1. [G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C.

NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a Petition for Review[1] dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court[3] dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program. The facts follow. On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land. After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga. Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.[4] DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order[5] dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.

Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6] citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.[7] The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing[8] due to his heavy workload. The trial court, in its Order[9] of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence. In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous. According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972. Private respondents filed a Comment[10] dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading. Land Bank filed a Reply[11] dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration. The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[12] Both parties complied.[13] The petition is unmeritorious. At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment. Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[14] Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable. Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence. The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.[15] Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.[16] The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17] Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation. Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.

The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter[18] to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[19] we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.[20] Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, [21] we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)[22] before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.[23] Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the

non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[24] In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. 2. [G.R. No. 159145. April 29, 2005] DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of the rights and interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY, respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710 granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and its Resolution[2] denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration. This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts. On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and raffled to Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of the case was Suntays landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its

value at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due process of law.[4] After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision[5] on January 24, 2001 in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of Suntays properties. Land Bank sought reconsideration of the RARAD decision for not being supported by clear and convincing evidence and for its conclusions which are contrary to law. However, in an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD denied Land Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of denial on March 26, 2001.[7] On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just compensation[8] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed that just compensation for the taking of Suntays landholdings be declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00). Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. After Land Bank filed its comment on Suntays motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a special agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Banks petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period.[9] The special agrarian court also denied Land Banks Motion for Reconsideration for being pro-forma.[10] Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal with the special agrarian court.[11] While the petition for just compensation was pending with the special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, 2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied LBPs motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,[15] directing the Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision. Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land Bank to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount of P157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the July 10, 2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration; and [4] the Writ of Execution dated July 18, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17] enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and

directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction. On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition, impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubricas prayer for a temporary restraining order.[19] This notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[20] on October 3, 2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution. On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, arguing that the writ of certiorari/injunction was issued under its power of supervision over its subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality. In an omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001, Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by DARAB in DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the DARAB for contempt.[22] Land Bank also filed its Comment[23] on October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of Lubricas petition for prohibition. It contended that the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land Banks petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubricas personality to file the petition for prohibition considering that she never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[24] on August 22, 2002. The appellate court ruled that petitioner DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubricas petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court also ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected DARABs contention that the issuance of the writ of certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal. Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the following errors to the Court of Appeals: The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled: 1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY, SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND INSTEAD, IT SHOULD

HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT LAND BANK, THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY OF CARP; 2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252 WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND 3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IT ISSUED.[25] This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law.[26] It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.[28] Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and Section 13 of E.O. No. 129A, the DARAB was created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases before it.[29] Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices. To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such selfconferment of authority.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.[31] The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure allows a party who does not agree with the RARADs preliminary valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice to bring the matter to the proper special agrarian court, thus: SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court affirmed the dismissal of a landowners petition for judicial determination of just compensation for its failure to file the petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided under Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the RARAD order denying its motion for reconsideration on March 26, 2001. Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation with the special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus, the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in accordance with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land Banks recourse to the special agrarian court. DARAB takes exception to the general rule that jurisdiction over special civil actions must be expressly conferred by law before a court or tribunal can take cognizance thereof. It believes that this principle is applicable only in cases where the officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof are not within the administrative power/competence, or in any manner under the control or supervision, of the issuing authority. This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ of execution upon the belief that its decision had become final and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual power of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within the bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave and serious disservice to the Program.[34] DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it perceived as an abuse of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs, but the same should be exercised within the context of administrative supervision and/or control. In the event that the RARADs or PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents the aggrieved party from availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on pleadings and practice.[35] While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have participated in the proceedings before said court by filing a comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has a peculiar interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time not totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal but also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking an active part in the proceedings. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. 3. G.R. No. 77663 April 12, 1988 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. HON. EMMANUEL G. PEA, as Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Br. CLII,

Pasig, Metropolitan Manila, and YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUM HO and ARCHIE CHAN represented by YIM KAM SHING, respondents.

TEEHANKEE, C.J.: This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks to set aside the orders, dated February 16 and March 5, 1987, rendered by respondent trial judge on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The main issue is whether regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) and properties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended, and whether said regional trial courts may interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. The Court holds that regional trial courts do not have such jurisdiction over the Commission and accordingly grants the petition. To eliminate all doubts, the Court upholds the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested in the Commission and holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases of illgotten wealth, assets and properties under the past discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by this Court. * The antecedent facts are: On March 25, 1986, the Commission issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms denominated as American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Said firms had both been organized by joint venture agreement on July 2,1984 with the approval of the Garments & Textile Export Board. Two-thirds or 67% of the stock of both corporations were subscribed by so-called Local Investors represented by Renato Z. Francisco and Atty. Gregorio R. Castillo and one-third or 33% thereof were subscribed by the so-called Hongkong Investors, namely respondents Yeung Chun Kam and Yeung Chun Ho. The Commission appointed Ms. Noemi L. Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the said corporations with full authority to manage and operate the same. On June 27, 1986, the Commission designated the OIC, Saludo, and Mr.Yeung Chun Ho private respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. On September 4, 1986, the Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Mr. Yeung Chun Ho and Mr. Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Ms. Saludo. However, in a memorandum dated February 3, 1987, and addressed to depository banks of the said two corporations, Ms. Saludo revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hongkong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa, and

designated James Dy as her co-signatory and Enrico Reyes Santos as the other authorized signatory with Teresita Yu as the latter's co-signatory. The said memorandum was approved by then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista of the Commission. On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the staff, employees and laborers of the same for the period from February 1 to 15 of 1987. On February 13, 1987, respondents Yeung Chun Kam Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in Hongkong, instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, the Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the OIC, Saludo, docketed as Civil Case No. 54298 of Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila, presided by respondent judge, and questioning the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Mr. Yim Kam Shing as private respondents' representative. On February 16, 1987, respondent judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order enjoining the bank, its attorneys, agents or persons acting in their behalf "from releasing any funds of American Inter-fashion Corporation without the signature of plaintiff Yim Kam Shing and to desist from committing any other acts complained of ..." and the Commission "from enforcing the questioned memorandum dated February 3, 1987" (Annex "J" Petition). On February 20, 1987, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to plaintiffs' (private respondents herein) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case and that assuming arguendo its jurisdiction, it acted with grave abuse of discretion since private respondents as 33% minority shareholders are not entitled to any restraining order or preliminary injunction. On March 5, 1987, respondent judge issued the other assailed order denying the Commission's motion to dismiss and granting private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on a P10,000 bond (Annex "L," Petition). On March 20, 1987, the Commission filed the petition at bar questioning the jurisdiction of respondent judge's court over it and praying for (a) the nullification of the aforesaid February 16 and March 5, 1987 orders and (b) the issuance of a writ of prohibition ordering the respondent judge to cease and desist from proceeding with the said case. On March 24, 1987, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, "ordering respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders dated February 16 and March 5, 1987 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 54298 ... subject to the condition that the amounts that the petitioner may withdraw from the accounts of (the sequestered corporations) with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., shall be limited to the 'necessary operating expenses of the two companies and for the payment of the salaries, wages and allowances of the

companies" staff, employees and laborers" ... and that the proceeds and income received shall likewise in due course be deposited with the said companies' accounts with the said Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc." On the issue of jurisdiction squarely raised, as above indicated, the Court sustains petitioner's stand and holds that regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals for that matter have no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" 1 whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" 2 and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. 3 The Constitution and the applicable Executive Orders and established legal principles and jurisprudence fully support the Court's ruling at bar. 1. The very first Executive Order issued by President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office and the ouster of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 25, 1986 was Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." 4 In the discharge of its vital task "to recover the tremendous wealth plundered from the people by the past regime in the most execrable thievery perpetrated in all history," 5 or "organized pillage" (to borrow a phrase from the articulate Mr. Blas Ople 6 ), the Commission was vested with the ample power and authority (a) x x x (b) to sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance

which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task. (c) to provisionally takeover in the public interest or to prevent the disposal or dissipation of business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities. (d) to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this Order. ... 7 As stressed in Baseco "So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it [the Commission] was granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of evidence by subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation)." 8 2. These ample powers and authority vested in the Commission by the President in the exercise of legislative power granted her in the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution 9 were confirmed in said Constitution and in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated that 'The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to: .. (d) recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. ..." 10 The Constitution overwhelmingly ratified by the people in the February 2, 1987 plebiscite likewise expressly confirmed that: Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill- gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period. A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification,

the judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof. The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein provided.
11

3. As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power and authority of the Commission, it exercises quasijudicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no power to control the other." 12 The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgment, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions. But as already indicated hereinabove, the Court of Appeals is not vested with appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. 4. Having been charged with the herculean task of bailing the country-out of the financial bankruptcy and morass of the previous regime and returning to the people what is rightfully theirs, the Commission could ill-afford to be impeded or restrained in the performance of its functions by writs or injunctions emanating from tribunals co-equal to it and inferior to this Court. Public policy dictates that the Commission be not embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land, since the loss of time and energy required to defend against such suits would defeat the very purpose of its creation. Hence, section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 has expressly accorded the Commission and its members immunity from suit for damages in that: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." The law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions. To paraphrase the leading case of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer,

et al, 12-a to draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is to undermine stability in litigations. A piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits, To force the parties to shuttle from one court to another to secure full determination of their suit is a situation gravely prejudicial to the administration of justice. The time lost, the effort wasted, the anxiety augmented, additional expenses incurred, the irreparable injury to the public interest are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. Civil Case No. 54298 pending before respondent judge is expressly denominated as one "for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction" (Annex "I," petition) filed by private respondents against the Commission and then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. The said case is clearly barred by the aforequoted immunity provision of Executive Order No. 1, as buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which further provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively withholds jurisdiction over cases against the Commission from all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, except the Sandiganbayan in whom is vested original and exclusive jurisdiction and this Court. Early on, in special civil actions questioning challenged acts of the Commission, its submittal that the cited Executive Order bars such actions in this Court was given short shrift because this Court, as the third great department of government vested with the judicial power and as the guardian of the Constitution, cannot be deprived of its certiorari jurisdiction to pass upon and determine alleged violations of the citizens' constitutional and legal rights under the Rule of Law. 5. The rationale of the exclusivity of such jurisdiction is readily understood. Given the magnitude of the past regime's "organized pillage" and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best legal minds available in the market, it is a matter of sheer necessity to restrict access to the lower courts, which would have tied into knots and made impossible the Commission's gigantic task of recovering the plundered wealth of the nation, whom the past regime in the process had saddled and laid prostrate with a huge $27 billion foreign debt that has since ballooned to $28.5 billion. To cite an example as recorded in Baseco, "in the ongoing case filed by the government to recover from the Marcoses valuable real estate holdings in New York and the Lindenmere estate in Long Island, former PCGG chairman Jovito Salonga has revealed that their names do not appear on any title to the property. Every building in New York is titled in the name of a Netherlands Antilles Corporation, which in turn is purportedly owned by three Panamanian corporations, with bearer shares. This means that the shares of this corporation can change hands any time, since they can be transferred, under the law of

Panama, without previous registration on the books of the corporation. One of the first documents that we discovered shortly after the February revolution was a declaration of trust handwritten by Mr. Joseph Bernstein on April 4, 1982 on a Manila Peninsula Hotel stationery stating that he would act as a trustee for the benefit of President Ferdinand Marcos and would act solely pursuant to the instructions of Marcos with respect to the Crown Building; in New York." 13 Were it not for this stroke of good fortune, it would have been impossible, legally and technically, to prove and recover this ill-gotten wealth from the deposed President and his family, although their ownership of these fabulous real estate holdings were a matter of public notoriety Hence, the imperative need for the Government of the restored Republic as its first official act to create the Commission as an administrative and quasi- judicial commission to recover the ill-gotten wealth "amassed from vast resources of the government by the former President, his immediate family, relatives and close associates." 14 This is the only possible and practical way to enable the Commision to begin to do its formidable job. Thus, in the fifties in an analogous case, the Court taking cognizance of the trend to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The court held that under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and of the regulatory statute administered. 15 In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable. For example, the Court in the case of Ebon vs. de Guzman 16 noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently..... had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim." 6. The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of

primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that he within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. The Commission's order of sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by the Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" 17 and the settled principle that findings by administrative or quasijudicial agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and

appellate courts, save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence. 7. The Solicitor General has herein picturesquely submitted its "more than prima facie evidence" for its sequestration and provisional take-over of the subject assets and properties as follows: ... the subject sequestered assets are completely owned and/or completely utilized and/or otherwise taken over by the Marcoses, with due 'compensation' to their co-participants in terms of tacitly agreed upon 'mutual benefits,' for their personal benefits and selfish economic interests, including particularly the salting, stashing and secreting of dollars abroad, cum loculo et pera as witness the following, by way of summarizing PCGG's submission, ... as supported by more than prima facie evidence: The fun: Glorious Sun, Phils., headed by Nemesio G. Co and with private respondents herein holding 40% of the shares of stock, soon after its incorporation on June 8, 1977, engaged in dollar salting, among other business unlawful manipulations. This was unearthed by the Garments and Textiles Export Board (GTEB) in January 1984. At that time, in the reign of Marcos, it had been decreed that the matter of dollar salting was the exclusive domain of the so-called 'Binondo Central Bank,' and any other person or en entity found engaging therein was guilty of 'economic sabotage,' more so where the 'saboteurs' are aliens like the herein private respondents who are otherwise known as the 'Hongkong investors. The squeeze: GTEB, under the Ministry of Trade, under then .Minister Roberto V. Ongpin, on April 27,1984 choked the lifeliness of Glorious Sun in terms of cancelling its export quotas, export authorizations, and license to maintain bonded warehouses and of disqualifying its 'major stockholders and officers from engaging in exports.' With protestations of innocence, Glorious Sun on May 25, 1984 even had the temerity to file a Petition with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 67180). How did Glorious Sun extricate itself from the tightening .screws let loose upon its neck by the then reigning Ceasar with his apparently legal contretemps? Easy: Give unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's. In July, 1984, herein private respondents came up with two (2) joint venture agreements. and within the month, respondents themselves withdrew their Petition in G.R. No. 67180. Pursuant to the two (2) joint venture agreements, American Inter-Fashion Co. was incorporated on August 22, 1984 and De Soleil on September 3, 1984, in each of

which herein private respondents, the Hongkong investors, held 33% of the shares of stock while the 'Filipino investors' held 67%. The sting: In August, 1984, the GTEB informed Glorious Sun, Phils., that the substantial portion of the latter's cancelled export quotas had been awarded to American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil. But while the Yeung brothers control only 33% of the two corporations, they, however, operated and managed said corporation and utilized 100% of their export quota allocations. The Yeung brothers paid the nominees of the Filipino investors controlling 67%, the amount of $3.75 per dozen as royalty for the utilization of the 67% export quota of said two corporations. It may also be stated that even before the export quota allocations were awarded to American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil Glorious Sun, Phils., despite the GTEB decision, Annex A hereof, was allowed to ship out garments worth US $1,261,794.00 under its [previously cancelled] quota from April 27 to May 30,1984. And on petition of a foreign buyer, Generra Sports Company of Seattle, Washington, Glorious Sun, Phils., was allowed to fin its 3rd and 4th fashion-quarter orders of 186,080 pieces valued at about US $1,159,531.00. As a result, Glorious Sun, Phils. continued to operate its bonded manufacturing warehouse ordered closed by the GTEB (Please see GTEB Comment dated June 4, 1984 in G.R. No. 67180.). (pp. 9-10, Consolidated Reply, May 15, 1987). The end of the fun: All was fun that ended in fun for all the participants in the fun, the squeeze and the sting, until of course the EDSA Revolution, when PCGG shortly sequestered the subject assets and provisionally took over the conservation thereof pursuant to law (Secs. 2 & 3, Executive Order No. 1 and related issuances) and pursuant to the very Baseco case cited ironically in the Motion at bar. Again, with protestations of innocence, the herein private respondents through their counsel and now Congressman Francisco Sumulong with the game temerity have gone to the courts and other forum (Civil Case No. 54298 entitled Yeung Chun Kam et al. vs. PCGG, et al., RTC, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila: SEC Case No. 003144 entitled Yeung Chun Kam et al. vs. PCGG, et al., Securities and Exchange Commission) just as Nemesio Co

allegedly President and owner of Glorious Sun, through counsel Benjamin C. Santos, has gone to the courts with the same protestations of innocence and equal temerity (Civil Cases Nos. 8637220 and 86-37221 before RTC, Branches 33 and 36, Manila; Civil Cases Nos. 761-87 and 762-87, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 56, Malabon; Civil Case No. 54911, RTC, Branch 151 Pasig, Metro Manila) and with his own 'brand' of private army to boot, resorted to the midnight plunder of the subject sequestered assets under a "midnight" writ (issued in Civil Case No. 54911 by Judge Eutropio Migrio). Obviously, the herein private respondent as well as Nemesio Co would like to continue their fun. 18 Such proliferation of suits filed against the Commission in the trial courts, and gross disregard of the Commission's primacy of administrative jurisdiction has of course compelled the Commission to question in turn in this Court and obtain restraining orders against the lower courts' usurpation of jurisdiction, in the following pending cases: 1. G.R. No. 79901 (PCGG v. Hon. Eutropio Migrio Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig and Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 2. G.R. No. 80072 (PCGG v. Emilio Opinion, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 56, Malabon, Metro Manila; Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 3. G.R. No. 80121 (PCGG v. Hon. Maximo M. Japzon as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila; Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co.) 4. G.R. No. 80281 (PCGG v. Hon. Felix Barbers as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila, Deputy Sheriff Salvador A. Pueca and Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co ) 5. G.R. No. 80395 (PCGG v. Hon. Emiho C. Opinion as Presiding Judge of Branch 56 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Malabon, Metro Manila; Glorious Sun Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Nemesio Co) Going back to the pre-EDSA squeeze and scam, it need only be added that everything at the time seemingly ended to everybody's satisfaction. Nemesio Co's Glorious Sun, Phil. notwithstanding the GTEB's closure order, continued to operate its bonded warehouse and to ship out millions of dollars of garments under its supposedly cancelled export quotas and peremptorily withdrew on August 20, 1984 19 its petition in G.R. No. 67180 from this Court . The two new

