently, he applied for reinstatement but he was reinstated not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I but to classroom teacher. He prayed for reinstatement to his former position, that his services be made continuous from original appointment, for back salaries, for restoration of his duly earned service credits and for all other rights and privileges not mentioned. The Solicitor General Commented that there is no justiciable controversy as the issue involved is whether or not petitioner merits reappointment to the position he held prior conviction. Issue: WON petitioner may be reinstated to his former position of Elementary Principal I after being extended an absolute pardon. Held: Yes. Ratio: There is a justiciable issue in this case as there is a concrete controversy on the legal relations of herein parties. The case calls for affirmative relief and not just a mere opinion or advice. The matter of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed or not is generally at the discretion of the appointing authority (the Division of City Schools in this case), but this discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. Such discretion is tempered with fairness and justice. The Court set aside the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was filed by a non-lawyer claiming that poverty denies him of having one. In Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., the Court held that the absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the RPC and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office. Petitioner Sabello was reinstated not to his former position as Principal I but rather as classroom teacher. There are no circumstances calling for his diminution in rank. Justice and equity dictate that he be reinstated to his former position. However, petitioner was not entitled to backwages as he was not entitled to automatic reinstatement. He was lawfully separated from the government service upon conviction for an offense. The right to backwages pertains only to those illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those acquitted of the charge against them. His government service cannot also be made continuous from his original appointment to the present. At any rate, he will be entitled to the appropriate retirement benefits as Elementary School Principal I upon his retirement.

Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. Petitioner Salvacion Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three others, was convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. She appealed to the SC her conviction and it was affirmed, but during reconsideration of the case, then President Marcos extended to her an absolute pardon which she accepted. She then requested the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be reinstated to her former position which was then still vacant. The request was referred to the then Ministry of Finance as the power of appointment of city government treasurers was transferred to it as per the LGC. The Ministry decided that she may be reinstated to her position without necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was absolutely pardoned. She sought reconsideration of the ruling, arguing that the full pardon wiped out her crime, implying that her government service was never interrupted and thus her reinstatement should be on the date of her preventive suspension, and that she is entitled to backpay on the entire period of her suspension. The issue was referred to the Office of the President (OP) which held that petitioner was not entitled to an automatic reinstatement based on her absolute pardon but she must secure an appointment to her former position, and that her civil liability subsisted. Petitioner then instituted this petition before the Court. Issue: WON petitioner Monsanto who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Philippine President is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. Held: No. Ratio: Petitioner, having accepted the pardon, is deemed to have abandoned her appeal before the SC and thus her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan became final. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. The act of forgiveness implies the commission of a wrong, and the wrong has been established by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. The Court would like to stress that a pardon does not blot out the guilt of an individual and that he should be treated as if he were innocent once absolved. Pardon cannot cover the acts constitutive of the crime as they are historical facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardon extended to petitioner expunged the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office which form part of the punishment for estafa through falsification of public documents. Thus, she may apply for reappointment to the office forfeited by reason of her conviction. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. The civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC and it subsists notwithstanding service of sentence or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty pr commutation of sentence. Her such may only be extinguished by the causes recognized in the Civil Code: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of debt, merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Cabagnot v. CSC The Provincial Government of Aklan undertook a reorganization which provided 364 regular plantilla positions from the previous 336, with the Office of the Governor having 144 from the previous 60 positions. 21 of the provincial employees who were reappointed felt aggrieved appealed to petitioner Governor Corazon Cabagnot and prayed that they be appointed to positions they applied for to which they are eligible and with the required educational background, training and experience. They also pray for the reconsideration of their new appointments to positions lower in rank than their positions prior reorganization. Petitioner Governor denied their appeal, ratiocinating that the appellants have no vested right in their original position as the new positions were rendered vacant by the reorganization. She also contended that she enjoys the prerogative to transfer employees to offices other than those they previously occupied for efficiency and that the items offered them carried the same rate and salary they were receiving prior reorganization, i.e., there was no diminution or reduction of their salary. Of the 21, only 17, herein private respondents appealed to the CSC which decided in their favor. It found that 16 of the 17 private respondents were demoted because of the wide disparity between the former positions held by them and the positions to which they were proposed by petitioner. Issue: WON appointments extended by petitioner Governor to private respondents were tantamount to demotion. Held: Yes, except to that extended to Ratio: 8 of the private respondents were given positions which were not only lower, by 2 to as much as 14 grades, but which were different in nature from the ones they previously held. 4 of them were offered positions lower by one grade although they applied for positions which they have shown to be comparable to the ones they previously held. 3 of them were given positions of the same salary grade but lower by one or two steps. Also, there was a change in the nature of their work and their status. Mr. Silva was demoted from clerk to janitor; Ms. Poblacion, from clerk also to security guard and Ms. Lumio, was reduced to a mere subordinate from being a former division chief. One experienced no actual decrease in the salary grade and step but there was a change in the nature of her work-from clerk to bindery helper. RA 6656, 1 declares as the policy of the State the protection of the security of tenure of CS officers and employees in the reorganization of various agencies of the government. 2 requires prior determination of a valid cause after due notice and hearing before any officer or employee in the CS can be removed or demoted, which in effect is a removal. To support her claim that cause for valid demotion exists, petitioner submitted an evaluation supposedly made by the Placement Committee showing that respondents were recommended to positions where they fit and would be performing more effectively. However, respondents objected to these for the following reasons: (1) the evaluation was not certified by any member of the Committee; (2) it was not complete; (3) its validity was dubious for different typewriters were used which mean that the other entries could have been entered belatedly; and (4) it was not submitted to the CSC and was offered only to the SC for the first time. The Court held that 16 of the private respondents have been demoted by their assignments to positions lower than their previous, or which though of equivalent salary grade and step, drastically changes the nature of their work without a showing by petitioner the existence of a valid cause for such demotion, which in effect is a removal. In the case of Mr. Oczon, he used to be a janitor at the Science Development High School of Aklan (SDHSA). When SDHSA was nationalized, the provincial government discontinued its contribution to Oczons salary (from where such salary came) so that he now receives his salary from the National Government. He was not terminated as a result of the reorganization but was actually caused when the SDHSA was nationalized and thus the provincial government ceased to contribute to his salary. His termination merely coincided with the reorganization of the provincial government. In this score, the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement and payment of backsalary of Mr. Oczon retroactive to the effective date of the reorganization.