Max Bulger PHIL133 Paper 2 Prompt: What, if anything, do the Twin Earth thought experiments tell us about the

meaning of natural kind terms?

Twin-Earth and Artificial Terms

Semantic Externalism and its implications for Natural Kind Terms
NOTE: When examining the Twin Earth thought experiment and its implications for natural kind terms, I accepted molecular science as universal truth. The pre-supposition that molecular sciece is true and reveals the scientific essence of objects is necessary when entertaining the Twin Earth experiments, as it allows the differentiation between water on Earth (H20) and Twin Earth (XYZ). The following arguments (and the Twin Earth thought experiments) are based on the acceptance of molecular composition as scientific essence. The Twin Earth thought experiment was introduced by Putnam (1975) and is considered the source of semantic externalism. The experiment supposes that in this world there is a planet Twin Earth that is exactly like Earth. Everything on Twin Earth is exactly like everything on Earth except for a single difference. The anomaly between the two planets is in the molecular composition of water. Water is used in exactly the same fashion on both planets, and appears exactly the same in all observable ways. However, on Earth, waters chemical composition is H2O, and on Twin Earth, it is XYZ. Residents of Earth and Twin Earth both use and reference water in identical ways. For simplicitys sake, our example is from any time in history on Earth and Twin Earth before the discovery of molecular science and identification of chemical composition. One morning, Halal wakes up on Earth and is thirsty. He says, Id like a glass of water. At the same time, Twin Halal wakes up on Twin Earth and is similarly thirsty. Being exactly the same as Halal, he issues the same statement: Id like a glass of water. Twin Earths, twin individuals, twin contexts and twin statements. The problem lies in the referent of the term water Halals statement references H20, while Twin Halals

references XYZ. Halal and Twin Halal are unaware of the molecular composition of water and molecular science in general, and lacking in any method of observing the chemical composition of liquids. There is a fundamental difference in the objects Halal and Twin Halal are referring to, but knowledge of that difference is not available to either speaker. These experiments lead Putnam to conclude that the meaning of a term does not necessarily exist within a speakers knowledge, or, more famously, meaning just aint in the head. That is also the core concept of semantic externalism (although Putnam did not coin it as such when he originally conceived Twin Earth): the contents of a speakers thoughts are not enough to determine the true meaning of a reference. There is some external semantic information about the referent beyond or outside the speakers awareness. The Twin Earth experiments and the concept of semantic externalism prove problematic when considering natural kind terms. Natural kind terms are words used to group objects into real sets (as opposed to artificial sets). A real set is a natural grouping defined by factors not determined by individuals or society. This makes natural kind terms names more than adjectives, as they reference the same thing in every world a kind has membership in. Zebra, being a naturally occurring object with a clear definition, is a natural kind term, as is gold. The older Descriptivist understanding of natural kind terms defined groupings through stereotypes and common sense. Kripke and Putnam, advocates of the Causal Theory of Reference and externalism, rejected this notion. Kripke and Putnam (pg 58) argued that the concept of natural kinds superceded

common stereotype. By definition, the term refers to groupings that are naturally existing, and thus would exist without any common sense reference. Extending semantic externalism to apply to natural kinds, their theory was that the scientific essence of natural kinds determined their metaphysical essence. In short, the true definition of a natural kind, according to Kripke and Putnam, lies in its scientific essence and is external to individual references or speakers. Without this external scientific definition, natural kinds would not be differentiated from any common grouping term defined (and periodically re-grounded) by causal chains of reference. For this reason, we have to accept that semantic externalism is necessary to the understanding of natural kind terms. The concept of semantic externalism is the key to explaining a speakers ability to use natural kind terms as references to concepts of scientific essence external to his or her knowledge. Halal can reference water without knowing its chemical composition, and Dilip Ninan can use the term aardvark to access the specific animal referent without knowing the molecular composition of an aardvark. While a speakers understanding of the description aardvark may change through causal reference, grounding the semantic definition of the natural kind in external knowledge allows it to be real. When the speaker acquires the scientific essence of a referent, he or she can reconcile the meaning of their descriptive term (which the old Descriptivists would have defined as the natural kind term) and the external natural kind term. Searle (1975) dubbed this scientific discovery-enabled reconciliation a reduction redefinition. The Twin Earth thought experiment shows that before reduction redefinition, speakers have access to a descriptive term, defined by common sense or stereotype that refers to an artificial grouping. This term could be called the Descriptivist natural kind, or

artificial kind. The artificial kind allows us to access a referent without fully understanding its scientific composition. The term water in Putnams Twin Earths experiment could be considered an artificial kind because it refers to a specific grouping of objects, but understanding of scientific essence would reveal natural differences. The meaning of a natural kind is real and external to speakers, accessible through reduction redefinition after scientific discovery revises the speakers understanding of an artificial kind. The true meaning of a natural kind term is grounded in semantic externalism.