substitute corporations American Inter-Fashion Co. and De Soleil cropped out of nowhere to take over the factories and export quotas and it was of public notoriety, particularly in the trade, that the family had taken over. 8. This is the thrust of the complaint filed on July 16, 1987 [well ahead of the Constitutional deadline of August 2, 1987]by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Commission representing Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 0002, PCGG-3, with the Sandiganbayan, against therein defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Imelda (Imee) R. Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Marcos Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages, involving, among others, the subject matter of the petition at bar, namely, American Inter-Fashion and De Soleil Corporations, together with their assets, shares of stocks, effects, evidence and records, which the Commission avers, based on documents in its possession, were "illegally acquired by said defendants in unlawful concert with one another and with gross abuse of power and authority. ... 20 The Commission correctly submits that "questions on whether or not the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is entitled to reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting or damages in respect of the above-subject matter is for the Sandiganbayan to resolve" not in any of the scattershot cases that respondents have filed in the various courts of the land. The Court has so held in various cases, among them, Ofelia Trinidad vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. No. 77695, June 16, 1987, wherein We pointed out that "The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts: it cannot conceivably go over all the minute evidence that may be presented by the PCGG. What is significant is that this Court believes that in the instant case no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion has been exercised by the PCGG," and Agro-Industrial Foundation Colleges of Southern Philippines, et al. vs. Regional XI Operating Team No. Five and/or the PCGG, G.R. No. 78116, July 28, 1987, wherein We ruled that the parties affected "may raise their defenses at the appropriate time and before the proper forum [the Sandiganbayan]. They will have their day in court." 9. What has not been appreciated by respondents and others similarly situated is that the provisional remedies (including the encompassing and rarely availed of remedy of provisional takeover) granted to the Commission in pursuing its lifeand-death mission to recover from a well-entrenched plundering regime of twenty years, the ill-gotten wealth which rightfully belongs to the Republic although pillaged and plundered in the name of dummy or front companies, in several known instances carried out with the bold and mercenary, if not reckless, cooperation and assistance of members of the bar as supposed nominees, the full extent of which has yet to be uncovered, are rooted in the police power of the State, the most pervasive and the least limitable of the powers of Government since it represents "the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 21 Police power has been defined as the power inherent in the State "to prescribe regulations to promote the health,

morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." 22 Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. 23 " Salus populi suprema est lex" the welfare of the people is the supreme law. For this reason, it is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest. Its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. 24 "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." 25 That the public interest and the general welfare are subserved by sequestering the purported ill-gotten assets and properties and taking over stolen properties of the government channeled to dummy or front companies is stating the obvious. The recovery of these ill-gotten assets and properties would greatly aid our financially crippled government and hasten our national economic recovery, not to mention the fact that they rightfully belong to the people. While as a measure of self-protection, if, in the interest of general welfare, police power, may be exercised to protect citizens and their businesses in financial and economic matters, it may similarly be exercised to protect the government itself against potential financial loss and the possible disruption of governmental functions. Police power as the power of self-protection on the part of the community that the principle of self-defense bears to the individual. 26 Truly, it may be said that even more than self-defense, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth and of the government's own properties involves the material and moral survival of the nation, marked as the past regime was by the obliteration of any line between private funds and the public treasury and abuse of unlimited power and elimination of any accountability in public office, as is a matter of public record and knowledge. 10 Despite all the complexities and difficulties, the original Commission created under Executive Order No. 1 headed by its first chairman, now Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, and composed of Hon. Ramon Diaz, the incumbent chairman, now Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap of this Court, Hon. Raul Daza, now a ranking member of the House of Representatives, and Hon.. Mary Concepcion Bautista, now chairman of the Human Rights Commission, and the present Commission headed by Chairman Ramon Diaz have produced unprecedented positive results for which they fully deserve the inadequately expressed ( at times ) appreciation and gratitude of the nation. The report as of the end of 1987 of Chairman Ramon Diaz shows the great extent of the Commission's accomplishments despite its limited resources, but fortunately bolstered by the spontaneous and welcome assistance of friendly foreign governments and lawyers, in the brief period of less than two years since its creation and which are regarded yet as the tip of the iceberg: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS As of January 05, 1988

1. CASH & OTHER CASH ITEMS Funds turned over to the treasury Gen. Fund 592,350,799.00 Proceeds of Sale of Princeton Property with PNBNew York 20,500,000.00 Proceeds of New Jersey Settlement 9,669,781.00 Proceeds of Auction Sale 17,231,429.00 Proceeds of Sale of Paintings 8,879,500.00 SBTC (1st payment Seq. T/Ds) 250,000,000.00 UPCB Bal of Profit Sharing 77,678,854.00 Other Cash Items (Certificate of Time Deposits) 1,492,951.00 Contribution to CARP 140,000,000.00 Sub-Total P1,117,803,314.00

2. OTHER RECOVERED FUNDS Government Funds in TRB/ National Treasury

(Casino Funds) 1,138,000,000.00 T-Bills delivered to the office of the President 100,020,000.00 Funds from Filbakers 59,884,453.00 P1,297,904,453.00 3. RECEIVABLES Projected Proceeds of Sale of knick-knacks and Furnitures from Hachensach in Olympic Towers 20,720,000.00 Projected Proceeds of New York Properties (Lindenmere, Olympic Towers Apartments, Makiki Properties) $9.0M 184,500,000.00 SBTC Certificates of Time Deposits 731,407,842.00 Sub-total P936,627,842.00

4. FUNDS HELD IN TRUST Funds with the Treasury 71,975,722.00 Funds with PNB-Ortigas 52,535,298.00 Sub-Total P124,511,020.00

GRAND TOTAL P3,476,846,629.00

5. JEWELRY

Estimated Value P250 M

6. COMPANIES WHICH WERE AFFECTED BY SEQUESTRATION ORDER INCLUDING RADION AND TV STATIONS 297 Companies were subject to sequestration (including those whose sequestrations was lifted and those surrendered companies by J.Y. Campos and those holding companies whose investments in shares were affected by Writs of Sequestration)

74 Companies have available financial statements with estimated total assets of P44B 223 Companies still without financial statements 18 TV Stations were sequestered

38 Radio Stations were sequestered

7. REAL PROPERTIES (BUILDING AND IMPROVEMENTS)

Coconut Palace 13 Houses and improvements 12 Condominium units Offices of R.S. Benedicto, E. Garcia, etc. 2 National Art and Museum Centers 2 Fishponds

8. SEQUESTERED LANDS (INCLUDING IMPROVEMENTS)

450 parcels of land (including improvements) have been issued with specific Writs of Sequestration of which only 148 have an area of 19,276,970.76 sq. m.

23 Haciendas of which 13 haciendas constituting RSB Farms, Inc. have

an area of 27,859,207.00 sq m.

9. SURRENDERED LANDS BY JOSE YAO CAMPOS

Total area in sq. m. of all surrendered properties 19,684,435.45 sq. m.

Disposed to DAR (202 IRC titles) with total area of 13,997,529 sq. m.

Remaining balance of 75 titles recommended for disposal, with total area of 5,686,906.45 sq. m.

OTHER INFORMATION:

81 Sequestered Vehicles 29 Sequestered Aircrafts 13 Sequestered Vessels 11. A final word about the alleged misdeeds of the OIC which the Solicitor General has denounced as false and unfounded. 27 Such alleged misdeeds, even if taken as true for the nonce, do not and cannot detract from the Commission's accomplishments in the unselfish service of the nation, rendered with integrity and honor and without the least taint of scandal and self-interest (in welcome contrast to the past regime's rape and plunder sub-silentio of the nation!). In our free and democratic space now, with full restoration of a free press and the people's liberties, it should be acknowledged with some sort of appreciation that any such misdeeds on the part of the Commission's representative or agents

have been subjected to full public exposure and the erring parties dismissed and replaced. ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition shall issue. The orders of respondent Judge dated February 16, 1987 and March 5, 1987 are hereby set aside as null and void. Respondent Judge is ordered to cease and desist from any further proceeding in Civil Case No. 54298 which is hereby ordered DISMISSED. This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY, **

4. G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight"

their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on

certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded." 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11 On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try

and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: 1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25 (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution

clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to

sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the

Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995 GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross

neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings. The background of this case is as follows: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)93-0036, respectively. The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. 2 Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. 4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5 In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape. 6 As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they

should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7 For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted. It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10 and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape. In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to 24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence. On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice: (a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.

(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. (c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office. (d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay. (e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension. (f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition. I. The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees

and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office. In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo. It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. II. The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness. 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character. Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, 3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders. III.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state: 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. 22. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. A. Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by 24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17 In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice

it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added). It is true that, under 24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case: The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19 In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds: A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence

on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings. Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under preventive suspension. Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. 20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. B. Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension

to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows: 1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act. 2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant. On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to 24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law. C. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

6. 6. G.R. No. 148152 November 18, 2005 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JOSE T. JALANDOON, Respondent. x ------------------------------------------------ x G.R. No. 149450 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. JOSE T. JALANDOON, Respondent. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62027 promulgated on May 9, 2001, and its Resolution promulgated on July 20, 2001 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order of the SEC dated October 5, 2000 and directed SEC to decide SEC Case No. 12-96-5505, entitled Jose T. Jalandoon v. International Broadcasting Corporation, et al. The antecedents2 of the case are as follows: On April 3, 1996, Julius Raboca, the corporate secretary of International Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), caused the publication in the newspapers of a Notice, which, among others, enjoined all persons having any claim against IBC to present them to the Office of the Corporate Secretary within five days from date of publication, after which, no claim would be entertained. Respondent Jose T. Jalandoon, after reading the Notice, wrote a letter to Raboca to make his claim of twenty percent (20%) of the shareholdings of IBC. Raboca allegedly did nothing on the claim.

In December 1996, Jalandoon filed with SEC an Amended Petition3 for Accounting, Reconstitution of Records, Mandamus, Nullification of Directors Election, Calling of Stockholders Meeting, and Damages against IBC and the members4 of its Board of Directors. On February 10, 1997, IBC, et al., filed its Answer with Counterclaims and, at the same time, moved for the dismissal of the case through its counsel, Cruz Enverga & Raboca. On June 2, 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) made a verbal manifestation that it had known of the filing of the case "a few days ago and requested for extension of time to enter into preliminary conference." Cruz Enverga & Raboca withdrew as counsel for IBC. During the preliminary conference on June 25, 1997, IBC, et al. were declared in default due to the failure of the OGCCs lawyers to produce a Board Resolution authorizing them to appear in behalf of IBC, et. al. On July 2, 1997, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss assailing SECs jurisdiction over the case on the ground that it is the Sandiganbayan that has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the case involving IBC, as an acquired asset of the Republic of the Philippines. On July 3, 1997, the OGCC, in behalf of IBC, filed an Omnibus Motion, namely, a Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Lift Order of Default; a Motion to Nullify All Proceedings Taken after Declaration of Default; and a Motion to Dismiss. On July 28, 1997, the SEC Hearing Officer issued an Omnibus Order lifting the Order declaring IBC in default, denying the motion to nullify all proceedings after declaring IBC in default, and denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. On the motion to dismiss, the SEC Hearing Officer ruled: The motion to dismiss cannot be sustained on the allegation that IBC was ceded to the government by Roberto S. Benedicto, over the claim of petitioner that he is owner of some shares of stocks in IBC. Whether said shares of stock are subject to sequestration or were sequestered shares, is best determined after trial on the merits. Also it cannot be argued that the real party in interest is the PCGG. IBC is an entity separate and distinct from the PCGG. If ever, the PCGG (or the) government owns shares of stocks in IBC, it does so [in] its proprietary character, stepping down from the pedestal of its sovereign power, and engages into private

ownership and contracts like an ordinary citizen, thus shedding off its sovereign immunity from suit.5 IBC, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order insofar as it denied their motion to dismiss and to nullify the proceedings after declaration of default. The SEC Hearing Officer denied it in an Order dated June 22, 1998.6 Pre-trial and trial ensued. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence. The SEC Hearing Officer admitted the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Jalandoon in an Order dated March 9, 2000. In an Order dated July 25, 2000, the SEC Hearing Officer admitted the exhibits formally offered in evidence by IBC,et al. and the case was considered submitted for decision. The parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda not later than 15 days from receipt of the Order. On August 9, 2000, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, took effect. The Act transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from SEC to the Regional Trial Courts. Anticipating the Codes effectivity, the SEC earlier issued, on August 1, 2000, the Guidelines on Intra-Corporate Cases Pending Before the SICD and the Commission En Banc of the Securities and Exchange Commission. On October 5, 2000, the SEC en banc issued an Order,7 the pertinent portions of which read: ... The Commission now holds that the Republic, as the registered owner of 100% of the shares of IBC -13, is a real party in interest, because it stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ... . . . The petition failed to implead the Republic and is therefore defective in form. Nonetheless, the substantiality being plainly evident, such defect in form can and must be cured, otherwise, no final determination of the case can be had. The impleading of the Republic as party-respondent is thus in order. And in accordance with the constitutional provisions and jurisprudential declarations, the Republic must be accorded due process and given its day in court. In view of the foregoing determination by the Commission, there is still much left to be done before the case can reach the final disposition stage. Considering the effectivity of the new Securities Regulation Code on August [9], 2000 and the

Guidelines of the Commission, and further considering that the case is not yet ripe for final adjudication, the Commission no longer has any jurisdiction to continue to hear the case, receive pertinent pleadings thereto nor render a final judgment therein. Despite the loss of its jurisdiction and because the Commission cannot render a final decision based on the foregoing discussions on the defect of non-joinder of an indispensable party, the Commission is of the opinion that it must issue this last order, so that "the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined." To do otherwise would leave the case in limbo, a situation which the Commission, in the [interest] of justice, cannot allow. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, and under the circumstances of the present case, the Republic of the Philippines, as represented by PCGG, is hereby ordered impleaded as party-respondent, copy of this decision shall be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the government. The parties are directed to furnish the Solicitor General with copies of all the pertinent pleadings they have filed in the instant case within fifteen (15) days from their receipt hereof. The Solicitor General is hereby directed to file its Comments and Answer to the petitioners claims within fifteen (15) days from its receipt of said pleadings. And the petitioner is given a like period of time to file his response thereto. Any and all pleadings required to be submitted after this Order is issued shall be filed before the court of proper jurisdiction as may be designated by the Supreme Court. SO ORDERED. 8 Respondent appealed the SEC Order to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. In its Decision promulgated on May 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals stated the main issue as: Did the Securities and Exchange Commission gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to decide the instant case and instead transferring the same to the regular courts? The Court of Appeals held that SEC should decide the instant case, thus:

It is undisputed that per order dated July 28, 2000, (p. 382, rollo), petitioners (Jalandoon) case before the Commission was "now submitted for decision". Both parties therein, per records, duly submitted the required memorandum within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Clearly, therefore, at the time petitioners case was being heard and up to the time the same was submitted for decision, it was still governed by the REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE IN

THE SECURITIES AND EXHANGE COMMISSION adopted on August 1, 1989 as amended, on April 26, 1993.

It must also be pointed out that the GUIDELINES which the Commission issued pursuant to par. 5.2, Sec. 5, of R.A. 8799, specifically Sec. 2 thereof provides thus: "The COMMISSION SHALL RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER PENDING INTRA-CORPORATE DISPUTES SUBMITTED FOR FINAL RESOLUTION [PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE ACT] which shall be resolved within one (1) year from July 19, 2000." Since petitioners case was submitted for final resolution on July 28, 2000 and since R.A. 8799 took effect only on August 9, 2000, petitioners case should have remained within the jurisdiction of public respondent Commission and decided by it pursuant to the August 1, 1989 Rules of the Commission, as amended . . . .9

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

Wherefore, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the challenged order of public respondent Commission hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and it is hereby DIRECTED to decide the case of petitioner in accordance with its August 1, 1989 Rules, as amended, and based on the evidence duly offered and admitted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.10

SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which was denied in a Resolution promulgated on July 20, 2001.

Both SEC and IBC filed before this Court their respective petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. SEC also sought a review of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated July 20, 2001, which denied its motion for reconsideration. Respondent Jalandoon moved for the consolidation of the two petitions, which was granted by the Court.

The relevant issues raised by petitioners are:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in ordering SEC to decide the case filed by respondent Jalandoon, docketed as SEC-SICD Case No. 12-96-5505?

2. Does SEC have jurisdiction over respondents claim of ownership or interest in IBC or is the determination of such ownership properly lodged with the Sandiganbayan in connection with Sandiganbayan Case No. 0034 for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages filed by the Republic/PCGG?

3. Assuming arguendo that SEC has jurisdiction over this case, was the case ripe for decision when Republic Act No. 8799 took effect on August 9, 2000, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from SEC to the Regional Trial Courts?

4. Did SEC lose jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799?

Petitioner IBC, represented by the OGCC, contends that SEC has no jurisdiction over the instant case since it involves the determination of the ownership of its company, which is the subject of Sandiganbayan Case No. 0034 for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages. IBC asserts that issues which arise from and are incidental to said sequestration case before the Sandiganbayan should be raised in the Sandiganbayan, citing Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea11 and Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan.12

We do not agree.

As stated by SEC in its Order, the sequestration proceedings over IBC are over. The Sandiganbayan has ordered the transfer of IBCs shares of stock in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. As ownership of IBC has been vested

upon the Republic, the subject matter of the instant suit falls within the definition of intra-corporate controversy over which SEC had jurisdiction at the time this case was initiated.

In a separate petition13 filed with us by Jalandoon against PCGG, which sought to enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the scheduled public bidding of the assets of IBC on December 27, 1996, PCGG recognized the jurisdiction of SEC over the instant case when it agreed in a Joint Motion with Jalandoon to refer the resolution of Jalandoons claim over the 20% equity in IBC-13 to SEC. The Joint Motion, in part, submitted:

...

3. That the claim of the petitioner over the 20% equity in IBC -13 shall be litigated in the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), and the release of the said 20% equity shall be conditioned upon the rendition of a final and executory judgment in favor of the person entitled thereto;

4. That in consideration for the immediate resolution of this case and the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order, subject to the above paragraph No. 3, petitioner or his assigns shall be granted the right of first refusal to acquire an additional twenty (20%) percent of IBC equity at PCGG established floor price; provided that this shall be subject to the approval of the Committee on Privatization (COP).

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this case be dismissed and that the Temporary Restraining Order be immediately lifted and dissolved and the question on the claim of the petitioner over the 20% equity in IBC be referred to the Securities & Exchange Commission and that the parties be granted such other reliefs to which they may be entitled to law and equity.14

On July 15, 1998, we issued a Resolution (Third Division) granting the said Joint Motion, thus:

. . . The joint motion, dated March 17, 1998, filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo and petitioner Jose T. Jalandoon, assisted by their counsels, praying that this case be dismissed and that the temporary restraining order be lifted and dissolved and the question on the claim of petitioner over the 20% equity in IBC be referred to the Securities and Exchange Commission is GRANTED.15

Next, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in directing SEC to decide the case since it was not yet ripe for decision when Republic Act No. 8799 took effect. Noted was paragraph 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which, in part, provides that "[t]he Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code."16 Petitioners, however, assert that although the SEC Hearing Officer in an Order dated July 28, 2000 considered the case submitted for decision even before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8799, the SEC en banc subsequently ordered on October 5, 2000 that the Republic of the Philippines be impleaded as partyrespondent as an indispensable party in the case. Hence, petitioners submit that since the Republic is yet to be heard, the case was not yet ripe for decision when Republic Act No. 8799 took effect; therefore, SEC lost jurisdiction over the case.

We agree.

The pertinent provision under Republic Act No. 8799 reads:

SEC. 5. Powers and Functions of the Commission . . . .

...

5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme

Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. . . .

Moreover, the Guidelines on Intra-Corporate Cases Pending Before the SICD and the Commission En Banc of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued by SEC on August 1, 2000 provides:

Section 3. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which shall be resolved within one (1) year from July 19, 2000, the enactment of the The Securities Regulation Code.

...

Section 5. All cases already decided by the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD) may be elevated to the Commission en banc on appeal provided that the appeal is perfected on or before August 8, 2000.

No appeal shall be accepted by the Commission thereafter.

Section 6. Subject to any circular that may be issued by the Supreme Court on the matter, all cases over which the Commission has not retained jurisdiction under the Securities Regulation Code shall, upon its effectivity on August 9, 2000, be transferred to the Regional Trial Courts.

Considering that SEC, in its Order dated October 5, 2000, ordered motu proprio that the Republic of the Philippines, as the registered owner of 100% of the shares of IBC, be impleaded as party-respondent as an indispensable party in this case, and directed the parties to furnish the Solicitor General, as counsel of the Government, with copies of all pertinent pleadings which they have filed

within 15 days from receipt of said Order and also directed the Solicitor General to file its Comments and Answer to the claims within 15 days from receipt of the pleadings, the case was clearly not yet ripe for final resolution at the time Republic Act No. 8799 took effect on August 9, 2000.

The SEC Order of October 5, 2000 overruled the SEC Hearing Officers Order of July 28, 2000 for the reason that the Republic of the Philippines, as an indispensable party, still has to be heard, through its counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General.

Stated otherwise, SEC Case No. 12-96-5505, as of August 9, 2000, was not a pending case submitted for final resolution, since the same could not be decided by SEC without including a new party and affording said party the opportunity to be heard, thereby requiring further proceedings.

Finally, the fact that Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 states that the pending cases over which SEC shall retain jurisdiction "should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code," confirms the interpretation that it refers to cases where no further proceedings are required for their final resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62027 and its Resolution promulgated on July 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order of the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 12-96-5505 dated October 5, 2000 is REINSTATED. The SEC

Case is hereby ordered TRANSFERRED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. L-42783-85 November 29, 1976 CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (formerly Public Service Commission), RAFAEL J. RUIZ, PETER ENRIQUEZ and CYRIL D. MOSES, respondents. Enrique O. Chan for petitioner. Zosimo Rivas for private respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.: The Court sets aside respondent board's orders ruling upon the complaints of the three private respondents-tenants of petitioner's apartment building that petitioner may not charge them pro rata the extra cost of electricity consumed for the building's common areas and facilities such as the elevator and servants' quarters. The question of the proportionate amount that each tenant should bear for the additional electricity cost for common facilities of the apartment building used by the tenants in common is purely civil in character, (involving the conditions of lease between landlord and tenant), to be adjudged under the applicable civil laws exclusively by the regular courts of general jurisdiction and is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent board. In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with respondent Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board. Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual obligations of respondents as apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein she again questioned the complaints as beyond the jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the

apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature. Petitioner added that the tenants including respondents had no complaint under the contractual set-up of billings for water and electric service consumption, whereby while individual electric meters are installed in each apartment, Meralco billings include all consumption in the entire compound, including the common areas, servants' quarters and elevators, the payment for which was advanced by petitioner and later collected by way of reimbursement from the tenants pro rata; but that respondents alone complained later when on account of the energy crisis, additional fuel adjustment costs were added by Meralco to their billings which were likewise passed on by petitioner to all the tenants pro rata. As stated in respondent board's questioned order of August 28, 1975, petitioner further manifested her willingness to abide by such computations as respondent board may determine to be the correct electric billing that should be charged against complainants-respondents for their respective electric consumption and submitted pertinent records of the electrical consumption and Meralco billings. Respondent board in said order however came up with its computation which would allow petitioner to charge respondents only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of electricity consumed by all tenants in the common areas. When petitioner pointed out in her motion for reconsideration that respondent board's computation would not reimburse petitioner for the cost of the electric consumption in the common areas and elevators with a resultant loss to her at the least of P1,250.00 a month or P15,000.00 a year and reiterated that this was a contractual obligation of the tenants over which respondent regulatory board had no jurisdiction, the board, acting through its Acting Chairman alone, Cesar S. de Guzman, (as seems to be the case with all the board actions herein involved) denied reconsideration and ruled that It is the considered opinion of this Board, that since the tenants (complainants) are already paying rentals for the use of their rooms and for the cost of their electricity within their rooms, they should no longer be required to pay for the extra cost of electricity in common areas such as the elevator and the servants' quarters, for it is only fair and equitable that the cost of electricity for common areas such as the elevator and servants' quarters be shouldered alone by the owner of the building as part of the cost for the rentals being paid by the tenants (complainants). ...

Hence, the petition at bar, wherein petitioner raises the basic question of the board's lack of jurisdiction, aside from the error of its action based on the admitted facts. The Court required comment and private respondents as well as respondent board's counsel filed their comments simply assuming the board's jurisdiction and supported its questioned orders. Also required to comment, Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. concurred with petitioner and submitted that respondent regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints, succinctly stating the State's position as follows: Since the petitioner does not operate, manage or control the power plant and furthermore, since electricity is directly and uninterruptedly supplied to the end-user, it cannot be correctly claimed that the petitioner is selling electricity nor can she be considered a middleman in the electric power business. The dispute between the petitioner landlord and her tenants as to how much each tenant should be correspondingly billed, for the actual electricity consumed and as to the proportionate amount each tenant should bear for the common facilities used in the apartments, if such amounts should be borne by the tenants at all, is an issue affecting mathematical computations and conditions of lease between landlord and tenant. The Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action and to grant the petition. Under the reorganization plan effected by Presidential Decree No. 1 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 458 issued on May 16, 1974, jurisdiction, supervision and control over public service related to electric light, power and waterworks utilities formerly vested in the Public Service Act 1 were transferred to respondent board. Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code

(not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void. ACCORDINGLY, the questioned orders of respondent board are annulled and the complaints of private respondents are ordered dismissed. With costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

8. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CCM GAS CORPORATION, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila and ordered it to reissue its writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioner from disconnecting its electric supply to private respondent. The facts are as follows: Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation (hereafter CCM Gas) is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric Company (hereafter MERALCO). On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272,684.81 for electric consumption for the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. The amount of the bill is broken down as follows: Actual electric energy consumed Purchased Power Adjustment Exchange Rate Adjustment Total P 51,383.98 213,696.00 7,604.83 P272,684.81

The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld payment until its question concerning the purchased power adjustment was answered. On May 31, 1984, MERALCO gave CCM Gas notice of disconnection if its account was not paid on or before June 5, 1984.

CCM Gas protested, although it made partial payment of P52,684.81. It demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213,696.00 had been arrived at. As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, praying that: (a) MERALCO be ordered to pay moral damages and attorneys fees; (b) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining or restraining MERALCO from disconnecting CCM Gas electric supply; and (c) a temporary restraining order be issued pending hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. On June 8, 1984, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on July 21, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by CCM Gas of a bond in the amount of P1,031,999.69. CCM Gas having posted the required bond on August 6, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court on August 13, 1984. On October 4, 1984, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended answer in which it raised, as special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case and lack of valid cause of action of CCM Gas. On April 30, 1985, the trial court dismissed the case and lifted the injunction it had issued on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. As basis for its holding that the matter was cognizable by the Board of Energy, it cited allegations in the complaint that the purchased power adjustment was arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive. The trial court said:i[1] This claim of the plaintiff is untenable as the P.D. 1206, as amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1573 vests upon the BOE supervision, control and jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates to be charged by electric companies. The purchased power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy after prior notice and hearing to the public in Case No. 80-117. The plaintiffs counsel admitted this law and the decision authorizing the BOE to regulate and fix power rate and therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action, that the defendant violated the rights of the plaintiff to be informed of the breakdown and itemization of the defendants computation of its purchased power adjustment and its refusal, is not supported by any law or jurisprudence on the matter. The court finds it difficult to continue this case on the basis of the citations made by the defendant and admitted by the plaintiff. On May 29, 1985, MERALCO received a copy of the order. Within the reglementary period, it applied for the payment of damages against the bond. CCM Gas, which also received its copy of the order on May 29, 1985, filed a motion for an extension of ten (10) days from June 13, 1985 (the end of the reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration) within which to file a motion for

reconsideration. Its motion was granted and so on June 24, 1985, CCM Gas filed a motion for reconsideration. MERALCO opposed the motion. On September 17, 1985, the trial court issued an order, denying CCM Gas motion for reconsideration as well as MERALCOs claim for damages against the bond. In denying MERALCOs application against the bond, the trial court said that the injunction bond was intended as a security for damages in case it was finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. No such finding was made in this case because the dismissal of the action was for want of jurisdiction. There was no trial; nor was there a final judgment. Both parties appealed. On November 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment (a) setting aside the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint;

(b) ordering the trial court to re-issue the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MERALCO from disconnecting its electric supply to CCM Gas until it furnishes CCM Gas with a statement showing the basis for computing the purchased power adjustment applicable to CCM Gas; (c) ordering the trial court to require the parties to reconcile the credits and debits they may have for or against each other; and (d) ordering the trial court to hear the case with dispatch.ii[2]

CCM Gas contended that the trial court erred in ruling (1) that it had no jurisdiction, (2) that CCM Gas had no right to inquire into MERALCOs electric billings, and (3) that MERALCO had the absolute power to disconnect the electric supply to its consumers like CCM Gas.iii[3] With respect to the first ground, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case because what CCM Gas was seeking was for MERALCO to show how it arrived at the purchased power adjustment. This does not involve an exercise of the Board of Energys power to regulate and fix power rates imposed by electric companies. With respect to the second contention, the appellate court sustained the right of CCM Gas to inquire into MERALCOs electric billing. Any customer has a right to know the basis for the charges he is being made to pay. MERALCO should have no difficulty complying with its duty because it is presumed to have the figures in computing the purchased power adjustment in accordance with the formula approved by the BOE, to wit:iv[4] Adjustment per KWH Where:
=

A - P0.1433 x B CxD

A B C D -

Billing of National Power Corp. (NPC) to MERALCO during the supply month Total kilowatt hour of Electric Power purchased by MERALCO from NPC during the supply month 1 - Franchise tax rates Kilowatt hours sales affected by the purchased power adjustment during the supply month.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the question whether the trial court erred in dismissing MERALCOs application for damages had become moot by virtue of its reversal of the trial courts decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court upheld the issuance by the trial court of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of CCM Gas. MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of December 17, 1991. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. MERALCOs petition presents the following issues: (1) whether the appeal of CCM Gas should not have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals considering that, as the trial court found, its order dated April 30, 1985 is final and executory because the motion for reconsideration was filed one day late, and (2) whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case. With respect to the first issue, we hold that the order of April 30, 1985 did not become final because, although the motion seeking its reconsideration was filed a day after the expiration of the extension, the last day, June 23, 1985, fell on a Sunday. Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration could be filed the next day.v[5] Nonetheless, it is argued that the trial courts finding that its order dismissing the complaint of CCM Gas had become final and executory was not assigned by CCM Gas as error in its brief before the Court of Appeals, with the result that such finding is itself now final. The point raised has no merit. A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration.vi[6] The September 17, 1985 order of the trial court, declaring its April 30, 1985 decision final and executory, has no effect because in fact CCM Gas filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The timely filing of the motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of the trial court from attaining finality. It is noteworthy that MERALCOs contention in the Court of Appeals was that the April 30, 1985 order of the trial court became final on June 13, 1985, i.e., 15 days after CCM Gas received a copy because, as held in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson,vii[7] the fifteenday period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.viii[8] What MERALCO is now saying is an entirely different theory. The change in MERALCOs theory is obviously prompted by the fact that the ruling it cited

was not final and was in fact qualified in the Courts resolution of the motion for reconsideration which made the ruling effective only on June 30, 1986.ix[9] As the trial courts order in this case granting extension for the filing of a motion for reconsideration was granted before June 30, 1986, it is clear that it was not interdicted by the Habaluyas rule. The petitioner contends that the trial court was right in holding itself to be without jurisdiction because the complaint alleges that CCM Gas did not only demand a breakdown of MERALCOs bill with respect to the item on purchased power adjustment but questioned as well the imposition of the purchased power adjustment which is a matter already decided by the Board of Energy in Case No. 80-117. This contention is also without merit. It is almost trite to say that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.x[10] In this case the pertinent allegations in the complaint read:xi[11] 6. The due date of the aforesaid statement of account was May 29, 1984 but plaintiff had to withhold its payment of the same because it did not agree with the purchased power adjustment as the same was arbitrarily and unilaterally imposed without the benefit of any public hearing and therefore the same was not only unconstitutional but also oppressive and excessive. That this is so is evident from the fact that the actual energy consumed by plaintiff was only P51,383.98 and yet the purchased power adjustment was P213,696.00 or an increase of two hundred forty percent (240%) [sic]. ... 8. Plaintiff protested this unilateral and arbitrary notice and as a show of its good faith and willingness to pay the just and fair value of the actual electric energy it consumed, it paid partially the amount of P52,684.81 but did not pay the purchased power adjustment for the reasons stated above. Moreover, plaintiff demanded for an itemization or basis of how defendant arrived at the computation of the purchased power adjustment but to no avail because defendant unjustifiably and unlawfully refused to issue the said computation, obviously because it could not justify how it arrived at such computation. A xerox copy of the receipt is hereto attached as Annex C. Although in paragraph 6 of its complaint CCM Gas complains of the unilateral and arbitrary imposition of the purchased power adjustment as having been made without the benefit of any public hearing, it is clear that what CCM Gas is questioning is not the power of MERALCO to collect the amount but the manner in which the amount was arrived at in short, the manner the power was exercised. CCM Gas predicament concerns its inability to understand why, for its consumption worth P51,383.98, it is being billed P213,696.00 for purchased power adjustment. Hence, its demand for the details of this item in its electric bill. Thus, in its memorandum filed in the trial court, CCM Gas said:xii[12]

As heretofore stated, previous to the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984, plaintiffs oxygen and acetylene plant was operating below its normal time of operation. Hence, previous to receiving its electric bill for this period it already made requests and demands for the breakdown and itemization of its purchased power adjustment for said periods. This fact was also shown by the plaintiff during the same hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Defendant MERALCO gave no heed and disregarded such requests and without notice again imposed and added that questioned purchased power adjustment of P213,696.00 to its electric bill for the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. Such act of the defendant MERALCO, it is submitted, was oppressive and arbitrary. It is illegal and done without due process. Here is a situation where normally the electricity consumption of the plaintiff CCM Gas Corporation should go down and decrease. Yet, it did not and it even increased! Under that situation, is not the plaintiff CCM Gas Corporation entitled to relief from this Honorable Court for such oppressive and arbitrary imposition of such questioned purchased power adjustment? Is not such imposition illegal under the premises? Furthermore, paragraph 6 merely states the reason why CCM Gas withheld payment of its April 22-May 22, 1984 electric bill. Paragraph 8 gives the reason why CCM Gas is asking for damages and an injunction, namely, to seek redress for the unilateral and arbitrary issuance by MERALCO of a notice of disconnection when it had failed to give the information demanded. Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies, but the regular courts power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. As the Court of Appeals held:xiii[13] To our mind, what CCM Gas demanded from Meralco was only the basis upon which the latter had computed the purchased power adjustment of P213,696.98. As the trial court observed, CCM Gas did not question the fact that the law (P.D. 1206) vests upon the BOE supervision, control and jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates; it did not question the fact that the purchased power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy in BOE Case No. 80-117; and it did not, before the trial court, question the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE. . . . Since the trial court concluded that CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question, but simply to demand a breakdown and itemization on which Meralco had based the purchased power adjustment amount of P213, 696.98 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way pertains to BOEs supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates. . . . The question CCM Gas raised before the trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of the BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and adjudication. [See La Orden de PP. Benedictinos v. Stiver and Phil. Trust Co., No. L-4568, 93 Phil. 341, 344-345 (1953)]. Thus, it is the trial

court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain a civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein. The right of CCM Gas to be informed concerning an item in its electric bill is undoubted. Revised Order No. 1, 4, which was issued by the then Public Service Commission provides: Information and assistance to customers. - Each public service shall, upon request, give its customers or users, all information and assistance pertaining to his service in order that they may secure proper, efficient and economical service. In MERALCO v. Court of Appeals,xiv[14] this Court said: One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the State may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Whether the right of CCM Gas was violated by MERALCO and, in the affirmative, whether CCM Gas was right in withholding payment are matters which we do not now decide. These questions must be resolved on the basis of evidence which the parties may present during trial. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

9. G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES, respondents. G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO, respondents.

MARTIN, J., These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Board of Communications in BC Case No. 7501-OC, entitled "Diego T Morales vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC Case No. 75-08-OC, entitled "Pacifica Innocencio vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have been Consolidated as per resolution of this Court dated March 21, 1977, as they involve the same issue as to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short. In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the nonreceipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes Innocencio has not been notified about its non-delivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter of Implementation No. 1.

The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1 and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code2 which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications. We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".3 The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. 4 As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. But even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power or jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. In the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of respondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation of respondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from

negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity. In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion. WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01 OC and BC Case No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. L-27520 January 21, 1987 GLOBE WIRELESS LTD., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ, respondents. RESOLUTION G.R. No. 27520 [Globe Wireless Ltd., vs. Public Service Commission and Antonio B. Arnaiz]. Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission [PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a duly organized Philippines corporation engaged in ;international telecommunication business under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150 as amended by Republic Act No. 4630.

A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. 65-39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee. Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner was likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. [Annex "C", petition, . 23, Rollo]. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner instituted the instant petition. We find for petitioner. Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus, Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.

Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category. ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted and the order of respondent Public Service Commission in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and void.

i ii

iii11. G.R. No. 162331

November 20, 2006

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., Petitioner, vs. WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC., Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74161, dated 21 November 2003, which dismissed herein petitioners Petition for Review of the Decision2 of the Office of the President dated 23 July 2002 affirming in totothe Order3 of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated 18 December 2001 approving the application for and the consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. On 22 March 1995, the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991. The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement. WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary. In an Agreement dated 6 October 2000, however, the Tampakan Companies sought to exercise its right of first refusal. Thus, in a letter dated 13 October 2000, petitioner assailed the Tampakan Companies exercise of its right of first refusal, alleging that the Tampakan Companies failed to match the terms and conditions set forth in the 12 July 2000 Agreement. Thereafter, petitioner filed a case4 for Injunction, Specific Performance, Annulment of Contracts and Contractual Interference with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, against WMC Resources, WMC Philippines, and the Tampakan Companies. WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies moved for the dismissal of said case. Said Motion to Dismiss having been denied, WMC Philippines challenged the order dismissing the Motion on appeal5 before the Court of Appeals which subsequently ordered the dismissal of the case on the ground of forum shopping in this wise:

Nevertheless, the Court finds that private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. In this case, petitioners argue that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping for having lodged the complain before respondent Court pending action by the Secretary of the DENR through the Mines and GeoSciences Bureau (MGB) on its approval of the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated July 12, 2000. Private respondent on the other hand, opposes the foregoing contention arguing that the MGB will be merely exercising its administrative not quasi-judicial power. The action before respondent court was filed by private respondent to compel petitioner WMC Resources to convey its equity in WMC Phils. and Hillcrest to the former. Meanwhile, in the case before the MGB, private respondent sought the approval of Sale and that the MGBs authority over the case is purely administrative, but further review shows that private respondent raised contentious issues which need resolution by the MGB before it can recommend any approval to the Secretary of the DENR. Particularly, in its letter dated October 13, 2000 to the Secretary of the DENR, private respondent posed its objection to the approval of the Sales and Purchase agreements between WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies, asserting that the latter failed to validly exercise its right of first refusal. Also, in its letter to the Director of the MGB dated December 8, 2000, private respondent spelled out in detail its reasons for objecting to the agreement between WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies, and in the same breath, argued for the approval of its own contract. And because of the opposing claims posited by private respondent and petitioners, the MGB was constrained to require the parties to submit their respective comments. At the juncture, the MGBs authority ceased to be administrative. Evidently, the MGB has to review all these opposing contentions and resolve the same. A resolution of the MGB on which contract to recommend or endorse to the Secretary of the DENR for approval will necessarily include a declaration on the validity of the different Sale and Purchase Agreements executed between the disagreeing parties, as well as on the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of its right of first refusal and its qualification as a contractor under the FTAA. Even the MGB is aware that the dispute revolves around these sales and purchase agreements. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the MGB will be exercising its quasi-judicial powers in resolving the conflict before it. Whether the MGB can validly exercise such jurisdiction over the controversy is another issue but nonetheless immaterial in determining whether private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping. What is determinative is the filing of two (2) separate actions in different for a based principally on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it is not highly unlikely that respondent Court and MGB will come up with conflicting pronouncements on the dispute, thereby creating a quandary as to which one will prevail. Private respondents act undisputably constitutes a clear case of forum-shopping, a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice of the action. The respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-087 on ground of forum-shopping.6 With the denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the case7 was elevated to this Court. In a Decision dated 24 September 2003, the Court affirmed the Decision of the appellate court and dismissed the petition. In said Decision, the Court elucidated that: True, the questioned agreements of sale between petitioner and WMC on one hand and between WMC and the Tampakan Companies on the other pertain to transfer of shares of stock from one entity to another. But said shares of stock represent ownership of mining rights or interest in mining agreements. Hence, the power of the MGB to rule on the validity of the questioned agreements of sale, which was raised by petitioner before the DENR, is inextricably linked to the very nature of such agreements over which the MGB has jurisdiction under the law. Unavoidably, there is identity of reliefs that petitioner seeks from both the MGB and the RTC. Forum shopping exists when both actions involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. Such elements are evidently present in both the proceedings before the MGB and before the trial court. The case instituted with the RTC

was thus correctly ordered dismissed by the appellate court on the ground of forum shopping. Besides, not only did petitioner commit forum shopping but it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by opting to go ahead in seeking reliefs from the court even while those same reliefs were appropriately awaiting resolution by the MGB.8 In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001. After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and other requirements set forth under the law. Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18 December 2001 Order on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act. In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the petition in this wise: At the outset, it bears emphasis that quite contrary to the argument of petitioner Lepanto, the above Order of the DENR Secretary is not violative of the Mining Law. Since the subject Columbio FTAA was granted in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63 on 22 March 1995, or prior to the effectivity of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, especially as it highlights the non-impairment of existing mining and/or quarrying rights, under Section 14.1 (b) thereof, only the consent of DENR Secretary is required. To hold otherwise would be to unduly impose a burden on transferor WMC and thereby restrict its freedom to dispose of or alienate this property right without due process. Thus, under the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Chapter XXX thereof expressly echoes the guaranty: "Section 272. Non-Impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.- All valid and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal, Mineral Production Sharing Agreements, FTAA granted under Executive Order No. 279, at the date of the Act shall remain valid, shall not be impaired and shall be recognized by the Government x x x. x x x Provided, finally, That this provision is applicable only to all FTAA/MPSA applications filed under Department Administrative Order No. 63 prior to the effectivity of the act and these implementing rules and regulations." As correctly stated by the MGB Director and affirmed by the DENR Secretary, Section 14.1 of the Columbio FTAA provides that the FTAA may be transferred provided that the Secretary consents to the same. Pursuant to Section 112 of the Mining Act and Section 272 of DAO No. 96-40, as amended, on non-impairment of existing mining rights, the subject application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius requires only the approval of the DENR Secretary.

Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner Lepantos argument that the DENR Secretary and consequently, this Office, has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue. The assailed Order of the DENR Secretary was pursuant to the latters exercise of the well-entrenched doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies. By virtue of the operation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, "courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes regulatory statute administered." (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 549 [2000]; Factoran v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 530 [1999]; Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 687 [1990]; Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service, 179 SCRA 569 [1989]). Thus, even though an action may be lodged in court that is ostensibly for annulment or "rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court," the doctrine of primary jurisdiction still applies. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426 [1990]). Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 specifies the powers and functions of the DENR. Also, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that the DENR "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the States mineral resources including those in reservations, watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. The Secretary shall have the authority to enter into mineral agreements on behalf of the Government upon the recommendation of the Director, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act." (Chapter II, Section 8). Since an FTAA is "a contract involving financial or technical assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources" (Ibid., Chapter 1, Section 3 [r]), any issue affecting the same is indubitably within the primary jurisdiction of the DENR, as in fact, the government enters into FTAAs through the DENR (Ibid., Chapter VI, Section 33). There is no dispute that the instant case involves and requires the special technical knowledge and expertise of the DENR. In the determination by the DENR of a "qualified person" pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, such person must possess the technical and financial capability to undertake mineral resources development". (Chapter I, Section 3 [aq]) Obviously, this determination peculiarly lies within the expertise of the DENR. The validity of the successive transfers is not a civil issue, contrary to the allegation of petitioner Lepanto, because validity of transfer depends on technical qualifications of the transferee and compliance with the DENR requirements on qualifications, all of which require administrative expertise. Notably, petitioner Lepanto is estopped from assailing the primary jurisdiction of the DENR since petitioner Lepanto itself anchored its Petition (cf. pp. 4-5) on the contention that, allegedly, "the Tampakan Companies failed to match the terms and conditions of the July 12 Agreement with petitioner Lepanto in that they did not possess the financial and technical qualifications under the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules". Petitioner Lepantos objections therefore go into the very qualifications of a transferee which is a technical issue. This contention is a recognition by petitioner Lepanto itself of the fact that the crucial and determinative issue in the instant case is grounded on the financial and technical qualifications of a transferee, which issue, indisputably, is within the exclusive domain and expertise of the DENR and not of the courts. xxxx Moreover, petitioner Lepanto, by its conduct, is again estopped from assailing the DENRs jurisdiction after actively participating in the proceedings therein and seeking affirmative relief. A

party who invoked the jurisdiction [of] a tribunal and actively participated in the proceedings therein cannot impugn such jurisdiction when faced with an adverse decision. (cf. Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, 174 SCRA 524 [1989]).9 [Emphasis ours] With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner lodged an appeal before the Court of Appeals which was consequently dismissed by the appellate court in the herein assailed Decision. According to the Court of Appeals: Petitioner forcefully argues that the DENR Secretary had usurped the power of the President of the Philippines to approve the transfer of FTAA, as under the provision of Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, any transfer or assignment of an FTAA has to be approved not by the DENR Secretary but by the President. The argument does not wash. The issue hinges on the applicability of Section 40 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which took force on 14 April 1995, on the transfer of FTAA from WMC to the Tampakan Companies, particularly the Sagittarius Mines, Inc. The said law provides: "Sec. 40. Assignment/Transfer A financial or technical assistance agreement may be assigned or transferred, in whole or in part, to a qualified person subject to the prior approval of the President: Provided, that the President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement assigned or converted in accordance with this provision within thirty (30) days from the date of approval." However, the above provision does not apply to the Columbio FTAA which was entered into by and between the Philippine Government and WMCP on 22 March 1995, or prior to the effectivity of RA No. 7942. Section 14.1 of the Columbio FTAA, under which the Tampakan Companies claim their rights to first refusal, reads: "14.1 Assignment "The Contractor may assign, transfer, convey or otherwise dispose of all or any part of its interest in the Agreement provided that such assignment, transfer, conveyance or disposition does not infringe any Philippine law applicable to foreign ownership: (a) to an Affiliate provided that it gives notice of such assignment to the Secretary within 30 days after such assignment; or (b) to any third party provided that the Secretary consents to the same, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." Section 10, Article III of the Philippine Constitution enjoins Congress from passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts. It is axiomatic that a law that impairs an obligation of contract also violates the due process clause. The obligation of an existing contract is impaired when its terms and conditions are changed by law, ordinance, or any issuance having the force of law, thereby weakening the position or diminishing the rights of a party to the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligations or dispensing with any part of its force. Impairment has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights.

The condition of RA No. 7942 requiring the further approval of the President, if made to apply retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would impair the obligation of contracts simply because it constitutes a restriction on the right of the contractor to assign or transfer its interest in an FTAA. In other words, it diminished the vested rights of the contractor to assign or transfer its interests on mere approval of the DENR Secretary. The restriction is therefore substantive, and not merely procedural, contrary to the contention of petitioner. xxxx Likewise militating against the petitioners side is the doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. At any rate, even if RA No. 7942 be accorded a retroactive effect, this does notipso facto permit the application of the requirement of securing a prior presidential consent to the transfer of FTAA, for, to iterate, this would impair the obligation of contract. In such a case, the correct application of RA No. 7942 is for the provisions to [be] made to apply on existing FTAAs only if the same would not result in impairment of obligation of contracts. This is as it should be. To hold otherwise would be to unduly impose a burden on transferor WMC and thereby restrict its freedom to dispose of or alienate its property right without due process. It constitutes impairment of obligation of contracts, which the Fundamental Law enjoins, and contravenes the doctrine of prospective application of laws.10 Hence, the instant Petition. The pivotal issue to be resolved herein involves the propriety of the application to the Columbio FTAA of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements. Petitioner maintains that respondents failed to comprehend the express language of Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President on the transfer or assignment of a financial or technical assistance agreement. To resolve this matter, it is imperative at this point to stress the fact that the Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on 22 March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14 April 1995. Furthermore, it is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not contain any similar condition on the transfer or assignment of financial or technical assistance agreements. Thus, it would seem that what petitioner would want this Court to espouse is the retroactive application of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 to the Columbio FTAA, a valid agreement concluded prior to the naissance of said piece of legislation. This posture of petitioner would clearly contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law. As reiterated in the case of Segovia v. Noel,11 a sound cannon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law.12 Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions without no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless

the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions.13 In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.14 Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that We are to apply the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 retrospectively to the Columbio FTAA, the lack of presidential approval will not be fatal as to render the transfer illegal, especially since, as in the instant case, the alleged lack of presidential approval has been remedied when petitioner appealed the matter to the Office of the President which approved the Order of the DENR Secretary granting the application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. As expounded by the Court in the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in the La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos[15]case, involving the same FTAA subject of the instant case: x x x Moreover, when the transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical application of the requirement of prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification to Congress in the event of assignment or transfer of an FTAA. In this situation, such approval and notification are appropriate safeguards, considering that the new contractor is the subject of a foreign government.1wphi1 On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical; hence, the lack of prior approval and notification may not be deemed fatal as to render the transfer invalid. Besides, it is not as if approval by the President is entirely absent in this instance. x x x That case involved the review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2003 in CA G.R. SP No. 74161, which affirmed the DENR Order dated December 31, 2001 and the Decision of the Office of the President dated July 23, 2002, both approving the assignment of the WMCP FTAA to Sagittarius.16 (Emphasis ours.) Furthermore, if petitioner was indeed of the mind that Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is applicable to the Columbio FTAA, thus necessitating the approval of the President for the validity of its transfer or assignment, it would seem contradictory that petitioner sought the approval of the DENR Secretary, and not that of the President, of its 12 July 2000 Sale and Purchase Agreement with WMC Resources. Hence, it may be glimpsed from the very act of petitioner that it recognized that the provision of the Columbio FTAA regarding the consent of the DENR Secretary with respect to the transfer of said FTAA must be upheld. It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws,17 and to fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.18 Substantial impairment as conceived in relation to impairment of contracts has been explained in the case of Clemons v. Nolting,19 which stated that: a law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA. By imposing a new condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before the parties to the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the said agreement, Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA,

will effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the exercise of their vested rights under the original agreement. Such modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in the conditions imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an impairment of said contract violative of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 74161 dated 21 November 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. L-61438 June 24, 1983 ERDULFO C. BOISER doing business under the name and style PREMIERE AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE NETWORK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., CONRADO HERNANDEZ, ROMAN JUEZAN and WILSON MORRELL, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order, to set aside the July 26, 1982 resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals which enjoined the enforcement of a March 2, 1979 restraining order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The resolution of the Court of Appeals, in effect, allows the disconnection of telephone communications between Tagbilaran, Bohol and Mandaue, Cebu thus cutting telephone communications with the rest of the country and the world, for the duration of the restraining order. The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement. On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting from any disruption of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages. On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties.

On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and agreed to consider jointly in said trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order including the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the merits progressed and petitioner was already in the process of winding up its evidence in Civil Case No. 17867 before the Court of First Instance, Cebu when on July 20, 1982, or nearly three (3) years after the filing of their motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order, the private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by filing the petitioner for certiorari. CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP. The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had for its object the setting aside of the CFI restraining order which enjoined PLDT and the other respondents from disconnecting the Mandaue-Tagbilaran telephone connections. The ground alleged in the petition was: RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING ORDER, DATED MARCH 2, 1979, CONSIDERING THAT THE ISSUE OR SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR WHICH THE SAID ORDER WAS ISSUED PROPERLY DEVOLVES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND NOT WITH THE REGULAR COURTS. THE REGULAR COURTS. As earlier mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals issued its July 26, 1982 resolution which reads: Without necessarily giving the course to the petition, respondents are directed to file their Comments (not a motion to dismiss), sufficient in form and substance to constitute an answer, within ten (10) days from notice of this resolution. Meanwhile, the respondents are restrained from enforcing the Order of March 2, 1979, until further orders from Us. The hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ. of preliminary injunction is hereby set on August 10, 1982, ... Subsequently, the hearing was re-set by the respondent Court of Appeals for September 6, 1982. The petitioner countered by filing this petition. The petitioner states that the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, should dismiss CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP on the following grounds: That the respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction or has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP; and That the petition CA-G.R. No. 14554-SP, before respondent Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) is premature and has no legal and factual basis. The jurisdictional issue raised by Premiere in this petition is tied up to the jurisdictional issue raised by PLDT on its petition filed with the Court of Appeals. According to PLDT, the principal issue in dispute is the propriety or validity of the "Circuit Authorization Order" it issued to its own employees co- respondents Ramon Juezan and Wilson Morrell regarding the use of its

own relay station by petitioner Boiser. PLDT emphasizes, and this is the main thrust of its case both here and below, that the order which cut off the Tagbilaran-Mandaue phone connections is an internal transaction and business of PLDT, and that it relates to a purely technical matter pertaining basically to the operation of the communications network of a public utility corporation. According to PLDT, the CFI of Cebu has arrogated upon itself the authority of supervising or overseeing the operations of PLDT at its Cebu relay station. Respondent PLDT maintains that the National Telecommunications Commission is the body with jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the operation of telephone systems or the interconnection of communications facilities, not the Court of First Instance. Petitioner Boiser or Premiere, in turn, contends in the petition before this Court that the CFI of Cebu acted within its jurisdiction and there being no grave abuse of discretion, the challenge to its interlocutory order should not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals. In seeking the dissolution or lifting of the March 2, 1979 CFI restraining order, PLDT stated that the disconnection it effected was authorized by: (1) The interconnecting agreement between PLDT and Premiere Automatic Telephone Network, and (2) The decision of the Board of Communications dated July 29,1977 in BOC Case No. 7653. Paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting and Operating Agreement between PLDT and Premiere provides: Violation of any of the conditions or terms of this Agreement or of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement attached hereto shall constitute sufficient cause for the cancellation of this Agreement and the severance of connection on May (30) days advance notice given in writing by either party unless such violation creates manifest hazard to life, property or to facilities of transmission and reception in which event severance may be made without notice. Section 2 of the Interconnecting and traffic Agreement mentioned in the above Paragraph 13, in turn, provides: Sec. 2. If either company defaults in the payment of any amounts hereunder or violates any other provision of this Agreement, and if such default or violation continues for thirty (30) days after written notice thereof, the other company may terminate this Agreement forthwith by written notice. It may be noted that the above provision mentions a default or violation continuing for thirty days after written notice and the termination of the agreement by another written notice. There is nothing in the provision about the period when such written notice should be given by the party wishing to terminate. Such period can be found in paragraph 13 of the Interconnecting Agreement quoted earlier. Therefore, even granting that there was default on the part of the petitioner, the 30-day requisite notice should have been followed. Whether or not the requirement was followed calls for the presentation of evidence before the proper tribunal. The second authority for disconnection cited by the private respondents is the decision in BOC Case No. 7653. The decision deals with members of PAPTELCO, of which petitioner is one who have outstanding accounts with PLDT. The BOC decision refers to outstanding accounts of PAPTELCO members representing PLDT's unremitted shares for domestic long distance and overseas calls. 'me pertinent provision of the decision is Sec. 3(f) which states that:

In addition to the penalty clause imposed under the preceding paragraph, if any PAPTELCO member neglects or fails to comply with obligations under this Agreement, its service may be disconnected by PLDT after sixty (60) days written notice to said PAPTELCO member, unless its delinquency shall have been fully paid or made current. It appears clear from the aforecited provision that 60 days prior notice must be given before disconnection may be effected. There is, therefore, more than ample basis for the Cebu CFI, now Cebu Regional Trial Court, to assume jurisdiction and to continue trying Civil Case No. 17867. The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral damages in addition to attorney's fees. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract. Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated. We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471): We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute'. Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.) The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna, Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 111.) As successor in of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. ... The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission. The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 769). It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon, 62 SCRA 388). The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425.) The petitioner alleges in its second ground for this petition that the case before the Court of Appeals is premature and has no legal or factual basis.

The private respondents explain that they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals because the Cebu CFI had taken an unreasonably long time to resolve the motion to lift its restraining order. PLDT argues that further delays would be prejudicial and, therefore, the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals is proper. The Court of First Instance of Cebu issued its restraining order on March 2, 1979. The motion to lift the order was filed five months later on August 2, 1979. The motion was properly filed with the trial court, but the lack of urgency in its filing and the failure of the private respondents to immediately and vigorously press for the lifting of the restraining order militate against a finding of grave abuse sufficient to justify a writ of certiorari. The petitioners point out that from the filing of the motion to lift restraining order on August 2, 1979 up to the filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on July 20, 1982, almost three years lapsed and in all that time, there was no request, motion, nor hint for the trial court to resolve the pending motion to lift the restraining order. As stated in Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals (97 SCRA 297, 305): Indeed, before a petition for certiorari can be brought against an order of a lower court, all available remedies must be exhausted. (Plaza v. Mencias, No. I,18253, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 563.) Likewise, in a host of case (Aquino v. Estenzo, L-20791, May 19, 1965, citing Herrera v. Barreto, 25 Phil. 345; Uy Chu v. Imperial, 44 Phil. 27; Amante v. Sison, 60 Phil. 949; Manzanares v. Court of First Instance, 61 Phil. 850; Vicencio v. Sison, 62 Phil. 300, 306; Manila Post Publishing Co. v. Sanchez, 81 Phil. 614; Alvarez v. Ibaez, 83 Phil. 104; Nicolas v. Castillo, 97 Phil. 336; Collector of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 100 Phil. 822; Ricafort v. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575; Cueto v. Ortiz, L-11555, May 31, 1960; Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa sa San Miguel Brewery v. Enriquez, L-12999, July 26, 1960; Santos v. Cardeola L-18412, July 31, 1962; Sy It v. Tiangco, L-18376, Feb. 27,1962; Plaza v. Mencias, L-18253, Oct. 31, 1962), We ruled that before a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction should be sought. If this is not done, the petition for certiorari should be denied. The reason for this rule is that issues which Courts of First Instance are bound to decide should not summarily be taken from them and submitted to an appellate court without first giving such lower courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due deliberation. Quite the contrary, the private respondents submitted to a trial on the merits and formally agreed that, in addition to the merits, the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order and the propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction would be considered and resolved in the trial of the case. The private respondents agreed that evidence submitted during trial would include evidence on the pending motion. In fact, the petitioner was already in the process of winding up its evidence before the Court of First Instance when the private respondents filed their petition with the Court of Appeals. Private respondents' handling of their case dispels any suspicion of unreasonable delay on the part of the Court of First Instance to resolve such motion. The private respondents aver that there are special circumstances which warrant immediate and direct action of an appellate court. The alleged circumstances include the failure of respondent PLDT to make full use of its own relay station and the alleged refusal of the petitioner to pay for its use thereby grievously affecting the expansion and modernization program of the respondent PLDT. Special circumstances may indeed warrant immediate intervention of a higher court even while the lower court is deliberating on the action to take on a pending matter. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768; De Gala-Sison v. Maddela, 67 SCRA 478). The private respondents, however, have failed to make a showing of such special or exceptional circumstances. We fail to see how closing one relay station serving the province of Bohol would hasten PLDT's program of national expansion. There are various other legal remedies,

administrative and judicial, available to handle the alleged non-payment by Premiere of PLDT's share in long distance and overseas calls. The case before the Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy for enforcing collections from Premiere under the circumstances of this case. And more important, matters dependent on the presentation of evidence are best handled at the trial court level. The private respondents overlook the fact that telephone and telecommunications services are affected by a high degree of public interest. It is not Premiere alone which win suffer from the appellate injunction but the people of Bohol. And as far as we can gather from the records, the consumers have been paying for the services given them. They are not at fault in this controversy between Premiere and PLDT. In Republic Telephone Co. V. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (25 SCRA 80), we sustained the "legalization" of unauthorized services maintained by PLDT for fifteen (15) years instead of ordering the discontinuance of the telephone system found operating illegally. The reason public interest would thus be better served. In Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (26 SCRA 620) we restated the rule that the Republic, acting for and in behalf of the Government Telephone System, and the PLDT cannot be coerced to enter into an interconnecting contract, where the two could not agree on terms. We ruled, however, that while the Republic may not compel PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require PLDT to permit interconnection with the Government Telephone System, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to payment of just compensation. The justification was, again, the general interest or public interest. In Cababa v. Remigio (8 SCRA 50), we sustained the acts of the Public Service Commission under the principle that while an already established public utility operator must be protected in his investments, the first consideration is still the protection of public interests and convenience. The question which ultimately determines issues raised by or against public utilities is what action is for the best interests of the public? In the petition now before us, we do not grapple with such issues as legalization of illegal services or compelling unwilling parties to enter into interconnection of services. We simply rule that pending final determination of the case before the trial court, the appellate court should refrain from acting on the petition now before it and from issuing orders that would punish the people of Bohol because Premiere and PLDT cannot see eye to eye. The basic policies for the telephone industry embodied in Presidential Decree No. 217 are premised on the principle that telephone service is a crucial element in the conduct of business activity, efficient telephone services contribute directly to national development, and telephone services must be made available at reasonable cost to as many subscribers as possible. Both law and policy considerations can for the issuance of the prayer for writs. WHEREFORE, the petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and our restraining order issued on August 25, 1982 is made PERMANENT. The Intermediate Appellate Court is directed to dismiss the petition in CA-G.R. No. 14554. SO ORDERED,

13. SECOND DIVISION DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, G.R. No. 141523 Present: PUNO, J.,*

- versus -

Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June 8, 2005

COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS (COSLAP), Public Respondent,

ARIEL ONDE, EUGENE C. CAASI, BIENVENIDA C. PORTUGUESE, CRESENCIANO CHING, FLORA DIONGSON, ALEX DIONGSON, FERMIN CARAZO, ANA DELEBIOS, ROMY CARAZO, ANA DELEBIOS, ROMY BETONIO, FELIX DELEBIOS, REMEDIOS DEJOS, ROSINI CASTILLO, PABLO CALLA, FLORIANO LAWAN, ROMEO LUMANSOC, MERCEDITA PALBAN, FELICIDAD C. UGPAY, RUPERTO TOLEDO, DAVID BRILLANTES, GERARDO CANCERAN, SUSANA CARAZO, PABLITO WABINGA, CLAUDIO CANCERAN, FORTUNATA SORILLA, EXUPERIO PADILLA, ALBERT SORILLA, JEAN SORILLA, FORTUNE SORILLA, WILFREDO SEGOVIA, PROTACIO SEGOVIA, EDUARDO SEGOVIA, EDUARDO GABOTO, SERVANDO PADILLA, ALRINO CANCERAN, LARRY SABELEONA, ALICE C. LAGURA, IGNACIO PADILLA, LYSA CANCERAN, CRISTITUTO BAON, AGUSTINA BUNANI, LEANDRO ABINA, MARTINO PADILLA, FRANSISCO SANORA, MARILOU CANCERAN, AVELINO DURABAN, PRIMITIVA CANA, LILIA VELASQUEZ, CIPRIANO GABATO, NATIVIDAD CAUTIVER, ERNESTO GABATO, SPOUSES AGAPITO and ELENOR CAPAROSO, RUEL CAPAROSO, JOSUE A. LAYON, BRYAN CAPAROSO, and MARIA S. STA. CRUZ, Private Respondents. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order to annul the Resolution of public respondent Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 and to restrain COSLAP from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction. Subject of the instant petition is a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Nio, Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to the late Roman Cuison,

Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the property and subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T-162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property subject of the instant dispute (Cuison property). Sometime in 1989, the government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries were herein private respondents who are members of the Sto. Nio Farmers Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs). After compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid organizations. Claiming that the disputed property had already been classified as urban/urbanizing and therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint docketed as DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents were the Regional Director for Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and NAMARFADC-KMP.[1] Respondent officials therein and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural as per certification issued on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city zoning ordinance classifying the Cuison property as urban/urbanizing for being without the approval of the HLURB. Evidence presented by the Bank consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB on October 13, 1993 correcting its prior classification that the Cuison property was agricultural and a written official classification from the Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 categorized the Cuison property as urban/urbanizing. On February 7, 1994, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision finding that the Cuison property was not agricultural land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARP because as early as 1982, it had already been classified as urban/urbanizing.[2] The Provincial Adjudicator granted the Banks prayer to nullify the compulsory acquisition proceedings with respect to the Cuison property and directed the Register of Deeds of Davao City to cancel the CLOAs issued to the beneficiaries and to reinstate TCT No. T-162664 in the name of the Bank. After reinstatement of the Banks title over the Cuison property, herein petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation acquired the property and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T162664 and the issuance of TCT No. T-210500 in its name. Subsequently, the Cuison property was further subdivided into seven (7) parcels now covered by TCT Nos. T-224628 to 224634 all registered in the name of petitioner. Respondents in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 appealed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), where petitioner intervened as the new owner of the Cuison property. The Bank opposed the appeal docketed as DARAB Case No. 2362. While the appeal was pending, private respondents filed an unnumbered case with the Provincial Adjudicator against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction and the restoration of their CLOAs and of TCT No. CL-850. They alleged that while the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 was seasonably appealed, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. CL-850 and reinstated the Banks certificate of title to the Cuison property. They also claimed that petitioner had introduced preliminary works on the Cuison property and was poised to forcibly eject private respondents from the premises.[3] The undocketed case filed anew with the Provincial Adjudicator was consolidated with DARAB Case No. 2362. On May 28, 1997, the DARAB rendered a decision in DARAB Case No. 2362, partially affirming the Provincial Adjudicators decision in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93. The DARAB also ordered the Bank

and petitioner to solidarily pay the disturbance compensation in favor of the beneficiaries.[4] In ruling that the Cuison property was outside the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program, the DARAB relied on the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 as interpreted inNatalia Realty, et al. v. DAR,[5] where it was held that lands converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law are outside the coverage of agrarian reform. According to the DARAB, since the Cuison property had been classified by the city government as a site for human settlements and relocation prior to June 15, 1988, the Cuison property cannot be categorized as an agricultural land. On July 31, 1997, petitioner filed a manifestation to bring to the DARABs attention the July 27, 1997 compromise agreement executed by the parties, namely: petitioner Davao New Town Development Corporation, SNFC, ARBA, Philippine Banking Corporation, and NAMAR-FADC-KMP, and the Legal Assistance Division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office. The compromise agreement stated, among others, that petitioner had agreed to give the beneficiaries disturbance compensation and to process the titling of beneficiaries homelots in exchange for the latters peaceful evacuation of the Cuison property and non-interference with petitioners projects in the area. The DARAB conducted a hearing on August 1, 1997 where the parties manifested their knowledge of and concurrence to the import of the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement. Thus, on August 14, 1997, the DARAB issued a Resolution[6] denying private respondents motion for reconsideration of the DARAB decision and considered the case closed and terminated. On September 25, 1997, herein private respondents filed a complaint for Injunction With Prayer for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, Damages, and Restraining Order with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Named respondents in the complaint were herein petitioner, the Bank, the Regional Director of the DAR, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and the Register of Deeds of Davao City. The complaint, docketed as DARAB Case No. XI-1382-DC-97 and hereafter referred to as the second DARAB case, alleged that the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 which was affirmed by the DARAB on appeal was null and void for failure to implead the Republic of the Philippines as the real party-in-interest in a suit for cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of the Republic. Private respondents also claimed that they were not made parties to the proceedings in DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 and to the execution of the July 27, 1997 compromise agreement.[7] During the pendency of the second DARAB case, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Davao City, Civil Case No. 26-897-98, entitled Ariel Onde, et al. v. Davao New Town Development Corporation and Timothy Te. In an Order[8] issued on February 18, 1998, Judge Jesus U. Quitain dismissed the case on the ground of forum-shopping in view of similarity of parties, prayer, reliefs and remedies sought in Civil Case No. 26-897-98 and in the second DARAB case which was pending before the Provincial Adjudicator. On December 1, 1998, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in the second DARAB case and ordered petitioner to pay herein private respondents disturbance compensation.[9] Both parties appealed to the DARAB, which appeal remains unresolved to date. Herein private respondents, who are members of SNFC, again referred their complaint with another agency, this time, COSLAP. On December 10, 1998, COSLAP issued a subpoena on petitioner directing the latter and PBC to appear for an investigation on the case docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-343. [10]At the scheduled investigation no representative from COSLAP appeared. On January 18, 1999, COSLAP issued another subpoena on petitioner directing the latter to appear for another investigation.[11] In light of the opposition raised by petitioner that it was not served a written complaint, the scheduled investigation was deferred for the second time. Upon urgent ex-parte motion by private respondents, COSLAP issued a status quo order[12] on January 14, 1999 enjoining petitioner from disturbing the peaceful possession of private respondents in the Cuison property. Petitioner filed a motion on January 25, 1999, seeking the dismissal of the case for lack of

jurisdiction of COSLAP and the lifting of the status quo order.[13] Without ruling on petitioners motion, COSLAP issued an order directing the parties to submit their respective position papers. Only private respondents complied,[14] after which the case was deemed submitted for decision. On December 21, 1999, COSLAP issued the assailed Resolution[15] in COSLAP Case No. 98-343, upholding its jurisdiction over the case and declaring the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator in the second DARAB case as not binding upon the Republic and private respondents who were not impleaded in said case. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Directing the Register of Deeds to reinstate the title of the land subject matter of this instant case in the name of the Republic of the Philippines; 2. Directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs in the name of the Farmer beneficiaries; 3. Directing the Davao Newtown Development Corporation to peacefully turn-over the possession of the property and to pay reasonable damages to the farmer beneficiaries. SO ORDERED.[16] Hence, the instant petition. Although the petition is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (with prohibition and application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining order) and pursuant to Section 3, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, series of 1979, the Court shall properly treat the same as an original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules on account of the jurisdictional question raised therein and the reliefs sought. The instant petition seeks to nullify the assailed Resolution of respondent Commission and to restrain respondent Commission from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction and for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[17] Petitioner alleges that respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refrained from passing upon the jurisdictional questions raised in its motion to dismiss and that respondent Commission had threatened to immediately enforce said patently void resolution, thereby rendering petitioner without any plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.[18] When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.[19] The Court is not unmindful of the explicit directive in Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[20] where it was held that appeals from the COSLAP may not be brought directly before the Court in view of Rule 45, Section 1[21] but must be elevated to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the same manner that orders, resolutions or decisions of other quasi-judicial agencies are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, in view of the nullity of the assailed Resolution, the Court may entertain the petition notwithstanding the failure of petitioner to appeal the Resolution to the Court of Appeals. If a decision is rendered without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity, the same may be attacked anytime.[22] While certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely

meritorious.[23] The Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari although appeal is the proper remedy where the equities of the case warranted such action, mindful that dismissals based on technicalities are looked upon with disfavor.[24] Furthermore, it is significant to note that the instant petition does not show that petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution before respondent COSLAP, which is a condition precedent in order that this petition for certiorari shall be given due course. The general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any factual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions.[25] Where the order (or a resolution as in the case at bar), is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, or where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon in the lower court, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari to be given due course.[26] As will be shown later, COSLAP was totally without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. This was correctly pointed out by petitioner even before the assailed Resolution was issued by COSLAP. To require petitioner to question COSLAPs jurisdiction in a motion for reconsideration as a condition precedent for the filing of the instant petition could only be an idle exercise. Now, the core issue of whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner mainly argues that respondent Commission was without jurisdiction in entertaining private respondents complaint and in promulgating the assailed Resolution because the matter falls within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB. A reading of private respondents Position Paper submitted to the COSLAP and the assailedResolution in relation to the laws creating the COSLAP compels the Court to declare the nullity of the COSLAP proceedings, including the assailed Resolution which was issued in excess of its jurisdiction. First. The dispute between petitioner and private respondents over the Cuison property is not cognizable by COSLAP. An account of the laws creating COSLAP and its predecessor is in order. COSLAP was created on September 21, 1979 by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Its forerunner was the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) founded on July 31, 1970 pursuant to E.O. No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions. It was given the power to issue subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum and to call upon any department, office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations and local government units, for assistance in the performance of its functions. At that time, the PACLAP did not exercise quasi-judicial functions.[27] On March 19, 1971, E.O. No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP. Apart from its policymaking, oversight and investigative duties, E.O. No. 305 vested the PACLAP with adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms, to wit: 1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative procedures, and in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain; [emphasis supplied] . . . . Thereafter, the PACLAP was reorganized pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 832 dated November 27, 1975. The law created a Policy Body to formulate its policies and submit them for its approval and an Executive Committee to implement its policies and be in charge of its overall operations. In the general language of P.D. No. 832, the adjudicatory power of PACLAP was retained and impliedly vested in the Executive Committee, thus:

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, that when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof; ... 4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible; In addition, the PACLAP was authorized to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the appearance of witnesses and the production of records, books and documents before it. [28] Notably, P.D. No. 832 did not contain any provision for judicial review of the resolutions, orders or decisions of the PACLAP. On September 21, 1979, the PACLAP was abolished and its functions transferred to the present COSLAP by virtue of E.O. No. 561. Compared to the previous enabling laws of respondent COSLAP, E.O. No. 561 enumerated the instances of COSLAPs exercise of adjudicatory functions, as follows: SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: . . . 2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action: (a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires; (b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; (c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants; (d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and (e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. [emphasis added] Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.[29] Under the law, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, namely: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of

the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.[30] The instances when COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant. The Cuison property is private property, having been registered under the Torrens system in the name of petitioner. Thus, the government has no more control or jurisdiction over it. The parties claiming the Cuison property are herein petitioner and private respondents. None of them is a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority. [31] The dispute between the parties was not critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action.[32] It is true that under paragraph 2(e) of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving other similar land problems of grave urgency. Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as clear as those specifically mentioned. In the instant case, the dispute is between parties claiming to be agrarian reform beneficiaries and a private property owner over a parcel of land which does not form part of the public domain. Clearly, the instant dispute cannot be characterized to be of the same kind as those enumerated under paragraph 2(a) to (d) of E.O. No. 561. In relation to this, private respondents complaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DAR. Private respondents Position Paper avers that they are agricultural lessees and beneficiaries of an agricultural land whose CLOAs have been improperly cancelled by the DAR. There is no dispute that the issue of the validity of the cancellation of private respondents CLOAs is within the competence of the DAR. As provided by Section 50 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the DAR. Neither R.A. No. 6657 nor E.O. No. 561 creating the COSLAP vests the latter and the DAR concurrent jurisdiction in respect to disputes concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply referred private respondents complaint to the DAR or DARAB, where another case involving the same parties, the same property and the same issues was pending on appeal. COSLAP filed its own comment to the petition, arguing that to divest itself of jurisdiction over the subject matter will defeat the purpose of its creation.[33] It cited this Courts pronouncement in Baaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[34] which pertinently states: . . . It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of the cases which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. However, the use of word may does not mean that the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely confined to the above-mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it.[35]

The abovementioned proviso, which vests COSLAP the power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Baaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR. COSLAP also points out that by petitioners own admission in its motion to dismiss, the Cuison property is not agricultural land covered by agrarian reform laws; thus, COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over the dispute. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. It is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.[36] Thus, it is the allegations in private respondents complaint questioning the validity of the cancellation of their CLOAs which effectively characterized the dispute to be within the competence of the DAR to the exclusion of respondent COSLAP. Second. COSLAP is not empowered to review decisions of the DARAB or the Provincial Adjudicator or any other quasi-judicial agency for that matter. In their Position Paper, private respondents questioned the validity of the DARAB and the Provincial Adjudicators order of cancellation of private respondents CLOAs and of the governments certificate of title over the Cuison property on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines was not impleaded in those cases. Private respondents recourse from the decision of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362, affirming the Provincial Adjudicators order of cancellation of the compulsory acquisition proceedings, is to appeal the decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Respondent COSLAP cannot arrogate the duty of directing the DAR to reinstate the CLOAs of private respondents because the same falls within the competence of the DAR subject to the appellate review of the Court of Appeals. Insofar as the assailedResolution delved on the propriety of the rulings of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 2362 and of the Provincial Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. XI-1012-DC-93, the Court finds COSLAP to have exceeded its quasi-judicial functions. Third. COSLAP exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of the governments title over the Cuison property. Well-settled is the rule that a torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, Sec. 48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[37] As noted by private respondents in their Position Paper, COSLAP directed the Register of Deeds to reinstate the certificate of title on the Cuison property in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, the complaint of private respondents before COSLAP sought an alteration petitioners certificate of title which COSLAP has no authority to order pursuant to Section 48 of P.D. 1529. Another overriding point. In United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[38] the Court observed that by reason of the ambiguous terminology employed in E.O. No. 561, the power to assume jurisdiction granted to the COSLAP provides an ideal breeding ground for forumshopping.[39] There is forum-shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances.[40] Private respondents complaint before the COSLAP questioned the validity of the cancellation of the compulsory acquisition of the Cuison property, private respondents CLOAs and the governments certificate of title over the property on the ground that the real parties in interest were not impleaded in the proceedings before the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB. Private respondents had previously raised the same issue when it filed the second DARAB case before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator whose decision thereon

is presently on appeal before the DARAB. There is no question that private respondents are guilty of forum shopping. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated December 21, 1999 issued by respondent Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 is SET ASIDE. Private respondents complaint in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and forum-shopping. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.

14. G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, respondents. Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners. The Solicitor General for public respondents. Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.

FERNANDO, C.J.: This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion to dismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union, its officers and members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers and members of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as any other persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained and ordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of its property and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao, Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending the determination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2 The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The

strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari. Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents to answer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11 After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July 20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exercise of the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.' " 12 On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on the other hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarely the issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He (i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and should be given due course." He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez 15 and in Bengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued, amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equally conclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trial court now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 20 This is to be compared with the former phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21 It is to be noted that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari and prohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior toLizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call for obedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of sixty years. 24 2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26 It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising from employeremployee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28 That same month, two other cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman 29 and Aguda v. Vallejos. 30 3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was not followed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more than four months later. 31 On this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation of Labor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32 promulgated on September 15, 1983. In that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seems difficult to explain why private respondent would not comply with such order considering that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g), mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately return to work and the employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with

competence to act on the matter. 4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested in labor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated the view that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is to be drawn" 35 between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrative agency]." 36Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policy grounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, a court is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely, the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondent Judge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, or whoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. The temporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent. EN BANC 15. G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),1 who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross). This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this Court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds true with this presentResolution. An extensive narration of facts can be found in the Decision.2 As can well be recalled, the case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA"), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.3 The SMA provides the structure and

mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.4 A brief summary as to how the present petition came to be filed by Southern Cross. Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland cement,5 in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure,6 the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation Report ("Report"). The Report determined as follows: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.7 The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA,8 the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision9 wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.10 Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus11 seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology.12 The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision13 penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,14 partially granted Philcemcors petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission,15 it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions recommendation.16 On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.17 He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.18 Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.19

On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a "Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction" ("TRO Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing hisDecision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law. On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, assailing the DTI Secretarys 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite safeguard measure. Yet Southern Cross did not promptly inform this Court about this filing. The first time the Court would learn about this Petition with the CTA was when Southern Cross mentioned such fact in a pleading dated 11 August 2003 and filed the next day with this Court.20 Philcemcor argued before this Court that Southern Cross had deliberately and willfully resorted to forumshopping; that the CTA, being a special court of limited jurisdiction, could only review the ruling of the DTI Secretary when a safeguard measure is imposed; and that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission are not binding on the DTI Secretary.21 After giving due course to Southern Crosss Petition, the Court called the case for oral argument on 18 February 2004.22 At the oral argument, attended by the counsel for Philcemcor and Southern Cross and the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court simplified the issues in this wise: (i) whether the Decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; (ii) assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether itsDecision is in accordance with law; and, whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.23 After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Courts Second Division, to which the case had been assigned, promulgated its Decision granting Southern Crosss Petition.24The Decision was unanimous, without any separate or concurring opinion. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, the proper remedy under Section 29 of the SMA being a petition for review with the CTA; and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative determination of the Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general safeguard measures, since Section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff Commission make a positive final determination before the DTI Secretary could impose these measures. Anent the argument that Southern Cross had committed forum-shopping, the Court concluded that there was no evident malicious intent to subvert procedural rules so as to match the standard under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court of willful and deliberate forum shopping. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 June 2003 was declared null and void. The Court likewise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003, rendered after the filing of this present Petition. This Decision by the DTI Secretary had cited the obligatory force of the null and void Court of Appeals Decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals was a nullity to begin with, the inescapable conclusion was that the new decision of the DTI Secretary, prescinding as it did from the imprimatur of the decision of the Court of Appeals, was a nullity as well. After the Decision was reported in the media, there was a flurry of newspaper articles citing alleged negative reactions to the ruling by the counsel for Philcemcor, the DTI Secretary, and others.25 Both respondents promptly filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 21 September 2004, the Court En Banc resolved, upon motion of respondents, to accept the petition and resolve the Motions for Reconsideration.26 The case was then reheard27 on oral argument on 1 March 2005. During the hearing, the Court elicited from the parties their arguments on the two central issues as discussed in the assailed Decision, pertaining to the jurisdictional aspect and to the substantive aspect of whether the

DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure despite a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. The Court chose not to hear argumentation on the peripheral issue of forumshopping,28 although this question shall be tackled herein shortly. Another point of concern emerged during oral arguments on the exercise of quasi-judicial powers by the Tariff Commission, and the parties were required by the Court to discuss in their respective memoranda whether the Tariff Commission could validly exercise quasi-judicial powers in the exercise of its mandate under the SMA. The Court has likewise been notified that subsequent to the rendition of the Courts Decision, Philcemcor filed aPetition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure with the DTI, which has been referred to the Tariff Commission.29In an Urgent Motion dated 21 December 2004, Southern Cross prayed that Philcemcor, the DTI, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff Commission be directed to "cease and desist from taking any and all actions pursuant to or under the null and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including proceedings to extend the safeguard measure.30 In a Manifestation and Motion dated 23 June 2004, the Tariff Commission informed the Court that since no prohibitory injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the Tariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on the petition for extension, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA, but opted to defer transmittal of its report to the DTI Secretary pending "guidance" from this Court on the propriety of such a step considering this pending Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 5 July 2005, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective of even date, and until further orders from this Court. The denial of the pending motions for reconsideration will obviously render the pending petition for extension academic. I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals Under Section 29 of the SMA The first core issue resolved in the assailed Decision was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed by Philcemcor assailing the 5 April 2002 Decision of the DTI Secretary. The general jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is beyond doubt. The Constitution itself assures that judicial review avails to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. At the same time, the special civil action of certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.31 Philcemcors recourse of special civil action before the Court of Appeals to challenge the Decision of the DTI Secretary not to impose the general safeguard measures is not based on the SMA, but on the general rule on certiorari. Thus, the Court proceeded to inquire whether indeed there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that would warrant the allowance of Philcemcors special civil action. The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA, which reads: Section 29. Judicial Review. Any interested party who is adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be. The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of Appeals.32 (Emphasis supplied) The matter is crucial for if the CTA properly had jurisdiction over the petition challenging the DTI Secretarys ruling not to impose a safeguard measure, then the special civil action of certiorari resorted to instead by Philcemcor would not avail, owing to the existence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.33The Court of Appeals, in asserting that it had jurisdiction, merely cited the general rule on

certiorari jurisdiction without bothering to refer to, or possibly even study, the import of Section 29. In contrast, this Court duly considered the meaning and ramifications of Section 29, concluding that it provided for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy that Philcemcor could have resorted to instead of filing the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. Philcemcor still holds on to its hypothesis that the petition for review allowed under Section 29 lies only if the DTI Secretarys ruling imposes a safeguard measure. If, on the other hand, the DTI Secretarys ruling is not to impose a safeguard measure, judicial review under Section 29 could not be resorted to since the provision refers to rulings "in connection with the imposition" of the safeguard measure, as opposed to the nonimposition. Since the Decision dated 5 April 2002 resolved against imposing a safeguard measure, Philcemcor claims that the proper remedial recourse is a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Interestingly, Republic Act No. 9282, promulgated on 30 March 2004, expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over "[d]ecisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article . . . involving . . . safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties."34 It is clear that any future attempts to advance the literalist position of the respondents would consequently fail. However, since Republic Act No. 9282 has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide whether Section 29 vests jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of the DTI Secretary not to impose a safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the CTA is endowed with such jurisdiction. Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section 29 authorizes the petition for review before the CTA only when the DTI Secretary decides to impose a safeguard measure, but not when he decides not to. In doing so, they fail to address what the Court earlier pointed out would be the absurd consequences if their interpretation is followed to its logical end. But in affirming, as the Court now does, its previous holding that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for review questioning the non-imposition of safeguard measures by the DTI Secretary, the Court relies on the plain reading that Section 29 explicitly vests jurisdiction over such petitions on the CTA. Under Section 29, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Obviously, there are differences between "a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure," and one issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." The first adverts to a singular type of ruling, namely one that imposes a safeguard measure. The second does not contemplate only one kind of ruling, but a myriad of rulings issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation to Section 29, contrary to the established rule requiring strict construction against the existence of jurisdiction in specialized courts.35 But it is the express provision of Section 29, and not this Court, that mandates CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a ruling imposing the safeguard measure. The key phrase remains "in connection with." It has connotations that are obvious even to the layman. A ruling issued "in connection with" the imposition of a safeguard measure would be one that bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard measure is covered by the phrase "in connection with," but such ruling is by no means exclusive. Rulings which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. So does a ruling allowing for a provisional safeguard measure. So too, a ruling by the DTI Secretary refusing to refer the application for a safeguard measure to the Tariff Commission. It is clear that there is an entire subset of rulings that the DTI Secretary may issue in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or dispositive in character.36 By the same token, a ruling not to impose a safeguard measure is also issued in connection with the imposition of a

safeguard measure. In arriving at the proper interpretation of "in connection with," the Court referred to the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.37 and New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.38 Both cases considered the interpretation of the phrase "relates to" as used in a federal statute, the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974. Respondents criticize the citations on the premise that the cases are not binding in our jurisdiction and do not involve safeguard measures. The criticisms are off-tangent considering that our ruling did not call for the application of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 in the Philippine milieu. The American cases are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation. Certainly, if there are applicable local precedents pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," then these certainly would have some binding force. But none avail, and neither do the respondents demonstrate a countervailing holding in Philippine jurisprudence. Yet we should consider the claim that an "expansive interpretation" was favored in Shaw because the law in question was an employees benefit law that had to be given an interpretation favorable to its intended beneficiaries.39 In the next breath, Philcemcor notes that the U.S. Supreme Court itself was alarmed by the expansive interpretation in Shaw and thus in Blue Cross, the Shaw ruling was reversed and a more restrictive interpretation was applied based on congressional intent.40 Respondents would like to make it appear that the Court acted rashly in applying a discarded precedent in Shaw, a non-binding foreign precedent nonetheless. But the Court did make the following observation in its Decisionpertaining to Blue Cross: Now, let us determine the maximum scope and reach of the phrase "in connection with" as used in Section 29 of the SMA. A literalist reading or linguistic survey may not satisfy. Even the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.41 conceded that the phrases "relate to" or "in connection with" may be extended to the farthest stretch of indeterminacy for, universally, relations or connections are infinite and stop nowhere.42Thus, in the case the U.S. High Court, examining the same phrase of the same provision of law involved in Shaw, resorted to looking at the statute and its objectives as the alternative to an "uncritical literalism." A similar inquiry into the other provisions of the SMA is in order to determine the scope of review accorded therein to the CTA.43 In the next four paragraphs of the Decision, encompassing four pages, the Court proceeded to inquire into the SMA and its objectives as a means to determine the scope of rulings to be deemed as "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Certainly, this Court did not resort to the broadest interpretation possible of the phrase "in connection with," but instead sought to bring it into the context of the scope and objectives of the SMA. The ultimate conclusion of the Court was that the phrase includes all rulings of the DTI Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken.44 This conclusion was derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguard measure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, which undergoes several stages upon which the DTI Secretary is obliged or may be called upon to issue a ruling. It should be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase "in connection with," it is the SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions questioning the non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures. The Court is simply asserting, as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the SMA. Without "in connection with" or a synonymous phrase, the Court would be compelled to favor the respondents position that only rulings imposing safeguard measures may be elevated on appeal to the CTA. But considering that the statute does make use of the phrase, there is little sense in delving into alternate scenarios. Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd consequences pointed out by the Decision had their proposed interpretation been adopted. Indeed, suffocated beneath the respondents legalistic tinsel is the elemental questionwhat sense is there in vesting jurisdiction on the CTA over a decision to impose a

safeguard measure, but not on one choosing not to impose. Of course, it is not for the Court to inquire into the wisdom of legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested and not presumed. Yet ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by making it appear that the Decision has uniquely expanded the jurisdictional rules. For the respondents, the proper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase "in connection with" is to pretend that the phrase did not exist at all in the statute. The Court, in taking the effort to examine the meaning and extent of the phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative will. The Court likewise stated that the respondents position calls for split jurisdiction, which is judicially abhorred. In rebuttal, the public respondents cite Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC), which allegedly provide for a splitting of jurisdiction of the CTA. According to public respondents, under Section 2313 of the TCC, a decision of the Commissioner of Customs affirming a decision of the Collector of Customs adverse to the government is elevated for review to the Secretary of Finance. However, under Section 2402 of the TCC, a ruling of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs against a taxpayer must be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and not to the Secretary of Finance. Strictly speaking, the review by the Secretary of Finance of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs is not judicial review, since the Secretary of Finance holds an executive and not a judicial office. The contrast is apparent with the situation in this case, wherein the interpretation favored by the respondents calls for the exercise of judicial review by two different courts over essentially the same questionwhether the DTI Secretary should impose general safeguard measures. Moreover, as petitioner points out, the executive department cannot appeal against itself. The Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance are all part of the executive branch. If the Collector of Customs rules against the government, the executive cannot very well bring suit in courts against itself. On the other hand, if a private person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs, he can have proper recourse before the courts, which now would be called upon to exercise judicial review over the action of the executive branch. More fundamentally, the situation involving split review of the decision of the Collector of Customs under the TCC is not apropos to the case at bar. The TCC in that instance is quite explicit on the divergent reviewing body or official depending on which party prevailed at the Collector of Customs level. On the other hand, there is no such explicit expression of bifurcated appeals in Section 29 of the SMA. Public respondents likewise cite Fabian v. Ombudsman45 as another instance wherein the Court purportedly allowed split jurisdiction. It is argued that the Court, in ruling that it was the Court of Appeals which possessed appellate authority to review decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases while the Court retaining appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases, effectively sanctioned split jurisdiction between the Court and the Court of Appeals.46 Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross, which points out the essential differences in the power exercised by the Ombudsman in administrative cases and non-administrative cases relating to criminal complaints. In the former, the Ombudsman may impose an administrative penalty, while in acting upon a criminal complaint what the Ombudsman undertakes is a preliminary investigation. Clearly, the capacity in which the Ombudsman takes on in deciding an administrative complaint is wholly different from that in conducting a preliminary investigation. In contrast, in ruling upon a safeguard measure, the DTI Secretary acts in one and the same role. The variance between an order granting or denying an application for a safeguard measure is polar though emanating from the same equator, and does not arise from the distinct character of the putative actions involved. Philcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limit CTA review only to impositions of the general safeguard measures. It claims that there is a necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff where the CTAs expertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for the assumption of jurisdiction by a specialized agency, when the ruling rejects the imposition of a safeguard measure. But of course, whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition or non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the common question for resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be

imposed an issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The determination of the question will call upon the same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses. In response to the Courts observation that the setup proposed by respondents was novel, unusual, cumbersome and unwise, public respondents invoke the maxim that courts should not be concerned with the wisdom and efficacy of legislation.47 But this prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA may not exercise judicial review over a decision not to impose a safeguard measure, a prohibition that finds no statutory support. It is likewise settled in statutory construction that an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity is not favored. Respondents do not address the particular illogic that the Court pointed out would ensue if their position on judicial review were adopted. According to the respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary imposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on review to the CTA and assailed on the ground of errors in fact and in law, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguard measures may be assailed only on the ground that the DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion. As stressed in the Decision, "[c]ertiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop."48 It is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any effective remedy should the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in making its determination whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate the imposition of the general safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary, bound as he is by this negative determination, has to render a decision denying the application for safeguard measures citing the Tariff Commissions findings as basis. Necessarily then, such negative determination of the Tariff Commission being an integral part of the DTI Secretarys ruling would be open for review before the CTA, which again is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to examine the findings of the Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the Tariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken by the DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged its cause on the claim that the DTI Secretarys actions may be annulled on certiorari, notwithstanding the explicit grant of judicial review over that cabinet members actions under the SMA to the CTA. Finally on this point, Philcemcor argues that assuming this Courts interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given retroactive effect, otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would be had. This erroneously presumes that it was this Court, and not Congress, which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law. Besides, respondents claim would also apply every time this Court is compelled to settle a novel question of law, or to reverse precedent. In such cases, there would always be litigants whose causes of action might be vitiated by the application of newly formulated judicial doctrines. Adopting their claim would unwisely force this Court to treat its dispositions in unprecedented, sometimes landmark decisions not as resolutions to the live cases or controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable only to future litigations. II. Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures

The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.49 The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this case. They are: (1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be. (2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President. (3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the President. There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution. Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from

constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch. The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities asalter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive. When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions50 in the legislatures scheme of things. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned "Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures," and stating: The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof

to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.51 Positive Final Determination By Tariff Commission Plainly Required by Section 5 of SMA There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on the presidential52 authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents. Philcemcor attributes this Courts conclusion on the indispensability of the positive final determination to flawed syllogism in that we read the proposition "if A then B" as if it stated "if A, and only A, then B."53 Translated in practical terms, our conclusion, according to Philcemcor, would have only been justified had Section 5 read "shall apply a general safeguard measure upon, and only upon, a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission." Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the five-year old child. Certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be expressly qualified by clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy. Indeed, applying this argument, the President would, under the Constitution, be authorized to declare martial law despite the absence of the invasion, rebellion or public safety requirement just because the first paragraph of Section 18, Article VII fails to state the magic word "only."54 But let us for the nonce pursue Philcemcors logic further. It claims that since Section 5 does not allegedly limit the circumstances upon which the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures, it is a worthy pursuit to determine whether the entire context of the SMA, as discerned by all the other familiar indicators of legislative intent supplied by norms of statutory interpretation, would justify safeguard measures absent a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. The first line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it allegedly not being as clear as it sounds. It is advanced that Section 5 does not relate to the legal ability of either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary to bind or foreclose review and reversal by one or the other. Such relationship should instead be governed by domestic administrative law and remedial law. Philcemcor thus would like to cast the proposition in this manner: Does it run contrary to our legal order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that a body of relative junior competence as the Tariff Commission can bind an administrative superior and cabinet officer, the DTI Secretary? It is easy to see why Philcemcor would like to divorce this DTI Secretary-Tariff Commission interaction from the confines of the SMA. Shorn of context, the notion would seem radical and unjustifiable that the lowly Tariff Commission can bind the hands and feet of the DTI Secretary. It can be surmised at once that respondents preferred interpretation is based not on the express language of the SMA, but from implications derived in a roundabout manner. Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary "shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission." The causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by the DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is patent, and even respondents do not dispute such connection.

As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5 to be clear, plain and free from ambiguity so as to render unnecessary resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent. Yet respondents, on the dubitable premise that Section 5 is not as express as it seems, again latch on to the record of legislative deliberations in asserting that there was no legislative intent to bar the DTI Secretary from imposing the general safeguard measure anyway despite the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Let us take the bait for a moment, and examine respondents commonly cited portion of the legislative record. One would presume, given the intense advocacy for the efficacy of these citations, that they contain a "smoking gun" express declarations from the legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure even if the Tariff Commission refuses to render a positive final determination. Such "smoking gun," if it exists, would characterize our Decision as disingenuous for ignoring such contrary expression of intent from the legislators who enacted the SMA. But as with many things, the anticipation is more dramatic than the truth. The excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of the late Congressman Marcial Punzalan Jr., by then (and still is) Congressman Simeon Datumanong.55 Nowhere in these records is the view expressed that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures if the Tariff Commission issues a negative final determination or otherwise is unable to make a positive final determination. Instead, respondents hitch on the observations of Congressman Punzalan Jr., that "the results of the [Tariff] Commissions findings . . . is subsequently submitted to [the DTI Secretary] for the [DTI Secretary] to impose or not to impose;" and that "the [DTI Secretary] here iswho would make the final decision on the recommendation that is made by a more technical body [such as the Tariff Commission]."56 There is nothing in the remarks of Congressman Punzalan which contradict our Decision. His observations fall in accord with the respective roles of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary under the SMA. Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to whether the conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures. These conditions are enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the Tariff Commission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary which states, among others, whether the above-stated conditions for the imposition of the general safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive final determination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then is mandated to recommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken by the DTI Secretary. Section 13 of the SMA gives five (5) specific options on the type of safeguard measures the Tariff Commission recommends to the DTI Secretary. At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan was cited as saying that the DTI Secretary makes the decision "to impose or not to impose," which is correct since the DTI Secretary may choose not to impose a safeguard measure in spite of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan also correctly stated that it is the DTI Secretary who makes the final decision "on the recommendation that is made [by the Tariff Commission]," since the DTI Secretary may choose to impose a general safeguard measure different from that recommended by the Tariff Commission or not to impose a safeguard measure at all. Nowhere in these cited deliberations was Congressman Punzalan, or any other member of Congress for that matter, quoted as saying that the DTI Secretary may ignore a negative determination by the Tariff Commission as to the existence of the conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures, and thereafter proceed to impose these measures nonetheless. It is too late in the day to ascertain from the late Congressman

Punzalan himself whether he had made these remarks in order to assure the other legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures notwithstanding a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. But certainly, the language of Section 5 is more resolutory to that question than the recorded remarks of Congressman Punzalan. Respondents employed considerable effort to becloud Section 5 with undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper resort to the legislative deliberations may be had. Yet assuming that Section 5 deserves to be clarified through an inquiry into the legislative record, the excerpts cited by the respondents are far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI Secretary may impose safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. Moreover, even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of the legislative record in support of their own view.57 It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the legislative debate in support of their particular views.58 A futile exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of the statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking. For the same reason that Section 5 is explicit as regards the essentiality of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, there is no need to refer to the Implementing Rules of the SMA to ascertain a contrary intent. If there is indeed a provision in the Implementing Rules that allows the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure even without the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, said rule is void as it cannot supplant the express language of the legislature. Respondents essentially rehash their previous arguments on this point, and there is no reason to consider them anew. The Decision made it clear that nothing in Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules, even though captioned "Final Determination by the Secretary," authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.59 Similarly, the "Rules and Regulations to Govern the Conduct of Investigation by the Tariff Commission Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8800" now cited by the respondent does not contain any provision that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as argued by Southern Cross and upheld by theDecision. The first paragraph thereof states that "[u]pon its positive determination, the [Tariff] Commission shall recommend to the Secretary an appropriate definitive measure", clearly referring to the Tariff Commission as the entity that makes the positive determination. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the same provision states that "[i]n the event of a negative final determination", the DTI Secretary is to immediately issue through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash bonds previously collected as a provisional safeguard measure. Since the first paragraph of the same provision states that it is the Tariff Commission which makes the positive determination, it necessarily follows that it, and not the DTI Secretary, makes the negative final determination as referred to in the penultimate paragraph of Section 13.60 The Separate Opinion considers as highly persuasive of former Tariff Commission Chairman Abon, who stated that the Commissions findings are merely recommendatory.61 Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is of no operative effect if the statute plainly states otherwise, and Section 5 bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure.62Certainly, the Court cannot give controlling effect to the statements of any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law otherwise imposes the duty on the public office or officer.

Nonetheless, if we are to render persuasive effect on the considered opinion of the members of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the Secretary of the Department of Justice rendered an Opinion wherein he concluded that the DTI Secretary could not impose a general safeguard measure if the Tariff Commission made a negative final determination.63 Unlike Chairman Abons impromptu remarks made during a hearing, the DOJ Opinion was rendered only after a thorough study of the question after referral to it by the DTI. The DOJ Secretary is the alter ego of the President with a stated mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government.64 As the DOJ Secretary has no denominated role in the SMA, he was able to render his Opinion from the vantage of judicious distance. Should not his Opinion, studied and direct to the point as it is, carry greater weight than the spontaneous remarks of the Tariff Commissions Chairman which do not even expressly disavow the binding power of the Commissions positive final determination? III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review Over Final Determination of the Tariff Commission We should reemphasize that it is only because of the SMA, a legislative enactment, that the executive branch has the power to impose safeguard measures. At the same time, by constitutional fiat, the exercise of such power is subjected to the limitations and restrictions similarly enforced by the SMA. In examining the relationship of the DTI and the Tariff Commission as established in the SMA, it is essential to acknowledge and consider these predicates. It is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the SMA and affirmed by the Constitution under which the Tariff Commission and the DTI operate, especially in light of the suggestions that the Courts rulings on the functions of quasi-judicial power find application in this case. Perhaps the reflexive application of the quasi-judicial doctrine in this case, rooted as it is in jurisprudence, might allow for some convenience in ruling, yet doing so ultimately betrays ignorance of the fundamental power of Congress to reorganize the administrative structure of governance in ways it sees fit. The Separate Opinion operates from wholly different premises which are incomplete. Its main stance, similar to that of respondents, is that the DTI Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, may modify and alter the findings of the Tariff Commission, including the latters negative final determination by substituting it with his own negative final determination to pave the way for his imposition of a safeguard measure.65 Fatally, this conclusion is arrived at without considering the fundamental constitutional precept under Section 28(2), Article VI, on the ability of Congress to impose restrictions and limitations in its delegation to the President to impose tariffs and imposts, as well as the express condition of Section 5 of the SMA requiring a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Absent Section 5 of the SMA, the President has no inherent, constitutional, or statutory power to impose a general safeguard measure. Tellingly, the Separate Opinion does not directly confront the inevitable question as to how the DTI Secretary may get away with imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission without violating Section 5 of the SMA, which along with Section 13 of the same law, stands as the only direct legal authority for the DTI Secretary to impose such measures. This is a constitutionally guaranteed limitation of the highest order, considering that the presidential authority exercised under the SMA is inherently legislative. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion brings to fore the issue of whether the DTI Secretary, acting either as alter egoof the President or in his capacity as head of an executive department, may review, modify or otherwise alter the final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The succeeding discussion shall focus on that question. Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the designation of the DTI or Agriculture secretaries under the SMA as the imposing authorities of the safeguard measures, even though Section 28(2) Article VI states that it is the President to whom the power to impose tariffs and imposts may be

delegated by Congress. The validity of such designation under the SMA should not be in doubt. We recognize that the authorization made by Congress in the SMA to the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries was made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egos of the President. Indeed, in Marc Donnelly & Associates v. Agregado66 the Court upheld the validity of a Cabinet resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates on metal exports and providing for their collection even though Congress, under Commonwealth Act No. 728, had specifically empowered the President and not any other official of the executive branch, to regulate and curtail the export of metals. In so ruling, the Court held that the members of the Cabinet were acting as alter egos of the President.67 In this case, Congress itself authorized the DTI Secretary as alter ego of the President to impose the safeguard measures. If the Court was previously willing to uphold the alter egos tariff authority despite the absence of explicit legislative grant of such authority on the alter ego, all the more reason now when Congress itself expressly authorized the alter ego to exercise these powers to impose safeguard measures. Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional "alter ego" principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached agency of the National Economic Development Authority,68 which in turn is the independent planning agency of the government.69 The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of the DTI.70 On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code. Justice Florentino Feliciano, in his ponencia in Garcia v. Executive Secretary71, acknowledged the interplay between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission under the Tariff and Customs Code when he cited the relevant provisions of that law evidencing such setup. Indeed, under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the rates of duty fixed therein are subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the NEDA.72 Moreover, under Section 401 of the same law, it is upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA that the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted under the law.73 At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact, the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the DTI, to determine whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a countervailing duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws, the determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual conditions exist is necessary before the DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in all three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual determination of the Tariff Commission.74 In fact, the SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latters imposition of a general safeguard measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI Secretary to disregard the Tariff Commissions recommendations as to the particular safeguard measures to be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two

bodies. This is properly so for two reasons the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures, pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA. Thus, in ascertaining the appropriate legal milieu governing the relationship between the DTI and the Tariff Commission, it is imperative to apply foremost, if not exclusively, the provisions of the SMA. The argument that the usual rules on administrative control and supervision apply between the Tariff Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely undercut by the plain fact that there is no long-standing tradition of administrative interplay between these two entities. Within the administrative apparatus, the Tariff Commission appears to be a lower rank relative to the DTI. But does this necessarily mean that the DTI has the intrinsic right, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the Tariff Commission? To insist that it does, one would have to concede for instance that, applying the same doctrinal guide, the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has the right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). As with the Tariff Commission-DTI, there is no statutory authority granting the DOST Secretary the right to overrule the CAB or the PCA, such right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of these bodies to the DOST. To insist on such a right would be to invite department secretaries to interfere in the exercise of functions by administrative agencies, even in areas wherein such secretaries are bereft of specialized competencies. The Separate Opinion notes that notwithstanding above, the Secretary of Department of Transportation and Communication may review the findings of the CAB, the Agriculture Secretary may review those of the PCA, and that the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may pass upon decisions of the Mines and Geosciences Board.75 These three officers may be alter egos of the President, yet their authority to review is limited to those agencies or bureaus which are, pursuant to statutes such as the Administrative Code of 1987, under the administrative control and supervision of their respective departments. Thus, under the express provision of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the CAB is an attached agency of the DOTC76, and that the PCA is an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture.77 The same law establishes the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau as one of the Sectoral Staff Bureaus78 that forms part of the organizational structure of the DENR.79 As repeatedly stated, the Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative control of the DTI, but under the NEDA, pursuant to the Administrative Code. The reliance made by the Separate Opinion to those three examples are thus misplaced. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion asserts that the SMA created a functional relationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary, sufficient to allow the DTI Secretary to exercise alter ego powers to reverse the determination of the Tariff Commission. Again, considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressional prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normally belong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff Commission is attached under the Administrative Code.

The Court has no issue with upholding administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of an executive department, but only over those subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or which are, under statute, relegated under its supervision and control. To declare that a department secretary, even if acting as alter ego of the President, may exercise such control or supervision over all executive offices below cabinet rank would lead to absurd results such as those adverted to above. As applied to this case, there is no legal justification for the DTI Secretary to exercise control, supervision, review or amendatory powers over the Tariff Commission and its positive final determination. In passing, we note that there is, admittedly, a feasible mode by which administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination could be had, but it is not the procedure adopted by respondents and now suggested for affirmation. This mode shall be discussed in a forthcoming section. The Separate Opinion asserts that the President, or his/her alter ego cannot be made a mere rubber stamp of the Tariff Commission since Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution denominates the Chief Executive exercises control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.80 But let us be clear that such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. The Separate Opinion cites the respected constitutional law authority Fr. Joaquin Bernas, in support of the proposition that such plenary power of executive control of the President cannot be restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress. However, the cited passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, "Since the Constitution has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power."81 Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: "The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President. It is within reason to assume the framers of the Constitution deemed it too onerous to spell out all the possible limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority to impose tariffs. Hence, the Constitution especially allowed Congress itself to prescribe such limitations and restrictions itself, a prudent move considering that such authority inherently belongs to Congress and not the President. Since Congress has no power to amend the Constitution, it should be taken to mean that such limitations and restrictions should be provided "by mere statute". Then again, even the presidential authority to impose tariffs arises only "by mere statute." Indeed, this presidential privilege is both contingent in nature and legislative in origin. These characteristics, when weighed against the aspect of executive control and supervision, cannot militate against Congresss exercise of its inherent power to tax. The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress. The functions and mandates of the particular executive departments and bureaus are not created by the President, but by the legislative branch through the Administrative Code. 82 The President is the administrative head of the executive department, as such obliged to see that every government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations, and empowered to promulgate rules and issuances that would ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as such issuances are not contrary to law.83 Yet the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments, and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components, hamstrung only by constitutional limitations. The DTI itself can be abolished with ease by Congress through deleting Title X, Book IV of the Administrative Code. The Tariff Commission can similarly be abolished through legislative enactment. 84

At the same time, Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of general safeguard measures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government. There are further limitations on the "executive control" adverted to by the Separate Opinion. The President, in the exercise of executive control, cannot order a subordinate to disobey a final decision of this Court or any courts. If the subordinate chooses to disobey, invoking sole allegiance to the President, the judicial processes can be utilized to compel obeisance. Indeed, when public officers of the executive department take their oath of office, they swear allegiance and obedience not to the President, but to the Constitution and the laws of the land. The invocation of executive control must yield when under its subsumption includes an act that violates the law. The Separate Opinion concedes that the exercise of executive control and supervision by the President is bound by the Constitution and law.85 Still, just three sentences after asserting that the exercise of executive control must be within the bounds of the Constitution and law, the Separate Opinion asserts, "the control power of the Chief Executive emanates from the Constitution; no act of Congress may validly curtail it."86 Laws are acts of Congress, hence valid confusion arises whether the Separate Opinion truly believes the first proposition that executive control is bound by law. This is a quagmire for the Separate Opinion to resolve for itself The Separate Opinion unduly considers executive control as the ne plus ultra constitutional standard which must govern in this case. But while the President may generally have the power to control, modify or set aside the actions of a subordinate, such powers may be constricted by the Constitution, the legislature, and the judiciary. This is one of the essences of the check-and-balance system in our tri-partite constitutional democracy. Not one head of a branch of government may operate as a Caesar within his/her particular fiefdom. Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs and imposts, and would thus serve to qualify the general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision over his/her subalterns. Thus, if the Congress enacted the law so that the DTI Secretary is "bound" by the Tariff Commission in the sense the former cannot impose general safeguard measures absent a final positive determination from the latter the Court is obliged to respect such legislative prerogative, no matter how such arrangement deviates from traditional norms as may have been enshrined in jurisprudence. The only ground under which such legislative determination as expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by the respondents, who do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the SMA. Given these premises, it is utterly reckless to examine the interrelationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary beyond the context of the SMA, applying instead traditional precepts on administrative control, review and supervision. For that reason, the Decision deemed inapplicable respondents previous citations ofCario v. Commissioner on Human Rights and Lamb v. Phipps, since the executive power adverted to in those cases had not been limited by constitutional restrictions such as those imposed under Section 28(2), Article VI.87 A similar observation can be made on the case of Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals,88 now cited by Philcemcor, wherein the Court asserted that the Land Bank of the Philippines was required to

exercise independent judgment and not merely rubber-stamp deeds of sale entered into by the Department of Agrarian Reform in connection with the agrarian reform program. Philcemcor attempts to demonstrate that the DTI Secretary, as with the Land Bank of the Philippines, is required to exercise independent discretion and is not expected to just merely accede to DAR-approved compensation packages. Yet again, such grant of independent discretion is expressly called for by statute, particularly Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which specifically requires the joint concurrence of "the landowner and the DAR and the [Land Bank of the Philippines]" on the amount of compensation. Such power of review by the Land Bank is a consequence of clear statutory language, as is our holding in the Decision that Section 5 explicitly requires a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before a general safeguard measure may be imposed. Moreover, such limitations under the SMA are coated by the constitutional authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Nonetheless, is this administrative setup, as envisioned by Congress and enshrined into the SMA, truly noxious to existing legal standards? The Decision acknowledged the internal logic of the statutory framework, considering that the DTI cannot exercise review powers over an agency such as the Tariff Commission which is not within its administrative jurisdiction; that the mechanism employed establishes a measure of check and balance involving two government offices with different specializations; and that safeguard measures are the exception rather than the rule, pursuant to our treaty obligations.89 We see no reason to deviate from these observations, and indeed can add similarly oriented comments. Corollary to the legislative power to decree policies through legislation is the ability of the legislature to provide for means in the statute itself to ensure that the said policy is strictly implemented by the body or office tasked so tasked with the duty. As earlier stated, our treaty obligations dissuade the State for now from implementing default protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions.90The conditions enumerated under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the application of safeguard measures by a member country are the same as the requisites laid down in Section 5 of the SMA.91 To insulate the factual determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted by an entity especially qualified by reason of its general functions to undertake such investigation, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to the Tariff Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not the those factual conditions exist to warrant the atypical imposition of safeguard measures. After all, the Tariff Commission retains a degree of relative independence by virtue of its attachment to the National Economic Development Authority, "an independent planning agency of the government,"92 and also owing to its vaunted expertise and specialization. The matter of imposing a safeguard measure almost always involves not just one industry, but the national interest as it encompasses other industries as well. Yet in all candor, any decision to impose a safeguard measure is susceptible to all sorts of external pressures, especially if the domestic industry concerned is wellorganized. Unwarranted impositions of safeguard measures may similarly be detrimental to the national interest. Congress could not be blamed if it desired to insulate the investigatory process by assigning it to a body with a putative degree of independence and traditional expertise in ascertaining factual conditions. Affected industries would have cause to lobby for or against the safeguard measures. The decision-maker is in the unenviable position of having to bend an ear to listen to all concerned voices, including those which may speak softly but carry a big stick. Had the law mandated that the decision be made on the sole discretion of an executive officer, such as the DTI Secretary, it would be markedly easier for safeguard measures to be imposed or withheld based solely on political considerations and not on the factual conditions that are supposed to predicate the decision. Reference of the binding positive final determination to the Tariff Commission is of course, not a fail-safe means to ensure a bias-free determination. But at least the legislated involvement of the Commission in the process assures some measure of measure of check and balance involving two different governmental agencies with disparate specializations. There is no legal or constitutional demand for such a setup, but its wisdom as policy should be acknowledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary operate within limited frameworks, under which nobody acquires an undue advantage over the other.

We recognize that Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process in requiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly independent body of specialized competence, the Tariff Commission. This prescribed framework, constitutionally sanctioned, is intended to prevent the baseless, whimsical, or consideration-induced imposition of safeguard measures. It removes from the DTI Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond his putative specialized aptitude, the compilation and analysis of picayune facts and determination of their limited causal relations, and instead vests in the Secretary the broad choice on a matter within his unquestionable competence, the selection of what particular safeguard measure would assist the duly beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national trade policy. Indeed, the SMA recognizes, and places primary importance on the DTI Secretarys mandate to formulate trade policy, in his capacity as the Presidents alter ego on trade, industry and investment-related matters. At the same time, the statutory limitations on this authorized power of the DTI Secretary must prevail since the Constitution itself demands the enforceability of those limitations and restrictions as imposed by Congress. Policy wisdom will not save a law from infirmity if the statutory provisions violate the Constitution. But since the Constitution itself provides that the President shall be constrained by the limits and restrictions imposed by Congress and since these limits and restrictions are so clear and categorical, then the Court has no choice but to uphold the reins. Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, or seemed "uncommonly silly,"93 the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. Since there is no convincing demonstration that the SMA contravenes the Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative regimen propounded by the law, even if it allots the Tariff Commission a higher degree of puissance than normally expected. It is for this reason that the traditional conceptions of administrative review or quasi-judicial power cannot control in this case. Indeed, to apply the latter concept would cause the Court to fall into a linguistic trap owing to the multifaceted denotations the term "quasi-judicial" has come to acquire. Under the SMA, the Tariff Commission undertakes formal hearings,94 receives and evaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties,95 and renders a decision is rendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the form of the final determination. The final determination requires a conclusion whether the importation of the product under consideration is causing serious injury or threat to a domestic industry producing like products or directly competitive products, while evaluating all relevant factors having a bearing on the situation of the domestic industry.96 This process aligns conformably with definition provided by Blacks Law Dictionary of "quasi-judicial" as the "action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."97 However, the Tariff Commission is not empowered to hear actual cases or controversies lodged directly before it by private parties. It does not have the power to issue writs of injunction or enforcement of its determination. These considerations militate against a finding of quasi-judicial powers attributable to the Tariff Commission, considering the pronouncement that "quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation."98 Indeed, a declaration that the Tariff Commission possesses quasi-judicial powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the Commissions powers beyond that contemplated by law. After all, the Tariff Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role under the SMA, burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere continuance of this tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a significant deviation from this traditional role by tying the decision by the DTI Secretary to impose a safeguard measure to the required positive factual determination by the Tariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the times. The sole benchmark for judicial substitution of congressional wisdom is constitutional transgression, a standard which

the respondents do not even attempt to match. Respondents Suggested Interpretation Of the SMA Transgresses Fair Play Respondents have belabored the argument that the Decisions interpretation of the SMA, particularly of the role of the Tariff Commission vis--vis the DTI Secretary, is noxious to traditional notions of administrative control and supervision. But in doing so, they have failed to acknowledge the congressional prerogative to redefine administrative relationships, a license which falls within the plenary province of Congress under our representative system of democracy. Moreover, respondents own suggested interpretation falls wayward of expectations of practical fair play. Adopting respondents suggestion that the DTI Secretary may disregard the factual findings of the Tariff Commission and investigatory process that preceded it, it would seem that the elaborate procedure undertaken by the Commission under the SMA, with all the attendant guarantees of due process, is but an inutile spectacle. As Justice Garcia noted during the oral arguments, why would the DTI Secretary bother with the Tariff Commission and instead conduct the investigation himself.99 Certainly, nothing in the SMA authorizes the DTI Secretary, after making the preliminary determination, to personally oversee the investigation, hear out the interested parties, or receive evidence.100 In fact, the SMA does not even require the Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the custody of the submitted evidence,101 to turn over to the DTI Secretary such evidence it had evaluated in order to make its factual determination.102Clearly, as Congress tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary which acquires the necessary intimate acquaintance with the factual conditions and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard measure. Why then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the Tariff Commission bereft of operative effect and makes them subservient to the wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser working familiarity with the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his "discretion", the factual determination of a private investigative group hired by the industry concerned, and reject the investigative findings of the Tariff Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute what the law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery. Moreover, the SMA guarantees the right of all concerned parties to be heard, an elemental requirement of due process, by the Tariff Commission in the context of its investigation. The DTI Secretary is not similarly empowered or tasked to hear out the concerns of other interested parties, and if he/she does so, it arises purely out of volition and not compulsion under law. Indeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of other than that of the local cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an indispensable need for the operation of other industries such as housing and construction. While the general safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of cheaper cement imports may similarly work to the detriment of these other domestic industries and correspondingly, the national interest. Notably, the Tariff Commission in this case heard the views on the application of representatives of other allied industries such as the housing, construction, and cement-bag industries, and other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments.103 It is only before the Tariff Commission that their views had been heard, and this is because it is only the Tariff Commission which is empowered to hear their positions. Since due process requires a judicious consideration of all relevant factors, the Tariff Commission, which is in a better position to hear these parties than the DTI Secretary, is similarly more capable to render a determination conformably with the due process requirements than the DTI Secretary.

In a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances when it is the DTI Secretary who initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard measure pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA, respondents suggested interpretation would result in the awkward situation wherein the DTI Secretary would rule upon his own application after it had been evaluated by the Tariff Commission. Pertinently cited is our ruling in Corona v. Court of Appeals104 that "no man can be at once a litigant and judge."105 Certainly, this anomalous situation is avoided if it is the Tariff Commission which is tasked with arriving at the final determination whether the conditions exist to warrant the general safeguard measures. This is the setup provided for by the express provisions of the SMA, and the problem would arise only if we adopt the interpretation urged upon by respondents. The Possibility for Administrative Review Of the Tariff Commissions Determination The Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission is required in order that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure, and that the DTI Secretary has no power to exercise control and supervision over the Tariff Commission and its final determination. These conclusions are the necessary consequences of the applicable provisions of the Constitution, the SMA, and laws such as the Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on whether this positive final determination may otherwise be subjected to administrative review. There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide for a procedure of administrative review. If ever there is a procedure for administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff Commission, such procedure must be done in a manner that does not contravene or disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations. In order that such procedure of administrative review would not contravene the law and the constitutional scheme provided by Section 28(2), Article VI, it is essential to assert that the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is indispensable as a requisite for the imposition of a general safeguard measure. The submissions of private respondents and the Separate Opinion cannot be sustained insofar as they hold that the DTI Secretary can peremptorily ignore or disregard the determinations made by the Tariff Commission. However, if the mode of administrative review were in such a manner that the administrative superior of the Tariff Commission were to modify or alter its determination, then such "reversal" may still be valid within the confines of Section 5 of the SMA, for technically it is still the Tariff Commissions determination, administratively revised as it may be, that would serve as the basis for the DTI Secretarys action. However, and fatally for the present petitions, such administrative review cannot be conducted by the DTI Secretary. Even if conceding that the Tariff Commissions findings may be administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has no authority to review or modify the same. We have been emphatic on the reasons such as that there is no traditional or statutory basis placing the Commission under the control and supervision of the DTI; that to allow such would contravene due process, especially if the DTI itself were to apply for the safeguard measuresmotu proprio. To hold otherwise would destroy the administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due process, and disregard the limitations or restrictions provided in the SMA. Instead, assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDAs decision in turn is reviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of the President then effectively substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI Secretarys decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review of the Tariff Commissions determination may be sustained without violating the SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law.

In bare theory, the NEDA may review, alter or modify the Tariff Commissions final determination, the Commission being an attached agency of the NEDA. Admittedly, there is nothing in the SMA or any other statute that would prevent the NEDA to exercise such administrative review, and successively, for the President to exercise in turn review over the NEDAs decision. Nonetheless, in acknowledging this possibility, the Court, without denigrating the bare principle that administrative officers may exercise control and supervision over the acts of the bodies under its jurisdiction, realizes that this comes at the expense of a speedy resolution to an application for a safeguard measure, an application dependent on fluctuating factual conditions. The further delay would foster uncertainty and insecurity within the industry concerned, as well as with all other allied industries, which in turn may lead to some measure of economic damage. Delay is certain, since judicial review authorized by law and not administrative review would have the final say. The fact that the SMA did not expressly prohibit administrative review of the final determination of the Tariff Commission does not negate the supreme advantages of engendering exclusive judicial review over questions arising from the imposition of a general safeguard measure. In any event, even if we conceded the possibility of administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination by the NEDA, such would not deny merit to the present petition. It does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative final determination of the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard measures despite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of the Commission. IV. Courts Interpretation of SMA In Harmony with Other Constitutional Provisions In response to our citation of Section 28(2), Article VI, respondents elevate two arguments grounded in constitutional law. One is based on another constitutional provision, Section 12, Article XIII, which mandates that "[t]he State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them competitive." By no means does this provision dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court. If it were so, judicial proceedings in this country would be rendered a mockery, resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the litigants and not their legal positions. Moreover, the duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XIII falls primarily with Congress, which in that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries from the possible ill-effects of our accession to the global trade order. Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the SMA also happens to provide for a procedure under which such protective measures may be enacted. The Court cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law without giving due regard to its letter. In like-minded manner, the Separate Opinion loosely states that the purpose of the SMA is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased importation of foreign products.106 This inaccurately leaves the impression that the SMA ipso facto unravels a protective cloak that shelters all local industries and producers, no matter the conditions. Indeed, our country has knowingly chosen to accede to the world trade regime, as expressed in the GATT and WTO Agreements, despite the understanding that local industries might suffer illeffects, especially with the easier entry of competing foreign products. At the same time, these international agreements were designed to constrict protectionist trade policies by its member-countries. Hence, the median, as expressed by the SMA, does allow for the application of protectionist measures such as tariffs, but only after an elaborate process of investigation that ensures factual basis and indispensable need for such measures. More accurately, the purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or

safeguarding of domestic industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof directly caused by the increased imports. In short, domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a matter of right or influence. Respondents also make the astounding argument that the imposition of general safeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but instead as an exercise of police power. The vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguard measures from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. This argument can be debunked at length, but it deserves little attention. The motivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin between rich and poor; the so-called "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help dissuade the consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful products. Taxation is distinguishable from police power as to the means employed to implement these public good goals. Those doctrines that are unique to taxation arose from peculiar considerations such as those especially punitive effects of taxation,107 and the belief that taxes are the lifeblood of the state.108 These considerations necessitated the evolution of taxation as a distinct legal concept from police power. Yet at the same time, it has been recognized that taxation may be made the implement of the states police power.109 Even assuming that the SMA should be construed exclusively as a police power measure, the Court recognizes that police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature, though it may also be exercised by the executive branch by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power.110 Considering these premises, it is clear that police power, however "illimitable" in theory, is still exercised within the confines of implementing legislation. To declare otherwise is to sanction rule by whim instead of rule of law. The Congress, in enacting the SMA, has delegated the power to impose general safeguard measures to the executive branch, but at the same time subjected such imposition to limitations, such as the requirement of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission under Section 5. For the executive branch to ignore these boundaries imposed by Congress is to set up an ignoble clash between the two co-equal branches of government. Considering that the exercise of police power emanates from legislative authority, there is little question that the prerogative of the legislative branch shall prevail in such a clash. V. Assailed Decision Consistent With Ruling in Taada v. Angara Public respondents allege that the Decision is contrary to our holding in Taada v. Angara,111 since the Court noted therein that the GATT itself provides built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices, which according to the public respondents, was a reason "why the Honorable [Court] ruled the way it did." On the other hand, the Decision "eliminates safeguard measures as a mode of defense." This is balderdash, as with any and all claims that the Decision allows foreign industries to ride roughshod over our domestic enterprises. The Decision does not prohibit the imposition of general safeguard measures to protect domestic industries in need of protection. All it affirms is that the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is first required before the general safeguard measures are imposed and implemented, a neutral proposition that gives no regard to the nationalities of the parties involved. A positive determination by the Tariff Commission is hardly the elusive Shangri-la of administrative law. If a particular industry finds it difficult to obtain a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission, it may be simply because the industry is still sufficiently competitive even in the face of foreign competition. These safeguard measures are designed to ensure salvation, not avarice. Respondents well have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the flag. Yet these postures hardly advance legal claims, or nationalism for that matter. The fineries of the costume pageant are no better measure of patriotism than simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland. And even assuming that

respondents are motivated by genuine patriotic impulses, it must be remembered that under the setup provided by the SMA, it is the facts, and not impulse, that determine whether the protective safeguard measures should be imposed. As once orated, facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.112 It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem as correct economic policy. Towards this end, we should not construe the SMA to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply because the law itself provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or disfavored. What we must do is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI Secretary shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Nothing in the whereas clauses or the invisible ink provisions of the SMA can magically delete the words "positive final determination" and "Tariff Commission" from Section 5. VI. On Forum-Shopping We remain convinced that there was no willful and deliberate forum-shopping in this case by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this present petition for review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it also appears that contrary to the undertaking signed by the President of Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform this Court of any similar action or proceeding pending before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from knowledge thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August 2003 of the petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate sanction is warranted for such failure, but not the dismissal of the petition. VII. Effects of Courts Resolution Philcemcor argues that the granting of Southern Crosss Petition should not necessarily lead to the voiding of theDecision of the DTI Secretary dated 5 August 2003 imposing the general safeguard measures. For Philcemcor, the availability of appeal to the CTA as an available and adequate remedy would have made the Court of AppealsDecision merely erroneous or irregular, but not void. Moreover, the said Decision merely required the DTI Secretary to render a decision, which could have very well been a decision not to impose a safeguard measure; thus, it could not be said that the annulled decision resulted from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Decision was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals Decision is null and void. At the same time, the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the peculiarities attaching to the 5 August 2003Decision of the DTI Secretary. In the DTI Secretarys Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, "there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application." Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated the Court of Appeals Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. Otherwise put, without the Court of Appeals Decision, the DTI Secretarys Decision of 5 August 2003 would not have been rendered as well. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a nullity the DTI Secretarys Decision dated 5 August 2003. As a necessary consequence, no further action can be taken on Philcemcors Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Obviously, if the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be, any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA.

Should this step be eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the parties involved would content themselves in observing the proper procedure, instead of making a mockery of the rule of law. WHEREFORE, respondents Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED WITH FINALITY. Respondent DTI Secretary is hereby ENJOINED from taking any further action on the pending Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Hironobu Ryu, President of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation, and Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz, counsel petitioner, are hereby given FIVE (5) days from receipt of this Resolution to EXPLAIN why they should not be meted disciplinary sanction for failing to timely inform the Court of the filing of Southern CrosssPetition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, as adverted to earlier in this Resolution. SO ORDERED.

iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv