Supreme Court rules on enforceability of unpublished laws

Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J.
, Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

A. When law takes effect Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a) Pesigan v Angeles Facts: Anselmo Pesigan and Marcelino Pesigan (petitioners) vs Judge Domingo Medina Angeles; Dra. Bella Miranda and Arnulfo Zenarosa, et al (respondents) Anselmo Pesiga and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported on April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination. Inspite of the permit to transport and the four certificates, the carabaos were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo Zenarosa (police station manager) and Doctor Bella Miranda (veterinarian) based on Executive Order No. 626-A Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for the recovery of the carabaos Judge Domingo Medina Angeles dismissed the case for lack of cause of action Pesigans appealed to the court Issue: Enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another Ratio: Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982 It became effective only 15 days thereafter They are not bound by the order Relevant Provisions: Commonwealth Act No. 638 provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated Ruling: Trial courts order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal are reversed and set aside Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners Pesigans are entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the 26 farmers who used them Notes: Statues generally have no retroactive effect unless the legislative intent is made manifest either by express terms of the stature or by necessary implication Penal statutes are construed strictly against the state to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts 1
Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J., Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.
or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures fall within this category. Before a person may be bound by law, he must be first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. When not published, such shall have no force and effect. For without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. The word shall imposes an imperative duty However, the implementation/enforcement of the presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
Tanada v Tuvera Facts: Lorenzo Taada, et al (petitioners) v Hon. Juan Tuvera, et al (respondents) Petitioners invoke the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various decrees and orders Issue: Locus standi of the petitioners Whether unpublished laws have binding force and effect Whether publication is required in light of the clause unless otherwise provided Ratio: When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest The publication in the Official Gazette is required to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make penalties binding on the person affected thereby. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is a mandated by law, and is a requirement of due process. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
Relevant Provisions: Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that the right of people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized Principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that petition for Mandamus When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to do the act required to be done 2
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided Commonwealth Act 638 Article 3 of the Civil Code provides that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith in permanent capacity), unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title Petitioners assert that Rep Act No. 9006 is null and void Petitioners maintain that Section 67 is a good law
Ruling: Respondents are ordered to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are or general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect Notes: Some justices concurred but with qualifications that publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette Farinas v Executive Secretary Facts: Rodolfo Farias et al (petitioners) v The Executive Secretary et al (respondents) o Petition for certiorari and prohibition Cong. Gerry Salapuddin (petitioner) v Commission on Elections (respondent) o Petition for prohibition Two petitions are seeking to declare Section 14 of Rep Act No. 9006 (primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for office other than the one they are holding
Issue: Locus Standi a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions Whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this court had declared in Dimaporo as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of overarching significance that justifies the Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on standing Enrolled bill doctrine the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment Ratio: On legal standing being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of overarching significance to our society had adopted a liberal stance on standing Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 is not a rider 3
o Court is convinced that the title and objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code o Section 67 as a form of harassment or discrimination is not the concern of the Court. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution o Equal protection of the law clause is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification o Since the classification of the officials is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is not infringed The enrolled bill doctrine is applicable in this case o Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of the Congress o Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. The effectivity clause is defective o But it does not render the entire law invalid o See Tanada v Tuvera o When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power Relevant Provisions: Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that any elective official, whether national or local, running for office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code and sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 9006 provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval
Ruling: Petitions are dismissed Notes: Where a petition for mandamus involves the enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, a citizen has the requisite locus standi 4
MRCA v CA Facts: MRCA, Inc. (petitioner) v Court of Appeals, Hon. Benjamin Pelayo; Domingo Sebastian Jr., Lilia Tioseco Sebastian, and Expectacion Tioseco (respondents) Petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants Issue: Is the ruling in the Manchester ineffective for the reason that it has yet been published in the Official Gazette? Can that said ruling be not given a retroactive effect because it imposes new penalty for its non-observance? Should it be applied to this present case because the petitioner herein had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper fees? Ratio: The contention that the ruling in the Manchester (enormous amount of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof to mislead the court in computing the filing fees to be paid) is ineffective for the reason that it has yet been published in the Official Gazette is not well taken because publication is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down new rule of procedure (Aguillon v Director of Lands) Established rule of statutory construction: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. o Complaint was filed on March 24, 1988 o Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987 o Manchester should apply except that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case where it was ruled that the court may allow payment within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period In accordance with the Courts ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint.
Relevant Provisions: Ruling: Petition for review is granted Order of RTC is set aside Complaint is reinstated Petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to recover from the defendants and to pay the proper filing fees therefore as computed by the Clerk of Court NEA v Gonzaga Facts: National Electrification Administration (petitioner) v Victoriano Gonzaga (respondent) Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Issue: 5
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in not applying section 59 of PD 269 Whether or not the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial courts nullification of the ECEC National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondents) Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili (petitioner) v The Senate of the Philippines (respondent)
Ratio: The ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondents disqualification and the question on the ECECs validity are within the inherent jurisdiction of regular courts to review. There is no error in the appellate and trial courts nullification of the ECEC o ZAMSURECO offered no proof of publication in the official gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance, rules and regulations in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Relevant Provisions: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided Section 59 of PD 269 Ruling: Petition is denied Garcillano v HR Facts: Virgilio Garcillano (petitioner) v The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
Issue: Locus standi Elements of standing: (1) petitioner must have suffered injury in fact which can be legal, economic, or environmental; (2) the injury must be traceable to the governmental act being challenged; (3) the injury must be redressable by the remedy being sought by petitioner Justiciability the exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies o Actual cases existing conflicts appropriate for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion o Advisory opinion an advisory opinion is an opinion issued by a court that does not have the effect of adjudicating a specific legal case, but merely advises on the constitutionality or interpretation of a law Legislative inquiry Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure o The requisite of publication of rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process Ratio: Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners (Agcaoili et al) due to the transcendental and paramout importance of the issue 6
Court points out that the Senate cannot be allowed to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement o Every senate is distinct from the one before it or after it o Rules of the senate confirms it Notes: Dissent to the Neri ruling o Neri ruling a faithful adherence to the case at bar to the Neri ruling would yield the conclusion that the Garci tapes investigation may be conducted even without the published rules of procedure governing inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered null and void Neri decision not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm Senate of each congress, although a continuing body, acts separately and independently of the senate of the congress before it o One-time publication suffices to satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern it and affect its rights Exception: one-time publication suffices for a law or rule to have a continuing effect is when there are circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity o Wiretapping may be held legal only if it was recorded with consent of the parties to the conversation or upon written court order Fuentes v Roca Facts: Manuel Fuentes and Leticia Fuentes (petitioners) v Conrado Roca, Annabelle Joson, Rose Marie Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo (respondents) 7
Relevant Provisions: Section 21, Article VI of he 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided RA 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes Anti-Wiretapping Law (RA 4200) penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communication by means of devices enumerated therein Section 123 of Rule XLIV of the Rules of Senate provides that all pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one Congress Ruling: Garcillanos petition is dismissed Ranada and Agcaoilis petition for a writ of prohibition is granted Conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the Hello Garci tapes is not allowed
Sabina Tarroza sold a piece of land to his son Tarciano Roca who did not for the meantime have the title be transferred to his name Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the Fuentes spouses The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale A new title was issued bearing the name of the spouses Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it RTC dismissed the case CA reversed the RTC decision Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for review o Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988 In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal
Issue: Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. Ratio: Signature is forged The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code
Relevant Provisions: Article 124 of the Family Code provides that in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void Ruling: Court denies the petition Affirms the CAs decision The deed of sale is declared void 8
The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled B. Ignorance of the Law Entire exhibit 1 is null and void therefore as well as the verbal contract Error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between parties was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvement and that exhibit 1 is null and void CA held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale and that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2) Kasilag v Rodriguez Facts: Marcial Kasilag (petitioner) v Rafaela Rodriguez, Urbano Roque, Severo Mapilisan, and Ignacio del Rosario (respondent) Petition for review on certiorari May 16,1932 Emiliano Ambrosio (party of the 1st part) and the petitioner executed a deed There commenced a verbal contract between the two parties: petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, introduced improvements, etc. Court of Appeals held that the contract was one of absolute purchase and sale of land
Issue: Whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated Ratio: Principal contract is that of (1) loan and the accessory that of (2) mortgage of the improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead o First is valid o Second converted the pact into antichresis (illegal and void) But the clauses regarding the contract of antichresis can be eliminated thereby leaving the latter in being because it is legal and valid Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule o The court cant deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116 o Even ignorance of law may be based upon an error of fact, or ignorance of fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, 9
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines o Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he s not a lawyer o As to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith o Petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits Ildefonso Elegado (petitioner) v Hon. Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent) Warren Graham died Ward Graham filed an estate tax return Commissioner of Internal revenue assessed the decedents estate an estate tax (Feb. 9, 1978) Assessment was protested (Mar. 7, 1978) Protest was denied by the commissioner (July 7, 1978) No further action Ward Graham appointed Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-infact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines Will was allowed He filed a second estate tax return with the BIR Commissioner imposed an assessment Protest again Commissioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax Commissioner cancelled the protested assessment The petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the assessment The commissioner did not answer and instead cancelled the protest assessment cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become moot and academic The motion was granted and the petition was dismissed Petition to review the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
Relevant Provisions: Section 443 of the Civil Code provides that every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith Article 1950 of the Civil Code provides that good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto Ruling: Appealed decision is reversed Elegado v CA Facts:
Issue: Whether the first assessment is binding
10
Whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action Appeal from what? Whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property Whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owners death or six months thereafter Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our country Relevant Provisions: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith Ruling: Petition is denied Notes: A judgment which had become final and had been executed can no longer be disturbed or modified Manzano v Sanchez Facts: Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano (May 21, 1966) However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge (March 22, 1993) Judge contended that he did not know that Manzano was legally married Court administrator recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law Issue: whether Judge Roque Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law Ratio: 11
Ratio: Whether the shares of stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not conjugal, property and whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the time of the owners death or six months thereafter o Immaterial Whether the appeal filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic o There was really no more assessment to review o Petitioner cannot now raise the question of validity Petitioner argues that second assessment cancels the first assessment and that the cancellation of the second assessment did not have the effect of reviving the first o It is illogical to suggest that a provisional assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which had become final and executory First assessment is not binding because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals o If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like
In the two unearthed affidavits, Manzano and Payao expressly stated that they were married to Borja and Relos The judge ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1) Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n) Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n) Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a) Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code. If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied. If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a) 12
Relevant Provisions: Ignorance of the law excuses no one Ruling: Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby adopted
RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS NCC Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect. For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions). Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation,
Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4) Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws. (n) Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n) Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n) Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320. (n) Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a) Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n) Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's possession before said date. (n) Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect: (1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants; (2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage; (3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation; (4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself; (5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments; (6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title; (7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise. (n) Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective: (1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; 13
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n) Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n) Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a) RPC Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. FC Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid. Frivaldo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996. Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but he was twice declared to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and he now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Issues: 1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid? (Secondary Issues) Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon? Should it be Frivaldo who is said to be an alien, Lee who got the second most number of votes or Vice- Governor Deri as the rules on political succession states? Held: Frivaldos repatriation is valid and it was given a retroactive effect. He is also allowed to take office for he got the popular support as is shown in the ballots. Gregorio v. C.A. G.R. No. L 22802, Nov. 29, 1968 Facts: The petitioners father, then the appellant, was denied to elevate to the CA the evidence presented in the two cases he was appealing. His counsels next motion for reconsideration was then denied. Issues: Can a procedural law have a retroactive effect? resolutions made by the CA valid? Are the
Held: The writ of certiorari is granted annulling the resolutions of CA denying the motion for reconsideration. The writ of mandamus is granted to compel CA to elevate to it the evidence presented at the trial before the Court of First Instance in Bulacan. Notes: Penal laws shall be applied retroactively if such application is favorable to the accused even if he is already serving a sentence unless he is a habitual deliveryman. Aruego v. CA 254 SCRA 711 Facts: The late Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian for 23 years. They had two children out of it, Antonia and Evelyn. Issues: Can the two be called illegitimate children? 14
Held: Antonia was proclaimed an illegitimate child and Evelyn was said not to be an illegitimate child. Cang v. CA 296 SCRA128 Facts: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married in 73 and begot 3 children. Later on Anna Marie found out that her husband had extramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Because of this, she filed for legal separation. They agreed that their children should receive a monthly support of P1,000 and that Anna Marie can enter into any contract or agreement without the written consent of her husband. After this, Mr. Cang went abroad filed a divorce case from her wife and married an American woman. (Anna Marie got custody of the children.) Eventually, they also divorced. While in the US, he remits money to his children in the Philippines. On 1987, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for adoption of the 3 children. Anna Marie consented this because she was leaving the country and her brothers and sisters have been helping her raise the children since her husband already lost his parental rights for not supporting their children. Upon learning about this, Cang went back to the Philippines and filed an opposition and a petition to reacquire custody of his children. Since the mother is already in the US, the court ruled that the custody should be passed to whom she relinquished it. Issues: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: The petition for reconsideration of the father was granted and the ruling of the lower courts has been set aside. Thereby denying the adoption since the court believes that who, by law and under the facts of the case, has not abandoned them. Francisco v. CA 299 SCRA 188 Facts: Eusebio Francisco was married to Arte Guevarra, his second wife, when they acquired a sari-sari store and two houses and lots. Eventually, Eusebio got too sick to administer these properties. During this time, his children in his first marriage were able to find a way on having him authorize Conchita, one of his children, to administer the two houses and lot. Issues: Arte petitioned that the administration of such properties be passed to her but the lower courts denied this for the reason of lack of evidence that these properties were acquired during their marriage. The trial court ruled that the properties were exclusively owned by Eusebio. Held: The petition is denied and the administration of the property in question is still given to the daughter of Eusebio. WAIVER OF RIGHTS PEFTOK Integrated Services vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 124841. July 31, 1998 This is a petition for certiorari filed by PEFTOK seeking to set aside the decision of NLRC dated 26 Feb 1995 that granted claims to complainants (security guards) against PEFTOK, and two other corps.
Facts: 15
*October 13, 1989, Eduardo Abugho, Claro Mendez, and Leonardo Daluperi, to bar all claims they may have against PEFTOK before June 30, 1989. They also sought the issuance of an alias writ of execution for their entitlement to full benefits as provided in the labor arbiters decision. *May 29, 1992, Eduardo Abugho, Fidel Sabellina, Leonardo Daluperi, Claro Mendez, and Reynaldo Maasin executed another quitclaim and waiver renouncing whatever claims they have against PEFTOK for the period ending March 15, 1998. However they also claimed that the waiver and quitclaim were prepared and readied by PEFTOK and were further forced to sign for fear that they will not get their salaries come payday. Or worse, their services be terminated. Furthermore, they asserted that the waivers they signed were contrary to public policy, the same being written in English, which they do not understand, nor were the contents of said waiver explained to them. * Petitioner (PEFTOK) answers in saying that the quitclaims signed by the security guards suffer no legal infirmity. That waiver of the claim in dispute is not prohibited by law. Issue: Whether the signed waivers effectively waives the claims of the security guards against PEFTOK. Held: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit; decision of the NLRC dated Feb. 26, 1995 affirmed. There is no voluntariness in the execution of the waivers in question. They are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers legal right. Valderama vs. Macalde, 470 SCRA 168 The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48899 partially annulling the deed of sale insofar as it affects the 2/3rds of the lot being occupied by the Macaldes. Facts: * Before the WWII, parents of Salvacion Macalde rented a lot in Tondo, Manila, where their house occupied 2/3 portion of the property. In 1977, Herminia Albano acquired the lot, and the Macalde siblings leased the property from Albano. On the remaining 1/3 of the land is an apartment which was being leased to the spouses Roberto and Natividad Valderama. * 11 Jun 1978, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1517 proclaiming specific parcels of urban lands as Urban Land Reform Zones. Under Sec. 6, legitimate tenants within the urban zones who had been residing on the land for ten years or more, who have built their homes on the land, and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract continuously for the last ten years, shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed right of first refusal to purchase the same * 14 May 1980, former Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1967, declaring the Metro Manila area as an Urban Zone. *13 April 1983, Proc. No. 2284 was issued amending Proc. No. 1967, identifying 244 sites in Metro Manila as areas for priority development, including Albanos property. *November 1990, Albano offered to sell the property to Salvacion Macalde and her siblings. Macalde on her behalf and in behalf of her siblings conveyed their desire to buy the property in a letter dated 9 Nov 1990. She further suggested that they discuss the price as well as other terms and conditions of the sale. Albanos grandchild received the letter but Albano did not respond. *14 March 1991, Albano told Macalde that she had already sold the property. In a letter dated 21 Mar 1991, Macalde complained to Albano about the sale of the land to another despite her prior offer to buy the land on Nov 1990. She also requested that Albano rescind the sale of the land insofar as the portion occupied by their house was concerned. It was later on found that the buyers of the land are the spouses Valderama. Macalde conveyed to the Valderamas in writing, her willingness to buy the portion of the 16
land her home occupies. Both Albano and Valderama rejected Macaldes offer. *Macalde filed a case against Albano and Valderama, to annul the sale of the land, cancellation of the title and reconveyance. The Macaldes asserted that they had the preferential right to buy the property under P.D. No. 1517. *Albano answered in saying that the property was not within the coverage of the law and that the Macaldes had been notified of her intention to sell the property but that they had ignored the offer. The Valderamas on the other hand said that the Macaldes had waived their preferential right to buy the property since they failed to exercise their right when Albano first offered the property to them. Later in the case Albano said in a testimony that she had repeatedly offered to sell the property to Salvacion Macalde and that at the end, she refused to do so due to financial constraints. She however, failed to present documentary evidence to this end. Issue: Whether the Macaldes right of first refusal to purchase the land where their ancestral home stands was waived by Salvacion Macaldes alleged verbal refusal when Albano offered to sell the lot to the Macaldes. Held: Petition denied. Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 48899 is affirmed. The preferential right of the Macaldes is deemed to not have been waived because the waiver of such right requires some note or memorandum or any private or public document for the waiver to be effective. Such verbal offer may not be sufficient basis to support the alleged waiver. In this case Albano and Valderama failed to present sufficient, competent and credible evidence that the Macaldes had waived their rights. DM Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001 This case was filed by DM Consunji Inc. seeking the reversal of the CA decision that affirmed the decision of the RTC of Pasig which granted Jose Juegos widow the right to claim damages against DM Consunji. Issue: Whether Maria Juegos right to claim damages was waived by her receipt of benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act. Facts: * 22 Nov 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig that caused his death. *Maria, his widow, filed a complaint for damages against his employer. The decision of the case was made in favor of Maria. On appeal by DM Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. DM Consunji now seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA. *In Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company it was ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the torfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. However, an exception was held in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. *Maria alleged that she only learned about the negligence of the employer after she had applied for and received the benefits under ECC. That she had committed a mistake of fact because she didnt know what damages could be recovered from the death or her husband or that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. *DM Consunji claimed that by being the complainant in a criminal case for Simple Negligence resulting to Homicide against the 17
employer, Maria couldnt have been ignorant of the facts. That from 2 Jan 1991, and every month thereafter, she knew of the choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from ECC. This choice resulted in a waiver of election that bars her from any action, suit or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy. In other words, the claimant, by her choice of one remedy, waived the other. Held: Remanded, the RTC of Pasig is to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. If so, the payments already made to the private respondent under the ECC should be deducted therefrom. There is no showing that Maria knew of the remedies before she applied for claims before the ECC. That she only learned after the prosecutor issued a resolution on 6 Feb 1991, that there may be a civil liability. This lack of knowledge or mistake of fact negates the waiver. REPEAL OF LAWS Mecano vs COA, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992 This is a petition for certoriari, seeking to nullify the decision of the Commission of Audit embodied in its 7th Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, the total amount of PHP40,831. Facts: *Petitioner, Director II of NBI, was hospitalized for cholecystitis from 26 Mar- 7 Apr, 1990, where he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. On 11 May 1990, in a memo to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Sec 699 of the RAC. Sec. 699. .In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees. Said claim was forwarded by Lim to relevant authorities. In a 4th Endorsement however, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, returned the petitioners claim to Lim stating that in a 5 th Endorsement by the Chairman of COA, the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Petitioner re-submitted his claim to Lim with a copy of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 stating that, the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Sec. 699.. Lim then forwarded the claim to the relevant authorities but finally in 16 Jan 1992, COA Chairman Eufemio Domingo in his 7th endorsement, denied the claim on the ground that Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated or re-enacted in the administrative Code of 1987. *Administrative Code or 1987 Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. --- All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. This is an example of a general repealing provision. *The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. This falls under the category of an implied repeal. Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repeal Sec. 699 of the RAC. Held: Petition granted. Respondent is ordered to give due course to the petitioners claim for benefits. There are two kinds of implied repeal. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the 18
two codes on the matter of the claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there cannot be a conflict because the provision on Sec. 699 of RAC has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. On the other hand, implied repeal by the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the formal laws on the whole subject matter is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject, to be a complete and perfect system in itself. In this case, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure (Opinion No. 73, S.1991). Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing Solangon vs. Salazar, G.R.No. 125944, June 29, 2001 This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA in C.A. G.R. No. 37899, affirming the decision of Malolos, Bulacan RTC Branch 16 for annulment of mortgage. This action was initiated by the plaintiffs to prevent the closure of the mortgaged property. Facts: *22 Aug 1986, plaintiffs mortgaged a parcel of land in Sta. Maria, Bulacan in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP60,000 loan, payable within 4mos., with an interest rate of 6%/mo. *27 May 1987 plaintiffs again mortgaged the same parcel of land in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP136,512 loan, payable within a year at the legal interest rate. *29 Dec 1990 plaintiffs again mortgaged the same parcel of land in favor of the defendant to secure the payment of a PHP230,000 loan, payable within 4mos., at the legal interest rate. *Plaintiffs contend that the CA erred in ruling that the loan obligation secured by a real estate mortgage with an interest rate of 72% per annum or 6% per month is not unconscionable. *Court of Appeals maintain that since Central Bank Circular No. 905 repealed the Usury Law, therefore rendering it legally inexistent, there is no more maximum rate of interest and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of the parties. Issue: Whether the 72% per annum interest rate on the loan of the petitioners be sustained, given that the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates has already been repealed or rendered ineffective by C.B. Circular No. 905. Held: Decision of the CA is affirmed subject to the modification that the interest rate of 72% per annum be reduced to 12% per annum. Even if C.B. Circular No. 905 repealed the Usury law, there is nothing in the circular that grants lenders the authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. In a similar case, Medel v. CA, the SC said that, We agree that the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5%/mo. on the P500,000 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant we find the interest rate at 5.5%/mo. or 66%/annum, stipulated upon by the parties in the promissory note iniquitous and unconscionable, and hence contrary to morals, if not against the law. The stipulation is void. In this case, the situation of the petitioners is much worse in that they are required to pay the stipulated interest of 72% per annum. 19
Thornton v Thornton Richard Brian Thornton for and in behalf of the minor child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton (petitioner) v Adelfa Francisco Thornton (respondent) Facts: Richard Thornton (American) and Adelfa Thornton (Filipino) were married and had a child (Sequeira). Richard Thornton admonished her wife for her irresponsibility to Sequeira. Adelfa Thornton left home with her child without notifying Richard Thornton. With such, Richard Thornton filed a petition for habeas corpus (Family Court in Makati City) which was dismissed for the reason that the child was just in Basilan. However, he did not find the child so he petitioned again for habeas corpus (Court of Appeals) which was denied due to the courts claimed lack of jurisdiction; thus, this petition for review of the CAs decision. Issue/s: Did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor case is concerned? Held: Petition is granted. The Court holds that the capacity to issue writ of habeas corpus is not exclusive to family courts. It was pointed out that the primordial consideration is the welfare of the child; thus, legal technicality (in this case, the use of the word exclusive) is not the main priority. Lledo v Lledo Carmelita Lledo (complainant) v Atty. Cesar Lledo (respondent) Facts: 20 Facts: Atty. Cesar Lledo was dismissed due to Carmelita Lledos filing of an administrative case against him. GSIS Regional Manager then explained that the request for a refund of retirement premiums is disallowed under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Furthermore, Courts decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. However, in the instant case, Cesar Jr. seeks only the return of his fathers personal contributions to the GSIS and not the retirement benefits. Issue/s: Is Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 impliedly repealed? Were the later enactments intended to substitute the earlier ones? Held: None of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their personal contributions. Atty. Cesars dismissal should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him in the first place. Also, it was mentioned that, as a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature so intended it JUDICIAL DECISIONS De Roy v CA Felisa De Roy and Virgilio Ramos (petitioners) v CA and Luis Bernal, et al (respondents)
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of the respondents. Felisa De Roy and Virgilio Ramos have been warning the respondents beforehand. RTC however found the petitioners guilty of gross negligence. The decision was affirmed by CA. On the last day of 15 day period in submitting appeals, petitioners filed a motion to extend time (February 27, 1986) which was then denied by the appellate court in a resolution; thus, this special civil action for certiorari to review the resolutions of the CA Issue/s: Did the CA err in dismissing the petitioners motion for time extension? Is the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v Japzon be made to apply in this case considering that the decision is not published in the Official Gazette? Held: The Court resolved to deny the instant petition for lack of merit. SC finds that CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for extension of time. It was said that CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v Japzon that 15 day for reconsideration cant be extended basing on a Resolution promulgated in May 30, 1986. Furthermore, there is no law requiring publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be considered binding and effective. Pesca v Pesca Lorna Guillen Pesca (petitioner) v Zosimo Pesca (respondent) Facts: CA reversed the decision of the RTC of Caloocan City which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent; thus, this petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Issue/s: Did the CA err in reversing the decision of the RTC? Do the decisions of the Court have the force of law? Held: The CA did not err in reversing the decision of the RTC. Psychological incapacity is already explained in Santos v CA and in Republic v CA and Molina. The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. In Santos, psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. This therefore should apply in the case. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith. Thus, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, as brought up by the petitioner to the respondent, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM Martinez v Van Buskirk SD Martinez and Carmen Ong de Martinez (plaintiffs and appellees) v William Van Buskirk (defendant and appellant) Facts: The horses of a cochero wounded the plaintiff and her child. The court of first instance of Manila found the defendant guilty of negligence; thus, this appeal. 21
Issue/s: Whether the cochero is guilty of negligence Held: The Cochero is not guilty of negligence. SC reversed the judgment on the principle that acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have been acquiesced in by society for so long time that they have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent Cocheros had been in the habit of leaving the horses and assisting in unloading the merchandise. Such is the manner described by the defendant on the day of the accident. NCC 10-12 Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n) Alonzo v. Padua Issue: How should Article 1088 be correctly interpreted and applied? This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. Fact: The Padua siblings (five brothers and sisters) inherited a parcel of land from their parents. Two of them, Celestino and Eustaquia, sold their undivided share to the petitioners in 1963 and 1964. The petitioners, then, enclosed the land they bought and lived there. In 1976, however, Teclo Padua, one of the coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the petitioners. The trial court dismissed the complaint citing that though there was no written notice, the co-heirs had actual knowledge of the sale. But the Intermediate Appellate Court Reversed the decision declaring that Article 1088 requires a written notice and no written notice has been issued; therefore, the 30 days of redemption has not yet started (citing Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. ) Held: The Court reversed the decision of the respondent court and reinstated the decision of the trial court. The Court sated The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. LEGAL PERIODS NCC 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. 22
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a) Revised administrative code Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twentyfour hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise. Rule of Court Rule 22: COMPUTATION OF TIME Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. The rules above are the basis for the decisions in the following cases: Armigos v. Court of Appeals Issue: Did the petitioner perfected his appeal within the reglementary period? Facts: The petitioner, Rudy Geo Armigos, received the decision on the complaint Mata filed against him on June 8, 1977. He filed for appeal on June 9, 1977 and perfected his appeal on June 24, 1977. The reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is 15 days. In Armigos computation, his appeal is still within the reglementary period. Held: The Court ruled against the petitioner. The rule stated in the Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included and the old Rule 28 (now Rule 22) of the Rule of Court which stated that In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a holiday. In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and found no cogent reason to adopt a different view. National Marketing Corporation (Namarco) v. Tecson Issue: Should a year be computed as calendar year or as based on Civil Codes computation of a year as having 365 days? Facts: On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment on Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Miguel Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The decision was served to the defendants of November 21, 1955. On December 21, 1965, Namarco (successor of Price Stabilization Corp) appealed for the revival of the judgment. Miguel Tecson moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. Article 1144(3) states that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. The decision became final on December 21, 1955 (thirty days after the defendants received the judgment) and the appeal was made on December 21, 1965. The years 1960 and 1964 23
both had leap years so that 365 days in ten years would be equal to 3,650 days and this would fall on December 19, 1965. Held: The Court denied the petitioners appeal citing Article 13 of the Civil Code. Go v. Dizon Issues: The petitioners Notice of Appeal should not have been dismissed since the appeal was filed within the time provided. Facts: The petitioners filed their notice of appeal thirteen days from March 21, 1986 (the date their petition for relief was denied by Judge Baltazar Dizon). But the respondent Equitable filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and was granted. Held: The denial for Petition for Relief was Reversed and Set Aside because Section 13, Rule 41 states that an appeal can only be dismissed where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided and the petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal within the time provided. Section 23: Perfection of appeal. In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Quiqui v. Boncaros Issue: Did the petitioner file their Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary period? Facts: The petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents regarding the ownership of a parcel of land. The presiding judge of the case, Judge Alejandro Boncaros, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on July 17, 1979. The same filed a Motion for Reconsideration on August 17, 1979. The motion was dismissed for it was already beyond the 30-day reglementary period. The petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal seeking relief from the Court of Appeals but were denied. Held: The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit, upholding the decision of the lower court. Cited Article 13 of the Civil Code: In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. Additional info: The petitioners cited De las Alas v. Court of Appeals but in this case, the last day fell on a Sunday, so the last day was moved to the first working day immediately after.
K. APPLICABILITY OF PENAL LAWS Lazaro B. Rayray (plaintiff-appellant) v Chae Kyung Lee (defendant-appellee) Related Provisions NCC 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. Nature of the Case Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Facts Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee who is formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea. Summons were served by publication. Plaintiff moved that the defendant be declared in default for not filing an answer. The 24
case was heard on the merits and the decision was rendered dismissing the plaintiffs complaint upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad, (2) that the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court. o Exhibit A is not signed and it was obtained only after the alleged wedding o Defendant did not say that she had been married before, but admitted to have lived with several other men o There is no showing of evidence that Korean laws permit bigamy or polygamy thus it is assumed that the foreign law is identical to the lex fori or in this case the Philippine Law o Exhibit D states that defendant had no previous marriage o The court cant believe the plaintiffs testimony because he lied regarding his status before in this very court L. BINDING EFFECT Manuela Barretto Gonzales (plaintiff and appellee) v Augusto C. Gonzales (defendant and appellant) Related Provisions NCC 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. NCC 17, par 3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Nature of the Case Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila Facts 25
Issues Whether or not the court has jurisdiction Whether or not the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant is substantially valid Held Decision is affirmed
Ratio The court has jurisdiction o the case is on the annulment of plaintiffs marriage to the defendant which is within the jurisdiction of our courts o the court acquired jurisdiction by the plaintiffs submission thereto of his complaint o Jurisdiction depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage Court has jurisdiction over the res, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum o Plaintiff is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein, making his status subject to the courts jurisdiction The marriage of the plaintiff and defendant is substantially valid
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippines and residents of Manila Significant dates o January 19, 1919 they were married in Manila and lived together until the Spring of 1926 Four children were born They had mutual agreement to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children (P500 monthly subject to increase if necessary), and the title of certain properties to be put in her name o November 28, 1927 absolute divorce is decreed as secured in Reno, Nevada by the husband o November 28, 1927 husband went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now has three children o August 1928 husband went back to the Philippines Wife requests that Philippine courts confirm and ratify the decree of divorce Court of First Instance found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors Parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters, but they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce Ratio Reno divorce is not recognized o Entire conduct of the parties clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and conditions not authorized by our law o The matrimonial domicile of the couple is in the Philippines thus the residence acquired by the husband in Nevada to secure a divorce did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he entered in 1919 Pastor B. Tenchavez (plaintiff-appellant) v Vicenta F. Escao, et al (defendants-appellees) Related Provisions NCC 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. NCC 17, par 3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Nature of the Case Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Facts Significant dates 26
Issues Whether or not the Reno divorce acquired by the party is recognized in the Philippines Held Judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila is reversed and defendant is absolved from the demands made against him
o February 24, 1948 Vicenta Escao (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register) o February 26, 1948 Mamerto Escao received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel o June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged o June 24, 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years o August 22, 1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character o October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute o 1951 Escaos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor o September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran o August 8, 1958 Vicenta acquired an American citizenship o July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escaos whom he charged for dissuading their daughter from him Falsely charged the Escaos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of plaintiff from supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife Thus, this appeal
Issues Whether or not Vicenta and Pastors marriage is valid Whether or not their marriage is subsisting and undissolved Whether or not Vicentas divorce and second marriage is valid Held Decision under appeal is hereby modified o Pastor is entitled to a legal separation o Vicenta is sentenced to pay Pastor for damages and attorneys fees o Pastor is sentenced to pay the Escaos by way of damages and attorneys fees Tenchavez falsely charged which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages
Ratio February 24, 1948 marriage is valid o Both parties were above the age of majority o Both consented to the marriage o Marriage was performed by a Catholic Priest in the presence of competent witnesses o The very act of Vicenta suing for divorce implies admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding Their marriage is subsisting and undissolved under the Philippine law; Vicentas divorce and second marriage is not valid o The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce 27
o Vicentas marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran entitles Techavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery Board of Commissioners, et al (petitioners) v Hon. Joselito Dela Rosa (respondents) Related Provisions Article 26 of the FC All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited Nature of the Case Petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution/ temporary restraining order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 29 Facts Significant dates o July 12, 1960 Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigraon as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board (CEB), Santiago testified that he has five children o June 27, 1961 William Gatchalian (12), sibling of Johnson, arrived in Manila with 3 other Gatchalians (Gloria and Francisco who are daughter and son of Santiago and Johnson who is the son of Francisco) o July 6, 1961 Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens; William was issued Identification Certificate by the immigration authorities o January 24, 1962 Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (BOC) on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of Board of Special Inquiry o July 6, 1962 new BOC reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian (final and executory) o 1973 respondent Gatchalian filed a motion for rehearing o March 14, 1973 BSI recommended to the commissioner the reversal of July 6 decision of BOC and the recall of warrants of arrest issued therein o March 15, 1973 commissioner reaffirmed the July 6 decision o June 7, 1990 acting director of NBI recommended that respondent Gatchalian along with other applicants covered by warrant of exclusion be charged with violation of Immigration Act of 1940 o August 1, 1990 secretary of justice indorsed the recommendation of NBI to the commissioner of immigration for investigation and immediate action o August 15, 1990 petitioner commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (appeared and was released upon posting cash bond o August 29, 1990 William Gatchalian filed Petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution/ temporary restraining order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 29 28
o September 4, 1990 petitioners file a motion to dismiss such allegation that the judge has no jurisdiction over the BOC or BSI o September 6, 1990 respondent Gatchalians wife and minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila for injuction with writ of preliminary injunction; alleged that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William o September 7, 1990 Judge Dela Rosa denied the motion to dismiss Thus, this petition ensued mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) The said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals does not extend to all quasi-judicial agencies (under Section 9, par 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) o Only those quasi-judicial bodies under Republic Act no. 5434 o There are quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court o Bureau of Immigration is not among those agencies whose decisions aew directly appealable to the Court of Appeals o As the BOI is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable through a special civil action for certiorari by the RTC (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) RTC is the competent court which could properly take cognizance of this case, not the Court of Appeals (under Sec 21, par 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) o But considering the voluminous pleadings, this court (SC) deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance Doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand o Exception to the rule (Burca v Republic): where the citizenship (material issue) is definitely resolved by a court or administrative agency (Solicitor General or his authorized representative) after a full-blown hearing, and the citizenship is affirmed by this Court, the decision shall constitute conclusive proof of such partys citizenship in any other case or proceeding 29
Issues Whether or not RTC have jurisdiction over judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies Whether or not Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, board of commissions (BOC, BSI, etc.) Which court could take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian Whether or not the July 6, 1962 decision is res judicata (the thing has been decided) Whether or not the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962 Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen Held William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen Ratio RTC have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
Court finds it devoid of merit (under Section 37, par a of Immigration Act of 1940) o Warrant of arrest issued by COI to be valid must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation, if for investigation only renders such null and void for being unconstitutional William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen o Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen; as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared a Filipino citizen o Applicants have not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian o Petitioners alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962; however the warrant of arrest was issued only on August 15, 1990 (28 years after) Such could not now be validly enforced due to inaction (under Sec 39 of the Immigration Act stating that deportation proceedings should be instituted within 5 years nor after 10 years under Article 1144 par 3 of the Civil Code) o Significant dates 1961 William Gatchalians admission as a Filipino citizen in the Philippines July 1, 1973 he married Ting Dee Hua Had 4 children, became a registered voter, engaged in business in the Philippines, is a taxpayer o Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere (Art. 26 of the Family Code) Santiago married Chu Gim Tee in China and Francisco Gatchalian married Ong Chiu Kiok in China Marriages are valid even though there are no showing of any China laws because there being no proof of China law, it is presumed that Philippine laws apply Having declared that the assailed marriages of Santiago and Francisco Gatchalian, William follows the citizenship of his father a Filipino
Germann & Co. (plaintiff-appellees) v Donaldson, Sim & Co. (defendants-appellants) Related Provisions NCC 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. Nature of the Case An incident of want of personality of the plaintiff's attorney Facts Both Tornow (resident of Berlin) and Kammerzell (resident of Manila) are citizens of Germany first-named instrument was authenticated by a notary with the formalities required by the domestic laws, the other was not so authenticated Significant dates o February 5, 1900 an instrument was executed in Berlin, Germany by Max Tornow conferring upon Kammerzell attorneys of powers 30
o October 27, 1900 a general power for suits was executed in Manila by virtue of a general power for suits conferred upon Kammerzell to recover a sum claimed to be due for freight under a charter party The main object of the instrument is clearly to make Kammerzell the manager of the Manila branch of the plaintiff's business, with the same general authority with reference to its conduct which his principal would himself possess if he were personally directing it - February 21, 1997, Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor filed with the SDC an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Banggolo, Marawi City, against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and Mangoda Radia. They alleged that they were the absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint. That Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he inherited it from his late father. That in 1996, they were informed that their land was leveled and the small houses were removed without their permission upon the orders of Tomawis. That they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title. - Tomawis denied the sisters claim of ownership and filed a motion for dismiss. Also it argue that a regular civil court not an SDC has the jurisdiction to hear the case. This was dismissed. Tomawis later on filed several motions including Urgent Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Correct the Name of Defendants to Read Sultan Yahya "Jerry" M. Tomawis & Mangoda M. Radia and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Cancel and Reset the Continuation of Trial Until After the Resolution of the Pending Incident claiming that the SDC does not have jurisdiction for hearing the case at hand. These were also dismissed. He then appealed to the CA and filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition but was yet again dismissed. On January 29, 2008, he filed another motion to dismiss on the same grounds as his previous motions to dismiss, his motion was denied with finality! - Petitioner asserts that Sec 19 (2), in relation to Sec 33 (3) of BP 129 removed from the SDCs jurisdiction civil actions that involve the title to, or possession of, real property granted to it by Art 143 of PD 1083. In other words, the former repealed the latter statute. 31
Issues Whether or not Fernando Kammerzell had the power of attorney for Max Leonard Tornow Held Yes, Fernando Kammerzell had the power of attorney
Ratio There is no reason why the general principle that the formal validity of contracts is to be tested by the laws of the country where they are executed should not apply The institution of the suit of this case is not considered to fall under Art. 1713 because it is not considered an act of strict ownership but only for the administration of business. Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 Nature: petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Orders dated July 13, 2005, September 6, 2005, and February 6, 2008 Facts:
And that therefore, SDC no longer have jurisdiction for such kind of cases. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Held: No. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts. It is held that a general law and a special law on the same subject should be read together and in harmony. A general law does not repeal a special law. In addition, there is no express repeal and as a general rule, implied repeals are not favored. Grave abuse of discretion on the other hand, is committed when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. Such is not the case in the lower courts ruling for its decision is in fact well founded. IV. PERSONS AND PERSONALITY B. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY 1. NATURAL PERSONS BIRTH NCC - Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) NCC - Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a) 1987 Consti, Art. II - Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. P.D. 603 - Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code. FC - Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a) RPC - Art. 256. Intentional abortion. Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer: 32
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman. 2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent of the woman. 3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman shall have consented. RPC - Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally. RPC - Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so. Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. RPC - Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same. Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S.Ct 705, 35 L.ed. 2d 147 Facts: - Petitioner Jane Roe is contesting the constitutionality of Texas state criminal abortion legislation which prohibits abortions except with respect to those procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant and that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe and clinical conditions. That she was unable to get abortion in Texas because her life didnt appear to be threatened by her continued pregnancy and that she could not afford to go to other jurisdictions that allow abortion under safe conditions. That the Texas statutes were vague and that they abridge her right for personal privacy protected by the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th and 14th Ammendments. And then something about fetus being a person and its rights that I do not as of yet understand waaaaa I cant understand the rest of the case yet, waaah Ill try to send the finished version as soon as I can. Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801 Nature: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the court of first instance of Manila, ordering Geluz to pay damages and attorneys fees to the Villanuevas. Facts: - Nita Villanueva had twice become pregnant by her legal husb and but that in both instances, the husband had consented to aborting the fetus. Both abortions were performed by Dr. Geluz. A third abortion was committed but this time without the consent of the husband, this now becomes the basis of the plaintiff in filing an action for damages. Court of Appeals and RTC both decide in favor of the plaintiffs. Thus Geluz filed a petition for review by certiorari. Issue: whether or not the husband of a woman who has voluntarily procured her abprtion could recover damages from the physician who caused it. 33
Held: No. The award given by the lower courts based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that does not have personality. It is also generally held in the prevailing American jurisprudence that recovery for damages cannot be had for the death of an unborn child. The damages that the parents can resort to are those that have been inflicted to them by virtue of the loss of their child. In this case, they would only be limited to moral damages, but because of the husbands indifference to his wifes previous abortions, it could be implied that he is unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections thus no grounds for moral damages are present. It appeared that his primary concern was in obtaining a large amount of money from the doctor as exemplified by his exaggerated claim for damages amounting to 50,000. Quimiging v. Icao 34 SCRA 134 Nature: Appeal from an order of the court of first instance in Zamboanga dismissing a complaint for damages and another order denying amendment of the same plea. Facts: - The parties are neighbors and had close confidential relations. Although married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and that despite efforts, plaintiff became pregnant and had to stop schooling. Hence she claimed support of P120/mo, damages and attys fees. - icao in his defense moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since she did not allege that a child has actually been born. Motion was granted. - Plaintiff moved to amend the same complaint to allege that a baby girl has been born due to the intercourse. This was dismissed on the grounds that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Issue: Considering that the plaintiff failed to mention in her complaint that a child has actually been born, does it mean that the child is thus not entitled to support from his/her father(respondent)? Held: No. A conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. Therefore, it has the right to support from its progenitors. In addition the plaintiff is entitled to further damages as being forced to yield to a married mans lust is a violation of her rights. De Jesus vs. Sequia 58 Phil 866 Nature: Appeal from a judgement of the court of first instance of manila of plaintiffs from the decision that denied part of the relief they sought and defendant from the decision that required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance. Facts: - Syquia and Antonia were engaged in an amorous relationship that resulted in the conception of a child that was later born on 17 Jun 1931. During the early months of pregnancy, defendant frequented on the plaintiffs house. On Feb 1931, the eve of his departure to China and Japan, he placed in her hands a note to a padre that read: The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it. While abroad, defendant also exchanged correspondence by way letters to the plaintiff. He also employed his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and made arrangements for the hospitalization of Antonia. Upon leaving the hospital, Antonia and her baby was taken by Syquia to a house at 551 camarines St., manila and lived there together for about a year as a regular family. When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant decamped and married another woman. 34
Issue: Whether or not the note to the padre written by the defendant to the mother during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity? Held: Yes. A child upon being conceived becomes a bearer of legal rights and is capable of being dealt with as living persons. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre is clear. Though in the end it was not given the name Cesar Syquia Jr. as was initially intended, its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montao This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano, grounded on the death of his unborn child. Facts: 9 January 2006, Hortillano, employee of Continental Steel and member of Union filed for a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded between Continental and Union: ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE xxxx Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with Claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child which, according to the Certificate of Fetal Death, died 35 pay to any employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following: 2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days xxxx ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS xxxx Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner: xxxx 4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
during labor. Hortillanos wife, Marife, was already on her 38th week or 9th month Continental granted paternity leave but not bereavement leave and other death benefits consisting of the death and accident insurance Seeking to reverse Continentals denial of the bereavement and other death benefit, the Union filed a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE, NCR. 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement and other death benefits with Atty. Montao as the chosen arbitrator. Arguments of the two parties: o Union the CBA did not specify that the dependent should have been born alive first so his death can be covered Other cases in MKK Steel Corp and Mayer Steel Pipe Corp, sister companies of Continental, gave death benefits to their employees with similar case Invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code which states that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer o Continental CBA did not specify death of unborn child, a fetus without legal personality Relying on Arts. 41-42 of the Civil Code, Continental averred that only one with civil personality could die and the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality A fetus which died before delivery is not a person at all and could not be considered a dependent since it never needed support nor did it acquire a right to be supported 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao issued a Resolution entitling Hortillano to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits amounting to P16, 489 Continental filed a Petition for Review of Certiorari with CA 27 February 2008, CA affirmed Atty. Montaos resolution 9 May 2008, CA denied Continentals MR
Issue: Can Hortillanos unborn child be considered dependent considering that she died before delivery and did not acquire civil personality? Held: Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA affirming Atty. Montaos Resolution is Affirmed. Continentals reliance on Articles 41-42 is misplaced since Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, Article 41 defines when a child is considered born, and Article 42 states that civil personality is extinguished by death. These articles do not provide a definition of death. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs 36
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs) 2006 Ladlad filed for registration with the COMELEC. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the org has no substantial membership base 17 August 2009 Ladlad filed for registration again o Ladlad argued that LGBT community 1. is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged bec of their sexual orientation and gender identity 2. That LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence 3. That bec of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation 4. And that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC o Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and org supporters, and outlined its platform of governance 11 November 2009 Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds o said that definition of the LGBT sector makes it clear that Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and cited the Bible and Koran o ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x o It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning. o Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows: Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon: 1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals; 2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same; (b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, 37
exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts. 3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. o Should the petition be granted, the youth will be exposed to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith o When Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nations, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. 4 January 2010 Ang Ladlad filed this petition praying the Court annul the assailed resolutions and direct Comelec to grant their application for accreditation and the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against COMELEC which will begin printing the final ballots on 25 January 6 January 2010 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was ordered to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC until 12:00 noon of 11 January. OSG filed for extension until 16 January. OSG filed a comment supporting Ladlad 2 February 2010 COMELEC filed its own Comment through its Law Dept. 12 January 2010 TRO was issued directing Comelec to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions 13 January Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Opined that the denial of Ladlads petition based on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 19 January Motion to Intervene granted 26 January Epifanio Salonga Jr. filed Motion to Intervene 2 February motion granted
Issue: Is Comelecs decision to deny Ang Ladlad accreditation valid? Held: The Court granted the petition and set aside Comelecs resolutions. Comelec is also directed to grant the petitioners application for party-list accreditation. Ang Ladlad has complied with the requirements for the party-list system Government action, including ints proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage has secular purpose 38
Comelecs Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad Moral disapproval is not enough to justify exclusion of homosexuals from party-list system Comelecs reference to purported violations of the penal and civil law are mere allegations and need proof beyond reasonable doubt No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior DEATH NCC 42: Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a) Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragrante This is a petition for review of a judgment of the Public Service Commission. Facts: May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibaez, issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the Intestate to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of 2 tons in San Juan and to sell ice from the plant in San Juan and Mandaluyong, Rizal and QC Background story: Pedro Fragante died before his application for certification was finalized. During the process of applying for certification, he has already incurred P35,000 in expenses, among others. Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragante is the excutor or administrator of his estate. Petitioner is questioning the right of Intestate to acquire the certificate considering that Fragante has died. Issue: Should the estate of Pedro O. Fragante be considered citizen of the Philippines within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission ton issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organied under the laws of the Philippines? Held: Court affirmed the decision of the Public Service Commission. The Court considered Fragantes estate as an extension of his person. Within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the juridical administration thereof of those rights and fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. Dissenting Opinion: The question can be restated into whether or not Fragantes heirs are citizens of the Philippines. If they are, the decision should be affirmed. Otherwise, the same should be reversed. The citizenship of the special administrator of the estate should also be investigated.
Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. 39
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Facts: 28 February 1962, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag, and Juana Darang to pay P3,667.03 plus interest to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. In case the defendants failed to pay before the decision becomes final, Quality Products will be authorized to foreclose the bond. The defendants failed to pay the amount and Quality Products (QP) ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and the sale at public auction of Orias land. 24 September 1962 the land was levied and sold at a public auction 20 November 1962 lower court confirmed the sale Backstory: o 23 April 1959 Orias death o 13 June 1960 case filed o QP did not know about Orias death o 24 June 1960 summons and copies of complaint served to the principal in the bond, Soliven, who acknowledged by signing for himself and his codefendants. 1 March 1963 the Dumlaos, testamentary heirs in Orias will sued QP for the annulment of judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the deceased. QP alleged that Orias heirs knew of the suit and were estopped to question the courts jurisdiction over Oria. Lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and other defendants because of their voluntary appearance. Since Orias counsel appeared for him, the court acquired jurisdiction over Oria. Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction over Oria considering that he no longer had civil personality during the action case against him? Held: The Court reversed and set aside the lower courts decision and declared its judgment in the case against Pedro Oria as void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Orias land is, therefore, also void. Oria has not been validly served with summons since he had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20. Facts: 5 October 1988 petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order/injunction seeking o to enjoin Judge Velez from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus (HC) case, o the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the said judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, o and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. 11 October 1988 Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for TRO Backstory: o 28 August 1988 Vitaliana Vargas (Vitaliana) died 40
o 27 September 1988 Vitalianas brothers and sisters (Vargases), unaware of her death, filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence and confined by the petitioner in his palacial residence o 28 September 1988 the court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatified. Petitioner refused to surrender the body reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of HC proceedings. He said that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy. He claimed legal custody of the body as her common law husband o 29 and 30 September 1988 the court issued two orders directing the delivery of the corpse to a funeral parlor in CDO and its autopsy. o Petitioner filed to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction o Vargases were granted leave to amend their petition. They alleged that Eugenio is interferring with their legal duty to bury their sister o 21 October 1988 petition to dismisss was submitted for resolution o 17 November 1988 the court denied the motion to dismiss. The court did not lose jurisdiction over nature and subject matter of the case and may entertain the case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead as well as the burial and interment. Cited Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction 1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 5. In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations 6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. o 17 January 1989 the court rendered decision on its jurisdiction over the case. And proceeded to award the rightful custody of the body to the Vargases. Issue: Does the court have jurisdiction over a dead person? Held: The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and dismissed the petitions. After the Vargases learned of Vitalianas death, their petition for HC was amended and not dismissed to avoid multiplicity of suits. Writ of HC became moot and academic due to the death of Vitaliana but the issue of custody remained Eugenio is a common law spouse, something which the Phil Law does not recognize. Therefore, custody over the body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the Vargases
41
NCC 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effects of death upon the rights and obligayions of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Marcos v. Manglapus Facts: The petitioners, the family of the late Pres. Marcos, filed for a motion for reconsideration regarding the denial of the court of their return to the Philippined and the return and burial of the corpse of Mr. Marcos. The President has also spoken of her disagreement with the petition of the Marcoses. Issues: Can the family of Mr. Marcos return to the Philippines, with the corpse of the late President? Do they pose a threat to the people of the Philippines? Does the President have the power to not allow a Filipino to return to his/her country? Held: The court denied the Marcos family of their motion for reconsideration. The court ruled that there is a lack of compelling reasons to reconsider the case, the President has power more than that listed in the Constitution, the threat to the government of the return of the Marcoses has not ceased, and it is the duty of the President to promote and protect the welfare of the people. Dissenting Opinions: Cruz emphasized that the death of Marcos has not plunged the country in grief nor has it disprove the indifference of the people to the late President. Cruz also argued that the death of Marcos also signalled the death of the threat he may have with him. Paras stresses that the dead still has certain rights, the alleged threat is unproved, and reconciliation will be achieved faster if the President will allow the return of the Marcoses and the corpse. Lastly, the world would appreciate a lot the act of mercy. Padilla argues that Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return, die and be buried in his homeland. Since the first two eighrs have already been deprived to Mr. Marcos, the last one should be given to him. Sarmiento pointed out the change in the position of the two families and insisted that emotions should not be allowed to overpower the use of reason. Also, the President has no power to prevent the Marxoses to bury the corpse in the country. NCC 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (ii): That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest; Joaquin v. Navarro Facts: Durig the battle for the liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro Sr. and his wife, Angela Joaquin de Navarro, aged 67, together with their children, Pilar (32 or 33 yrs.ols), Concepcion, Antiviral (the two are between 23 and 25 yrs old) and Joaquin Jr (and his wife, Adela Conde) sought refuge in the ground floor of the German Club. There were many refugees in the said building and it was set on fire. At the same time, the Japanese started shooting inside the building, especially those who are trying to escape. This time, the three daughters were killed. Joaquin Sr. and his son decided to leave the said building for safer haven but Angela was not convinced and so they left her. Joaquin Jr.,around 30 years old, was then shot. Minutes later, the German Club collapsed presumably killing the people inside. Three days later Joaquin Sr., aged 70, was also shot. The case is important for the right of succession of Ramon Joaquin, natural child of Angela and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio Navarro, son of Joaquin Sr. in his first marriage. 42
RTC ruled that Angela died before her son while the CA ruled that it was the other way around. Francisco Lopez is the sole witness. Applicable Provisions: Rule 123, Section 69 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that when two people perish in the same calamity, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circunstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules. Art. 43 of NCC. Issue: Who died first? Held: The Court reversed the decision and hold that the distribution of the descendentsestates should be made in accordance with the decision of the RTC. 2. Juridical Persons NCC Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a) Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. (38a) Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 Sec. 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. Sec. 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Sec. 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or disapproved. - The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of incorporation or disapprove any amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance with the requirements of this Code: Provided, That the Commission shall give the incorporators a reasonable time within which to correct or modify the objectionable portions of the articles or amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or disapproval: 1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not substantially in accordance with the form prescribed herein; 2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or contrary to government rules and regulations; 3. That the Treasurer's Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock subscribed and/or paid if false; 4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the Constitution. 43
No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks, banking and quasi-banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies and other financial intermediaries, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions, and other corporations governed by special laws shall be accepted or approved by the Commission unless accompanied by a favorable recommendation of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such articles or amendment is in accordance with law. NCC Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. (1665a) Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph. Barlin v. Ramirez Faxts: The defendant, Ramires, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on July 1901. He administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until November 1902. His successor, having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document, refused to make such delivery. The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the said properties and asks that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief. The answer of the defendant, in addition to the general denial of the allegations of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. Issues: Who is the real owner of the property in question? Is the Roman Catholic Church a juridical entity? Held: The court held that the property be delivered, with the costs of this instance be against the appellant. Yes, the Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity and the defendant should not and can not be permitted to deny the plaintiffs right to the possession of the property. Camid v. Office of the President Facts: Andong,a town that is not supposed to exist yet, is anyway insisted to some as actually alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declard void ab initio by the Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong strives on, and hence, it legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. Sec. 442 of the Local Government Code of 1991: Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, of at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P=2,500,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. 44
(c) h The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income. (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. E.O. No. 107, which established Andong, was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with 33 other E.O.s Issues: Is Andong a municipality and a juridical entity? Is the DILG to be blamed for this issue? Held: The case is not a fit subject for the special civic actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual actions. Thus, the petition is dismissed. Also, the Certification issued by the DILG does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. The annulment of this will really do nothing to the recognition of Andong. Note: Even where a decision has been rendered by a Department Secretary, an alter ego of the President under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, an appeal to the President is still proper where the law expressly provide for exhaustion. Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza Facts: Juasing Hardware, alleging to be a single proprietorship due organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. Dolla failed and refused to pay, despite repeated demands, the purchase prices of items, materials and merchandise which she bought from the plaintiff. Solla stated that she has no knowledge about the plaintiffs legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in the complaint. RULE 3 Revised Rules of Court Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the crossdefendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant. RULE 10 Revised Rules of Court S Sec. 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. Issues: Is the Juasing Hardware a juridical entity with legal capacity to bring an action in court considering that it is a sole proprietorship, not a corporation or partnership? Did the lower court commit a grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case and refuse the admission of the Amended Complaint filed by Juasing Hardware? Held: There is no law authorizing sole proprietorship to bring suit in court. The complaint should have been filed in the name of the owner. Also, the defect of the complaint in the instant case was merely formal and not substantial. The substitution of the plaintiff would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. With this, the petition is granted. The lower court is ordered to admit the Amend Complaint. C. RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL CAPACITY 1. PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY Catalan v. Basa This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA which affirmed the judgment of the RTC in Lingayen dismissing the 45
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages. Facts: October 20, 1948 Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service o The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was schizophrenic and unfit to render military service September 28, 1949 Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo June 16, 1951 Feliciano allegedly donated one-half of his real property in Pangasinan to his sister Mercedes Catalan o BIR issued a tax certificate to Mercedes for the land o Half of the property remained with Feliciano December 11, 1953 Peoples Bank and Trust Co. (BPI) filed Special Proceedings No. 4563 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent December 22, 1953 court issued its Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano December 23, 1953 court appointed bank as Felicianos guardian Nov. 22, 1978 Feliciano and Corazon donated lots to their son, Eulogio March 26, 1979 Mercedes sold the land he received from Feliciano to her children Delia and Jesus Basa (deed of sale was registered Feb. 20, 1992) June 24, 1983 and Feb. 14, 1983 Feliciano and Corazon donated more of their land to their children April 1, 1997 BPI filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages against the Basas o Alleged that the donation is void ab initio since Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes and even if he did, the donation will still be void since Feliciano was not of sound mind and was, therefore, not capable of giving consent Aug. 14, 1997 Feliciano died and his heirs became the complainants Dec. 7, 1999 lower court found that the evidence is not enough to prove that Feliciano was not of sound mind on the time he executed the deed o Complaint was dismissed Petitioners went to CA o Affirmed the lower courts decision Issue: Whether or not Feliciano was capable of giving consent to the deed considering that he was not of sound mind Held: The SC affirmed the findings of the CA and the trial court A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property rights o A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property Petitioners failed to show proof that at the date of donation, Feliciano had lost total control of his mental faculties; thus, unless proved otherwise, he is presumed to have been capable of giving consent A. MINORITY Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the 46
Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Facts: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs) 2006 Ladlad filed for registration with the COMELEC. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the org has no substantial membership base 17 August 2009 Ladlad filed for registration again o Ladlad argued that LGBT community 5. is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged bec of their sexual orientation and gender identity 6. That LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence 7. That bec of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation 8. And that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC o Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and org supporters, and outlined its platform of governance 11 November 2009 Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds o said that definition of the LGBT sector makes it clear that Ladlad tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs and cited the Bible and Koran o ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x o It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning. o Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows: Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon: 1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals; 2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the 47
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same; (b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts. 3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. o Should the petition be granted, the youth will be exposed to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith o When Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nations, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. 4 January 2010 Ang Ladlad filed this petition praying the Court annul the assailed resolutions and direct Comelec to grant their application for accreditation and the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against COMELEC which will begin printing the final ballots on 25 January 6 January 2010 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was ordered to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC until 12:00 noon of 11 January. OSG filed for extension until 16 January. OSG filed a comment supporting Ladlad 2 February 2010 COMELEC filed its own Comment through its Law Dept. 12 January 2010 TRO was issued directing Comelec to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions 13 January Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. Opined that the denial of Ladlads petition based on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 19 January Motion to Intervene granted 26 January Epifanio Salonga Jr. filed Motion to Intervene 2 February motion granted Issue: Is Comelecs decision to deny Ang Ladlad accreditation valid? Held: The Court granted the petition and set aside Comelecs resolutions. Comelec is also directed to grant the petitioners application for party-list accreditation. Ang Ladlad has complied with the requirements for the party-list system 48
Government action, including ints proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage has secular purpose Comelecs Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad Moral disapproval is not enough to justify exclusion of homosexuals from party-list system Comelecs reference to purported violations of the penal and civil law are mere allegations and need proof beyond reasonable doubt No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior Mercado vs. Espiritu 37 Phil 215 Facts: This is an appel to the judgment of the Court of First Instance wherein the plaintiffs were ordered to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land and to pay the costs of the trial. April 9, 1913 - a complain was submitted by the plaintiffs, Domingo and Josefa Mercado, against Luis Espiritu( later died and so the defendant became his son, Jose) Arguments of the plaintiffs: The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu (sister of Luis); That Margarita died in1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land which hereditary portion has been held by the plaintiffs since then through their fayjer Wenceslao; that in 1910, Luis induced and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sign a deed of sale of the land; that 1/2 of the land belongs to Margarita, and one fourth of the land is to the plaintiffs while the other hquarter is to their sisters; and that Luis has received the produce of the land since 1901 (until he died). They hold that the contract of the sale is null and void and prayed that the defendant deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land together with the produce thereof. The defendant's rebuttal: He denies each and all of their argument and argues that in 1894, Margarita sold a portion of the land to Luis; that in 1901, Wenceslao sold under pacto de retro to Luis the remainder of the land; that also in the same year, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age (together with their sisters) executed the notarial instrument ratifying the said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother. He rendered by ordering that the plaintiffs be ordered to keep perpetual silence with respect tot the land and to pay the said inestate estate P1,000 for losses and damages and the costs of the trial be charged against them. Ley 6, Title 19, Partidas 6: If he who is a minor (1) deceitfully says or sets forth in an instrument that he is over 25 years old, and this assertion is believed by another person who takes him to be of about that age, (2) in an action at law he should be deemed to be of the age he asserted, and should not (3) afterwards be released from liability on the plea that he was not of said age when he assumed the obligatopn. The reason for this is that the law helps the the deceived and not the deceiver. Issue/s: Is the notarized document ratifying the sale of the land null and void considering that the plaintiffs were said to be minors at the time when it was signed? 49
Held: It would be improper and illegal to hold that Luis had any need to to forge or simulate the notarized document. Also, the plaintiffs have absolutely no right to recover the said parcel of land as its ownership was conveyed to Luis by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and to other portion they could have redeemed before 1910 upon the payent or the return of the sum which Wenceslao had received as a loan under the security of the pledged property; bit after the execution of the notarized document, Luis definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of land, There is no legal ground or wellfounded reason why the document should be rejected. The document were they claimed to be of legal age and signed it is perfectly valid. The sale of real estates by minors who pretend to be of legal age is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by them or to have them annulled. Lastly, there are no proofs that the plaintiffs have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of the document. With these, the Court ruled that the ruling of the Court of First Instance is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. Bambalan vs Maramba and Muerong Facts: Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the owner of the parcel of land in question and that the plaintiff is his sole heir. A document signed by the plaintiff is presented to the court as a proof that the land has been conveyed in favor of the defendants, as payment for his mothers loan of P200 to the defendants. The plaintiff was also a minor at the time he signed the document. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff sold the land to the defendants. Held: No. The document transferring the ownership of the land from the plaintiff to the defendant is void because at the time he signed it, he was a minor and it also does not appear that he intended to sell the land. Thus the land is not bound by the contract between the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff cannot be held estopped because in the first place, the defendants knew that he was a minor at the time the contract was executed. Braganza, et al (petitioners) vs De Villa Abrille (respondent) Nature of the Case Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts From October 30, 1944 Rosario Baraganza and sons (Rodolfo and Guillermo) were required by Fernando de Villa Abrille to pay P10,000 plus 2% interest o Braganza et al, received, as a loan from Villa Abrille, P70,000 in Japanese war notes so they promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay him March 1949 Villa Abrille sued them for not paying o Branganza et al claimed that they only received P40,000 and that Guillermo (16) and Rodolfo (18) were minors when they signed the promissory note (Exhibit A) The court rendered judgment which the CA affirmed o There can be no question about the responsibility of Rosario Braganza because the minority of her consigners does not release her from liability o Rodolfo and Guillermo are liable They did not confess in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age They pretended to be of legal age when in fact theyre not Issues WON Rodolfo and Guillermo are liable Held 50
CA decision is modified Ratio Rodolfo and Guillermo are not liable o Being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in Exhibit A The written contract is unenforceable due to non-age o However, they are not entirely absolved from monetary responsibility They shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money they received Besides, the funds were used for their support Sian Suan and Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara This is a petition for review on certiorari a decision of the CA. Facts: August 3, 1931 Rufino Alcantara and sons Damaso and Ramon executed a deed of sale conveying Sia Suan five parcels of land o Roman Alcantara was 17 years, 10 months, and 22 days old August 27, 1931 Gaw Chiao (Sia Suans husband) received a letter from Ramons lawyer, Francisco Alonzo, informing him that Ramon was a minor and is, therefore, disavowing the contract o Gaw Chiao contacted Ramon and Ramon executed an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale in the office of Jose Gomez, Gaw Chiaos lawyer Ramon received P500 from Gaw Chiao Sia Suan sold one of the lots to the Azoreses August 8, 1940 an action was instituted by Ramon for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land they sold o Action was against Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao and his father and sibing including Azores Court of First Instance of Laguna absolved all defendants Ramon appealed to CA which reversed the trial courts decision o Deed of sale is not binding against Ramon because he was a minor o The fact that appellees took no step nine years to protect their interet beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale was not binding against Ramon Alcantara since he was a minor the time he signed the contract Held: SC reversed CAs decision and absolved the appellants from complaint Since appellees conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness, it should produce its full force and effect It does not matter even though the appellant informed the spouses about his minority a month after the sale because his previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract The information just serves to prove that the spouses did not know that Ramon was minor CRIMINAL LIABILITY Revised Penal Code 51
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80. 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances; 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.chan robles virtual law library 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. PD 603 Art. 189. Youthful Offender Defined. - A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. 52
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of his or her father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192. The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 190. Physical and Mental Examination. - It shall be the duty of the law-enforcement agency concerned to take the youthful offender, immediately after his apprehension, to the proper medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental examination. Whenever treatment for any physical or mental defect is indicated, steps shall be immediately undertaken to provide the same. The examination and treatment papers shall form part of the record of the case of the youthful offender. Art. 191. Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. - A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from the time of his arrest be committed to the care of the Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on recognizance, to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever required. Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. - If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. Art. 193. Appeal. - The youthful offender whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in criminal cases. Art. 194. Care and Maintenance of Youthful Offender. - The expenses for the care and maintenance of the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended shall be borne by his parents or those persons liable to support him: Provided, That in case his parents or those persons liable to support him can not pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality in which the offense was committed shall pay onethird of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay 53
two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said indebtedness. All city and provincial governments must exert efforts for the immediate establishment of local detention homes for youthful offenders. Art. 195. Report on Conduct of Child. - The Department of Social Welfare or its representative or duly licensed agency or individual under whose care the youthful offender has been committed shall submit to the court every four months or oftener as may be required in special cases, a written report on the conduct of said youthful offender as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by him. Art. 196. Dismissal of the Case. - If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender whose sentence has been suspended, has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, even before reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, it shall dismiss the case and order his final discharge. Art. 197. Return of the Youth Offender to Court. - Whenever the youthful offender has been found incorrigible or has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his rehabilitation programs, or should his continued stay in the training institution be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment. When the youthful offender has reached the age of twenty-one while in commitment, the court shall determine whether to dismiss the case in accordance with the next preceding article or to pronounce the judgment of conviction. In any case covered by this article, the youthful offender shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention effected under the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 198. Effect of Release of Child Based on Good Conduct. - The final release of a child pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil damages. Art. 199. Living Quarters for Youthful Offenders Sentence. - When a judgment of conviction is pronounced in accordance with the provisions of Article 197, and at the time of said pronouncement the youthful offender is still under twenty-one, he shall be committed to the proper penal institution to serve the remaining period of his sentence: Provided, That penal institutions shall provide youthful offenders with separate quarters and, as far as practicable, group them according to appropriate age levels or other criteria as will insure their speedy rehabilitation: Provided, further, That the Bureau of Prisons shall maintain agricultural and forestry camps where youthful offenders may serve their sentence in lieu of confinement in regular penitentiaries. Art. 200. Records of Proceedings. - Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city or provincial fiscal or before any municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be destroyed immediately thereafter. Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and subsequently releases him pursuant to this Chapter, all the records of his case shall be destroyed immediately after such acquittal, dismissal or release, unless civil liability has also been imposed in the criminal action, in which case such records shall be destroyed after satisfaction of such civil liability. The youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to 54
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose. "Records" within the meaning of this article shall include those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation and with any police department, or any other government agency which may have been involved in the case. Art. 201. Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. - The civil liability for acts committed by a youthful offender shall devolve upon the offender's father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. Art. 202. Rehabilitation Centers. - The Department of Social Welfare shall establish regional rehabilitation centers for youthful offenders. The local government and other non-governmental entities shall collaborate and contribute their support for the establishment and maintenance of these facilities. Art. 203. Detention Homes. - The Department of Local Government and Community Development shall establish detention homes in cities and provinces distinct and separate from jails pending the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders. Art. 204. Liability of Parents or Guardian or Any Person in the Commission of Delinquent Acts by Their Children or Wards. - A person whether the parent or guardian of the child or not, who knowingly or willfully, (1) Aids, causes, abets or connives with the commission by a child of a delinquency, or (2) Does any act producing, promoting, or contributing to a child's being or becoming a juvenile delinquent, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 3. Section. 5. Minor or incompetent persons. A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued, with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. INSANITY FC. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to 55
be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a) NCC Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors; (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a) Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable. (n) Rules of Court RULE 101 Sec. 1. Venue; Petition for commitment. - A petition for the commitment of a person to a hospital or other place for the insane may be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province where the person alleged to be insane is found. The petition shall be filed by the Director of Health in the all cases where, in his opinion, such commitment is for the public welfare, or for the welfare of said person who, in his judgment, is insane, and such person or the one having charged of him is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for the insane. Sec. 2. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date for the hearing thereof, and copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to be insane, and to the one having charge of him, or on such of his relatives residing in the province or city as the judge may deem proper. The court shall furthermore order the sheriff to produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date of the hearing. Sec. 3. Hearing and judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof, in open court on the date fixed in the order, that the commitment applied for is for the public welfare or for the welfare of the insane person, and that his relatives are unable for any reason to take proper custody and care of him, the court shall order his commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health. The court shall make proper provisions for the custody of property or money belonging to the insane until a guardian be properly appointed. Sec. 4. Discharge of insane. - When, in the opinion of the Director of Health, the person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may file the proper petition with the Court of First Instance which ordered the commitment. Sec. 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. - It shall be the duty of the provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to prepare the petition for the Director of Health and represent him in court in all proceedings arising under the provisions of this rule. US vs. Vaquilar Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape. Facts: Estelita Ronaya, 14 yrs old, was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children. On March 16, 1976, 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant 56
threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainan. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. The accused plead not guilty and has put in his defense his alleged schizophrenic condition. Issue: Should the accused be absolved of his crime due to his insanity. Held: No. In People vs. Formigones, the Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. In this case while it was said that the accused did have a schizophrenic condition one or two years before he has committed the crime, the testimony of Dr. Jovellano confirmed that the accused was conscious and that he had not lost all of his mental faculties at the time he committed the act. People vs. Rafanan Nature: An appeal of a judgment sentencing the accused to life time imprisonment. Facts: The accused was charged with two counts of parricide, one for killing his wife and another for his child. The commission of these crimes is not denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at the time he committed the crimes and subsequent to that. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. Issue: Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability on the grounds that several testimonies had confirmed that he looked crazy at the time he committed the crime? Held: No. It was apparent that in most of the testimonies, the word crazy was used to describe an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. This is far from the legal definition of the word insane. In People vs. Foy, the court said that heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives as these. Also, the doctrine in United States vs. Carmona says that, In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven. In this case the conduct of the accused after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is consistent with the actions of a sane person. A health examiner also stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not. Therefore, the accused inability to prove 57
that he had indeed lost his sanity at the time he committed the crime leads the court to presume that he was sane and thus liable. The trial Court finds that the monomania of Vicente does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one concerned. Issue/s: Is Vicente really insane? Does Vicente's monomania affect his judgment and was he not in sound mind when he executed the bonds? Can he be relieved of the ruling of the Court of First Instance? Held: The facts of the case cannot conclude that on Dec. 1908, when Villanueva subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed. Therefore, the judgment was reaffirmed. Hernandez v. San Juan Santos Petition for review pm certiorari of a decision of the CA Facts: Lulu is the only daughter of Felix Hernandez and Maeia San Juan Hernandez. Her mother died due to complications of childbirth. Then, his father left her in the care of her maternal uncle Sotero. Eventually, Felix remarried and had three kids. Meanwhile, Lulu inherited real properties from her uncle. In 1957, she went to live with her father and his new family. (she was then 10 yrs. old) Due to her "violent personality", she stopped schooling. In 1968, when she reached the age of majority, she was given full control of her estate. Her father continued to exercise actual administration since she did not even finish elementary school. Upon his death in 1993, petitioners took over his role. From 1968 - 1993, Felix and the petitioners took various "projects" in her properties. In 1974, Felix "purchased" one of her properties to develop Marilou Subdivision. In 1995, Lulu signed a SPA believing 58
Standard Oil Co. v. Codina Arenas Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila Facts: On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced all the five debtors to pay jointly and severally to the company the sum of P3305.76, together the interest therein at 1% per month from Dec. 15, 1908, until complete payment should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs. While the judgment was on the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged that: 1. On July 24,1909, Vicente was declared to be insane by the Court of First Instance 2. she was appointed guardian 3. she was authorized by the Court to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity 4. she was not aware of the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof 5. when his husband gave the bonds, he was alreadt insane She prayed that her husband be relieves from the suit and reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of him with respect to his incapacity. The Court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the intro of evidence. The Court then decided that on Dec., 1908, when Vicente executd the bond, he understood perfectly well the nature and consequences of his act. And so, the decision of the Court on the case against him was reaffirmed.
she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to stand on her behalf in a court when she was actually authorizing her to sell the property to Manila Electronic Co. Thereafter, Cecilio asked her to authorize him to lease her property in Montalban, Rizal to oxford Concrete Aggregates. In Sept. 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal cousin, Jovita San Juan Santos. She confided that she was made to live in the basement and received measly allowance for food and medications. She was then overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. Due to her poor hygiene she was found to have TB, rheumatism and diabetes. Then, the San jUan family demanded an inventory and accounting of all her properties. And it was ignored. Oct. 1998, Jovita filed for guardianship in the RTC. Her half-siblings intervened. Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision was owned by Lulu. The Hernandez also alleged that Lulu is literate and fully understands the consequences of her acyions. Moreover, the sale of the land to Felix was on 1974 and it is already barred by the statute of limitations. In Sept. 2001, Lulu was proven to be of weak physical and mental capacity. Thus, Jovita was appointed guardian. Hernandez family moved for a reconsideration but it was denied. July 2002, they appealed to the CA yet on Dec. 2004, it was denied again. Then, the petition is now filed to the SC. In Nov. 2003, Lulu was abducted from the apartment she was staying then. It was later found out that the Hernandez have her and claimed that she went there voluntarily for she was maltreated by Jovita. On Dec. 2003, Jovita filed for a writ of habeas corpus. On April 2005, CA granted the petition for the wirt. Hernandez filed for a reconsideration but it was denied in July 2005. Then filed it again to the SC. Issue/s: Is Lulu an incompetent? Does she require a guardian? Held: The petition of the Hernandez family is denied. They are also ordered to give accurate and faithful account of Lulus properties within 30 days. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability regarding Lulus properties and her abduction. Ratio: Section 2, Rule 92 Rules of Court Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. Notes: While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other, it does not follow that it cannot arise in any other situation. The ward has no right to possession or control of his property during his or her competency. DEAF-MUTISM NCC Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n) 59
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code. (n) PRODIGALITY Rules of Court Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. CIVIL INTERDICTION Revised Penal Code Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected; 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification. Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. FAMILY RELATIONS FC Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a) Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a) Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) NCC Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191. (1458a) 60
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915) Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants. A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (916a) Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917) Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent. In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth. (918a) Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father and the same mother. Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father. (920a) ALIENAGE ARTICLE IV CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. 61
Gaudencio Cordora (petitioner) v Commission on Elections and Gustavo Tambunting (respondents) Nature Special civil action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus. Facts Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in his Certificates of Candidacy o Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that Tambuting claimed that he is an American o Upon arrival in the Philippines on December 16, 2000 o Upon departure from the Philippines on June 17, 2001 Cordora maintained that such travel dates confirmed that Tambuting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on December 2, 2000 Tambuting refuted Condoras claims by presenting a copy of his birth certificate showing that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father Tambunting took an oath of allegiance on Nov. 18, 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 Tambunting stated that he had resided in the Philippines since birth. He has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools, and he has even served as councilor of Paraaque Tambuting contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship COMELEC ruled that Cordoras complaint against Tambunting is dismissed because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting o Tambuting having traveled with an American passport is not sufficient to prove that he is an American citizen COMELEC then dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration; thus, this petition The present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy
Issues WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense Ruling Petition is dismissed Ratio There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs ruling o On Tambuntings citizenship Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 election (Mercado v Manzano) Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance 62
Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship. Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 In section 2 and 3, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries even after their naturalization. The twin requirements (of swearing an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship involving natural born Filipinos who became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines) do not apply to Tambunting cause he is a natural born Filipino and he never became a naturalized citizen of another country o On Tambuntings residency Cordoras reasoning that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement is wrong because residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship ABSENCE NCC Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. (181a) Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. (182) Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court. (183a) Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared. (184) Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence: (1) The spouse present; (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same; (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; 63
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185) Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. (186a) Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with Article 383. (187a) Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. (188a) Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases: (1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent; (2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear; (3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or other title. In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the property shall be at the disposal of those who may have a right thereto. (190) Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n) Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (n) Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194) Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must prove that he was living at the time his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195) Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a succession to which an absentee is called, his share shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property. (196a) Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the action of petition for inheritance or other rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. In the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the 64
circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article shall be stated. (197) Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received in good faith so long as the absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in interest do not bring the proper actions. (198) INSOLVENCY AND TRUSTEESHIP Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible: (1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof; (2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number; (3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them; (4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority; (5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission. (1291a) Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: (1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship; (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given; (3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration; (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale; (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. (6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a) Art. 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, subject to the exemptions provided by law. (1911a) Miguela Villanueva, et al (petitioners) v Court of Appeals Nature Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts Disputed lots (Lot No. 210-D-1 and Lot No. 210-D-2) were originally owned by the spouses Celestino Villanueva and Miguela Villanueva Jose Viudez and Andres Sebastian of Philippine Veterans Bank swayed Miguela Villanueva into executing a deed of sale of the lots Villanueva later found out that the original titles of the lots were cancelled and that new ones were issued in the name of, at first, Jose Viudez and Andres Sebastian, but later to PNB after the lots wee foreclosed 65
Miguela Villanueva sought to repurchase the lots from PVB after being told that the lots were to be sold at auction PVB told Villanueva that she can redeem the lots at P110,416.00 August 1985 Negotiations with Villanueva were stalled by the filing of liquidation proceedings against PVB October 1984 Ildefonso Ong offered to purchase two pieces of land that had been acquired by PVB through foreclosure; he deposited P10,000.00 to back-up his offer November 23, 1984 PVB approved Ongs offer while he was still abroad o Conditions imposed: Purchase price is at P110,000.00 (less deposit of P10,000.00) payable in cash within 15 days from receipt of approval of the offer Mid-April 1985 Ong returned to the country and immediately verified his offer with the PVB now under the control of CB, where he was informed that the same has already been approved April 16, 1985 Ong formally informed Central Bank of his desire to pay provided the bank should execute the corresponding deed of conveyance; but the letter was not answered May 21, 1987 Ong sent the last of his follow-up letters that went unheeded May 26, 1987 Ongs payment for the balance were accepted by CB June 8, 1983 efforts of Miguela Villanueva to acquire the property began; she offered P60,000.00 with a 20% downpayment and the balance payable in 5 years on a quarterly amortization basis Villanuevas subsequent offers were rejected but still she sent her sealed bid of P110,417.00 pursuant to the written advice of the vice president of the PVB April 3, 1985 PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution June 7, 1985 PVB was place under liquidation; afterwards a petition for liquidation was filed May 26, 1987 Ong tendered the sum of P100,000.00 representing the balance of the purchase price of the litigated lots; An employee of PVB received the amount conditioned upon approval by the CB liquidator October 23, 1987 Ong filed an action for specific performance against the Central Bank June 15, 1989 Presiding Judge Enrique Inting issued an order allowing the purchase of two lots at the price of P150,000.00 Central Bank liquidator of the PVB moved for the reconsideration of the order July 26, 1989 Miguela Villanueva filed her claim with the liquidation court; she averred that she is the lawful and registered owner of the subject lots which were mortgaged in favor of the PVB thru the falsification committed by Jose Viudez in collusion with Andres Sebastian October 31, 1991 trial court rendered judgment: that Ongs right to the lot was no longer enforceable as he failed to exercise it within the prescribed 15-day period, and that the court ruled that the principle of estoppel bars Miguela from questioning the transaction with Viudez Nevertheless, the court allowed her to purchase the lots if only to restore their status as conjugal properties. CA reversed the decision of the trial court CA declared that Ongs failure to pay the balance within the prescribed period was excusable because the PVB neither notified him of the approval of his bid nor answered his letters manifesting his readiness to pay the balance This, this petition for review on certiorari by the petitioners 66
Issues Whether or not the CA erred in its decision that Ong is better entitled to purchase the disputed lots Ruling CA erred when it held that Ong had a better right than the petitioners to the purchase of the disputed lots The petition is granted Ratio April 3, 1986 PVB was placed under receivership pursuant to the MB Resolution after a finding that it was insolvent, illiquid and cannot operate profitable The PVB was then prohibited from doing business in the Philippines Insolvency of a bank and the consequent appointment of a receiver restrict the banks capacity to act Ongs offer to purchase the subject lots became ineffective because the PVB became insolvent before the banks acceptance of the offer came to his knowledge; hence, the purported contract of sale between them did not reach the stage of perfection The P100,000.00 payment of Ong was disapproved on the ground that the subject property was already in custodia legis, and hence, disposable only by public auction, subject to the approval of the liquidation court Since it is only Ong who appealed in the decision of the trial court, the PVB and the Central Bank, as well as the petitioners, are deemed to have fully accepted the judgment, which thus became final as to them for their failure to appeal GENDER Consti Art II. Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. NCC Art. 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage. (321a) 1997 Rules of Procedure Rule 3 Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE OF PERSONS NCC 51 When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a) NCC 50 For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a) FC 68-69, cf. NCC 110 FC 68 The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a) 67
FC 69 The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a) NCC 110 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. (58a) (repealed by the Family Code) FC 55 A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a) FC 101 If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) FC 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a) 68
FC 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a) Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections This is a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court.Certiorari. Facts: 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representativess be a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the election March 8, 1995 Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte March 23, 1995 Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent Rep and candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEc o Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constis one year residency requirement o Avers that Tacloban is not the petitioners domicile of origin since she did not live there until she was 8 years old and when she left the place in 1952, she abandoned her domicile and cant re-establish it merely by expressing her intention to live there again March 29, 1996 Imelda filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry 7 months to since childhood o The Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed her that her amendment to the Certificate wont be accepted because it was filed out of time o Deadline of filing was March 20 March 31, 1995 Imelda filed her Certificate with the Comelecs head office in Manila o Also answered Montejos petition saying that the entry of 7 months in her Original Certificate was the result of an honest misinterpretation o Said that Montejo wanted to remove her as an opponent April 24, 1995 the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections, by a vote of 2 to 1, came up with a Resolution: o Finding respondents Petition for Disqualification meritorious o Striking off petitioners Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy o Canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy o Petitioner studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila May 8, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Imeldas MR declaring her unqualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Rep May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued a resolution allowing Imeldas proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes o COMELEC reversed itself and issued a 2nd Resolution directing that Imeldas proclamation be suspended if she wins the election May 25, 1995 Imelda submitted a Supplemental Petition stating that she won the elections Issue: Whether or not Imelda was a resident, for election purposes, of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections What is the difference between residence and domicile Held: Mrs. Marcos is qualified to run for a seat in the House of Reps. The Comelec Resolutions are set aside. Comelec is directed to order 69
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. One can have two or more residences. Is acquired by living in a place Domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing about domicile is the intention to stay there permanently even if residence is also established in another place. Also, even if a person leaves his domicile to seek for greener pastures for example, there is still an intention and desire to return. For the purposes of election, domicile and residence are considered synonymous When Mrs. Marcos married former Pres. Marcos and left her Tacloban, she gained a new residence but she did not lose her domicile of origin V. Intro to the Family Code Osmena v. Osmena Petition for review on certiorari Facts: Before her death, Chiong Tan Sy executed a last will and testament in which she enumerated her properties (2 parcels of land and one ancestral house in one of the lands). The titles to the lots were in the name of Nicasio and Jose Osmenas father, Ignacio, Bernarda Osmenas older brother. Upon Ignacios demise, Nicasio and Jose transferred the title to their own name. Bernarda asserts that she is a co-owner of the properties. She argued that the lots were her mothers and were part of the inheritance that she and her siblings received upon his mothers death. She said that the Issue: whether the CA erred in giving credence to the deed of sale and in holding that Nicasio and Jose are owners of the lots. Held: The Court agrees that the deed of sale is a legal and binding document. No affirmative relief is available. The Curt leaves the parties where they have placed themselves. Petition is denied. Costs against Bernarda A. Effect and Retroactivity EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 29 as amended by E. O 227 Sec. 1. Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows: 70 lots were placed in his brothers name for he is the only Filipno citizen in the family at the day the properties were purchased. With regard to the ancestral house, she argued that ownership of her share was transferred to her brother under the guise of a simulated contract to defeat any claims by her estranged husband. She also said that she was never been charged rent by her brother for her continued residence in the same. Nicasio and Jose predicate the claim to the disputed properties on the transfer certificates of title covering the lots issued in their fathers name and a deed of sale signed by Bernarda, covering her share in the ancestral house. Both the trial court and the CA recognized the validity of the said documents. The trial court enjoined Bernarda from utilizing the the lot for her orchid business and ordered her to leave the house immediately. CA ruled that Bernarda is a co-owner of the litigated house to the extent of shares she inherited from 2 of her siblings.
"Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." Sec. 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." Sec. 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall have taken effect." Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect upon the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines. Family Code Title VIII. - PATERNITY AND FILIATION CHAPTER 1 LEGITIMATE CHILDREN Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: (1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband. (108a) Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. Art. 105. During the pendency of legal separation proceedings the court shall make provision for the care of the minor children in accordance with the circumstances and may order the conjugal partnership property or the income therefrom to be set aside for 71
their support; and in default thereof said minor children shall be cared for in conformity with the provisions of this Code; but the Court shall abstain from making any order in this respect in case the parents have by mutual agreement, made provision for the care of said minor children and these are, in the judgment of the court, well cared for. Art. 162. The value of what is donated or promised to the common children by the husband, only for securing their future or the finishing of a career, or by both spouses through a common agreement, shall also be charged to the conjugal partnership, when they have not stipulated that it is to be satisfied from the property of one of them, in whole or in part. Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brillantes Administrative Matter in the SC. Gross immorality and impropriety. Facts: Atienza alleges trhat he has 2 children with Yolanda De castro who all live in Makati. He stays in said house whenever he is in Manila. One day, he saw Brillantes sleeping on his bed and found out that the latter is already cohabiting with De Castro. Thereafter, Brillantes prevented Atienza from visiting her children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Atienza claims that Brillantes is already married with Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Also, he alleges that Brillantes was responsible for his arrest after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside her office. Respondent alleges that Atienza was not married to De Castro and that the filing for administrative action was related to Atienzas claim for the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. He also denied having been married with Ongkiko though he admits having children with her. He alleges that his first marriage with her was not valid for lack of marriage license. They had their second marriage in Manila but again neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned him 19 years ago, leaving his children and giving him full custody. He claims that when he married De Castro he believed he is single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Under FC, there must be judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. rt. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Brillantes argued that FC doesnt apply to him because his first marriage took place in1965 and thus governed by NCC; his second marriage took place in 1991. Issue: Brillantes immorality and impropriety. Held: Art. 40 is applicable regardless of the date of the marriage under Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Brillantes has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Art. 40. The retroactive effect of procedural laws is 72
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. No vested right may attach to procedural laws. Brillantes employed deceit to cohabit with a woman. Any law student knows that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. A public figure is also judged by his private life. WHEREFORE, he is dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government. Bernabe v. Alejo Petition for review on certiorari Facts: The late Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of 23 yrs. (Carolina Alejo). The son was born Sept. 18, 1981 and named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal died Aug. 13, 1993 while his wife Rosalina died on Dec. 3, 1991, leaving Ernestina as sole surviving heir. May 16,1994, Carolina filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son and be given his share in Fiscals estate. July 16, 1995, RTC dismissed the complaint since the father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation. On the other hand, CA ruled that Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son. Because he was born in 73 1985, his rights are governed by Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. Issues: whether or not Alejo has a cause of action to file a case against Ernaestina; whether or not CA erred in the ruling that Adrian had 4 yrs from attainment of majority to file an action for recognition; wheteher or not petition for certiorari is fatally defective for failure to include CA as respondent Held: FC cannot take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. The petition is denied and the ruling of RTC and CA is affirmed. Ratio: Under FC, an action for recognition of an illegit child must be brought with the lifetime of alleged pareny with no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. FC Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Fuentes v. Roca Facts: Sabrina Tarroza sold her 358-square meter lot in Zamboanga to her son Tarciano Roca yet he did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. Six yrs latrer, Tarciano offered to sell the land to the Fuentes spouses. They met and signed the agreement that the sale was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment for the transfer of the lots title to him. And within 6 mos. Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario, to the sale. Upon his compliance with these conditions, Fuentes were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional amount. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, Fuentes spouse would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. Atty. Plagata, to whom the agreement was left to, alleged that he went to Rosario in Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized the affidavit in Zamboanga. Then Tarciano executed an absolute deed of sale, a new title was issued and the spuses immediately constructed a building on the lot. Jan. 28, 1990, Tarciano died, followed by his wife Rosario nine months after. Eight yrs later, children of Tarciano filed an action for annulment for sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes before the RTC. They claim that the sale was void since Rosario did not give her consent to it since her signature had been forged. RTC dismissed it. The CA ruled that the annulment entitled the spuses to reimbursement of what they paid Tarciano plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until the final payment. Issues: was the signature forged? Was the filing for nullity already prescribed? Is rosario the only one who can annul the sale? Held: The signature was forged and so it meant that there was no consent from Rosario. The law that applies to this case is the FC 74
not the NCC as the CA claims. The passage of time does not erode the right to bring an annulmet of sale. The Court denies the petition and affirms with modification the ruling of the CA. The deed of sale and transfer of certificate of title is void, the certificate of title be reinstated to Tarciano, The children of Tarcianno is ordered to pay the Fuentes with legal interest, indemnify the spouses for introducing useful improvements, and RTC is directed to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity. Ratio: NCC Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. Vs. FCC Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. B. Repeal/Amendment Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. VI. Marriage and Personal Relationship between Spouses A. The concept of marriage FC Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. NCC Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage. 75
FC Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. 87 Consti Art. II Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Art. XV Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Estrada v. Escritor Administrative matter in SC. Immorality. Facts: Estrada wrote a letter to Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They alledgely have a son of 18-20 yrs of age. He filed the charge as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritor said that when she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow, her husband having died the year before. She admitted that she has been living with Quilapio without the benefit of marriage for 20 yrs and that they have a son. But as a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. Issues: Will Escritor prevail with her plea of religious greedom? Held: The case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and practice; to present evidence on the states compelling interestto override Escritors religious belief and practice and to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded 30 days from the OCAs receipt of this decision. FC Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) RULE 131 Burden of Proof and Presumptions Sec. 3.Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (a)That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b)That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; (c)That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d)That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (e)That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; (f)That money paid by one to another was due to the latter; (g)That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter; 76
(h)That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid; (i)That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced; (j)That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; (k)That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly; (l)That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; (m)That official duty has been regularly performed; (n)That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o)That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; (p)That private transactions have been fair and regular; (q)That the ordinary course of business has been followed; (r)That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract; (s)That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration; (t)That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated; (u)That a writing is truly dated; (v)That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail; (w)That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1)A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft; (2)A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years; (3)A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years; (4)If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (x)That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact; (y)That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life; 77
(z)That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship; (aa)That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; (bb)That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. (cc)That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal. (dd)That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1)A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (2)A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (ee)That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature; (ff)That the law has been obeyed; (gg)That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published; (hh)That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases; (ii)That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest; (jj)That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules: 1.If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived; 2.If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived; 3.If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived; 4.If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; 78
5.If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived. (kk)That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a) New Civil Code Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. Muslim Code Article 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations of the spouses. Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda Facts: Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara and Jose Campos-Rueda were legally married on 7 Jan 1915 in Manila. Immediately thereafter, they established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelina. After a month of living together, defendant demanded that his wife perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. Petitioner continued to refuse to do any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Because of this, the Facts: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgement rendered in the proper proceedings. It carries the imposable 79 defendant got exasperated and started maltreating his wife. Eloisa took refuge in her parents home and claimed for support from his husband. Defendants counsel argue that in a previous case (Don Ramon Benso) in Spain, the Spanish court had held that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode unless by a final judgment granting a divorce. And that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce and if the court lacks the power to decree a divorce, it also follows that it lacks the power to decree a divorce. Issue: WON the husband can be compelled to give support to the wife. Held: Yes. With regards to the first argument the court has held that the governing the obligation and duties of husband and wife in the Philippines is not the same with that in Spain. And that the mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband. The enforcement of that obligation is a vital concern of the state that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is a calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of society. Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals
penalty of prison mayor. Being punishable in an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribed in fifteen years. The fifteen year prescriptive period commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended paty, the authorities, or their agents. On 26 May 1992, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. He moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that the second marriage was made in public and that the contract became a public record when it was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Register in 1975. This being a notice to the whole world constitutes a constructive notice of the subsequent marriage to his first wife. So following the prescriptive period, the case should have been filed by 1990. Prosecution said that the prescriptive period began when complainant discovered the subsequent marriage in July 1991. Issue: WON the rule on constructive notices can be applied in the case in order that the defendant may be absolved of the crime of Bigamy. Held: No. The principle of constructive notice cannot be applied to the crime of bigamy. A bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Other acts are also undertaken in order that the offenders legal impediments in contracting another marriage be concealed. Thus if the prescriptive period for the offense of bugamy were to be counted from the date of registration, the prosecution of violators would almost be impossible. In addition, inspecting or verifying the marriages enlisted in the NCO routinely to make sure that no second or third marriages are contracted is too difficult a task to even be considered. The court found evidence that the first wife had died during the Spanish era and that before 1900, when the first child in the second marriage was born, Lucio Perido had no legal impediments to marry Baliguat. With respect to the civil status of Perido in the titles issued to him on 1923, the court held that it was not conclusive to show that he wasnt actually married with Baliguat. The court also held the presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Thus children from the second marriage are legit. 80 Lastly if he did not really intend to keep his second marriage (as is allegedly proven by his filing of the marriage contract to be public document) then he should have just told his wife in the first place.
Perido vs. Perido Facts: Lucio Perido married twice in his lifetime. He died on 1942. The children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages executed a document partitioning among themselves their late father/grandfathers real properties. The children belonging to the first marriage however, filed a complaint against the children of the second marriage praying for the annulment of the document and that the real properties be re-partitioned among the plaintiffs alone. The reason being that the properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage and that all five children of with Marcelina Baliguat are illegitimate. Issue: Are the children from the second marriage illegitimate? Held: No.
People vs. Malabago Revised Penal Code Art. 246. Parricide Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Parricide is committed when (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Facts: On 5 Jan 1994 at about 7:00PM Guillerma Romano, accused mother-in-law, was tending to her sari-sari store when Leticia Romano Malabago arrived and sat at the benches outside the store. Allandel, Leticias 14yr old son appeared and sat on the bench across her. He listened while his mother and grandmother were conversing. After a few minutes, Leticias husband, the accused Pedro Malabago, came and interrupted the conversation. He and Leticia began arguing. Guillerma turned away but heard the couples quarrel about money and the husbands jealousy of someone. Suddenly, Guillerma heard a loud sound and she thought that the appellant had slapped Leticia but when she looked out the store window, she saw her daughters face full of blood with a slash along the right ear. The appellant then again struck his wife with a bolo, this time hitting the lower left side of her face, from her lips down to her neck. The victim fell to the ground lifeless. Appellant fled to Dodong Opulentisimas house, but the latter called the police and so Malabago was fetched and brought to the police station. Upon investigation, the police found the bolo in the pineapple plantation near the appellants house. Accused plead not guilty saying that at the time the crime was committed he was in the poblacion of Dipolog City, he claimed his son Allandel as defense witness and that his mother-in-law only disapproved of their marriage thats why shes testifying against him. Appellant was found guilty and was sentenced to death. The case was then raised to higher court saying that among other things, assuming that he was guilty of Parricide, the lower courts had erred in appreciating the existence of treachery and refused to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Issue: WON the accused is guilty of parricide and assuming he is, was there treachery and has the CA erred in not considering his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Held: Accused is GUILTY. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. Guillermas testimony established the relationship between Pedro and Letecia as husband and wife and this was not contested or challenged but was in fact confirmed by the accused in his testimony. While the prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma, her inconsistencies were minor and did not prejudice her credibility. But the court found that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The evidence does not show that the accused deliberately and consciously planned this particular mode of attack to ensure the killing of his wife. The unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked his wife in the midst of a sudden and unscripted argument. The prosecution did not also dispute the claim of the appellant to voluntary surrender. Thus there is a lack of aggravating circumstance and the presence of a mitigating circumstance. Sentence is commuted to reclusion perpetua. Go vs Court of Appeals Facts: During the marriage of Hermogenes and Jane Ong, video coverage services were availed from the petitioners. The spouses tried 81
to claim the videos before they left for the US for their honeymoon, but since the petitioners were still unable to process the videos the parties agreed to deliver the videos 2 months later, upon the couples return. However, it was found out that the tape had been erased and could no longer be delivered. Spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC, which eventually granted the Ongs petition for rescission of agreement and a payment for damages amounting to PhP 552,000. The Gos then appealed the decision claiming that they shouldnt be liable for various reasons but that at the end Alex Go questions the decision of the RTC holding him jointly and severally liable for the damages. Claiming that when his wife entered into the contract, she was acting alone. Issue: WON Alex Go should be held liable for a contract his wife had entered into. Held: No. Alex Go is absolved from any liability in the case. Art 73 of the Family Code provides that the wife may exercise any profession, occupation, or engage in business without the consent of the husband, and in this case, only Nancy Go entered into the contract. Trinidad vs CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of 3 children: Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left 4 parcels of land, all in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad When Inocentes and Anastacia died, Arturio lived with the defendants Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar After the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three equal shares and that he be given the 1/3 individual shares of his late father Defendants refused and asserted that the plaintiff was never the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad for the reason that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth
Issues WON Arturio Trinidad has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents WON has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad Held Yes, Arturio was able to prove that Inocentes and Felicidad were validly married and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage
Ratio Arturio was able to prove that Inocentes and Felicidad were validly married o Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place 82
o To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: testimony of a witness to the matrimony, couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents o Arturio secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths, and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality o In place of marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren (present during the nuptial) and Gerardo (old barangay captain who used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad) o Arturio also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother Arturio was able to prove that he was born during the subsistence of Inocentes and Felicidads marriage o Filiation may be proven by the following: record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, in the absence of such, filiation shall be proven by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child, and in the absence of a record of birth, authentic document or possession of status, legitimate filiatiion may be prove by other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws o Arturio presented a certification that records relative to birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956 o Thus, he presented 2 family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony as well o Furthermore, Arturio consistently used Inocentes surname without objection from private respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child; plus the fact the he had so lived with the defendants as shown by the family pictures only show that it is only when Arturio demand for the partition of his share that provoked the ire of the only living defendant (Lourdes Trinidad) thus she disowned him as his nephew De Jacob vs CA Nature Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts On one hand, Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Alfredo Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased On the other hand, Pedro Pilapil claimed to be the legally adopted son of Alfredo and his sole surviving heir. In support of his claim, he presented an Order issued by Judge Jose Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo Issues 83
WON the marriage of Tomasa and Alfredo is valid WON Pedro is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob Pedros adoption has not been sufficiently established o The issue of authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on the questioned Order of Adoption Judge Moya cant recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption He positively declared that the signature over his name in the aforementioned order was not his o No proof was shown that Dr. Jacob had treated Pedro as an adpted childs Silverio vs Republic Nature Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate He alleged that he is a male transsexual, anatomically male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female And so he underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married He sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Rommel on the grounds of upholding the principles of justice and equity, not causing any harm to anybody if petition is granted, and no presenting of evidence that shows cause to deny the petition 84
Held Yes, Tomasa and Alfredos marriage is valid No, Pedro is not legally adopted by Jacob Ratio It has been sufficiently proven that Tomasa and Alfredos marriage is valid o The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss o The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents o Tomasa as secondary evidence presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract in 1978 o It has been established that Dr. Jacob and Tomasa lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner o There were testimonies from Adela Pilapil (present during the marriage ceremony) and Msgr. Florencio Yllana (solemnized the marriage) o There were photographs of the wedding ceremony o There was an authorization issued by the Archbishop ordaining the union of Tomasa and Alfredo o And finally, there was the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate
But the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari in the CA CA then alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration, rendering its decision in favor of the Republic Petitioner moved for reconsideration thus this petition administrative (should have filed in the local civil registrar), not judicial. o Rommel failed to show any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is not allowed o Art, 412, amended by RA 9048, insofar as clerical/typographical errors are involved provides that corrections can be made administratively, without any judicial order. This particular case however is not one such error. To correct means that there was an error in the first place. In this instant case, the petitioners birth certificate contains no error, and so no correction is necessary. o Finally, to grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter many laws. For instance, on marriage and family relations, it will allow the union of a man and another man who has undergone sex reassignment. People vs Dela Cruz Nature Appeal seeking the reversal of the CA decision which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC convicting appellant Victoriano dela Cruz of the crime of parricide Facts There are two versions of the story Version of the prosecution o Between 3:30 and 4:00 pm on August 18, 2002, Joel Song, while playing tong-its with 3 others, saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, Anna Liza 85
Issues WON a persons first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment WON a change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is allowed Held No, a persons first name cant be changed on such aforementioned ground No, a change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is not allowed
Ratio A persons first name cant be changed on the ground of sex reassignment o RA 9048 provides grounds for which change of first name may be allowed If the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce New first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community The change will avoid confusion o The petition was filed in the wrong venue for the reason that proceedings of this nature are primarily
Caparas dela Cruz, in front of their house. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latters hair, then slammed the door. There were shoutings inside and, suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their daughter. Victoriano asked for Joels help. He then noticed that there was blood spurting out of Annas mouth. Joel accompanied the couple to the hospital where Anna eventually died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound in the trunk. Victoriano was turned over to the police officers for investigation. Version of the defense (as testified by Victoriano) o Around 6:30 pm on August 18, 2002, he came home very drunk. Anna then, seeing him in that condition, started nagging at him. Victorianoo slapped Anna and dragged her inside the house. Victoriano then pushed her aside so he could go out; however, she fell on a jalousie window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up, he noticed that Annas back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass. He then asked for Joels help to bring the wife to the hospital. Furthermore, he said that he does not usually drink and that he consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident. Lastly, he attested that he loved his wife and that he did not intentionally hurt her. Ratio The key element in parricide other than the fact of killing is the relationship of the offender to the victim In the case of the parricide of a spouse, the best proof would be the marriage certificate Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction provided that o There is more than one circumstance o The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven o The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt In this case, there is the presence of the requisites for circumstancial evidence to sustain a conviction o Immediately preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated Anna o It was Victoriano who violently dragged Anna inside the house o Anna sustained injuries in different parts of the body due to the physical abuse of Victoriano o Location and extent of the wound indicated Victorianos intent to kill the victim o Victoriano is certainly the lone assailant o The act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the hospital does not manifest innocence Besides, it is clear that Victoriano was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident o To be exempted from criminal liability, the following elements must concur A person is performing a lawful act With due care He causes an injury to another by mere accident Without any fault or intention of causing it 86
Issues WON Victoriano can be held guilty of parricide beyond reasonable doubt Held Yes, Victoriano is guilty of parricide beyond reasonable doubt
And lastly, the defense failed to show that independent proof that Victorianos intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the accuseds drunkenness affected his mental faculties Amores vs CSC capacity, there could not have been any violation of petitioners supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure
Nature Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Facts Issues WON Amores is entitled to the permanent seat as Deputy Director of LCP despite his lack of CES eligibility WON petitioners separation from service violated his right to security of tenure Held Amores is not entitled to the permanent seat as Deputy Director No.
People vs. Poras This is an appeal from the November 8, 2006 decision of the CA which found Poras guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Facts: Characters: o AAA 13 years old victim o BBB aunt of AAA o CCC AAAs godmothers daughter o DDD victims brother o FFF victims deceased mother and common-law wife of Poras o Jennifer AAAs school friend Victims version of story: o She lives in Barangay Pingkian, Pasong Tamo, QC with the appellant and CCC and her siblings ever since her mothers death on January 31, 1994 o Poras first raped her when she was in Grade II o November 26, 1994 evening, Poras asked her to drink coffee which she refused at first but Poras became angry She fell asleep after drinking the coffee and woke up to see Poras beside her Poras was moving on top of her and touching her private parts The strap of her bra had been removed, and her panty was lowered to her knees There was blood on the rear end of her panty 87
Ratio A permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issuant pursuant thereto The possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one And because petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent
She pushed Poras and Poras put on his briefs and shorts Poras threatened to kill her if she tells anybody CCC was no longer on the mattress where they slept when AAA woke up but was lying outside of the mat where they slept Poras sleeps alone in his room She did not reveal the incident to DDD because he might side with Poras o December 2, 1994 AAA told BBB about the incident o December 4, 1994 BBB reported the incident to the police which told her to bring AAA to Camp Crame for medical examination o Medico-Legal Report: According to Dr. Cosidon, there was laceration in the victims vagina at 3 and 9 oclock positions Laceration could have been caused by a hard object such as a finger or a fully erect penis On cross examination, the doctor said that these lacerations could have happened even before November 27, 1994 Poras version: o He was FFFs common-law husband o Before FFFs death, he, FFF, and her 5 children lived together o After FFFs death, he stayed at a friends house at QC o FFFs children asks him for money continually but he refused to give them anything since they were already of age o On the day of the crime, he was at the La Loma Cockpit Arena and slept at his friends place Witnesses presented: o AAA, Dr. Cosidon, BBB for prosecution o Poras for his own defense Regional Trial Court convicted Poras of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA a total of P100,000 for damages CA affirmed RTCs decision but with the modification that Poras be held liable for rape under Article 335 as the rape was committed prior to the enactment of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 o Relied on the evaluation made by the RTC regarding AAAs credibility as the trial court had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses attitude, conduct, and demeanor o Victims testimony proved that Poras had sex with her while she was unconscious o Totality of established circumstances constituted an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conslusion that Poras raped AAA o Minor inconsistencies in AAAs testimonies strengthened her credibility bec they eliminated the chance of a rehearsed testimony o Poras uncorroborated alibi and denial cannot prevail over the victims positive testimony Issue: Is the circumstancial evidence enough to convict Poras of rape/ Did the prosecution present enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt Poras guilt? Held: No. Prosecution faileed to prove Poras guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime rape. SC convicts him instead of the lesser acts of lasciviousness, included in rape, as the evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. - Appelant was sentenced to imprisonment minimum of 6 months (arresto mayor) and maximum of 4 years and 2 months 88
(prision correccional) and to pay the victim a total of P52,000 for damages Rape is a painful accusation to make but can be done by a person w/ malice in her mind Bec of the private nature of rape that justifies the acceptance of lone testimony of a credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, althoug innocent, to disprove his guilt Rape committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she is under 12 years old or is demented Full penetration is not required to sustain conviction of rape, there must be at least proof beyond reasonable doubt of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ In this case, no direct evidence exists showing the required penetration o AAA could not have seen Poras insert his penis into her vagina bec she was unconscious o Without direct evidence, Rule 133, Section 4, of the Rules on Evidence allows the court to rule on the basis of circumstantial evidence: Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: There is more than one circumstance; The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. o A related rule is that the totality or the unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical conclusion than the guilt of the appellant.[35] o Circumstances from which RTC and CA based their decision: Poras made AAA drink coffee which made her fall asleep AAA saw Poras lying beside her, moving on top of her, and touching her private parts when she woke up AAAs panty has been lowered to her knees, and the strap of her bra had been removed Poras put on his briefs and shorts after AAA pushed her AAA felt pain in her private parts, saw blood stains on her panty Poras threatened to kill AAA if she tells anyone The examining physician found deep-healed lacerations in AAAs vagina The circumstantial evidence failed to clearly establish an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Poras raped AAA o First, the result of the medical examination did not in any way support AAAs claim that the appellant had sex with her. Dr. Cosidon testified that the deep-healed lacerations on the victims hymen could have also been caused by a finger, and that these lacerations could have been present even before November 27, 1994. Ruptured hymen is not equal to rape It only proves that AAA has had prior sexual experience Insertion of finger in the vagina did not constitute rape in 1994, only in 1997 89
o Second, we find it highly unlikely that the appellant inserted his penis into AAAs vagina while the latters panty was lowered to her knees. Common sense and ordinary human experience show that penile penetration is extremely difficult, if not almost impossible under this situation, unless the victims legs were spread apart. o Third, considering that AAA was an unmarried 13-year old, she would have been in unusually deep sleep in order not to feel the pain and sensation reasonably expected from the insertion of a penis into her young, vaginal canal. o Fourth, we cannot equate AAAs testimony of pain in her private parts with rape. o Fifth, the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses did not establish with moral certainty that the appellant raped AAA. o Finally, we cannot help but observe that AAA, in her direct testimony, revealed that she merely came to the conclusion that the appellant had raped her afterbeing told by the examining physician that the result of the medical examination was positive, and that something had happened to her. Lewd oscene, lustful, indecent, or lecherous o There is sufficient evidence to convict Poras with acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code o Elements of acts of lasciviousness: 1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; 2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and 3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. o The evidence confirms that Poras committed lewd acts when he touched the victims private parts CHAPTER 1 REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage. (n) Panganiban vs. Borromeo This is a disbarment proceeding against respondent Borromeo. Facts: November 25, 1931 Alejandro Pabro and Juan Mappala, husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo who was a member of the Philippine Bar o The contract was prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela o Atty. Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document, and had, at least, some knowledge of its content, although he may not have been fully informed because of a difference in dialect o Contract purported to formulate between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them 90
Issue: Whether or not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose Whether or not the notary public be disbarred Held: The Court held the contract to contain provisions contrary to law and public order, and as a consequence, not judicially recognizable - The consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or concubinage, but they still remain as crimes that violates the sanctity of marriage - The Court confined their discipline of the respondent to severe censure In re Santiago This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor General against the Santiago charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.. Facts: Ernesto Baniquit, who was living separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some 9 consecutive years and was bent on contracting a 2nd marriage Atty. Santiago told Baniquit that he could secure his separation from his wife and afterwards, he could marry again May 29, 1939- Ernesto and Soledad signed a document authorizing each other to marry again Ernesto asked if there would be trouble, Santiago pointed at his diploma and said he would tear it off if the document turns out to be void June 11, 1939 Ernesto remarried Santiago realized his mistake and had the spouses sign another document cancelling the first on June 30, 1939 Issue: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice Held: The document prepared by Santiago is contrary to law, morals, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family and he should be disbarred. However, since, after learning his mistake, he tried to rectify it, Santiago was found guilty of malpractice and was only given a 1 year suspension Selanova vs. Mendoza This is an administrative complaint in the Supreme Court for gross ignorance of the law Facts: Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document extrajudicially dividing the conjugal assets of the couple, licensing either spouse to commit any act of infidelity and ratifying their personal separation Issue: Whether or not the contract is valid. Held: Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, the Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership approval was void. Mendoza claims that he was aware of the invalidity of the contract but ratified it nevertheless under the impression that the couple will have it approved by the Court of First Instance of Negros afterwards However, judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be sought for prior the dissolution Therefore, the document is null and void Mendoza was severely censured De Leon vs. Court of Appeals 91
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA. Facts: October 18, 1969 Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco De Leon got married August 28, 1971 they had a daughter, Susana De Leon October 1972 because of irreconcilable marital differences, Sylvia left their conjugal home March 1973 Sylvia went to America where she obtained Ame citizenship November 23, 1973 Sylvia filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with Jose Vicente in California o Also filed claims for support and distribution of properties March 16, 1977 Sylvia entered into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, Macaria De Leon o The letter states: In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon: The obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon to Sylvia which included the delivery of several real properties, money, child support, and custody of their daughter The obligations of Sylvia to Jose Vincent which included amending her divorce complaint in the US and allowing her daughter to visit her father for 2 to 3 months each year o Macaria gave Sylvia the money she stipulated in the Letter-Agreement March 30, 1977 Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the trial court of Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership February 19, 1980 the trial court approved the petition, dissolving the spouses conjugal partnership March 17, 1980 Sylvia moved for the execution of the order o Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the petition adding a P4,500/month monthly support to the agreement April 20, 1980 during the pendency of the MR, Macaria filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. Motion was granted October 29, 1980 Macaria filed her complaint in intervention o Assailed the validity and legality of the LetterAgreement which purpose is to terminate the marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente December 29, 1983 trial court rendered judgment in favor of the intervenor, declaring null and void the letter-agreement and ordering Sylvia to give back to Macaria the amount she received o The order of the court which dissolved the conjugal partnership of the couple was affirmed except those properties belonging to Macaria Sylvia appealed to CA raising the ff. Errors: 1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter- Agreement is the termination of marital relations; 2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and documentary evidence proving that Macaria de Leon's claims of threat, intimidation and mistake are baseless; and 3) The trial court erred in finding that Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of the Letter-Agreement; and further, failed to appreciate evidence proving Macaria de Leon's material breach thereof. CA affirmed the trial courts decision in toto and denied MR 92
Issue: WON the Letter-Agreement is valid Held: The Court denied the petition and granted positive relief to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing Macaria to be placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into. The use of the word relations in the letter is ambiguous and subject to interpretation o Sylvia insists that relations refer to their property relations o Macaria asserted that it refers to marital relations o The Court sustained the observations and conclusions made by the trial court which states that the couple contemplated terminating not just their property relations but also their marital relations which is evidenced by Sylvias continuing of the divorce proceedings in California The Civil Code renders null and viod those contracts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public property. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation... But if the Letter-Agreement pertained only to property relations, it is still void as stated in Article 221 of the Civil Code Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; (2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife; And since it was Sylvia who prepared the Letter-Agreement, the interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity Since the Letter-Agreement has been nullified, Sylvia, applying the pari delicto rule (Legal principle that if two parties in a dispute are equally at fault then the party in possession of the contested property gets to retain it (courts will not interfere with the status quo), alleges that she will not recover what she has given nor can she ask for what has been promised her Macaria, on the other hand, alleges that she only signed the Letter-Agreement because of Sylvias threats of scandalizing her family Both parties were found to have violated the laws, but pari delicto does not apply in this case as Article 1414 of the Civil Code: When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property. Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria CHAPTER 2 HUMAN RELATIONS (n) 93
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. CHAPTER 2 QUASI-DELICTS Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) CHAPTER 8 UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n) Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: 2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
Domalagan v. Bolifer This is an appel from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Misamis. Facts: November 1909 Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a contract wherein Domalagan will pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano with Bolifers daughter Bonifacia April 1910 he paid Bolifer P500 plus P16 as hansel or token of future marriage August 1910 Bonifacia married Laureano Sisi Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded the return of P516 plus interest and damages which he suffered since he was obliged to sell a certain real property in Bohol to come up with the P500 Bolifer denied the allegation and alleged that the facts stated in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action The trial court ruled in favor of Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to pay P516 plus interest Issue: WON Domalagan really delivered money to Bolifer WON the verbal contract between the two parties regarding the delivery of the money for a prospective marrieage is considered valid and effective Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court The trial court found enough evidence that Domalagan indeed gave Bolifer the said amount and the Court affirms this decision Bolifer claims that since the agreement was not put into writing, Domalagan cannot recover the amount 94
o Art 335 of the (old) Civil Code does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides that aid section simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in confirmity with said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. f the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing Cabague vs. Auxilio This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. Facts: Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from defendants refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo The following are the complaints: a. That defendants promised marriage if plaintiffs would improve the house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride b. That plaintiffs made the improvement and spent P700 c. That without any reason, the defendants refused to honor their promise Defendants moved for the dismissal of the case, arguing that the contract was oral, and unenforceable The court dismissed the case Under the former rules of procedure, when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued was on writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for demurrer Under the new rules, defendant may now present a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact may be proved by him
Issue: WON that the transaction was not in writing can be proven in court Held: For breach of contract to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. But Felipe cant continue with his suit because the suit is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Felipe cant sue Matias on grounds of breach of mutual promise to marry. Felipe cant sue Socorro for breach of mutual promise to marry Basically, Geronimo is the only one who can sue Socorro for damages for her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et al. This is a petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Facts: 95
Soledad, had an intimate relationship with Francisco who was 10 years younger than her. When she got pregnant, Francisco promised to marry her. Chris was born on June 17, 1954. However, on July 24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez October 4, 1954 Soledad Cagigas filed a complaint against Francisco Hermosisima for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as well as support for the child and moral damages for breach of promise Francisco admitted he is the father of the child and expressed willingness to give support but denied promising marriage to Soledad The court rendered judgment acknowledging the child as Franciscos daughter and ordering him to pay P30/month for child support as well as P4,500 for actual and compensatory damages, P5000 as moral damages, and P500 for attorneys fees CA affirmed this decision but increased the compensatory damages and moral damages to P5,614.25 and P7,000 Issue: WON moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the CA but eliminated the payment of the moral damages The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced xxx upon the faith of such promise Since the law making bodys intent is not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the court is untenable even if the justification of the said award is that Francisco seduced Soledad. The Court does not find Francisco morally guilty of seduction because: o He is 10 years younger than Soledad o And because the trial court found that Soledad surrendered herself to Francisco because overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy Wassmer vs. Velez This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Rizal. Facts: August 23, 1954 - Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a marriage license which was subsequently issued. The wedding was set on September 4, 1954 September 2, 1954 Francisco left a note to Beatriz stating that the wedding will have to be postponed and that she sould not ask many people for the reason to avoid scandal September 3, 1954 Francisco sent a telegram telling Beatriz that the wedding is back on o He did not appear nor was he heard from again Beatriz sued Francisco for damages. o Velez was declared in default since he did not file an answer April 29, 1955 the court ordered Francisco to pay P2,000 as actual damages, P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees June 21, 1955 Francisco filed a Petition for Relief from Orders, Judgment and Proceedings and Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration The court tried an amicable settlement between the two but the possibility of such was nil July 20, 1956 defendants motion was denied Issue: WON Beatriz has the right to sue for breach of promise to marry 96
Held: The Court held that what Francisco did was not a case of mere breach of promise of contract to marry. Preparations for the wedding have already been madewedding trousseau were purchased, invitations were sent, among otherswhen, two days before the wedding Francisco walked out on his bride to be. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which Francisco must be held liable for damages. Moral damages was reduced to P15,000 Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals This is a petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: From December 1957, Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos The two became a couple afterwards and because Apolonio promised he would marry her, Araceli consented to have sex with him regularly until December 1959 which resulted to Aracelis pregnancy When Apolonio learned of the pregnancy, he stopped seeing Araceli Araceli was forced to resign from her job as secretary of IBM to avoid embarassment and social humiliation Araceli suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliation because of Apolonios breach of promise to marry She then sued him for support, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees Trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action CA found that Araceli stated a cause of action for damages premised on Art 21 of the civil code: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage Issue: WON Tanjanco violated Article 21, specifically if whether or not he seduced Araceli Held: No. Seduction in law is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of a promise of marriage. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The Court does not find that Araceli was seduced since Araceli, an adult, maintained a sexual relationship with Apolonio for one whole year. This shows voluntariness and mutual passion and that Araceli was not deceived by Apolonio. Hence, no case is made under Art. 21. The decision of CA is reversed and that of the CFI is affirmed.
Baksh vs CA Facts: Baksh, an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course in Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City courted and proposed to marry Marilou Gonzales. She accepted the proposal on the condition that they were getting married during the semestral break. Baksh then visited her Gonzalezs parents to secure approval of their marriage. Sometime after, baksh was able to force her to live with him in his apartment. She was a virgin prior to that. And then Baksh started maltreating her and threatening to kill her. Thus she filed a complaint claiming for damages. Baksh said that he didnt promise to marry her, never sought consent from her parents, forced her to live with him or maltreated her. In the end the RTC ruled in favor of Marilou on the bases that the parties were lovers and that she was not a woman of loose morals and that she only allowed herself to be deflowered 97
(haha!) because of his promise to marry her etc. Baksh appealed the decision in the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC decision further saying that Bakshs admission of his common law wife in Bacolod before he wooed Marilou is a proof that he isnt a man of good character and that his acts are against morals, good customs, public policy, and derogatory of women. Issue: WON damages for breach of promise to marry are recoverable under the provisions of Art. 21 of the Civil Code. Held: Yes. In this case the court found that it was Bakshs fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry the plaintiff that made her surrender her virginity and to live with him in sincere belief that he would keep that promise. She had surrendered her virginity not because of her lust but because of moral seduction. Thus she is entitled to claim for damages under Art. 21 not because of the breach of promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind the promise and the willful injury to her honor and reputation. from the third marriage filed a complaint claiming that they were also children of Mariategui and were deprived of their rightful share in their fathers estate by their co-heirs. In answer, the other party said that the complaint was not really for annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition but for recognition of natural children. The lower court ruled in favor of Lupos heirs from the first and second marriage. Thus, the case was elevated to the CA, where they raised the issue of their parents lawful marriage and their legitimacy as children. CA ruled that all the heirs of Lupo were entitled to equal shares in the estate. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the children from Mariateguis third marriage are legitimate and thus entitled to succession rights on his estate. Held: Children from the third marriage are legitimate. Lupo and Felipa were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo to his son who testified that, when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume 98
D. REQUISITES FOR A VALID MARRIAGE Mariategui v. CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the court of appeals granting Lupo Mariateguis descendants from his third marriage an equal share in his estate. Facts: Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, he had contracted three marriages. At the time of his death he had left certain properties, which he had acquired when he was still unmarried. His descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they sought to divide among themselves Lot 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. The court released a decree ordering the registration of the lot, wherein separate titles were given to the heirs. The descendants
that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. On filitaion, evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacintos birth certificate was a record of birth referred to in Article 172 of the Code. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto. wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) FC Art. 5 Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a) FC Art. 45 A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twentyone, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian, or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a) NCC Art 53 No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: 99
1. Kinds of Requisites & Effects of non-compliance FC Art. 2 No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a) FC Art. 3 The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
(1) (2) (3) (4) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; Their consent, freely given; Authority of the person performing the marriage; and A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character (Sec. 1a, Art. 3613). Facts: De Mijares is the presiding judge of Pasay RTC, while Villaluz is a retired Associate Justice of the CA. De Mijares seeks for the disbarment of Villaluz. In her complaint, she asserts that Villaluz had committed bigamy. That on 7 Jan 1994, she married the respondent as culmination of a long engagement. On the night of their marriage, while in the condo unit of the respondent, she answered a phone call from a woman who was offending her with insulting remarks. She confronted him on the identity of the caller, but what ensued was a heated exchange that led de Mijares to leave their would-have-been-honeymoon-place. Since then, they had lived separately and without communication. Several months after, she learned from Manila RTC Judge Makasiar that Villaluz had contracted a marriage with Lydia Geraldez on 10 May 1994. In his defense, Villaluz said that their marriage is not valid and was a sham. That they only did it in order to protect de Mijares from the immorality charge that Atty. Naval had commenced against her. And that his marriage by his first wife was still subsisting at the time they were married because the decision had not yet become final and executory. Issue: WON their marriage is valid. WON Villaluz should be disbarred. Held: Marriage is valid. Regardless of the intention of the respondent in saying I do, with the complainant before competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Verano was authorized by law to solemnize their marriage and both of them had the legal capacity to contract such marriage. Being a Justice of the CA, he must be fully aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary requisites. 100
RPC Art. 350 Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. If either of the contracting parties shall obtain consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. RPC Art. 351 Premature marriages. Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and fine not exceeding 500 pesos. The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation. De Mijares vs. Villaluz Nature: Administrative action in the Supreme Court for Gross Immorality and Grave Misconduct.
No disbarment. Although evidence shows that the respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession, his declining years of life and the fact that he had rendered some years of commendable service to the judiciary cannot be denied. Thus the court decided to suspend him for 2 years but with specific warning that a more severe penalty shall be impsed should he commit the same or similar offense. Mallion vs. Alcantara Facts: Mallion filed a petition with San Pablo City RTC seeking declaration of nullity of his marriage with Alcantara alleging the respondents psychological incapacity. This petition was denied. The appeal in the CA was likewise dismissed. After the decision attained finality, he filed the same petition with San Pablo RTC this time on the grounds that the marriage is without a valid marriage license. The respondent for her part moved to dismiss the petition invoking the principle of res judicata. Issues: WON res judicata applies. Assuming it does not, would the lack of marriage license render the marriage null and void? Held: Res Judicata applies and lack of marriage license cannot render the marriage null and void. The petitioner is barred from instituting another suit where the cause of action is the same (declaring nullity of his marriage with Alcantara). In the second case, he is only invoking a different ground which is the lack of marriage license. The judiciary would be squandering time, effort, and financial resources by litigating the same controversy over again. And assuming, for arguments sake, that he is not barred from instituting another case, he has already impliedly conceded the validity of his marriage when he instituted the first case. This admission binds the petitioner and cures the alleged defect of his marriage. Egap Madsali, Sajiron Lajim, and Maron Lajim vs. People of the Philippines Nature: An appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the Decision of Palawan RTC finding accused Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim guilty of the crime of abduction with rape and finding accused Egap Madsali and Sajiron Lajim guilty of the crime of serious illegal detention. Facts: (This is actually a rape and kidnapping case but lets just concentrate on the marriage aspect of the case.) (Note: AAA- 15 yr old victim, BBB- her mom, CCC- her dad) Palawan, 1 Jul 1994AAA was fetching water from the cave together with her aunt Sajiron arrived, running towards them and carrying a bolo. They tried to run away, but Sajiron held AAAs and threatened to kill her if she does not go with him. Inon Dama was as well threatened with death so she went home and reported the incident to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, brought her to the forest, and violated her. During the entire time that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. In the morning of the following day and brought AAA to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. Egap asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days 101
after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994, upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and without the presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. Defense: Sajiron and AAA had been engaged for 3 years prior to their elopement and that the sex was consensual. The only reason why AAA filed the criminal charges against because he did not pay the dowry of 10k to AAAs parents. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and proposed marriage after 3 years of courtship. CCC also claimed to have talked with BBB that they were both amenable to the marriage and that he and BBB were present during the marriage. Issue: WON the marriage between AAA and Sajiron is valid Held: No. The testimony of CCC supporting the defense was found to be made out of self serving interest. Further, his allegation that his wife was present during the marriage celebration was also controverted by the testimonies of AAA and Imam Musli Muhammad. Thus without the consent of AAAs parents in addition to the presence of intimidation and lack of consent on the part of AAA makes the marriage invalid. (KAWAWA NAMAN ANG BATANG TO ) 2. Essential Requisites a. Legal Capacity i. Gender FC Art 2 Par 1 cf. FC Art 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing under such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) Silverio vs Republic Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, anatomically male but feels, thinks, and acts as a female. And so he underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001, he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok. From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Rommel on the grounds of upholding the principles of justice and equity, not causing any harm to anybody if petition 102
is granted, and no presenting of evidence that shows cause to deny the petition. But the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA then alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration, rendering its decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration thus this petition Issues: WON a persons first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment WON a change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is allowed Held: No, a persons first name cant be changed on such aforementioned ground No, a change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is not allowed Ratio A persons first name cant be changed on the ground of sex reassignment o RA 9048 provides grounds for which change of first name may be allowed If the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce New first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community The change will avoid confusion o The petition was filed in the wrong venue for the reason that proceedings of this nature are primarily administrative (should have filed in the local civil registrar), not judicial. o Rommel failed to show any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment is not allowed o Art. 412, amended by RA 9048, insofar as clerical/typographical errors are involved provides that corrections can be made administratively, without any judicial order. This particular case however is not one such error. To correct means that there was an error in the first place. In this instant case, the petitioners birth certificate contains no error, and so no correction is necessary. o Finally, to grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter many laws. For instance, on marriage and family relations, it will allow the union of a man and another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
ii. Age NCC Art. 54 Any male of the age of sixteen years or upwards, and any female of the age of fourteen years or upwards, not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 to 84, may contract marriage. (2) NCC Art. 80 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents; 103
RPC Art. 344 Concubinage. --- Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision coreccional in its minimum and medium periods. The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. iii. Absence of Impediment Garcia vs. Recio Nature Petition for review Facts March 1, 1987 Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal but they lived in Australia May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. June 26, 1992 Rederick A. Recio became an Australian citizen January 12, 1994 Rederick married a Filipina, Grace GarciaRecio, in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City In his application for marriage license, Rederick declared that he was single and Filipino From October 22, 1995 onwards lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage May 16, 1996 while the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided March 3, 1998 Grace Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy July 7, 1998 while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down
Issues WON the divorce between Rederick Recio and Editha Samson is valid and proven WON Rederick was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace Garcia Held Yes No
Ratio The divorce between Editha and Rederick is valid and proven o In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry o A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws o However, it ought to be noted that before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. 104
o The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the evidentiary rules must be demonstrated. o Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. o Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Rederick was not proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace Garcia o Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. This quotation bolsters the courts contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the court finds no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. Te vs. Choa Facts September 14, 1988 Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites but they did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly April 21, 1989 Choa gave birth to a girl. Petitioner stopped visiting her May 20, 1990 Te contracted a second marriage with one Julieta Santella August 9, 1990 Choa charged Te with bigamy July 20, 1990 Te filed an action for the annulment of his marriage to Choa on the ground that he was forced to marry her. Furthermore, he alleged that Choa concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated November 8, 1990 Choa filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against Te and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of 105
immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite her subsisting marriage with Te. Also, Te committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single Prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy Te then filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel during the hearings of said case November 28, 1990 Trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar Peralejo He also filed a motion for the suspension of proceedings with the PRC July 16, 1991 PRC denied Tes motion He filed with the CA another petition for certiorari, contending that the PRC board committed grave abuse of discretion August 31, 1994 CA affirmed decision of RTC No
Issues WON CA committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal (criminal and administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage WON CA gravely abused its discretion and committed an error of law in not holding that the demurrer to evidence should have been given due course WON CA committed a serious legal error in not holding that the trial judge (a quo) should have inhibited himself Held No No
Ratio CA did not err in refusing to suspend the legal (criminal and administrative) proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage o The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. o Article 40 of the Family Code states that absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding o Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. CA did not gravely abused its discretion and committed an error of law in not holding that the demurrer to evidence should have been given due course o First, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner o Second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same 106
CA did not commit a serious legal error in not holding that the trial judge (a quo) should have inhibited himself o Grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case o Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality It was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case 3. Parental Consent FC Art. 14 In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of 18 and 21, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a) FC Art. 5 (refer to pg. 1) cf. NCC Art 61. In case either of the contracting parties is a widowed or divorced person, the same shall be required to furnish, instead of the baptismal or birth certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the decree of the divorce court, as the case may be. In case the death certificate cannot be found, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and the date of the death of the deceased spouse. FC Art. 5 cf. (refer to pg. 1) NCC Art 95. The public official in charge of registration of priests and ministers, with the approval of the proper head of Department, is hereby authorized to prepare the necessary forms and to promulgate regulations for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Title. Said official may also by regulations fix and collect fees for the authorization of priests and ministers to solemnize marriages. (36a) 4. Consent freely given by both spouses a. Mistake as to identity FC Art. 35 (5). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; NCC Art. 86 (1). Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 4 of the preceding article: (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; b. Effect of Insanity (FC Art. 45 (2), refer to pg. 1) c. Effect of Fraud (FC Art. 45 (3), refer to pg. 1) FC Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; 107
(3) Concealment of a sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a) NCC Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. (1269) NCC Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should have not been employed by both contracting parties. Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270) Anaya vs. Palaroan Nature Appeal from an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Facts December 4, 1953 Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married January 7, 1954 Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage, and granting Auroras counterclaim While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando had divulged that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his Aurora contended that such non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced constituted fraud Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages Fernando denied the allegations and set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel for her having prayed the validity of marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted to her Fernando counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal with respect to the alleged moral damages
Issues WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with another woman constitute fraud and therefore is a ground for annulment of marriage WON Auroras contention that Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her constitute fraud and therefore is a ground for annulment of marriage Held 108
No No d. Effect of force, intimidation, and undue influence (FC Art. 45 (4), refer to pg. 1) NCC Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed. There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce ones claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. (1267a) NCC Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual, and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress. (n) Villanueva vs. CA Nature Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Facts April 13, 1988 Orlando Villanueva and Lilia Villanueva got married in Puerto Princesa, Palawan Canalita109
Ratio Non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman does not constitute fraud and therefore is not a ground for annulment of marriage o Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause of annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4 of the Civil Code o Such fraud is limited exclusively by law to those kinds of fraud enumerated in Article 86 o Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that, no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage Auroras contention that Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her does not constitute fraud and therefore is not a ground for annulment of marriage o This ground is already barred o Any secret intention on the husbands part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage; hence, her action for annulment based on the fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage o The wedding was celebrated in December 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966
November 17, 1992 Orlando filed a petition for annulment of his marriage on the grounds that: o threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia who was already pregnant o he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage o he never cohabitated with her after the marriage o he later learned that Auroras child died during delivery on August 29, 1988 Lilia prayed for dismissal of the petition on the grounds that: o Orlando freely and voluntarily married her o He stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage o He wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which she is visited by Orlando personally o He knew about the progress of her pregnancy years and eight months when Orlando took serious step to have the marriage annulled Prolonged in action evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was then pending against him o At the time he was allegedly being harassed, Orlando worked as a security guard in a bank; thus, it is reasonable to assume that he knew the rudiments of self-defense or the proper way of keeping himself out of harms way o Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted instead into undermining the credibility of his wife o The letters admitted by Orlando contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress o (on the side) Appellants claim that his married should be annulled due to lack of cohabition between him and his wife is not allowed for lack of cohabitation per se is not a ground to annul a marriage Attorneys fees may be awarded; however, moral and exemplary damages cannot be awarded for lack of factual and legal basis e. Effect of physical incapacity/ impotence (FC Art. 45 (5), refer to pg. 1) Jimenez vs. Canizares Nature: Appeal for the judgment of CFI. 110
Issues WON the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent as alleged by the appellant WON petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs Held No Yes for attorneys fees, no for moral and exemplary damages
Ratio Orlando freely and voluntarily married Lilia; that is, no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so o Despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of 4
Facts: Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to Remedios Canizares before a judge of the municipal court in Zamboanga City, upon the gorund that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist; and because of these, he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. Issues: whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband Held: The decree of CFI that annuls the marriage is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. Alcazar vs. Alcazar Nature: Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals that denied her petition for annullment Facts: Veronica Alcazar alleged that she was married to Rey Alcazar. After their wedding the two lived for five days in the hometown of Reys parents. Thereafter, they went back to Manila but Rey did not live with Veronica. After 12 days from their marriage, Rey left for Riyadh where he worked. While working there, he did not communicate with his wife by phone or by letter. She tried to call him 5 times but he never answered. About a year and a half, a co-teacher informed her that he was about to come home to the Philippines. She was surprised that she was not advised by his arrival. When he arrived, he did not go home to her house. Instead, he proceeded to his parents house. Upon learning of this, she went to her brother-in-law who claimed that he was not aware of his whereabouts. She then went to Reys parents house where she was informed that he had been living with his parents since his arrival. She asserted that since his arrival, he never contacted her. She concluded that he was physically incapable (Narcissistic Personality Disorder) of consummating his marriage with her. Issues: WON Rey is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations Held: Petition is denied for Veronica failed to prove that his husband was really psychologically incapacitated. FC Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. f. Effect of affliction with STD (FC Art. 45 (6), refer to pg. 1) 5. Formal Requisites 111
a. Marriage License Republic vs. CA Nature: Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision of the CA declaring the marriage void Facts: Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony in Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Angelinas parents. Edwin personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the marriage license. The marriage contract itself stated that a marriage license was issued in Pasig City. The couple did not immediately live together for castros parents know nothing about the marriage. It was only a year after when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that they lived together. However, their cohabitation only lasted for 4 months. Then, they parted ways. On Octobr of the same year, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by her brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the US. Deciding to follow her daughter, she wanted to finalize her marital status. With her counsels help, she found out that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. Issues: WON the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro are sufficient to establish are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the Civil Registrar of Pasig prir to the celebration of the marriage of the couple. Held: Petition by Republic is denied there being no showing of any reversible error committed by CA ROC Rule 132 Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. Cosca vs. Palaypayan Nature: Administrative Matter in the SC Facts: Cosca, et.al charged Palaypayon Jr and Baroy with illegal solemnization of marriage, falsification of the monthly reports of cases, bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court, non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received, infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners and requirement of filing fees from exempted entities. For the first accusation, Palaypayon argues that he did not solemnize the 5 weddings stated by the plaintiffs for there is no date and place written in the marriage contract and he did not affix his signature there. And, with regard to the pictures taken showing that he solemnized the marriage of a couple, he said that it was just a simulation and not the real thing. Issues: WON the allegations are true Held: The Court imposes a fine of P20,000 on Palapayon with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the 112
future will definitely be severely dealt with. Baroy is dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including GOCCs. Let copies of the decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. Sy vs. CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina and Fernando Sy. Facts: Filipina and Fernando were married in 1973 when they were both 22 years old. Their marriage begot 2 children. In 1983, Fernando left their conjugal house. Since then, they lived separately, and the children were in the custody of the mother. However, their son transferred to his fathers residence on 1988 and lived with him. On 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation but later amended it to separation of property on the grounds that Fernando abandoned her without cause, that theyve been living separately for more than a year and that they voluntarily entered into a MoA containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It was granted plus the cutody of the children was given to her. On 1988, she filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. But the RTC only convicted Fernando of slight physical injuries and sentenced him of 20 days imprisonment. Later she filed for legal separation on the grounds of repeated physical violence, sexual infidelity, attempt by respondent against her life and abandonment of her without justifiable cause. The petition was granted and the custody of her daughter was given to her while her son was to her husband. On 1992, she filed a petition for absolute nullity of her marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity of her husband. This was denied by the RTC and CA. Issues: WON their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of ceremony and WON Fernando is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration Held: Petition is granted The marriage is declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of the celebration. NCC CHAPTER 2 MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER Art. 72. In case either of the contracting parties is on the point of death or the female has her habitual residence at a place more than fifteen kilometers distant from the municipal building and there is no communication by railroad or by provincial or local highways between the former and the latter, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license; but in such cases the official, priest, or minister solemnizing it shall state in an affidavit made before the local civil registrar or any person authorized by law to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or at a place more than fifteen kilometers distant from the municipal building concerned, in which latter case he shall give the name of the barrio where the marriage was solemnized. The person who solemnized the 113
marriage shall also state, in either case, that he took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and that there was in his opinion no legal impediment to the marriage at the time that it was solemnized. Alcantara vs. Alcantara Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA denying Restitutos appeal and affirming the decision of the RTC dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage. Facts: A petition for annulment was filed by Restituto against Rosita alleging that he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro. They got married on the same day. They went to another marriage ceremony the following year without securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license appearing in the marriage contract is a sham as neither party was a resident of Carmona and they never went there to apply for a license. Two years later, she gave birth to Rose Ann. Three years later, they parted ways and live separate lives. He prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering Civil registrar to cancel the marriage contract and its entry on file. Issue: Was the marriage void? Held: Petition denied. The marriage having been solemnized on Dec. 8, 1982, or before effectivity of FC, applicable law to determine its validity is NCC which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. Ratio: Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character
De Castro vs. De Castro Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA declaring that Reianne Tricia A. De castro is the legitimate child of petitioner and at the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Facts: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of pasig City in Sept 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in the next month, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the OCR, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, to push through with the plan, they executed an affidavit the next year stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. After the ceremony, they both went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Nov 1995, respondent gave birth to reianne Tricia. Since childs birth, she has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice. 114
Three years after, she filed a complaint for support against petitioner. She alleged that she is married to him and that he has reneged on his responsibility to financially support her and her child. Petitioner denied that he is married to her, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state, and that he was not able to get his parents consent. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledge the child. Issue: WON the court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage in an action for support and WON the child is the daughter of the petitioner. Held: Decision of CA set aside and the decision of RTC is reinstated. (RTC ruled the marriage void. However, the petitioner was declared the natural father and obliged to give support. Ratio: NCC Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. Republic vs. Dayot Petition for review on certiorari of amended decision of the CA which declared the marriage between Dayot and Felisa void ab initio. Facts: On 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Binan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when 115
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house and he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Held: Petition is denied. Decision of CA is affirmed. Ratio: NCC Art. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 4 of the preceding article: (1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; (2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; (3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. 2. Where to apply FC Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar fo the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a) FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a) 3. Requirements for issuance a. Application FC Art. 10. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following: (1) Full name of the contracting party; (2) Place of birth; (3) Age and date of birth; (4) Civil Status; (5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; (6) Present residence and citizenship; (7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties; (8) Full name, residence and citizenship of father; (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of mother; and (10) Full name, residence and citizenship of guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of 21 years. The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a) b. proof of capacity FC Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or 116
copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity. If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality. The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (60a) FC Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (61a) FC Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a) FC Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a) NCC Art. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n) Sevilla vs. Cardenas Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA which set aside the decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties 117
Facts: Jaime Sevilla claimed that on May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita Cardenas and the latters father. On the said date, the father caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry. On her part, she claims that they were married civilly and in a church ceremony. Both marriage were registered with the local civil registry. He was stopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years. Issue: Was the marriage valid? Held: Petition is denied. Decision of CA is affirmed. c. parental advice FC Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a) d. marriage counseling FC Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. e. Publication FC Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a) f. investigation of impediments FC Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a) g. payment of fees 118
FC Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a) h. family planning certificate PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 965 - A DECREE REQUIRING APPLICANT FOR MARRIAGE LICENSE TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON FAMILY PLANNING AND RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD 4. Place where valid FC Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a) 5. Period of validity (FC Art. 20, refer above) 6. Duties of the Civil Registrar FC Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n) FC Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n) Alcantara vs. Alcantara (see digest above) 7. Marriages exempt from license requirement FC Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a) FC Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a) FC Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) FC Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar 119
of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a) FC Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a) FC Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a) FC Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a) FC Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a) NCC Art. 76. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. (n) PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1083 A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZIN G THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Leda vs. Tabang Nature: Administrative case in the SC for disbarment.
Facts: Evangeline Leda seeks for Atty. Trebonian Tabangs disbarment for lack of good moral character. The two contracted a marriage of an exceptional character under Art 76 of the NCC. Both parties agreed to keep the marriage secret until Tabang finishes his law studies to be able to ensure a stable future. Petitioner alleged that the respondent made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage (assuming that the marriage was indeed invalid) and that he had misrepresented himself as single in his application for the bar when the truth was the contrary. Defense: marriage is void ab initio due to the absence of the requisites of Art. 76 of the NCC He could not have abandoned the complainant for they never lived as husband and wife. And that when he applied for the bar he honestly believed that he was single. Issues: WON the lack of requisites under NCC Art. 76 would render the marriage void. Held: No. Respondent cannot assume that his marriage with the complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a exceptional character under Art. 76 of the NCC have been met and that the Judges official duty ion connection therewith has been regularly performed. 120
Ninal vs. Bayadog Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA dismissing the petitioners appeal for declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to his second wife. Facts: Pepitio Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, mother of the petitioners. However on 11 Dec 1985, Ninal shot her and caused her death (wonder why he didnt get charged with parricide). 1 yr and 8 mos after her death, Ninal and respondent Bayadog married w/o a marriage license but executed an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 yrs and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. This case was filed under the assumption that the validity/invalidity of the second marriage would affect the petitioners succession rights. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition for lack of cause of action. Issues: WON the marriage is valid. And WON petitioners can assail the validity of their fathers marriage considering that he has already died. Held: Marriage is void ab initio and can thus be assailed even after the death of one of the parties. The marriage of Ninal and Bayadog took place when the FC was not yet in effect, thus Art. 76 of the NCC applies. Court has ruled that the 5 yr cohabitation contemplated in Art 76 should be counted back from the date immediately before the celebration of marriage. It should be characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years, and that the continuity must be unbroken. In this case the 5 year cohabitation clearly could not have happened since the parties got married only 20 mos. After the death of Ninals first wife. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of exemption. Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party. Article 47 does not apply. Voidable marriages can be assailed during the lifetime of the parties and so the action prescribes. Pepito and Normas marriage was void so it never existed.
Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez Facts: Hemrminia Borja claims to have been the lawful wife of the late David Manzano and that they were married on May 21, 1966 at St. Gabriel the Archangel Parish in Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. On March 22, 1993 David Manzano married Luzviminda Payao. Petitioner contends that Judge Sanchez must have known that the marriage would be bigamous and void as the marriage contract clearly states that both contracting parties were separated. Judge answered in saying that he did not know that Manzano was legally married with someone else and that he only knew that Manzano and Payao have been cohabiting as husband and wife for 7 years. Issue: WON marriage between Manzano and Payao is valid. And WON Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law. Held: Yes and Yes. The judge believed that on the basis of (A) the affidavits submitted by the participants of the second marriage which 121
stated that they were separated and been cohabiting for five years+, and the (B) Family Code Article 34 that states that those who have been cohabiting for five years may get married without a license, he can marry them both. The SC finds the judge grossly ignorant of the law. The FC does not allow cohabitation with another to dissolve existing marriage bonds, and it only allows exemption from procuring a marriage license; and it does not grant the legal status to enable marriage. De Castro vs. De Castro (see digest above) Republic vs. Dayot (see digest above) (b) Authority of the Solemnizing Officer 1. Who are authorized FC Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect; (3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31; (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a) FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a) FC Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a) FC Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a) NCC Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; (2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals; (3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance; (4) Mayors of cities and municipalities; (5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace; (6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in Article 92; and (7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75. (4a) NCC Art. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a voyage, or by the commanding officer of a military unit, in the absence of a chaplain, during war. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be 122
complied with by the ship captain, airplane chief or commanding officer. (n) NCC Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. (n) RA 7160 SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws. (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: (1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall: (xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding; ARANES vs OCCIANO Nature Administrative matter in the Supreme Court Facts January 5, 2000 Petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License however neither of them claimed it February 17, 2000 Judge Salvador Occiano solemnized Mercedita Aranes marriage to her late groom Dominador Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside the judges territorial jurisdiction o The Office of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua both have no record of their marriage o Orobia then had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of traveling to Balatan which is 25 km from his residence in Nabua so they requested that the judge solemnize the marriage in Nabua May 8, 2001 Petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Registrar of Nabua for the issuance of her marriage license May 9, 2001 A clerk informed the judge that they cant issue the marriage license due to failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse Since the marriage was a nullity, Merceditas right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized; likewise, she was deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia Mercedita prays that sanctions be imposed against Judge Occiano July 5, 2001 In his comment, respondent judge averred that he was just requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of Dominador and Mercedita, having been assured that al the documents to the marriage were complete Furthermore, respondent judge refused at first to solemnize the marriage when he discovered that the parties did not possess marriage license; however, due to the pleas of the parties, he proceeded to solemnize such out of human compassion 123
September 12, 2001 Mercedita filed her Affidavit of Desistance; she said that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that the judge solemnized her marriage and she is now bothered by her conscience
NAVARRO vs DOMAGOTOY Nature Administrative matter in the Supreme Court Facts September 27, 1994 Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Tagadan and Borga despite knowledge that the Tagadan is merely separated from his first wife o Judge stated that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years October 27, 1994 Judge Domagtoy is alleged to have performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction (Dapa, Surigao del Norte) o Judge argued that he did not violate Article 7 (1) of the Family Code which states that marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question Issue WON Judge Domagtoy gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law Held Ratio 124 Yes
Issue WON judge is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction Held Yes Ratio Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction o Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in wedding only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability o Despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by the petitioner, respondent judge still cannot avoid the liability for violating the law on marriage Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license o It is the marriage license which gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage o Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner; thus, he acted in gross ignorance of the law
In Tagadan and Borga wedding o The law is clear. Even if the spouse present has wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement incorporated in the Family Code o Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding o Such neglect or ignorance of the law has therefore resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage In Sumaylo and Rosario wedding o Again, the law is clear. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8 refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance therewith will not invalidate the marriage. o Respondent judge was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte o Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law director of the proper government office, upon receiving such sworn statement containing the information required, and being satisfied that the denomination, church, sect, or region of the applicant operates in the Philippines, shall record the name of such priest or minister in a suitable register and issue to him an authorization to solemnize marriage. Said priest or minister or rabbi shall be obliged to exhibit his authorization to the contracting parties, to their parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons in charge demanding the same. No priest or minister not having the required authorization may solemnize marriage. (34a) Art. 93. Freedom of religion shall be observed by public officials in the issuance of authorization to solemnize marriages. Consequently, no public official shall attempt to inquire into the truth or validity of any religious doctrine held by the applicant or by his church. (n) NCC Art. 94. The public official in charge of registration of priests and ministers shall cancel the authorization issued to a bishop, head, priest, rabbi, pastor or minister of the gospel of any denomination, church, sect, or religion, on his own initiative or at the request of any interested party, upon showing that the church, sect or religion whose ministers have been authorized to solemnize marriage is no longer in operation. The cancellation of the authorization granted to a priest, pastor or minister shall likewise be ordered upon the request of the bishop, head, or lawful authorities of the denomination, church, sect or religion to which he belongs. (35a) NCC Art. 95. The public official in charge of registration of priests and ministers, with the approval of the proper head of Department, is hereby authorized to prepare the necessary forms and to promulgate regulations for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this Title. Said official may also by regulations fix and collect fees for the authorization of priests and ministers to solemnize marriages. (36a) NCC Art. 96. The existing laws which punish acts or omissions concerning the marriage license, solemnization of marriage, authority to solemnize marriages, and other acts or omissions relative to the celebration of marriage shall remain and continue to be in force. (n) 125
2. How Authorized [FC Art 7 (2) refer to pg1] NCC Art. 92. Every priest, or minister, or rabbi authorized by his denomination, church, sect, or religion to solemnize marriage shall send to the proper government office a sworn statement setting forth his full name and domicile, and that he is authorized by his denomination, church, sect, or religion to solemnize marriage, attaching to said statement a certified copy of his appointment. The
VILLAR vs. PARAISO Nature Appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Facts Pedro Vilar and Gaudencio Paraiso were among the candidates registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija Paraiso won the mayoralty race Vilar then protested that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code Vilar also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal in lieu of Paraiso Paraiso denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21, 1951, and that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church The trial court found respondent to be ineligible for mayor, being an ecclesiastic and consequently, it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so Issue WON Paraiso, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office WON Paraiso actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability Held
Yes, Paraiso is ineligible to hold office No, Paraiso did not resign
Ratio Paraiso remains to be ecclesiastic for he failed to resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries o The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status o This information is necessary for the protection of the public; especially so with regard to authority to solemnized marriages He failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting evidence certain documents purporting to show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting but one cannot help but brand them as selfserving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his disqualification under the law o If one examines the minute book, one would get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with seriousness and solemnity o Such lead the court to believe that the supposed resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent 126
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 3. Effect of Absence of Authority FC Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; RPC Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. Cf. Tenchavez v. Escano Related Provisions NCC 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. NCC 17, par 3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by Nature Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Facts Significant dates o February 24, 1948 Vicenta Escao (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register) o February 26, 1948 Mamerto Escao received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel o June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged o June 24, 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years o August 22, 1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character o October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute o 1951 Escaos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor o September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran o August 8, 1958 Vicenta acquired an American citizenship 127
o July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escaos whom he charged for dissuading their daughter from him Falsely charged the Escaos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of plaintiff from supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife Thus, this appeal Whether or not Vicenta and Pastors marriage is valid Whether or not their marriage is subsisting and undissolved Whether or not Vicentas divorce and second marriage is valid Decision under appeal is hereby modified o Pastor is entitled to a legal separation o Vicenta is sentenced to pay Pastor for damages and attorneys fees o Pastor is sentenced to pay the Escaos by way of damages and attorneys fees Tenchavez falsely charged which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages o The very act of Vicenta suing for divorce implies admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding Their marriage is subsisting and undissolved under the Philippine law; Vicentas divorce and second marriage is not valid o The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce o Vicentas marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran entitles Techavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery
Issues Held
4. Duties of the Solemnizing Officer FC Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a) FC Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n) 5. Effect of irregularity 128
Ratio February 24, 1948 marriage is valid o Both parties were above the age of majority o Both consented to the marriage o Marriage was performed by a Catholic Priest in the presence of competent witnesses
(c) Marriage Ceremony (1) form of ceremony FC Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) FC Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a) FC Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a) FC Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Martinez vs. Tan EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM, and MARON LAJIM v PEOPLE (please refer to the previous set of digests) 2. Place of Ceremony FC Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a) FC Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) FC Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a) 3. Issuance of Marriage Certificate 129
FC Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also state: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a) o June 17, 1917 a child was christened at the parish church of Siniloan; the child was named Melecio Perez w/ Flaviana as the mother and no mention of the father o July 8, 1920 in her deathbed, Flaviana and Pedro got married o July 9, 1920 Flaviana died leaving behind Pedro, Melecio and Domingo o May 2, 1928 Domingo died o Defendants Gonzalo de Leon et al contend that the trial court erred when it declared that: Pedro and Flavianas marriage is valid Pedro and Flavianas subsequent marriage legitimated Melecio Melecio is the rightful heir of the property left by de Leon Issue: WON Pedro and Flavianas marriage is valid even w/o the marriage cert and if Melecio was legitimated by his parents marriage MADRIDEJO v DE LEON Facts:

The trial court held that Melecio was Domingos next of kin and is the rightful successor of the property Back story: o Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were married and had one child, Domingo de Leon o Eulogio died and when Flaviana was widowed, she lived w/ Pedro Madridejo o June 1, 1917 registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna shows tha Pedro and Flaviana had a child, Melecio Madridejo
Held: The Court reversed the lower courts decision Just because the parish priest did not send a copy of the MC to the municipal secretary does not mean that Pedro and Flavianas marriage was not valid o Forwarding a copy of the MC is not one of the laws requirement for a marriage to be valid There is no attempt to deny WON Melecio is the son of Pedro and Flaviana, what needs to be validated is WON his parents marriage legitimated him o Article 121 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. o 2 Kinds of acknowledgment: 130
Voluntary by the mother or father: Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document. Compulsory acknowledgment by the father: Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases: 1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence. 2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his family. 3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed. Compulsory acknowledgment by the mother: Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child: 1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding article. 2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven. o No document shows that Melecio was not voluntarily acknowledged by his parents o In order for Melecio to be compulsory acknowledged, the Civil Code requires that he take a judicial action against his parents to compel them to recognize him, something which he havent done PEOPLE v BORROMEO Facts:
July 3, 1981 4- year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Susanas mother, Matilda Taborada, that Susan was asking for help because Elias was killing her o Matilde seek the help of her son, Geronimo who, together with his father went to Susanas and Elias hut o The two peeped through the bamboo slats of the hut and saw Susana lying on the floor, apparently dead; her one-month child was crying beside her; Elias was holding a bloody kitchen bolo o The police were called and arrested Elias who asked to be allowed to smoke first before surrendering o Susana was found dead with her intestine spilling out of her abdomen o Susana died due to the stab wounds Elias contends that the trial court erred when it held that: o He and Susana were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony when the officiating priest testified otherwise and they had no MC so he should only be liable for homicide o In failing to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender w/o any aggravating circumstance to offset the same o In convicting him of parricide and imposing on him reclusion perpetua 131
Issue: WON Elias and Susana were legally and validly married Held: The Court affirmed the lower courts decision and increased the indemnity to be paid by the defendant In his testimony, Elias, upon being asked, admitted that he was married to Susana Non-existence of MC does not invalidate a marriage as long as during its celebration, all the requirements for its validity were present Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. E. LAW GOVERNING VALIDITY OF MARRIAGES ABROAD 1. General rule in contracts (a) As to form NCC Art 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) (b) As to substantive requirements NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) 2. Special rule in marriage (a) lex loci celebrationis FC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) FC Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a) 132
FC Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. (75a) o Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are IC And appointed Sze Sook Wah as administratrix CA modified the decision: o Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman w/ whom he lived as husband and wife w/o the benefit of marriage o Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen are acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Yao Kee since the legality of their marriage in China has not been proven as valid o Affirmed the administrator
YAO KEE v SY-GONZALES Facts:
January 17, 1977 - Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in his residence in Caloocan City leaving real and personal properties amounting to P300,000 Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of letters of admin and alleged that: o They are the children of Asuncion Gillego o Sy Kiat died w/o a will o They do not recognize Sy Kiats marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him o They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales as administratrix of the intestate estate of Sy Kiat Yao Kee Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen opposed the petition and alleged that: o Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on Jan 19, 1931 in China o The other oppositors are the LC of the deceased w/ Yao Kee o Sze Sook Wah, the eldest, is competent, willing, and desirous to become administratrix The probate court held that: o Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were legally married o Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen are LC
Issue: WON Sy Kiat and Yao Kees marriage in China has been proven valid in accordance w/ laws of China Held: The Court affirmed CAs ruling Petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage o Yao Kees and Gan Chings (her younger brother) testimonies cannot be considered as proof of chinas law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving but they are also not competent to testify on the matter o For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and the validity of the marriage in accordance w/ that law or custom, Yaos and Sy Kiats marriage cant be recognized by Philippine law Yao Kee said that there was no solemnizing officer in their wedding as is known here in the Philippines Back story: 133
o Yao Kee claimed that her marriage to Sy Kiat took place in accordance w/ Chinese custom and that in this custom, there is no MC, and that the practice during that time was a written docu is exchanged bet the parents of the bride and of the groom or any elder o In several docus, Sy Kiat admits to being married to Yao Kee and to having children w/ her thats why Yao Kees children were considered as Sy Kiats acknowledged natural children REPUBLIC v ORBECIDO III Facts:
May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva got married at United Church of Christ in Lam-an, Ozamis City o They had children, Kristoffer Simbortriz and Lady Kimberly 1986 Myros left for US w/ son Kristoffer A few years later, Cipriano learned that Myros has been naturalized as US citizen 2000 Cipriano learned from Kristoffer that Myros divorced Cipriano and married Stanley who she now lives with in California Cipriano filed at theRTC for petition to remarry invoking par 2 of Art 26 of FC which the lower court granted Republic, through OSG, filed for review contending that par 2 of Art 26 of the FC is not applicable to this case bec it applies only to marriage bet a Filipino citizen and an alien o Also suggests that Cipriano should file for annulment/legal separation instead
Held: The Court granted the Republics petition Par 2 of Art 26 of the FC should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry o This is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse remains married while the alien spouse is not married anymore to him/her o The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry However, since the respondent did not submit sufficient evidence that his wife was indeed naturalized and has remarried, the Court is unable to declare that the respondent is now capacitated to marry DACASIN v DACASIN For review is a dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction. Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain 134
Issue: WON Cipriano can remarry under Art 26 of the FC
from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. Issue: whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child. Held: RTC: In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction. Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case. In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality. SC: REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. Ratio: Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child.[30] As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the courts jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest. b. Exceptions FC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even 135
with the consent of parents or guardians; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; FC Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. FC Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. FC Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. NCC Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. (19a) F. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGES/ LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS FC Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. 136
RPC Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person, who without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contact marriage is in disregard pf a legal impediment. If neither of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph. NCC Title III. - CO-OWNERSHIP Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title. (392) Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a) Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a) Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n) Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership. (395a) Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492. (n) Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed: (1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each; (2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata; (3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively. (396) Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief. (397a) Art. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding. There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by 137
the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership. Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator. Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. (398) Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399) Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a) Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in 138 common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498. (401a) Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402) Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. (403) Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coowners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. (404) Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the coownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition. (405) Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n) Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other co-owners. (n) Facts: LESACA v LESACA
Baldomero J. Lesaca died on November 8, 1946, and was survived by Juana Felix, his 2nd wife, two of their minor children, two children from his first marriage, and three natural children from a third woman. His will stated that Juana Lesaca and Consuelo Lesaca, the children from his first marriage, be his co-executrices. 1. In the Court of First Instance of Manila, the two minor children of the widow Juana were granted P100 for living expenses plus P300 for their matriculation and uniforms. The co-executrices refused to do this, saying that the amounts for support should be charges against the minors share of the inheritance. On March 11, 1949, the court ruled that the amounts be deducted from their inheritance only insofar as they exceed what they are titled to as fruits or income, and ordered the co-executrices to deposit all the amounts for the minors, totaling P2955.83. 2. In another order, on March 11, 1949, the widow claimed that the sum of P2500 as repurchase price of the land is conjugal property, thus she was entitled to one-half of it. Widow and deceased lived together since 1924 but did not get married till December 18, 1945. In 1930, the land was conveyed to Baldomero by Ramon Garcia. The court ruled in favor of the widow. 3. In another order, on April 29, 1949, the widow claimed that the 1040 cavans of palay received as rent on decedents land should be considered conjugal property, and that she is entitled to one-half of it. The co-executrices argued that the rent was harvested on June-July, 1946, after the death of Baldomero (which caused the dissolution of their marriage), thus it was not conjugal. The court ruled in favor of the widow. The co-executrices then appealed to the higher court. WON: 139 1. The allowances for the support of the minors are subject to collation (deductible from their share of the inheritance) 2. Money received after the marriage, as purchase price of land sold a retrovendondo before such marriage, constitutes conjugal property or not 3. The 1040 cavans of palay is considered conjugal property Held: 1. Yes, they are subject insofar as the amount exceeds what they are title to as fruits or income. 2. No, it is not conjugal property. It is considered part of the deceaseds estate, thus the widow is NOT entitled to one-half. 3. Yes, the crop of palay is conjugal property, thus one-half goes to the widow. Ratio: 1. Art. 1430 of the CC of 1889 (re-enacted as Art. 188 of NCC) directs that surviving spouse and his or her children should be given allowance, which shall be deducted from their inheritance share once it exceeds what they are entitled to as fruits or income. Although Art. 1041 states that allowances for support are not subject to collation, this applies to property or rights received during the lifetime of the decedent. 2. The fact that the money was returned after the marriage cannot make it conjugal property. Although Art. 1401 of 1889 CC declares that property obtained by work of the spouses belongs to the spouses, this refers to property obtained during the
marriage. Also, there was no proof that the money was earned by the joint efforts of the widow and deceased. 3. The palay was planted after the marriage (June or July 1946). It is immaterial that the rent was received after the dissolution of the marriage. What is important is the date of the accrual. YAPTINCHAY v TORRES Facts: A common-law wife arguing with the legal familys possession of a North Forbes house. (wooh! waaw! asteeg! :) Of course she had no right. July 17, 1965 - Teresita Yaptinchay, alleged 19-year common-law wife of Isidro Yaptinchay, was declared by Pasay CFI as Special Administratix (SA) of deceased Isidros properties. July 30, 1965 - probate court declared Virginia Yaptinchay (Isidros legitimate daughter) as SA for Isidros estate, including a North Forbes house. Teresita then filed on Pasig CFI an action for replevin and liquidation of properties. Aug. 17, 1965 - the judge (Torres) temporarily restrained Virginia from disposing any of the involved properties including the NF house. Aug. 25, 1965 - Virginia resisted the restraining order, alleging that Teresitas claim/right is still disputed and that the Pasay CFIs jurisdiction was being undermined, and prayed for Teresita to cease and desist disturbing the properties, including the NF house. Teresita also claims ownership of the NF house, alleging that she has shared in the costs of building it. Jun.15 and 28, 1966 Virginia was ruled to be still the SA, and the cease and desist order was issued against Teresita. Teresitas MR was denied. Hence, this case. Issue: Whether or not Teresita has SA powers on the NF house. Held: No, she doesnt have. Ratio: 1) Virginia was in actual/physical possession of the NF house, and Teresita cant shake this possession by having a writ of injunction issued. 2) The properties are legitimate conjugal properties between Isidro and his legal wife Josefina. Teresita has not proved her contributions to the NF house. Her loans (during the time of the building of the house) do not necessarily translate to her shares on the building expenses. Furthermore, the house was constructed on Isidros lot during his marriage with Josefina, thus, it should fall under Virginias administration. 3) Teresita cant claim the NF house by using NCC 144 (which provides for the sharing of properties of unmarried man and woman). She must first prove that she has contributed to the property, and this she failed to do. EUGENIO v. VELEZ (please check the digest w/ IV. Persons and Personality heading) ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR (please check digest w/ FC Art 1 . Rule 131 Burden of proof.. heading its there haha!) G. VOID MARRIAGES General Rule: 140
FC Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). 1. Kinds of Void Marriages (a) Absence of requisites FC Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53. FC Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twentyone years. Emancipation also takes place: (1) By the marriage of the minor; or (2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6809 AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 234.Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." Sec. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed. Sec. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "Art. 236.Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. "Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code." Sec. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice Sec. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. ALCANTARA v. MALLION Facts: Mallion filed a petition with San Pablo City RTC seeking declaration of nullity of his marriage with Alcantara alleging the respondents psychological incapacity. This petition was denied. 141
The appeal in the CA was likewise dismissed. After the decision attained finality, he filed the same petition with San Pablo RTC this time on the grounds that the marriage is without a valid marriage license. The respondent for her part moved to dismiss the petition invoking the principle of res judicata. Issues: WON res judicata applies. Assuming it does not, would the lack of marriage license render the marriage null and void? Held: Res Judicata applies and lack of marriage license cannot render the marriage null and void. The petitioner is barred from instituting another suit where the cause of action is the same (declaring nullity of his marriage with Alcantara). In the second case, he is only invoking a different ground which is the lack of marriage license. The judiciary would be squandering time, effort, and financial resources by litigating the same controversy over again. And assuming, for arguments sake, that he is not barred from instituting another case, he has already impliedly conceded the validity of his marriage when he instituted the first case. This admission binds the petitioner and cures the alleged defect of his marriage. SO v. VALERA Facts: 1973 Renato Reyes, 17-year old HS student, and Lorna Valera, 21-year old college student, met at a party. Meeting led to a courtship and to a 19-year common-law relationship. o Eloped two months after meeting at a party. They stayed in (1) Bulacan, (2) Caloocan City and (3) Muntinlupa City. [1986 Valera asked Reyes to sign a blank marriage application from and marriage contract. According to Reyes, he signed these documents on the condition that these would only be used if they decide to get married. He also admitted not knowing what happened to these documents, and maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991.] [1990 Reyes found all his things outside their house when he came home (drunk) late after closing a deal with a client. He left their house for 2 months, but when he tried to go back to their place, Valera prevented him from doing so.] December 10, 1991 Exchange of marital vows between parties at the Caloocan City Hall Union produced three children: Jeffrey, Renelee and Loni May 14, 1996 Reyes filed a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage with the respondent on the ground that Valera was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage: o Valera failed and refused to cohabit and make love with him; o Did not love and respect him; o Did not remain faithful to him; o Did not give him emotional, spiritual, physical and psychological help and support; o Failed and refused to have a family domicile; o Failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with him. Aside from his testimony, he presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of their children, marriage contract, curriculum vitae and psychological report of Dr. Gates: o Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder and exhibited Compulsive Behavior Patterns. RTC annulled the marriage (i.e. declared null and void ab initio) on the ground that Valera is psychologically 142
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. No sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity. o CA: While respondent appears to be less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband, these flaws were not physical manifestations of psychological illness. (b) Bigamous Marriage FC Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]). FC Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) FC Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) FC Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 143
Issues: WON Reyes failed to prove Valeras psychological incapacity? Held and Ratio: Yes. The totality of evidence presented by Reyes failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations. o Psychologists Report/Testimony Conclusions were based on statements by Reyes whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. Conclusions appear to be exaggerated extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The particulars are, as it were, snapshots rather than a running account of the respondents life from which her whole life is totally judged. Report is not comprehensive enough to be reliable. Failed to show that the respondents behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence requires (i.e. removal of stimulus) Failed to prove that behavioral disorder is so grave and serious that Valera would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; that it was rooted in Valeras medical or psychological history before her marriage; that a cure was beyond Valeras capacity to achieve
APIAG v CANTERO Facts: Maria Apiag and (Judge) Esmeraldo Cantero joined together in holy matrimony in marriage on August 11, 1947. After having lived together as husband and wife, their union produced two children, Teresita Cantero (June 19, 1947) and Glicerio Cantero (October 29, 1953). Thereafter, Cantero left conjugal home without any apparent cause leaving Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher (Hinanduyan, Southern Leyte). For several years, Cantero was never heard of and his whereabouts unknown. When Cantero surfaced in Southern Leyte, Apiag begged for support, however she was ignored by defendant. On September 21, 1993, Apiag, through Atty. Guyula, wrote to Cantero demanding for (1) maintenance and support for the family and (2) children be declared compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents. The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, Apiag learned that Cantero had another family with Nievas Ygay to whom he has five children Noralyn (May 19, 1968), Ellen (February 4, 1970), Erwin (April 29, 1979), Onofre (June 10, 1977) and Desirie (December 2, 1981) Cantero. Also, Apiag found out that in all public documents of Cantero, he declared himself as being married to Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage, when his previous marriage was still subsisting. On November 10, 1993, Apiag and her children charged Cantero with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. In response, Judge Cantero said that he honestly believed that his marriage with Apiag was void from the beginning considering that and his consent was not freely given (i.e. That parents of the parties were the ones who agreed on the marriage to save name and shame due to the early pregnancy of Apiag; that he did not know he was to appear on a drama marriage on that day; and, that they were forced to acknowledge the signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract; that he was still 20 and at his second year HS days at that time); and, that they never lived together as husband and wife nor have established a conjugal home (NOTE: As to this, Judge Cantero did not file for a declaration of nullity of the alleged marriage because there is nothing to be voided or nullified in the first place.). Also, he said that they never communicated for the last 40 years and that Apiag has been living with another man during her public school teaching days and has another child, Manuel Apiag, with him (He who seeks justice must seek justice with clean hands.). It is also highly suspicious and intriguing that the complaints are filed just now knowing that he is retirable next year, 1997. March 1994, Cantero and Apiag executed and entered into a compromise agreement wherein it was agreed that the complaint be withdrawn and that support and inheritance rights be granted. (Investigating Judge and Court Administrator found Cantero guilty of grave misconduct of bigamy and falsification of public documents. Investigating Judge called for 1 year suspension without pay; whereas, Court Administrator recommended dismissal from service and forfeiture of benefits. They also ruled that bigamy constitutes a continuing offense.) Issues: WON Cantero committed bigamy WON Cantero is guilty of falsification of public documents WON charge of grave misconduct against Cantero is applicable Held and Ratio (SC): No. Bigamy charge cannot stand. o The marriage of Cantero to Ygay took place and all their children born before the promulgation of Wiegel v Sempio-Dy and before the effectivity of the Family Code, which provides that a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;otherwise, the second marriage is also void. 144
o Doctrine in Odayat v Amante applies in this case: No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. No. Cantero is not guilty of falsification of public documents. o Since charge of bigamy cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail. o No malice in filling up the public documents (i.e. good faith). No. Gross misconduct is not applicable. o The acts imputed against Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. HOWEVER, the absence of finding criminal liability on his part does not preclude the Court from finding him administratively liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. o His personal life falls short of the standard because the record reveals he had two families. o His conduct of not giving support to his first family is unbecoming of a trial magistrate. o Court would have imposed a penalty but because of Canteros death, the case was dismissed. 10 Oct 1976 Mercado married Oliva again (in church) 27 Jun 1991 Mercado married Ma. Consuelo Tan (by a Judge; him posing as single) 29 Jun 1991 Mercado married Tan again (in church) 5 Oct 1992 Tan filed bigamy against Mercado 13 Nov 1992 Mercado sought for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for his marriage with Oliva 6 May 1993 the above petition was granted by the RTC (BUTRTC and CA held Mercado guilty of bigamy under RPC Art. 349) Issue: WON Mercados marriage with Tan is bigamous (and thus void). Held: Yes, its bigamous and thus void. Ratio: RPC 349 states the elements of the crime of bigamy: 1) That the offender has been legally married 2) That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code 3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage 4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requirements for validity. On 22 January 1993, all of these elements were present when the Information (for the crime of bigamy) was filed! The declaration of nullity came after the Information had been filed. So Mercado was still validly married to Oliva when he married Tan. He had already committed bigamy. 145
MERCADO v. TAN Facts: A case about a two-timing doctor who sought declaration of nullity to save himself from the crime of bigamy. 10 Apr 1976 Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva (by a Judge)
SC cited conflicting precedents on whether or not theres a need for a judicial declaration of nullity. BUT FC Art. 40 overturned them all and explicitly provided that there needs to be one before a person can contract a second marriage. Vitug, concurring and dissenting: [t]he necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place[i]t is likely that Art 40 of the FC has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Arts 35-38 and 53 thereof. Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulledthe complete nullity however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. TY v. CA Facts: Another stupid case involving a stupid two-timing husband and an equally stupid second wife with petition for support. 29 Mar 1977 Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva (civil rites) 27 Aug 1977 same parties wed again (church rites) 4 Aug 1980 Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared their civil marriage null and void ab initio for lack of license, and the church marriage also null and void ab initio for lack of consent 4 Apr 1979 Reyes married Ofelia Ty (civil rites) 4 Apr 1982 Reyes wed Ty again in church 3 Jan 1991 Reyes filed a petition for his marriage with Ty to be declared null and void for lack of a marriage license, and alleged that he was still married to Anna Maria Ty responded by presenting a marriage license that theyve used, and the 1980 declaration of nullity to protect her marriage (stupid girl, she still wanted to stay married to this two-timer?!?) RTC declared Reyes and Tys marriage null and void ab initio CA affirmed RTC Issue: WON Reyes and Tys marriage is valid. Held: YEP. Really. Ratio: (SC cited various precedents) Then CC Art 83 applies here, which provides conditions before entering into a 2nd marriage. It did not state whether theres a need for a declaration of nullity though. Jurisprudence showed conflicting decisions. Had FC 40 applied, there wouldve been a need to present this decree. In the end, SC decided to hold Reyes and Tys marriage valid and subsisting. The reasons: - FC 40 cant apply because childrens rights would be affected - there was really a marriage license (the fact that the same license was used for the 2 ceremonies does not matter) - the church wedding confirmed, ratified, and fortified (oo na) the earlier civil wedding - all the requirements for a valid marriage were present\ P.S. Damages not awarded. Support was granted. 146
to account innocence for the accused. MORIGO v. MORIGO Facts Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).They maintained a long distance relationship from 1894 ro 1990. Lucia was then based in Canada. They got married on August 30, 1990 in Iglesia Filipina Nacional in Catagdaan Pilar Bohol.. After the marriage, in Septembet 8,. Lucia once again left for Canada. By August 19, 1991, Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted on Jan 17, 1992 and effective after a month. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Issue: WON the marriage was void ab initio for the lack of the lack of a valid marriage ceremony WON the crime of BIGAMY should hold considering that defendant married in good faith thinking that his marriage was already dissolved WON the case People vs. BITDU should hold and the erred failed Ratio: The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. This case should be differentiated from others as its nullity is retroactive, hence the defendant did not contract a second marriage. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic. TENEBRO v, CA Overview A man declaring his bigamous marriage void ab initio due to his psychological incapacity, hence he would have no criminal liability for bigamy. Facts Apr 10, 1990 Veronico Tenebro married Leticia Ancajas Tenebro & Ancajas lived together without interruption until latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of marriage contract b/n him and Villareyes Tenebro left Ancajas to cohabit with Villaretes Jan 25, 1993 Tenebro contracted another marriage, this time with Nilda Villegas 147 Held: Yes, marriage is void ab initio. There is no crime of bigamy committed.
Ancajas heard of third marriageconfirmed with Villareyes Villareyes confirmed through letter that she was married with petitioner Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner (Criminal Case: 013095-L) Petitioner pleaded not guilty and claimed that: o He and Villareyes were not validly married; they cohabited from 1084-1988 though o There was no record of said marriage in Civil Registrar of Manila Nov 10, 1997 - RTC rendered decision finding petitioner guilty of bigamy. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner files for review on the following errors o That the CA affirmed decision of the RTC despite the non-existence of the first marriage and insufficiency of evidence o That the CA convicted petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage between the accused and complainant had been declared null and void ab initio without legal force and effect Petitioner argues that 1) the marriage with Villareyes does not exist, and 2) that the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological capacity retroacts to the date of their marriage. Petitioner prays for acquittal Held 1. Yes. Marriage with Villareyes was valid; Tenebros marriage with Ancajas was bigamous 2. No. Ratio 1. The first marriage exists. o Documentary evidence a copy of the marriage contract, a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were married o A certification from the NSO and CR of Manila that record of marriage can not be found has no bearing. Such certifications merely attest that there were no records; the marriage contract itself serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage. Mere absence of record is different from absence of a marriage ceremony altogether. 2. Bigamous marriages are automatically void. o Petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio regardless of petitioners psychological incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriafe is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. o Art 349 of the RPC penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage o The declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. All essential and formal 148
WON 1. The marriage contracted between Villareyes and Tenebro valid, rendering Tenebros marriage with Ancajas bigamous 2. The judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity allows Tenebro to be free from criminal liability in bigamy
requisites for the validity of Ancajas-Tenebro marriage were present. o Judicial declaration of nullity of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage, but said marriage still has legal effects. Such a marriage may still produce legal consequences. o MORE IMPORTANTLY, Tenebro contracted marriage THRICE. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in. Concurring, Vitug: The absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, even prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy EXCEPT on account of psychological incapacity. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity: o Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage o Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental state may not be so readily evident o Marriage remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void MALLION v. ALCANTARA Overview: Mallion filed a declaration of nullity of marriage to Alcantara twice: (1) due to psychological incapacity, (2) lack of marriage license. The court denied the two petitions. Facts: On October 24, 1995, Oscar Mallion filed for a petition seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara due to the latters psychological incapacity. Because of lack of evidence, the petition was denied by the RTC. On July 12, 1999, Mallion again filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage this time claiming that the marriage was null and void because it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. RTC ruled in favor of Alcantara and dismissed the petition. Issues: WON a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? o WON res judicata can be applied in this case o WON marriage was valid without a marriage license Held and Ratio: Yes, a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license. o Yes, res judicata can be applied in this case. Res judicata is present because (1) former judgment is final (2) decision is rendered by court having jurisdiction over the case (3) judgment was based on merits (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter, cause of action and relief sought. A party cannot avoid the application of res judicata by varying the form of his action or adopting another method of presenting the case. 149
Plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, ALL THE ISSUES EXISTING when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. o Petitioner expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration during the first petition, and is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. Note: This decision is wrong because it is highly unfair to bar a subsequent petition when the contents therein are not yet known during the previous petition. ABUNADO v. REPUBLIC Facts: Dates: September 18, 1967: Salvador Abunado (petitioner) married Narcisa Arceno 1988-1992: Narcisa left for Japan to work and only came back upon knowing that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and left their conjugal home. After earnest efforts, she found him cohabiting with Fe Plato. She also discovered that her husband contracted a 2nd marriage. January 10, 1989: Salvador married Zenaida Binas January 19, 1995: annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa May 18, 1995: a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida December 24, 1955 (allegedly): Salvador first married Zenaida and they separated in 1966 stating that they only remarried for purpose of complying with the requirements needed by their son for military RTC convicted petitioner of bigamy, Zenaida was acquitted because evidence was insufficient CA affirmed RTCs decision but modified penalty to a lesser degree
Issue/s: 1. WON Information given to petitioner was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989 2. WON petitioner is absolved from criminal liability because his wife consented to his other marriage 3. WON his proceedings for bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of his annulment case (this being a prejudicial question) 4. WON penalty imposed was improper Held: 1. No. Real nature of the crimes are determined by the facts alleged in the information and not by the title or offense in the caption of the information. The information clearly states that the petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage and the date was obviously just a typographical error. 2. No. The crime of bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same. 3. No. The outcome of the civil case of annulment would have no bearing upon the petitioners guilt or innocence in the criminal case of bigamy. Prejudicial question one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the 150
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Yes. His age of 76 years old was already taken into account. SC affirmed CAs penalty of indeterminate penalty 2 years, 4 months, 1 day as minimum and 6 years, 1 day as maximum. JARILLO v. PEOPLE Overview: Jarillo was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage with Uy when her previous marriage with Alocillo was still subsisting. Facts: On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. On May 4, 1975, they again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. On October 29, 1975, Rachelle Alocillo was born. On November 26, 1979, Jarillo contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. April 16, 1995, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding ceremony. In 1999, Uy filed for the annulment of their marriage. Thereafter, Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasay City. October 5, 2000, Jarillo filed against Alocillo a declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC of Makati City. For her defense, Jarillo insisted that (1) her marriage with Alocillo was null and void because he was still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at that time (2) her marriage with Alocilllo and Uy were null and void for a lack of a valid marriage license (3) action has prescribed since Uy, through her mother, knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978 (15 years has already elapsed.). July 29, 2001, RTC ruled that Jarillo is guilty of bigamy (with 6-10 years imprisonment). August 2, 2001, MRC was denied. July 21, 2003, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Meanwhile, on March 28, 2003, RTC of Makati City declared Jarillos marriage with Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. July 8, 2004, CA invoked the Tenebro ruling saying that the subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage, the said marriage is not without legal consequences among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Issue: WON Jarillo committed bigamy when she contracted another marriage with Uy? Held and Ratio: Yes. Jarillo is guilty of bigamy. o The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages with Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy considering that the second marriage was contracted without the previous one being declared null and void. Herein, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and existing. o Jarillo failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation that 15-years has already elapsed (i.e. prescription began to ran as of 1978). Mother was not called to the witness stand. Disposition: Petition is partly granted. Penalty is modified (2 years, 4 months and 1 day imprisonment 8 years, 1 day imprisonment).
PUSE v. PUSE Facts: 151
A case about a teacher who married twice and his license was revoked. On 10 Jan 1992, elementary school teacher Rene Puse married barangay rural health midwife Ligaya Delos Santos. He had 2 kids with her. But Ligaya found out that he was previously married to Cristina Pablo on 27 Dec 1986 and that he also had 2 kids with Cristina. After their living together for 12-13 years, Ligaya filed for bigamy, abandonment, and the revocation of Renes license (for immorality and dishonorable conduct). Of course Rene denied these, and alleged that if these were true, then Ligaya would be guilty as well. Ligaya said that she married him in good faith, and that she didnt know he was previously married. Rene defended himself by saying that he believed that his 1 st wife was dead already because he had no communication with her (but he did not have a declaration of presumptive death). So the PRC found Rene guilty and revoked his teaching license1. CA dismissed Renes appeal and held Ligaya to be in good faith when she married him. Issue: Was the marriage of Rene and Ligaya bigamous? (orwas Rene guilty of Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct by virtue of his marriage with Ligaya?) Held: Yes. (Yes) Ratio:
1
Renes allegation that he believed his 1st wife to be dead was found a lie by the PRC and the CA. If he really believed that, he should have gotten a declaration of presumptive death. Plus, he earlier submitted an affidavit saying that Rene knew that his 1st wife was working in Hongkong and she regularly sent him and their children financial support and visited them at least once a year. Even though hes walking away from his 2nd family to be with his 1st, it does not absolve him. Plus he does not seem to be remorseful of his conduct. (c) Subsequent Marriage, upon appearance of absent spouse FC Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) FC Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the 152
Theres also a discussion on which body would have to decide on Renes conduct, the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC or Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) or whatevs but it wont probably be discussed. If asked, its the PRC pursuant to Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 and it was where the case was first filedso it acquired jurisdiction.
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n) NCC Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n) NCC Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (n) FC Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or FC Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) JONES v. HORTIGUELA Facts December 1914 Marciana Escano married Arthur Jones January 10 1918 Jones secured a passport. He went abroad, and was never heard of again. October 1919 Escano filed for the declaration of Jones as absentee October 25 1919 Arturo Jones was declared an absentee pursuant to the provisions of Art 186 of the Civil Code. Declaration of absenteeism was published in the Official Gazette and the El Ideal April 23, 1921 Court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence May 6, 1927 Escano married Hortiguela May 9, 1932 Escano died, leaving Hortiguela as judicial administrator of her entire estate. Her only heirs were Hortiguela and Angelita Jones, Escanos daughter from first marriage 153
May 3, 1934 Angelita Jones filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother; that the marriage between Hortiguela and her mother being null and void (so that Hortiguela doesnt get to be judicial administrator of the estates) o Angelita Jones argues that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25 1919 but in that of April 23 1921; and that from April 23 1921 to May 6, 1927 when Escano married Hortiguela, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed. November 1983: He arrived in Antique and tried to look for her. He even tried looking for her when the ship docked in England. Also, he was given back all the letters he had sent to Janet in Liverpool. Even when he asked the friends, they did not know where she was. He also said that he knew nothing about her because she refused to tell him such information. He also did not report her disappearance to the authorities. August 5, 1988: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. Either that or to declare the marriage null and void. His mother testified that Janet had expressed her desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on December 7, 1982. Janet was not used to living the rural way of life in Antique. She tried to stop Janet but when she couldnt, she gave Janica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on December 22, 1982 for England. She said she knew nothing about the whereabouts of Janet. Held: No. Evidence and testimony only prove that they did not communicate to one another. It did not prove she was dead. Rationale: Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four years. However, judicial declaration of presumptive death is needed to enable the spouse present to remarry. As compared to Article 83 of the Civil Code, Art.41 of the FC is much stricter since before it just needed that there be no news of partner still living or the partner is generally considered dead and the spouse present believed him to be dead. The FC needs a well-founded belief that partner is dead before granting the declaration. The Court considers that the investigation Gregorio conducted to find Janet Monica Parker was not enough to form a basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he found out that his wife had left, instead of going to the authorities, he just secured another seamans contract and went to London to look for 154
WON Escano and Hortiguelas marriage was valid Held Yes Ratio The absence of Arthur Jones should be counted from Jan 10, 1918, the date when he was last heard of. Note: For some reason, the marriage contracted b/n Hortiguela and Escano does not appear recorded in the marriage register of Malitbog. However, failure to transmit such document to the municipal secretary does not annul the marriage. Facts: REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO
They met in a bar in England. November 19, 1980: Couple returned to Antique after 6 months on a ship. (He was a seaman). January 15, 1982: They got married. January 1983: A letter from Gregorios mother informed him that Janet gave birth to his son and that she left Antique.
her there. It is not believable that in a major city such as London or Liverpool, one can hope to bump into one particular person there. The fact that he claims to know nothing about her and has lost all their letters to each other was deemed too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. Even his statement that he asked his unnamed friends if they knew where Janet was cannot be believed since there are serious doubts to respondents credibility. Couples cannot circumvent the laws on marriage. Gregorio even tried to have the marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding. BIENVENIDO v. CA Facts October 3, 1942 Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco February 6, 1952 Without marriage to Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio contracted a marriage with Luisita. Aurelio and Luisita lived together since 1953, and this led to the birth of Aurelio Luis Faustino Camacho, born in May 22 1961. 1967 Aurelio met Nenita Bienvenido. They lived together from June 1968 until Aurelios death in May 28, 1988. April 30, 1982 Aurelio bought the house Nenita and he have been staying in from its owners. November 26, 1984 Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favour of Nenita September 7, 1988 Luisita and son sought for the annulment of the sale of the property to Nenita, alleging that the deed of sale was a forgery and was executed in fraud of her as legit wife of Aurelio. August 29, 1989 trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to Nenita. Nenita claimed that the sale of the property to her was with Luisitas consent and that she was a purchaser in good faith. June 4, 1993 CA reversed lower courts decision, holding that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and that the sale of the property to Nenita was void for the same reason that donations b/n persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art 379 of the Civil Code
WON Aurelio and Luisitas marriage was valid (If marriage was valid, then the property was property of conjugal partnership and Luisita is the proper party to question the validity of the sale to Nenita) Held No Ratio Art 83 provides that Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage 155
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) The first exception in par 2 cannot be invoked in this case because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife (Velasco). The first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse, and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse Note: Because marriage b/n Luisita and Aurelio was void, conjugal properties do not exist, hence Luisita was not in position to question property. The sale of property to Nenita Bienvenido must be presumed. ARMAS v. CALISTERIO Facts: January 13, 1946- Marietta was first married to James Bounds. February 11, 1947- James Bound disappeared without a trace. May 8, 1958- (11 years later) Marietta married Teodorico Calisterio without securing a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. April 24, 1992- Teodorico died, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value of P604, 750.00. October 9, 1992- Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the QC RTC a petition entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner. Antonia claims that she is the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, as the latters marriage with Marietta is null and void due to bigamy, since Marietta married without the courts declaration that her first husband is presumptively dead. Antonia prays that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr. be appointed the administrator of the state of the deceased. Marietta opposed this saying that her first marriage with James Bound has been dissolved due to the latters absence for more than 11 years before she contracted her second marriage. February 5, 1993- RTC appointed Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr. and Marietta as administrator and administratix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico. January 17, 1996- the RTC decided in favor of Antonia, declaring her as the sole heir of Teodoricos intestate estate. Marietta appealed the case in the CA stating basically that the RTC erred in applying the provisions of the FC on her (which requires that she should seek the courts declaration of her first husbands presumptive death before she marries again), when the controversy arose at the time that the New CC was still in force. (This is particular to the issue, please check page 203 of the case for the other points she raised). August 31, 1998- CA decided in favor of the validity of Mariettas marriage with Teodorico, thereby making her the compulsory heir of her husband. She is entitled to half of the estate, and Antonia and her children to the other half. November 23, 1998- CA denied Antonias MR.
Issue: WON the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is valid, hence being determinative of Mariettas right to inherit as the surviving spouse of Teodorico. Held: Yes, as the applicable provision in this case is Article 83 of the New Civil Code and not the Family Code. Ratio: Mariettas marriage with Teodorico was solemnized on May 8, 1958, when the New CC was still in effect. According to Article 83 of 156
the New CC, a judicial declaration of absence of absentee is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. Hence, Mariettas marriage with James was lawfully dissolved due to the latters absence for more than 11 years, rendering her marriage with Teodorico valid. Judgment: SC affirms CA decision, however modifying it so as to grant half of the estates share solely on Antonia, excluding her children. REPUBLIC v. BERMUDEZ Facts: Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her Franciso Lorino married in 1987 and had 3 children. She then found out that her husband was a habitual drinker and possessed violent character and found it safer to leave him. She went to her parents home with her children. In order to support her children, she was compelled to work abroad. From then on, she had absolutely no communication with her husband. After 9 years, she filed a verified petition with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law stating: reason why she left and that she believes him to be dead and seeking a petition for a court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for purpose of remarriage. RTC rendered the presumptive death/absence of her husband Office of Solicitor-General, for RP, appealed to CA even if the judgment shall be immediately final and executory (Art 247, FC) CA denied RPs appeal Issue/s: 1. WON CA has jurisdiction over the appeal on a final and executor judgment of the RTC 2. WON the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 FC were duly established Held: 1. No. Under Sec 247 of the Family code, the judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. RP had no right to appeal the RTC decision. 2. They did not answer this, but only stated that the decision of the RTC is final and executory. Husbands presumptive death is final. REPUBLIC v. CA Overview: It is about the declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc Issue: WON a petition for presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding Facts: RTC granted the petition for declaration of presumptive death of absentee spouse on the basis of the Commissioners Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead. Trial court Judge Fortunato Madrona cited Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family code which says that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage wherein the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse. The Republic appealed however the court dismissed it assuming that it was a special proceeding which needed a filing and serving of a record of appeal, there was no such appeal filed and served (Sec 2(1) Rule 41 of Rules on Civil Procedure). Republic says 157
that it isnt a special proceeding in a petition for certiorari. CA denied appeal on the basis of procedural and substantive grounds (failure to attach to the petition a certified true copy of the assailed order and it questioned an order that declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, which cannot be found in the records.) Nevertheless, CA says that in Section 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a special proceeding is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. Therefore, the instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding. As opposed to an ordinary proceeding, the instant petition does not aim to seek the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. Thus denial of appeal was correct since the OSG should have filed a record on appeal first. Held: Nope. Its a summary proceeding. Ratio: Since Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates special proceedings and the declaration of presumptive death is not one of them, a mere notice of appeal is enough. Article 41 of the Family Code also states that the purpose of the petition was to enable Apolinaria Jomoc to contract a subsequent marriage and was a summary proceeding. Therefore it is not a special proceeding. Manuel vs. People 476 SCRA 461 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a 'love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was 'single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. Elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy The phrase 'or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings' was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21] 158
3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act REPUBLIC v. CA FACTS: Alan Alegro and Lea Julaton married on Jan 20, 1995 at Catbalogan Samar. On Feb 6, Lea went home late and he berated her saying if that she wanted a single life she should return to her parents. Lea did not go home the following day and the Alan presumed she went back to her parents. Alan searched for his wife at her parents house, and went to her friends, Janeth. He went to Manila to look for her in malls, etc for two years. In 1997 he went back to Catbalogan. On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton. Dismissed. On June 20, 2001 he filed a missing persons case at the local police station, on July 9 2001 at the NBI. The Barangay officials and Lea's father who was the owner of RADIO DYMS, supported his claim. Alan files another case to the CA.On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse. OSG appeals that he did not exhaust all efforts to find his wife and Held Ratio
There is no showing that The petitioner's contentions lie to bar Dr. Dr. Acampado's Acampado from further testifying as an testimonies refer to the expert witness in her case, being the exact case of Nelly Lim medical expert who has examined her. From the testimonies, it shows that the petitioner is The Court allowed the Doctor to testify not interviewed alone since the latter is only called upon as an Dr. Acampado never expert witness, not as the physician who disclosed any information looked after Lim's alleged ailments. As obtained from the Acampado only answers within authorized petitioner regarding her realms, keeping the exact ailment, ailment and treatment treatment and other medical recommended recommendations given to Lim as The petitioner makes no privileged, proving that the Doctor has not claim in any of her blackened the reputation of the patient, pleadings that her counsel the Court believes that the petition is had objected to any devoid of merit. question asked of the witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege. that the state should strengthen the institution of marriage. Issue: WON the wife is presumptively dead. 159
Held: No Ratio: The in-laws had reported that Lea did drop by their house but did not leave a clue to her whereabouts. Secondly, he filed a missing persons report after the RTC dismissed his case. It did not appear that he really wanted to find his wife. REPUBLIC v. TANGO (d) Bad faith of both spouses FC Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) (e) Psychological incapacity FC Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. FC Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a) FC Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a) FC Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) FC Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a) FC Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a) FC Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper; and (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a) LIM v. CA Overview: This is about the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship Issue: WON the CA denied due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner. Facts: 160
Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are lawfully married. November 25, 1987: Juan Sim filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that petitioner Nelly Lim has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia before, during, and after the marriage and until the present. Juan Sim had 4 witnesses. One is Dr. Lydia Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, specializing in Psychiatry. Nelly Lim objected to this witness since the testimony sought from Dr. Acampado is privileged. Nelly Lim had gone to Dr. Acampado in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. The doctor was allowed to testify since she would be testifying as an expert and not as an attending physician. All they discussed was hypothetical and did not mention specifically Nelly Lim. Held: Nope. Only disclosures made to the physician to enable him safely and efficaciously to treat his patient are covered by the confidentiality rule. Since expert witness and she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination of Nelly Lim, her testimony cannot be excluded. Besides, Nelly Lim was never interviewed alone and thus, has destroyed the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient. Lastly, since Nelly Lim did not object when she found out that the doctor was going to testify, even if the information was privileged, she had waived her right to object. SALITA v. MAGTOLIS Facts: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church, Manila, on January 25, 1986. After a year, their marriage turned sour, and they eventually separated in 1988. Espinosa then filed an annulment case before the QC RTC on January 7, 1992. Espinosa alleged in the petition that sometime in 1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Salita was not satisfied with the details of the petition, so she requested for a Bill of Particulars. Espinosa filed such, which states that: x x x at the time of their marriage, respondent (Salita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his professionthat of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicineupon petitioners time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job. Salita was still not satisfied with the Bill of Particulars, however, the RTC found it adequate already. Hence, it ordered Salita to file a response. Salita was not convinced still so she filed a petition for certiorari with SC. The petition was sent instead to CA for a resolution. CA affirmed the resolution of the RTC on July 21, 1992. The present case in SC therefore is a petition on certiorari questioning the Resolution of the CA, which denies due course to her petition. Salita insists that the Bill of Particulars failed to point out specific details which can explain Espinosas cause of action (i.e. lack of ultimate facts, which are issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial court will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts). Salita also reasons out that she cannot respond if the BP were inadequate. Hence, the issue is Issue: WON the Bill of Particulars filed by Espinosa is sufficient to enable Salita to file a response. 161
Held: Yes. Ratio: The BP already stated the cause of Espinosas action for annulment. There is no need to go into very specific details, neither are pieces of evidence needed yet. That should be presented in the trial court. There is no point in prolonging the agony of the annulment case, the court must immediately decide on the matter so the couple can move on either together or separately. Judgment: Instant petition is denied. CAs resolution is affirmed. Notes: A few points on FC 36 (I cannot include it in the issue because the case really does not concern itself with the details of Salitas psychological incapacity. However, there were a lot of stuff mentioned as obiter dictum): There is no need to limit the scope of situations which denote the psychological incapacity of a party. Each allegation should be treated in a case-to-case basis. Giving examples might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Interpretations shall be guided by the Judges experience, findings of experts, and by decisions of church tribunals, which may not be binding, but are otherwise helpful. SANTOS v. CA Facts: September 20, 1986- Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario BediaSantos exchanged vows before MTC Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City. This was followed by a church wedding. The two lived together with Julias parents. July 18, 1987- Julia gave birth to a baby boy. Later on, the two started having fights due to the interference of Julias parents in their relationship. May 18, 1988- Julia left for US to work as a nurse. January 1, 1989- (7 months after) Julia called up Leouel to tell him that she would just finish her contract and return in July 1989. But she never did. April 10 to August 25, 1990- Leouel underwent a training program in the US under the auspices of the AFP. He tried to look for Julia, but he was not able to find her. Leouel went back to the Philippines and filed with Negros Oriental RTC a complaint for Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code. Summons was served. May 31, 1991- Julia opposed the complaint and denied its allegations. She even claimed that it was Leouel who is irresponsible and incompetent (HAHA! Mature!). October 25, 1991- Julia filed a manifestation that she would neither appear nor submit any evidence for the case. November 6, 1991- RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. Leouel appealed in the CA. CA affirmed the RTC decision. On JULIAs PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: Leouel basically argues that There is no love, there is no affection for (him) because Julia failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. Respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos is one such wife.
Issue: WON Leouel can nullify his marriage with Julia on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity (given his basic argument), hence rendering the decision of the RTC and CA wrong. 162
Held: Sorry, but no. Ratio: FC 36 cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by FC 68, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity and render help and support. The law intends to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders, which in this case was not proven. The sanctity of marriage is important in our culture, hence FC 1 and Secs. 1 and 2 of Art XV of the 1987 Constitution. inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded. FC 36 is not the same as divorce, it is but a recognition that some marriages, by reason of incapacity, fail short of the ideal.
Note: It is important to reiterate that FC 36 refers to the inability of a person to fulfill marital obligations, granting that the incapacity is already present at the time of their wedding (just to be strict about the timeframe), although its symptoms only became obvious after a while. Divorce, on the other hand, grants dissolution of marriage based on problems that appeared even after the marriage ceremony.
CHI MING TSOI v. CA Facts: A case where the petition for annulment was granted on the basis of psychological incapacity (to consummate the marriage). Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao married on May 22, 1988. However, they havent had sex on their wedding night up until March 15, 1989 (almost 10 months), when they separated. There was no attempt on her husbands part. Gina suspects him of being a closet gay. Chi rebutted by saying that she refuses his attempts. And there were detailed medical reports hahaha. RTC declared their marriage void. CA affirmed it. Issue: Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi was incapable of consummating the marital act (because of his psychological incapacity). Held. Yes, he is incapable. Marriage was annulled. 163
Judgment: Petition is denied. SC explains that Leouel may be in a very difficult situation, however, the law nor society can provide all the specific answers to the individual problems. Padilla, J., dissenting: Julia clearly shows signs of psychological incapacity that she is not even able to live with her husband. (Please see page 37 of the case for the outlined specific reasons of Justice Padilla). Romero, J., separate opinion: FC 36 is not a means to provide couples an easy way out of their marriage. Filipino culture sees marriage as a permanent,
No. Marriage still valid. Ratio: - It was proven that theyve never had sex. - Chi had a serious personality disorder which prevented him from having sex with his wife, proven by his abnormal reluctance and unwillingness to consummate their marriage. (FC 36) - If Gina really refused to have sex with him, why didnt he try to find out what her problem was? He cant prove that Gina was the one who had the problem. - FC states that to procreate children is one of the essential marital obligations, and this he cannot fulfill. - Why wasnt he the one who sought the declaration of nullity? - Gina is a Filipino woman who is modest and unless she had compelling reasons to do so, she would not expose her private life to public scrutiny. Republic vs. CA (Republic vs. Olaviano Molina) Facts: A case for annulment of marriage. Psychological incapacity not proven. Roridel (girl) and Reynaldo Molina married on April 14, 1985. They had a son, Andre. After 1 year of marriage, she found out that Reynaldo was immature (going out with friends, squandering money, quarreling with her, etc.). Feb 1986 he lost his job, and she became the breadwinner. Mar 1987 she resigned and went back to her parents and Reynaldo left her and Andre alone. May 14, 1991, RTC declared the marriage void and CA affirmed this. Issue: Whether Reynaldo Molina was psychologically incapacitated. Held: Ratio: - neglect of marital duties does not translate to incapacity. It is essential that the party must be proven to be incapable of doing these, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. - it wasnt proven that Reynaldos personality traits were present at the time of marriage. SC + Amici Curiae (Rev. Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno) Guidelines for Interpreting FC Art. 36 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a. medically or clinically identified b. alleged in the complaint c. sufficiently proven by experts d. clearly explained in the decision FC 36 requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must 164
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage. 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person. 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Art 6871 and Art 220, 221 and 225 of the FC. 7. Interpretations given by the National Appelate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. - the term psychological incapacity, to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under FC 36, must be able to pass the following tests; viz: 1. The incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature; 2. The psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume, and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support; 3. The psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and 4. The mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable. HERNANDEZ v. CA Overview: Lucita Hernandez filed a petition seeking an annulment of her marriage to Mario on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity that causes him not to perform his marital duties and obligations. Facts: In 1977, Lucita Estrella Hernandez and Mario Hernandez met at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Mario was Lucitas student for two consecutive semester. When she was no longer his teacher, they became sweethearts (February 1979). On January 1, 1981, Lucita and Mario were married at Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite. Three children were born to them: Maie (May 3, 1982), Lura (May 22, 1985) and Marian (June 15, 1989). July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to Mario on the ground of his psychological incapacity. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of filing the suit, Mario failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household (for he has no stable job), devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. Also, she claimed that 165
Padilla, Separate Statement. [w]hether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Romero, Separate Opinion. - Reynaldos traits did not show difficulty. Theyre more like refusal or neglect. - neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. - (probed intent of the UP Law Centers Civil Code Revision Committee---they wanted to exclude mental inability.) - church annulments are not recognized by civil law Vitug, Concurring Opinion - FC did not define psych incapacity
Mario cohabited with several women [Edna, Angie, Japayuki Tess, Myrna and Ruth Oliva (whom he had an illegitmate child (i.e. Margie Oliva) with)] and, that because of his promiscuity, Mario endangered her health by infecting her with gonorrhea (sometime in 1986); and, that sometimes he physically abused her and her children. She averred that Mario was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of married life. As such, Lucita prayed for support (P9000 monthly), custody of their children and ownership of the land and jeep bought and used during their marriage. In 1992, Mario left for the Middle East. RTC dismissed petition ruling that circumstances mentioned are valid reasons for the grant of legal separation not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment thereof. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: WON marriage of Lucita and Mario Hernandez should be annulled on the ground of Marios psychological incapacity? Held and Ratio: No. Psychological incapacity of Mario was not proven. o No evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of his basic marital obligations. Expert testimony should have been presented to establish that such incapacity existed at the inception of marriage. o Private respondents alcoholism, sexual infidelity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge his essential marital obligations, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. These matters may be appropriately litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime and/or custody of children. Note: Root cause of psychological incapacity: (1) medically or clinically identified, (2) alleged in the complaint, (3) sufficiently proven by experts and (4) clearly explained in the decision. MARCOS v. MARCOS Overview: Brenda Marcos filed for declaration of nullity of marriage based on her husbands psychological incapacity. Issue: WON psychological examination is required to prove psychological incapacity WON the totality of the evidence presented and the demeanour of the witnesses show that he was psychologically incapacitated to marry Facts: September 6, 1982: Judge Eriberto Espiritu solemnized their marriage at the Municipal Court of Pasig May 8, 1983: It was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo Eleazar at Malacanang Park. Since the marriage, they lived in a housing unit from Bliss Development Corporation that Brenda Marcos had acquired when she was single. They had 5 kids. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, he often hit and beat her. Even forcing her to have sex when she did not want. 1992: They were already living separately October 16, 1994: They had a bitter quarrel that turned super violent that she had to leave with their kids. She sought refuge 166
in her sisters house and then underwent a medical examination which found that the injuries were contusions. August 1995: She and two sisters went to his house (her old Bliss home) looking for her missing son. He got so mad that he ran after them with a samurai sword and even beat her driver. Social worker Sonia Millan said that the kids described their dad as cruel and physically abusive. - The court found that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude. - CA reversed the decision and held that the incapacity has not been proven. Held: Not needed because the totality of evidence, with or without the psychological exam, can be enough. No, in this case, the totality of evidence is not enough to prove psychological incapacity of Wilson Marcos. Rationale: Even with the testimonies of the petitioner, the children, the sister, the social worker, petitioner failed to prove that her marriage was null and void. Although respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There could be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. His behaviour may be traced to his lack of employment for a period of more than 6 years which let him drink and fail to give support. Article 36 of the Family Code is not the same as a divorce law which cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves. It should be psychological illness afflicting a party even before marriage. It should also be grave and permanent such that one becomes incapable of doing ones duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. Article 36 is also different from legal separation which can be based on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment etc. At most, the evidence presented can be grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void. REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG Facts Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20) on September 7, 1975. Their marriage begot two children. A week after their wedding, Avelino started leaving his family w/o explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees, would return home drunk and force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse with him. If she did not comply, she was beaten. The last time Erlinda saw him was on Oct. 1993. She later learned that he was imprisoned but escaped from jail and was now a fugitive. A certificate issued by the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990 declared that he was still at-large. July 3, 1990 Erlinda filed for petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity (FC 36) December 17, 1990 teh court issued an order giving the investigating prosecutor until Jan. 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. Although he found that there was no collusion, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. December 27, 1990 RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under FC Art 36 167
January 29, 1991 - Investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that RTC decided on the issue prematurely since he was given till January 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. The OSG likewise filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it, stating that the fact that Avelino failed to support his family is a violation of essential marriage obligation in Art. 68 of the Family Code. The OSG then appealed to the CA which consequently affirmed the decision of the RTC (April 22, 1993). OSG petitioned for review to the SC. June 23, 1988 Florence filed with the CA an MR January 19, 1999 CA denied MR This appeal was filed, and the court noticed the nonparticipation of the State during the proceedings and the case in general.
WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the petitions without due participation of the State in the proceedings. Held Yes Ratio Art 48 of the Family Code provides for the need of the participation of the state in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e. dissolution of a marriage that the State values so much) did not happen, so lack of participation of State was cured. However, the task of protecting a marriage requires active participation from the State. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. Note Ruling shall be given upon proper trial by the lower courts. PESCA v. PESCA Facts: Loren Pesca filed a petition to declare her marriage with Zosimo null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. Petition was denied. 168
WON Marriage of Matias and Dagdag could be declared null on the basis of Dagdags alleged psychological incapacity Held No Ratio Erlinda failed to comply with guideline no. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Also, the allegation that her husband is a fugitive was not sufficiently proven. MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN Facts January 4, 1987 Florence and Philipp got married September 20, 1994 Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage June 16, 1995 trial court dismissed Florences petition December 19, 1995 Florence filed a notice of appeal to CA April 30, 1998 CA dismissed Florences petition
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art 68 of FC, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support -Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by the petitioner, cannot be equated to psychological incapacity CHOA v. CHOA Facts: Leni Choa files a petition for review on certiorari on ruling of CA (denied her demurrer of evidence). Her husband filed the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity. Petition was granted. Santos ruling: psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity (grave or serious such that the party will be incapable of carrying out ordinary duties required in a marriage), juridical antecedence (rooted in history antedating the marriage although overt manifestations may emerge only in marriage) and incurability (cure would be beyond means of the party involved). Molina ruling: psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty. A Refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. -Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity -Dr. Gauzon, a psychotherapist, claims that the spouses had an incompatibility-a defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy -Declaration for nullity based on grounds of psychological incapacity of Leni was dismissed. BARCELONA v. CA Facts: The specific details of their marriage (i.e. date of wedding, etc.) are not mentioned in the case. It starts with these: March 29, 1995- Tadeo R. Bengzon filed an annulment case against Diana M. Barcelona before QC RTC. May 9, 1995- Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the RTC granted in its Order dated June 7, 1995. July 21, 1995- Tadeo filed a new Petition for Annulment of Marriage against Diana in QC RTC. Tadeo asserts that Diana is psychologically incapacitated. He also claims the following (see page 47 for a clearer discussion of these reasons): 1) they had frequent quarrels due to their differences in upbringing; 2) due to Dianas several miscarriages, she withdrew herself and refused to talk to Tadeo; 3) Diana requested Tadeo to temporarily leave their home; 4) in order to keep the peace, Tadeo was forced to permanently leave their home and reside in a condominium in Greenhills instead; 5) complete estrangement of the couple; 6) they agreed on the support and custody of their children, nonetheless; 6) Diana is psychologically incapacitated from the celebration of their marriage until the present, which was found in the psychological examination conducted on their relationship; and 7) under FC 36, their marriage must be declared void ab initio. Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss Tadeos petition for annulment based on two grounds: 1) the second petition fails to state a cause of action, and 2) it violates SC Administrative Circular 04-94 on forum shopping. 169
September 18, 1996- RTC Judge Tabiolo issued an Order deferring the resolution of Dianas motion until the hearing. Diana filed for MR. January 21, 1997- RTC Judge Pison denied the MR. The Judge claims that: 1) it is for the court to examine if theres no cause of action, 2) Tadeos petition shows that Diana violated the rights of Tadeo, which constitutes a cause of action. Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the CA, against the RTC. Desperado si Ate! CA dismissed the petition and the MR. CA agrees with the RTC that there is a sufficient cause of action in Tadeos petition. It also agrees that there was no violation of Circular 04-94 because there is neither litis pedentia (i.e. because Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition) nor res judicata (i.e. because there is no final decision on the merits). Tadeos second petition was able to state the physical manifestations indicative of Dianas psychological incapacity.
Judgment: SC denies Dianas petition. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are affirmed. Facts: DEDEL v. CA
Issue: WON Tadeo Bengzon has fully established his cause of action, which is Dianas psychological incapacity, in order for the petition for annulment to proceed. Held: Yes. Ratio: There is no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity since only experts in neurological and behavioral sciences can do that.
Alleging that his wife Sharon L. Corpuz-Dedel was an irresponsible and immature wife and had abandoned her family and repeatedly committed acts of infidelity during their marriage, petitioner sought the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of his wife to perform the essential obligations of marriage. After trial, petitioner obtained a favorable judgment from the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The civil and church marriages between petitioner and his wife were therefore declared null and void on ground of psychological incapacity on the part of private respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Respondent, Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General appealed. The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's petition. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: WON The marriage can be annulled based on psychological incapacity Held: No. Ratio: her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are 170
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be. RP v. QUINTERO-HAMANO Overview: Lolita sought that her marriage with Toshio, a Japanese, be declared null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity that prevents him from fulfilling his marital responsibilities. Facts: Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan in October 1986. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Meanwhile, on November 16, 1987, Lolita gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in a civil wedding ceremony. Unknown to Lolita, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. Toshio, after leaving for Japan, stopped giving financial support after two months and responding and/or communicating with her. Sometime in 1991, Lolita learned that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not even bother to see her and their child. July 8, 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. Court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons was published in a newspaper of general circulation. November 5, 1996, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation due to Toshios failure to respond. Court granted the motion on November 7, 1996. November 20, 1996, prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. RTC declared the marriage between said parties null and void. In an appeal of the OSG, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Republic of the Philippines appealed such a decision saying that mere abandonment by Toshio did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. Issue: WON Lucita successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilites, thereby declaring their marriage null and void? WON there is a distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse in proving psychological incapacity? Held and Ratio: No. Lucita did not prove Toshios psychological incapacity. o Toshios act of abandonment, albeit irresponsible, was never alleged nor proven to be some kind of psychological illness. o It would have helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness (i.e. expert witness). o As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. No. There is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse in proving psychological incapacity. 171
o The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. Note: Molina ruling re: guidelines for psychological incapacity presented on pages 740 to 742. Overview: Basically, husband Manuel filed for nullity of marriage due to Juanitas alleged psychological incapacity. This the lower court dismissed while the court of appeals granted that BOTH were psychologically incapacitated. Hence, Juanita filed a motion for certiorari. Issue: WON the marriage between petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel is null due to the psychological incapacity of either parties Facts: June 27, 1973: Juanita and Manuel were married at civil rites August 11, 1973: They were married before the Catholic Church 1977: They adopted a baby boy, Jeremy, because they discovered that they couldnt have a child of their own September 25, 1997: Manuel filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Juanita. - She was, according to him, over-domineering and selfish. She was also extremely volatile and had a bellicose nature. She also complained a lot and didnt respect and support him and his position as MTC judge. She also yelled and threw objects at him. This, he claims is rooted in her resentment for SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO her perceived lack of love from her parents. It is, he says, incurable and existed even before marriage. Treatment would take years which he cannot take emotionally and physically since he had already suffered 22 years of loveless marriage. - She says that these are lies concocted by Manuel since he wants to marry his paramour. She was a loving mother and wife. She was supportive of Manuel and she was raised in a really happy family and had a happy childhood. She also says that it was Manuel who was lacking. Witnesses: 1) Manuel he supported his claims and said that he had no mistress 2) Lucena Tan, respondents Clerk of Court she agreed that Juanita was weird/OC/praning 3) Dr. Valentica Garcia, professional qualifications as a psychiatrist, for Juanita the couple had defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. Both spouses display narcissistic psychological repertoire failed to adequately empathize to each others needs and feelings. Their relationship is not conducive to a healthy and progressive marriage. They have both shown their psychological incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. 4) Juanita denied what Manuel said 5) Dr. Eduardo Maaba, psychiatrist, for Manuel Juanita was psychologically capacitated 6) Crispina Sevilla a friend of the couple couple were sweet, religious leaders. 172
RTC denied the petition of Manuel since they did not prove that they were psychologically incapacitated. Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that both are psychologically incapacitated. - Due to the gravity of the failed relationship in which the coupled was trapped in. - Since they could not have sexual intimacy. Held: No, the marriage is still valid. Rationale: Supreme Court rules that sexual intimacy is a non issue. It is actually about a husband who does not want to married to an overbearing irritating wife. And that is not an inadequacy of Juanita amounting to psychological incapacity. Manuel: Sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological capacity. It must be shown that Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his desire to have a child. He admitted that he had extramarital affairs because he wanted to have a child. Juanita: Manuel failed to prove that she showed grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Even Dr. Maaba said that Juanita was ok. Marriage is always presumed to be valid. Therefore, since both are not incapacitated and since an unsatisfactory marriage is not null and void, their marriage is still valid. Antonio v. Reyes G.R. No. 155800 (March 10, 2006) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari on the Decision and Resolution of the CA. Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts: August 1989- Leonilo Antonio, 26 y/o (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, 36 y/o (respondent), met. Barely after a year- The two married before a Minister of the Gospel. December 6, 1990- Church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig. April 19, 1991- Their child was born, but died after 5 months. August 1991- Leonilo separated from Marie. March 8, 1993- Leonilo filed a petition to have his marriage declared null and voidFC36 psychological incapacity. Marie allegedly persistently lied about herself: o She concealed that she has an illegitimate son. o She lied that her brother-in-law tried to rape and kill her. o She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist. o She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold. o She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez who she said sent her letters of admiration. o She represented herself as a person of greater means. o She exhibited insecurities and jealousies RTC: Granted declaration of nullity. Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila: Annulled the church marriage. CA: Revised RTC. Issue: WON Leonilo has fully established the psychological incapacity of his wife for their marriage to be declared null and void. 173
Held: Yes. Ratio: SC relied heavily on the 1997 Republic v. CA (aka Molina) case, which enumerates the requirements for a marriage to be declared null and void under FC 36: Petitioner has sufficiently overcome the burden of proving his wifes psychological incapacitypresenting witnesses, experts (he presented two psychologists), certifications from Blackgold and Philippine Village Hotel (that Marie is never an employee of Blackgold, and that there never was a tribute to Marie held in the said hotel). Root cause of psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts, clearly explained before RTC. Psychological incapacity was established to have existed before celebration of marriage. Gravity of the respondents psycho incapacity was so grave it would make prolonged marriage life difficult. Wife failed to comply with essential marital obligations stated in FC 88 and 71. Catcholic church annulled their marriage. In terms of curabilitypsychosis is quite grave. Judgment: RTC decision AFFIRMED. Marriage declared null and void. Petition was granted. Santos and Molina ruling stated. Must be able to prove gravity, judicial antecedence and incurability. -Felys hot-temper, nagging, extravagance, abandonment of Crasus, marriage to an American, and flaunting of her American family and surname do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave, and which has been in the existence at the time of celebration of marriage and is incurable. Yu v. Yu Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: The whirlwind left and right filing of cases started on: Jan. 11, 2002, Eric Jonathan Yu filed petition for habeas corpus before the CA alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Tanchay Yu unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child Bianca. Petition also includes prayer for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca. March 3, 2002. Catherine filed a petition against Eric before Pasig RTC for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the absolute community of property. It includes prayer for full cutody and for fixing the visiting rights of Eric. March 21, 2002 Eric was given full cutody during pendency of habeas corpus, with full visiting rights to Catherine. April 5, the couple filed a Joint Motion to Approve Interim Visitation Agreement, approved April 24. April 28, Catherine filed to CA a Motion for the Modification of her visiting rights. Eric filed for the Opposition with Motion to Cite 174
REPUBLIC v. IYOY Facts: Republic of the Philippines, through office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition to reverse the CA decision declaring the marriage between Crasus Iyoy and Fely Rosal-Iyoy null and vode on the basis of psychological incapacity.
Respondent for Contempt of Court in light of her filing of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC which constituted forum shopping. July 5, CA ordered Catherine and her counsel to make amendments in her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC. She then motioned to Admit Amended Petition. On December, she filed for Motion to Dismiss the said petition since she no longer has time and attention for it. RTC granted it thereby dismissing her petition. June 12, 2003, Eric petitioned for nullity of marriage and dissolution of absolute community of property before RTC. July 3, CA dismissed habeas corpus petition for being moot and academic July 2, Catherine petitioned for habeas corpus and sole custody of Bianca in Pasay RTC July 25, Eric prayed for custody of Bianca in the duration of the case in the Pasig RTC Pasay RTC granted Catherines petition and so Eric motioned to dismiss it for certain issues. Aug. 12, Paay RTC released an Order that Bianca should stay with her mother on certain times. Petitioner filed Motion for recon for RTC has no jurisdiction Oct. 30, Pasig RTC ordered that the couple observe the Interim Visiting Agreement and granted custody to Eric Issue: Whether custody should be litigated before Pasay RTC or before Pasig RTC - WON the ground of psychological incapacity is valid to nullify the marriage and not to give the custody to Catherine Held: The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of nullity of marriage before Pasig RTC is the appropriate action to determine the issue of who between the parties should should have custody. The Court orders the Pasog RTC to continue with dispatch. Dismissing the ruling of Pasay RTC and setting aside the ruling of CA. Ratio: FC Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. 175
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Notes: The welfare, best interests, benefit and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be custodian. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Ferraris v. Ferraris Motion for Recinsideration of a decision of the SC denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the CA for Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error. Facts: Feb. 20, 2001, Pasig RTC denied her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Brix Ferraris. Suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. CA affirmed in toto CA held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of marriage. Dr. Dayans failed to explain her allegations that Brix has mixed personality disorderschizoid, dependent and avoidant type. Petitioner motioned for a Recon but was denied. Issue: WON Brix is psychologically incapacitated therefore being a ground for annulment. Held: Brixs alleged MPD, leaving the house attitudewhenever they quarrelled, violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, sexual infidelity, abandonment and lack of support and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. The Petition is denied. Mallion v. Alcantara Catalan v. CA Petition for review on certiorari on the decision and resolution of the CA which reversed the decision of the Dagupan RTC declaring the marriage between Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void bigamous and the resolution denying motion for recon. 176
Facts: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando in 1950, Pangasinan, They migrated to the US and allegedly became naturalized citizen thereof. After 38 yrs of marriage, they were divorced. Two months after, Orlando married Merope. Considering that the marriage is bigamous since Merope is married, Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of mullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and Merope. Issue: WON Felicitas has required standing to question nullity of marriage WON failure of CA to declare the marriage void constitutes reversible error Held: The Court cannot rule on the first issue without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence. She might have the personality if it was a limited divorce (suspend the marriage and leave the bond in full force) or if the foreign law restricts remarriage. Therefore, the case is remanded to RTC Under the NCC anyone can file a petition for nullity of marriage, however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interestcan fill the same. Ratio: RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Notes: The accused who secured a foreign divorce and later remarried in the Phil, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid is liable for bigamy. Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose Marriage valid, no psychological incapacity. Case was decided following the doctrine in Molina. The testimony of Dr. Guanzon alleging the psychological incapacity of Manolito due to his AntiSocial Disorder is unscientific and unreliable because it was only deduced from 2nd hand information from Laila and no actual psychological examination was performed on the respondent. Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity was premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. However, Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition. Zamora v. Court of Appeals Marriage valid, no psychological incapacity. Petitioner allege that his wife is psychologically incapacitated because she refused to cohabit with him and in fact lived in the US for more than 20 years and that she is horrified by the mere thought of having children. Respondent says that she didnt want to cohabit only because of his infidelity and that he had in fact 2 mistresses and had children with them. Also that she had always been fond of children as she is by profession a nurse. Court decided based on the Molina case and said that mere refusal to bear children does not constitute psychological incapacity unless it is proven to be due to a psychological illness. Also petitioner failed to present an expert to corroborate his contentions, and while it is not expressly required in Molina and Santos cases for an expert opinion to prove psychological incapacity, the petitioner must nonetheless be able 177
to present evidence to sustain the finding of such incapacity, this the petitioner wasnt able to do. Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro Marriage valid, no psychological incapacity. Court said that the spouses frequent squabbles and the respondents refusal to sleep with the petitioner and be supportive of him (because he is a doctor and is often on duty DAW) does not constitute psychological incapacity. Incapacity must be more than just difficulty/ refusal/ neglect to perform the marital obligations, it must be shown that this incapacity is due to a psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The testimony of the expert as well is mere hearsay since his findings were deduced from second hand information from petitioner and not from his personal knowledge of the spouses relationship. Court said that they were just IMMATURE, and immaturity is not psychological incapacity. Republic v. Cabantug Baguio Petitioners expert witness said that respondents psychological incapacity because of immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. However, the doctor's findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette's deposition. Both second hand information w/c constitute hearsay and is unreliable. It was also said that Being a Mama's Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself single and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her manifested defendant's psychological incapacity. These findings reveal nothing in the defendants past life and acts that shows a behavior pattern that would prove the alleged psychological incapacity. Court said that Martini's failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons is not psychological incapacity. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence.
Almerol v. RTC of Las Pinas Marriage valid. Leonida filed a petition to annul her marriage with Manuel due to the latters psychological incapacity. During the trial, it was said that Manuel was also a homosexual. Las Pinas RTC annulled the marriage not because of psychological incapacity but because of his homosexuality. Court said that homosexuality is a ground only of legal separation and cannot in itself annul a marriage. It is the concealment of that sexual orientation at the time of the celebration of marriage that makes it a ground for declaring nullity and no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate this. What was proven in this case was that the spouses had 11 years of blissful marital union that bore 3 children and it was Leonidas burden to show the nullity of this marriage, this she failed to do. Laurena vs CA Nature Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Facts January 1983 Darlene Dimayuga Laurena and Jesse Lauro Laurena met December 19, 1983 they got married at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila They had two children: Mark Jordan and Micheal Joseph 178
October 19, 1993 Darlene filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Lauro on the ground that Lauro is psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage, and the incapability existed at the time of the celebration of marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage o During their honeymoon in Baguio, Lauro invited a 15 year old boy (son of one of Lauros house helpers) to sleep in their hotel suite o When Darlene almost bled to death when she suffered a miscarriage, Lauro just ignored her and continued watching tv o Lauro gave priority to the needs of his parents o Lauro tried to convert Darlene to his religion o Lauro was a womanizer o Lauro was said to have feminine tendencies o Lauro sometimes hit Darlene o September 1990 Lauro left their conjugal home and stopped supporting their children Lauro denied such allegations and asserted that Darlene was emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous Ruling of the Trial Court o Petition is denied on the ground that the manifestations of Lauros psychological incapacity were not so serious as to consider him psychologically incapacitated o Evidence showed that Darlee could not only get along with Lauro Ruling of the CA o Trial Courts decision is affirmed on the ground that Darlene failed to prove that the root cause of respondents psychological incapacity was medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts o Dr. Lourdes Lapus (psychiatrist presented by Darlene) was not able to talk to Lauro and simply based her conclusions and impressions of Lauro from her twohour session with Darlene o Darlene was not able to prove that the alleged incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage o Darlenes allegations lacked factual and evidentiary bases Issues WON Lauro is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations Held No Ratio Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical violence, or moral pressure to compel Darlene to change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a marriage void There is a failure on the part of Dr. Lapuz to prove that psychological incapacity is the root cause of Lauros behaviour and that such is incurable Social Case Study Report found that Lauro was responsible while Darlene was immature, and that the two separated because of Lauros infidelity Darlene was not able to prove that the alleged incapacity was existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Darlene failed to show that Lauro was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of their marriage Te vs Te 179
Nature Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions of the CA Facts Sharing a similar angst towards their families, Edward Kenneth Ngo and Rowena Ong Gutierrez understood each other and developed a certain degree of closeness March 1996 Rowena asked Edward that they elope, and they did However, Edwards money lasted for only a month; both of them having no work, they decided to go back to Manila Rowen proceeded to her uncles house while Edward went to his parents home Threatened by Rowena, Edward agreed to stay with her April 23, 1996 Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married However, in Rowenas uncles place, Edward was treated like a prisoner Rowena suggested that Edward should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own A month after, Edward was able to escape from the house of Rowenas uncle June 1996 Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives They the parted ways Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of her psychological incapacity The clinical psychologist who examined Edward found both parties psychologically incapacitated (the findings and conclusions were exhaustive in the sense that data about Edwards life, both before and after the marriage, were presented) o Edward Kenneth Ngo Te Is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage Is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals o Rowena Gutierrez Yu Te Is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman Is seen to be quite exploitative in her plight for a life of wealth and glamour Is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that her husband is weak-willed Upon knowing that she has no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship Is apparent to be suffering the grave, incurable, and sever presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage Trial court held that their marriage is null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court decision on the ground that clinical psychologist did not personally examine Rowena, and relied only on the information provided by Edward, and that psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability 180
Issues WON the marriage between Rowena and Edward is null and void Held Yes Ratio Courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties Psychological assessment, which the Court consider in this case as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders dependent personality for Edward and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for Rowena o Dependent personality disorder individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others t make most of their important decisions, and tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong o Antisocial personality disorder characterized by lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of such considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void Ting vs Ting Nature Petition for review o certiorari of the amended decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Facts July 26, 1975 Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting were married They begot 6 children After being married for 18 years, Carmen filed a petition praying for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Benjamin on the ground of psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage which however became manifest thereafter Carmen stated that o Alcoholism - Benjamin was a drunker o Violent nature - He would confront and insult her, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him o Compulsive gambling habit o Irresponsibility and immaturity - He refused to give financial support to their family Benjamin denied such allegations Carmens testimony was corroborated by Susana Wasawas who served as nanny to the spouses children Carmen presented Dr. Pureza Trinidad, a psychiatrist, whose evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition o She concluded that Benjamin is suffering from a personality disorder Benjamin presented Dr. Renato Obra who observed that there is nothing wrog with Benjamins personality Lower court held that the marriage is null and void CA reversed the decision stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion the Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated when he married Carmen
Issues WON the marriage of Carmen and Benjamin is null and void Held 181
No Ratio The parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity,, then such expert opinion should be presented and be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant the petition for nullity The court find that the totality of evidence adduced by respondent is insufficient to prove the petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him Presumption is always in favour of the validity of marriage Nature Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Facts July 24, 1993 Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married 1997 they separated March 2, 2002 Marietta filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Rodolfo o Rodolfo was said to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband o He never looked for a job and always asked his mothers financial assistance o He is said to be still residing with his mother and not with Marietta Marietta presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas who found that Marietta is mature, independent, very responsible, focused and Azcueta vs RP has direction and ambition on life; and that, basing on the testimonies of Marietta, she found that Rodolfo is suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder associated with sever inadequacy related to masculine strivings o Persons suffering from it were those whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of self confidence, constant selfdoubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people o In this case, the root cause being the cross identification with the mother who was a dominant figure in the family and that this problem began during the early stages of life but manifested only after his marriage o This problem is said to be severe because he may not be able to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person and that it is incurable because it is deeply ingrained into his personality RTC decided that the marriage is null and void ab initio CA reversed the RTC decision
Issues WON the totality of the evidence is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated Held YEs Ratio Marietta successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband The root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision Rodolfos incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage
182
It was shown to be sufficiently grave so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with his marital obligations The incurability of his condition which is deeply ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness So vs Valera (see Cheerios digest) Held: Yes. Expert testimony was able to establish the petitioners psychological incapacity and was able to trace its root cause o His motivation for marriage was questionable o Petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. It was even his mother who had to tell him to seek legal help when he learned that his marriage was real. (dependent personality disorder) o He allowed himself to be dominated by his father and by the respondent who is as domineering as his father (self-defeating) o The cause of Lesters personality disorder is his dysfunctional familyabusive and domineering father, unhappy mother, and the children never received affirmation Lester grew up w/o self-confidence, immature, and did not understand what it meant to be a husband and what it meant to have a real family life Dr. Dayan was also able to conclude that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of his marriage Najera vs. Najera Facts: Digna Najera (petitioner) filed for declaration of nullity of marriage (with alternative prayer for legal separation, with application for designation as administrator pendent lite opf the conjugal partnership of gains) Her allegations: 183
Halili vs. Santos-Halili Facts: Lester Benjamin Halili (petitioner) filed a case to declare his marriage to Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of psychological incapacity on his part His allegations o that he wed Chona thinking that it was a joke o they never lived together as husband and wife but maintained a relationship o they started fighting a year after the wedding o he started seeing other women and stopped seeing Chona o he received prank calls that he should stop seeing other women since hes already married so he made inquiries and found out that his marriage was not fake Lester was diagnosed by his expert witness Dr. Natividad Dayan as suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder Issue: WON the petitioners marriage is null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity on his part
o At the time of their marriage, Eduardo, was dependent on her since he was jobless, that he never exerted any effort to find a job and was only able to work as a seaman with the help of her brother o While working as a seaman, respondent never gave her financial support o Whenever he comes home, he would quarrel with her, accuse her of having an affair, smoke marijuana and drink o In one of their quarrels, respondent, without provocation, inflicted physical violence upon her and tried to kill her with a bolo o She never saw the respondent after that and learned afterwards that he jumped ship and is now living in LA o Her parents are happily married while that of Eduardos are separated; his brothers marriages also ended in separation Respondents answer; o Petitioner was incurably immature, of dubious integrity, w/ very low morality, and guilty of infidelity Issue: WON their marriage is null and void on the grounds of respondents psychological incapacity Held: No. The evidence presented by petitioner regarding respondents physical violence or grossly abusive conduct towards respondent and his abandonment of his wife without justifiable cause are grounds for legal separation only and not annulment of marriage The totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essentials of marriage The root cause of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable Expert witness, Cristina Gates interviewed the petitioner but not the respondent who was abroad o Respondent is afflicted with Borderline Personality Disorder as shown by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal relationships, his marred self-image, and self-destructive tendencies, his uncontrollable impulses o His disorder can be traced to his parents separaton aggravated by his mothers meddling in his life o The ingestion of alcohol and marijuana are also known to cause irreparable damage organically as seen by respondents violent and abusive behavior o The chances of curability of respondents disorder were nil, depending on WON the damage done by marijuana and alcohol was minimal Just in case maam asks about this: Petitioner also filed a petition for annulment of her marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese of Alaminos, Pangasinan and her petition was granted o The Court still held NO since Petitioner presented addtl set of witnesses in the Matrimonial Tribunal who were not presented in the Court The Matrimonial tribunal confirmed the decree of nullity of petitioners marriage because the respondent suffered from grave lack of discretion of judgment and not psychological incapacity Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua 184
Facts: Rowena Padilla Rumbaua (petitioner) filed for the declaration o nullity of marriage against Edward Rumbaua (petitioner) based on psychological incapacity of the respondent Her allegations: o He reneged on his promise to live with her after finding work o He failed to support her financially o He blamed her for his mothers death o He represented himself as single in his transactions o He pretended to be working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches Issue: WON marriage is null and void on the grounds of physical incapacity Held: No. Petitioners expert witness, Dr. Tayag did not examine respondent and based his conclusions on petitioners statements Dr. Tayags report did not mention the cause of the respondents so-called narcissistic disorder o It did not discuss the respondents childhood and this failed to give the Court an insight into the respondents developmental years Expert witness failed to establish the permanence and incurability and the incapacitating effect of the disorder The petitioners claims merely showed that the respondent is o irresponsible for his refusal to live with her o forgetful or emotionally immature for failing to greet her on her birthday, sending her cards during special occasions, blaming her for his mothers death, and representing himself as single in transactions Aspillaga vs. Aspillaga Facts: Rodolfo Aspillaga (petitioner) filed for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on Auroras (respondent) part His allegations o Aurora is domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends o She is spendthrift as she overspent the family budget o She made crucial family decisions w/o consulting him o She was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy Her allegation o He has an affair with her cousin w/c led to the disintegration of their marriage Issue: WON marriage is null and void on the grounds of physical incapacity Held: No. Expert witness examined both respondent and petitioner and found both of them to have personality traits o Dr. Maaba failed to reveal these personality traits were grave or serious enough to bring about incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage o He failed to link the parties psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife o Dr. Maaba stated that their psychological incapacitation will hamper both to comply with their marital obligations; mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity 185
o Theres no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent Also, the couple seemed to have a harmonious relationship for 8 years before Rodolfos infidelity was discovered Disagreements regarding money matters is common and even normal and is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void Evidence only showed that parties are incompatible and have irreconcilable differences o Both he and respondent have psychological disorders dependent personality disorder and histrionic personality disorder Issue: WON marriage is null and void on the grounds of physical incapacity Held: No. Expert, Dr. Villegas only interviewed petitioner but not respondent Her conclusions about the respondent were all from information supplied by the petitioner Her testimony did not lead to the conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations She did not conduct tests that would have been able to measure specific aspects of a persons intelligence, thinking, or personality The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded Paz vs. Paz Petition for review on the resolution of the CA dismissing Jordan Chan Pazs appeal of the Decision of the Pasig RTC which granted Jeanice Pavon Pazs petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Jordans motion for recon is denied. 186
Lim vs. Sta. Cruz-Lim Facts: Edward Lim (petitioner) and Ma. Cheryl Sta-Cruz Lim (respondent) met, fell in love and got married As is customary for Chinese people, they stayed in petitioners grandparents and parents house They had three children Petitioner supported the family Respondent wanted to live separate from petitioners parents One October day, respondent found the petitioner in a compromising situation with the stay-in caregiver of his grandmother This incident was recorded in a police blotter and was front page in Abante Respondent left the house with their three children, also took the petitioners passport, jewelry and a land title Petitioner filed for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage to respondent on the grounds of respondents psychological incapacity; he amended his complaint three years later and included his own alleged psychological incapacity
Facts: Jeanice was just 19y/o while Jordan is 27 y/o when they met. Two months later, they became a couple. Four months later they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding two months after and two more months after they had their church wedding. They had one son, Evan Gambert, born five months after. After a big fight she left their home (a year after their son was born). Seven months later Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She alleged that he is psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. It is manifested in his uncontrollable tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, his predisposition to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied. Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son. Issue: WON Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations Held: Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordans Psychological Incapacity. His incapacity is not shown to be so grave and so permanent to deprive him of the awareness of his duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will Furthermore, Gates, a doctor, did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. Petition granted and the resolution of the CA is set aside. RTC ruling is reversed. Marriage subsists and remains valid.
Suazo v. Suazo Appeal by Jocelyn Suazo from the decision of the CA which reversed the judgment of RTC thus nullifying her marriage with Angelito Suazo on the ground of psychological incapacity. Facts: Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went from Laguna to Manila with Angelito and some friends. After being gone for 3 days, their parents sought them and brought them back to Binan. Soon, their marriage was arranged and they wre married in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor. Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts. Jocelyn left Angelito a year later. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children. 187
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Issue: WON Angelito is psychologically incapacitated and is their marriage void? Held: Court finds the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition. Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed. negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations. Eleven years later, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning. Her excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical violence. In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Issue: WON the CA has jurisdiction and WON May is psychologically incapacitated. Held: Silvino should have filed for a petition for a review on certiorari, procedurally speaking. Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. 188
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug Petition to set aside the decision of the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the marriage between Silvino Ligeraldo and May Ascension Patalinghug null and void. Facts: Silvino and May got married and were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity,
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or capricious in its findings. Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr. NicdaoBasilio failed to show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, Petition denied. (b) Incestuous Marriages FC Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a) NCC Art. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915) NCC Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants. A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (916a) NCC Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917) NCC Art. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent. In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth. (918a) NCC Art. 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father and the same mother. Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father. (920a) (g) Marriages Against Public Policy FC Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or 189
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82) NCC Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages; (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character; (4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, Number 2; (5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81; (6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them; (7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. (n) RPC Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. NCC Art. 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning: (1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons; (2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter; (3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a) Reyes v. CA Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the CA allowing or admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of letters Testamentary in favour of Julio A. Vivares as executed without bond but declaring that paragraph II of the will and testament including subparagraph a and b as valid (contrary to the decision of RTC saying it is null and void) Facts: On Jan. 3, 1992, Torcuato executed his last will and testament which states in paragraph II that he is giving wife Asuncion the properties (a) all his shares of their personal properties (including jewelries, coins, antiques, etc. and (b) all his shares consisting of half of all the real estate he own in common with his brother Jose. He died on May 12 of that year and nine days later, Julio Vivares filed a petition for probate of the will before the RTC. Two months later, the natural children of Torcuato with estebana Galolo (Manuel, Mila and Danilo) and his natural children with Celsa Agape (Lyn and Marites) filed an opposition (a) last will and testament was not executed and attested in accordance with the law and (b) Asuncion executed undue and improper influence at the time of the execution. They also averred that Reyes was never married to Asuncion because she was already married to Lupo Ebarle. On Apr. 23, 1993, the RTC 190
declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law and that the relationship Torcuato and Asuncion had was an adulterous one. Dissatisfied with the decision of the CA, the children submitted this case arguing also that Torcuato and Asuncion were collateral relatives on the 4th civil degree (niece of Torcuato). Issue: Is the paragraph II valid? WON the formalities of the will had been complied with. Held: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Petition denied. Ratio: The petition is said to be devoid of merit. As a general rule, curts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. It does not determine nor prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions. The declaration that she was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. Also, the failure of the children to show the marriage certificate of Asuncion and Lupo during the probate proceedings constituted a waiver and this cannot be entertained in the CA nor in the SC. (h) Non-compliance under FC 53 2. Who can invoke nullity FC Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. FC Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. FC Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court. (c) Imprecriptibility of action or defense. - An action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe. (d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. Ninal vs. Bayadog Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months after, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car 191
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. RTC denied the petition. Issue: WON the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death Won the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio; Won plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death Held:(a and c) The marriage is already extinguished the moment the father died. However, for determination of heirship, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (b) it is void ab initio In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. Oetition is granted and the case is reinstated to the RTC Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the FC, the applicable law to determine their validity is the NCC which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. Enrico v Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad CatliMedinaceli Facts: Heirs of Eulogio and Trinidad Mecinaceli filed for an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and petitioner Lolita Enrico. Allegations: (1) no marriage license, (2) their marriage was barely 3 months from the death of the 1st wife, Trinidad, therefore no extraordinary circumstances and (3) lack of a marriage ceremony because Eulogio was already seriously ill that time. Lolita on the other hand, argued that (1) she lived with Eulogio publicly for 21 years (2) a marriage ceremony was held in Lal-lo, Cagayan and was solemnized by the mayor, and (3) by virtue of AM No 02-11-10-SC Sec 2, only the contracting parties while living can file an action for the nullity of marriage. RTC dismissed the complaint based on Sec 2 of AM No. 02-11-10-SC saying that A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void 192
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But RTC reversed itself when respondents filed for a motion for reconsideration and invoked the ruling on Ninal v Bayadog. And so the court got confused (haha!) and said that they needed to reconcile the invoked ruling and AM No. 02-11-10-SC and concluded that AM No. 02-1110-SC applies only when both spouses are still living. Upon the death of the parent, the heirs already have a vested right over whatever property the deceased left. They now have a legal standing in court. Issue: WON the heirs of the deceased can raise a petition for nullity of marriage. Held: No Administrative matter No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec 2(a) sole right of husband or wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage plus in Sec 1 this rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code. The language is CLEAR. There is no need to reconcile AM with the ruling in Ninal because Ninal was under the scope of the NCC and not the Family Code. Respondents can bring up the question of marriage validity in the settlement proceedings of the estate. Carlos v Sandoval Facts: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their two sons, Teofilo Carlos and Juan De Dios Carlos (petitioner). The first three parcels of land (1, 2, 3) were given and registered in the name of Teofilo. Lot 4 was registered in the name of Juan De Dios. When Teofilo died in May 13, 1992, he was survived by his spouse Felicidad and their son Teofilo Carlos II. Upon the death of Teofilo, Lots 5 and 6 were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II (respondents). The parties signed an approval of a compromise agreement acknowledging their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the rest of the first parcel of land. Also, the second parcel of land was divided in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994. Two more contracts were signed dividing the third and fourth parcels of land. In August 1995, petitioner filed for (a) declaration of nullity of marriage due to their lack of marriage license; (b) status of a child, Teofilo II, since he is not the natural nor the adoptive son of Teofilo ; (c) recovery of property by cancellation of the certificates of titles issued to the respondents; (d) reconveyance to Juan of the said properties; and (e) sum of money and damages. RTC declared marriage null and void via a summary judgment. Issue: WON a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgement on the pleadings or a summary judgement and without the benefit of a trial and WON anyone other than the spouses themselves has a capacity to bring the action for nullity of marriage. Held: No and no. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proven. Confession of judgment, judgment on pleadings and summary judgments are not allowed. By issuing the summary judgment, RTC divested the state of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The marriage contested was celebrated at the time when NCC was the governing law. Although NCC is silent as to who can bring an action to declare a marriage void, the SC has ruled 193
that only persons who have material interest or who stand to be benifited or injured by the judgment of the suit can bring action. Case remanded to determine WON petitioner is a real party in interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the assailed marriage and to determine Teofilo II filiation. 3. When to file an action for declaration of nullity FC Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid. FC Art. 42. (2). A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) FC Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority over the minor but shall not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil Register. (n) 4. Procedure in actions for declaration of nullity (a) Requisite for valid marriage (see previous notes) (b) Safeguards against collusion FC Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a) Malcampo-Sin v Sin Facts: Florence and Philipp Sin were married in 1987, 7 years later, Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. RTC dismissed petition and CA dismissed appeal and motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the SC invoking FC Art 48 saying that, in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties an to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Issue: WON the fiscals of the lower courts made sure that there was no collusion Held: No Throughout the trial, the state did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed a manifestation stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. While it can be argued that this lack of participation cured the lack of participation on the part of the fiscal, it is not the case. The reason is that there exists the task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution and that requires vigilance and zealous participation, not mere pro forma compliance. 194
Ancheta v Ancheta Facts: Marietta and Rodolfo are married and had 8 children. Latter left the conjugal home and abandoned his wife and his children. Eventually, they had dissolution of their conjugal partnership and a judicial separation. Rodolfo, wanting to get married again filed in the court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In his petition he stated that the summon can be served in Las Pinas when he knew for a fact that Marietta has already moved to Carmona. Because of this, Marietta was unable to respond to the summon. Then Rodolfo filed an Ex-Parte motion to declare defendant as in default, which the court granted because Marietta did not show up on the date of trial. Marriage was declared void ab initio and then Rodolfo got married again. Marietta filed a petition against Rodolfo alleging that Rodolfo committed gross misrepresentation in his petition when he declared that she was a resident of Las Pias, when in truth, he knew very well that she was residing in Cavite. That her son failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition in the summons, that she only knew about this on January 11, 2000, and that she was deprived of her right to be heard in the said case allowing Rodolfo to secure a favorable judgment without any opposition. She alleges that the order of the trial court then was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by Rodolfo. Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing Mariettas original petition and denying the admission of the amended petition and WON the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Rodolfo is null and void. Held: Yes and yes. CA failed to consider the material allegations of the petition, 1st that the petition was based on extrinsic fraud and 2 nd that the RTC lacked of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and that the latter is a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff, no statement was made to the effect that there was an impossibility in locating the defendant or that the effort was actually made. There was also no mention that Venancio, who supposedly received the summon, lived in the place where Marietta allegedly lives. As it turns out, his father only showed him the summon and the complaint and made him sign it, no copy was furnished. Decision of RTC null and void. A judgment rendered by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed anytime either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. In the spirit of protecting marriages as an inviolable institution, if the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot just declare him or her in default. It should first order the prosecuting/solicitor general attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. Salmingo v Rubica Facts: Rubica filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Liza Estano. The summon for Estano was returned unserved for she could not be found in her last known address. So then the summon was published in the Visayan Post, a local weekly newspaper, but still nothing was heard from her. So evidence were presented ex parte without the participation of the City Prosecutor. Marriage was declared null and void. But now, Rubica filed a complaint against his lawyer because he allegedly concealed the address of Liza so she couldnt be served with the summons, that the summon was only published in a local circulation, that a copy of his petition wasnt served to the OSG and 195
City Prosecutor, and that he did not cause the registration of the decree of nullity with the Civil Reg. Issue: WON Atty. Rubica failed to follow the proper rules on the proceedings for nullification of marriage. Held: No. The rules on which the complainant bases his complaints on, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Void Marriages took effect on March 15, 2003 (case is not under the scope of this because it was filed on Jan 2003). Before that, there was no need for the summons to be published in a nationwide circulation and it is the courts duty to inform the OSG and City Prosecutor. (c) No confession of judgement NCC Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) (d) AM No 02-11-10-SC. 4 Mar 2003 Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Facts: May 27, 1958 Gloria Jocson was married to Ricardo Robles Jocson VS Robles It was alleged that prior to such, Ricardo had contracted a marriage with Josefina Fausto February 4, 1963 Gloria commenced in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and action for the annulment of her marriage on the ground that it was bigamous o Gloria further demanded from Ricardo damages, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to maltreatment that resulted to the premature birth of their first child Ricardo, in his answer, assailed the validity of the marriage o He charged Glorias parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract the marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man Ricardo filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case December 23, 1963 Court denied the motion for summary judgment o the ground that before the court can pass upon the prayer for declaration of nullity of marriage to Ricardo, there is necessity for proof that when she contracted marriage, Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage Ricardos plea to have his marriage declared as having brought about by force and intimidation was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage March 9, 1964 when both parties failed to appear at the hearing, the court directed the dismissal of the action Ricardo notified the court below of his intention to appeal to the SC. The appeal bond and amended record o appeal, dated April 15, 1964 were approved
Issues: WON the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment 196
Held: Yes Ratio: In view of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, Art. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. (n) o The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code Nature: Petition to annul a order of the Juvenile ad Domestic Relations Court of Manila Facts: September 28, 1959 Romulo Tolentino and Helen Villanuevas marriage was solemnized January 1962 Helen was discovered to be residing in San Francisco, Cebu April 1962 Romulo filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to Helen on the ground that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the wedding, he found out that Helen was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife immediately after the Tolentino VS Villanueva celebration, Helen left his house and her whereabouts were unknown to him Despite being served with summons, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading June 13, 1962 Romulo filed a petition to declare Helen in default and set the date for the presentation of evidence June 28, 1962 Judge declared that Helen is in default but referred the case to the City of Fiscal of Manila (CFM) to determine if there whether collusion exists between the parties o Report should be submitted within 60 days from receipt thereof o In the event of negative finding, CFM is asked to represent the state at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence Romulo is directed to furnish CFM with copies of complaints and other documents necessary July 3, 1962 Romulo submitted to the CFM only a copy of his complaint Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose issued a subpoena to Romulos counsel to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 August 24, 1962 Romulos counsel informed the Assistant City Fiscal that he cant comply with the subpoena for it will expose his evidence October 29, 1962 Romulo prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence for the City Fiscal has not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of 60 days November 6, 1962 Judge denied the motion of Romulo unless he submits himself to the City Fiscal to determine if there is collusion between parties 197
July 29, 1963 and April 11, 1964 Romulos motion for reconsiderations were denied so he then filed for petition to annul the order of the Judge and to compel the Judge to receive his evidence May 2, 1990 Rafael Ortanez filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for the annulment of marriage with damages against Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity Rafael presented his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence (exhibits A to M) Among the exhibits were 3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between Teresita and unidentified persons June 9, 1992 Teresita submit her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence; trial court admitted all of Romulos offered evidence Teresita filed a petition for certiorari assailing the admission in evidence of the cassette tapes June 10, 1993 CA ruled that tape recordings are inadmissible per se, and that a petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial; such is correctible by an appeal, not a certiorari
Issues: WON Romulos petition has merit Held: No Ratio: Article 88 and 101 of the NCC specifically provides that Art. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed. Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. (n) The prohibition expressed is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and thus as much the concern of the state And so when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of marital bonds Salcedo-Ortanez VS CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts:
Issues: WON the remedy of certiorari was properly availed of by Teresita in the CA WON the tape recordings are admissible as evidence Held: Yes No Ratio: The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy is an ordinary appeal incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. HOWEVER, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress 198
The inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200 (An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes) Pesca VS Pesca January 11, 1995 Zosimo belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court November 15, 1995 Trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting on the ground that Lorna failed to prove that Zosimo showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code
Facts: March 3, 1975 Lorna Pesca and Zosimo Pesca got married The union begot 4 children 1988 Lorna Pesca alleged that her husband began to show signs of psychological incapacity for being a habitual drinker, and for being immature, irresponsible, and violent November 19, 1992 Lorna and children left their house and began to live with her sister Two months later, Lorna forgave her husband and went back to their house March 22, 1994 Zosimo once again assaulted Lorna After going through medical examination, Lorna filed a case against respondent for slight physical injuries Zosimo was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment Lora and children then left their conjugal home and sued Zosimo for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, seeking custody of her children April 25, 1994 Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on Zosimo As Zosimo failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties August 3, 1994 Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties
Issues: WON Lorna and Zosimos marriage is null and void ab initio due to psychological incapacity Held: No Ratio: Lorna has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity
199
Carlos VS Sandoval Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Facts: Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate They left 6 parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and Juan De Dios Carlos During the lifetime of Felix, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo to avoid payment of inheritance taxes; Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver ad turn over the share of the other legal heir, Juan De Dios Carlos o First 3 parcels were under Teofilos name o Parcel 4 was under Juans name Teofilo died intestate; he was survived by Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II o Upon Teofilos death, Parcel 5 and 6 were registered under Felicidad and Teofilo Carlos II Juan De Dios filed a suit against Felicidad and son o In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land September 17, 1994 parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement and was approved accordingly; two more contracts were entered into, equally dividing the 3rd and 4th parcels of land Juan De Dios commenced an action against Felicidad and son with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage in view of the absence of marriage license, (b) status of a child neither a natural nor the adoptive son of Teofilo, (c) recovery of property, (d) reconveyance, and (e) sum of money and damages October 16, 1995 Felicidad and son submitted their answer: dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate her marriage to Teofilo and that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased with another woman o Felicidad prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter Before parties could proceed to pre-trial, Felicidad and son moved for summary judgment (attached was the affidavit of justice of peace who solemnized the marriage and the certificate of live birth of respondent designating Teofilo and Felicidad as parents) o Juan De Dios opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the marriage contract and the absence of a record of birth of Teofilo II as attested by the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa discounted the possibility of collusion between parties RTC rendered judgment o Marriage of Teofilo and Felicidad is rendered null and void ab initio o Teofilo Carlos II is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of Teofilo o Juan De Dios as the sole owner of lands Felicidad and son appealed to the CA which reversed the RTC judgment
Issues: WON marriage may be declared void ab initio through judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial 200
WON Jose, who is not a spouse, has the capacity to bring the action for nullity of marriage o Jose is a real party in interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage because if the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, then he succeeds to the entire estate o A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse but it never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs f their successional rights They can still question the validity of marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity of the marriage but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts o The case is remanded for further proceedings 5. EFFECTS OF PENDENCY OF ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY FC Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) 6. Effects of final judgment declaring nullity a. In general, FC Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to 201
Held: No Yes Ratio: The grounds for declaration of nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is the confession of judgment disallowed. o With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity of annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity: Sec. 17 (2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife as provided . Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code o Section 2 (a) of A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage o However, the new rule extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988 o The applicable law for the marriage (May 14, 1962) under scrutiny, having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is the Civil Code which is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void
marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.chan robles virtual law library Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. But see, FC Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in 202
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Chan-Tan vs. Tan Facts: 203 Susie Tan (petitioner) and Jesse Tan (respondent) married in June 1989 and had two children, Justin and Russel After 12 years of marriage, in June 2001, Susie filed a case for the annulment of marriage under Art 36 of FC Along with the petition, a compromise agreement on the custody of children, division of property of the spouses was also submitted 30 March 2004 - RTC approved the agreement and granted the annulment on the grounds of mutual psychological incapacity 17 May 2004 - Susie did not fulfill her part of the agreement and so, custody of the children was awarded to Jesse 28 June 2004 - Petitioner filed an MR and alleged that she and her children went abroad for fear of their lives because her husband allegedly beat her and because of his pernicious gambling and womanizing 12 October 2004 petitioners MR denied since it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period 4 November 2004 petitioner filed for a motion to dismiss and MR o Claimed she was no longer interested in the suit and prayed that an order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit 28 December 2004 trial court denied both motions and held that the decisions have become final and executory upon the lapse of 15-day reglementary period 15 Feb 2005 trial court issued a Cert of Finality of the decisions Issue: WON the 30 March 2004 and the 17 May 2004 decisions have attained finality despite the alleged denial of process Held: Yes.
The resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal The alleged negligence of petitioners counsel w/c resulted to her loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgment She cannot claim she was denied due process since records show that she actively participated in the proceedings, filing motion after motion Petitioner seems to be the one negligent in pursuing the case since her counsels manifestation showed she was incommunicado during the time she was supposed to file her appeal Petitioner cannot use Sect 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Viodable Marriages since it applies only to respondent and not to petitioner: SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied) Obiter: Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest. b. On remarriage, FC Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy Facts: Karl Heinz Weigel (respondent) filed for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (July 1978) to Lilia Wiegel (petitioner) on the ground that the latter has a subsisting marriage to one Eduardo Maxion Lilia admits the first marriage (June 25, 1972) but alleged that she and first husband were forced into that union making the marriage null and void The case was filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan In the pre-trial, both parties agreed that the issue was the status of the first marriage (assuming that both parties were forced into it), WON it was void or merely voidable Lilia contested the validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence that her 1st marriage was done through force and that her 1st husband was married to someone else when they got married Judge Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation of evidence because the parties has already agreed that there was an existing force on the 1st marriage Issue: WON the order compelling the parties to submit for resolution based on agreed facts is final and executory and, therefore, the courts denial of petitioners motion to present evidence in her favor, lawful Held: Yes. 204
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her 1 st marriage was entered into against their will because if this is so, their marriage was merely voidable (Art 85, Civil Code) and is valid until annulled It is clear that when petitioner married respondent, her 1 st marriage was still subsisting making the 2nd marriage void There is no need to present evidence about the 1 st marriage since even if the said marriage was void, petitioner still need a judicial declaration of its nullity Terre vs. Terre This is an administrative case in the Supreme Court for grossly immoral conduct. Facts: Dorothy Terre (complainant) was married to a Merlito Bercenilla who is allegedly her 1st cousin Jordan Terre (respondent), then a law student, was able to convince Dorothy that her marriage to Merlito is void ab initio and that there was no need to go to court to declare it as such Jordan and Dorothy got married on June 14, 1977 Jordan continued his studies with his parents and Dorothys support The two had a son, Jason Terre 1981- Jordan disappeared Dorothy learned Jordan contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem She filed the following cases: o Abandonment of minor o Bigamy o Administrative Case with the Commission on Audit where the respondent worked o Administrative Case in the Supreme Court since Jordan is a member of the Philippine bar The Court resolved to require the respondent to answer the complaint Respondent was able to evade 5 attempts to be served a copy of the Courts Resolution by moving from one place to another April 24, 1985 - after 3 and a half years of no answer from respondent, the Court resolved to suspend the respondent from the practice of law until he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint September 28, 1985 respondent filed an Answer with Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order o Averred that when he married Dorothy, he thought she was single only to find out after that she was already married to Merlito o That Dorothy drove him out of their home when he confronted her about her prior marriage o That Dorothy told him that Jason is the son of Merlito (Dorothy avers that she put Jason as dependent of Merlito because her pregnancy was risky) o That he believed his marriage to Dorothy is void ab initio thats why he got married again The Court denied the respondents motion January 6, 1986 the complaint was referred to the OSG for investigation, report, and recommendation Solicitor Pio Guerrero, appointed investigator by the OSG, set 3 hearings with notice to both parties o July 7, 1986 Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte since respondent did not appear o August 19, 1986 respondent did not appear again; complainant finally presented her evidence and rested her case o October 2, 1986 another hearing wherein respondent was given a warning that if he fails to appear again, the 205
case will be deemed submitted for resolution; respondent did not appear Solicitor considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution The parties were given time to submit their memoranda o December 8, 1986 Dorothy submitted hers o Respondent did not February 26, 1990 OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation to the Court Issue: WON Jordan Terre is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and should be disbarred Held: Yes. The conduct of respondent in inveigling Dorothy to contract a 2nd marriage w/ him, in abandoning the complainant after she cared for him and supported him through law school, in leaving her w/o means for the safe delivery of his child, in contracting a 2nd marriage when his marriage was still subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct under Sect 27 of Rule 138 of the ROC affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment o Jordan, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that for purposes of determining WON a person is legally free to contract a 2nd marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential o Therefore, his marriage to Dorothy is deemed valid and his marriage to Helina is bigamous Domingo vs. CA This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA Facts: The petition seeks to reverse the CAs ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property Backstory: o May 29, 1991 Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation property against the petitioner in this case (Roberto Domingo) o She alleged the following: They were married on November 26, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg (as shown by their MC with ML) She did not know that Roberto had a previous marriage until 1983 when they were sued for bigamy by the first wife, Emerlinda dela Paz From January 23, 1979 to the present (1993), she has been working in Saudi Arabia and would come to the Phil only during her annual one-month vacation From 1983 to the present (1993), Roberto has been unemployed and relies only on her for support Out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties amounting to P350,000 which were under the possession and administration of Roberto In 1989, while on vacation, she learned that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman She also discovered that he was selling some of her properties w/o her knowledge or consent She appointed her brother Moises Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties 206
Roberto failed and refused to turn over the properties to Moises She alleges that Roberto is not authorized to administer and possess the properties since their marriage is null and void She prayed that a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration over the properties That their marriage be declared null and void That she be declared sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage And that her brother be declared administrator of her properties Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss (MD) on the ground that the petition has no cause of action That since their marriage is void ab initio, declaring it to be such would be superfluous and unnecessary That no property of Delia is in his possession August 20, 1991 MD was denied for lack of merit The lower court relied on the precedent of Vda. De Consuegra vs. GSIS which states that there is a need for declaration of nullity of marriage An MR was filed stressing that the use of the precedent is erroneous and that there is no justiciable controversy as to the nullity of marriage September 11, 1991 MR was denied and petitioner was given 15 days after he received the order to file his answer The petitioner filed, instead, a civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied the motion to dismiss o Feb 7, 1992 CA dismissed the petition stating that the case Yap vs. Ca cited by the petitioner and Consuegra vs. GSIS relied upon by the RTC do not have relevance to this case because these cases dealt w/ successional rights of the second wife while the case here prays for separation of property corollary w/ the declaration of nullity of marriage Separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship bet said parties The declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together w/ the partition and distribution of the properties involved The alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for w/c the remedy ordinarily would be to file an answer, proceed w/ the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal o The petitioner filed an MR w/c was also denied for lack of merit Issues: 1. WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If it is, WON the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage 2. WON Delias petition is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively Held: 1. Yes. The Court held that Roberto and Delias marriage is indeed void ab initio since Robertos 1st marriage was still 207
o o o
subsisting when he married Delia. However, as in the Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy case and as explicitly stated in the FC, a judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. This is to protect both parties from committing bigamous marriages. Also, this declaration cannot be made solely for the purposes of remarriage. This could also be invoked for purposes wherein the validity of marriage needs to be ascertained like in cases of liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of properties, as well as an action for the custody and support of the children and delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes. 2. Yes. CA concluded that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The private respondents prayer for separation of property is a necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. The petition is denied. Note: Art. 40 of FC: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) Petitioner argues that the word solely means that judicial declaration should be had only if one wants to remarry. But during the deliberations of the Committee, according to Judge Diy, solely refers to the final judgment. Cario vs. Cario This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Facts: The issue here is the validity of the 2 marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy bet the two Susans he married June 20, 1969 SPO4 married Susan Nicdao (petitioner) with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee November 10, 1992 he married again, this time to Susan Yee (defendant) with whom he had no children after almost ten years of cohabitation starting from 1982 1988 SPO4 fell ill and bedridden because of diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis November 23, 1992 SPO4 passed away under the care of Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses Both Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various govt agencies Nicdao collected P146k while Yee got P21k December 14, 1993 Yee filed a case against Nicdao for collection of at least one-half of the P146k Nicdao failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to hold her in default Yee admitted that her marriage to SPO4 took place while his 1st marriage was still existing and w/o a judicial declaration of the nullity of the 1st marriage She claimed that she didnt know such marriage existed until during the wake of SPO4 where she met Nicdao who told her she was SPO4s wife Yee contended that the 1st marriage was void ab initio since it was solemnized w/o an ML and even presented the MC w/c had no ML no. and a cert from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila which states that they have no record of the ML bet Nicdao and SPO4 RTC ruled in favor of Yee CA affirmed RTCs decision 208
Issues: 1. WON there is a need for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage 2. WON Yee is entitled to half of the death benefits received by Nicdao Held: Yes, even though the marriage bet Nicdao and SPO4 is, indeed, void for lack of ML (the two were married before enactment of FC). However, it does not mean that the marriage bet Yee and SPO4 is valid. It is also void ab initio since it was contracted w/o the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. No. Since both marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime is not absolute community or conjugal partnership of property but, rather Art. 147 and 148 of FC: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. Yees marriage to the deceased falls under Art. 148 since it is a bigamous marriage. In this property regime (actual joint contribution), wages and salaries of each party belong to him or her exclusively. This includes contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration. The disputed money is the earnings of the deceased and unless Yee can prove that she contributed money, industry, or property in the acquisition of these benefits, she has no right to claim the same. Instead, these benefits will pass to his legal heirs Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. xxx xxx xxx When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Nicdaos marriage falls under Art. 147 since they were legally capacitated to marry but whose marriage was nonetheless void for other reasons. Under this provision, wages and salaries earned by either party shall be owned by the parties in equal 209
share and will be divided equally between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Art 147 creates a co-ownership, entitling Nicdao to half of the benefits if there is no allegation that the marriage was entered into in bad faith. Since both parties of the first marriage is presumed to be in good faith, Nicdao will get half of the death benefits while the other half will go to her children w/ SPO4 The petition is GRANTED. Bobis vs. Bobis Petition for certiorari of a decision of RTC suspending the criminal case filed against Isagani Bobis. Facts: Isagani Bobis contracted a marriage a second marriage with Imelda Marbella Bobis while his first marriage with Ma. Dulce Javier is still not annulled. The first marriage is governed by the NCC while the 2nd one is under FC. (Another woman was mentioned Julia Sally Hernandez) With this in mind, Imelda filed for an information for bigamy against Isagani. He then filed for a civil action for judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his 1st marriage on the ground that it had no marriage licnse. He also filed for a motion to suspend proceedings on the petition of Imelda (granted but after morion for reconsideration filed by Imelda, it was denied). Issue: WON 1 marriage was void for lack of marriage license is a matter of defense because theres still no judicial declarationof its nullity at the time of the 2nd marriage was contracted.
st
whether the filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. *Prejudicial question one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involvd therein. - determines the guilt/innocence of the accused - determinative of the criminal case 2 elements of PQ 1. Civil action involves issue similar to criminal action 2. Resolution of issue determines WON criminal action may be proceed Held: RTC erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. (Isagani also erred in seeking the declaration of nullity only after the case on bigamy has been filed.) It is not a prejudicial question. Petition granted. RTC decision reversed. And it is ordered to immediately proceed with criminal case. Ratio: Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Only then can a marriage be declared void and so long as there is no such declaration, first marriage exists and the 2nd marriage void. Criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case on declaration of nullity. He was married when he contracted 2nd marriage so any decision in civil case would not ease the fact that he entered into a 2nd marriage during the subsistence of the 1st one. Ignorance of FC Art. 40 is not an excuse. 210
Mercado vs. Tan Petition for certiorari on decision of CA convicting Dr. Vicente Mercado of bigamy. Facts: Vincent contracted a marriage with Maria Consuelo Tan (1 child with her) while still married to Thelma Oliva (2 children here). Vincent alleged he is single as written in the marriage contract of his 2nd marriage. Tan filed a letter-complaint for bigamy against Vincent. One month later, he filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of his 1 st Marriage (Art. 36). It was declared null and void. This was used by Vincent as a defense in the criminal case. Issue: WON the 1s6t element of bigamy is present WON hes guilty of bigamy WON he is acquitted (WON Tan should receive relief for damages) Held: Petition is not meritorious. All the elements of bigamy are present. Crime has already been consummated (declaration of nullity should be obtained before a 2nd marriage). He is guilty of bigamy. (She was well aware of the existence of the 1 st marriage when she married him.) Petition denied. Ratio: Elements of Bigamy: 1. Offender has been previously legally married 2. 1st marriage has not been legally dissolved/ spouse not yet presumed dead according to NCC 3. 3. He contracted a 2nd marriage 4. 4. 2nd marriage had the requisites for validity. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Justice Vitug Marriagesvoid ab initio need not be declared by the Court. Art. 40 is only for VALID or VOIDABLE 1st marriages alleged to be void. Petition should be granted. Ty vs. CA Petition for certiorari of a decision of CA declaring the marriage void ab initio. Facts: (This case is before Wiegel. Both marriages are under NCC) The 1st marriage was contracted between Edgardo Reyes and Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in 1977. The 2 nd marriage was contracted in 1979 between Reyes and Ofelia Ty (civil wedding). Later on, the 1st marriage (civil wedding) was declared void (no marriage license), followed on 1982 when the church wedding was declared void also (no consent of both parties). In 1982, the 2nd marriages church wedding was held. In 1991, it was declared void because there is no marriage license and Reyes was still married when he married Ty. Issue: whether the decree of nullity of 1st marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly Held: There is no need for judicial declaration because 1 st marriage is before Wiegel. Therefore, 2nd marriage is Valid. FC not retroacted because it will prejudice the rights of the petitioner and the children. 211
2nd marriage is valid for all the essential and formal requisites are complied with. Marriage license is valid. No damages to be given since it will be from conjugal/common funds (absurd). Petition granted and awards to the children are ratified and maintained. Ratio: NCC doesnt say judicial declaration is needed. Wiegel said that there is a need for judicial declaration of a void marriage. Morigo vs. People Review for certiorari on CA decision that Morigo is guilty of bigamy. Lucio Morigo was first married to Lucia Barreto. After a year, Lucia went to Canada and had their marriage divorce (1992). After Lucia left, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago who later filed for a criminal case of bigamy against Lucio. The 1 st marriage was declared null in 1993 because there is no marriage license. When Lumbago filed for the bigamy case, Lucio filed for a suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for udicial declaration of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. This was granted but later on denied. Issue: WON criminal intent is a dispensable requisite WON he committed bigamy WON good faith is valid Held: Divorce with Lucia is not recognized because neither of the spouses had their domicile in the place where divorce was granted she only went there to get a divorce. Bigamy is mala in se, good faith and criminal intent are complete defense. There is no marriage ceremony, it was amere signing of marriage contract without a solemnizing officer. The 1st element for bigamy is not present meaning he was never married and so it was not bigamy. There is no marriage ceremony so there is no need for judicial declaration. He is acquitted. Abunado vs. People Review on certiorari convicting Salvador Abunado of bigamy. Facts: 1st marriage was between Salvador and Narcisa Arceno in 1967 (had 4 children). 1988, she left for Japan to work and when she returned in 1992 she learned he was having an affair and cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered he had a 2nd marriage in 1989 with Zenaida Binas. In 1995, an annulment case was filed by him against Narcisa. She filed for a bigamy case against him that same year. Issue: WON he was sufficiently informed of the nature of the case filed against him WON he committed bigamy 212
Held: Bigamous marriage was contracted in 1989 and not in 1995. It was a typographical error. Petitioner said Narcisa consented the 2nd marriage but the Court ruled that it is not established and her consent doesnt extinguish his criminal action since it is also a crime against the State. He said it is a prejudicial question The Court held that proceedings on bigamy should be suspended during annulment case. But this can only suspend the bigamy case. Civil case has no bearing on the criminal case. He said that the penalty is improper. At the time of this decision he is already 70 yrs ols which is a mitigating circumstance. He is guilty of bigamy. modified. Concurring Opinion, Carpio General rule: If marriage is void ab initio, there should be no need for a judicial declaration. Numbers of years in prison is celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. On October 29, 1975, Rachelle Alocillo was born. On November 26, 1979, Jarillo contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. April 16, 1995, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital vows in a church wedding ceremony. In 1999, Uy filed for the annulment of their marriage. Thereafter, Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasay City. October 5, 2000, Jarillo filed against Alocillo a declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC of Makati City. For her defense, Jarillo insisted that (1) her marriage with Alocillo was null and void because he was still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at that time (2) her marriage with Alocilllo and Uy were null and void for a lack of a valid marriage license (3) action has prescribed since Uy, through her mother, knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978 (15 years has already elapsed.). July 29, 2001, RTC ruled that Jarillo is guilty of bigamy (with 6-10 years imprisonment). August 2, 2001, MRC was denied. July 21, 2003, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Meanwhile, on March 28, 2003, RTC of Makati City declared Jarillos marriage with Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. July 8, 2004, CA invoked the Tenebro ruling saying that the subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of marriage, the said marriage is not without legal consequences among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. Issue: WON Jarillo committed bigamy when she contracted another marriage with Uy? Held and Ratio: Yes. Jarillo is guilty of bigamy. o The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages with Alocillo cannot be 213
Jarillo vs People Overview: Jarillo was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage with Uy when her previous marriage with Alocillo was still subsisting. Facts: On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. On May 4, 1975, they again
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy considering that the second marriage was contracted without the previous one being declared null and void. Herein, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and existing. o Jarillo failed to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation that 15-years has already elapsed (i.e. prescription began to ran as of 1978). Mother was not called to the witness stand. Disposition: Petition is partly granted. Penalty is modified (2 years, 4 months and 1 day imprisonment 8 years, 1 day imprisonment). Constancia was already dead, so technically his lawful wife is Romana and not Maelotisea. And that at the time when he contracted all his marriages, he wasnt a lawyer yet, so the court shouldnt take that against his practice. For the part of Romana she said that Maelotisea actually knew of their marriage (Yes, chance na! Kahit may asawa na pwede na rin! hahaha) and that she didnt say a word about it when everything was still favorable to her. But still, the fact is she took away a man from his wife and six kids and prevented him from legalizing his first marriage when the first wife died. Issue: Could the marriage bet Angel and Romana be valid and should the respondents be disbarred? Held: (1) Yes, the marriage is void-bigamous but it should be borne in mind that he misrepresented himself as a bachelor to Maelotisea. And instead of making legal amends to that marriage when the first wife died he went running off with another woman and bore a child with her. (What does that say about his morality?haha) He even went as far as using his expertise in order to avoid liability. DISBARRED. (2) In a strict legal sense the third marriage could be considered as valid, but the Court could not believe the honesty of Romanas belief that the 2nd marriage was really void. While it is true that the second marriage was null and void, the fact still remains that the man has six children and a wife who believed that their marriage was valid. Any strand of decency in her body would tell her to stay away from him but she didnt and she should be held responsible for that. Besides, there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage at the time they were married. Immoral, DISBARRED. Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon Salvador 214
Garrido vs Garrido Petitioner: Maelotisea Garrido; Respondents: Atty. Angel Garrido and Atty. Romana Valencia Facts: Angel was married to Maelotisea. After years of marriage and 6 children, he married Romana in Hongkong and eventually left the house to live with her. Maelotisea only had a suspicion of this second marriage when the daughter from the second marriage secretly called and told one of her children that she was a child of Angel from another woman, this was confirmed by another child who said that she saw her father with another woman in Robinsons Ermita. She investigated and eventually found out the truth and filed a disbarment case against Angel and Romana. Angel said that his marriage with one Constancia was subsisting at the time he married Maelotisea so that their marriage was actually null and void. And that at the time he married Romana,
Facts: (This is a messed up case about passionate grudge and money haha!) So many facts but the relevant ones are: Corazon filed an administrative case against Noel and Amelia asserting among others that they had committed bigamy when they married each other because Noel was married to one Rosemary and Amelia knew of this. But the respondents said that the previous marriage had already been declared void by the court. As it turned out in the investigation, both parties actually had subsisting marriages at the time they got married. But also both were eventually declared void. Issue: Could the subsequent declaration of nullity of a previous marriage make legal an otherwise bigamous marriage? Held: NO! Yes the previous marriages were judicially declared void, but the fact is at the time they were married, they were legally impeded. The subsequent declaration of nullity of both their first marriages does not change the fact that they have already and knowingly committed bigamy. c. On rights and obligations between the former spouses d. On the property regime of the marriage FC Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Compare with 215
FC Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Valdez vs QC-RTC Facts: The marriage between Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez was declared null and void due to the psychological incapacity of both parties. In the decision, three of the children were given the choice as to whom they wanted to live with (they chose their father), while the other two were put under the care of their mother. Also, the court directed that the liquidation of the property be commenced according to Art. 147 in relation to Art. 50, 51, and 52 of the family code. Consuelo filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that there are no provisions in the FC that govern the procedure for liquidation of common property in unions without marriage, therefore, Art 147 could not apply. Issue: Does Art 147 apply in this case? Held: Yes. FC 147 applies to void marriages irregardless of the cause thereof. The co-ownership evoked in this provision applies when a man and a woman, with no legal impediment, exclusively live together as husband and wife with a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Sales vs Sales Facts: Marriage between Albano-Sales and Sales was declared void ab initio due to the psychological incapacity of both parties. As a result, the court ordered a dissolution of their conjugal properties. AlbanoSales filed a motion for execution and manifestation with a list of the properties that have to be apportioned. Sales opposed this and prayed that the partition be withheld until all the issues have been resolved, one of them being that Albano-Sales had been collecting rent on several of their townhouses but had misappropriated those funds and also sold some of the units without his approval. The court set a trial for this but Sales failed to show up even if it had already been reset twice. So the court admitted evidence and based the decision solely on that presented by Albano-Sales. So the properties were partitioned as she wanted. But Sales filed a case with the court and said that he had been deprived of his properties without due process as the matters he mentioned above has not yet been dissolved. 216
Issue: Did the court err when it granted the respondents appeal considering that a writ of execution considering that under the rules of the court no appeal can be taken from an order of execution? Held: No. indeed there are still issues that need to be resolved before a fair and reasonable distribution of the properties can be made. Thus the case is REMANDED. Buenaventura v CA Facts July 12, 1992 Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura Isabel then filed an answer but Noel then amended his petition stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated Isabel denied the allegation July 31, 1995 RTC promulgated a decision o That marriage is null and void ab initio o That Noel pay Isabel moral damages of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest, plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00 o That Noel pay Isabel expenses of litigation of P50,000.00 plus costs o That assets of the conjugal partnership property be liquidated o That Noel give a P15,000.00 monthly regular support to Javy Singh Buenaventura o That custody of Javy is to his mother o That Isabel can revert back to the use of her maiden family name Noel appealed to the CA Isabel filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support Noel filed an opposition praying that it be denied September 2, 1996 CA issued a resolution increasing the support to P20,000 Noel appealed but appellate court dismissed such Noel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied Noel filed an instant petition for review on certiorari November 13, 1996 through a resolution, CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration of the September 2 resolution Noel filed a petition for certiorari to question the two resolutions July 9, 1997 Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Petition for Certiorari were consolidated by the court In the petition for review on certiorari, Noel contends that CA decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence In the petition for certiorari, Noel contends that CA gravely abused its discretion when it refused to set Isabels motion for increased support for the parties son for hearing Issue (on the topic): WON assets of conjugal partnership property be liquidated in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage Held Yes Ratio In case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and ditributed is that of equal co-ownership The parties were legally married on July 4, 197 and therefore all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition have been made, contracted, or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved 217
Art. 147 of the FC: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. In this case, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found both by the trial court and the CA to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. FC Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) FC Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n) 218
(e) On legitimes of the common children FC Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
FC Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. NCC Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. (806) NCC Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a) FC Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) NCC Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. (818a) NCC Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a) Section 21 of AM no 02-11-10-SC. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Buenaventura v CA See Facts above Issue WON Javy Singh Buenaventura is entitled to a support Held and Ratio Yes supposed to be because when a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. However, with regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority. 219
(f) On the status and custody of children FC Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) Dacasin v Dacasin Facts Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994 They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995 In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to Sharon sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement Sharon undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts In 2004, Herald sued Sharon in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement Herald alleged that in violation of the Agreement, Sharon exercised sole custody over Stephanie Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree RTC held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction
Issue WON the trial court has jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child Held The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void Ratio: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. 220
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket, the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Separate Opinion J. Abad uncomfortable with the proposition that an agreement between the mother and the father on a joint custody over a child below seven years of age is void for being contrary to law and public policy Such is because the 1987 Constitution acknowledges in Article II, Section 12, the natural and primary right and duty of parents to nurture their children and that the State must support them in this respect The law does not take away from a separating couple the authority and competence to determine what is best for their child. If they resolve on their own that shared parental custody is in their childs best interest, then the law and the courts have no business vetoing their decision. The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read as prohibiting separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age No legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal custody. It is not the policy of the state to prohibit separated parents from compromising on child custody even if the child is of tender age. On the contrary, voluntary custody agreements are generally favored as it can only work for the best interest of the child The agreement between petitioner Herald and his estranged wife providing for joint custody of their then six-year-old child is a valid exercise of parental discretion and authority.
(g) On use of surnames Yasin v Honorable Judge Sharia District Court Facts Hatima Yasin filed in the Sharia District Court in Zamboanga City a Petition to resume the use of maiden name She said that she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin but they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., and that her former husband is now married to another woman The respondent court held that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance and that the pleading must be rectified Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration but again was denied by the respondent court on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname Thus, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying rule 103 to this case 221
Issue WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name WON the petitioner can resume her use of maiden name Held No Yes Ratio The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register; In this case, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but just to be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Yasin Under the civil code, the use of husbands surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage, and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation Under article 371 of the civil code states that in case of annulment of marriage if she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname, unless she or the former husband is married again to another person When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or sseek judicial authority o use her husbands name similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husbands name is optional and not obligatory Rule 103 of the rules of court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname Facts Bar Matter No. 1625 Josephine P. Uy Timosa Josephine P. Uy-Timosa, prayed that she be allowed to use her maiden name, Josephine P. Uy, in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations She asserted that despite her marriage, she has continuously used her maiden name in all her transactions, except in her school records and those in the CHED and other offices. However, all her records in the University of Santo Tomas reflect her maiden name She contended that she and her husband have been separated since May 2000 and that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is now pending before the RTC
Issue WON the court can grant the petitioners request Held Yes Ratio Article 370 of the Civil Code reads: ART. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." This provision clearly indicates that the wife's use of her husband's surname is optional, not obligatory Furthermore, Section 14, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men". o Such is our nation's response to the increasing clamor of women worldwide for gender equality 222
So, clearly, petitioner has the right to use her maiden name Jospehine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations Remo vs. DFA petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioners request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport. Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring. Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Her petition was denied. Issue: whether petitioner, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage. Held: The petition lacks merit. DENIED Ratio: Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs. We agree with petitioner that the use of the word may in the above provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband's surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using 223
her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, h. On hereditary rights i. Effect of death Castro vs. Castro H. Voidable marriages 1. Void v. voidable marriages FC Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a) Wiegel vs. Wiegel See digests above Terre 224
2. Grounds for annulment a. absence for parental consent FC Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a) b. Insanity Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity; NCC Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n) Lim vs. CA Overview: This is about the rule on the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship Issue: WON the CA denied due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an attending physician of petitioner. Facts: Nelly Lim and Juan Sim are lawfully married. November 25, 1987: Juan Sim filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that petitioner Nelly Lim has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia before, during, and after the marriage and until the present. Juan Sim had 4 witnesses. One is Dr. Lydia Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, specializing in Psychiatry. Nelly Lim objected to this witness since the testimony sought from Dr. Acampado is privileged. Nelly Lim had gone to Dr. 225
Acampado in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia. The doctor was allowed to testify since she would be testifying as an expert and not as an attending physician. All they discussed was hypothetical and did not mention specifically Nelly Lim. Held: Nope. Only disclosures made to the physician to enable him safely and efficaciously to treat his patient are covered by the confidentiality rule. Since expert witness and she did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination of Nelly Lim, her testimony cannot be excluded. Besides, Nelly Lim was never interviewed alone and thus, has destroyed the confidential nature of the communication between doctor and patient. Lastly, since Nelly Lim did not object when she found out that the doctor was going to testify, even if the information was privileged, she had waived her right to object. c. Fraud Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a) Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud; NCC Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. (1269) Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n) Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n) Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n) Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n) Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error. (n) 226
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties. Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage complaint is dismissed. Issues was there a fraud? Held: Case is remanded to CFI wth the new evidences: 1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant; 2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage; 3. Affidavit of Albert Powell stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant; 4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26, 1955; 5. Birth Certificate of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law; 6. Birth Certificate of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and 7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time the picture was taken. 227
Buccat vs. Buccat Facts: Petitioner and defendant met and fell in love. After 89 days, Luida Mangonon-Buccat gave birth to their child. On this event, he left her and never returned. Plaintiff was a student of 1st yr Law. Issue: Held: Court ruled in favour of defendant Luida. Aquino vs. Delizo petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo. Facts: Conchita Delizo, it is alleged, at the date of her marriage to Fernando Aquino concealed from the latter that she was pregnant by another man, and about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. She said that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. In CFI, no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does
Ratio: Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). She was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At that stage, her pregnancy was not readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Anaya vs. Palaroan Nature Appeal from an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court Facts December 4, 1953 Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married January 7, 1954 Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage, and granting Auroras counterclaim While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando had divulged that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his Aurora contended that such non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced constituted fraud Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages Fernando denied the allegations and set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel for her having prayed the validity of marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted to her Fernando counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal with respect to the alleged moral damages
Issues WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his premarital relationship with another woman constitute fraud and therefore is a ground for annulment of marriage WON Auroras contention that Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her constitute fraud and therefore is a ground for annulment of marriage Held 228
No No Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo Florence Teves Macarrubo filed a complaint for disbarment of Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo with IBP alleging he deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza. After their marriage, he admitted that he was married but he said it was void. She averred that he also have a third marriage with Josephine Constantino and he abandoned her and her children without support IBP remanded the case to the Investigating Commissioner. According to respondent, she knew he was married and he was dragged by her to a sham wedding because she was then pregnant He also declared that their marriage was void ab initio. He also showed evidence showing fully paid educational plans for the education of his children. After this, he was suspended for 3 months. Issues: Did he commit gross misconduct and fraud in his marriages? Held: He is guilty of gross misconduct. Having his 2nd marriage void ab initio doesnt clean his case. Even if his claim of being under duress during the wedding, he actually lived with her and bore with her a second child. He is disbarred. Ratio:. Pictures of a happy familydo not lie about the relationship he had with complainant. It is not easy to believe that a lawyer like him could easily be cowered to enter into any marriage. He exhibited the vice of entering into marriages and later leaving the woman behind. 229
Ratio Non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman does not constitute fraud and therefore is not a ground for annulment of marriage o Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause of annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4 of the Civil Code o Such fraud is limited exclusively by law to those kinds of fraud enumerated in Article 86 o Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that, no other misrepresentation or deceit as to chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage Auroras contention that Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her does not constitute fraud and therefore is not a ground for annulment of marriage o This ground is already barred o Any secret intention on the husbands part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage; hence, her action for annulment based on the fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage o The wedding was celebrated in December 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966
Almelor vs. RTC of Las Pinas Petition for review on certiorari of decision of CA denying petition for annulment of judgment and affirming the decision of RTC Facts: Manuel Almelor and Leonida Trinidad were married and had three children. After 11 years, she filed for petition to annul their marriage on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform obligations of marriage She alleged that he was a very harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous and too attached with his mother. He was laso alleged to have concealed his homosexuality. She noticed his closeness with his male companions, caught him while in the middle of a telephone conversation talking about a guy he likes and saw him kissed a guy. Psychologist, Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, proved her claims. She interviewed her and had one time interview with Manuel and their eldest child. He said all these claims were due to their professional rivalry. He belied he is cruel to his children, defended his closeness with his mother and he allegedly avoid female companions because Leonida is overly jealous. RTC held the marriage is void ab initio not on Art. 36 but on Art. 45. Issue: WON he employed fraud in their marriage Held: This case is exempted from the rule that wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal shall be dismissed. Errors of manuel should be pointed to the negligence of his counsel who has committed a lot of errors during the trial. NCC Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed. There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil 230 Concealment of homosexuality is the correct ground and not homosexuality per se. Lower court should have dismissed the case for evidence doesnt support claims under Art. 36 but rather shows the homosexual tendencies of Manuel. Homosexuality is only a ground for legal separation. Concealment of homosexuality raises the issue of consent. Leonida failed to prove nullity of marriage and fraud. The marriage is considered valid and dissolution of manuels share in property regime is unwarranted. They remain joint administrators of community property. Petition granted. RTC decision reversed. Trial to annul marriage is dismissed. d. Force, intimidation and undue influence Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. (1267a) Art. 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, although it may have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract. (1268) Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress. (n) RPC Art. 344. Last paragraph In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the abovementioned crimes. e. Physical incapacity/impotence FC Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage. (87a) Jimenez vs Canizares Nature: Appeal for the judgment of CFI. Facts: Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to Remedios Canizares before a judge of the municipal court in Zamboanga City, upon the gorund that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals existed at the time of the marriage and continues to exist; and because of these, he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. Issues: whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband Held: The decree of CFI that annuls the marriage is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Alcazar vs Alcazar 231
Nature: Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals that denied her petition for annullment Facts: Veronica Alcazar alleged that she was married to Rey Alcazar. After their wedding the two lived for five days in the hometown of Reys parents. Thereafter, they went back to Manila but Rey did not live with Veronica. After 12 days from their marriage, Rey left for Riyadh where he worked. While working there, he did not communicate with his wife by phone or by letter. She tried to call him 5 times but he never answered. About a year and a half, a co-teacher informed her that he was about to come home to the Philippines. She was surprised that she was not advised by his arrival. When he arrived, he did not go home to her house. Instead, he proceeded to his parents house. Upon learning of this, she went to her brother-in-law who claimed that he was not aware of his whereabouts. She then went to Reys parents house where she was informed that he had been living with his parents since his arrival. She asserted that since his arrival, he never contacted her. She concluded that he was physically incapable (Narcissistic Personality Disorder) of consummating his marriage with her. Issues: WON Rey is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations Held: Petition is denied for Veronica failed to prove that his husband was really psychologically incapacitated. FC Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. I. Marriage when one spouse is absent FC Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of 232
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n) Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) CC Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force; Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows: (2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other; 233
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Jones v Hortiguela Facts Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate In an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage (a minor), and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs The project of partition and final account were approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue thereof. On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao She contends that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void The fact states that o In December 1914 Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones o January 10, 1918 Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever heard of him o October 1919 proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee o April 23, 1921 the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence (1 st order), publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in El Ideal o May 6, 1927 Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void
Issues WON Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escao was valid Held Yes Ratio For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead 234
and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68) The absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. o A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law o A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only and would still be disputable Gue v Republic Facts Angelina Gue was married to William Gue January 5, 1946 William Gue left Manila and went to Shanghai Chia, but since then, he had not been heard of Despite Angelinas efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him; and they had not acquired any property during the marriage Angelina asked the court for a declaration of presumption of death of William Gue Trial Court issued the order of dismissal on the ground that no right had been established by Angelina upon which a judicial decree may be predicated, and such action is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, as it is clear that he did not leave any Thus, this appeal Issues WON Angelinas appeal should be granted Held No, the appealed order dismissing the petition is affirmed Ratio Angelina invoked Article 390 of the New Civil Code and 191 of the Old Civil Code o But said provision was repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be repealed by the Rules of Court 235
Lukban v Republic Facts Lourdes Lukban married Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her Lourdes believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law Issues WON Lourdes should be declared widow Held No Ratio Based on Szartraw case
o Only a mere disputable presumption of death was available to any party o Solicitor-general cites the Lukban case decided long after the new civil code went into effect Based on Szartraw and Lukban case o The rule invoked is merely one of evidence which permits the court o presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person has been unheard from in seven years had been established o The petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioners husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead o A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only and would still be disputable SSS v Jarque vda. De Bailon Hermes Diaz, brother and guardian of Alice Diaz, also claimed the death benefits accruing from Bailons death Alisa Diaz filed an affidavit stating that o Clemente cannot have her declared presumptively dead because he could have easily found her because she was just living with her parents o Hence, his marriage with Teresita is void being bigamous SSC ruled that Teresitas marriage to Bailon was void and she was just a common law wife SSS is ordered to pay Alice the appropriate death benefit SSC ratiocinated that contrary to the declaration of CFI of Sorsogon, the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad faith o Marriage to Teresita is therefore void o Teresita therefore is not entitled as a primary beneficiary to Bailons death benefit and that behoves her to refund the amount previously paid to her Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed a petition for review before the CA and CA ruled in favor of her SSS present petition for review on certiorari
Facts April 25, 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz were married August 8, 1983 Clemente married Teresita Jarque October 9, 1970 Clemente filed a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead January 30, 1998 Clemente died (a member of SSS since 1960 and a retiree pensioner) Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits, an additional claim for death benefits Cecilia Cecilia Yap, who claimed to be the daughter of Clemente and one Elisa Jayona claimed that she together with her siblings should be granted the benefits because they were the ones who paid for Clementes medical and funeral expenses She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages: (1) with Alice, (2) Elisa, (3) Teresita all of whom are still alive
Issues WON the 2nd marriage is null and void upon the reappearance of the missing spouse Held No Ratio The two marriages involved having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code Article 83 of the civil code maintains that a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is 236
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the circumstances: o The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or o The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court As no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and Teresitas marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon After that, Angelita did not hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not June 20, 1985 believing that Sofio was already dead, Angelita married Virgilio Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the US State Department of Homeland Security was denied because Angelitas marriage to Sofio was still subsisting March 29, 2007 Angelita filed a petition before the RTC of Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio November 12, 2007 Petition was dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that Angelita was not able to prove the wellgrounded belief that Sofio Polborosa was already dead o RTC found that She did not find her husband anymore in light of their agreement to live separately Nancy was prevented to look for her father There is a strong probability that Sofio is still alive because hes only 61 at this time that there is no evidence presented that Sofio still continues to drink and smoke until now Angelita filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that the Civil Code applies in her case since the marriage with Sofio was celebrated before the Family Code RTC denied such Thus, this petition
Valdez v Republic Facts January 11, 1971 Angelita Valdez married Sofio December 13, 1971 Nancy was born Angelita and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money March 1972 Sofio left their conjugal dwelling May 1972 Angelita went back to her parents home in Tarlac 3 years passed without any word from Sofio October 1975 Sofio showed up They agreed to separate and executed a document to this effect Such was the last time Angelita saw Sofio
Issues WON Angelina and Virgilios marriage is legal and valid Held Yes Ratio The marriage of Angelita to Sofio and Virgilio were both celebrated under the Civil Code
237
A petition for judicial declaration that petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law o Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise o Since death is presumed to have taken place by the 7 th year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982 Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry And considering that CC applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) FC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Benedicto vs. Dela Rama Facts: This is an action for divorce on the ground of abandonment and adultery The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to defendant, and asked for divorce CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force Backstory: o Agueda Benedicto and Esteban de la Rama were married in July 1891 and were happily together until August 1892 o The defendant suddenly without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards 238
J. Marriages dissolved by a foreign judgment NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
o The plaintiff: complains that husband committed adultery with one GREGORIA BERMEJO in 1892 o Other two charges relate to 1899 and 1901 insufficient evidence ARGUMENTS: a) The power of the gov gen, without such order to suspend the operation of the code b) The order of suspension is inoperative did not mention the book of this code in which the suspended titles 4 and 1q2 were to be found c) Title 4: relates to marriage and divorce , title 12: to civil registry (book 1) SC: this is an error Ratio: 1) July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the phils and took effect on dec 8, 1889 2) On dec 31, an order was published which states that titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the archipelago- no decree can be found published in the Gaceta 3) The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the consti of 1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in 1889, no part of the law was in force here, except arts 44 to 78 which were promulgated in 1883 4) It is claimed that if these are suspended, the only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical 5) There can be no doubt that the order of suspension refers to titles 4 and 12 of book 1 and it has always been understood follows that arts 42-107 of the CC were not in force here 6) The canon law had not as such any binding force outside the church-however, any part of the canon law which by proper action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same footing as any other law in Spain 7) COUNCIL OF TRENTthese decrees have in spain the force of a civil law 8) It may be doubted if these decrees, even if considered as extended to the phils and in force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question 9) CANONISTS: declare adultery to be a ground for divorce however, the causes for divorce are nowhere distinctly stated therein 10) The laws of the church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil laws 11) The DECRETAL LAW abolishing in the peninsula the special jurisdictions was extended to the phils 12) DECRETAL LAW STATES: ecclesiastical courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and ellemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trentbut incidents with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts 13) PARTIDAS: contain provisions relating to the subject of divorcestates that when spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between them 14) Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the other the sin of fornication 15) Religion if on desires to take holy orders and the other should grant permissionwith authority of the church 16) Divorce due to adultery or fornicationbrought before the judge of the holy church, includes spiritual fornication 239
17) In here the spouses are separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may remarry after the death of the other 18) No other person but the spouses themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties themselves of their attorneys 19) This divorce did not annul the marriage 20) That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her suit so is the fact that she has pardoned herif after a divorce has been granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the judgment Issue: Were these provisions of the partidas in force in the island prior to 1889? - The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way - RECOPILACION de lasLEYES de INDIASprovision that and as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations and the PARTIDAS of these kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the decisions of causes in accordance with the following law - By the operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the PARTIDAS herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery and settlement of the Phils became at once effective thereinthey have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished from laws of the church - Being in force on august 13, 1898they continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature - The PARTIDAS recognized adultery as a ground for divorce therefore according to the civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898the commission of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce - That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of sovereignty - The complete separation of the church and the state under the American govt while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not affect the right itself - The fact that ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important - The jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of ACT no. 136 - The RESULT: - A) the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for divorce - B) that the only ground therefore is adultery - C) that the action on that ground can be maintained by husband and - D) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond DECISION: the CFI of Iloilo therefore committed no error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case - The adultery of the defendant was fully proved - Adultery of the plaintiff is however, plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence (PROOFletter) - Letter: confession of guilt? MAIN ISSUE: adultery 1) The lack of evidence destroys the theory of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the company of other women 2) Not adequate to explain the sudden termination of their marital relations 3) Testimony of the defendant correctly explained the theoryhe stated that on his return from an inspection of one his estates his 240
wifes maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard, named ZABAL 4) She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon herthat same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her there 5) If The plaintiff is guilty the defendant has condoned the offenseno factual evidence on this claim PRINCIPLE: a) Law 6 , title 9 partida 4, the wife can defeat the husbands suit for divorce by proving that he has pardoned her but no laws in the partidas which say that the effect of the pardon would be so farreaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him in a case like this present one CONCLUSION: - Neither of the party is entitled to a divorceboth committed adultery - JUDGMENT REVERSED COOPER, J. DISSENTING - Immaterial which law governs , since under each causes for divorce are substantially the same, one of which is adultery - Higher court not to review the findings of the lower courtsmore competent since they have the witnesses - Condonation: offending party is restored to the same position he or she occupied before the offense was committed the only condition being that the offense must not be repeated - Not proper to say that just because plaintiff has once been guilty she would forever lose her right to a divorcemakes condonation conditionedparty granting it shall forever have the right to commit the same offense himself with impunity - Condoned offence not being sufficient as a cause for divorce, is not a bar to divorce in favor of the plaintiff condonation restores equality before the law - The court has not only reversed the judgment of the trial court but has entered a judgment against the plaintiff - To deprive the plaintiff of the judgment which she has obtained and make a final determination of the case here without giving her an opportunity of correcting this error, if such exists, is inequitable and unjust Arca vs. Javier Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite ordering appellant to give a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs and to pay them attorneys fees Salud Arca and Alfredo Javier, both Filipinos, got married on Nov 19, 1937 They had a son, Alfredo Javier, Jr. on December 2, 1931 In 1938, Alfredo (defendant) left for the US as a member of the US Navy (he was already part of this since 1927) Salud left her residence in Maragondon, Cavite to live w/ Alfredos parents at Naic Friction occurred bet Salud and Alfredos parents, so she went back to Maragondon After that incident, the couples relationship became strained that on August 13, 1940, Alfredo filed an action for divorce against SAlud before the Civil Circuit of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA alleging as ground abandonment by his wife September 23, 1940 Salud received a copy of the divorce complaint and filed an answer where she averred: 241
o The defendant was not a resident of the State of Alabama but of Naic, Cavite o It is not true that she left her husband. Since her husband is a member of the US Navy, he had to leave for the US w/o her o Defendant has always supported her and their son o She did not abandon defendants home in Naic o their separation is due to physical impossibility for they were 10 thousand miles away from each other o Under the old Civil Code, the wife is not bound to live w/ her husband if the latter has fone to ultramarine colonies o Prayed that the divorce complaint be dismissed Nevertheless, the foreign court granted defendants complaint for divorce and dissolved the marriage bet the two on April 9, 1941 July 1941 after the divorce, defendant married an American citizen, Thelma Francis and bought a house and lot in NYC 1949 Thelma filed for divorce 1950 defendant retired from the Navy and returned to the Phil o Armed w/ two divorce decrees, one against Salud and the other against him, married Maria Odvina (April 19) Salud filed for bigamy on July 25, 1950 CFI: o Acquitted defendant on the basis that he married Maria in good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage to Salud has been dissolved by the divorce decree from Alabama o Defendant had no criminal intent when he contracted a subsequent marriage while the 1st one was still subsisting Held: NO One of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer) o A person must be a bona fide residence of the State or county of the judicial forum o He should not be living in that State or county only to obtain a divorce and w/o intention of remaining o Otherwise, his residence there is not enough to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State It is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court but his legal residence w/in the State o Even if his residence had been taken in good faith, and the court has acquired jurisdiction upon the appellant, the same cannot be said of the plaintiff In short, the Mobile County Court of Alabama had not acquired jurisdiction over the case because at the time Alfredo filed the complaint, his legal residence was still in the Phil and not at Mobile County because he was still in the service of the US Navy and was merely renting a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty Also, defendant never intended to live there permanently as shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma, he moved to NYC and after he retired, he returned to the Phil where he married a 3rd time It could, therefore be said that he only went to Mobile County to obtain a divorce from his wife Another reason for not granting the divorce is our concept of moral values w/c always looked upon marriage as an inviolable institution 242
Issue: WON the divorce decree has a valid effect in the country
The decision appealed from is affirmed Pastor B. Tenchavez (plaintiff-appellant) v Vicenta F. Escao, et al (defendants-appellees) Related Provisions NCC 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. NCC 17, par 3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Nature of the Case Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Facts Significant dates o February 24, 1948 Vicenta Escao (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register) o February 26, 1948 Mamerto Escao received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel o June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged o June 24, 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years o August 22, 1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character o October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute o 1951 Escaos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor o September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran o August 8, 1958 Vicenta acquired an American citizenship o July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escaos whom he charged for dissuading their daughter from him Falsely charged the Escaos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of plaintiff from supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife Thus, this appeal
Issues Whether or not Vicenta and Pastors marriage is valid Whether or not their marriage is subsisting and undissolved Whether or not Vicentas divorce and second marriage is valid Held Decision under appeal is hereby modified 243
o Pastor is entitled to a legal separation o Vicenta is sentenced to pay Pastor for damages and attorneys fees o Pastor is sentenced to pay the Escaos by way of damages and attorneys fees Tenchavez falsely charged which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages Ratio February 24, 1948 marriage is valid o Both parties were above the age of majority o Both consented to the marriage o Marriage was performed by a Catholic Priest in the presence of competent witnesses o The very act of Vicenta suing for divorce implies admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding Their marriage is subsisting and undissolved under the Philippine law; Vicentas divorce and second marriage is not valid o The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce o Vicentas marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran entitles Techavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery Van Dorn v Romillo Facts: 1973: Petitioner (Filipino) married respondent (American) in Hongkong and thereafter, begot two children. 1982: They were divorced in Navada and petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn. Jun 1983: Respondent filed a case against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" Respondent says that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction, especially if it is contrary to public policy.
Issue: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal properties in the Philippines? Held: The divorce decree effectively divests the respondent the standing to sue in this case. o Pursuant to the respondents national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. He is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court and is thus estopped by his own representation (that they had no community property) before that Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. o It cannot be said that under our law, the petitioner is still married to respondent. She should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should 244
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Pilapil vs. Somera Facts: September 7, 1979 Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, got married at Friedensweiler in Federal Republic Germany. They later resided in Malate, Manila . They had a kid Isabela Pilapil Geiling on April 20, 1980. The twos marriage turned sour and they separated. Jan 1983 after three years and a half, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding befor the Schoneberg Local Court o He claimed that there was a failure of their marriage and that they have been living apart since April 1982 Pilapil, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property on January 23, 1983 (this is still pending) January 15, 1986 Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses o Custody of the child was given to Imelda o Records show that under German law, that said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of the said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction June 27, 1986 more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints of adultery alleging that Pilapil had an affair with William Chia (1982) and Jesus Chua (1983) while their marriage was still subsisting Asst. Fiscal Jacinto de los Reyes Jr recommended the dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence But, upon review, the city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of the two complaints of adultery Issue: WON he can still file for adultery after German divorce Held: NO - 344 of RPC only offended spouse may bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when complaint was filed. Since he filed it after the divorce was decreed he is now not considered a spouse and it is now absurd to bring action determined by his status before or subsequent to commencement of adultery. Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot sue as spouse anymore Quita vs CA Facts: Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan (both are Filipinos) on May 18, 1941 but had no children. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in the San Francisco, California She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately and a settlement of their conjugal properties July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce Three weeks after, she married Felix Tupaz but this also ended in divorce She married a 3rd time. To a certain Wernimont On April 1972, Arturo died without a will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC of QC for issuance of letters of admin concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Phil Trust Company 245
Blandina Dandan, who alleged that she was married to Arturo on April 1947 and had 6 children with the deceased, claimed to be the surviving spouse She also submitted certified copies of the private writing and the final judgment of divorce between Fe and Arturo Later, Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased, intervened RTC: o The trial court invoked the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled to recognition was valid in this jurisdiction, and discarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo. It expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo. o Did not consider valid the extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval o Opined that theres no evidence that Arturo and Blandida married and that Arturo recognized the children as his o Found that Ruperto was the brother of Arturo o Declared Ruperto and Fe as heirs On an MR, Blandina was allowed to present proofs that the deceased recognized the children as his legitimate children (except for one) Partial reconsideration was granted and the Padlan children were entitled to half of the estate while the other half went to Ruperto and Fe Blandidas marriage to Arturo was bigamous since it was contracted on April 1947. Blandina appealed to CA and CA reversed the decisions of the RTC and directed the remand of the case for further proceedings There still remains the controversy of who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo During the proceedings, when asked by Blandida whether or not Fe was entitled to inherit from decedent considering their divorce, Fe replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. Issue: WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the divorce secured in the United States. Held: NO Her statement in the facts implied that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. Llorente v. CA Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the RTC declaring Alicia F. Llorente, as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente may have acquired during the 25 years that they lived together as husband and wife. Facts: For 30yrs. (1927 1957), Lorenzo is is an enlisted serviceman of US Navy. In 1937, he married Paula. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, he left for the US and she was left in their conjugal home in CamSur. In 1943, he was admitted to the US citizenship. And a certificate of neturalization was issued in NY. In 1945, he was given a leave in the Navy to visit his wife. He found out she was pregnant and living in with his brother, Ceferino. That same year, she gave birth to 246
a baby boy. In the birth certificate it was written that it was not legitimate and the name for the father was left blank. In 1946, they drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the US Navy as part of his salary and all other obligations for her daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) he would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. He returned to the US and in 1951, he filed for divorce in California. The next year, the divorce decree became final. Then, he returned to the Philippines. In 1958, he married Alicia. She apparently did not know of his marriage to Paula who lived in the same town as they do. They lived together as husband and wife for 25 yrs with their 3 children. In 1981, he executed his last will and testament. In this docu, he gave ALICIA his residential house and lot in CamSur, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing there. He also gave her and their children, in equal shares, all her real properties. He also stated that the said properties shall not be sold to other people but only among themselves. Lastly, he included in his will that he desired that no relative of his shall bother his family regarding the properties stated. On 1985, when he died, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over his estate in her favor. She argued that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that the properties were acquired during their marriage, that his will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. RTC declared the divorce of Lorenzo and Paula void and not applicable in the Philippines and so his marriage with Alicia is void. It also declared the execution of the will as void saying that half of the conjugal properties and one third of the properties be given to her (one third also to the 3 illegitimate children). Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? Held: CA decision is SET ASIDE. RTC decision REVERSED and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce. Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of his will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court. Ratio: NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
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Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. He is a foreigner and is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. Whether his will is valid and who is to succeed him is under the foreign law. Nature Petition for review Garcia vs. Recio July 7, 1998 while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down Issues WON the divorce between Rederick Recio and Editha Samson is valid and proven WON Rederick was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace Garcia Held Yes No
Facts March 1, 1987 Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal but they lived in Australia May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. June 26, 1992 Rederick A. Recio became an Australian citizen January 12, 1994 Rederick married a Filipina, Grace GarciaRecio, in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City In his application for marriage license, Rederick declared that he was single and Filipino From October 22, 1995 onwards lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage May 16, 1996 while the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided March 3, 1998 Grace Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy
Ratio The divorce between Editha and Rederick is valid and proven o In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry o A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws o However, it ought to be noted that before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. o The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the evidentiary rules must be demonstrated. o Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner 248
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. o Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. Rederick was not proven to be legally capacitated to marry Grace Garcia o Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent. o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. This quotation bolsters the courts contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the court finds no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. Diego vs. Castillo 249 Administrative complaint against RTC Judge Silverio Castillo for allegedly Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment and/or Rendering Judgment in Gross Ignorance of the Law Facts:In 1965, Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio Jr. got married (both Filipinos). In their marriage contract, Lucena used and adopted the name Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status as single. After 13 years, a Decree of Divorce was issued to Jorge in Texas which dissolved their marriage. After 9 yrs., Crescencia married Manuel Diego (brother of complainant). The marriage contract shows that she already used her real name, Lucena. Complainant, Eduardo Diego filed a bigamy case against Lucena but she was acquitted. RTC argued that she is acquitted for there was good faith on her part and she believed that her first marriage was already dissolved. The crime of bigamy requires the presence of criminal intention to be committed. Issue: WON respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law. Held: There is no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering unjust judgment. The error committed by the Judge being gross and patent, constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action. He is FINED with P10, 000 with STERN WARNING that repetition of his acts will be dealt with severely. Ratio: Knowingly rendering unjust judgment is a criminal offense. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, wilfully or intentionally. It means there is a conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice.
Requisites for this: a. Offender is a judge b. He renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision c. Judgment is unjust d. He knew that the judgment is unjust o This is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse remains married while the alien spouse is not married anymore to him/her o The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry However, since the respondent did not submit sufficient evidence that his wife was indeed naturalized and has remarried, the Court is unable to declare that the respondent is now capacitated to marry San Luis vs. San Luis Petition for review on the decision of the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC denying petitioners motion for recon. Facts: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisiomo San Luis who was the former governor of Laguna. He had three marriages in his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit with whom he had 6 children. She predeceased him. 5yrs. Later, he then married Merry Lee, an American citizen, with whom he had a son. She filed for divorce in Hawaii which was granted. After 6 yrs., he married Felicidad Sagalongos in California (no children). They lived together for 18 yrs. After his death she sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of his estate. In 1993, she filed for a petition for letters of administration in Makati RTC. The next yr., Rodolfo, his son in his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. He claimed that the petition should be filed in Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He also claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition 250
Facts:
REPUBLIC v ORBECIDO III
May 24, 1981 Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva got married at United Church of Christ in Lam-an, Ozamis City o They had children, Kristoffer Simbortriz and Lady Kimberly 1986 Myros left for US w/ son Kristoffer A few years later, Cipriano learned that Myros has been naturalized as US citizen 2000 Cipriano learned from Kristoffer that Myros divorced Cipriano and married Stanley who she now lives with in California Cipriano filed at theRTC for petition to remarry invoking par 2 of Art 26 of FC which the lower court granted Republic, through OSG, filed for review contending that par 2 of Art 26 of the FC is not applicable to this case bec it applies only to marriage bet a Filipino citizen and an alien o Also suggests that Cipriano should file for annulment/legal separation instead Issue: WON Cipriano can remarry under Art 26 of the FC Held: The Court granted the Republics petition Par 2 of Art 26 of the FC should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
coz she is only a mistress, Felicisimo still married to Mary Lee. This petition was DENIED. The Court of Appeals differentiated residence and domicile and held that he resided in Muntinlupa. It found the second marriage validly dissolved. Issue: whether the venue was properly laid and whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the petition. Held: Petition for motion for recon lacks merit and so DENIED. He is proven to be residing in Muntinlupa and so the petition is validly filed in Makati RTC. FC need not retroactivel;y apply (marriage took place 1974). There is insufficient evidence to prove that the second marriage was validly dissolved. Insufficient evidence that the third marriage was valid under the US Law. This case is remanded to RTC. Ratio: Residence is where Felicisimo resides at the time of his death. Residence is not the same with domicile. She proved his residence through Deed of Absolute Sale, billing statements from Phil Heart Center and Chinese Gen Hospital, proof of membership in Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club Inc. FC Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) If he is not capacitated to remarry, she has legal capacity to file petition, she may be considered co-owner of properties acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Art. 144 of NCC applies (co-ownership in properties assumed equal). If divorce and third marriage is not proven as valid, Art. 148 governs (couple living together as husband and wife but incapacitated to marry). Limited co-ownership in which co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Amor-Catalan vs. CA Bayot vs. CA Dacasin vs. Dacasin K. Marriages giving rise to criminal liability FC Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. 251
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n) NCC Art. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n) RPC Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos. The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation. Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. People vs. De Guzman Motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and reconsideration fpr SC Decision filed by Ronnie De Guzman Facts: Ronnie was charged with 2 counts of rape in the Pasig RTC. In the instant motion, he alleges that he and private complainant contracted marriage last year. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate of Marriage and a joint sworn statement executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the existence of a valid and legal marriage between them. Appellant, thus, prays that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C of the (RPC). Issue:Dis he commit rape? Held:Motion granted. He is absolved and ordered released. Ratio: RPC ART. 266-C. Effect of Pardon. The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage be void ab initio. ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code. ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x x. Ecidence presented were: copies of pictures taken after the ceremony. VII. The Law of Separation of the Spouses A. Concepts of separation and Divorce. Benedicto vs Dela Rama (please see above digest) 252
1. Separation in fact SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW Chapter 1. Prefatory Provisions Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. (n) Chapter 2. Separation in Fact Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.(n) Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n) Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n) Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n) Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n) Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n) Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n) Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n) Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n) 253
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these rules. (n) o Florentino was ordered to return to the petitioners the consideration of the sale w/ interest CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Issue: 1. Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents 2. Was its sale by Florentino w/o Eliseras consent valid Held: The property is conjugal Under Article 178 of the CC, the separation in fact bet husband and wife w/o judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership Also, under Article 160 of the CC, all properties acquired by the spouses during marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife o Elisera presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot o Also, the spouses Chiong categorically declared in their Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property o The conjugal nature of the lot was also admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale The sale is not void ab inition but is viodable The husbands alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the FC is not viod, but merely viodable Applying Article 166 of the civil code, both Florentinos and Eliseras consent are needed for the sale of a conjugal property Since the sale was made w/o Eliseras consent, applying Article 173 of the Civil Code, Elisera can have the sale annulled during the marriage and w/in 10 years from the transaction questioned. Elisera timely questioned the sale 254
Villanueva vs. Chiong Facts: Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975 During their marriage, they acquired a certain lot at Dipolog City In 1985, Florentino sold one-half of the western portion of this lot to petitioners, payable in installments He also allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build store, a shop and a house thereon After their last installment payment, December 1986, petitioners demanded from the respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor Elisera refused to sign the deed of sale July 5, 1991 - She filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title w/ Damages Feb 12, 1992 - Petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance w/ Damages The two cases were consolidated May 13, 1992 Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the petitioners July 19, 2000 RTC annulled the deed and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein
Petitioner contend that assuming arguendo the property is still conjjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot o Lacks merit o Alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper o Restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into o Petitioners should give back the land w/ its fruits o Respondents should return the payment Agreements to Separate Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; Albano vs. Gapusan FACTS: In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Barrio 6, Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. There is no question that the covenents contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs (Biton vs. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7). Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family, "Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution". "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the bases of human society throughout the civilized world (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864; Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168). To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during themarriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial 255 Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. (He was admitted to the bar in 1937). ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Gapusan should be censured because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses Albano. HELD:
sanction was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15). A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family (Selanova vs. Mendoza, Adm. Matter No. 804- CJ, May 19, 1975, 64 SCRA 69; Miranda vs. Fuentes, Adm. Case No. 241, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 802; Biton vs. Momongan, supra,, Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367; In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66; Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277). In Re: Atty. Rufillo Bucana A.M. No. 1637 July 6, 1976 IN RE: ATTY. RUFILLO D. BUCANA, respondent. FACTS: February 26, 1976, Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo wrote to the Court that notary public, Rufillo D. Bucana that notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the aforementioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose. March 23, 1976, Court Resolution asking respondent to show cause within 10 days of receipt April 21, 1976, he stated that the document was prepared by his clerk without his knowledge; that upon seeing it he recognized that it was immoral and nature and refused to notarized it; that he tried to contact the parties but to no avail; that he was planning on destroying the document; and he inadvertedly notarized it as it was not removed from his desk
ISSUE: WON the notary public should be reprimanded HELD: Defendant guilty of malpractice and suspended for six months. RATIO: As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We find, however, that the aforementioned document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public Absolute Divorce Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
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Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Tenchanvez vs. Escano Van Dorn vs. Romillo Pilapil vs. Somera Dacasin vs. Dacasin VII. THE LAW ON SEPARATION OF THE SPOUSES A. Concepts of separation and divorce Benedicto v. De la Rama Facts: This is an action for divorce on the ground of abandonment and adultery The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to defendant, and asked for divorce CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force Backstory: o Agueda Benedicto and Esteban de la Rama were married in July 1891 and were happily together until August 1892 o The defendant suddenly without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards o The plaintiff: complains that husband committed adultery with one GREGORIA BERMEJO in 1892 o Other two charges relate to 1899 and 1901 insufficient evidence ARGUMENTS: a) The power of the gov gen, without such order to suspend the operation of the code b) The order of suspension is inoperative did not mention the book of this code in which the suspended titles 4 and 1q2 were to be found c) Title 4: relates to marriage and divorce , title 12: to civil registry (book 1) SC: this is an error Ratio: 1) July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the phils and took effect on dec 8, 1889 2) On dec 31, an order was published which states that titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the archipelago- no decree can be found published in the Gaceta 3) The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the consti of 1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in 1889, no part of the law was in force here, except arts 44 to 78 which were promulgated in 1883 4) It is claimed that if these are suspended, the only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical 5) There can be no doubt that the order of suspension refers to titles 4 and 12 of book 1 and it has always been understood follows that arts 42-107 of the CC were not in force here 6) The canon law had not as such any binding force outside the church-however, any part of the canon law which by proper action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same footing as any other law in Spain 257
7) COUNCIL OF TRENTthese decrees have in spain the force of a civil law 8) It may be doubted if these decrees, even if considered as extended to the phils and in force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question 9) CANONISTS: declare adultery to be a ground for divorce however, the causes for divorce are nowhere distinctly stated therein 10) The laws of the church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil laws 11) The DECRETAL LAW abolishing in the peninsula the special jurisdictions was extended to the phils 12) DECRETAL LAW STATES: ecclesiastical courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and ellemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trentbut incidents with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts 13) PARTIDAS: contain provisions relating to the subject of divorcestates that when spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between them 14) Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the other the sin of fornication 15) Religion if on desires to take holy orders and the other should grant permissionwith authority of the church 16) Divorce due to adultery or fornicationbrought before the judge of the holy church, includes spiritual fornication 17) In here the spouses are separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may remarry after the death of the other 18) No other person but the spouses themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties themselves of their attorneys 19) This divorce did not annul the marriage 20) That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her suit so is the fact that she has pardoned herif after a divorce has been granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the judgment Issue: Were these provisions of the partidas in force in the island prior to 1889? - The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way - RECOPILACION de lasLEYES de INDIASprovision that and as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations and the PARTIDAS of these kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the decisions of causes in accordance with the following law - By the operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the PARTIDAS herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery and settlement of the Phils became at once effective thereinthey have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished from laws of the church - Being in force on august 13, 1898they continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature - The PARTIDAS recognized adultery as a ground for divorce therefore according to the civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898the commission of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce 258
- That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of sovereignty - The complete separation of the church and the state under the American govt while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not affect the right itself - The fact that ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important - The jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of ACT no. 136 - The RESULT: - A) the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for divorce - B) that the only ground therefore is adultery - C) that the action on that ground can be maintained by husband and - D) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond DECISION: the CFI of Iloilo therefore committed no error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case - The adultery of the defendant was fully proved - Adultery of the plaintiff is however, plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence (PROOFletter) - Letter: confession of guilt? MAIN ISSUE: adultery 1) The lack of evidence destroys the theory of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the company of other women 2) Not adequate to explain the sudden termination of their marital relations 3) Testimony of the defendant correctly explained the theoryhe stated that on his return from an inspection of one his estates his wifes maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard, named ZABAL 4) She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon herthat same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her there 5) If The plaintiff is guilty the defendant has condoned the offenseno factual evidence on this claim PRINCIPLE: a) Law 6 , title 9 partida 4, the wife can defeat the husbands suit for divorce by proving that he has pardoned her but no laws in the partidas which say that the effect of the pardon would be so farreaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him in a case like this present one CONCLUSION: - Neither of the party is entitled to a divorceboth committed adultery - JUDGMENT REVERSED COOPER, J. DISSENTING - Immaterial which law governs , since under each causes for divorce are substantially the same, one of which is adultery - Higher court not to review the findings of the lower courtsmore competent since they have the witnesses - Condonation: offending party is restored to the same position he or she occupied before the offense was committed the only condition being that the offense must not be repeated - Not proper to say that just because plaintiff has once been guilty she would forever lose her right to a divorcemakes condonation conditionedparty granting it shall forever have the right to commit the same offense himself with impunity - Condoned offence not being sufficient as a cause for divorce, is not a bar to divorce in favor of the plaintiff condonation restores equality before the law 259
- The court has not only reversed the judgment of the trial court but has entered a judgment against the plaintiff - To deprive the plaintiff of the judgment which she has obtained and make a final determination of the case here without giving her an opportunity of correcting this error, if such exists, is inequitable and unjust 1. Separation in fact Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. (n) Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n) Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n) Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n) Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n) Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n) Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n) Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n) Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n) Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n) Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these rules. (n) Villanueva vs Chiong Facts: Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975 During their marriage, they acquired a certain lot at Dipolog City 260
In 1985, Florentino sold one-half of the western portion of this lot to petitioners, payable in installments He also allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build store, a shop and a house thereon After their last installment payment, December 1986, petitioners demanded from the respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor Elisera refused to sign the deed of sale July 5, 1991 - She filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title w/ Damages Feb 12, 1992 - Petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance w/ Damages The two cases were consolidated May 13, 1992 Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the petitioners July 19, 2000 RTC annulled the deed and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein o Florentino was ordered to return to the petitioners the consideration of the sale w/ interest CA affirmed the decision of the RTC Issue: 3. Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents 4. Was its sale by Florentino w/o Eliseras consent valid Held: The property is conjugal Under Article 178 of the CC, the separation in fact bet husband and wife w/o judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership Also, under Article 160 of the CC, all properties acquired by the spouses during marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife o Elisera presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot o Also, the spouses Chiong categorically declared in their Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property o The conjugal nature of the lot was also admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale The sale is not void ab inition but is viodable The husbands alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the FC is not viod, but merely viodable Applying Article 166 of the civil code, both Florentinos and Eliseras consent are needed for the sale of a conjugal property Since the sale was made w/o Eliseras consent, applying Article 173 of the Civil Code, Elisera can have the sale annulled during the marriage and w/in 10 years from the transaction questioned. Elisera timely questioned the sale Petitioner contend that assuming arguendo the property is still conjjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot o Lacks merit o Alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper o Restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into o Petitioners should give back the land w/ its fruits Respondents should return the payment 261
2. Agreements to separate NCC Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect: (1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife; Albano vs Gapusan FACTS: In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Barrio 6, Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. (He was admitted to the bar in 1937). ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Gapusan should be censured because of notarizing the void agreement between the spouses Albano. HELD: There is no question that the covenents contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs (Biton vs. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7). Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family, "Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution". "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the bases of human society throughout the civilized world (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864; Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168). To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during themarriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15). A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family (Selanova vs. Mendoza, Adm. Matter No. 804- CJ, May 19, 1975, 64 SCRA 69; Miranda vs. Fuentes, Adm. Case No. 241, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 802; Biton vs. Momongan, supra,, Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367; In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66; Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277). In re: Atty. Rufillo Bucana FACTS: February 26, 1976, Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo wrote to the Court that notary public, Rufillo D. Bucana that notarized on November 262
10, 1975 at Dumangas, Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them" and that the aforementioned Agreement was "entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose. March 23, 1976, Court Resolution asking respondent to show cause within 10 days of receipt April 21, 1976, he stated that the document was prepared by his clerk without his knowledge; that upon seeing it he recognized that it was immoral and nature and refused to notarized it; that he tried to contact the parties but to no avail; that he was planning on destroying the document; and he inadvertedly notarized it as it was not removed from his desk 3. Absolute divorce (a) Divorce under the Family Code Art. 26. (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Tenchavez v. Escano Nature Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu Facts Significant dates o February 24, 1948 Vicenta Escao (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register) o February 26, 1948 Mamerto Escano received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor and one Pacita Noel o June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged o June 24, 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years 263
ISSUE: WON the notary public should be reprimanded HELD: Defendant guilty of malpractice and suspended for six months. RATIO: As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We find, however, that the aforementioned document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his duties as notary public
o August 22, 1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character o October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute o 1951 Escaos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor o September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran o August 8, 1958 Vicenta acquired an American citizenship o July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escaos whom he charged for dissuading their daughter from him Falsely charged the Escaos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover damages The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of plaintiff from supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife Thus, this appeal citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law. o The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, and only provides for legal separation o Recognizing the foreign divorce decree would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state and would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
Van Dorn v Romillo Facts: 1973: Petitioner (Filipino) married respondent (American) in Hongkong and thereafter, begot two children. 1982: They were divorced in Navada and petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn. Jun 1983: Respondent filed a case against petitioner stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" 264
Issues Whether or not Vicentas divorce and second marriage is valid Held No. The marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino
Respondent says that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction, especially if it is contrary to public policy. Jan 1983: Erich (respondent) filed for a divorce in Germany, on that same month, Imelda (petitioner) filed a case for legal separation, support, and separation of property. Jan 1986: Divorce was granted Jun 1986: Respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983"
Issue: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal properties in the Philippines? Held: The divorce decree effectively divests the respondent the standing to sue in this case. o Pursuant to the respondents national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. He is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court and is thus estopped by his own representation (that they had no community property) before that Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. o It cannot be said that under our law, the petitioner is still married to respondent. She should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera Facts: Sept 7, 1979: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino) and Erich Ekkehard Geiling (German) were married in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Issue: WON the petitioner can still be sued for adultery by former spouse when a foreign divorce has already been obtained. Held: NO. Under the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. For the respondent to have standing to sue, he should still be the husband of the petitioner at the time the case was filed. The divorce obtained by respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany and its legal effects is recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. Thus the respondent is no longer the petitioners husband and cannot be the offended spouse contemplated in ART 344 of the RPC. Dacasin v Dacasin Facts Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994 They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995 265
In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to Sharon sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement Sharon undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts In 2004, Herald sued Sharon in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement Herald alleged that in violation of the Agreement, Sharon exercised sole custody over Stephanie Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree RTC held that (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction Held No. An alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad, even within the jurisdiction of this country. A foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, regardless of who obtained the divorce.
(b) Divorce under the Muslim Code Art. 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila); (c) Injurious assanilation of the wife by the husband (zihar); (d) Acts of imprecation (li'an); (e) Redemption by the wife (khul'); (f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwld); or (g) Judicial decree (faskh). Art. 46. Divorce by talaq. (1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during her nonmenstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiation made during one tuhr shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed 'idda. (2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall become irrevocable (Talaq bain sugra). 266
Issue WON Herald Dacasin can raise the invalidity of the divorce decree in order to give effect to the former spouses agreement on joint custody?
Art. 47. Divorce by Ila. Where a husband makes a vow to abstain from any carnal relations (ila) with his wife and keeps such ila for a period of not less than four months, she may be granted a decree of divorce by the court after due notice and hearing. Art. 48. Divorce by zihar. Where the husband has injuriously assimilated (zihar) his wife to any of his relatives within the prohibited degrees of marriage, they shall mutually refrain from having carnal relation until he shall have performed the prescribed expiation. The wife may ask the court to require her husband to perform the expiation or to pronounce the a regular talaq should he fail or refuse to do so, without prejudice to her right of seeking other appropriate remedies. Art. 49. Divorce by li'an. Where the husband accuses his wife in court of adultery, a decree of perpetual divorce may be granted by the court after due hearing and after the parties shall have performed the prescribed acts of imprecation (li'an). Art. 50. Divorce by khul'. The wife may, after having offered to return or renounce her dower or to pay any other lawful consideration for her release (khul') from the marriage bond, petition the court for divorce. The court shall, in meritorious cases and after fixing the consideration, issue the corresponding decree. Art. 51. Divorce by tafwid. If the husband has delegated (tafwid) to the wife the right to effect a talaq at the time of the celebration of the marriage or thereafter, she may repudiate the marriage and the repudiation would have the same effect as if it were pronounced by the husband himself. Art. 52. Divorce by faskh. The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh on any of the following grounds : (a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive months; (b) Conviction of the husband by final judgment sentencing him to imprisonment for at least one year; .chan robles virtual law library (c) Failure of the husband to perform for six months without reasonable cause his marital obligation in accordance with this code; (d) Impotency of the husband; (e) Insanity or affliction of the husband with an incurable disease which would make the continuance of the marriage relationship injurious to the family; (f)Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article; or (g) Any other cause recognized under Muslim law for the dissolution of marriage by faskh either at the instance of the wife or the proper wali..chan robles virtual law library Art. 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. A decree offaskh on the ground of unusual cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband: (a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not result in physical injury; (b) Associates with persons of ill-repute or leads an infamous life or attempts to force the wife to live an immoral life; (c) Compels her to dispose of her exclusive property or prevents her from exercising her legal rights over it; (d) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious practices; or (e) Does not treat her justly and equitably as enjoined by Islamic law. Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects: (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this Code; (b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance; (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of this code; 267
(d)The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been affected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation; .chan robles virtual law library (e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67; and (f) The conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated. Art. 55.Effects of other kinds of divorce. The provisions of the article immediately preceding shall apply to the dissolution, of marriage by ila, zihar, li'an and khul', subject to the effects of compliance with the requirements of the Islamic law relative to such divorces. B. Concept of legal separation, compare with NCC 97 NCC Art. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n) 1. Grounds for legal separation Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC March 4, 2003 RE: PROPOSED RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION RESOLUTION Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Legal Separation, the Court Resolved to APPROVED the same. The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003 March 4, 2003 Davide Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.Ynares-Santiago, on leave,Corona, officially on leave. RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for legal separation under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. Section 2. Petition. - (a) Who may and when to file. - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes: (a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed 268
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the Philippines; (h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent; (i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or (j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. (b) Contents and form. - The petition for legal separation shall: (1) Allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action. (2) State the names and ages of the common children of the parties, specify the regime governing their property relations, the properties involved, and creditors, if any. If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and other similar matters requiring urgent action, (3) Be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The verification and certification must be personally signed by the petitioner. No petition may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact. If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation, consul general, consul or viceconsul or consular agent in said country (4) Be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall, within five days from such filing, furnish a copy of the petition to the City or Provincial Prosecutor and the creditors, if any, and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period. Failure to comply with the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. (c) Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing "or in The case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. Section 3. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and by the following rules: (a) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such place as the court may order. In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on respondent at his last known address by registered mail or by any other means the court may deem sufficient. (b) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the following data; (1) title of the case; (2) docket number; (3) nature of the petition; (4) principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for, and (5) a directive for respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication. Section 4. Motion to Dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer. Section 5. Answer. - (a) The respondent shall file his answer within 269
fifteen days from receipt of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact. (b) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him in default. (c) Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does not tender an issue the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties. Section 6. Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. - (a) Within one one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (c) of the preceeding section, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court on whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies on the parties and their respective counsels, if any. (b) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that parties are in collusion,-it shall dismiss the petition. (c) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial. Section 7. Social Worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and to submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary, Section 8. Pre-trial. (a) Pre-trial mandatory.-A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties on a date not earlier than six months from date of the filing of the petition. (b) Notice of Pre-trial.-(1) The notice of pre-trial shall contain: (a) the date of pre-trial conference; and (b) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pretrial briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days before the date of pre-trial. (2) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial. (3) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address. Section 9. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following: (1) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed by law, indicating the desired terms thereof; (2) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and authorities; (3) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and legal issues; (4) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose thereof; (5) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and (6) Such other matters as the court may require. Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding section. Section 10. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (1) If the petitioner fails to appear personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court and 270
proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner. (2) If the respondent filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent and submit within fifteen days a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties/ If there is no collusion the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the.merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. Section 11. Pre-trial conference. - At the pre-trial conference, the court may refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by law. The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month. In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Section 12. Pre-trial order. - (a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination of the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and, except as to the ground of legal separation, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by the parties. (b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following: (1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section 13 of this Rule; (2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated; (3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be presented; (4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of affidavits; and (5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence. The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits. (c) The parties shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other than those stated in the pre-trial order. The order shall control the trial of the case unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. (d) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections or modifications. Section 13. Prohibited compromise. - The court shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters, such as the following: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation; (3) Any ground lor legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; and (6) Future legitime. Section 14. Trial. - (a) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses. (b) The grounds for legal separation must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (c) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the court determines 271
on the record othat requiring a party to testify in open court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the party's right to privacy; or would be offensive to decency (d) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of the court. Section 15. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda. Section 16. Decision. - (a) The court shall deny the petition on any of the following grounds: (1) The aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of or has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of; (2) There is connivance in the commission of the offense-or act constituting the ground for legal separation; (3) Both parties have given ground for legal separation; (4) There is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or (5) The action is barred by prescription. (b) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the Decree of Legal Separation shall be issued by the court only after full compliance with liquidation under the Family Code. However, in the absence of any property of.the parties, the court shall forthwith issue a Decree of Legal Separation which shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage was recorded and in the Civil Registry where the Family Court granting the legal separation is located. (c) The decision shall likewise declare that: (1) The spouses are entitled to live separately from each other but the marriage bond is not severed; (2) The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases; and (3) The offending spouse is disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession, and provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse are revoked by operation of law. (d) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall also be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. Section 17. Appeal. (a) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment. (b) Notice of Appeal - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon the adverse parties. Section 18. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, and support of minor children. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody and support of common children, under the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. 272
Section 19. Issuance of Decree of Legal Separation. - (a) The court shall issue the Decree of Legal Separation after: (1) registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition tor legal separation in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry where the Family Court is located; and (2) registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located. (b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition. Section 20. Registration and publication of the Decree of Legal Separation; decree as best evidence. (a) Registration of decree.-The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report to the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days iron receipt of the copy of the Decree. (b) Publication of decree.-- In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation. (c) Best evidence.-The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the legal separation of the parties and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent. Section 21. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a party dies at any stage of me proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the case closed and terminated without prejudice to the settlement of estate proper proceedings in the regular courts. (b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment, the same shall be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts. Section 22. Petition for revocation of donations. - (a) Within five (5) years from the date the decision granting the petition for legal separation has become final, the innocent spouse may file a petition under oath the same proceeding for legal separation to revoke the donations in favor of the offending spouse. (b)The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of Deeds in the places where the properties are located. (c)Alienations, liens, and encumbrances registered in good faith. before the recording of the petition for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. (d)After the issuance of the Decree of Legal Separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation or change shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insurer. Section 23. Decree of Reconciliation. - (a) If the spouses had reconciled, a joint manifestation under oath, duly signed by the spouses, may be filed in the same proceeding for legal separation. (b) If the reconciliation occurred while the proceeding for legal separation is pending, the court shall immediately issue an order terminating the proceeding. (c) If the reconciliation occurred after the rendition of the judgment granting the petition for legal separation but before the issuance of the Decree, the spouses shall express in their manifestation whether or not they agree to revive the former regime of their property relations or choose a new regime. The court shall immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that the legal separation proceeding is set aside and specifying the regime of property relations under which the spouses shall be covered. (d) If the spouses reconciled after the issuance of the Decree, the court, 273
upon proper motion, shall issue a decree of reconciliation declaring therein that the Decree is set aside but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected subsists, unless the spouses have agreed to revive their former regime of property relations or adopt a new regime. (e) In case of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d). if the reconciled spouses choose to adopt a regime of property relations different from that which they had prior to the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall comply with Section 24 hereof. (f) The decree of reconciliation shall be recorded in the Civil Registries where the marriage and the Decree had been registered. Section 24. Revival of property regime or adoption of another. (a) In case of reconciliation under Section 23, paragraph (c) above, the parties shall file a verified motion for revival of regime of property relations or the adoption of another regime of property relations in the same proceeding for legal separation attaching to said motion their agreement for the approval of the court. (b) The agreement which shall be verified shall specify the following: (1) The properties to be contributed to the restored or new regime; (2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses, and the amounts owing to each. (c) The creditors shall be furnished with copies of the motion and the agreement. (d) The court shall require the spouses to cause the publication of their verified motion for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. (e) After due hearing, and the court decides to grant the motion, it shall issue an order directing the parties to record the order in the proper registries of property within thirty days from receipt of a copy of the order and submit proof of compliance within the same period. Section 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15,2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003. (a) Sexual infidelity Art. 333. Who are guilty of adultery. Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree than that provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be imposed. Art. 334. Concubinage. Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. 274
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband. The enforcement of that obligation is a vital concern of the state that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is a calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of society. People vs Zapata Facts Andres Bondoc filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against his wife, Guadalupe Zapata, and her paramour, Dalamacio Bondoc for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse from 1946 to March 1947 (the date of the filing of the complaint), Dalmacio knowing his codefendant to be a married woman Guadalupe Zapata entered a guilty plea and was sentenced which penalty she served In the same court, Andres Bondoc filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948 (the date of the filing of the 2nd complaint) The defendants filed a motion to quash on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense Trial court quashed the 2nd complaint o Adulterous acts must be deemed one continuous offense o The acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope of the constitutional 275
Facts January 7, 1915 Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos-Rueda were married Immediately thereafter, they established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelina After a month of living together, defendant demanded that his wife perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. Petitioner continued to refuse to do any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Because of this, the defendant got exasperated and started maltreating his wife. Eloisa took refuge in her parents home and claimed for support from his husband. Defendants counsel argue that in a previous case (Don Ramon Benso) in Spain, the Spanish court had held that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode unless by a final judgment granting a divorce. And that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce and if the court lacks the power to decree a divorce, it also follows that it lacks the power to decree a divorce. Issue: WON the husband, considering his conduct towards his wife, be compelled to give support to the wife Held: Yes The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense Issues: WON the 2nd complaint should be quashed Held: No Two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the state for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. And for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting a crime. The concept of continuous crime does not apply in this case because the last unity does not exist; culprits perpetrating the crime in every sexual intercourse. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the 1st complaint and for which the 2nd complaint was filed o In continuous crime, there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim nd The 2 complaint does not constitute a violation of double jeopardy clause in the constitution Because assuming that the husband should pardon his adulterous wife exempting her from the complaint, it however does not apply to subsequent adulterous acts Gandionco vs Penaranda Facts May 29, 1986 Teresita Gandionco filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages (civil case) October 13, 1986 Teresita also filed with the MTC General Santos City a complaint against Froilan for concubinage (criminal case) November 14, 1986 application for provisional remedy of support pendente lite was filed by Teresita in the civil case December 10, 1986 Judge ordered the payment of support pendente lite Froilan contends that civil action for legal separation and the application for support pendente lite should be suspended in view of the pending criminal case filed against him (Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure: After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal procedure has been rendered) o He contends that decision in Jerusalem v Zurbano applies Issues: WON the civil case should be suspended in view of the pending criminal case WON Froilans conviction for concubinage will have to be secured first before the action for legal separation can prosper, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage 276
WON support pendente lite can be granted by the judge Held: No. Jerusalem v Zurbano relied only on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of court on criminal procedure: After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal procedure has been rendered o Such did not clearly state, as the 1985 rules do, that the civil action to be suspended is one which is to enforce civil liability arising from the offense o In other words, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense o Section 1, Rule 111 (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged o Whereas the old Sec. 1, Rule 107 simply referred to civil action arising from the offense No. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary Yes. Support pendente lite as a remedy can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge o Judge cant be disqualified from the case on the ground of divergence of opinion with a partys counsel as regards to applicable laws and jurisprudence considering that, in this case, judges disposition of petitioners motion are sound and well-taken Ong vs Ong Facts July 13, 1975 Ong Eng Kiam/ William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married They have 3 children Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation (Art. 55 par. 1 of the FC) before the RTC on the grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation, and grossly abusive conduct of his husband towards her o After 3 years of marriage, she and William quarrelled almost every day with physical violence, shouting invectives at her (putang ina mo, gago, tanga, etc.) o William would also scold and beat the children o December 14, 1995 she asked William to bring Kingston (one of their children) back from Bacolod but a violent quarrel between them ensued; William hit her and pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house o She went to her sisters house in Binondo and was fetched by her other siblings and brought to her parents house in Dagupan o Dr. Vicente Elizano treated her injuries William denied her allegations January 5, 1998 RTC decreed legal separation William appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision contending that the gross conduct against Lucita was adequately proven o The straightforward and candid testimonials of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible 277
o Dr. Elizanos testimony confirmed the injuries established by Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim o The medical certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctors testimony He filed for MR but was denied; hence, this petition Issues: WON Williams gross conduct against Lucita was adequately proven Held: Yes, petition is dened To the testimonies of Lucita et al, all William and his witnesses could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the incidents While William contends that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her, the court said that relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label witnesses testimony as biased and unworthy of credence The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child abuser does not elicit sympathy from the court because he gave Lucita enough reason to go to court in the first place And finally, the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56 par 4 of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation, is unacceptable o Such abandonment refers to those without justifiable cause for more than one year (b) Drug Addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism, or homosexuality (c) Attempt on the life of the other spouse (d) Abadonment Art 101 (3). A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (e) Other grounds 2. Who can ask for legal separation NCC Art. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710) 3. When petition may be filed Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102) Art. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. (4a, Act 2710)
Facts August 18, 1953 Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on the ground of his cohabitation with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 and that the defendant be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defences and counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his 278
Lapuz vs Eufemio
marriage with Carmen Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok May 31, 1969 Carmen died in a vehicular accident before the trial could be completed June 9, 1969 Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation for it was filed beyond the one year period provided in Art. 102 of the CC and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation Issues: WON Carmens death before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? Held: Yes An action for legal separation is purely personal thus, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself In terms of property rights involved in an action for legal separation abated by the death of the plaintiff, these rights are mere effects of a decree of legal separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree, such rights do not come into existence o Property rights could be resolved in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by heirs of the appellant Petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio by Eufemio is rendered moot and academic upon the death of Carmen Matubis vs Parexedes Facts: Socorro Matubis, plaintiff, and Zoilo Praxedes, defendant, married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, CamSur They separated on May 30, 1944 On April 3, 1948, they entered into an agreement which states that they are allowing each other to live w/ other people w/o interference from each other, that they will not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any crime arising from their separation; that they are no longer entitled to support or benefits from each other; and that they cannot claim anything from each other starting their separation January 1955 Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado September 1, 1955 Asuncion gave birth to her child w/ defendant April 24, 1956 Socorro filed a complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname against her husband CFI: o The acts of the defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation o But it dismissed the case since Art 102 of the New Civil Code states than an action for legal separation cannot be filed except w/in one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and w/in five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. Socorro learned of Zoilos and Asuncions affair in January 1955, the complaint was filed April 24, 1956 It was filed out of time and for that reason the action is barred Art 100 on the other hand, states that a legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or consubinage The agreement Socorro entered with Zoilo expresses her consent to the commission of concubinage Issue: WON the CFI erred in dismissing the case Held: NO 279
The complaint is indeed filed out of time Since Socorro condoned and consented to the concubinage, she is now undeserving of the courts sympathy The decision of the CFI is affirmed CA affirmed the dismissal holding that there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription Background: o April 1938 the spouses got married and had children who are now living with Ocampo o March 1951 Jose discovered that Serafina was having an affair with Jose Arcalas o He sent her to Manila in June 1951to study beauty culture o Again, Ocampo discovered she had affairs w/ several other men while in the city o June 1952 she finished studying and left Ocampo o o They lived separately since then o June 28, 1955 Ocampo caught his wife with Nelson Orzame (I think he caught them in the act. Kawawang guy. Why is his wife so malandi?) o Luis told her of his intention to file for legal separation to w/c Serafina agreed to provided she is not charged w/ adultery in a criminal case The defendant did not answer the petition and upon investigation, the court did not find collusion between the parties So, the defendant was defaulted and Luis presented his evidence (testimonies from several people) Issue: WON there was condonation or consent to the adultery and a confession of judgment Held: NO CA held that the husbands right to legal separation on account of the defendants adultery w/ Jose Arcalas has prescribed 280
4. Court procedure on legal separation Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103) Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n) Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a) RA 9262 Sec. 19. Legal Separation Cases. In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act. Araneta vs Concepcion (see digest below) Ocampo vs Florenciano Facts: July 5, 1955 Jose de Ocampo filed for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife, Serafina Florenciano CFI of Nueva Ecija dismissed it
SC agrees w/ this, the complaint was filed beyond the one year period CA found that upon discovering defendant w/ another man, Luis signified his intent of filing for legal separation w/c Serafina agreed to. Upon questioning by the Fiscal, Serafina reiterated her conformity to the legal separation and admitted she had an affair Orzame o CA interpreted this as a confession of judgment and under Art 101, legal separation could not be decreed SC: o Confession of judgment happens when defendant appears in court and confesses the right of the plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to plaintiffs demand o This is not what happened w/ Serafina o However, if, indeed, this is what happened in this case, as long as there is evidence of adultery aside from the statement of Serafina, the decree may and should be granted since it wont be based on the confession but on evidence presented by petitioner o What the law prohibits is a judgment based solely on the defendants confession. If a confession defeats the action , ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment purposely to prevent it o Even if Serafina told the Fiscal that she also liked to be legally separated from Luis, this does not present an obstacle to the successful prosecution of the case o There is no collusion bet the parties Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement bet spouses for one of them to commit or to pretend to commit or to be represented in court as having committed a matrimonial offense or to suppress evidence of a valid defense to enable the other to obtain divorce So, there would be collusion if the parties pretended there was adultery even if there wasnt just so they could be legally separated Here, adultery was really committed and just because Serafina admits the allegations doesnt mean theres collusion Also, the desire for divorce and refusal to defend oneself does not also mean collusion o Luis failure to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relationship o It was not his duty to search for her. She was the one who left, it was her obligation to return (bongga ni Luis!) o SC REVERSED the appealed decision and DECREED a legal separation bet the parties Lapuz vs Eufemio(see digest above) Samosa vs Vamenta This ones the same with the Araneta case Facts: June 18, 1971 Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation on the grounds of concubinage and an attempt against her life against her husband, Clemente Ramos in the sala of Judge Vamenta She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property w/c was then under the administration and management of Clemente 281
July 3, 1971 - Clemente opposed the hearing for the preliminary injunction based on Art 103 In a pleading on July 16, 1971, he alleged that hearing that motion will cause the prospect of reconciliation even dimmer September 3, 1971, Lucy received an order dated August 4, 1971 granting Clementes motion to suspend the hearing Issue: WON Art 103 of the Civil Code w/c prohibits the hearing of a petition for legal separation before the lapse of 6 months from the filing of petition would also prohibit the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as ancillary remedy to such suit Held: NO The law sees marriage as an inviolable institution, that is why it does everything to preserve it. So, in separation cases, the law mandates a 6-month period before the case is heard for, hopefully, a reconciliation bet the parties However, the law also states: o After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court. o This appears to recognize that the issue of the management of property even during the six monthperiod should be resolved o Therefore, the petitioners motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court especially since the husband whom she is accusing of concubinage and an attempt against her life is the person managing what she claims as her paraphernal property However, the 6-month period has already elapsed. All the more reason for the judge to act on the motion of the petitioner Plea for certiorari of petitioner is GRANTED and the order of the judge suspending the hearing on the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction is SET ASIDE. The court is directed to proceed w/o delay the motion Requirements for Legal Separation (I dont know if I should include this. But since this is still part of the case, Ill include it na lang. hehehe) Legal separation that state of marriage w/c permits the separation of husband and wife from bed and board, otherwise known as a mensa et thoro. - Distinguished from absolute divorce in that in absolute divorce the bonds of marriage are dissolved - Also known as relative divorce - Introduced in the Phil by the Siete Partidas during the Spanish regime - During the Ame regime, provisions of the Siete Partidas were repealed by the provision that instituted absolute divorce - In the New Civil Code, relative divorce was reestablished under the name Legal Separation o Does not admit absolute divorce quo ad vinculo matrimonii and does not even use the term o Only provides for legal separation, expressly prescribing that the marriage bonds still exists - An action for legal separation is purely personal o Only innocent spouses are allowed to claim legal separation (art 100) 282
o Spouses can, by reconciliation, top or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered (Art 108) o It follows then that the death of one of the parties to the action causes the death of the action itself (Actio personalis moritur cum persona) Grounds for Legal Separation 1. Adultery or concubinage of spouse o adultery act of a wife in having sexual intercourse with any other man not her husband o concubinage the act of a husband in maintaining a mistress in the conjugal dwelling (so, its ok if the mistress is in another house?!?!?!?!), in having sexual intercourse with another woman under scandalous circumstances (so, if they do it in a secret place, which Im sure they will, the wife does not have ground for legal separation?!?!) or in cohabiting with another woman as husband and wife in any other place (so, the guy could have sex w/ everybody he sees, but as long as he doesnt live with any of them, its not concubinage?!?! This is so sexist!&^%###@) 2. Attempt of spouse on the life of the other o this should be taken to mean attempted or frustrated parricide o according to Senator Tolentino, a mere inflection of physical injuries w/o intent to kill is not sufficient to constitute an attempt by the spouses against the life of the other o this is basically saying that as long as your husband doesnt want to kill you, its ok if he beats you to a pulp. This is stupid. Procedural Requirements 1. Judicial satisfaction that reconciliation is highly improbable o The court is mandated to take steps towards reconciliation of the spouses and to proceed with the case only if such is highly improbable o Supposedly, when people understand that they must live together, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they can not shake off and they become good husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives (more like, they make each others lives more miserable until one decides to commit suicide or parricide. Saang lupalop ba ng mundo nakatira ang mga justices?) 2. Time element involved o no person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Phil for 1 year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for legal separation has taken place w/in the territory of the Phil o where the cause of action has taken place w/in the Phil or the parties are residents of the country, the suit for legal separation should be filed by the innocent spouse w/in 1 year from and after the date on w/c he became cognizant of the cause and w/in 5 years from and after the date when such cause of action occurred in the computation of the 1 year period, the computation should be counted not from the time the spouse received hearsay info about the husbands infidelity but from the time the innocent spouse obtained personal knowledge of such infidelity 283
o an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition cooling off period in the hope that the parties will reconcile (as if) however, this provision does not bar other issues from being heard: custody of children alimony and support pendente lite provisions on injunction to restrain the spouse from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding Pacete vs Cariaga (see digest below) 5. Effect of pendency of petition (a) Cooling off period FC 58 (b) Right of Consortium Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. (c) administration of property Art. 61 (2). The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a) De la Vina vs Villareal Original action in the SC. This is a petition to declare that Judge Villareal has no jurisdiction (CFI) to try the divorce case filed by Narcisa Geopano against Diego de la Vina, that the Judge exceeded his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction gainst Diego prohibiting him from alienating any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the divorce case and that the proceedings were null and void. Facts: She alleges that she was a resident of Iloilo and he was a resident of Oriental Negros, she was the legitimate wife (marriage 1888), they lived as husband and wife and had nine children (3 are still living and of age), they acquired properties (he is the administrator, he has been committing adultery since 1913 with Ana Caloz, he ejected her in their conjugal home for which she moved to her parentshouse in Iloilo and he never supported her and her children. With all these, she prays for a divorce decree, partition of conjugal property and alimony pendent lite (while the litigation is pending). Plus a preliminary injunction restraining and prohibiting him in the premises. CFI granted the preliminary injunction petition. Issues: May a married woman ever acquire a residence/domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of their marriage? May the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining him from alienating any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the case? Held: The rule that the husband and wife should have same residence is not an absolute rule. The exceptions include: the unity of the marriage is dissolved (divorced/in divorce case), husband gave the cause for divorce or ejected the wife from the house, there is an agreement to separate, wife is battered wife and forfeiture of the wife. That rule does not oust the court from having its jurisdiction over the case. CFI has jurisdiction. When that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is just 284
and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned. The wife may obtain preliminary injunction against her husband during an action for divorce. Ratio: Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it: 1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually; 2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; 3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Sabalones vs CA Petition for review on decision of CA granting the preliminary injunction. Facts: Samson Sabalones left his wife, Remedios Gaviola Sabalones, the administration of their conjugal properties for 15 yrs during his fulfilment of his duties as a diplomat. When he retired in 1985, he went back to the Philippines but not to their conjugal house. Four yrs later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership. (Hes 68 y/o at this time, very sick and living w/o income and hell use the money hell get for his hospitalization and medical treatment). She filed a counterclaim for legal separation and claimed that the house in Greenhills is where she and her children live and they depend for support in the building and lot rentals in Forbes Park. He also argued that he never returned to their house and instead, live with Thelma Curameng and their 3 children. RTC granted the legal separation (due to his bigamy), which forfeited his share therefore, he is not entitled for support from the properties. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Issue: WON preliminary injunction is validly issued. Held: Petition has no merit. Injunction GRANTED. The injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code. Ratio: The designation for the administration of the properties is implicitly provided to maintain the status quo.Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. 285
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. The injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. (d) Support and custody pendente lite Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a) Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) Yangco vs Rhode Original petition for a writ of mandamus. Demurrer to petition. Facts: Victoria Obin petitioned that she be declared the lawful wife and she be granted divorce, alimony and attorneys fees. William Rohde, on the other hand, argued that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, facts presented by her does not prove cause of action Issue: Can she avail of the alimony? Held: This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse, and sues for divorce or separation. 286
The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter. Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy upon the facts related. he motion and demurrer are overruled and the defendant is authorized to answer the complaint within twenty days from this date. Ratio: She needs to prove the relationship they had to prove that she has the right for alimony from William (present the canonical certificate). According to article 143 of Civil Code, the right to support is granted to: the spouses inter se, the legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se to parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children, to other illegitimate children and to brothers and sisters. Araneta vs Concepcion and Araneta Petitioner: Husband, Respondent: Wife Facts: Husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery Wife filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their 3 minor children and support among others Husband opposed this petition saying that in order to determine the custody and support of children, the parties must be required to admit evidence o Contends that: wife is not entitled to the custody of the children and support because of abandonment and adultery/infidelity and that there are no conjugal assets. That she is unfit to educate their children because of her emotional instability. Court granted the custody of the children and support to the wife Husband filed an MR but was refused by the court thus this petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit evidence with regards to the custody and support Judge invoked Art. 108 of Civil Code saying that: An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. o Provision of the code is mandatory. Admitting evidence be it on the merits or incidental to the case is prohibited and would only make reconciliation of the parties difficult if not impossible. The custody of the children must be given to the mother since family tradition and custom says so. o The court must ignore that the wife had committed adultery and restore the status quo of the family 6 months had already elapsed since the filing of the petition but court said lets still decide so that the scope of that article may be explained.
Issue: Is the 6 month period contemplated in Art 108 of the CC bars the presentation of evidence in a case for child custody and support? Held. No. That 6 month period was intended to be a cooling-off period to make reconciliation between spouses possible. But, this does not override the other provisions such as those on custody and alimony and support pendente lite. Law expressly says that this should be determined according to the circumstances. If these are ignored, injustice may be caused. 287
o Why ignore the claim of adultery by the wife when there is circumstancial evidence to that effect? Or assume that the childrens custody be given to the mother and that she still lives in the conjugal house when the husband actually claims that she has abandoned them? The rule is that all provisions of the law must be given effect or reconciled even if they seem contradictory. Thus the evidence must be admitted for the determination of the custody of the children and support as long as it does not violate the coolingoff period Ramos vs Vamenta Facts: 18 Jun 1971: Wife filed a case for legal separation against he husband Clemente Ramos on the grounds of concubinage and further asserting that he had attempted to kill her. o Writ of mandatory preliminary injunction: to return to her what she claims to be her paraphernal and exclusive property The husband opposed saying that if the motion for preliminary injunction was heard then the prospect for reconciliation between him and his wife would become even more dim (Art 103 of CC cited in the previous case) 3 Sept 1971: an order dated 4 Aug 1971 was received by the husband granting his motion to suspend the hearing of the petition for the writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Thus this petition for certiorari. Issue: Does Art 103 of the Civil Code bar the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the 6-month period? Held: No. The staLte gives so much effort in keeping families in tact but there are cases where spouses are better off apart such as where there is adultery/concubinage etc, thats why there is legal separation in our laws. But also, the state does not abandon the hope that there might still be reconciliation between the spouses thus the 6-month period in Art 103 of the CC. Because of Art 103, the court must let the parties alone for 6 mos. There is therefore a plausibility to the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as in this case not be acted on. But there is also some sort of recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved during that 6month period. This is embodied in the article that says: after the filing of petition for legal separation The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property Therefore the absolute limitation in Art 103 is eased. There is now justification for the insistence of the wife that her motion for preliminary injunction be heard. All the more reason for the court to hear the motion because of concubinage and threat on her life. Plus they cited Araneta with regards to presenting evidence. But 6 months already elapsed. (HAHAHAHA) Lerma vs CA Petitioner Lerma: Husband, Respondent Diaz: Wife Facts: 19 May 1951: Lerma and Diaz were married 22 Aug 1969: Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against respondent and Teodoro Ramirez 18 Nov 1969: Respondent filed for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children 2 and support, 288
with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory. GROUNDS: Concubinage and Attempt against her life. Petitioner opposed. DEFENSE: adultery charge then pending. 24 Dec 1969: Lower court granted respondent's application for support pendente lite 12 Mar 1970: Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner was heard but was eventually dismissed on January 20, 1971. Thus this petition. Procedural law on support pendente lite is Rule 61 Sec 5. The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as equity and justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the questions involved. ... Petitioner said that the lower court ignored that provision when it made the assailed decision. Because of this he was deprived of the opportunity to present the evidence supporting his claim on the respondents adultery in the case for support pendente lite. But the issue on whether the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence on his wifes adultery is already moot. Because on Sept 26, 1972 the CFI of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and co-accused guilty of charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. This the respondent did not deny. Issue: Assuming that it had not become academic, would adultery be a good defense against the respondents claim for support pendente lite? Held: Yes. In Quintana v. Lerma, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Sanchez v. Zulueta, and Mangoma v. Macadaeg, et al. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..." and Section 5 of Rule 61, requires that when support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine provisionally "the probable outcome of the case. The probable failure of the respondent's suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First Instance. so If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite, The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. but under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite. (Guys, the argument here is a bit complicated. Just take note that those with the same bullets follow the same train of thought ) Facts: Pacete vs Carriaga Jr. 289
30 Apr 1938: Enrico Pacete married Concepcion Alanis. This marriage was bore a child named Consuelo 11 Mar 1943: He contracted another marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion. 29 Oct 1979: Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Enrico and Clarita, legal separation and separation of properties. Petitioner alleges that she only learned of the marriage in 1979 and that during their marriage, the respondent had acquired vast property that he had named under his, Claritas, their childrens and other dummies names. The defendants were issued summons (15 Nov 79) but they filed for a motion for extension within which to file an answer which was granted. Upon the expiration of the extension and with a new counsel, defendants again sought for a 30-day extension (18 Dec 79) but was only granted 20 days. Likely unaware of the order, the defendants again filed a motion for extension (18 Jan 80) to be counted from the expiration of the 30-day extension but this was denied by the court. Plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default: GRANTED. Evidence was presented to the court in Feb 1980. Lower court granted the petition of Alanis Thus this petition for certiorari for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation; FC Art 58 and NCC Art 103 providing for the cooling off period; and Rule 18 of the ROC recognizing the significance of the provisions mentioned earlier. With this, it is clear that the State loosens its rules on special proscriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriages in jeopardy. Petitioners case is for legal separation, that other remedies were sought in the same action CANNOT dispense nor excuse compliance with the statutory requirements earlier mentioned.
6. Defenses in actions for legal separation FC. Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: 1. Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of; 2. Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of; 3. Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation; 4. Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; 5. Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or 6. Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a) a. Consent FC 56(2) see above for provision CC 100 (repealed) The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery 290
Issue: Whether the CFI of Cotabato gravely abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion for extension of the time with which they were to file their answer and in declaring them in default. Held: First, the case that should have been filed is an appeal from judgment by default or petition for relief from judgment. But because this is an unusual situation, court decided to loosen up the rules. Yes Because of the presence of FC Art 60 and NCC Art 101 calling
or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. Matubis vs Parexedes Facts: Socorro Matubis, plaintiff, and Zoilo Praxedes, defendant, married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, CamSur They separated on May 30, 1944 On April 3, 1948, they entered into an agreement which states that they are allowing each other to live w/ other people w/o interference from each other, that they will not prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage or any crime arising from their separation; that they are no longer entitled to support or benefits from each other; and that they cannot claim anything from each other starting their separation January 1955 Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado September 1, 1955 Asuncion gave birth to her child w/ defendant April 24, 1956 Socorro filed a complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname against her husband CFI: o The acts of the defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation o But it dismissed the case since Art 102 of the New Civil Code states than an action for legal separation cannot be filed except w/in one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and w/in five years from and after the date when the cause occurred. Socorro learned of Zoilos and Asuncions affair in January 1955, the complaint was filed April 24, 1956 It was filed out of time and for that reason the action is barred Art 100 on the other hand, states that a legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage The agreement Socorro entered with Zoilo expresses her consent to the commission of concubinage Issue: WON the CFI erred in dismissing the case Held: NO The complaint is indeed filed out of time Since Socorro condoned and consented to the concubinage, she is now undeserving of the courts sympathy The decision of the CFI is affirmed People vs. Sansano (we couldnt find this case. Im just gonna write here my notes from maams discussion) NOTES: Wife lived with another man Afterwards, husband went to Hawaii for seven years He came back and filed for adultery Denied because his leaving afterwards and not filing a complaint then and there is implied consent People vs. Schneckenburger Facts: March 16, 1926 Rodolfo Schneckenburger (accused) married Elena Ramirez Cartagena (complainant) After 7 years of marriage, they agreed to separate due to incompatibility of character 291
May 25, 1935 they executed an agreement (in Spanish) which basically states that they agree to live separately and to let each other do whatever they want w/o interference from one another June 15, 1935 accused secured a decree divorce from Mexico May 11, 1936 accused married Julia Medel and lived together as husband and wife Because of the nullity of divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, Elena filed 2 complaints against Rodolfo: o Bigamy o Concubinage In bigamy, Rodolfo was convicted and sentenced to prison During proceedings for concubinage, accused interposed plea of double jeopardy and the case was dismissed The fiscal appealed and SC held that the dismissal before trial is premature and remanded the case to lower court Rodolfo was convicted of concubinage Rodolfo appealed Issues: 1. WON accused is in double jeopardy 2. WON accused is guilty of concubinage Held: 1. NO Bigamy and concubinage are two distinct offenses o Bigamy is marrying again while the first marriage still subsists An offense against civil status w/c may be prosecuted at the instance of the state o Concubinage is mere cohabitation by the husband w/ a woman who is not his wife An offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party On the matter of double jeopardy, the test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense NO The agreement w/c the spouses entered into wherein they agreed to live separately and let each other do whatever they want w/o interference, although illegal, constitutes a valid consent to the act of concubinage Consent bars the offended party from instituting a criminal procedure in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and act of lasciviousness Difference between pardon and consent o Pardon refers to the offense after its commission o Consent refer to the offense prior to its commission Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense Judgment is REVERSED and accused is ACQUITTED
2.
NOTES: The consent was valid to concubinage, a private offense, but not to bigamy which is a public offense b. Condonation FC 56(1) see page 1 for provision
Bugayong vs. Ginez Facts: August 27, 1949 - Benjamin Bugayong (plaintiff), a serviceman in the US Navy, married Leonila Ginez 292
The two lived together for a while w/ Bens sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila Before Ben left for work, the spouses agreed that Leonila will stay w/ his sisters July 1951 Leonila left the house of Bens sisters and lived w/ her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan and later moved to Dagupan to study o Ben began receiving letters from his sister-in-law, Valeria Polangco, and some from anonymous writers informing him of his wifes infidelity o Ben also said that he received a letter from Leonila informing him that a certain Eliong kissed her October 1951 he seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain if he could file for legal separation on the grounds of infidelity o Chaplain directed him to the navy legal department August 1952 Ben went to Asingan and looked for his wife whom he met at her godmothers house The two went to Pedro Bugayongs (Bens cousin) house where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife (in short, they had sex) Then, they went to Bens house and passed the night as husband and wife (sex again) On the 2nd day, Ben asked wife about her infidelity but instead of answering, she packed up and left w/c he took to mean she is guilty November 18, 1952 Ben filed a complaint for legal separation o Leonila denies all allegations in her answer June 9, 1953 hearing of the case where only Ben was able to testify because defendants counsel orally moved for dismissal of complaint because: o The cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations o The acts charged have been condoned by the husband o Complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for the court to render valid judgment The court dismissed the complaint based on the issue of condonation Ben appealed to CA o Trial court erred in prematurely dismissing the case o Erred in finding there was condonation on his part o In entertaining condonation as ground for dismissal CA raised the case to SC bec the questions raised were questions of law Issue: WON Ben condoned Leonilas infidelity (assuming she did commit such act) Held: YES Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouviers Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed Defendant vehemently denies all allegations Ben was the only one who testified and was not able to produce the letter he allegedly received informing him of his wifes infidelity SC based its decision on US decisions since there is no precedent in the Phil: o Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness. (Shackleton vs. Shackleton) o Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense; and also that he shall thereafter 293
treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may be expressed or implied. (Tiffanys Domestic and Family Relations, section 107) The conduct of the husband despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and w/ the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L.J. Prob. 73) Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation. (27 C.J.S., section 6-d) Order appealed from is AFFIRMED adulterous relationship w/ Carlos Field w/ whom she has a daughter o That he only learned about this in 1945 upon his release o Afterwards, they lived separately and executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to Juanita as her share o Prayed for: the confirmation of the liquidation agreement Custody of their children Defendant declared disqualified to succeed him For other just and equitable remedy CFI declared wife in default for failing to answer the complaint in time despite being served summons and declared the City Fiscal to investigate and make sure that no collusion exists between the parties and to report his investigation after 15 days and to intervene in the case in behalf of the State During Fiscals investigation, he found out that Ben cohabited w/ another woman and had children w/ her CFI denied petition for legal separation because Brown is also guilty of the misconduct similar in nature to that of his wifes adultery, that there had been consent and connivance, and that Browns action had prescribed since he learned of his wifes infidelity in 1945 but filed a complaint in 1955 Issue: WON the Fiscal actually acted as counsel for the defendant and not of the State WON Browns action is barred by prescription WON legal separation should be decreed Held: NO o To make sure there is no collusion between the parties whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense or by failure in pursuance of an 294
NOTES: Kissing somebody does not constitute an adulterous act Sleeping w/ the guilty spouse is condonation (so, dont sleep w/ her/him and dont even stay w/ her/him in the same house!!!!!) Voluntary sexual intercourse is equal to forgiveness c. Recrimination FC 56(4) see page 1 for provision Brown vs. Yambao Facts: July 14, 1955 William Brown filed for legal separation against his wife, Juanita Yambao o Alleged that while he was interned by the Japanese invaders from 1942-1945 at UST, his wife engaged in
agreement to defend divorce proceedings, it is legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wifes default was calculated or agreed upon to enable husband to obtain legal separation o One such circumstance is the fact of Browns cohabitation w/ another woman o The policy of calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation is to emphasize that marriage is not a mere contract o The inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not YES o He filed for legal separation 10 years after he learned of the adultery o The law states that an action for legal separation can not be filed except w/in one year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and w/in 5 years from and after the date when such cause occurred NO o Both parties are guilty Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED Arroyo vs. CA Facts: Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri (petitioner) and Eduardo Arroyo (petitioner also) committed on November 2, 1982 Defendants pleaded not guilty RTC convicted Neri and Arroyo of adultery Backstory of adultery: o November 2, 1982 Neri w/ Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabuan went to Baguio o They went to the Neri spouses condo where Arroyo went to thereafter o Upon arriving, Arroyo went to the masters bedroom where Neri and Sare where o Sare left Neri and Arroyo in the room o After 45 mins, Arroyo came out of the room and told Sare she could go back inside o In his testimony, Dr. Neri also said that he caught Neri looking at photos and she seemed guilty after being caught o Because of her unusual behavior, he looked around their room and found in the dressing rooms a Kodak envelope w/ film negatives w/c turned out to be pictures of his wife and Arroyo in intimate bedroom poses (3 of w/c showed them half naked) o That upon confrontation, Neri confessed to having an affair w/ Arroyo Arroyo filed an MR Neri also filed an MR or a new trial contending that her husband has pardoned her and that he has contracted marriage w/ another woman w/ whom he is presently cohabiting Petitioners filed for several petitions (review, MR) August 26, 1991 Dr. Neri filed a manifestation praying that the case be dismissed as he had tacitly consented to his wifes infidelity Petitioners then filed their respective motions for dismissal or for a new trial using as basis Dr. Neris manifestation
Issues: 1. WON Dr. Neris affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his credibility 295
2. WON Neris constitutional rights against self-incrimination has been violated 3. WON Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto 4. WON Dr. Neris manifestation is sufficient for granting new trial Held: 1. NO Trial courts conclusions on the credibility of the witnesses are generally not disturbed since the questions before the Court is limited to questions of law The conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given considerable weight The claim that Dr. Neris testimony is incredible is unavailing at this stage Plus, the Court does not believe that such an admission by an unfaithful wife was inherently improbable or impossible 2. NO This would have been committed if Neris confession was gotten through investigation by an investigating officer w/o her counsel being present Dr. Neri is not an investigating officer His testimony about Neris confession is admissible to court 3. NO For this contention, petitioner relies on the Guinucud case However, this case does not refer to pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal proceedings; the husband entered into an agreement w/ the wife that they are going to live separately and marry other persons In the present case, the spouses did not enter into an agreement that they are allowing each other to marry or cohabit w/ other persons Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after discovering the illicit affair Concept of pari delicto applies to contracts w/ illegal consideration Dr. Neris manifestation wherein he stated that he tacitly consented to his wifes infidelity is an attempted recantation of his testimony however, not all recantations should result in granting a new trial The Court doubts the truthfulness and reliability of the belated recantation since there were 2 previous occasions where Dr. Neri could have made the claims contained in his manifestation: o In the compromise agreement o His affidavit These 2 docs merely stated that he pardoned petitioners and that the complaint was filed out of pure misunderstanding but did not hint that he already knew of the adulterous relationship beforehand 4. NO Dr. Neris affidavit of desistance did not operate as a pardon thereby meriting a new trial For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint While the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted w/o the offended spouses complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor Enforcement of law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse 296
Such enforcement relates, more importantly to the protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of w/c the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind MR is DENIED and denial is FINAL Petition for REVIEW is also DENIED DOJ is directed to inquire into the possible liability of Dr. Neri for perjury NOTES: Husband filed adultery against wife as soon as he discovered it He started living w/ another woman and desisted from the case Wife was still convicted o Husband did not give consent to the adultery o In fact, he filed a case right after discovery o Court did not believe his recantation d. Collusion/Mutual Consent FC 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a) FC 56(3), (5) see page 1 for provision CC 101 No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. (n) CC 221 (3) The following shall be void and of no effect: (3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage; Brown vs. Yambao (see above digest) Ocampo vs. Florenciano Facts: July 5, 1955 Jose de Ocampo filed for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife, Serafina Florenciano CFI of Nueva Ecija dismissed it CA affirmed the dismissal holding that there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription Background: o April 1938 the spouses got married and had children who are now living with Ocampo o March 1951 Jose discovered that Serafina was having an affair with Jose Arcalas o He sent her to Manila in June 1951to study beauty culture o Again, Ocampo discovered she had affairs w/ several other men while in the city o June 1952 she finished studying and left Ocampo o o They lived separately since then o June 28, 1955 Ocampo caught his wife with Nelson Orzame (I think he caught them in the act. Kawawang guy. Why is his wife so malandi?) o Luis told her of his intention to file for legal separation to w/c Serafina agreed to provided she is not charged w/ adultery in a criminal case 297
The defendant did not answer the petition and upon investigation, the court did not find collusion between the parties So, the defendant was defaulted and Luis presented his evidence (testimonies from several people) Issue: WON there was condonation or consent to the adultery and a confession of judgment Held: NO CA held that the husbands right to legal separation on account of the defendants adultery w/ Jose Arcalas has prescribed SC agrees w/ this, the complaint was filed beyond the one year period CA found that upon discovering defendant w/ another man, Luis signified his intent of filing for legal separation w/c Serafina agreed to. Upon questioning by the Fiscal, Serafina reiterated her conformity to the legal separation and admitted she had an affair Orzame o CA interpreted this as a confession of judgment and under Art 101, legal separation could not be decreed SC: o Confession of judgment happens when defendant appears in court and confesses the right of the plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to plaintiffs demand o This is not what happened w/ Serafina o However, if, indeed, this is what happened in this case, as long as there is evidence of adultery aside from the statement of Serafina, the decree may and should be granted since it wont be based on the confession but on evidence presented by petitioner o What the law prohibits is a judgment based solely on the defendants confession. If a confession defeats the action , ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment purposely to prevent it Even if Serafina told the Fiscal that she also liked to be legally separated from Luis, this does not present an obstacle to the successful prosecution of the case There is no collusion bet the parties Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement bet spouses for one of them to commit or to pretend to commit or to be represented in court as having committed a matrimonial offense or to suppress evidence of a valid defense to enable the other to obtain divorce So, there would be collusion if the parties pretended there was adultery even if there wasnt just so they could be legally separated Here, adultery was really committed and just because Serafina admits the allegations doesnt mean theres collusion Also, the desire for divorce and refusal to defend oneself does not also mean collusion Luis failure to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relationship It was not his duty to search for her. She was the one who left, it was her obligation to return (bongga ni Luis!) SC REVERSED the appealed decision and DECREED a legal separation bet the parties
o o
o o o
7. Effects of decree of legal separation a. On personal relations FC 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: 298
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a) b. On the custody of children FC 63(3) see above FC 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n) CC 106(3) The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian; PD 603(The Child and Youth Welfare Code) Art 17 par 3 Article 17. Joint Parental Authority. - The father and mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over such children, unless in case of the surviving parent's remarriage, the court, for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as guardian. In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so. Matute vs. Macadaeg Facts: 1952 - Armando Medel (private respondent), filed for legal separation against his wife, Rosario Matute (petitioner) on the ground that she committed adultery w/ his brother Ernesto Medel CFI found Rosario guilty and awarded to Armando custody of their 4 minor children Armando went to US and left the children w/ his sister Pilar Medel Subsequently, Rosario lived in Pilars house to be w/ her children 1954 Armando returned to the Phil March 1955 after school ended, children went to their father in Cebu April 1955 Rosario, w/ Armandos permission, took the children to Manila to attend her fathers funeral Armando alleged that he consented on the condition that the children will be returned after 2 weeks However, Rosario did not return the children and instead filed a case praying for the childrens custody contending that the children expressed their desire to stay w/ her and for support for the children 299
Armando opposed the motion and countered w/ a petition to declare and punish Rosario in contempt for refusing to restore the custody of the children to him CFI absolved Rosario on the charge of content since she has Armandos permission to bring the children to Manila but denied her motion for custody and ordered her to deliver the children to Armando Thus, this appeal for certiorari and prohibition w/ preliminary injunction contending that the CFI order had been issued w/ grave abuse of discretion Issue: WON Rosario should have been awarded custody of the children Held: NO Rosario contends the children should be under her custody because: o She is their mother and they wish to be w/ her o 2 of the 3 children are of the age wherein they can choose the parent they want to live w/ unless that parent is unfit to take charge by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty o The act of infidelity she was guilty of is a thing of the past and does not involve moral depravity o Armando is unfit to have the custody since he is now living w/ another woman and is guilty of bigamy Judge (respondent) did not act w/o or in excess of jurisdiction o If there were errors made, they were errors in the exercise of jurisdiction and these errors do not affect the legality or validity of the order Rosario obtained and has the physical possession of the children only through Armandos consent Armando has the right to demand their return whenever he wants and Rosario has no right to question this authority The children can, indeed, choose the parent they wish to live with However, poverty, among other causes, renders Rosario unfit to take charge of her children o Rosario has no job and is living in the charity of her brothers Petition is DENIED and case is DISMISSED NOTE: Generally, custody of children is granted to the innocent spouse c. On property relations FC 63 (2) see preceding pages FC 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final. (107a) FC 102 (4). Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage 300
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (n) d. On support FC 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) NOTE: After legal separation, support ceases but guilty spouse will continue support of the innocent spouse e. On the use of surname NCC 370-372 Art. 370. A married woman may use: 1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her husbands surname, or 2. Her maiden first name and her husbands surname, or 3. Her husbands full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs. Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husbands surname, unless: 1. The court decrees otherwise, or 2. She or the former husband is married again to another person. Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. Laperal vs. Republic Facts: May 10, 1960 Elisea Laperal filed in the CFI of Baguio a petition to allow her to revert to her maiden name since she is now legally separated from her husband, Enrique Santamaria, and that they have ceased to live together for a long time Petition was opposed by the City Atty of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art 370 (should be 372) of the CC and that it is not sanctioned by the ROC Oct 31, 1960 court denied the petition for Art 372 of CC requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before legal separation Upon petitioners motion, court granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets The State appealed Issue: WON petitioner who is legally separated from her husband can resume the use of her maiden name Held: NO Art 372: o When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation 301
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation Because her married status is unaffected by the separation Wife should continue the use of the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned Fact of legal separation alone is not a sufficient ground for a change of name even under Rule 103 of ROC The issuance of the decree of legal separation automatically dissolved and liquidated conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband So, there could be no more occasion for eventual liquidation of conjugal assets f. On hereditary rights FC 63 (4) see preceding pages g. Solo Parents Act RA 8972 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8972 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES TO SOLO PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines Congress assembled: Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000." Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to promote the family as the foundation of the nation, strengthen its solidarity and ensure its total development. Towards this end, it shall develop a comprehensive program of services for solo parents and their children to be carried out by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), the National Housing Authority (NHA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and other related government and nongovernment agencies. Section 3. Definition of Terms. - Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Solo parent" - any individual who falls under any of the following categories: (1) A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, That the mother keeps and raises the child; (2) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to death of spouse; (3) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year; (4) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner; (5) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children; (6) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children; 302
(7) Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year; (8) Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his child/children instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution; (9) Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children; (10) Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent. A change in the status or circumstance of the parent claiming benefits under this Act, such that he/she is no longer left alone with the responsibility of parenthood, shall terminate his/her eligibility for these benefits. (b) "Children" - refer to those living with and dependent upon the solo parent for support who are unmarried, unemployed and not more than eighteen (18) years of age, or even over eighteen (18) years but are incapable of self-support because of mental and/or physical defect/disability. (c) "Parental responsibility" - with respect to their minor children shall refer to the rights and duties of the parents as defined in Article 220 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines." (d) "Parental leave" - shall mean leave benefits granted to a solo parent to enable him/her to perform parental duties and responsibilities where physical presence is required. (e) "Flexible work schedule" - is the right granted to a solo parent employee to vary his/her arrival and departure time without affecting the core work hours as defined by the employer. Section 4. Criteria for Support. - Any solo parent whose income in the place of domicile falls below the poverty threshold as set by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and subject to the assessment of the DSWD worker in the area shall be eligible for assistance: Provided, however, That any solo parent whose income is above the poverty threshold shall enjoy the benefits mentioned in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of this Act. Section 5. Comprehensive Package of Social Development and Welfare Services. - A comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families will be developed by the DSWD, DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA and DILG, in coordination with local government units and a nongovernmental organization with proven track record in providing services for solo parents. The DSWD shall coordinate with concerned agencies the implementation of the comprehensive package of social development and welfare services for solo parents and their families. The package will initially include: (a) Livelihood development services which include trainings on livelihood skills, basic business management, value orientation and the provision of seed capital or job placement. (b) Counseling services which include individual, peer group or family counseling. This will focus on the resolution of personal relationship and role conflicts. (c) Parent effectiveness services which include the provision and expansion of knowledge and skills of the solo parent on early childhood development, behavior management, health care, rights and duties of parents and children. (d) Critical incidence stress debriefing which includes preventive stress management strategy designed to assist solo parents in coping with crisis situations and cases of abuse. (e) Special projects for individuals in need of protection which include temporary shelter, counseling, legal assistance, medical care, self-concept or ego-building, crisis management and spiritual enrichment. 303
Section 6. Flexible Work Schedule. - The employer shall provide for a flexible working schedule for solo parents: Provided, That the same shall not affect individual and company productivity: Provided, further, That any employer may request exemption from the above requirements from the DOLE on certain meritorious grounds. Section 7. Work Discrimination. - No employer shall discriminate against any solo parent employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his/her status. Section 8. Parental Leave. - In addition to leave privileges under existing laws, parental leave of not more than seven (7) working days every year shall be granted to any solo parent employee who has rendered service of at least one (1) year. Section 9. Educational Benefits. - The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall provide the following benefits and privileges: (1) Scholarship programs for qualified solo parents and their children in institutions of basic, tertiary and technical/skills education; and (2) Nonformal education programs appropriate for solo parents and their children. The DECS, CHED and TESDA shall promulgate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this program. Section 10. Housing Benefits. - Solo parents shall be given allocation in housing projects and shall be provided with liberal terms of payment on said government low-cost housing projects in accordance with housing law provisions prioritizing applicants below the poverty line as declared by the NEDA. Section 11. Medical Assistance. - The DOH shall develop a comprehensive health care program for solo parents and their children. The program shall be implemented by the DOH through their retained hospitals and medical centers and the local government units (LGUs) through their provincial/district/city/municipal hospitals and rural health units (RHUs). Section 12. Additional Powers and Functions of the DSWD. The DSWD shall perform the following additional powers and functions relative to the welfare of solo parents and their families: (a) Conduct research necessary to: (1) develop a new body of knowledge on solo parents; (2) define executive and legislative measures needed to promote and protect the interest of solo parents and their children; and (3) assess the effectiveness of programs designed for disadvantaged solo parents and their children; (b) Coordinate the activities of various governmental and nongovernmental organizations engaged in promoting and protecting the interests of solo parents and their children; and (c) Monitor the implementation of the provisions of this Act and suggest mechanisms by which such provisions are effectively implemented. Section 13. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - An interagency committee headed by the DSWD, in coordination with the DOH, DECS, CHED, TESDA, DOLE, NHA, and DILG is hereby established which shall formulate, within ninety (90) days upon the effectivity of this Act, the implementing rules and regulations in consultation with the local government units, nongovernment organizations and people's organizations. Section 14. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the budget of concerned government agencies in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.1awphil.net Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. Section 16. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect. 304
Section 17. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspaper of general circulation. Approved. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA President of the Philippines 8. Reconciliation FC 65-67 Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies 9. Effect of death of one of the parties Lapuz vs. Eufemio Facts August 18, 1953 Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on the ground of his cohabitation with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 and that the defendant be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defences and counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok May 31, 1969 Carmen died in a vehicular accident before the trial could be completed June 9, 1969 Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation for it was filed beyond the one year period provided in Art. 102 of the CC and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation Issues: WON Carmens death before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? Held: Yes 305 of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtorspouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a)
An action for legal separation is purely personal thus, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself In terms of property rights involved in an action for legal separation abated by the death of the plaintiff, these rights are mere effects of a decree of legal separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree, such rights do not come into existence o Property rights could be resolved in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by heirs of the appellant Petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio by Eufemio is rendered moot and academic upon the death of Carmen Filomena filed a petition for appointment of administrator, to administer the estate of the conjugal partnership pending the termination of the case Antonio oppose the petition January 4, 1973 trial court decreed legal separation but the decision on the dissolution of the conjugal property will be provided in a supplemental decision after the court has been given a complete list of the community property to be divided April 25, 1973 Filomena filed another petition for the appointment of an administrator to impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio Sept 6 - Antonio filed his opposition Sep 20 trial court issued an order directing Filomenas counsel to submit 3 names for appointment as administrator, including in the list, if possible, a banking institution authorized to handle cases of administration of properties, furnishing a copy of said list to Antonio for observations and objections to recommended persons and entity Antonio filed an MR and prayed that he be allowed to continue administering the conjugal properties Oct 13 Filomena filed a motion for appointment of administrator and submission of complete list of conjugal assets by Antonio and submitted 3 nominees for administrator Oct 23 Antonio filed his 2nd MR w/c was denied Antonio brought the case to CA praying among others to prohibit judge from treating the January 4, 1973 decision on legal separation as being final and executor and from enforcing the same in any manner whatsoever Dec 21, 1973 - CA ruled that the January 4 decision has become final and the appointment of administrator is subsequently valid Feb 6, 1980 counsel for Antonio through a notice of death and motion to dismiss informed the court about Antonios 306
Macadangdang vs. CA (i dont understand this case) Facts: Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang (private respondent) and Antonio Macadangdang (petitioner) got married During their marriage, they were able to put up a humble buy and sell business and sari-sari store w/c expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate, and others through hard work and good fortune They had 6 chilren 3 of w/c are of age and the other 3 still minors Their marriage became shaky and both accused each other of extramarital affairs The two separated in 1965 when Filomena left for Cebu for good When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of her husbands illicit affairs April 28, 1971 she filed for legal separation Antonio filed his answer w/ counterclaim
death on Nov 30, 1979 and that as a consequence, the cases have become moot and academic Filomena moved for the resolution of this case although she believes that her husbands death has posed new intervening circumstances that would affect the entire purpose in filing the same In effect, she agrees that her husbands death has rendered the instant petition moot and academic Issue: WON the January 4 decision has become final and executor y Held: YES The decree of legal separation had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a supplemental decision is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation The final disposition of their conjugal partnership, by reason of final decree, had been automatically dissolved The death of the petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem w/c can be resolved simply by the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner The petition is DISMISSED VIII. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES NCC Art. 113. The husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (1) When they are judicially separated; (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year; (7) When the action is upon the civil liability arising from a criminal offense; (8) If the litigation is incidental to the profession, occupation or business in which she is engaged; (9) In any civil action referred to in Articles 25 to 35; and (10) In an action upon a quasi-delict. In the cases mentioned in Nos. 7 to 10, the husband must be joined as a party defendant if the third paragraph of Article 163 is applicable. (n) Art. 114. The wife cannot, without the husband's consent acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. (n) A. Obligations to love each other FC Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a) B. Obligation to live with the other spouse 307 (3) When there is a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements; (4) If the administration of all the property in the marriage has been transferred to her, in accordance with Articles 196 and 197; (5) When the litigation is between the husband and wife; (6) If the suit concerns her paraphernal property;
1. General rule and exceptions FC Art. 68 supra Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) 308
NCC Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse: (4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation; RPC Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability: 2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng Appeal from judgment of CFI Facts: May 1951, Chua Ching beng and Pilar Atilano got married in Zamboanga. Then, they sailed to Manila and lived with Chuas parents. October of the same year, they visited Pilars parents in Zamboanga upon the initiation of Chua. He was prevailed upon by Pilars parents to return to Manila leaving her behind, with the understanding that she will follow him later, which she failed to do. After two years, she filed a complaint for support from Chua alleging that they have been living separately because of incessant marital bickering and quarrels brought about by incompatibility of temperament and by Chuas inability to provide for themselves a home. On his part, he argued that they marriage was characterized with harmony and understanding, that it was Pilars parents who caused her to be alienated from him and that he tried to fetch her but through force and intimidation she was prevented by her parents from going with him. He said he is willing to fulfil his duties to his wife but he prefers to do it by receiving and maintaining her in Manila and he is willing to establish a conjugal dwelling in Manila separate from his parents. Issue: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstandings she had with her husbands immediate relatives. 309
Held: Chua is given the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents. Should the wife refuse to abide by the term of this decision then he shall be considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife. Ratio: The law in giving the husband authority to fix the conjugal residence does not prohibit him from establishing the same at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any norm, especially if he is not fully capable of meeting his obligations without the aid of his elders. There is no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband yet there is no reason why she should be allowed any support from the husband. Held: Yes. With regards to the first argument the court has held that the governing the obligation and duties of husband and wife in the Philippines is not the same with that in Spain. And that the mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband. The enforcement of that obligation is a vital concern of the state that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is a calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of society.
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda Facts: Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara and Jose Campos-Rueda were legally married on 7 Jan 1915 in Manila. Immediately thereafter, they established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelina. After a month of living together, defendant demanded that his wife perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genitals. Petitioner continued to refuse to do any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Because of this, the defendant got exasperated and started maltreating his wife. Eloisa took refuge in her parents home and claimed for support from his husband. Defendants counsel argue that in a previous case (Don Ramon Benso) in Spain, the Spanish court had held that neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode unless by a final judgment granting a divorce. And that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce and if the court lacks the power to decree a divorce, it also follows that it lacks the power to decree a divorce. Issue: WON the husband can be compelled to give support to the wife.
Arroyo v. Vasques-Arroyo Facts: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and had few short intervals of separation. They have lived together for ten years then the wife went away with intention of living separate from her husband. She alleged tha she was treated badly by her husband. The husband filed a petition to compel her to return to their home. Issue: Is the spouse who absented herself from the conjugal home be given support from the husband? Held: None of the relief sought should be granted. It is not within the province of the court to compel one of the spouses to live with the other though the said spouse may be admonished to return. Ratio: Abandonment by her was without sufficient justification in fact. Provision of support to the wife involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses which is abnormal. 310
RTC authorized her to live separate from her husband, granting her with alimony. Cuaderno v. Cuaderno Facts: Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno and Angel Cuaderno were living separately since 1956 when the husband, after inflicting bodily injuries to her, took her to her parents house and left her there. She filed a claim for support. Trial court granted her petition while the CA denied it. Issue: Should she be given support? Held: The fact thatshe has been receiving money from him and desisting from receiving any later only indicates thateven before the filing of this case, husband was already providing something for the separate maintenance. Trial court ruling revived. Lacson v San-Jose Lacson (1968) (Petitioner: Alfonso Lacson; Respondent: Carmen San Jose-Lacson) Facts: Carmen left their conjugal home in Bacolod and established a residence in Manila. She filed a case in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (JRDC) for the custody of their 4 children. But the spouses where able to come up with an amicable settlement for the separation of their properties and custody of their children. 2 younger children were given to her. 21 Apr 1963 They filed a joint petition for the approval of the amicable settlement with the CFI of Negros Occidental 7 May 1963 Carmen filed in the JRDC a motion wherein she said that she only entered into the settlement because she wanted custody of her 2 younger children and to be relieved from the stipulations of the settlement and to be given custody of all their children. DISMISSED. So she went up to the CA, but because there were no hearing in the JRDC and there was a question of law, the case was certified to the SC CFI rendered its decision and ordered the execution of the contract and said that Carmen would be held in contempt should she fail to comply with her obligations. She went up to the CA again and questioned the decision of the CFI and the validity and legality of the amicable settlement. Which the CA declared null and void.
Issue: WON the settlement between the spouses conforms to the law. Held: Only partially. That part of the agreement pertaining to the settlement of properties was upheld by the court. One, because the law allows the dissolution of conjugal partnership during marriage as long as judicial sanction is obtained beforehand, in which case the spouses did. Two, it has already been 5 years since the couples have been separated in fact and the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is clear. Three, the courts cannot constrain the spouses to live with each other. Besides not allowing the separation of properties would only compel the spouses to live together and that in the experience of the other countries, that practice is questionable. That part of the agreement pertaining to the custody of the children is void because the law is clear, when the children are still below 7 years of age the custody belongs to the mother, and since all children are below 7yo custody should be awarded to the mother. 311
Ilusorio v Bildner (2000) Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano Ilusorio were married, had 6 children and lived together for 30 years. But in 1972, they separate, Erlinda stayed in Antipolo while Potenciano in Baguio and Makati. In 1997, when Potenciano arrives from US, he lived with Erlinda in Antipolo for 5 months, in that time 2 of the children were saying that their mother was giving their father an overdose which deteriorated hi health. 31 May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in Makati 11 Mar 1999, Erlinda filed a writ of habeas corpus with the CA to have custody of her husband. She said that her daughters prohibited her from seeing and visiting her husband. CA ruled that she be given visitation rights and that if the respondents still prohibits her, they would be held in contempt. But the writ of habeas corpus wasnt awarded. Issue: WON it is proper to issue a writ of habeas corpus so that Potenciano must now live with Erlinda. Held: No. To justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be illegal and an involuntary deprivation f freedom of action, it must be actual and effective and not merely nominal or moral. In this case, it cannot be granted since there is no evidence that Potenciano is being held against his will on the contrary, he is in fact still of sound mind despite his advanced age and his choice as to where he wants to live should be respected. The order of the CA with regards to the visitation rights and hilding the respondents in contempt is unnecessary. CA missed the fact that the case does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit her husband. o If the husband refuses to see his wife, he should not be compelled to because that would be a violation to his right of privacy. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by a writ of habeas corpus. 2. Designation of Domicile a. General Rule: Jointly FC 69 par. 1Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. CC 110 Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. (58a) Abella v COMELEC (1991) Facts: Emeterio Larrazabal was the candidate of PDP-Laban for the gubernatorial race in Leyte, but he was disqualified by the COMELEC because he was not a resident of Leyte but of Ormoc. So his wife substituted him saying that her residence was in Kananga, Leyte. De la Cruz, a vvoter of Tacloban, filed a motion for disqualification for her alleged false statement in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence and that she was actually a resident of Ormoc. 312
A restraining order was issued to enjoin the provincial board of canvassers from proclaiming her as the winning candidate, but upon motion of Larrazabal, the TRO was lifted and she was proclaimed governor while the case regarding her residence was pending. Finally, she was disqualified, COMELEC said that her attempt to establish a residence in Kananga 1 yr before the election is a proof that she was not a resident of Kananga. Larazzabal however says that she has entered a contract of lease with Anastacia Mangbanag with option to buy the two parcels of land in Kananga; that Mangbanag often sees the spouses and that they had decided to buy the property. She also argues that her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City did not necessarily erase or remove her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendi evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City. Emeterio is the husband of Adelina, therefore Adelina also lives in Ormoc. DISQUALIFIED. On the animus revertendi, the Court quotes Faypon vs Quirino, saying that mere absence from ones residence or origindomicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence." In this case, there is no evidence that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga to pursue any calling, profession or business. Animus revertendi is not present. It is clear that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident of that place. Facts: Narcisa Geopano and Diego De la Vina were married and had children, 3 of which are alive and of age. During their marriage they had acquired properties amounting to 300K, but that since 1913, Diego had been committing adultery with Ana Calog and had in fact taken her as a concubine and that due to shame and scandal she was forced to leave the conjugal home in Oriental Negros and was forced to live with one of her daughters in Iloilo She filed a case wih the CFI of Iloilo for (a) a decree of divorce, (b) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month. Also she prayed for preliminary injunction to enjoin Diego from disposing of their properties to her prejudice, this the court granted. Diego contends that the Court of First Instance of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said action for divorce because the defendant therein was a resident of the Province of 313 De la Vina v Villareal (1920)
Issue: WON Adelina Larazzabal should be considered a resident of Kananga, Leyte. Held: No. The Court cited COMELEC s decision, saying that for the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. The NCC also provides that the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode. Emeterio Larrazabal was disqualified for being a resident of Ormoc,
Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, must also be considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the husband is also the domicile of the wife Issue: WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage? Held: The general rule is, the wife follows that of her husband. But where the theorical unity of husband and wife is is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, etc. Then the wife may acquire a separate domicile from that of her husband. b. Exception FC 69 par 2 The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a) C. Joint Management of Family Life FC. Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a) D. Joint obligation to support FC Art. 70 supra SSS vs De Los Santos Facts April 29, 1964 Antonio De Los Santos and Gloria De Los Santos were married; They had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine February 1965 Gloria contracted a marriage with Domingo Talens 1969 Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983 1983 Gloria left Antonio and went to the US May 8, 1986 She filed for divorce against Antonio May 21, 1983 She executed a document waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters November 5, 1986 The divorce was granted May 23, 1987 Antonio married Cirila De Los Santos; They had one child: May-Ann July 1987 Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant (American citizen) May 15, 1989 Antonio amended his records at SSS; changed his beneficiaries from Margarita De Los Santos to Cirila De Los Santos; from Gloria De Los Santos to May-Ann De Los 314
Santos; and from Erlinda De Los Santos to Armine De Los Santos March 1, 1996 Antonio retired from his employment May 15, 1999 Antonio died of respiratory failure Cirila applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit beginning December 1999 December 21, 1999 Gloria filed for Antonios death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch but which was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Securities Commission who decided that: May-Ann is the secondary beneficiary of Antonio o For having abandoned Antonio, having obtained a divorce, and having married another man, Gloria failed to satisfy the dependency requirement of primary beneficiaries under the law o And since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a qualified beneficiary o May-Ann was an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary and so she was entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate child o However, considering that legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only remaining beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit CA agreed that subsequent marriages contracted by Gloria and Antonio are void bigamous but it found that Gloria, being the legal wife of Antonio, was entitled by law to receive support from her husband Hence, this petition Held WON Gloria, being the legal spouse, is qualified as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband No, CA decision is reversed and SSC decision is reinstated
Ratio Reckoning point is the time of Antonios death Although Gloria was the legal spouse of the deceased, she is still disqualified to be Antonios primary beneficiary under the SS law because she failed to fulfill the dependency requirement o In the SSS vs Aguas case, it is said that although a husband and a wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone o A wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with other men (in this case, Gloria left the conjugal abode on two separate occasions to live with two different men), was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial, or otherwise, during the entire period E. The right to exercise a profession or calling FC Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. NCC Article 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided: 315
Issues
(1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and (2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family. FC Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; FC Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 1987 Constitution. Article XIII, Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation. CC 113 supra Rules of Court. Rule 3, Section 4. Spouses as Parties Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. RA 7192, An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development and Nation Building RA 8187, An Act Granting Paternity Leave RA 9710, Magna Carta for Women F. Related rights/obligations Facts Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name She said that she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, but they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation and that her former husband Hadji Idris Yasin is now married to another woman The respondent court held that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and substance and that the pleading must be rectified Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration but again was denied on the gorund that is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname Thus, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying rule 103 to this case 316 Yasin vs Shariah Court
Issues WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name WON the petitioner can resume her use of maiden name Held No Yes Sharica Mari Go Tan vs Spouses Tan
Ratio The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register; In this case, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin Under the present article of our Code, the use of the husband's surname by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory except in case of legal separation When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her Rule 103 of the rules of court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname G. Enforcement of rights of women and children RA 9262, Anti-Violence Against Women and Children
Facts April 18, 1999 Sharica Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married; Two children were born: Kya and Kristen January 12, 2005 Sharica filed a petition for with prayer for Temporary Protective Order against Steven and her parents-inlaw (Perfecto Tan and Juanita Tan) on the ground that Steven, in conspiracy with his parents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5 of RA 9262, Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 RTC granted TPO Respondents filed a motion to dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order on the ground that RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-inlaw of the petitioner, they were not covered by RA 9262 Sharica filed a comment stating that respondents are covered under the liberal interpretation of RA 9262 RTC decided in favor of the respondents Sharica filed her verified Motion for Reconsideration Respondents filed a comment on such RTC denied Sharicas verified MR Hence, this petition Issues WON respondents-spouses (parents-in-law of Shanica) may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order in accordance with RA 9262 Held Yes 317
Ratio While section 3 of RA 9262 defines violence against women and their children as any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife thus providing that the offender be related to the victim by marriage, it however does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC Section 47 of RA 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC; and in turn, Article 10 of the RPC mentions that the code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary Furthermore, section 4 of RA 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law Thus, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband Facts Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004 When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him but Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it Rustan Ang vs CA June 5, 2005 Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with her face superimposed on the figure She then got other text messages from Rustan who boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her; And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages and asked Rustan to meet her The waiting police officers then at the place intercepted and arrested him Rustan claims that he went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages and that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner and thus found Rustan guilty of Section 5 of RA 9262 In addition, RTC was not impressed by the testimonies of Rustan and his wife with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except for two. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that two had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. And if she knew 318
that some pictures remained in the memory card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Rustan appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision Thus this present petition Court said that it cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Subordinate Issues: 1) Yes, because the dating relationship that the law contemplates can exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Rustan contends that romantically involved implies that the offender and the offended woman had sexual relations. The court doesnt believe so because R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual 319
Issues Principal Issue: Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262 Subordinate Issues: 1) Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262 2) Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262 3) Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights 4) Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case Held and Ratio Principal Issue: Yes Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them
relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." Furthermore, an "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding and not continuous. 2) Yes, because the object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. 3) No, because the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. 4) Yes, because Rustans objection regarding that admissibility of the obscene picture is just raised for the first time before the Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection. IX. PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES A. Requisites for Validity of Marriage Settlements FC Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a) FC Art. 130. Par 3 Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) FC 103 par 3 Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) NCC Art. 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the contract. (1279a) Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein a governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405; (2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains; (3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should prejudice a third person; 320
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document. All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in action are governed by Articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405. (1280a) 1. Prior to marriage: Modifications FC Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a) FC Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121) Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtorspouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a) Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse 321
who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a) Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a) 2. Form and Registration requirement FC 77 Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties. (122a) 3. Celebration of the Marriage FC 81 Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a) Art 86 par 1 Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; B. Parties to a Marriage Settlement 1. Who may enter into settlements a. Minors 322
FC 78 Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a) b. Persons under civil interdiction FC 38 The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82) FC Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a) c. Incapacitated persons FC 79 For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a) FC 38 supra FC Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533[Approved February 23, 1998]). 2. Participation of Parents/Guardians Art 78 supra C. Which Law Governs Property Relations 1. Stipulation in marriage settlements FC 80 Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply: (1) Where both spouses are aliens; 323
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a) 2. If both Filipinos 3. Mixed Marriage Between Filipino and Alien 4. If Both Aliens 5. For Property Located Outside RP FC 80 (2) and (3) supra NCC 16 Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a) Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a) D. Donations Propter Nuptias 1. Definition Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. Solis vs Solis Facts Spouses Juan Lambino and Maria Barroso begot three children: Alejo, Eugenioa, and Marciana Lambino June 2, 1919 Spouses made a donation of propter nuptias to their son Alejo and Fortunata Solis in a private document in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about to enter into One of the conditions of the donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half June 8, 1919 Alejo and Fortunata were married August 3, 1919 Donee Alejo died 1919 Donor Juan also died Maxima Barroso then recovered possession of the donated lands Fortunata Solis filed an action against donor Maxima and heirs Eugenia and Marcelina with their respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law 324
CFI rendered judgment based on article 1279 of the Civil Code granting Fortunatas prayer Thus, this appeal from donor, or which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the donee, neither of which is true in the present donation o In donation propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation A valid donation would forever be valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription Marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation 2. Forms of Donations FC 83 Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles. (127a) NCC 748 Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing, otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a) 325
Issues WON article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is applicable to the present case Held No
Ratio A donation propter nuptias according to article 1328 of the Civil Code must be governed by the rules established in Title II, Book III of the code on donations (articles 618-656) Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument; this is the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remunetory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620) Art. 1279 is not applicable in this case because what is at hand is a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right since it was not made in a public instrument Lower court contends that the present donation is onerous and so it must be governed by rules on contracts, and that the by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based upon the marriage as a consideration and must therefore be considered onerous o Donations for valuable consideration are such as compensate services which constitute debts recoverable
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. (633) 3. Who May Be Donors FC 83 supra 4. What May Be Donated by a Spouse as a Donor a. Present property FC 84 Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a) b. Future property FC 84 supra NCC 761 Art. 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (n) c. Encumbered property FC 85 Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a) d. Donations in the marriage settlements FC 81 Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a) 5. Void Donations by the Spouses FC 87 Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) a. Donations during the marriage b. Donations in common law marriages Matabuena vs. Cervantes Bienvenido vs. CA Facts: Aurelio Camacho married Consejo Velasco on Oct 3, 1942 On Feb 6, 1962, w/o annulling his 1st marriage, he married Luisita Camacho (respondent) and the two had a child, Aurelio Luis Faustino Camacho (Chito) The two would quarrel and would leave their home for a long time 326
During their quarrels, Luisita would stay in Davao, Hong Kong or Japan In 1967, Aurelio met Nenita (petitioner), who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera (ang drama ng kasong to) Aurelio courted her and they lived together from June 1968 until Aurelios death on May 28, 1988 They lived in a duplex apt in QC where Nenitas daughter and Aurelios son lived (for a year), too April 30, 1982 Aurelio bought the apt they have been staying in In the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in his name, Aurelio stated he was single November 26, 1984 Aurelio executed a deed of sale in favor of Nenita for the sum of P250k The Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in Nenitas name on January 11, 1985 Bet. 1985 and 1987, Nenita and Luisita learned about each other o Luisitas version: Nenita would call her looking for Aurelio since he allegedly left their home and Nenita called herself Mrs. Nenita Camacho o Nenitas version: it was the other way around. Luisita called up their residence many times looking for Aurelio to urge him to file an application for American citizenship May 28, 1988 Aurelio died Nenita, w/ the use of her life plan and Aurelios account in the PCI Bank, took care of funeral arrangements Luisita and Chito were in the US and went home upon learning of Aurelios death Luisita had the remains of Aurelio transferred from Loyola Memorial Chapels to Arlington and paid for the funeral services Luisita was granted death benefits from AFP as Aurelios sspouse Soon, she also claimed ownership of the house and lot in QC where Nenita had been living in In 1988, Luisita and Chito filed a case in the RTC of QC for the annulment of the sale of the property to Nenita o Alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife o Nenita claimed the property was purchased through their joint funds w/c they accumulated during their living tog for 14 years The sale of the property was w/ Luisitas consent She was a purchaser in good faith RTC upheld the sale o The deed of sale was genuine o Luisita and Chito are in estoppels for not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale On appeal, CA reversed RTCs decision and declared Luisita and Chito as owners of the house and lot o Although Luisita admitted she knew as early as 1985 that Nenita had been staying in the premises, she was not barred by laches bec she did not know Nenita obtained the title to the property o In the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelios 1st wife must be presumed absent for 7 years w/o Aurelio having new of her being alive when he contracted his 2nd marriage o The property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita o The sale of the property to Nenita was void for the reason that donations bet persons guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art. 739 of the CC 327
Issue: WON the marriage bet Luisita and Aurelio is valid and, therefore, the sale of the property is void Held: NO The CA presumed the validity of Aurelios 2nd marriage bec of the failure of Nenita to prove otherwise SC: petitioner showed that during the 2nd marriage, the 1st marriage was still subsisting; therefore, it is respondents burden to prove otherwise w/c they failed to do so Besides, the 7-year period absence cannot be invoked since it was Aurelio who left his wife What applies to this case is the general rule that since Aurelio contracted a 2nd marriage while his 1st was still subsisting, his 2nd marriage, therefore, is void for being bigamous So, there can be no conjugal partnership bet Luisita and Aurelio An action for nullity of donations in this case can only be brought by the innocent spouse, Consejo So, until otherwise proven, the validity of the sale to Nenita is presumed as evidenced by the deed of sale and by the Transfer Certificate of Title The property was acquired during Aurelios and Nenitas long period cohabitation Theres nothing to show that Nenita knew Aurelio was married, only that he had a son, since he represented himself as single The decision appealed from is REVERSED Sumbad vs. CA Facts: After the death of his wife, Agata Tait, George Tait cohabited w/ Maria Tait to whom he donated a parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc George died on Dec 24, 1977 From 1982-1983, Maria sold lots included w/in the Sum-at property in favor of the private respondents: Eduard Okoren, Gregorio Acoking, Evelyn Saclangan, Mary Atiwag, Jaime Fronda, Barbara Tallongen, Julia Piyes, Glen Paquito, and Felicitas Alinao Private respondents purchased the lots based on a Tax Declaration w/c showed Maria as the owner of the property and planted diff fruit trees and plants on the lot Maria died in 1988 July 24, 1989 Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait (petitioners) brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession w/ damages against private respondents o Alleged they are children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata o Their parents owned properties in Otucan w/c George sold and used the proceeds to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at o Maria sold the lots w/o their knowledge and consent o Private respondents were warned that the property did not belong to Maria o Maria had no right to sell the property o Deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to the respondents o They discovered the transactions only in 1988 and they communicated w/ respondents thereafter o Respondents refused to meet w/ them Private respondents: o Denied being informed of petitioners claim on the lots o Denied that petitioners only learned of the sale in 1988 o The property did not belong to the conjugal partnership of George and Agata since the Tax Declaration was issued 30 yrs after Agatas death 328
Maria did not need petitioners consent to sell the land They are purchasers in good faith The action is barred by laches They were in possession of the lots and had introduced improvements thereon o They had separate tax declarations covering the lots Realizing that included in the pre-trial order was their admission that a deed of donation was executed by George in favor of Maria, petitioners included in their complaint the alleged forgery of the deed of donation and were allowed to present evidence on such claim Info from the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioners: o The Sum-at property was bought from the proceeds of the Otucan property of George and Agata o The Sum-at property was bought years after Agatas death o George was an educated man and a former congressman o A certain Shirley Eillinger saw a Deed of Donation regarding the Sum-at property and other documents containing Georges signature in the possession of Raquel Tait, her former boardmate and Georges ward She saw Raquel type the Deed of Donation at their dorm in 1979 or 1980 when George was already dead She saw Raquel forge Georges signature and even asked the help of their male boardmates for this task although she ended up signing herself Raquel also tried forging Marias signature Raquel signed the Deed of Donation Raquel went to Bontoc carrying w/ her the Deed of Donation It took Raquel 20-30 minutes to type the Deed w/c she copied from a form o o o o It took the male boarders the entire morning to try copying Georges signature Info from respondents: o Basically, theyre saying that they are purchasers on good faith o That they based ownership of the lot on the Tax Declaration in the name of Maria o That they have introduced improvements on the lots RTC dismissed the complaint CA affirmed Issue: WON the donation is null and void making the sale also null and void Held: NO The forgery allegation was not sufficiently proven o According to trial court, Shirleys testimony is incredible and grossly unconvincing o It is unbelievable that a 20-year old Raquel could, in 20-30 minutes, prepare the Deed in all its legal form just by copying a format o Also unbelievable that Raquel called the boys and in view of everyone, made them forge Georges signature only to forge the signature herself in one sitting o Shirleys testimony appeared rehearsed o They should have presented handwriting experts to prove forgery sufficiently Petitioners argue that the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 of CC w/ requires a public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property and that the person who notarized the deed had no authority to do so o They were not able to prove this either o The person who notarized the deed actually had authority 329
Petitioners argue that the deed of donation violates Art 133 of the CC o However, this issue was not raised in the trial court o Even if they did raise this issue, they still failed to present evidence to show that George and Maria did not get married Petitioners claimed they only learned of the sale in 1988 o They waited for 12 years (after the death of their father) before claiming their inheritance o They are now guilty of laches (failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that w/c, by exerting due diligence, could or should have been done earlier) w/c precludes them from assailing the donation made by their father Petitioners failed to prove that the Sum-at property was indeed bought from the proceeds of the Otucan property CAs decision is affirmed Arcaba vs. Vda. de Batocael Facts: January 16, 1956 Francisco Commille and wife Zosima Montallana became reg owners of a lot in Dipolog City After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition w/ waiver of rights wherein Juliana waived her share of the property to Francisco June 27, 1916 Francisco reg the lot in his name Since he had no children, Francisco asked his niece, Leticia Bellosillo and her cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian and Cirila Acaba (petitioner) to take care of his house as well as the store inside Cirilas relations w/ Francisco cannot be determined: o Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco, said that Francisco told her that Cirila is his mistress o Leticia said that the two were lovers since they slept in the same room o Cirila says shes just a helper who could enter the masters bedroom only when the old man asked her to. She denies having sex w/ him When Leticia and Luzviminda got married, Cirila was left to take care of Francisco o Cirila was a 34-year old widow and Francisco was a 75year old widower when she worked for him Franciscos main source of income was the rentals he got from his lot He did not pay Cirila regular cash wage but provided her family w/ food and lodging Before his death in 1991, he executed a Deed of Donation in w/c he gave a portion of his lot together w/ his house to Cirila o The deed stated that the donation is made in consideration of the faithful services rendered over the past 10 years o Was notarized by Atty. Lacaya o Was registered w/ Cirila as the absolute owner February 1993 respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession , and damages Respondents who are the decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession allage that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and that the donation was void under Art. 87 of FC RTC decided in favor of the respondents o Based its decision on documents bearing the signature Cirila Comille Business permit Sanitary permit 330
Franciscos death certificate CA affirmed RTC based on o Testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda and Cirila o Copies of documents showing Cirilas use of Franciscos surname o A pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-law wife o The fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage Issue: WON CA correctly applied Art 87 of the FC (basically, won Cirila is the common-law wife of Francisco) Held: YES The term cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not only residing in one roof but also having repeated sexual intercourse. It could also be more than just sexual intercourse, especially if one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. o At the very least, it is the public assumption of a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling tog as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such o Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together are merely meretricious o Sufficient proof of common-law relationship: stipulations bet the parties, conviction of concubinage, existence of IC Cirila admitted she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time It was possible they consummated their relationship since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same room (ang dumi din ng isip ng justices. Hahaha) Their public conduct indicated their relationship was more than that of caregiver and patient but that of exclusive partners Other indications of the relationship: o Documents bearing Cirila Comilles signature showing that she saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife o The lessees of Franciscos lot refer to her as his common-law wife o She did not demand a regular cash wage It is difficult to believe that she stayed w/ him out of pure beneficence Since Cirila was proven to be a common-law wife, the donation made in her favor is void under Art 87 of the FC CAs decision is AFFIRMED SSS vs. Davac Facts: Petronilo Davac was a member of SSS and in his SSS form, he designated Candelaria Davac (respondent) as his beneficiary and referred to her as his wife Upon his death, Candelaria and Lourdes Tuplano (respondentappellant) filed their claims for death benefit w/ SSS It appears from their claims that Petronilo contracted two marriages o First, w/ Lourder who bore him a child, Romeo o 2nd w/ Candelaria who also bore him a child, Elizabeth Upon due process, SSS awarded the benefits to Candelaria Issue: WON SSS acted correctly in declaring Candelaria as the person entitled to receive the death benefits Held: YES Sec 13 of RA 1161 as amended by RA 1792 states: Under this provision, the beneficiary as recorded by the employees employer is the one entitled to the death benefits 331
Lourdes contends that the designation made to the bigamous marriage is null and void bec o It contravenes the provisions of the CC o It deprives the lawful wife of her share in the conjugal property as well as of her own and her childs legitime in the inheritance As to the 1st point, Lourdes says SSS is of the same nature as a life insurance policy and therefore Art 2012 of the NCC applies and that Art 739 of NCC also applies o SC: prohibition in Art 739 is not applicable to Candelaria since she was not guilty of concubinage there being no proof that she was aware of the 1st marriage As to the 2nd point, the benefits accruing from the membership in SSS do not form part of the properties of the conjugal partnership of the covered member since they are disbursed from a public special fund created by Congress o Basically, the benefits from SSS cannot be considered as property earned by the member during his lifetime o His contribution constitutes only a portion thereof o The benefits are specifically declared not transferable o In short, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits (unless they are designated as such) o Only when there is no designated beneficiary that the laws of succession are applicable o Social Security Act is not a law of succession Resolution of Social Security Commission is AFFIRMED 6. Revocation of Donations Propter Nuptias a. Revocation by donor FC 86 Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general. (132a) NCC Art. 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases: (1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;
332
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. (648a) FC 50 Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. FC 43 (3) Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; In 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao donated to their son 2 parcels of land in consideration of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo ( petitioner) After their marriage, the spouses took possession of the lots but the title remained in the name of Cipriano 1923, Bonifacias husband died She and her daughter lived w/ her father-in-law who undertook the farming of the donated lots During this time, Cipriano gave Bonifacia the owners share of the harvest In 1926, Cipriano refused to give her the share Bonifacia resorted to the Justice of the Peace Court w/c awarded her the possession of the lots 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the lots in question to his younger son, Gervasio (respondent) Bonifacia was still receiving the owners share of the harvest though but it was stopped in 1956 This was when Bonifacia learned of the sale of the lots to Gervasio Petitioners went to the CFI seeking annulment of the deed of sale and for recovery of possession of the properties CFI ruled in favor of Bonifacia and Bonnifacia was given possession of the lands 1957 Gervasio and wife filed an action against Bonifacia for reimbursement of the reimbursements they made in the lots (2nd for easy referral) CFI dismissed the complaint for being barred by the first case Respondents appealed and during the appeal, Gervasio and Cipriano filed another case, this time seeking the annulment of the donation for in donating the two lots, not only did Cipriano neglected leaving something for his own support, he also prejudiced the legitime of his heir, Gervasio (3rd) In 1958, Cipriano died pending the resolution of the cases Both cases were dismissed 333
Mateo vs. Lagua Facts: Cipriano Lagua was the orig reg owner of 3 parcels of land in Asingan, Pangasinan
o The 2nd was dismissed for lack of cause of action o The 3rd was dismissed on the ground of prescription since it was brought 41 years after the donation CA affirmed the decision on the 2nd but on the 3rd, it held that the donation to Alejandro of the 2 lots exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. o The donation was declared inofficious and Bonifacia was ordered to reconvey the excess to Gervasio Issue: WON CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in ordering Bonifacia to reconvey to Gervasio the unidentified excess portion of the donated lots Held: Yes and No SC is in accord w/ CA in holding that the 3rd case is not exclusively for annulment or revocation of the entire donation but only of the portion w/c is allegedly entrenching on the legitime of Gervasio o That the cause of action having accrued only upon Ciprianos death, the dispute has to be governed by the provisions of the NCC o That a donation propter nuptias (by reason of marriage) property may be reduced for being inofficious Donations propter nuptias are w/o onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation and not the cause Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donors death if they should infringe the legitime of a forced (compulsory) heir However, CAs judgment rests on several unsupported assumptions o That the 3 parcels of lands were the only properties composing the net hereditary estate of Cipriano o That Alejandro Lagua and Gervasio Lagua were his only heirs o That Cipriano left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc. for w/c the estate would be answerable o In the computation of the heirr legitime, CA considered only the area, not the value of the properties o Art 908 of NCC should apply Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps must be taken first: o Net estate of the decedent must be ascertained by deducing all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death then all donations subject to collation would be added to it o W/ the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established and only thereafter can it be ascertained won a donation has prejudiced the legitimes In order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donees share as legitime in the properties of the donor b. By operation of law FC 48 Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent 334
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (88a) Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a) E. Absolute Community of Property (ACP) 1. When applicable 4. Waiver after marriage FC 75 Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a) FC103 (3) supra FC 130 (3) supra 2. Commencement FC 89 par 2. supra NCC Art 168. The wife may, by express authority of the husband embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property. (n) 5. Suppletory rule Co-ownership FC 90 Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n) 335 FC 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a) 3. Waiver during marriage FC 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)
NCC Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title. (392) Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a) Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the coownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a) Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n) Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other coowners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the coownership. (395a) Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492. (n) Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed: (1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each; (2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata; (3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on successively. (396) Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief. (397a) Art. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding. 336
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the coowners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the coownership. Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator. Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the coowners, and the remainder is owned in common, the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. (398) Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399) Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a) Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498. (401a) Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402) Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. (403) Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coowners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed. (404) Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before the division was made. Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition. (405) 337
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n) Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other coowners. (n) 6. What constitutes ACP FC 91 Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
a. b. c.
NCC 160 Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (1407) 7. What is excluded from ACP FC 92 Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a) FC 95 Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a) 8. Charges upon ACP FC 94 rt. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; 338
All property at the time of marriage Property acquired subsequently Winnings from gamblings
NCC 164 Art. 164. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any kind of gambling, betting or game, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser, and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. (1411a)
d.
Presumption of ACP
FC 93 Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160)
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for selfimprovement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a) Luzon Surety Co, Inc. vs. De Garcia Facts: Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co., Inc., executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB, to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000.00. On or about the same date, Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees. On or about April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint before the CFI of Negros Occidental against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. On or about August 8, 1957, in turn, a third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon B. Lacson and Vicente Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement, was instituted by Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 339
CFI granted the petition ordering ladislao and Co. to pay PNB and ordering the third party defendants to pay Co. the amount it has to pay to PNB. It also issued a writ of execution against Garcia. A writ of garnishment was the issued and the Garcia then filed for injunction. Later RTC declared the garnishment void thus making the injunction permanent. Issue: WON a conjugal partnership could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3 rd party in favour of a surety company. Held: As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the New Civil Code. However, as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Art. 161 of NCC, a conjugal partnership is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party. CA affirmed. Gelano vs. CA G-Tractors, Inc. vs. CA Sunga-Chan vs. Ca a. Family expenses FC 100 (3) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) FC 121 (5) Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; FC 94 (4) supra Francisco vs. Gonzales b. Debts of spouses FC 94 (2) and (3) supra c. Subsidiary liabilities FC 94 (9) supra Buado v CA (2009) Facts: Spouses Buado filed a case against Erlinda Nicol for slander. Erlinda was found guilty and was ordered to pay Php 40K in favor of the spouses. But her personal properties were insufficient so one of her real properties were levied and sold in an auction where the spouses were the highest bidder for Php 51K A year later, Romulo Nicol, Erlindas husband, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy 340
sheriff. He said that they should have exhausted the personal properties of Erlinda first and that the property was conjugal and that its value was at Php500K and was sold at a very low price. The case was dismissed by the RTC saying that they didnt have jurisdiction and that the case should be filed in the same court that rendered the decision and issued the writ of execution. CA however reversed the decision and remanded the case, thus this petition. Spouses Buado argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. d. Sole obligations of a spouse FC 94 supra e. Gambling losses FC 95 supra f. Other charges FC 94 supra 9. Ownersip FC 90 supra FC 96 Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) 10. Administration and enjoyment a. Joint administration FC 96supra FC 90 supra Facts: Yu Bun Guan v Ong (2001) 341
Issue: WON conjugal properties in a CPG could be used to satisfy the criminal liability of Erlinda. Held: No. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Equally, it cannot be concluded that the obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
Yu Bun Guan and Elvira Ong were married and had three children, but eventually, Yu abandoned her and their children During their separation, Erlinda bought a lot in Rizal out of her personal funds. But because Yu said that he was going to get a loan in his name (which he would pay out of his own funds) and build a commercial building in the lot for the benefit of their children if she executes a deed of sale in his favor. Because of the refusal of Yu to perform his promise, and also because he insisted on delivering to him the owner's copy of the title of the JP Rizal property, in addition to threats and physical violence, she decided executing an Affidavit of Adverse Claim. She said that the sale was simulated and therefore void but Yu said that since Erlinda bought the property out of her income, which is conjugal in nature, the lot should be co-owned. Yu was also saying that he was the one who eally bought the property but since at that time he didnt have the required citizenship, he had the title registered to his wifes name. RTC and CA both ruled in favor of Erlinda and said that the lot was her paraphernal property and that the sale was void because it was simulated and it happened during the subsistence of the marriage. from the facts of the case, it is clear that neither party had any intention whatsoever to pay that amount. Instead, the Deed of Sale was executed merely to facilitate the transfer of the property to petitioner pursuant to an agreement between the parties to enable him to construct a commercial building. The title issued to Yu by virtue of the sale was cancelled. Sole administration Incapacity FC 96 (2) supra Separation in fact FC 100 (3) supra FC 100 (2) The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; 4. Abandonment FC 101 Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) 5. Pendency of legal separation proceeding - FC 61 supra 342 b. 1. 2. 3.
Issue: WON the property is conjugal. Held: No. Yu could not substantiate his claim that he really bought the property because he could not even establish where his funds came from. On the other hand, Erlindas capacity was proven. In the present case, it is clear from the factual findings of both lower courts that the Deed of Sale was completely simulated and, hence, void and without effect. No portion of the P200,000 consideration stated in the Deed was ever paid. And,
c. Disposition and encumbrance Art. 96. supra Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n) Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (n) Matthews v Taylor (2009) Facts: Jocelyn Taylor (Filipino) and Benjamin Taylor (British) were married, during their marriage they acquired a property in Boracay and built a resort all at the expense of Benjamin. The marriage was falling apart and Jocelyn ran away with another man. She executed a Special Power of Attorney to authorize Benjamin to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties the Boracay property But on Jul 1992, she entered into a contract of lease with Matthews for 25 years and a lease price of 12K per month. Benjamin filed a Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Jocelyn for entering into the contract without his consent. She failed to answer to the charges and the petition was granted. CA reversed and remanded the case to let allow Jocelyn to file her answer. Matthews claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife. The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamins right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the courts findings that the property was purchased and improved through his funds. It also refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the contract of lease and not on every page thereof. This the CA confirmed.
Issue: WON the consent of Benjamin is needed for the validity of the lease. Held: No. The lower courts focused on using he NCC in deciding the case when in fact there os a higher law that governs and that is the Constitution. In Art 12 Sec 7 of the 1897 Constitution, aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands of public domain and private lands. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. 11. Effect of separation de facto FC 100 supra 343
FC 239 Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court.(n) 12. Effect of abandonment FC 101 supra FC 72 Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. (116a) 13. Causes for dissolution of ACP FC 99 Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a) a. Death FC Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. FC 66 Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) 344 If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extrajudicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) ROC Rule 73 Sec 12 b. Legal Separation FC 63 (2) Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
c. annulment and declaration of nullity FC 50 Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. FC 43 (2) rt. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; d. judicial separation of property FC Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. 345
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a) Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a) Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. (191a) 14. Effects of dissolution a. Liquidation procedure FC 102 Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n) b. For cause other than death FC 43 (2) supra, FC 63 (2) supra c. Termination due to death FC 104 Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a) 346
Buenaventura vs. CA November 13, 1996 through a resolution, CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration of the September 2 resolution Noel filed a petition for certiorari to question the two resolutions July 9, 1997 Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Petition for Certiorari were consolidated by the court In the petition for review on certiorari, Noel contends that CA decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence In the petition for certiorari, Noel contends that CA gravely abused its discretion when it refused to set Isabels motion for increased support for the parties son for hearing Issue (on the topic): WON assets of conjugal partnership property be liquidated in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage Held Yes Ratio In case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and ditributed is that of equal co-ownership The parties were legally married on July 4, 197 and therefore all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition have been made, contracted, or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved Art. 147 of the FC: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed 347
Facts July 12, 1992 Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura Isabel then filed an answer but Noel then amended his petition stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated Isabel denied the allegation July 31, 1995 RTC promulgated a decision o That marriage is null and void ab initio o That Noel pay Isabel moral damages of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest, plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00 o That Noel pay Isabel expenses of litigation of P50,000.00 plus costs o That assets of the conjugal partnership property be liquidated o That Noel give a P15,000.00 monthly regular support to Javy Singh Buenaventura o That custody of Javy is to his mother o That Isabel can revert back to the use of her maiden family name Noel appealed to the CA Isabel filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support Noel filed an opposition praying that it be denied September 2, 1996 CA issued a resolution increasing the support to P20,000 Noel appealed but appellate court dismissed such Noel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied Noel filed an instant petition for review on certiorari
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. In this case, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found both by the trial court and the CA to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership 15. For marriages before FC FC 104 supra, FC 103 (3) supra Vda. de Delizo v Delizo (1976) Facts: Nicolas Delizo contracted 2 marriages in his lifetime: Rosa Villasfer from 1891-1909(when she died) and Dorotea de Ocampo 1911-1957(when Nicolas died) April 15, 1957 Action for partition of the conjugal partnership was filed by a daughter and a son and the heirs of another son (all from the first marriage) against their father his second wife and their children The 2nd family opposed the partition claiming that the properties described in the complaint were those of the 2 nd marriage. June 3, 1957 Dorotea filed a special proceeding for the intestate estate of Nicolas. April 27, 1964 Lower Court distributed the properties involved as follows: o 1/2 pro indiviso to the 3 children of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the deceased Francisco Delizo o 1/4 pro indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo o 1/4 pro in equal shares to the children of both marriages, 9 of whom were begotten during the second marriage or into 13 parts RTC said that because there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership property of the first marriage, upon the death of the first wife, the conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage hence, all the fruits or increase of the properties acquired thereafter shall belong to such co-ownership. From said judgment, petitioners-appellants (2nd family) appealed to the CA. CA affirmed with modifications the trial courts decision. o The fact that the disputed lands situated in Caanawan were registered in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo's no proof that the property is owned by the second conjugal partnership. The phrase 'married to' is merely descriptive of the civil status of Nicolas Delizo. o They also found that the Caanawan lands, were acquired during the existence of his first marriage to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. o Contrary to what the RTC said, one-half of the conjugal properties of the first marriage constituted the separate property of the husband at the formation of the second 348
conjugal partnership upon his remarriage in October 1911 (Art. 145, NCC). Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were acquired through the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. These improvements were made in good faith considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the properties of the first marriage. The second marriage is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 516, NCC) Even the Muoz property acquired during the second marriage had to be improved by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. Issues: WON CA erred in ruling that the Caanawan properties were acquired during the first marriage and WON CAs partition is correct? Held and Ratio: Yes. It does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer. o The decisive fact in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. No. Judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. Division of properties should be IN PROPORTION TO THE DURATION OF EACH CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. o Capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision o Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both marriages, with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate child. The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half () of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. The court took into account that respondents are in possession of the Muoz lands, while petitioners are in possession Caanawan properties as well as the house in Sampaloc, Manila. 349
16. Support during ACP liquidation F. Conjugal partnership of gains Facts July 27, 1927 Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday They had 3 children: Flora, Teresita, and Gaido 1946 Alayo left the conjugal home and started to live with Josefa Rivera They had 1 child: Josephine August 23, 1949 Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. He indicated his civil status as married to Josefa Bosing, the common-law wife October 6, 1959 he authorized Magdalena Estate to transfer the lot in the name of Josefa Bosing October 24, 1959 final deed of sale was executed November 9, 1959 Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Josefa Bosing June 6, 1967 Alayo married Josefa March 11, 1967 Alayo died September 17, 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of lot in question, which was there described as conjugal property of Josefa and Alayo; In the deed, Josefas supposed interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine, thereby completing for herself, along with her interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full ownership of the property; Such was published June 6, 1974 a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued Belcodero vs CA October 30, 1980 Juliana (Alayos real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court an action for reconveyance of the property Trial court ruled in favor of Juliana and her children Aggrieved, Josefa and Josephine went to the CA which affirmed the Trial Courts decision, but reversed the decision on the award for damages Hence, the petition
Issues WON the property purchased by Alayo from Magdalena Estate Inc. remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana WON the respondent court erred in finding that the action for reconveyance had long prescribed WON a new trial must be granted on the ground of newly found evidence Held and Ratio Yes o Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the Old Civil Code (Article 1407), All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. o Such presumption has not been rebutted o It cannot be seriously contented that simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property was acquired unquestionably by Alayo. And Alayos letter merely authorized Magdalena Estate to have the title to the property transferred to Josefas name. 350
o Moreover, Josefa implicitly recognized Alayos ownership when she and Josephine executed a deed of extrajudicial partition which upon observation whould have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of Alayo. o As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. No o The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of property by the beneficiaries is 10 years. Ordinarily, that period starts from the establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of action would be considered to have accrued. Unfortunately, for Josefa and Josephine, however, the property involved is a realty titled under the Torrens system. The prescriptive period is thus to be counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the corresponding issuance of new certificate of title. From June 6, 1974 (issuance of new title) to October 30, 1980 (filing for reconveyance), only 6 years and 4 months had elapsed. The case therefore has been initated seasonably. No o Assuming that such is granted, a new trial would not serve a useful purpose in altering the result of the questioned decision Facts Jocson vs CA Moises Jocson and Agustina Joscon-Vasquez are the surviving offsprings of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled Emilio died intestate There are 3 documents (deeds of sale) executed by Emilio during his lifetime: 1) marked as Exhibit 3, sold at P10,000; 2) marked as Exhibit 4, sold at P5,000; and 3) marked as Exhibit 2, sold at P8,000 These documents purportedly conveyed by sale to Agustina what apparently covers almost all Emilios properties, including his 1/3 share in the estate of his wife Moises assailed these documents and prays that they all be declared null and void and the properties therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents Moises contended that Augustina and Ernesto through fraud, deceit, and influence procured their father to sign the contract for a simulated price; and that the second and third document, all allegedly simulated, are null and void because the consent of the father was obtained through fraud, deceit, and trickeries; and that without any other business or employment or source of income, the spouses would not have the sufficient means to purchase such properties Furthermore, Moises said that Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra and so the former cant validly sell Trial Court decided in favor of Moises on the grounds that (1) there was no proof that Augustina paid for the properties, (2) prices were grossly inadequate, and (3) improbability of the sale 351
CA reversed the Trial Courts decision on the grounds that (1) the complaint, in so far as exhibit 3 and 4 are concerned, is barred by 4 year prescription with regards to fraud, (2) exhibits 2, 3, and 4 are not simulated for Emilio intended them to be binding, in fact all titles were cancelled and new ones were issued, and (3) exhibit 2 is valid and that the partition with sale made by Emilio and Augustina affects only 2/3 portion of the subject property and the so Moisess 1/3 is not prejudiced Hence this petition o Augustina testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay and rice and therefore she is capable of paying the purchase price of the properties o The alleged inadequacy of price is untenable. The difference between the market value and the purchase price was only slight and is not so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter o Moises allegation that exhibits 3 and 4 are conjugal properties of Emilio and Alejandra since they were registered under the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete and are unliquidated and therefore cannot be validly sold cannot be sustained. Before Moises may validly invoke the presumption under art. 160 that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage. The certificate of title upon which petitioner rests his claim however is insufficient, for acquisition and registration are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Contrary to Moises position, the certificates of title in fact show on their face that the properties were exclusively owned by Emilio. The import from the certificate of title is that Emilio is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that the words Married to are merely descriptive of his civil status. Facts Philippine Trust Company granted Romarico Agcaoili a credit in current account not to exceed at any one time P20,000 upon 352 Ansaldo vs Sheriff
Issues WON the complaint has prescribed WON the contracts are null and void Held and Ratio No o According to art. 1330 of the Civil Code, an action for annulment of a contract vitiated by consent obtained by fraud must be brought within 4 years from the time of discovery of fraud. Since exhibits 3 and 4 were registered in 1968, but Moises had filed the complaint in 1973, CA ruled that the suit has prescribed; however, there is another ground used by Moises in assailing the deeds; that is, the amounts appearing thereon as paid were just simulated. According to art. 1352 of the Civil Code, a contract with a simulated price is void, and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not prescribe. Thus, Moises action is imprescriptible. No o Moises has not proven that the documents are without consideration
the guaranty of Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands Angel Ansaldo agreed to indemnify the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands for any and all losses and damages that it might sustain for having guaranteed Agcaoilis obligations Agcaoili defaulted Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands paid the Philippine Trust Company P19,065.17 Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands then brought an action against Angel Ansaldo to recover the sum After obtaining a favorable judgment, Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands cause the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account and joint current account both under the name of Angel Ansaldo and Margarita De Ansaldo The Ansaldo spouses then filed a third party claim alleging that the money on which the sheriff levied execution was the property of the conjugal partnership of the two and not liable for the payment of personal obligations of Angel Ansaldo Sheriff retained the money in his possession Ansaldo spouses instituted an action against the appellants to have the execution levied by the sheriff declared null and void CFI of Manila granted the relief prayed for and sentenced the appellants jointly to pay P636.80 with interest Ratio The P636.80 was derived from the paraphernal property of the appellee, Margarita De Ansaldo; It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses The provision of article 1408 of the CC to the effect that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband must be understood as subject to the qualifications established by article 1386 of the same code, which is then clarified by reference to the 1st paragraph of article 1385 Article 1386: The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family Article 1385: The fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family In this case, the has been no attempt to prove that the obligations contracted by appellee, Angel, were productive of some benefit to his family The contention that P636.80 can only refer to the share of the husband from the conjugal partnership is untenable since the right of the husband to one-half of the property does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when the conjugal partnership is dissolved Sps. Estonina vs CA Facts October 2, 1967 Santiago Garcia died 353
Issues WON a joint savings account and a joint current account in a bank of a husband and his wife are liable for the payment of the obligation of the husband Held No
The title of the parcel of land which is the subject of the controversy is issued under Santiagos name March 10, 1973 CFI of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estoninas application for a writ of preliminary attachment in a case entitled Trinidad, et al. vs Consuelo Garcia, et al. Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance at the back of Transfer Certificate Title No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad covering all rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo, Santiagos widow, may have in that parcel of land As a result of a prior sale of Santiago to Balasoto, TCT T19175 was cancelled and TCT 77215 was issued Again another sale of Santiago to Ofelia Garcia, so the latter was cancelled, TCT 82229 was issued Children of Santiago with his first wife, Adela, executed a deed selling, transferring, and conveying their 4/10 pro indiviso share of the land to the Atayan spouses And then, Santiagos second wife, Consuelo, and their children also sold to the Atayan spouses their 1/10 pro indiviso share in the land Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad in a case against Consuelo, execution pending appeal was made on the land Land was sold in an auction where Trinidad was the highest bidder In time, TCT 82229 was cancelled, TCT T-99961 was issued in favor of Trinidad Spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale and transfer certificate of title with damages, impleading as defendant spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina, Silvano, Javier, Solidum, and the heirs of Santiago who sold their pro indiviso shares to the Atayan spouses RTC rendered a decision that the subject TCT was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo and is presumed to be conjugal in nature and that upon Santiagos death, of the land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession (5 children from the 1st wife, 4 from the 2nd wife, and Consuelo as the 2nd wife getting 1/10 each of the land) and the other pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo; with such, what could be attached to TCT in the name of Trinidad is 55% (Consuelos total take) pro indiviso, the other 45% belonging to the heirs of Santiago Atayan appealed to the CA which reversed the RTC decision stating that the land was not conjugal but is an exclusive property of Santiago and therefore Consuelo gets only 1/10 pro indiviso share which share could be validly attached to Trinidad Hence, this petition
Issues WON the subject parcel of land is a conjugal property or an exclusive property of Santiago Held Exclusive property of Santiago
Ratio Presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during marriage Petitioners in this case have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo 354
Applying the Jocson vs CA case, although as evidenced, in the registration is the name of Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza; this however has no merit since the married to are merely descriptive of the civil status of Santiago. In other words, the import from the certificate of title is that Santiago is the owner of the property for such is registered in his name alone With such, the sale at the auction by the Sheriff to Trinidad over and above the 1/10 share of Consuelo is null and void The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Facts May 17, 1977 Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture: one in Paranaque, Metro Manila, and the other on installment basis, one in Paco, Manila They had two children: Romeo and Alexander April 30, 1978 Concordia died While at Dubai, Moises agreed that the Paranaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander 1984 When he returned, he renegotiated with Romeo and Alexander for he wanted the Paranaque property for himself but would leave the Paco property to the two December 14, 1984 Moises was able to pay the balance of the Paco property He secured the title over the property in his name as a widower According to Romeo, Moises violated the agreement that their names would be registered in the title once the balance was paid Upon demand, Moises gave the owners duplicate copy of the Paco property title to Romeo April 1988 Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property; he gave Romeo a partial payment of P6,000 355 Castro vs Miat
1. When CPG commences and applies (a) marriages under FC Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void. Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. (b) marriages before FC Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
February 1988 Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding, Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had given Moises money as downpayment for the sale by Moises of the Paco property to her son Virgilio December 1, 1988 Property was discussed in the chambers of Judge Anunciacion of Manila Trial Court Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 Moises said that Romeo just borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it to his friend Lorenzo Moises ran into financial difficulties so he mortgaged the Paco property to Virgilio Castros parents He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage Moises, with his children, went to the city hall to discuss the sale and so it happened that he proceeded to sell the property to the Castro spouses Alexander said that he got 2/3 of the sale, his father got 1/3, and Romeo did not get any but he was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property Alexander said that he intended to return to Romeo the P6,000 for he considered it as a personal debt Virgilio Castro testified that he informed Romeo that Moises was selling the Paco property During the meeting, Virgilio was told by Romeo that the Paco property was already given to him by Moises; yet, still he proceeded to buy the property Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale; to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property to him upon the payment of the balance of the agreed price; and to make them pay damages Issues WON the Paco property is conjugal or capital WON there was a valid oral partition covering the said property WON the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith Held and Ration Conjugal o Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply o Under Article 153 (1) of the New Civil Code, those acquired during the marriage at the expense of common fund, whether acquisition be for partnership, or for only one of the spouses, are conjugal partnership property o In this case, it is clear that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund; thus, it is a conjugal property o Moises did not bring the property into their marriage. Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage; hence, it has to be considered conjugal o They executed a Deed of Sale. The title was passed to them upon delivery of the Paco property. The title was gained therefore during the conjugal partnership. Yes o Moises brother, Ceferino, testified to such agreement o Furthermore, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family and they all attested to it in a document o Furthermore, the oral partition between the siblings is enforceable because Alexander accepted the downpayment and that the witnesses who testified regarding the sale were intensely questioned 356
No o Because a buyer in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of purchase or before any notice of some other persons claim on or interest in it o Virgilio Castro already knows that Moises had already given Romeo the property yet they still proceeded with the sale (c) When applicable FC 105 Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) FC 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local custom. (118) Malang vs. Moson (i would just like to say, why did you marry so many times? Why?) Facts: Hadji Abdula Malang (a Muslim) married Aida (Kenanday) Limba They had 3 sons (Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu, and Datulna) and a daughter, Lawanbai Hadji Abdula was engaged in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry He bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato He already had 2 children w/ Aida when he married Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao He begot no children in his 2nd marriage When Aida was pregnant w/ their 4th child, he divorced her 1965 he married again, Nayo H. Omar and they were also childless He married Hadji Mabai (Mabay) in Kalumamis and they had a daughter, Fatima (Kueng) They stayed there for a while to farm and Hadji Abdula also engaged in the business of buying and selling of rice, corn, and other agricultural products Abdula married again this time, to 3 other Muslim women, Saaga, Mayumbai, and Sabai who he also divorced afterwards He then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married Neng Malang (petitioner) They established residence in Cotabato City and they were childless For a living, they relied on farming and buy and sell of agri products Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City He deposited money in United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dec 18, 1993 while living w/ Neng, Abdula died w/o a will Neng filed w/ the Sharia Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of the estate w/ prayer that letters of admin be issued in the name of her niece Tarhata Lauban o Claimed she was the wife of Hadji Abdula 357
o His other legal heirs are his 3 children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula (sons in the 1st marriage), and Kueng Malang o He left 7 parcels of land, 5 of which were titled in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up jeepney The petition was published and Hadji Mohammad, eldest son, filed his opposition to the petition o His fathers surviving heirs are: Jubaida Malang, surviving spouse Nayo Malang, surviving spouse Neng Malang Himself, son Hadji Ismael, son Fatima Malang, daughter Datulna, son Lawanbai, daughter o He and his brother, Ismael, helped in their fathers business making them more competent to be administrators The rest of the surviving heirs also filed their opposition, adopting Hadji Mohammads opposition as their own Sharia Court appointed Hadji Mohammad as administrator of properties outside Cotabato and Neng and Hadji Ismael as joint administrators of the estate in Cotabato April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994 petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits w/ 9 major banks o Prayed that the managers of bank be ordered to submit a bank statement of the outstanding deposit UCPB P1M 520K 400.48 Metrobank P378, 493.32 PCIB - P850 During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate medical treatment o Filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw P300k from UCPB o She was awarded P250k Petitioner and Hadji Ismael were required to submit an inventory and appraisal of properties o Hadji Ismael: 7 residential lots An agri land 3 one-storey residential bldgs 1 two-storey residential building all under Hadji Abdulas name o Neng: 7 residential lots in Cotabato City Isuzu pick-up jeepner Bank deposits Neng asserted that all properties located in Cotabato City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties accdg to Art 160 of CC and Art 116 of FC while properties outside of Cotabato were exclusive properties of Hadji Abdula Oppositors asserted that all properties left by Hadji Abdula were his exclusive properties: o He had no conjugal partnership w/ petitioner bec his having contracted 8 marriages w/ diff Muslim women violates the CC w/c provides for a monogamous marriage o He adopted a complete separation of property in his marital relations and while his other wives contributed to his properties, petitioner showed no evidence that she did 358
o The presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable bec at the time he acquired the properties, he was already married to 4 women o The properties are not conjugal in nature even if some of them are titled in the Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang because such description is nothing but just that, a description o Petitioner admitted in her petition that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from claiming that the properties were conjugal in nature o If the properties were conjugal, these should have been registered in both their names Sharia Court, presided by Judge Moson, held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains bet petitioner and the decedent primarily bec latter married 8 times o CC cannot be applied if there is more than 1 wife o The decedent was the chief, if not the sole, breadwinner of his families and petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives o The description married to Neng Malang is just a description o Islamic law, wherein the regime of property is complete separation of property in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement or any other contract, should be applied in the distribution of the estate Issue: WON the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Phil/Muslim Code Held: SC cannot decide properly absent pertinent proofs Sought the help of 2 amicus curiae, Justice Ricardo Puno and former Congressman Michael Mastura Undisputed facts: o Hadji Abdula contracted 8 marriages including the 3 w/c ended in divorce o All 8 marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of CC and before enactment of Muslim Code (MC) o Hadji Abdula divorced 4 wives and all divorces took place before MC and FC took effect o Hadji Abdula died on Dec 18, 1993 after MC and FC took effect and he was survived by 4 wives and 5 children o Following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula: CC, took effect on Aug 30, 1950 RA 394 authorizing Muslim divorces w/ was effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969 MC w/c took effect Feb 4, 1977 FC, effective Aug 3, 1988 The Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution to the petition Any attempt to dispense w/ the basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case and cast profound implications on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties therein The Court identified collateral issues w/c are required to be resolved in the settlement of the estate 1. What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of MC - All 8 marriages were during CC, so, CC applies - Art 78 recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance w/ their customs and rites 359
Before the expiration of the 30-year period after w/c Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriage in accordance w/ CC, MC took effect 2. Are multiple marriages before MC valid - Before MC, no law was in force w/c sanctioned multiple marriages - MC is prospective 3. How do the Courts pronouncement in People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo affect Muslim marriages celebrated before MC - CC, w/c recognizes monogamous marriages and treats subsequent marriages as void and monogamous and the law in effect during the celebration of the marriages, was applied in People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo 4. What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before MC - Depends on o When the marriages took place o Whether the parties lived tog as husband and wife o When and how the subject properties were acquired - Art 119, 135, 136, 142, 143 are the pertinent provisions in the CC - Art 114 of CC cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage but the wives are not precluded from proving that properties acquired during their cohabitation w/ Hadji Abdula is their exclusive property. Absent such proof, the presumption is the properties are conjugal properties of the legal marriage - Art 147 and 148 of FC also applies to properties acquired from and after Aug 3, 1988 5. What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the MC and FC took effect 6. What laws apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into before the MC but dissolved after MC - 5th and 6th answer - MC should determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs - The status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend on the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite - Status and capacity of children will depend on the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child o Child conceived or born during CC, CC will determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child (Art 255 and 256) o Child conceived or born during the period covered by MC, MC determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child (Art 58, 59, 60, and 61) - Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed, the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply (Art 110) - When the wife survives w/ a legit child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to 1/8 of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit 7. Are Muslim divorces effected before MC valid - RA 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance w/ Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969 360
A Muslim divorce under RA 394 is valid w/in that time frame efforts or assets of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties 4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula and what are their share in intestacy a. The lawful wife b. The children - MC will determine their respective shares The following evidence should be submitted: o Exact dates of the marriages o Exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages either terminated by death or by divorce o Exact periods of actual cohabitation o Identification of specific properties acquired during the periods of cohabitation and the manner and source of acquisition indicating joint or individual effert o Identities of the children (LC or IC) begotten from several unions, dates of their conceptions or births Sharia Courts decision is SET ASIDE and petition is REMANDED for the reception of addtl evidence d. Suppletory rules FC 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. (147a) NCC 1767 By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession. (1665a) 361
Four corollary issues to further situate the points of controversy in the case 1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993 - That marriage w/c was celebrated at a time when there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death 2. Who among the children are legit and who are illegit - Children conceived of a validly existing marriage are legit - Fact and time of conception or birth may be determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and applicable law 3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage are conjugal and should be liquidated and divided bet the spouses under the MC b. Properties acquired under the conditions in Art 144 of CC from Aug 30, 1950 to Aug 2, 1988 are conjugal and should be liquidated and divided bet spouses under the MC. But wives other than the lawful wife could submit evidence to prove the properties are exclusively theirs c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Art 147 and 148 of the FC from and after Aug 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding par and obtained from exclusive
Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph. (n) PNB vs. Quintos Facts: June 20, 1918 PNB granted a loan to the spouses in the amount of P31, 284 In return, the spouses mortgaged and pledged to the bank certain certificates of their shares of stock in BPI and other security bonds o In the document, they did not state that they were husband and wife, but their status says so o The document also did not show that they hold themselves solidarily liable for the debt The spouses securities given to the bank were not sufficient to pay their obligations The bank informed the spouses of their remaining balance, P33, 558.45, which Ansaldo (husband) examined and found to be correct The bank demanded payment from the spouses but they were unable to pay The defendants allege that the debt is not solidary in nature and that they should be asked to pay only the amount which they actually benefited from o They even tried to prove that Margarita only received P10k from the loan The lower court held that the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership The defendants also allege that Margarita did not accept as correct the banks notice reminding them of their remaining balance and so, this could not be held legally binding against her The lower court, however, held that Ansaldo is the husband of Margarita and the legal manager of the conjugal property which is held liable for the debt The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the bank and ordered that the conjugal partnership be held liable for the debt and in case of insufficiency, the private properties of the spouses will be used to cover the remaining unpaid balance Issue: WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt Held: YES As stated in Art 1408 of the CC, it is immaterial WON the debt is contracted by the one or the other for in either case, the debt was contracted during the marriage and therefore, the conjugal partnership is liable The decision of the lower court is affirmed Note: There is another decision attached to this case w/c says that it is a Decision Upon Motion for Reconsideration SC reiterates its first ruling: o The conjugal partnership is liable for the debt since it was contracted during the marriage in accordance w/ Art 1408 of CC o Art 1432 of the CC expresses that the conjugal partnership begins to exist at the celebration of the marriage and separation of property will only begin when it is stipulated in the marriage settlement or as provided for in Art 50 of the CC CC 1401 states what constitutes the conjugal partnership: Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the 362
common property whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them Those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them The fruits, rents, or interest received or accruing during the marriage, from the common of private property of each of the spouses o Conjugal partnership does not produce the merger of properties. So, what the spouses owned before the marriage remain exclusively theirs In case of insolvency of the conjugal partnership, WON the spouses may be held JOINTLY liable YES o CC 1698 partners are not solidarily liable w/ respect to the debt of the partnership and none can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not given him any power therefor o CC 1137 in obligations created by the will of the parties, solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined in the title thereof, giving them such a character Therefore, if solidarity exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that the partner cannot be held solidarily liable for the debts of the partnership o Since the contract signed by the defendants did not show that they have contracted a solidary obligation, the properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila (supra) 2. What is Included in the CPG FC 106 Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a) 3. What is Excluded from CPG a. brought as exclusive property FC 109 The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; b. acquired by gratuitous title during marriage FC 109 The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; FC 113 Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the doneespouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper. (150a) FC 115 Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. (n)
Laperal vs. Katigbak 363
Facts: Ramon Katigbak executed several promissory notes in favor of the Laperals However, Ramon failed to pay for his debts The Laperals filed a case against Ramon for payment of his debt and for the return of jewelry worth P97, 500 The trial court ruled in favor of the Laperals After this decision was rendered, Evelina Kalaw (wife of Ramon) filed for judicial separation of property and separate administration against her husband The court granted the judicial separation of property Among those property declared to be paraphernal property of Evelina is the lot in question which the Laperals want to be declared conjugal and therefore liable for the debt of Ramon The trial court, however, found that the property was indeed paraphernal based on the following facts: o The spouses were married in 1938 o They did not bring any property to their marriage o Ramon is an Asst. Atty. in BPI and his monthly salary is P200 o Two years after their marriage, Evelina received a lot from her mother and this is the lot in question o Her mother registered this lot in Evelinas name as was her practicebuying properties and registering them in her childrens names o Ramon himself admitted that he has no interest in the property in question Issue: WON the property is conjugal since it was acquired during the marriage Held: NO Art 160 of CC states that all properties acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife In this case, this presumption is sufficiently rebutted: o Title of the property is in the name of the wife alone o The land is of such substantial value that the husband could not have been able to afford to buy it considering the amount he earns o The money to acquire the land was given by the wifes mother o It was the practice of her mother to give her children money so they could buy properties for themselves The decision of the trial court that the property is paraphernal is AFFIRMED Veloso vs. Martinez Facts: Lucia Martinez is the widow and administratix of the estate of Domingo Franco Before Domingos death, he borrowed from Veloso the sum of P4, 500 and gave as security for the payment certain jewelry Now, Lucia is asking for the return of the jewelry, alleging that they were her sole and paraphernal property which she inherited from her mother The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lucia Issue: WON the jewelry in question is paraphernal property and should be returned to Lucia Held: YES Veloso alleges that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo w/ the knowledge and consent of Lucia and that Lucia even promised, after the death of Domingo, that she would pay the amount for which the said jewels were pawned 364
Lucia denies these allegations The Court held that in the absence of proof that the jewels were not sole and exclusive property of Lucia which she inherited from her mother, the presumption is that they are her paraphernal property (Art 1382) Hence, based on Art 1384, she has exclusive control and management over them until and unless she allowed her husband, before a notary public, to administer it for her Therefore, she could not be deprived of her possession of the said jewelry through the act of her husband if such act was done without her consent The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED Berciles v. GSIS Facts: Aug. 21, 79 Judge Pascual berciles died in office at age of 66y/o because of cardiac arrest due yo cerebral vascular accident. Because he served the govt for more than 34 yrs (26 yrs in judiciary), hes eligible for retirement so that his heirs were entitled to survivors benefits. Other benefits (unpaid salary, money value of his terminal leave and transportation and representation allowances) are to be paid by SC as employer and the return of retirement premiums to be paid by GSIS. Those benefits were claimed by two families. 1. Iluminada Ponce (they were married Jan. 20, 1941) and her 4 children (SC approved their claim for survivors benefits subject to proper determination of the rightful beneficiaries and corresponding shares (since there were 2 claimant families) and the usual clearance requirements. 2. Flor Fuentebella (claims that they were married Maar. 28, 1937) and her 4 children Nov. 11, 1980 Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the transmittal to the GSIS of the retirement papers of the deceased be held in abeyance until the payment to the rightful heirs of the other benefits from SC and that an investigator be designated to determine the respective clams of the supposed heirs of the deceased. (Recommendation was approved and Atty. Quilala was designated as investigator) Dec. 22, 1980 Atty. Quilala sent to all alleged heirs a notice of hearing and reception of evidence in support of their claims. (None of the parties appeared) Backtrack: Oct. 9, 1980 records show that claim of Iluminada and her children was already approved by GSIS Oct. 15, 1980 - the 5 yrs lump sum (retirement premiums) had been remitted by the Budget and Finance Office of SC to GSIS for payment to Iluminada and heirs Back to the present: Feb. 4, 1981 Iluminada et. Al submitted to the investigator additional documents in support of their claims: a. Evaluation report as approved by GSIS b. Certified Xerox copies of the deceseds Income tax Return for 1975, 1976 and 1979 where he listed Iluminada as his wife c. Certified Xerox copy of the application for optional insurance filed with GSIS by the deceased where he listed Iluminada et al as beneficiaries. Feb. 5 telegram was sent to Flor et al to submit their evidence of filiation yet they did not submit anything. Memorandum of investigator: The alleged marital relationship between deceased and Flor has no basis since no marriage contract was presented or any certification from the Local Civil Registrar certifying their marriage. 365
So, it is assumed that they were not legally married and they have no established family filiation - Because of this, Iluminada was said to be the lawfully wedded wife (a certification from the Local Civil registrar is present) and their children are therefore declared legitimate. (Later in GSIS, she presented an affidavit of loss from the Registrar and presented witness who were present or has knowledge of their marriage. All these were still found deficient by GSIS. Also, the authority of the solemnizing officer in the said marriage was contested.) - It recommended the awarding of other benefits from SC to Iluminada.and their children. - Recommendation was approved by SC and the money was given to Iluminada and their children. April 23 Flor et al filed a motion for recon. One of their allegations was that they did not receive the Resolution of SC awarding the money to Iluminada nor the notice of hearing from the investigator because it was sent to their old address (theyve been living in the US and the aunt and uncle living there already changed residence). They presented the letter-carrier who executed an affidavit (eto yung part na magulo yung dates) July 2 In a resolution the Court argued that survivors benefits are still not paid to Iluminada and even if Flors children are illegit they are still entitled to a share to the deceaseds other benefits from SC. July 21 The Court in another resolution clarified that it has not finally and conclusively decided that Flors children are not the heirs of the deceased. June 25. 1982 GSIS denied having approved the claim of Iluminada and the claims wwere elevated to the Committee on Claims Settlement sometime in Oct. 1980 June 3, 1981 - Contended (GSIS Board of Trustees) Decision: Retirement benefits (P311, 460) partly conjugal and partly exclusive in nature. 77/134 to Iluminada, 10/134 to their children, 5/134 to natural child Pascual Voltaire Berciles (son with Flor before marriage with Iluminada. Iluminada contends that he is not acknowledge by the deceased. ) and 4/134 to the illegitimate children Iluminada filed this case because of that decision and prayed for TRO enjoining GSIS from enforcing the said resolution. July 27 Flor et al filed a petition to trial court a petition for Mandamus with a Prayer for Restraining Order against GSIS for denying their claim to death benefits of deceased Issue: WON the GSIS Resolution is valid when it found Pascual Voltaire Berciles as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and the other children of Flor as illegit thus partitioning the benefits as such. (both families question the legality of the decision of GSIS) Held: GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the contended Resolution. Iluminada et al are the lawful heirs entitled to the benefits and it should be divided equally. With regard to the retirement premiums, it is considered to be conjugal property and so half of it goes to the wife while the other half is to be divided to the children. The other benefits from SC is again to be shared by Iluminada et al. Ratio: The Court finds no evidence showing that the deceased sign the birth certificate and acknowledged Pascual Voltaire. The deceased did 366
not also participate in the baptismal and birth certificates of the other children with Flor. With the statement of the deceaseds sister-in-law, it did not prove filiation of the Flor et al to the deceased (she said their families lived together before). Neither did the family pictures presented show proof of filiation. Nor does the letters sent by the deceased to his children with Flor to be considered. It is said that his mention that Flor is the only one is only said by the deceased so as to keep one of his families from knowing the existence of the other. NCC Art. 996 If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Art. 980 The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. FC 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. c. Acquired by redemption/exchange FC Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; Plata vs. Yatco Facts: Amalia Plata, in 1954, had purchased a parcel of land in Caloocan, Rizal, in her name, single, Filipino citizen. On 13 February 1958, she sold the property to Celso Saldaa who obtained a TCT; but seven months afterwards, Saldaa resold the same property to Amalia, married to Gaudencio Begosa, and a new certificate of Title was issued to Amalia. On the same date, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa," in consideration of a loan of P3,000, mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva married to Gregorio Leao, the said property and its improvements "of which the mortgagor declares to be hers as the absolute owner thereof." The mortgage was also signed by Gaudencio Begosa, as co-mortgagor. For failure to pay the mortgage, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold on 12 April 1960 to the mortgagee as the highest bidder; on 13 May 1961, the Sheriff issued a final deed of sale on the strength of which the Register of Deeds issued the buyer TCT. Subsequently, Villanueva sued Gaudencio alone for illegal detainer and obtained judgment against him in the CFI, that became final. A writ of execution was duly issued, but Amalia resisted all efforts to eject her from the property, and she filed a third party claim, averring ownership of the property. Upon motion of the judgment creditors, CFI cited both Begosa and Plata for contempt and, finding her explanation unsatisfactory, found her guilty and sentenced her. RTC ruling: finding petitioner Plata in contempt of court for refusing to vacate certain property, and sentencing her to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with a warning of more drastic action should she persist in disobeying the writ issued by said court. Issue: whether Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio. She denies it, claiming that she was never lawfully married to Begosa, and that she had acquired the property while still single, and was in possession thereof when the Sheriff of Rizal attempted to enforce the writ of ejectment. Villanueva and her husband maintain that Plata had repeatedly acknowledged being married to Begosa; that she had lived with him openly as his wife, and their marriage is presumed; that, 367
therefore, she is to be deemed as holding under Begosa, and is bound by the judgment against the latter. Held: Plata's possession was not derived from Gaudencio. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent (Civ. Code, Arts. 136. 137, 140). Hence, as she was not made party defendant in the eviction suit, she could validly ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband, and it was no contempt of court for her to do so, because the writ of execution was not lawful against her). The order of the lower court is annulled and set aside. The preliminary injunction is made permanent, with costs against Villanueva. Ratio: Evidence against the marriage of Amalia to Gaudencio is weak, considering the admissions of married status in public documents; the well known presumption that persons openly living together as husband and wife are legally married to each other, and that the prior marriage of Begosa to someone else does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a valid subsequent marriage to Amalia; still Villanueva could not ignore the paraphernal character of the property in question, which had been unquestionably acquired by Plata while still single, as shown by the TCT (Art. 148 of the New Civil Code). The conveyance to Celso Saldaa, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaa came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153). The deed of mortgage in favor of Villanueva actually recites that the Amalia was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaa to her. It is true that Gaudencio Begosa signed the mortgage (Exh. 4) as a comortgagor; but by itself alone that circumstance would not suffice to convert the land into conjugal property, considering that it was paraphernal in origin. This is particularly the case where the addition of Begosa as co-mortgagor was clearly an afterthought, the text of the deed showing that Plata was the sole mortgagor. Lim vs. Garcia Facts: Hilario Lim died intestate some time in 1903, leaving a widow and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some P50,000. RTC: the entire estate was conjugal property, except a house and lot and the sum of P10,000 which had been brought to the marriage by the Hilario, and except the P700 paid by him for a certain lot which had been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration of his estate, together with the improvements made thereon during the period of coverture. Luis Lim (administrator) and Hilarios children contends that none of the said property should be treated as the property of the conjugal partnership, because Hilario brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and Isabel Garcia (widow) brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time thereafter. RTC: the evidence offered in support of this contention was not sufficient to overcome the presumption established in NCC art. 1407, which provides that all the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife, and after a careful examination of the record that this finding must be sustained. 368
Issue: error of the trial court in refusing to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name of Isabel and claimed as her separate estate. It is contended by Luis Lim that these parcels of land were conveyed to Isabel during the coverture by Hilario either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. Held: These parcels of land were not acquired by Isabel by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for which it is exchanged. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with the costs against the Luis. d. Purchased with exclusive money FC Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n) Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a) e. Properties of parents Laurena vs CA Facts: Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena and Jesse Lauro Laurena met in January 1983. They were married on 19 December 1983 at the Church of Saint Augustine in Intramuros, Manila. They have two children, Mark Jordan who was born on 2 July 1985 and Michael Joseph who was born on 11 November 1987. On 19 October 1993, Darlene filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jesse. She alleged that he was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage, and the incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage although she discovered it only after the marriage. She alleged that after their wedding, they went to Baguio City for their honeymoon. They were accompanied by a 15-year old boy, the son of one of his house helpers, who he invited to sleep in their hotel suite. After their honeymoon, they settled in his house in Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque City. She became pregnant in March 1984 but suffered a miscarriage. According to her, she almost bled to death while he continued watching a television show at the foot of their matrimonial bed. 369
She alleged that he gave priority to the needs of his parents; would come home past midnight; and even tried to convert her to his religion. In addition, he was a womanizer. She lived in Batangas for three years while she tended to their gasoline station while he remained in Paraaque City. She discovered that he had been living a bachelors life while she was away. She also noticed that het had feminine tendencies. They would frequently quarrel and one time, he hit her face. She alleged that in September 1990, he abandoned their conjugal home and stopped supporting their children. She alleged that his psychological incapacity was manifested by his infidelity, utter neglect of his familys needs, irresponsibility, insensitivity, and tendency to lead a bachelors life. She further alleged that during their marriage, they acquired the following properties which were all part of their CPG: 1. duplex house and lot located at 4402 Dayap Street, Palanan, Makati City; 2. house and lot on Palaspas Street, Tanauan, Batangas; 3. dealership of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Pres. Laurel Highway, Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex Station); 4. Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi Lancer, Safari pickup, L-300 van and L-200 pick-up; and 5. Jeddah Trucking. She prayed for the dissolution of the CPG, for custody of their children, and for monthly support of P25,000. He denied her allegations. He asserted that she was emotionally immature, stubborn, unstable, unreasonable, and extremely jealous. He alleged that some of the properties claimed by her were not part of their CPG. He prayed for the dismissal of the petition. RTC: denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The manifestations of his psychological incapacity alleged by her were not so serious as to consider he is psychologically incapacitated. evidence only showed that she could not get along with him. Her
DECLARING the CPG Dissolved with all the effects provided by law; and all the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties; AWARDING the custody of the children to the parent chosen by the minors considering that they are over seven (7) years of age; Support of minors shall be borne by the parents in proportion to their respective incomes. CA: AFFIRMED with regard to the denial of the petition for annulment of marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The adjudication respecting the properties which comprise the conjugal partnership is MODIFIED to exclude the properties belonging to the parents of Jesse, i.e., the ancestral house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas, the duplex house and lot at Dayap Street, Makati, as well as the properties acquired through the operation of the Caltex station and Jeddah Trucking. Issue: Whether respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations; and Whether the properties excluded by the Court of Appeals form part of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent. Held: She failed to show that he was psychologically incapacitated and that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage. As early as 15 July 1978, his parents already executed a General Power of Attorney in favor of Jesse covering all their properties and businesses. Several Special Powers of Attorney were also executed by his parents in favor of him. On 14 April 1987, his parents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering two parcels of land located in Tanauan, Batangas. The transfer was merely an accommodation so 370
that Darlene, who was then working at the BSP, could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate using the properties as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as additional capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station. The loan was still being paid from the income from the Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by him as attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was the business of his parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. As regards the duplex house and lot in Makati City, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Manuela C. Felix in favor of Jesse. He claimed that the duplex house was purchased from the income of the Jeddah Caltex Station. However, there is no sufficient proof to sustain this allegation. In fact, he testified that he received a series of promotions during their marriage until we can afford to buy that duplex [on] Dayap. Hence, the duplex house on Dayap Street, Makati City should be included in the conjugal partnership of gains. 3. Administration of exclusive property A. by the spouse-owner FC Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a) FC Art. 110 (2) supra b. by the other spouse Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a) Veloso vs. Martinez(please see above digest) Facts Felipe has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda subdivision since 1949 upon permission obtained from Andres Ladores, the overseer of the subdivision, with an understanding that Felipe would buy the lot in time April 2, 1950 the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate were placed under custodia legis 371 Manotok Realty vs CA
Felipe made a deposit (P1,500.00) for the said lot to Vicente Legarda, the husband of Clara; but there still a remained unpaid balance which Felipe was unable to pay due to Claras death wherein her heirs could not settle their differences April 28, 1950 Vicente was appointed special administrator of Claras estate Felipe remained in possession of the lot Manotok Realty became the successful bidder and vendee of the subdivision pursuant to the deed of sale executed in its favor by the Phil. Trust Company as administrator of Testate estate of Clara Felipe refused to vacate the lots Manotok filed an action to recpver the lot Trial court dismissed Court of appeals ruled that the only right remaining to Manotok Realty is to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor Hence; this petition Furthermore, Vicente was appointed administrator of the estate more than three months adter the questioned sale; thus, the sale between Vicente and Felipe is void ab initio, the former being neither the owner nor the administrator when the subject property was sold After the appointment of Vicente as administrator, he should have applied for authority to sell. If the probate court approved such, he could have executed a valid deed of sale in favor of Felipe Ong vs CA Teodora Ong has a logging business She secured a loan from Francisco Boix Teodora however defaulted Boix then filed a complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong (joined as husband of Teodora) Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix and such was executed Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land Boix was the highest bidder A writ of possession and a certificate of sale were issued in favor of Boix Ramon Ong filed a motion to quash the writ of possession which was denied; CA affirmed such Hence, this petition Ramon Ong contends that the auction sale was null and void on three grounds: 1) the auction was made on a date different from that reflected in the advertisement, 2) the sale was published in a newspaper not of general circulation in the province where the property is situated, 3) subject property is conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife 372
Facts
Issues WON the sale of Vicente to Felipe of the land in question is valid Held No Ratio There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara during her lifetime; thus, it cannot be said that the sale that Vicente entered into had its inception before the death of Clara and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was consummated only after her death. Thus, Vicente could not have validly disposed of the land in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara
only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper Issues WON the auction sale is null and void on the ground that the notice of public auction sale was not published in accordance with law WON subject property is conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper Held and Ratio No, because the trial court deemed that the executed proceedings were in accordance with law. Factual questions should be resolved by the lower courts, not by the Supreme Court (unless of course theres showing of grave abuse of discretion on the lower courts part). No, the property is an exclusive property of the wife. Although the surname of the husband in the tax declaration was used, still it is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Thus, the lot in question is paraphernal and is therefore liable for the personal debts of the wife. o Art. 160 of the NCC is clear that the party who invokes that presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. o And even assuming that the property is conjugal in nature, the same may still be held liable. The wife was engaged in a logging business without the husbands knowledge. The rule is that wifes paraphernal properties, as well as of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business. After all, whatever profits are earned go to the conjugal partnership thus it is equitable that obligations accrued be chargeable against the conjugal property. 4. Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive property FC 111-112, of FC 236 amended by RA 6809 Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same. (n) Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. (n) Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a) AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Palanca vs Smith Facts Smith, Bell & Co. obtained a judgment against Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money 373
Smith, Bell & Co. obtained an execution which was levied upon the property in question Alejandra Palanca commenced an action asking that the attachment be dissolved on the ground that she is the only and exclusive owner of the property in question Lower Court denied such Hence, this petition properties and the house built thereon upon the consent of her husband Shortly after the execution of the contract, because of incompatibility, the spouses separated and executed a judicial separation of their conjugal property Months after, Schneckenburger obtained a divorce against Elena from Mexico and married another woman, Julia Medel Upon learning about this, Elena filed for concubinage against Rodolfo While the two were still living together/married, the spouses constructed a house on the land in question However, in order to build the house, Elena obtained a loan from The Insular Savings and mortgaged the said land as security of payment and this she executed w/ her husbands consent After the house was built, the land, along w/ the house was sold to Queco for P7, 500 The agreement was, Queco will pay 500 as downpayment and the remaining amount plus interest will be paid in monthly installments The monthly installments will be divided into payment for the Insular Savings and for Elena From Oct 30 1933 to Mar 25, 1935, the payment for Elena was given to Rodolfo And then later on, during the proceedings as to who really should receive the payment, Rosario deposited her monthly installment to Clerk of the CFI of Manila Invoking Art 1412 of CC, Rodolfo contends that as the husband and manager of the conjugal partnership, the payment must be made to him o Also alleges that the land in question and the house built on it are conjugal properties Elena, contends that the land in question is her paraphernal property and that payment must be made to her 374
Issues WON the property in question is conjugal in nature Held Yes Ratio Based on evidence, Alejandra was the owner of the property in question, which was given by Emiliano, with the consent of Alejandra, as a guaranty for the payment of a sum of money which Emiliano borrowed from the International Banking Corporation (medyo magulo di ba dire-diretso din kasi siya inexplain sa case di pa ata uso ang period noon ) With the money borrowed, Emiliano constructed the house in question, and later, conveyed the house as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking Corporation The money became a conjugal property, and when such was reinvested for the construction of the house, the house then became conjugal property and was therefore liable for the payment of debts of the husband Queco vs. Cartagena Facts: Elena Ramirez and Rodolfo Schneckenburger (respondents) were married in 1926 until sometime in August 1933 During their marriage, Elena entered into a contract w/ Rosario Queco (petitioner) to sell to Rosario her four paraphernal
o Also contends that she and Rodolfo are already divorced o That he is already married to another woman Issue: WON the land in question is conjugal Held: NO Rodolfo assumes that there is conjugal partnership and the management thereof belongs to the husband Elena, in her part, contends that the lots in question are her exclusive and paraphernal properties which she acquired before her marriage o That she and Rodolfo have divorced o That he is married to another woman That the house in question wherein Rodolfo contributed P795.90 in order to be completed has already been sold to Rosario with the express consent of Rodolfo Art 1384 of CC states that administration of a womans paraphernal property is exclusively hers unless she executes a notarized document w/c states she is giving her husband the right to administer such In this case, no proof was shown to prove that Elena gave Rodolfo the right to administer her property On the contrary, the contracts entered into by Elena with Rosario and The Insular Savings w/c Rodolfo only gave his consent to, proved that she herself was the one administering her properties as for the loan obtained by the wife, it could not be considered as conjugal since only Elena borrowed the said amount and it was only her paraphernal property which was used as mortgaged Rodolfo even received P820.61, the monthly payment given by Rosario for Elena which is way more than what he contributed to the construction of the house (Im not sure exactly how this relates to the rest of the story. At kung tama ba ang translation ko ng part na to. Hehehedugo na ilong ko sa kaka-translate. Ang haba!) Wong et al vs IAC Facts Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda They had been most of the time living separately In Angeles City, Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father with money borrowed from an officemate In Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. Katrina failed to return such so Anita Chan demanded payment. Katrina was charged with estafa for issuing a check which was dishonored for lack of funds, but the court dismissed such Anita and her husband, Ricky Wong, filed against Katrina and her husband, Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money Atty. Gregorio and Atty. Albino appeared as counsel solely for Katrina Court decided in favor of the Wongs so a writ of execution was issued, levied upon four lots in Angeles City Public auction sale was set and during that sale, properties in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson were sold A property covered by Cert. Title No. 30951 was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac and was sold to Juanito Santos, who had earlier bought such and thus redeeming it Before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the writ of execution, levy on execution, and the auction sale for the following grounds: (1) he was not given a 375
day in court, (2) he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorized her to enter into such transactions, and (3) the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore as to him all the proceedings had in the case were null and void Issues WON Romarico had his day in court WON the properties levied upon may be reconveyed to Romarico finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal property liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina Held and Ratio No o Romarico and Katrina had been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when the business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of the case, Romarico failed to act in the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife. Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court and necessarily the public auction is null and void. No The properties belong to the conjugal partnership even though the spouses Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear evidence to overcome such presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. It is unclear where he obtained the money to repay his officemate from whom he borrowed. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of money utilized in the purchase. The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrinas indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the Wongs to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. Furthermore, under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of her family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family. Wongs failed to establish such and so they cannot bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrinas personal obligations to them. (Wongs must return to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson [they are the buyers of the land] the prices they received from the sale. Furthermore, the redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against Romarico and Katrina filed by Rural Bank of Porac should however be respected unless ROmarico exercises his right of redemption over the property. These are in line with the principle that innocent buyers may not be prejudiced.) 5. What constitutes CPG a. Definition FC 106 supra b. presumption of CPG FC 116 All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a) 376
Torela vs. Torela Facts: Clara and Silveriana Torela (petitioners) claim that the land in question is the conjugal property of their parents and that they are entitled to their deceased mothers share CFI ruled in favor of the petitioners but the CA reversed the decision The following are the facts which the CA based its decision on: o A certain parcel of land is registered in the name of Felimon Torela married to Graciana Gallego o When Graciana died and Felimon contracted a 2nd marriage w/ Marciana Gepanago, he filed a Motion ExParte alleging that the land was inherited by him before his 1st marriage and since his 1st wife has died many years ago, that the civil status appearing on the face of the certificate of title be changed from Felimon Torela married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela married to Marciana Gepanago o This motion, w/c contained the conformity of Clara was granted by the Register of Deeds o Thereafter, Felimon sold the said land to the Mahilums o In the deed of sale, Felimon stated that the he is the owner of the said land and that he inherited it from his father o According to the petitioners, however, they saw their mother and father clean the said lot when they were still young thereby implying that the said lot is conjugal property of their parents and that they are, therefore, entitled to their mothers share o As support to their allegations, Silveriana and Miguel Pedrosa testified that the land in question was cleared jointly by Graciana and Felimon o The CA did not give ceredence to their testimony since Silveriana was not yet born when Felimon and his father started living in the said land in 1905 and because Miguel was just 1 year old then So, they could not have known that Felimon and his father lived in the said property in 1905 Since Felimon was already 27 then, he must have already helped his father in cleaning and tilling that land In fact, during his 1st marriage, he has already cultivated portions of the said land Issue: WON the said property is conjugal Held: NO The property in question is one of those under Art 1401 of CC Petitioners allege that CA failed to consider Art 1407 which states that all property of spouses shall be deemed conjugal in the absence of proof to the contrary They said that since the lot was registered in the name of Felimon Torela married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed that it is a conjugal property SC held that the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage o In the instant case, there is no proof w/c shows that the land in question was acquired during the 1st marriage o In fact, Clara even conformed to the Motion Ex-Parte w/c states that the land is inherited by Felimon before his 1st marriage o The term married to Graciana Gallego is merely descriptive of the civil status of Felimon Torela and cannot be used as proof the land was acquired during the marriage o That the land was registered during the marriage is not proof that it was acquired during the marriage 377
Since Felimon was the exclusive owner of the property, he had the right to sell the land to the exclusion of his children in the 1st marriage Magallon vs. Montejo Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint against their father, Martin Lacerna, compelling him to deliver to them their share in a parcel of land in Davao del Sur which they claim is a conjugal property of him and their mother, Eustaquia Pichan, who has already died Martin denied having married Eustaquia and denied being the father of the respondents However, the trial court found that Martin did marry Eustaquia and that the respondents were his children with her It also found that Martin started working the homestead and his right to patent the land accrued during his marriage to Eustaquia So, therefore, the respondents herein were entitled to share of the property Martin appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court However, during the time the case was filed, no certificate of title to the land had yet been issued to Martin although he has already fulfilled all the requirements and when the certificate was finally granted, it was issued in the name of Martin Lacerna, married to Epifania Magallon (2nd wife and petitioner) The writ of execution was served on both Martin and Epifania Epifania filed a motion for intervention and to stay execution alleging that the property in question is her and Martins conjugal property Issue: WON the property in question is conjugal property of the 2nd marriage by virtue of the name stated in the certificate of title of the land Held: NO The land in question rightfully belonged to the 1st marriage and should have been titled as such; however, through fraud or mistake, it was registered in the names of Martin and Epifania In this situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied or constructive trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto Magallon, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the respondents their share in the land The title of the land w/c says married to Epifania Magallon is merely descriptive of Martins status and is not proof that the land is their conjugal property Further, the Court found that Epifania cannot invoke the presumption that the property is conjugal since she was not able to prove that she was married to Martin except for the title on the certificate of the land and the homestead claim on the land was perfected during the first marriage However, the trial court and IAC seemed to have overlooked that Martin, as the surviving spouse, also has share in the of the land pertaining to the share of Eustaquia and he should, therefore, be given equal share to the said portion The case is remanded to the lower court for the partition Another question: o Is petitioner bound by final judgment rendered in an action to w/c she was not made a party? Yes WON she was a lawful wife or a mere live in partner, the Court could not believe that she was not aware of the litigation concerning the land until the writ of execution was served 378
And if she really had a right to the said land, he would have lost no time in asserting it at an earliest possible time These documents were proven to be genuine by the notary public Adel Ras, a relative of Maria, also testified that the said lands were given to Maria by her father before her marriage to Agripino o On the part of the petitioners, their only evidence regarding that the properties were the conjugal property of their parents is oral testimonies w/ only tax declarations for support This petition is upon the claim of the petitioners that they have new evidence to present Issue: WON the petitioners are able to prove that the properties in question were the conjugal properties of their mother and Agripino Held: NO The petitioners presented evidence showing that Agripino was indeed married to Engracia therefore, proving that they were LC o However, this was no longer needed since in its decision, the appellate court declared Engracia as the surviving spouse They also presented, as proof that the lands in question were conjugal properties of Engracia and Agripino, 8 sketch maps of these lands which were approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia The Court affirmed CAs decision that the presumption of conjugal partnership refers to those properties acquired during marriage The fact that these lands were surveyed and approved during the 2nd marriage does not prove that the same were acquired during the same marriage 379
Cuenca vs. Cuenca Facts: Respondents Restituto and Meladora filed a case against their half-siblings (petitioners) for recovery of real property Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners but the appellate court reversed and set aside the said decision The two families are claiming ownership over several parcels of land o Respondents allege that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, who are owners of the lands in question They also allege that some of the parcels are paraphernal properties of Maria and Agripino while others were their conjugal property Agripino and Engracia Basadre (mother of petitioners) were not legally married bec at the time they were together, Agripino was married to Jesusa Pagar o Petitioners denied the legitimacy of the marriage bet Agripino and Maria and the legitimacy of the respondents Agripino and Engracia were legally married and they are the LC The lands in question are conjugal property of their parents Appellate court based its decision on the following: o Two documents wherein Agripino himself declared that the 3 parcels of land in question are the exclusive properties of Maria
In fact, some of the documents presented showed that 5 of the 8 parcels of land in question were in the name of either of the respondents Titan Construction Corporation vs. David Facts: Manuel and Martha David (respondents) got married on March 25, 1957 During their marriage, they acquired a lot in White Plains w/c was registered in Marthas name In 1976, the spouses separated in fact and stopped communicating w/ each other In 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had sold the lot to Titan Manuel filed a complaint for the annulment of the contract and reconveyance of the land o Alleged that the sale by Martha in favor of Titan was w/o his knowledge and consent and, therefore, void Titan claimed it was a buyer in good faith bec it relied on a Special Power of Attorney signed by Manuel w/c authorized Martha to dispose of the land in behalf of the spouses Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious and his signature was forged RTC ruled in favor of Manuel and the CA affirmed the decision Petitioner appealed and alleged that the property was Marthas paraphernal property Issue: WON the said property is conjugal considering that it was in Marthas name Held: YES CC 160 states that properties of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal unless proven otherwise Art 153 (1) states that properties acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for partnership, or for only one of the spouses are conjugal properties This is carried over to Art 117 of FC Titan was not able to prove that the property was Marthas paraphernal property Therefore, the presumption that the property is conjugal is not overturned Since Manuel did not consent to the sale of the property, the Deed of Sale is, therefore, void since Art 172 of the CC and Art 124 of FC specifically states that a husbands written consent is needed in any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property The RTC found the signature in the SPA as a forgery as shown by the expert testimony and the SPA was spurious for it did not contain Manuels residence certificate and because it was not presented for reg w/ the QC Register of Deeds in violation of Sec 64 of PD 1529 (c) what are included in CPG, FC 117 Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse; 380
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found; (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting; (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and (7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159) Issues Held Ratio Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that o the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money") o Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land o Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith WON Thomas has a right over the land WON Estelita is a buyer in good faith No Yes Fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, 381
Facts December 4, 1970 - Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married February 15,1981 They have been separated June 4, 1974 a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman Again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants July 31, 1981 Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and
Cheesman vs IAC
particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself The finding of the lower court that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise Villanueva vs. CA Facts: Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot 5 children. They resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired 22 real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Also, Nicolas, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income from coconuts and the other lands/houses are leased to the following: a) Mandaue Food Products Company b) Barben Wood Industries, Inc. c) Metaphil, Inc. d) Benedicto Development Corp. e) Benedicto Development Corporation f) Visayan Timber and Machinery Corp. g) House lessees
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time Nicolas suffered a stroke on 1985 and until the present, it is Procopio, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. Natividad went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. Eusebia then complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by her to Procorpio, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties. Further, Natividad testified that the parcel of land was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. 382
RTC: Family Code Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is proved. The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute solid evidence which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented no factual solidity to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152[2] exclusively with her own money. (Return everything to Eusebia) Villanuevas filed a petition to CA. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebias heirs substituted her. The CA eventually upheld the Decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees, ruling in this wise: Issue: whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias complaint; WON the 6 properties were conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia; WON the presumption under Art. 148 on co-ownership should be applied. Held: Since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense for the first time on appeal. The properties are conjugal. The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses, establish this fact. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any claim the Villanuevas may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal. Ratio: ROC Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. 383
Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. Finally, reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. It shows that there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Zulueta vs. Pan-Am Facts: Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration of the decision of SCRafael Zulueta maintains that the decision appealed from should be affirmed in toto. Pan-American World Airways Inc., in turn, prays that the decision "set aside ... with or without a new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs; or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award embodied therein be considerably reduced." (parang wala talagang kwento yung case) Mr. Zulueta caused a delay in their flight because of a call of nature. He had to go to the beach to relieve himself. This made the Captain somewhat irritated on him and so he was off-loaded and stranded. It was said that even before Mr. Zulueta had reached the ramp leading to the plane, Capt. Zentner was already demonstrating an intemperate and arrogant tone and attitude ("What do you think you are?), thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back in the same vein. As a consequence, there immediately ensued an altercation in the course of which each tried to show that he could not be cowed by the other. Then came the order of Capt. Zentner to off-load all of the Zuluetas, including Mrs. Zulueta and the minor Miss Zulueta, as well as their luggage, their overcoats and other effects handcarried by them; but, Mr. Zulueta requested that the ladies be allowed to continue the trip. Meanwhile, it had taken time to locate his four (4) pieces of luggage. As a matter of fact, only three (3) of them were found, and the fourth eventually remained in the plane. In short, the issue between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta had been limited to determining whether the latter would allow himself to be browbeaten by the former. In the heat of the altercation, nobody had inquired about the cause of Mr. Zulueta's delay in returning to the plane, apart from the fact that it was rather embarrassing for him to explain, in the presence and within the hearing of the passengers and the crew, then assembled around them, why he had gone to the beach and why it had taken him some time to answer there a call of nature, instead of doing so in the terminal building. Issue: WON the amount damage was excessive WON the compromise agreement between the ailine and Mrs. Zulueta can be enforced Held: Motion for recon denied. (Hindi ko magets yung connect sa CPG kasi nga ewan yung facts) Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases SC denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned - she having settled all her differences with the airline, which appears to have paid her the sum of P50,000 therefor - "without prejudice to this sum being deducted from the award made in said decision." The payment is effective, insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due from the airline, with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. What is ineffective is the compromise agreement, insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Mrs. Zulueta's motion was for the dismissal of the case insofar as she was concerned, and the defense cited in support thereof Article 113 of said 384
Code, pursuant to which "(t)he husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except: ... (2) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year." This provision, We held, however, refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest, not to the case at bar, "in which the husband is the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership ... he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of the conjugal partnership," to which the amounts recoverable for breach of said contract, accordingly, belong. The damages suffered by Mrs. Zulueta were mainly an in accident of the humiliation to which her husband had been subjected. The Court ordered that said sum of P50,00 paid by PANAM to Mrs. Zulueta be deducted from the aggregate award in favor of the plaintiffs herein for the simple reason that upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, as provided by law, said amount would have to be reckoned with, either as part of her share in the partnership, or as part of the support which might have been or may be due to her as wife of Rafael Zulueta. It would surely be inane to sentence the defendant to pay the P700,000 due to the plaintiffs and to direct Mrs. Zulueta to return said P50,000 to the defendant. In this connection, it is noteworthy that, for obvious reasons of public policy, she is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the husband's consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations by compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the law seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them. It is urged that there is no proof as to the purpose of the trip of the plaintiffs that neither is there any evidence that the money used to pay the plane tickets came from the conjugal funds and that the award to Mrs. Zulueta was for her personal suffering or injuries. There was, however, no individual or specific award in favor of Mrs. Zulueta or any of the plaintiffs. The award was made in their favor collectively. Again, in the absence of said proof, the presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the plaintiffs and that the money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed "(t)hat things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life." In fact Manresa maintains that they are deemed conjugal, when the source of the money used therefor is not established, even if the purchase had been made by the wife. And this is the rule obtaining in the Philippines. Even property registered, under the Torrens system, in the name of one of the spouses, or in that of the wife only, if acquired during the marriage, is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless there is competent proof to the contrary. Ratio: Said damages fall under paragraph (1) of said Article 153, the right thereto having been "acquired by onerous title during the marriage ... ." ART. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; 385
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title; (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses; (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. Mendoza vs. Reyes Facts: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. The properties in question were bought from J. M. Tuason & Co., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc. on February, 1947 on installment basis. (Julia said, February 15, 1963). The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the instalments to Araneta due to lack of money so they had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Thus, on November 26, 1948, they jointly obtained a loan of P12,000.00 from the RFC for the following exclusive purposes only: 'to complete the construction of one-storey residential building; and to pay the balance of the price of the lot offered as security'. Out of this loan, P5,292.00 was paid to Araneta. The deed of absolute sale was executed by Araneta on November 27, 1948. On October 2, 1952, the spouses secured an additional loan of P8,000.00 from the RFC 'to pay the balance of the lot offered as additional security, and to defray the expenses incurred in the repairs of the building'. From the amount of this loan, P7,719.60 was paid and the deed of absolute sale was executed by Araneta. In the deed of sale, the vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the phrase: 'with my marital consent. As a result of these sales, TCTs were issued for the 2 Lots by the Register of Deeds of QC, in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO REYES." The mortgage contracts executed by the spouses in favor of the RFC were duly registered and annotated on the said TCTs. As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later a camarin on the two lots. The camarin was leased as a school building to the Quezon City Elementary School of La Loma for the period of two years (1950-51) at P500.00 a month. When the school was transferred to another place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza for ten years at P600.00 a month for the first year and P700.00 for the remaining nine years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. The camarin was converted into a movie house and used as such by the lessees. In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the building, the spouses failed to pay seasonably their obligations to the RFC so, as late as November 28, 1958, they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from the DBP, as successor of the RFC, for the payment of an outstanding balance of P7,876.13. On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question, together with their improvements to Mendozas for the sum of P80,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the same time the spouses were living separately and were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale, TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas. Ponciano S. Reyes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent. 386
Mendozas alleged that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. Julia supported the spouses contentions. CFI: dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of Julia. It ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. Contested CA Decision: the deed of sale executed by Julia de Reyes in favor of Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. Mendoza is hereby declared null and void with respect to one- half share of Ponciano reyes therein; the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to cancel TCT and to issue certificates of title in favor of t Ponciano S. Reyes for 1/2 pro-indiviso and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia Mendoza for one-half (1/2) also pro-indiviso; the Mendozas are hereby ordered to pay unto Ponciano the accrued rentals of style properties in litigation due to the share corresponding to him, at the rate of P350.00 a month from March 3, 1961 until the finality of this decision, with legal interest thereon; and mendozas are likewise ordered to pay him P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs in both instances. Issue: WON the said property id conjugal. Held: There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. Ratio: ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Tarrossa vs. De Leon Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Fairview, QC. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. Subsequently, Bonifacio, for P 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. Thereafter, on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. 387
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had former TCT cancelled. They secured the issuance in their names of a new TCT from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of new TCT, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of QC to protect their rights over the property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in QC. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. In support of their case, they presented the following documents: a. A Real Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on July 22, 1977. b. A Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on November 27, 1979 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage. c. The Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, promulgated on July 30, 1982, nullifying the Real Estate Mortgage. The Tarrosas averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. And, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC: Deed of Sale void ab initio; cancel TCT in the name of Tarrossas CA: affirmed Issues: WON properties were fully paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property. Held: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. The nullity proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and 388
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to onehalf of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, SC is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration in the amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. d. If property bought by instalments FC Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n) Castillo vs. Pasco Facts: n October 1931 Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived two previous husbands. Petitioners were children and grandchildren (representing their deceased parents) of Marcelo Castillo, Sr. by his previous marriage. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died, and his widow married her fourth husband, Luis San Juan, on June 8, 1934. On December 22, 1932, Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as coowners of the fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for P6,000.00 (although the deed recited a higher amount), payable in three installments: P1,000 upon execution of the deed; P2,000 on January 25, 1933 without interest; and P3,000 within one year thereafter, with 11% interest from February 1, 1933, but extendible for another year. Against the contention of petitioners that the fishpond thus bought should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture, the CA declared it to be paraphernalia because it was purchased with exclusive funds of Macaria. She was admittedly a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and the latter's principal source of income was only his P80 a month salary, as provincial treasurer, besides two small residential lots and fishponds, which were encumbered and later transferred to his five children by his first wife and whom he was then supporting in medical and high school. Actually, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died without enough assets to pay his debts. . CA found that the initial payment of P1,000 for the fishpond now in litigation was made up of P600, that one of the vendors (Gabriel Gonzales) owed to appellee Pasco, and P400 in cash, which the latter paid out of the proceeds of the sale of one of her nipa lands. The second installment of P2,000 appears to have been paid with the proceeds of the loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond 389
was mortgaged by both spouses. Dr. Jacinto later assigned his interest to Dr. Antonio Pasco. The last payment of P3,000 was derived from a loan secured by a mortgage (Exh. 2) on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria Pasco, and one of which she had inherited from a former husband, Justo S. Pascual, while the other lot encumbered was assessed in her exclusive name. CFI: the fishpond in San Roque, Paombong, Bulacan was the exclusive paraphernal property of Macaria Pasco, surviving spouse of the deceased Marcelo Castillo, Sr., and dismissing the complaint for partition and accounting filed by Castillos CA: affirmed Issue: WON the fishpond is conjugal property Held: Since the wife, under Article 1418, cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband, her private transactions are presumed to be for her own account, and not for the account of the partnership. he finding of the Court of Appeals is that Gabriel Gonzales owed this particular indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the husband authorized her to use community funds therefor, the appellate Court's finding can not be disturbed by us. Whether the evidence adverted to should be credited is for the Court of Appeals to decide. the deeds show the loans to have been made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, and by Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was owned by the conjugal As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco As the fishpond was undivided property of the widow and the conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs of the latter were entitled to ask for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's one-sixth direct share; (b) her half of the community property; (e) her successional rights to a part of the husband's share pursuant to the governing law of succession when the husband died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for any amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage debt as aforesaid. All these details must be settled after proper trial. Ratio: ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse: 390 partnership, and which the creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so desired. If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security of his wife's property is conjugal in character, a fortiori should it be conjugal when borrowed by both spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan becomes an obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one primarily bound for its repayment. two installments, totalling P5,000, of the price of the fishpond were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that was paid exclusively with money belonging to the wife.
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband. ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong: 1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only. The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the circumstance of the sale of the fishpond in question being made by the original owners in favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and Macaria Pasco, is indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be deemed paraphernal or conjugal. Tarrossa vs. De Leon (please see above digest) e. credits due, FC 119 Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a) f. improvements on CPG property, FC 120 Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. (158a) Padilla vs. Padilla Facts Narciso Padilla died Widow Concepcion prays that her paraphernal property be segregated and that she be given of the conjugal partnership and that her usurfructuary right over of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted be recognized CFI of Manila declared certain pieces of real estate and jewelry and certain sums of money to be paraphernal Backstory: o Dec. 12, 1912 Narciso and Concepcion were married o Husband contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the time of the marriage while the wife brought to the marriage considerable property in real estate, jewelry, and cash o Feb. 12, 1934 husband died o Husband left no children, executed a will giving his whole estate to his mother, Isabel Bibby Vda. De Padilla 391
o Seven pieces of real estate are in controversy in this case o SC agrees in the finding of the RTC that the aforementioned properties are paraphernal, also certain jewels, and that the husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet some personal obligations and that an amount received by the wife during the marriage was commingled with the conjugal partnership funds Issues How far is a Torrens title conclusive and incontestable Whether the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the construction of the building, or the value at the time of liquidation of the conjugal partnership Whether the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to make possible the construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership, should be reimbursed to the wife Is the P7000 borrowed by the husband from the wife for personal debts be deducted from the conjugal partnership Whether interest should be paid by the widow on the amount withdrawn by her from the savings account of the conjugal partnership Held and Ratio What appears in the Torrens certificates in this case is neither final nor incontrovertible o Property may be shown to be really of either spouse, though recorded in the names of both o Because of the feelings of trust existing between the spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the true ownership of the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase money o Oral and documentary proof is more than sufficient to offset and counteract the certificates of title and the presumption of law Value of the lots occupied by the constructions, to be paid to the widow, should be that prevailing at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership o The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership o Wife should not be allowed to demand payment of the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this would unduly disturb the husbands management of the conjugal partnership Value of the buildings at the time they were torn down should be paid to the wife o Old buildings had some value, though small, and it will be the duty of the commissioners to assess that value o The court entertains no matter of doubt that the conjugal partnership derived a positive advantage from the demolition, which made it possible to erect new constructions for the partnership The amount in question cannot be charged to the conjugal partnership (came almost exclusively from the fruits of the paraphernal property) because there was no proof that they redounded to the benefit of the family and that the privilege established by law on behalf of the paraphernal patrimony would be encroached upon Yes for there was no proof that said amount suggests the possibility that the same might have been used for funeral expenses Caltex vs Felias 392
Facts
Lot No. 107 was owned by spouses Juliano Felias and Eulalia Felion Spouses donated said lot to their daughter, Felisa Felias, making said lot her paraphernal property TC rendered judgment in civil case Texas Company vs Simeon Sawamoto (husband of Felias) ordering payment of the latter A writ of execution was issued who levied upon the subject lot The lot was then sold at a public auction Felisa filed an action to declare herself the exclusive owner of the lot Conception died and is now represented by her testate heirs and legatees Backstory: o The seven properties were declared to be paraphernal o After the decision was returned to the lower court for execution, the battle for liberation of Manila supervened and as a result, the conjugal buildings on the Arquiza and Juan Luna properties were completely destroyed, and the Regidor property was expropriated The court held that Arquiza and Luna properties remained paraphernal (the conjugal improvements having been destroyed) The Camba property was originally paraphernal but a building was erected thereon by the conjugal partnership, so that it becomes conjugal partnership property upon the reimbursement of the wife of its present value Martin property, again reimbursement should be made so that it becomes a conjugal partnership property Callejon property was proven to be paraphernal so such should be delivered to Concepcion Regidor property, compensation received for the expropriation should be divided between the spouses Hidalgo property is partly conjugal and partly paraphernal but it shall become conjugal after Concepcion shall have been reimbursed
Issues WON the subject lot is not anymore a paraphernal property of Felisa considering that a building was erected into it during the marriage with the conjugal funds Held Yes Ratio When the lot was donated to Felisa, the lot became her paraphernal property. At the time of the levy and sale of the sheriff, the lot did not belong to the conjugal partnership so it was not answerable for the obligations of the husband. The building constructed was destroyed during the last war, so that at the time the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of Caltex, the house included in the deed was no longer in existence Vda. de Padilla vs. Paterno Facts Feb. 12, 1934 Narciso Padilla died leaving a childless widow, Conception Paterno His last will instituted Ysabel de Padilla, his mother, as universal heiress His widow moved for the delivery of her paraphernal property, etc.
Issues WON the estate of Concepcion has also the exclusive right to the fruits of those properties which, although originally paraphernal, had finally become converted to conjugal assets after their values were reimbursed or paid to the estate of 393
Concepcion in the final partition and division of the estate left by Narciso Held Yes Ratio The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time immediately before the death of Narciso that ended the conjugal partnership They cannot be considered to have become conjugal property only as of the time their values were paid to Concepcion because by that time the conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not acquire the ownership of said properties He acquisition by the partnership of there properties was subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted As a consequence, all the fruits of these properties, after the dissolution of the partnership by the death of the husband, until the final partition, logically belonged to the universal heir of said husband and to the widow in co-ownership, share and share alike Calimlim vs. Fortun Facts Dec. 19, 1962 Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married They begot five children; they lived on a small house on the land in question After Fernandos father died in 1965, Fernando inherited the land 1978 Fernando abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines They were convicted of concubinage Fernando then sold the subject property with the house to Daguines Unable to take possession of the lot and house, Daguines initiated a complaint
Issues WON the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property WON the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction Held and Ratio Yes o Both the land and the building belong the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land o The value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership No Since the properties are conjugal, Fernando could not have alienated the house and lot to Daguines considering that Mercedes did not consent to it With such, the sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support 394
The law prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union WON the lot was a paraphernal property WON the sale of Lucia to Eda was valid WON Salimbagat and Cimafranca were buyers in good faith Held and Ratio The venta definitiva over the lot was executed when her marriage to Torregiani was already subsisting. Although the ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the presumption of conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the venta definitiva which contains the positive assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly supported by the testimony of Carpitanos, one of the original sellers of the lot. However, in 1958, a construction of a building was done. Although no evidence was presented on the source of funds used in the construction to determine whether the same was conjugal or partnership, petitioners nevertheless enjoy in their favor the presumption that the funds were conjugal. Thus, even if the lot was originally paraphernal, the same became conjugal upon the construction of the building. The sale was not valid. Eda had no sufficient means of livelihood and they were totally dependent on their mother Lucia for the support of their family; thus, strengthening the claim that the price of the property is fictitious and Eda could not have paid such. And assuming if the deed of sale was indeed signed by Lucia, still it is void ab intio since the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent. They are not buyers in good faith. They should have inquired from the office of the register of deeds concerning the genuineness of the certificate of title. Ravina vs. Villa-Abrille Facts: 395
Embrado vs. CA Facts The lot was originally owned by Juan, Pastor and Matias Carpitanos Jul. 2, 1946 they sold a lot to Lucia Embrado The document provided that even thought he deed was prepared and signed on such date, the effects of the document would retroact to Apr. 15, 1941, the date the lot and its improvements were actually sold to Lucia The sale was registered in the name of Lucia alone who was then already married to Torregiani The word single was cancelled and replaced by married to Torregiani Lucia sold the lot, described as paraphernal property, to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez Eda sold the lot to Marcos Salimbagat Torregianis instituted an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against Eda and spouse Santiago, Cimafranca and Salimbagat alleging that the sale was void because Torregiani did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because the lot was a conjugal property, and that Lucia was only misled into signing the deed of sale on the belief that the lot was merely intended as security for a loan Issues
Mary Ann Villa-Abrille and Pedro Villa-Abrille a married couple w/ 4 children 1982, they bought a lot (lot 2) adjacent to lot 1 w/c is Pedros exclusive property The spouses built a house on the two lots and made improvements including a poultry and annex 1991, Pedro got a mistress and started neglecting his family Mary Ann sold their movables to support the family and the studies of the children Pedro, alone, sold the house and the two lots to the petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners The house and lots were sold nevertheless even w/o Mary Anns consent After the sale, Pedro, w/ the members of CAFGU and w/ the help of petitioners, took Mary Anns and the childrens properties while they were not in the house When the family came back, they were not allowed to enter their house Mary Ann filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages, and Attorneys Fees w/ Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and petitioners Pedro alleged, during the trial that he bought the house w/ his own money Petitioners asserted that they inspected the titles of the property before buying RTC voided the sale in terms of Mary Anns one-half share CA declared the sale of lot 1, Pedros exclusive property as valid and the sale of lot 2 and the house as void Issue: WON lot 2 is Pedros exclusive property WON its sale is valid w/o Mary Anns consent WON the Ravinas are purchasers in good faith and could claim reimbursements for the improvements they made to the properties Held: NO o Petitioners assert that Pedro acquired lot 2 through exchange/barter w/ his sister and thus, the lot remained exclusive even when acquired during his marriage o but since they were not able to show proof of the exclusive nature of the property, the presumption that the lot is conjugal since it was acquired during the marriage subsists o the house built is also conjugal for having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses who had to borrow money from DBP for such purpose NO o The sale was made during the effectivity of FC and Art 124 of FC states that disposition of conjugal property w/o the consent of both husband and wife is void o Since the sale was done w/o Mary Anns consent although w/ her knowledge, it was, therefore, annullable w/in 5 years NO o The petitioners knew that the property belong to the spouses as evidenced by the Title of the said property o Also, they were informed by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale o Art 449 of NCC states that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown w/o right to indemnity Note: Mary Ann is not claiming ownership over lot 1. The issue her involves lot 2 and the house 6. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121 and 122 Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: 396
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a) Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose abovementioned. (163a) Mariano vs. CA (Ill only include the info specific to the topic. May kasali kasi syang procedural info na di ko gets. Hehehe) Facts: Esther Sanchez filed a complaint against Lourdes Mariano for payment of the ready-made ladies dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to Lourdes After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lourdes and ordered Esther to pay Lourdes for damages The writ of execution was levied, among others, on real and personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and her husband Daniel 397
Daniel filed an annulment of the execution of sale alleging that the conjugal partnership could not be held liable for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife and that household appliances and utensils necessarily used in conjugal dwelling were exempt from execution Issue: WON the conjugal partnership is liable for obligations contracted solely by the wife Held: YES Though Daniel is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, it is clear that Esther engaged in business w/o objection from him and w/ his consent and approval It was also acknowledged by the spouses that the profits from the business had redounded to the benefit of the familythey were used for expenses necessary to support the family like the education of the children, food and other household expenses Since Lourdes action against Esther was incidental to the business in which she is engaged, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived therefrom benefited the family PBM failed to pay the loan Ayala filed a complaint to get back the loan they gave In the writ of execution, among those included were 3 of the conjugal properties of Alfredo and his wife, Encarnacion Private respondents filed a case to enjoin the auction sale of their conjugal properties on the ground that the properties could not be held liable since the conjugal partnership did not benefit from the loan Ayala, on the other hand, contends that it is not necessary to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the family The lower court held that the conjugal partnership is not liable for the obligations of Alfredo Issue: WON the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the obligations contracted solely by Alfredo Held: NO Petitioners assert that the following were benefits to the family: o The employment of Alfredo would be prolonged and he will receive his monthly salary longer o Shares of stock of the members of his family in PBM would appreciate o His prestige in the corp would be enhanced and his career would be boosted The Court held that these are not the benefits contemplated by Art 161 of CC o The benefit must be one directly resulting from the loan and not merely by-products or spin-off of the loan itself Petitioner also assert that Art 161 of CC says that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership o There is a diff bet redounded to the benefit of or benefited from and for the benefit of 398
Ayala vs. CA Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50M and 30K loan from Ayala Investment and Devpt Corp. As added security to the credit line, Alfredo Ching (respondent), Executive VP of PBM, executed security agreements and made himself jointly and severally liable for PBMs loan
o The former requires actual benefit to be realized o The latter requires only that the transaction should be one which normally would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of whether or not actual benefit accrued The Court held that Art 161 of CC and Art 121 (2) of FC are similarly worded and while both provisions used for the benefit of, Art 122 of FC used redounded to the benefit of. Thus, the phrases are actually used interchangeably and are one and the same If the husband contracted the loan on behalf of the family business, then, the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the obligations since such will naturally redound to the benefit of the family though no actual benefit may be proved But if the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, and the money was given to a 3rd party, then, that contract cannot be categorized as falling w/in the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership In the case at bar, Alfredo only acted as a surety for the loan contracted by PBM Petitioners also assert that acting as surety us part of the business or profession of Alfredo The Court contends that it is not o Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business o Surety does not become part of his profession All in all, payment of the personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife cannot be charged to the conjugal partnership unless these benefited the family o The loan is a corporate loan and not a personal one o Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession or an act of administration for the benefit of the family Ching vs. CA (this couple seems to always be in trouble) Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBCMI) obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) o At first, P9M o 2nd P13M For these loans, acting as one of the guarantor is Alfredo Ching (one of the petitioners) who bound himself to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of PBCMI obligations to ABC PBCMI was not able to pay its loans ABC filed a complaint for sum of money w/ prayer of preliminary attachment against PBCMI and the guarantors including Alfredo Among those included in the attachment is the 100k shares of stocks in Citycorp Investment Philippines of Alfredo Ching Encarnacion Ching filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment on the 100k shares of stock contending that the said shares are conjugal in nature and should not be held liable for the personal obligations of Alfredo since those obligations did not redound to the benefit of the family o Part of her evidence: Marriage contract w/ Alfredo stating that they were married on January 8, 1960 Articles of incorporation of Citycorp Investment Philippines dated May 14, 1979 General Information Sheet of the corp showing that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of the said corp and was one of its 20 stockholders RTC ruled in favor of the spouses CA reversed the ruling Issue: WON the 100k shares of stocks is conjugal in nature and if it is, can it be held liable for the personal obligation of Alfredo 399
Held: It is conjugal in nature o CA contentions: that the presumption in Art 160 of NCC shall not apply when the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of money used to acquire the stocks That the shares of stocks were solely in the name of Alfredo and is, therefore, his o Petitioner contentions: Source of funds in the acquisition of the shares is not the controlling factor when invoking Art 160 of NCC Such presumption subsists even when the property is in the name only of one of the spouses o SC ruling: Art 160 of NCC provides that all properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired w/ funds of the partnership (Tan vs. CA) As long as properties were acquired during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal Even when the manner in w/c the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply and the properties will still be considered conjugal The evidence given by the petitioners showed that the stocks were acquired during their marriage These are, therefore, presumed to be conjugal ABC failed to prove that the said stocks were acquired using the exclusive funds of the husband The fact that the stocks were solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that it is only Alfredo who owns them It cannot be held liable for the personal obligation of the husband o CA contends that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement w/ ABC for the payment of PBCMI loans, Alfredo was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legit business o Petitioners contend that suretyship was not contracted in the pursuit of the husbands profession or business That it did not redound to the benefit of the family o SC: for the conjugal partnership to be held liable for the obligations of the husband, the respondent should have shown proof that the partnership benefited by Alfredos act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship w/ ABC for and in behalf of PBCMI The loan was for the benefit of PBCMI and not for Alfredo Possible appreciation of the stocks of the members of the family in PBCMI and enhancements of Alfredos career are not the benefits contemplated by Art 161 of NCC Benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan and not merely byproduct or spin-off of the loan 400
Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo Facts: Miguela (respondent) and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967 They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their marriage The deed of absolute sale, however, was named only to Marcelino December 1, 1993 Marcelino Dailo executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo authorizing her to obtain a loan from petitioner and use the house and lot in question as security This transaction took place w/o Miguelas knowledge and consent Marcelino was not able to pay the loan The mortgaged property was auctioned and was bought by the petitioner Marcelino died on Dec 20, 1995 In one of her visits to the property, Miguela learned that petitioner has already employed a Roldan Brion to clean its premises and her car was razed bec Brion allowed a boy to play w/ fire w/in the premises Miguela filed a case for the nullity of the sale and reconveyance of the property Petitioner contended that the property in question was the exclusive property of Marcelino RTC ruled in favor of Miguela CA affirmed the decision Issue: WON the property in question is exclusive property of Marcelino WON the obligations of Marcelino could be held against the conjugal partnership Held: NO o Petitioners contention: Art 124 (consent of both spouses is needed in the encumbrance of conjugal property) of FC should be construed in relation to Art 493 (rules on co-ownership)of CC Therefore, the sale can be valid as to the share of Marcelino to the said property There is no need to obtain the consent of the other spouse w/ regards to the mortgage and subsequent sale of the portion of the other spouse in the property o SC: There is no legal basis to construe Art 493 as an exception to Art 124 of FC Art 124 is applicable in this case, therefore, since it was w/o the consent of the wife, the entire sale is null and void The property in question was acquired during the marriage of Miguela and Marcelino The regime of property governing is CPG since the spouses did not execute an MS Provisions in FC regarding CPG are made applicable to CPGs already existing before its effectivity unless vested rights have been acquired under the CC Rules of co-ownership does not apply here since CPG is a special type of partnership where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either 401
or both spouses through their joint efforts or by chance Rules on co-ownership is suppletory to ACP Rules on contract of partnership is suppletory to CPG RTC ordered the Sungas to render accounting, return and restitute the properties to the partnership, pay half of the shares and interest of Chua, pay unreceived income and profits, wind up the affairs of the partnership and Lilibeth was found guilty of breach of trust. CA affirmed. Issues: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can [impose] interest on a final judgment of unliquidated claims. Whether or not the Sheriff can enforce the whole divisible obligation under judgment only against one Defendant. Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment. Held: 1. Chuas share and interest on such assets partake of an unliquidated claim which, until reasonably determined, shall not earn interest for him. 2. The obligation of petitioners is solidary. 3. The use and appropriation by Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husbands benefit. RTC decision affirmed. Ratio: The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable. Buado vs. CA Facts: Spouses Buado filed a case against Erlinda Nicol for slander. Erlinda was found guilty and was ordered to pay Php 40K in favor of the spouses. 402
NO
o Petitioner content that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family o SC: petitioner was not able to prove that there was benefit to the family During trial, petitioners allegation is that the property in question is exclusively owned by Marcelino it cannot be allowed to change its theory on appeal Sunga-Chan vs. CA Facts: In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of LPG. For convenience, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite), was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for equal sharing of the net profit. After Jacintos death in 1989, his widow, Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chuas consent. Chuas subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file on June 22, 1992 a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC.
But her personal properties were insufficient so one of her real properties were levied and sold in an auction where the spouses were the highest bidder for Php 51K A year later, Romulo Nicol, Erlindas husband, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. He said that they should have exhausted the personal properties of Erlinda first and that the property was conjugal and that its value was at Php500K and was sold at a very low price. The case was dismissed by the RTC saying that they didnt have jurisdiction and that the case should be filed in the same court that rendered the decision and issued the writ of execution. CA however reversed the decision and remanded the case, thus this petition. Spouses Buado argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Issue: WON conjugal properties in a CPG could be used to satisfy the criminal liability of Erlinda. Held: No. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Equally, it cannot be concluded that the obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership a. with consent a. With consent Javier vs. Osmena Facts: Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona Javier, became indebted to the estate of Tomas Osmea. On June 15, 1913, judgment was rendered in behalf of the estate and the sheriff sold at public auction all the right, title, interest or share which Collantes had or might have in two parcels of real estate and especially the interest therein of Pascuala Santos, the surviving widow of Felix Javier y Sanchez, which interest was acquired by Petrona Javier, Collantes' wife, on March 20, 1911. Petrona was the only daughter of Felix Javier(died in 1908) and Matea Corunan (she died in 1901) Felix, after the death of his wife, married Pascuala Santos (in 1890). Felix and Matea left at their death, as an inheritance to their only daughter Petrona, two urban properties. Petrona acquired from her father's second wife, Pascuala, the latter's right in Felixs estate for the sum of P3,000, which amount she was obliged to borrow, giving as security for the loan a mortgage on the property she had inherited. These properties were those levied upon by the sheriff in the execution of the judgment against Florentino. The successful bidder was the Osmea estate itself which paid P500 for each parcel of property, that is, P1,000 for Collantes' right in both parcels and in the interest acquired by his wife from Pascuala. Petrona claimed that her husband had no rights in said two pieces of property or in the interest acquired by her.
403
She filed claim of intervention in order to recover her ownership of the properties and the sheriff's sale should be annulled. Osmea estate admitted her exclusive right of ownership in the two parcels of real estate. Osmena claimed, however, that the money with which said usufructuary interest was purchased belonged to the conjugal partnership and therefore that the right of usufruct so acquired belonged to the conjugal partnership. CFI: annulled only the sale of the two properties and ordered the cancellation of their registration in the property registry Issue: whether the sum owed by the husband to the Osmea estate can and should be paid out of the fruits and revenues of the two parcels of real estate that exclusively belong to the wife Held: Yes, the fruits and revenue from the two properties belonging to the wife are liable for the payment of the debt owing, Considering that the debts contracted by the husband during the marriage, for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes toward the support of his family, cannot be deemed his personal and private debts, nor consequently, can they be excepted from payment out of the products or revenue of the wife's own property which are liable, like those of her husband's, for the discharge of the liabilities of the marriage couple. Ratio: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: 1. All the debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband, 5. The support of the family. Vda. De Sta. Romana vs. PCIB Facts: The Civil Case appealed from is an offshoot of another Civil Case which was filed way back on August 6, 1968 (an action for rescission with damages filed by PCIB as Administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges, and for the recovery of a parcel of land which Ramon Sta. Romana purchased from the late Hodges under a Contract to Sell). On motion of PCIB, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the Sheriff levied (after 2 wks) on the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over the other Lot and the improvements existing thereon, which lot Ramon Sta. Romana also purchased from C. N, Hodges under another Contract to Sell. A third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that the Lot and its improvements had been sold to him by Ramon Sta. Romana on August 16, 1963. CFI (on the 1st case): rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering Ramon Sta. Romana to return the possession of the Lot to PCIB as well as to pay rentals or damages for use and occupation thereof. CA: affirmed and ordered Ramon Sta. Romana to pay the land taxes and the interest thereon. 1979 CFI issued a writ of execution and the Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over the Lot and its improvements for the satisfaction of the damages awarded in the decision. After 2 wks, Ramon Sta. Romana died intestate. After a month, Socorro L. Vda. de Sta. Romana, the surviving spouse of Ramon, filed a motion to quash the writ of execution alleging that the proceedings in the Civil Case did not affect 404
her rights and interests over the 2 Lots inasmuch as she was not a party in said cases. (RTC Denied) The public auction sale was held and PCIB was issued the certificate of sale. partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment that could be rendered therein. Issues raised by her in the 2nd Civil Case may not be litigated anew, if not by the principle of res judicata but at least by conclusiveness of judgment. The record reveals that the contentions being raised by her were squarely placed before and ruled upon by the CFI in connection with the execution proceedings in 1st Civil Case.
After almost a yr, Socorro instituted the appealed Civil Case praying that the writ of execution and the levy on execution made on one of the Lots and the improvements existing thereon be annulled as her 1/2 share in the said properties is concerned, and that she be declared the lawful and absolute owner of said 1/2 share of the said properties. PCIB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. CFI: granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and laches. Issue: WON the conjugal property is liable for the 1st civil case Held: Yes. The action filed by PCIB against Ramon was clearly a suit to enforce an obligation of the conjugal partnership. The 1 st Civil Case arose out of the failure of Ramon to pay the purchase price of a lot he bought from Hodges presumably in behalf of the conjugal partnership. The liability incurred by Ramon is chargeable against the conjugal partnership assets, it being undisputed that the obligation was contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Her non-inclusion as a party in the 1st Civil Case is immaterial. There is no rule or law requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation, the husband must be joined by his wife. There was no need of including her as a party in the 1st Civil Case for the purpose of binding the conjugal
G-Tractors vs. CA Facts: Luis R. Narciso is a businessman who is engaged in business as a producer and exporter of Philippine mahogany logs and operates a logging concession. He is legally married to Josefina Salak Narciso. G-Tractors, Inc. on the other hand, is a domestic corporation engaged primarily in the business of leasing heavy equipments such as tractors, bulldozers, and the like. 1973 - Luis entered into a Contract of Hire of Heavy Equipment with G-Tractors under the terms of which the latter leased to the former tractors for the purpose of constructing switchroads and hauling felled trees at the jobsite of Narciso's logging concession. The contract provided for payment of rental for the use of said tractors. Luis defaulted in his rental payments. Hence, on 1974, GTractors instituted an action against him to collect an amount representing unpaid rentals for the leased tractors. Luis was declared in default. G-Tractors accepted his offer for a compromise agreement which was signed by G-Tractors and Luis. It stipulated for payment by Luis of the total claim of GTractors on an instalment plan. Luis failed to comply and so after a month, G-Tractors filed a motion for execution. This 405
was opposed by Luis who asked for the suspension of the issuance of a writ of execution on the ground that he allegedly has a pending loan with a banking institution. RTC: denied the request for suspension and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Levy was made by the City Sheriff on certain personal properties of Luis. Auction sale was held, and G-Tractors, being the highest bidder, was awarded the sale of all the personal properties listed under the levy. Luis offered to redeem and/or buy back all the personal properties sold to G-Tractors for the same amount which the latter agreed and for which a Deed of Reconveyance was executed by G-Tractors. On March 31, 1976, the spouses filed a complaint for "declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction sale of theirconjugal property with damages and injunction". They alleged that whatever transpired in the first civil case could be binding only on Luis and could not affect or bind Josefina who was not a party to that case; that the nature of the Sheriff's sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him; that the conjugal property of the spouses could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment considering that the subject matter of said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or of the family; and that the levy of the wife's share in the conjugal property to satisfy the money judgment against her husband is null and void.
On February 12, 1975, the Sheriff made a levy on "all rights, interest, title, participation which the Luis" may have over a parcel of residential which parcel of land is allegedly the conjugal property of the spouses. On February 22, 1975, the Sheriff notified the general public that on March 25 he would sell at public auction to the highest bidder for cash "the rights, interest and participation of Luis in the said real estate property, together with all the improvements existing thereon" to satisfy the writ of execution. On March 25, 1975, a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to the highest bidder G-Tractors, Inc. At that time, however, the land was mortgaged to Mercantile Financing Corporation to guarantee an outstanding unpaid account of the spouses. Soon after the issuance of the Certificate of Sale, Luis and GTractors, Inc. executed a contract of lease over the property whereby Luis obligated himself to pay a monthly rental
CFI ordered the issuance of the new certificate of title in the name of G-Tractors. CA annulled the levy on execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale, as well as the sheriff's final deed of sale; and the Orders of CFI. Issue: whether or not the judgment debt of Luis is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership property can be held answerable. Held: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he should not be made to suffer and answer alone. 13 So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family. CA decision reversed. 406
Ratio: Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All the debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. Facts Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) The obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse of the condition of ten-year period as provided in a promissory note whereby they (spouses) bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account Confesor executed another promissory note, again promising to pay the amount on a said date The spouses still failed to pay DBP filed a complaint in the City Court of Iloilo A decision was rendered ordering the spouses to pay DBP jointly and severally CFI reversed the decision Hence this petition Issues WON in signing the second promissory note, Patricio Confesor can bind the conjugal partnership Held and Ratio Yes. Although the second promissory note was signed by Confesor alone, still it doesnt necessarily follow that he cannot bind his wife anymore. In this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the DBP vs Adil conjugal partnership. Hence, the conjugal partnership is liable for the obligation. Facts The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano for recovery of the value of ladies' ready made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00 or so Her motion for the discharge of the attachment having been denied, Lourdes Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari That Court ordered the Trial Court to receive evidence, then it said that the attachment had indeed been improperly issued Ultimately, judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes Mariano and against plaintiff Esther Sanchez Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment which the Court granted Sheriff garnished the sum of P 11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther Sanchez and her husband, Daniel Sanchez Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband, filed a complaint for annulment of the execution alleging that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that, moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution 407 Mariano vs CA
Issues WON the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez could not be made liable for Esther's judgment obligation arising from the spouses' joint business with Lourdes Mariano Held and Ratio There is no dispute about the fact that Esther Sanchez was engaged in business not only without objection on the part of her husband, Daniel, but in truth with his consent and approval. It is also established that, as expressly acknowledged by Esther herself and never denied by Daniel, the profits from the business had been used to meet, in part at least, expenses for the support of her family, i.e., the schooling of the children, food and other household expenses Lourdes Mariano action against Esther Sanchez was justified, the litigation being "incidental to the ... business in which she is engaged and consequently, the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded to the benefit of the partnership Wong vs CA Facts Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda They had been most of the time living separately In Angeles City, Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father with money borrowed from an officemate In Hongkong, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. Katrina failed to return such so Anita Chan demanded payment. Katrina was charged with estafa for issuing a check which was dishonored for lack of funds, but the court dismissed such Anita and her husband, Ricky Wong, filed against Katrina and her husband, Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money Atty. Gregorio and Atty. Albino appeared as counsel solely for Katrina Court decided in favor of the Wongs so a writ of execution was issued, levied upon four lots in Angeles City Public auction sale was set and during that sale, properties in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson were sold A property covered by Cert. Title No. 30951 was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac and was sold to Juanito Santos, who had earlier bought such and thus redeeming it Before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the writ of execution, levy on execution, and the auction sale for the following grounds: (1) he was not given a day in court, (2) he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorized her to enter into such transactions, and (3) the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore as to him all the proceedings had in the case were null and void
Issues WON Romarico had his day in court WON the properties levied upon may be reconveyed to Romarico finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal property liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina Held and Ratio No 408
o Romarico and Katrina had been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when the business transaction eventually resulted in the filing of the case, Romarico failed to act in the belief that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife. Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not yet had his day in court and necessarily the public auction is null and void. No o The properties belong to the conjugal partnership even though the spouses Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear evidence to overcome such presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. o It is unclear where he obtained the money to repay his officemate from whom he borrowed. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of money utilized in the purchase. o The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrinas indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the Wongs to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. o Furthermore, under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of her family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family. Wongs failed to establish such and so they cannot bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrinas personal obligations to them. o (Wongs must return to Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson [they are the buyers of the land] the prices they received from the sale. Furthermore, the redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against Romarico and Katrina filed by Rural Bank of Porac should however be respected unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption over the property. These are in line with the principle that innocent buyers may not be prejudiced.) Facts Ong vs CA supra Teodora Ong has a logging business She secured a loan from Francisco Boix Teodora however defaulted Boix then filed a complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong (joined as husband of Teodora) Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix and such was executed Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land Boix was the highest bidder A writ of possession and a certificate of sale were issued in favor of Boix Ramon Ong filed a motion to quash the writ of possession which was denied; CA affirmed such Hence, this petition Ramon Ong contends that the auction sale was null and void on three grounds: 1) the auction was made on a date different from that reflected in the advertisement, 2) the sale was published in a newspaper not of general circulation in the province where the property is situated, 3) subject property is conjugal which 409
the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper Issues WON the auction sale is null and void on the ground that the notice of public auction sale was not published in accordance with law WON subject property is conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper Held and Ratio No, because the trial court deemed that the executed proceedings were in accordance with law. Factual questions should be resolved by the lower courts, not by the Supreme Court (unless of course theres showing of grave abuse of discretion on the lower courts part). No, the property is an exclusive property of the wife. Although the surname of the husband in the tax declaration was used, still it is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Thus, the lot in question is paraphernal and is therefore liable for the personal debts of the wife. o Art. 160 of the NCC is clear that the party who invokes that presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. o And even assuming that the property is conjugal in nature, the same may still be held liable. The wife was engaged in a logging business with the husbands knowledge. The rule is that wifes paraphernal properties, as well as of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business. After all, whatever profits are earned go to the conjugal partnership thus it is equitable that obligations accrued be chargeable against the conjugal property. Ayala vs CA Facts Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC) As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal Abelardo, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. 410
Private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners To enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership June 25, 1982 the auction sale took place Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which was registered on August 9, 1983 contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership (proof must be presented) In this case, co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the probable prolongation of employment in PBM and increase in value of its stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of certainty, that the said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to the conjugal partnership. Obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited"
o o
Issues WON the conjugal partnership of private respondents is liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband WON acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-husband Held and Ratio No o Redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" and "for the benefit of" mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." o The court derived the following conclusions: 1) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, 2) If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
No o No matter how often an executive acted or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty. o Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal 411
partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. o Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family. Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Mar Tierra Corp. Facts: Mar Tierra Corporation through its president Wilfrido Martinez (private respondent), applied for a P12M credit accommodation w/ petitioner bank Wilfrido Martinez and 2 others acted as surety on behalf of the corporation The corporation was able to borrow P9, 952, 000 It was not able to pay all its obligations since it suffered setbacks until it finally ceased operations Security Bank filed a complaint for sum of money w/ a prayer for preliminary attachment against the corporation and the private respondents RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of the corporation and of Martinez Among those included in the writ is the conjugal house and lot of Wilfrido and Josefina RTC ruled that the obligation contracted by Wilfrido did not redound to the benefit of his family and their conjugal property should not, therefore, be held liable CA affirmed the RTCs decision Issue: WON the conjugal partnership could be held liable for an indemnity agreement contracted by the husband to accommodate a 3 rd party Held: NO Art 161 (1) of FC states that the conjugal partnership could be held liable for debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the family In acting as a surety or guarantor for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a 3rd party Petitioner should have shown sufficient proof that such act by Wilfrido redounded to the benefit of his family b. without consent Luzon Surety Co, Inc. vs. De Garcia Facts: Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co., Inc., executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB, to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000.00. On or about the same date, Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the petitioner may at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid; and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees. On or about April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint before the CFI of Negros Occidental against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit. On or about August 8, 1957, in turn, a third-party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon B. Lacson and Vicente Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement, was instituted by Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 412
CFI granted the petition ordering ladislao and Co. to pay PNB and ordering the third party defendants to pay Co. the amount it has to pay to PNB. It also issued a writ of execution against Garcia. A writ of garnishment was the issued and the Garcia then filed for injunction. Later RTC declared the garnishment void thus making the injunction permanent. Issue: WON a conjugal partnership could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3 rd party in favour of a surety company. Held: As explained in the decision now under review: "It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the New Civil Code. However, as such administrator the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In Art. 161 of NCC, a conjugal partnership is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is none in this case. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party. CA affirmed. BA Finance Corporation vs. CA Facts: July 1, 1975 - Augusto Yulo, private respondent, secured a loan from BA finance in the amount of P591, 003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as rep of the A & L Industries Augusto presented an SPA from his wife, Lily Yulo, who manages the company and under whose name the said company is registered The SPA purportedly authorized Augusto to procure the loan and sign the promissory note Before the loan, however, Augusta had already left Lily and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home Augusto failed to pay the loan Oct 7, 1975 BA Finance filed its complaint against the spouses on the basis of the promissory note and prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment RTC issued the writ of attachment enabling petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries Lily filed her answer w/ counterclaim o Her husband had abandoned her and their children 5 months before the filing of complaint o They were already separated when the promissory note was executed o Her signature in the SPA was forged bec she never authorized Augusto to transact any business for and in behalf of the company which she owned as a single proprietor o She never benefitted from the loan mentioned in the promissory note o Her company closed bec of the illegal attachment and it was now taken over by the new owner RTC dismissed respondents complaint CA affirmed 413
Issue: WON the signature in the SPA was forged WON Lilys exclusive property can be held liable for the obligation because it forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Held: YES o Lily presented an expert who was able to observe 12 glaring and material significant differences between Lilys signatures in the SPA and in her other transactions o The notary public forgot to state in the acknowledgment portion of the SPA that Lily acknowledged the said document showing that Lily did not personally appear before the notary public NO o Petitioner contends that since the company was established and its assets were acquired during the marriage, it is presumed that they form part of the conjugal partnership o SC The property is indeed conjugal since it was established during the marriage The fact that it was registered in Lilys name only does not change its being conjugal in nature But for the conjugal property to be liable for the obligation contracted by Augusto, the said loan must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (Art 161 of the CC) Augustos loan did not redound to the benefit of the family since at the time he secured the loan, he had already abandoned his family and left the conjugal home Petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties w/ Lily
Costuna vs. Domondon Facts: Amadeo and Estela Costuna, during their marriage, acquired 3 parcels of land in QC Nov 8, 1976 Amadeo, 68, executed his last will and testament After the execution of the last will and testament, the spouses experienced marital problems Nov 1977 Amadeo sustained 3rd degree burns on his legs Apr 17, 1978 while Amadeo was already ill, his relatives requested that he be brought to Samar to sign documents regarding his Samar properties Amadeo never returned but stayed w/ his sister in Samar June 18, 1978 - Amadeos relatives and Estela had fights as to the custody of Amadeo, Estela even instituted a petition for habeas corpus June 23, 1978 Amadeo filed an action for partition He was not able to get Estelas consent though even after repeated demands He was constrained to execute a deed of sale over the undetermined portion of the conjugal property w/o Estelas consent to Laureana Domondon During the pendency of the case, Amadeo died Laureana instituted an action to compel Estela to give her conformity to the deed of sale executed by Amadeo RTC ruled in favor of Laureana and ordered Estela to affix her signature on the deed of sale 414
o Estelas refusal to give her consent is unreasonable o She could be compelled to grant her consent consistent w/ the last provision of Art 166 of NCC o The disposition is not valid only if it prejudices the share of the wife CA affirmed o Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code. (1413a) o Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. (n) o The husband may not validly sell w/o the wifes consent except, among others, if the purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (Art 161) as stated by Art 171 o Here, the proceeds were used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership since if one of the spouses is physically ill, the conjugal partnership will suffer Issue: WON the sale of Amadeos share in the conjugal properties is valid even w/o his wifes consent WON the conjugal partnership can be made liable for the payment of the hospital and medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned the conjugal home and his wife Held: Yes o Estela contends that she did not consent to the sale That Amadeo was only used by persons who wanted to deprive her of her inheritance That the sale is invalid for want of consideration since the buyer is not financially capable to pay the purchase price That Amadeos hospital and medical expenses should not be chargeable to the conjugal partnership since he abandoned his wife and their conjugal home That she was unable to take care of her husband since his relatives held him captive That she exerted all efforts to regain custody of her husband That she shouldered the funeral and other expenses of Amadeo That Art 161 of NCC does not include illness or old age of one or both the spouses as among the expenses for w/ the conjugal partnership may be held liable o Laureana contends that the sale is valid even w/o the wifes consent since the funds from the sale were for Amadeos hospital and medical expenses The sale of the share of the conjugal property should be allowed as long as the other spouses share is not prejudiced It was not Amadeos fault that his wifes consent is lacking Estelas refusal to give her consent is unjustified and cruel since she turned her back and denied her husband moral and financial help when he needed it most 415
She refused to give her consent since she wanted to own all the conjugal partnership properties esp since they have no children Art 161 of the CC should apply since the payment of the hospital and medical expenses redounded to the benefit off the conjugal partnership Amadeo left the conjugal home for his survival o SC held that Amadeo sold only his share of the conjugal properties and only because he needed money to pay for his hospitalization and medication The consent of the wife is essential for the validity of the sale, but in this case, where consent was unreasonably withheld, the Court is constrained to relax the application of the law and consider the sale as falling w/in the recognized exceptions Estela was motivated by greed when she refused to consent to the sale because she knew that her husbands last will and testament left to her the whole conjugal properties YES o The benefit required by Art 161 need not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property o It is enough that the transaction would result to some discernible advantage or good to the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly o Health and well-being of both or either of the spouse would undeniably redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership Carlos vs. Abelardo Facts: Honorio Carlos, petitioner, gave a loan of US $25k to Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo (his daughter) and Manuel Abelardo (respondent and husband of Theresa) for the purchase of a house and lot in Paraaque He issued the check to a certain Pura Vallejo as full payment of the property When he inquired from the spouses as to the status of the amount loaned to them, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet able to settle the loan Aug 4, 1994 Honorio made a formal demand for the payment of the loan but the spouses failed to pay Oct 13, 1994 Honorio filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages Bec the spouses have been separated in fact for more than a year before the filing of the complaint, Manuel and Theresa filed separate answers Maria admitted that they secured a loan but claimed that the loan was on a staggered basis so she was surprised when honorio demanded immediate full payment Manuel also admitted to having received the money but contended that the money was not a loan but his share in the profit of the company H.L. Carlos Construction w/c is owned by Honorio and w/c he helped revive after it experienced setbacks RTC ruled in favor of Honorio CA reversed Issue: WON the husband could also be held liable for the obligation considering that he did not sign the acknowledgment of the loan executed by the wife Held: YES 416
o Manuel contends that he received P3M from the company as his share from its profits and if he and his wife were, indeed, indebted to Honorio, then, he should have deducted the amount of the loan from his share of the profits o SC held that the checks amounting to P3M were issued from the account of the company while the US $25k was from the personal account of Honorio If the money was his share and not a loan, then it should have been issued by the company and not by Honorio Manuel is not a stockholder of the company and is, therefore, not entitled to the profits or income of the company He was not an employee or an agent either so as to be entitled or commission from the company The conjugal partnership is liable for the loan as stated in Art 121 of FC since the loan clearly redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was used to purchase the house and lot w/c served as the spouses conjugal home Hence, even w/ the alleged lack of consent of Manuel, he shall be solidarily liable for the loan together w/ his wife Ramones vs. Agbayani Facts: Spouses Santos and Aldegonda Ramones are the registered owners of a lot. 1979, Santos Ramones, without the knowledge of his wife, Aldegonda, sold to Aurora P. Agbayani a 100-square meter portion of the lot for. The Deed of Sale was annotated by the Register of Deeds at the back of the TCT. 1980, Santos Ramones died. Aldegonda and her daughters Beatriz and Margarita had a restroom and a concrete septic tank built on the area sold by Santos without Agbayanis knowledge. This prompted them to bring the matter to the barangay authorities but no settlement was reached by the parties. 1983, Agbayani filed with the RTC a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Ramones on the basis of the Deed of Sale executed by Santos Ramones. Aldegonda averred that the 100-square meter lot is the conjugal property of the spouses. Even if Santos, during his lifetime, sold the property, the sale is void since it was executed without the consent of his wife.
RTC: holding that the Deed of Sale is void because it was executed without the consent of the wife CA: reversed Issue: whether the sale of real property belonging to the conjugal partnership by the husband without his wifes consent is void. Held: the lack of consent on her part will not make the husbands alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable. There is no proof that petitioner Aldegonda Ramones filed any complaint to annul the Deed of Sale entered into by her husband. Her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable. Ratio: Article 166 of the Civil Code, provides: Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a 417
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. x x x Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated the husband. Villanueva vs. Chiong Facts: Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired a Lot. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to Villanuevas payable in installments. Florentino allowed them to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, they demanded from him the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale. On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages. On February 12, 1992, Villanuevas filed with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. RTC: annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered Villanuevas to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein; dismissed the other case, but ordered Florentino to return to Villanuevas the consideration of the sale with interest. CA: affirmed Issue: Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? Was its sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent valid? Held: Separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Eliseras interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. The sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent is not, however, void ab initio. Without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. T he award of the trial court for the payment of interest should be deleted. Ratio: On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property. But Elisera also presented a real property tax declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property. Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot. Ravina vs. Villa-Abrille (please see above digest) 418
Fuentes vs. Roca Facts: Sabrina Tarroza sold her lot in to her son Tarciano Roca yet he did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. Six yrs later, Tarciano offered to sell the land to the Fuentes spouses. They met and signed the agreement that the sale was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment for the transfer of the lots title to him. And within 6 mos. Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario, to the sale. Upon his compliance with these conditions, Fuentes were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional amount. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, Fuentes spouse would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. Atty. Plagata, to whom the agreement was left to, alleged that he went to Rosario (his estranged wife) in Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata notarized the affidavit in Zamboanga. Then Tarciano executed an absolute deed of sale, a new title was issued and the spouses immediately constructed a building on the lot. Jan. 28, 1990, Tarciano died, followed by his wife Rosario nine months after. Eight yrs later, children of Tarciano filed an action for annulment for sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes before the RTC. They claim that the sale was void since Rosario did not give her consent to it since her signature had been forged. RTC dismissed it. The CA ruled that the annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid Tarciano plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until the final payment. Issues: was the signature forged? Was the filing for nullity already prescribed? Is Rosario the only one who can annul the sale? Held: The signature was forged and so it meant that there was no consent from Rosario. The law that applies to this case is the FC not the NCC. The passage of time does not erode the right to bring an annulment of sale. The deed of sale and transfer of certificate of title is void, the certificate of title be reinstated to Tarciano, The children of Tarcianno is ordered to pay the Fuentes with legal interest, indemnify the spouses for introducing useful improvements, and RTC is directed to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity. Ratio: NCC Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. Vs. FCC Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. 419
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both off errors. c. personal debts, FC 122 Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose abovementioned. (163a) People vs. Lagrimas Facts: The heirs of Pelagio Cagro, the murdered victim, filed an Information against the accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for the murder committed. Thereafter, the heirs filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the property of the accused (granted). RTC: guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs in the sum of P6,000.00 plus the additional sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of damages, attorney's fees and burial expenses. An appeal from the judgment was elevated to SC by the accused but thereafter withdrawn, the judgment, therefore, became final. A writ of execution was issued upon motion of heirs. A levy was had on 11 parcels of land in the name of the accused. The sale at public auction was scheduled but on December 29, 1964 the wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as well as the writ of execution with the allegation that the property levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and, therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
RTC: granted motion declaring null and void the order of attachment and the writ of execution, in accordance with Article 161 of the new Civil Code.
420
Another RTC: set aside the order, sustaining the legality of the preliminary attachment as well as the writ of execution. RTC #3: revived the original order, declaring such attachment and the writ of execution issued as null and void. Issue: WON the conjugal properties are liable. How an obligation for fines and indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets? Held: Yes but the family should first be satisfied by CPG before the indemnities and the heirs should present evidence as to how the partnership assets could be made to respond, this on the assumption that the property levied upon does not belong exclusively to the convicted spouse. In view of the failure to respect what the Civil Code ordains, reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. Ratio: The Civil Code recognizes the liability of the conjugal partnership for fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered," in the absence of any separate property of the offending spouse or its insufficiency. The responsibilities enumerated in Article 161, covering primarily the maintenance of the family and the education of the children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of them as well as other obligations of a preferential character, are first satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme cannot be susceptible to the charge that for a transgression of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family may be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous character. Obiter: every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable and so has to indemnify the victims/heirs. Facts: A parcel of lot is registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane As a result of a motion for execution in Civil Case No. 1841 (Florence Pucay de Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas, and Muriel Pucay Yamane vs Cypress Corporation), the property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees The said property was scheduled to be sold at a public auction Four days before the auction, Leonardo Yamane filed a 3 rd party claim on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and therefore should not be held liable for the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters But still, the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale, and so the property was sold to spouses Josephine and Henry Go A final sheriffs certificate of sale was issued Again, Leonardo file a complaint for annulment and cancellation of auction sale RTC held that the property was paraphernal CA reversed the RTC decision Issue: WON the subject property is conjugal Held and Ratio: Conjugal. Petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal therefore stands. The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967, before the FC took effect. The transaction was governed by NCC. Basing from Art. 160 of NCC, it is said that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal 421 Go vs. Yamane
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during marriage. Presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. The burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it. In this case, the land is conjugal in nature. Spouses Muriel and Leonardo acquired it from Eugene Pucay on Feb. 27, 1967 or specifically during the marriage. Three important concepts : 1) the nature of property (whether conjugal or paraphernal) is determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses; thus, no unilateral declaration by one spouses can change the character of a conjugal property, 2) mere registration of a property in the name of one spouses does not destroy a propertys conjugal nature (presumption is rebuttable only with strong convincing evidence, 3) nonredemption of the property by the respondent within the period prescribed by law did not indicate the absence of his right or title to it (in fact, he filed a 3rd party claim) properties of Erlinda first and that the property was conjugal and that its value was at Php500K and was sold at a very low price. The case was dismissed by the RTC saying that they didnt have jurisdiction and that the case should be filed in the same court that rendered the decision and issued the writ of execution. CA however reversed the decision and remanded the case, thus this petition. Spouses Buado argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
Buado vs CA (salamat sa sponsor) Facts: Spouses Buado filed a case against Erlinda Nicol for slander. Erlinda was found guilty and was ordered to pay Php 40K in favor of the spouses. But her personal properties were insufficient so one of her real properties were levied and sold in an auction where the spouses were the highest bidder for Php 51K A year later, Romulo Nicol, Erlindas husband, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. He said that they should have exhausted the personal
Issue: WON conjugal properties in a CPG could be used to satisfy the criminal liability of Erlinda. Held and Ratio: No. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Equally, it cannot be concluded that the obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership d. winnings from gambling, FC 123 422
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. (164a) 7. Ownership, Administration, and Enjoyment a. Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) Facts: Gilda Corpuz filed a complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang seeking the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of Gilda and Judie, null and void RTC rendered the deed of transfer null and void CA affirmed the RTC decision Backstory: o Dec. 24, 1968 Gilda and Judie are married; they had three children (Junie, Harriet, and Jodie) o Feb. 14, 1983 Gilda and Judie, with Gilda as vendee, bought a lot from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor o The consideration was payable in installment o Apr. 22, 1988 couple Gilda and Judie sold portion of the land to Luzviminda and Antonio Guiang o Jun. 1989 Gilda left for Manila to look for work in the Middle East (with the consent of the husband) o After wifes departure, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling 423 Guiang vs. CA
o Harriet wrote a letter to her mom that her dad intends to sell the remaining half portion of the land o Gilda replied that she was objecting the sale (Harriet gave Luzviminda the letter so that she would be the one to advise Judie) o Judie nevertheless pushed through with the sale o Judies children signed the document as witnesses o Gilda returned home and found her children staying with other households (Junie was the only one staying at their house) and she was informed that their father had a wife already o Luzviminda and Antonio complained Gilda for trespassing Issue: WON the contract of sale was merely voidable Held and Ratio: No. Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. The contact falls under Art. 124 of the FC which states that the administration and enjoyment of the cpp shall belong to both spouses jointly. In the event that one spouse is unable to participate, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. As compared to CC, under Art. 166, alienation or encumbrance if so made is not null and void but merely voidable. Facts: Heirs vs. Mijares A parcel of lot is registered in the name of spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business Backstory: o 1960 Vicente and Ignacia were married o 1974 they had been separated in fact o 1984 Ignacia learned that Vicente sold the lot to spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares on March 1, 1983 o She also found out that Vicente filed for administration and appointment of guardian with the MTC o Vicente misrepresented therein that Ignacia has already died and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs o Court then appointed Vicente as guardian and authorized him to sell the estate of Ignacia o Aug. 4, 1984 Ignacia demand the return of her share in the lot o Cipriano and Florentina MIjares claim that they were buyers in good faith o Vicente contends that what he sold to the Mijares was only his share, excluding that of his wife (also asserting that he never represented that the latter was already dead)
Issue: What is the status of the subject lot Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of Ignacia Are Cipriano and Florentina buyers in good faith Held and Ratio: 424
There is no dispute that the lot is conjugal, having been purchased using the conjugal funds during the subsistence of their marriage. The sale of said lot without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia is voidable. The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several cases the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The better view however is to consider the transaction as merely voidable, consistent with Art. 173 of the CC pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment. Ignacias action to annul is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Art. 173 of the CC. The voidable sale of lot should be annulled in its entirety. Had the congress intended to limit the annulment in so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out. Moreover, there are several bases why it is necessary to strike down the subject contract as a whole and not merely those which concern the share of the wife: (1) conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while conjugal partnership exists, (2) conjugal property is even subject to payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Art. 161 have been covered if it turns out that one of the spouses has no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient so husband should not dispose of the conjugal property without the wifes consent. No. Respondents cannot deny the knowledge that at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente was married to Ignacia and that the latter did not giver her conformity to the sale. This is so because the 1978 agreement described Vicente as married but the conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear in the deed. Vicente should refund the amount paid by the respondents. Roxas vs. CA Facts: Melania Roxas is married but living separately from husband Melania discovered that her estranged husband, Antonio Roxas, had enetered into a contract of lease with Antonio Cayetano covering a portion of their conjugal lot without her knowledge and consent Melania was planning to put up her flea market with at least 20 stalls and mini-mart for grocery and dry goods items for which she had filed an application for the mayors permit and municipal license She already had spent P135,000.00 And because of the alleged illegal lease, Melania is therefore compelled to seek redress and ventilate her grievance to the court Issue: WON a lease is an encumbrance/ alienation within the scope of Art. 166 of the NCC Held and Ratio: Yes. Art. 165 of NCC provides that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. But while the husband can administer, still he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Alienation means transfer of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one person to another. Encumbrance means every right to, or interest in, the land which may subsist in 3rd persons, to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the 425
passing of the fee by conveyance or any act that impairs the use or transfer of property or real estate. Lease is a grant of use and possession. In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the lessee. Thus, lease is a burden on the land, and it is an encumbrance of the land. Furthermore, lease is considered as a qualified alienation, with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease. In this case, the wife has the remedy of filing for an annulment of contract because her husband leased their conjugal property without her consent. Ysasi vs. Fernandez Facts: Juan Ysasi (petitioner) and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi (one of the respondents) are husband and wife Hacienda Manucao-A is their conjugal property Since 1948, the spouses have been traveling between the Phil and Spain where they also own real properties The husband shuttled more often since he was the one who manages the hacienda 1952-1965 Valentin Bilbao managed the hacienda w/ Juan maintaining overall supervision 1965 Jon Ysasi (another respondent), son of the spouses, took over as manager 1966 Juan instructed their younger son, Jose Mari to assist Jon in the management of the hacienda Jon did not allow him to participate and Jon also refused to let him act as Cashier of the hacienda even though he was designated such by their father Disagreement arose between the brothers So, Maria left Spain for the Phil to iron out the diff between the brothers and to inquire about the affairs of the hacienda She brought w/ her a letter from Juan to the sons and a list of matters she was to ascertain and report to her husband Juan claimed she never made any such report June 1967 Jon resigned as a manager of the hacienda Juan accepted the resignation and sent Valentin Bilbao to manage the hacienda Jon refused to turn over the hacienda to Valentin claiming that Maria has already taken possession and administration of the hacienda since his resignation September 5, 1967 - Maria filed a petition for the administration of the conjugal partnership or, in the alternative, a separation of property w/ ex parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendent lite o Alleged that her husband was no longer in the position to manage the properties bec of his age (77) and his blind left eye o That he abandoned her and their conjugal properties w/o just cause The judge granted her petition the same day Juan moved to set aside the order, wife opposed September 22, 1967 Maria asked respondent judge to modify the earlier decision and appoint BPI as receiver Juan moved for a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive injunction to compel his wife and son to turn over to Valentin the hacienda and to make them desist from interfering w/ Valentins administration of the hacienda Nov 10, 1957 BPI filed an Urgent Motion to Authorize Crop Loan Releases Juan asked the court that the releases be made to him Lower court ruled that the Hacienda be placed under the receivership of BPI 426
Issue: WON a husband may be deprived of his powers of admin over conjugal partnership properties upon mere allegations of abuse of such powers Held: NO The law grants the husband sole administration over the conjugal partnership o He could even enforce right of possession against the wife who has taken over the admin w/o his consent o The wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets The wife is not entitled to joint admin o She has the prerogative to ask the courts to remove admin of the conjugal properties from the husband for her protection as stated in Art 167 of CC: Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property. (n) Maria took advantage of Art 167 by instituting a case against her husband alleging abandonment and fraud amounting to abuse of powers of admin o Even asked for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite or before she had shown evidence to prove her assertions of fraud o According to Tolentino, although the changes in the code have given certain rights to the wife, this did not relegate the husband to the position of an ordinary admin of anothers property and the wife is not granted the right to require her husband to render an accounting of their property The husband cant be divested of his admin upon mere assertions of fraud. These must first be proven. The law presumes good faith. In this case, since there are only bare allegations of fraud, the husband is still entitled to take over possession and management of the hacienda On the issue of receivership, it is to be granted w/ extreme caution. The purpose of receivership is to preserve or protect the rights of the parties during the pendency of the main action. At stake here is the husbands power of admin and the wifes right to be protected from abuse thereof The wifes right rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wifes right does not exist Receivership is aimed at preservation of and at making more secure, existing rights and cant be used for the destruction of those rights Juan cant be divested of his right to administer the conjugal partnership w/o sufficient proof of abuse of his power But, in order to protect the spouses from possible abuses that may arise, the petitioner is required to pay a bond before the hacienda can be given back to his management
Docena vs. Lapesura Facts: June 1, 197 Casiano Hombria (private respondent) filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, Antonio Docena and Alfreda Docena (petitioners) The spouses claimed ownership of the land since time immemorial 427
The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses but the CA reversed it and ordered the spouses to vacate the land and for the reconveyance of the property to Hombria When the sheriff issued an alias Writ of Demolition, the spouses filed a Motion to Set Aside or Defer the Implementation of Writ of Demolition w/ was denied by the judge Their MR was also denied by the judge so they went to the CA and filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition w/c was also denied bec of prescription and bec the certification of nonforum shopping was signed only by one of the petitioners Issue: WON the certification of non-forum shopping is sufficient even if it was only the husband who signed it Held: YES Petitioners argue that the signature of the husband is sufficient since they have joint/indivisible interest over the alleged conjugal property and the husband is the statutory administrator of the conjugal property SC: earlier ruling is that all petitioners or plaintiffs should sign the certificate since the attestation in the certificate requires personal knowledge by the party executing it o However, in this case, the petitioners are husband and wife and their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal o WON the property is conjugal under the NCC or FC cannot be determined but Under NCC, the husband is the admin of the conjugal partnership He is the sole admin and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him in his endeavor The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action w/o being joined by the wife If the husband could defend the conjugal partnership alone, the more he is allowed to execute the certificate alone Under the FC, the admin belongs to the husband and wife jointly But joint management does not require that the husband and wife always act together Each of the spouse may exercise full management of power alone subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided under Art 124 Even under FC, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against their conjugal property o More importantly, the petitioner signed in his behalf and that of his wife; the husband may be presumed to have personal knowledge won his wife has already filed any similar action/ claim o Also, this action is clearly for the benefit of the conjugal partnership o Plus, the wife is in Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Manila and to apply the rules on certification of non-forum shopping strictly would be too harsh and uncalled for Homeowners Savings Loan Bank vs. Dailo Facts: Miguela (respondent) and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967 They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their marriage 428
The deed of absolute sale, however, was named only to Marcelino December 1, 1993 Marcelino Dailo executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo authorizing her to obtain a loan from petitioner and use the house and lot in question as security This transaction took place w/o Miguelas knowledge and consent Marcelino was not able to pay the loan The mortgaged property was auctioned and was bought by the petitioner Marcelino died on Dec 20, 1995 In one of her visits to the property, Miguela learned that petitioner has already employed a Roldan Brion to clean its premises and her car was razed bec Brion allowed a boy to play w/ fire w/in the premises Miguela filed a case for the nullity of the sale and reconveyance of the property Petitioner contended that the property in question was the exclusive property of Marcelino RTC ruled in favor of Miguela CA affirmed the decision Issue: WON the property in question is exclusive property of Marcelino WON the obligations of Marcelino could be held against the conjugal partnership Held: NO o Petitioners contention: Art 124 (consent of both spouses is needed in the encumbrance of conjugal property) of FC NO 429 should be construed in relation to Art 493 (rules on co-ownership)of CC Therefore, the sale can be valid as to the share of Marcelino to the said property There is no need to obtain the consent of the other spouse w/ regards to the mortgage and subsequent sale of the portion of the other spouse in the property There is no legal basis to construe Art 493 as an exception to Art 124 of FC Art 124 is applicable in this case, therefore, since it was w/o the consent of the wife, the entire sale is null and void The property in question was acquired during the marriage of Miguela and Marcelino The regime of property governing is CPG since the spouses did not execute an MS Provisions in FC regarding CPG are made applicable to CPGs already existing before its effectivity unless vested rights have been acquired under the CC Rules of co-ownership does not apply here since CPG is a special type of partnership where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their joint efforts or by chance Rules on co-ownership is suppletory to ACP Rules on contract of partnership is suppletory to CPG
o SC:
o Petitioner content that the loan redounded to the benefit of the family o SC: petitioner was not able to prove that there was benefit to the family During trial, petitioners allegation is that the property in question is exclusively owned by Marcelino it cannot be allowed to change its theory on appeal Alinas vs. Alinas Facts: Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated in 1982 Rosario moved to Pagadian while Onesiforo moved to Manila They left behind two lots, lot w/ the bodega standing on it and another lot w/c had petitioners house Onesiforo and Victor Alinas (respondent) are brothers Petitioners allege that they entrusted their properties to Victor and Elena w/ the agreement that any income from the rentals of the properties should be remitted to the SSS (where the lot w/ the house was mortgaged) and to Rural Bank of Oroquieta (where the lot w/ the bodega was mortgaged) o Onesiforo alleged that he left blank papers w/ his signature on them to facilitate the administration of the said properties 1993 the petitioners learned that their properties were foreclosed and were bought by the respondents and the transfer certificate title were issued in their names These transactions were executed by the SPA signed by Onesiforo in favor of his brother, in an Absolute Deed of Sale also signed by him and a notarized Agreement where Onesiforo acknowledged that his brother used his own money to buy the lot and that he waives all his rights and interests over the said lots Petitioner filed w/ the RTC a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership of their conjugal properties RTC found that the petitioners were not able to prove their allegations o That it was Valeria Alinas, their mother, whom Onesiforo requested/directed to take care of everything and sell everything and his sister, Teresita, to whom he left a verbal authority to administer his properties o That Onesiforo really did sign the documents w/c made the sale possible o That the lot w/ bodega is validly owned by the respondents but the sale of the lot w/ the house is null and void for lack of consent from the wife The respondent spouses appealed the RTC decision questioning among others the ruling of the court which held null and void the sale of the lot w/ the house since they only redeemed it and did not really buy it CA affirmed the rule of the RTC w/ modifications o Only the sale of Rosarios part in the property is null and void
Issue: WON the sale of the lot w/ the house is valid w/ regards to Onesiforos side but not w/ regards to Rosarios part since she did not give her consent to the sale Held: NO Although petitioners were married before the FC, the sale occurred in 1989, making the sale of the conjugal property under CPG of the FC Art 124 of FC states that w/o both spouses signature, the sale would be null and void 430
Therefore, based on Art 124, the sale of petitioners conjugal property made by the husband alone is void in its entirety The Court does not see how applying Art 124 of the FC would lead to injustice or absurdity since the respondents were well aware that Onesiforo was selling the properties w/o the consent of his wife However, petitioners should reimburse the respondents of the redemption price w/c they paid for the property b. Sole administration Art. 124. supra 1. Incapacity, FC 124, 253 o Prayed that his mother and the wife of Dr. Ernesto, Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza (petitioner), be appointed guardian o Prayed also that no property be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to 3rd persons June 13, 1991 Gilda herself filed a petition for the declaration of incapacity of her husband, assumption of sole powers of admin of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same o Averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband who was confined for intensive medical care and treatment at Iloilo Doctors Hospital o Signified her desire to assume sole powers of admin o Alleged that her husbands medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up that she needed to sell the property in question and its improvements RTC set a hearing for June 20, 1991 On the day of the hearing, RTC rendered its decision w/c found Dr. Ernesto as truly incapacitated and that it was necessary to sell the property in question to pay for his medical expenses o Made a pronouncement that the petition by Gilda was pursuant to Art 124 of FC and the proceedings thereon are governed by Art 253 of the same code July 3, 1991 Teodoro filed an MR o Alleged that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of admin, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Dr. Ernesto and cannot be prosecuted under Art 253 of FC but under the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court w/c require procedural due processneed of notice and a hearing on merits o Under the NCC, Ernesto had acquired vested rights as conjugal partner and that these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced w/o his consent and he cant be 431
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n) Uy vs. CA Facts: March 25, 1991 Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. suffered a stroke w/c left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties June 6, 1991 upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the spouses was about to be sold, Teodoro Jardeleza (respondent), one of the sons of the spouses, filed a petition for the guardianship of his father o Averred that the present mental and physical incapacity of his father prevent him from completely administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the spouses real and personal assets, there was a need for a court appointed guardian to administer the properties
deprived of his properties through mere summary proceedings o Questioned the propriety of the sale of the property in question in order to pay for the hospitalization of his father since the conjugal partnership had other assets to pay for all financial obligations Apart from sufficient cash, Ernesto owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors Hospital w/c can be off-set against the hospital bills o Ernesto enjoys certain privileges at the hospital w/c allows hm to pay on installment basis o 2 of his doctors are his own sons who are not charging him anything for their professional services o The property is worth P12-15M but he was informed that it would be sold for much less o The property w/c houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernestos labor and service to his fellowmen and that it has sentimental value to the family While the MR was pending, Gilda sold the lot in question to her daughter and her husband, the petitioner-spouses Uy, for P8M and filed an ex-parte motion for the approval of the deed of absolute sale August 12, 1991 Teodoro filed his Opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale o The motion was prematurely field and should be held in abeyance o The motion does not allege or prove the justifications for the sale o The motion does not allege that Ernesto would approve of the sale had he been competent RTC denied the MR and approved the motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale on the grounds that Teodoro does not have the personality to oppose the petition considering that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the spouses who are still alive CA reversed the decision and declared the sale as void Issue: WON Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto who suffered a stroke rendering him incapacitated, may assume sole powers of admin of the conjugal property under Art 124 of FC and dispose of a parcel of land w/ its improvements w/ the approval of the court in a summary proceedings Held: Yes, she could assume sole powers of admin and dispose of property but not under summary proceedings The proper remedy is the appointment of a judicial guardian o the person or estate or both of such incompetent under Rule 93, Sec 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court Summary judicial proceedings under the FC contemplate a situation where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained These rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under FC may apply to the wifes admin of the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of admin has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court A spouse who desires to sell real property as such admin of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under ROC, not the summary judicial proceedings under the FC Hence, absent the opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process 432
The trial court should have served notice of the petition to the incapacitated spouse and required him to show cause why the petition should not be granted 2. Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127 (3) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) 3. Abandonment, FC 101, 128 Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a) 4. Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61 Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Sabalones vs. CA Petition for review on decision of CA granting the preliminary injunction. Facts: Samson Sabalones left his wife, Remedios Gaviola Sabalones, the administration of their conjugal properties for 15 yrs during his 433
fulfilment of his duties as a diplomat. When he retired in 1985, he went back to the Philippines but not to their conjugal house. Four yrs later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership. (Hes 68 y/o at this time, very sick and living w/o income and hell use the money hell get for his hospitalization and medical treatment). She filed a counterclaim for legal separation and claimed that the house in Greenhills is where she and her children live and they depend for support in the building and lot rentals in Forbes Park. He also argued that he never returned to their house and instead, live with Thelma Curameng and their 3 children. RTC granted the legal separation (due to his bigamy), which forfeited his share therefore, he is not entitled for support from the properties. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Issue: WON preliminary injunction is validly issued. Held: Petition has no merit. Injunction GRANTED. The injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code. Ratio: The designation for the administration of the properties is implicitly provided to maintain the status quo.Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of the rentals. The injunction is necessary to protect the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Ravina vs. Villa-Abrille Facts: Mary Ann Villa-Abrille and Pedro Villa-Abrille a married couple w/ 4 children 434
1982, they bought a lot (lot 2) adjacent to lot 1 w/c is Pedros exclusive property The spouses built a house on the two lots and made improvements including a poultry and annex 1991, Pedro got a mistress and started neglecting his family Mary Ann sold their movables to support the family and the studies of the children Pedro, alone, sold the house and the two lots to the petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners The house and lots were sold nevertheless even w/o Mary Anns consent After the sale, Pedro, w/ the members of CAFGU and w/ the help of petitioners, took Mary Anns and the childrens properties while they were not in the house When the family came back, they were not allowed to enter their house Mary Ann filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages, and Attorneys Fees w/ Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and petitioners Pedro alleged, during the trial that he bought the house w/ his own money Petitioners asserted that they inspected the titles of the property before buying RTC voided the sale in terms of Mary Anns one-half share CA declared the sale of lot 1, Pedros exclusive property as valid and the sale of lot 2 and the house as void Issue: WON lot 2 is Pedros exclusive property WON its sale is valid w/o Mary Anns consent WON the Ravinas are purchasers in good faith and could claim reimbursements for the improvements they made to the properties Held: NO o Petitioners assert that Pedro acquired lot 2 through exchange/barter w/ his sister and thus, the lot remained exclusive even when acquired during his marriage o but since they were not able to show proof of the exclusive nature of the property, the presumption that the lot is conjugal since it was acquired during the marriage subsists o the house built is also conjugal for having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses who had to borrow money from DBP for such purpose NO o The sale was made during the effectivity of FC and Art 124 of FC states that disposition of conjugal property w/o the consent of both husband and wife is void o Since the sale was done w/o Mary Anns consent although w/ her knowledge, it was, therefore, annullable w/in 5 years NO o The petitioners knew that the property belong to the spouses as evidenced by the Title of the said property o Also, they were informed by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale o Art 449 of NCC states that he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown w/o right to indemnity Note: Mary Ann is not claiming ownership over lot 1. The issue her involves lot 2 and the house c. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121 (8) Art. 124 supra Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (174a) 435
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n) Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon FACTS: The spouses Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara bought several pieces of land the lands were divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate. During their marriage, on 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe. However, the sale was made without the consent of her husband, Maximo. After Maximos death on 1959, his widow Gimena and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of the lots; had orally mortgaged them to the defendants; and an offer to redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in order to recover the three parcels of land. On the other hand, the defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants stating that they are the lawful owners of the property. Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of RTC and ordered the defendants and to turn over the property and the net monetary value of the profits they obtained from it. The appellate court found the Deed of Purchase and Sale executed by Gimena Almosara is not a forgery. However, the sale was made by Gimena Almosara is invalid, because it was executed without the needed consent of her husband. The lots were also conjugal because they were purchased during the existence of marriage. ISSUE: WON the sale of the lots by Gemina without the consent of the husband is invalid. HELD: Yes, but the term voidable contract should have been used by the Court of Appeals instead of invalid. Judgement was made in favor of Sofia and Salvador Aldon (excluded Gimena) and ordered the Felipes to pay the fruits gained from the property starting from 1959 (death of Maximo). According to Art. 165, Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. Art. 172 on the other hand states that wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. In this case, it was sold without consent and is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." Invalid - SC discussed the term invalid used by the Court of Appeals to describe the sale. According to SC, the term is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective contracts, namely: rescissible, voidable, unenforceable, and void or inexistent. According to the Court the sale should have been described as a voidable contract. This was held by using a process of elimination. Voidable contracts according to Par. 1, Art 1390, NCC are those where 436
one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." In the instant case, Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses. Rescissible - The contract cannot be not rescinded by Gimena however, for in such contract all the essential elements are untainted but Gimena's consent was tainted. Unenforceable - Neither can the contract be classified as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. Void or Inexistent The contract cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. The voidable contract of Gimena however, was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The death of Maximo does not change the bar on Gimena because what she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. However, the case of their children, Sofia and Salvador Aldon, is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow. The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died. According to SC, two questions should be answered: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon barred by the statute of limitations? First Question: Petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the lots by prescription because of bad faith. According to the evidence, the petitioners son attempted to have Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting their rights on the property. Thus, the Felipes knew the lots were not theirs. There were no attempts made to obtain the husband's signature, despite the fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close relatives. These indicate the bad faith of the appellees. The period for extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed since the sale was made during 1951 and the present action was instituted on 1976. Second Question: The children's cause of action started from the death of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it and because the action was filed in 1976 it is still well within the period. Cheeseman vs. IAC Facts December 4, 1970 - Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married February 15,1981 They have been separated June 4, 1974 a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman 437
Again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants July 31, 1981 Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that o the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money") o Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land o Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith WON Thomas has a right over the land WON Estelita is a buyer in good faith No Yes Fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself The finding of the lower court that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise
Issues Held Ratio
Frenzel vs. Catito FACTS: The Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel (an Australian with German descent) is an electrical engineer by profession but worked as a pilot of New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started business in the country and married and married Teresita Santos (a Filipina). They eventually separated without obtaining a divorce. Alfred later arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation met Ederlina Catito (a Filipina masseuse) in a night club. Unknown to Alfred, she resided in Germany before and was married to Klaus 438
Muller (a German). They started seeing each other after and he was later so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at the club, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business. Upon arrival in the Philippines, she suggested that she could establish a beauty parlor which Alfred agreed to. He told her that he was married to someone in Australia but that he was eager to have a divorce. He proposed marriage to her, but she said that they should wait a little bit longer. She later found a building at Ermita, Manila, owned by one Atty. Jose Hidalgo, bought it, and established Edorial Beauty Salon, which was registered under her name. Alfred paid for the property (P20K) and the purchase of equipment and furniture for the parlor (300K). Later, as Ederlina was going to Germany, she executed a special power of attorney appointing her brother, Aser Catito, as her attorney-in-fact in managing the beauty parlor business. She stated in the said deed that she was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his work as a pilot. When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited Ederlina in her Manila residence and found it unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house and lot owned by Victoria Binuya Steckel in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Since he knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer, as well as in its title. They bought it for the sum of US$20,000.00. He believed that after their marriage, they would jointly own the property. When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her two sisters occupy the property. Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He sold some of his properties in Australia and Papua New Guinea. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in Alfreds account with the HSBC, Kowloon Branch. They later opened another account in that bank under Ederlinas name where Alfred transferred his own deposits. Later, he received a letter from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin. Klaus informed him about that Ederlina was already married to him and begged him to stop seeing his wife. Upon inquiry, she admitted to the fact but assured him that she would divorce Klaus which appeased him. He agreed to continue the relationship wait for the outcome of her petition for divorce, and acquired and paid for the services of a law firm in Berlin, as her counsel who informed her of the progress of the proceedings. While the decision for their petition for divorce was still pending he decided to acquire, on separate occasions, two house and lots and a beach resort in Davao, all of which were registered under Ederlinas name. However her petition for divorce, and her second petition later, was denied because Klaus opposed. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by her in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce and threatened to file a bigamy case against her. Their relationship started deteriorating and he eventually decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. He later wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings, accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his own money, and demanded the return of all the amounts they had stolen and turn over to him all the properties. He later filed two separate complaints in the RTC QC and Davao alleging the she managed to transfer funds from their account, without his consent, to her own account in HSBC Hong Kong. He said that she used this to purchase the properties and also said that the financed for the beauty parlor in Manila and the property in Quezon City. However both RTCs, and later CA, ruled in favor of Erlinda, 439
invoking the bar on alien ownership of Philippine property under the Constitution. ISSUE: WON Alfred Frenzel does have rights to the properties. HELD: No, SC affirmed CAs decision of dismissing the case. Under Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain and also disqualified from acquiring private lands. Even if he was the real vendee, the transactions would be a violation of the Constitution; and thus, it is null and void ab initio. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. Affirming the findings of the trial court, he really did have knowledge about the prohibition based on the fact that he registered the properties under Ederlinas name to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. FOR THE TOPIC: SINCE FOREIGNERS ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM ACQUIRING PHILIPPINE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, THEY ARE LIKEWISE PROHIBITTED IN DISPOSITION AND ENCUMBERANCE. Ayuste vs. CA Facts: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on 1961. Although the couple resided in Manila, they operated a machine shop in Lucena City, which was managed by Rafael. In order to serve as a temporary residence for Rafael while in Lucena, the couple purchased on 1982 a parcel of land on which a residential house was built from spouses Pedro and Aida David. A deed of sale was executed and signed by the parties and filed with the Register of Deeds. 1983, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name of "RAFAEL T. AYUSTE, married to Christina Ayuste. 1987, a deed of absolute sale was executed by Rafael in favor of Viena Malabonga. On page 2 of this deed appears the signature of Christina Ayuste below the phrase "With my conformity." The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and new TCT was issued in Malabongas name. After Rafael's death on 1989, Christina discovered, in the course of an inventory of their properties, that the title to the land in Lucena was missing. She searched for it in the office of her husband in Lucena City and it was then that she learned from her employees about the sale of the house and lot by her husband to private respondent. 1990, Christina filed a complaint with the RTC for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of the title issued and for the payment of moral, exemplary and actual damages. In her complaint Christina alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was forged and that her husband sold the property without her knowledge and consent. 1995, during pendency of the case, Christina died and represented by her heirs (2 children)
RTC: Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of House and Lot executed by husband CA: reversed holding that Christina's right to bring an action for the annulment of the sale is barred by laches because of her failure to file it during the existence of the marriage in accordance with article 173 of the Civil Code. 440
Also, Malabonga is entitled to the protection of a buyer in good faith and for value. It is settled in this jurisdiction that registration with the Register of Deeds is notice to the whole world. The questioned deed of sale has long been registered. Villaranca vs. Villaranda Facts: This controversy revolves around a Deed of Exchange executed by and between two brothers Vicente Villaranda and Honorio Villaranda. A parcel of land was left to the two brothers and their eight other siblings by their parents. Estate Administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 square meters of the property to Honorio starting on 1976 until 1986. Vicente, on the other hand, inherited 64.22 square meters of the property that had not been leased to Honorio. 1976, the two brothers executed the Deed of Exchange. Under this, Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter portion to Honorio, in exchange for a 500-square-meter property, After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and constructed a building thereon. Years later, 1992, a subdivision plan was completed, in pursuit of which the 64.22 square-meter share of Vicente was issued in his name. The other heirs were issued their own TCTs for their respective shares. Honorio and his wife, Ana Maria, then brought an action for specific performance before the RTC to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange. The spouses alleged that they could not fully use or dispose of their property, because Vicente had yet to identify and delineate his undivided 500- square-meter portion of the property. They asked the court to compel him to do so, as well as to convey to them the 64.22-square-meter lot, in compliance with his obligations under the Deed. During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the 64.22 sq. m. lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. which intervened in the civil case. 441
Issue: WON the wife can still redeem the property Held: A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time. Ratio: Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without his wife's consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Vicente did not deny that he had entered into the Deed of Exchange with Honorio. He, however, averred that he was not bound thereby, because the property had not been delivered, the Deed had not been consummated. He claimed that the Deed had already been revoked by both parties. According to him, he, together with his co-heirs, requested Honorio to agree to its rescission, because the considerations therein were iniquitous. Honorio agreed, provided certain conditions he had disclosed were met. Vicente contended that he had complied with those conditions; and that, therefore, he and spouses had already revoked the Deed of Exchange. c) There was no acceptance and actual delivery of the 500 square meters lot to petitioner at any given time; Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and enforceable."28 Held: 1. Issue not raised in lower Court so the SC will not pass upon it. 2. the lack of consent on her part will not make the husbands alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but merely voidable (NCC). Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless annulled. In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten years from "the transaction questioned." Her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the Deed is still valid and enforceable. Ratio: The Deed was entered into on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998. Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, are applicable to the present case. The lot was part of Honorio and Anas conjugal properties. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code on the disposition of real properties of the conjugal partnership are the following: "Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. x x x 442
RTC: reconvey the Lot to the spouses and ORDERING Vicente to choose his 500 square-meter portion on the lot of the spouses. After he shall have chosen his 500 square meter portion of the lot, they shall thru a surveyor, segregate this portion. After the subdivision plan shall have been approved by the Executive Director of the DENR to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of him over this 500 square-meter portion of his land "(c) With this judgment, plaintiffs and CA: affirmed Issue: Whether there was a perfected and consummated deed of exchange on account of the following: a) There was no specific identification and delineation of the object of the Deed of Exchange and that there was a condition precedent for petitioner to examine and accept the specific area to effect the exchange; b) There was a need for another contract to be executed in order to identify the object of the exchange;
"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband." Ainza vs. CA (sa case, Ainza vs. Padua siya) Facts: Spouses Eugenia and Antonio Padua owned a lot with an unfinished residential house. Sometime in April 1987, Concepcion Ainza bought one-half of an undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia, and Antonio. No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed but cash payment was received and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and daughter, Natividad Tuliao. Concepcion authorized Natividad and the latters husband, Ceferino to occupy the premises, and make improvements on the unfinished building. Then, without Concepcions consent, Paduas caused the subdivision of the property into three portions and registered it in their names in violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of the title. On the other hand, Antonio averred that he bought the property in 1980 and introduced improvements thereon. Between 1989 and 1990, he and Eugenia, allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. In 1994, they caused the subdivision of the property and 3 separate titles were issued. Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the she refused and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. He filed an ejectment suit on 1999. Concepcion, represented by Natividad, also filed a civil case for partition of real property and annulment of titles with damages. RTC: ordered the subdivision of the property in equal shares with onehalf of the property, including the portion occupied by the spouses Severino and Natividad to be awarded to the Concepcion; The trial court upheld the sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. It ruled that the sale was consummated when both contracting parties complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession by delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid the purchase price. It also declared that the transfer of the property did not violate the Statute of Frauds because a fully executed contract does not fall within its coverage. CA: reversed Issue: whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. Held: Contract VOIDABLE because no consent of husband (NCC) but the action to annul the same must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action accrued. Eugenia sold the property in April 1987 hence Antonio should have asked the courts to annul the sale on or before April 1993. No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by prescription. there was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay. The contract of sale was consummated when both parties fully 443
complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia. Obiter: The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds Ratio: A contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, upon a meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment. a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement. Thus, where one party has performed his obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement. Alinas vs. Alinas (see digest above) Siochi vs. Gozon Facts: This case involves a parcel of land and is registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon." 1991, Elvira filed a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT. 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property. stipulations in the Agreement: Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredos exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the back of TCT; (2) secure the approval of the RTC to exclude the property from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis pendens pertaining to the case and annotated on TCT. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying a partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in the same year. (the Agreement was annotated on TCT)
RTC: decreeing the legal separation. Elvira is entitled to live separately from Alfredo without dissolution of their marriage bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is declared DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred whose custody is awarded to Elvira. (parties are required to mutually support their child as her needs arises.) (property is deemed conjugal property.) 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of Winifred. The Register of Deeds cancelled TCT and issued new TCT in her name, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI). IDRI paid for the property. Register of Deeds cancelled TCT and issued new TCT to IDRI. Mario then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. 444
RTC: On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction: made permanent The Agreement to Buy and Sell is approved, excluding the property and rights of Elvira to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property The Deed of Donation is nullified and voided. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant InterDimensional Realty, Inc. is nullified and voided. Alfredo is ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mario over his one-half undivided share in the property and to comply with all the requirements for registering such deed. Mario is ordered to pay Alfredo Gozon the balance CA: affirmed On appeal to SC: Mario wants the whole property. IDRI, buyer in good faith, sale valid. Issue: Held: As sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. he representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis pendens and the legal separation case filed before the RTC. (knew property is conjugal) Ratio: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: 445
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied) 8. Effect of Separation de facto, FC 127, 100, cf 239 Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a) Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n) 9. Effect of Abandonment, FC 128 c.f. 101 Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her 446
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a) Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) Facts Jose Jo had cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife; their child is Monina Jo Prima filed for judicial separation of conjugal properties and an action for support RTC decided that Jo should provide support but it appeared in the dispositive part that there was none about judicial separation of conjugal property Jo elevated the decision to the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property for lack of cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Art. 178 of Partosa-Jo vs CA the CC (The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership) Thus this petition
Issues WON no such separation was decreed by the RTC in the dispositive portion of its decision WON the judicial separation of conjugal property sought not allowed under Art. 175, 178 and 191 of the CC Held and Ratio Yes o The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete in so far as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision. o The RTC made definite findings on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property, holding that Jo and Prima were legally married and that the properties mentioned by Prima were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. o There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the decision of the RTC was a ruling based upon such findings and so should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. No o Art. 178(3) of the CC provides that The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership except that if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of 447
property. Such was superseded by Art. 128 of the FC providing that an aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: (1) abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause, and (2) failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for ones family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention off perpetual separation. Record shows that as early as 1942, Jo had already rejected Prima, whom Jo denied admission to their conjugal home; thus, showing that Jo had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Also, Jo refused to give financial support to Prima. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with Jos refusal to give support, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for judicial separation of their conjugal property. Furthermore, Prima can also invoke the 2nd ground allowed by Art. 128 of the FC for the fact is that Jo failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband or parent Amendments introduced in the FC are applicable to this case because the greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. o The properties should now be divided between Jo and Prima on the assumption that they were acquired during the coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. 10. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126 Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a) a. death, FC 126 (1) supra b. legal separation, FC 63(2), FC 66 Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a) 448
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a) c. annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel to FC 43 (2) Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; d. judicial separation of property, FC 134-138 Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; 449
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a) Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a) Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. (191a) 11. Effects of Dissolution, FC 129 450 Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a) Nicholson allegedly executed on April 9, 1995) The waiver covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses but did not incidentally include the lot in question Florencia and spouses failed to pay so foreclosure proceedings were initiated; in an auction sale, Metrobank was the highest bidder RTC declared the REM invalid and CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision Hence, Metrobank filed this petition
Metropolitan Bank vs. Pascual Facts Jan. 19, 1995 Nicholson and Florencia were married During the union, Florencia bought a lot with an apartment A TCT was issued in the name of Florencia, married to Nelson (Nicholson) Pascual Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage July 31, 1995 RTC declared their marriage null and void on the gorund of psychological incapacity and ordered the dissolution and liquidation of their CPG Couple went separate ways but without liquidating their CPG Florencia, with spouses Oliveros, obtained a 58 million loan from Metrobank To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages REM on their properties including the subject property mentioned above (Florencia submitted 3 documents: (1) a copy of the title, (2) photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and (3) waiver that
Issues WON the subject property is conjugal WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between Nicholson and Florencia ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses WON Metrobank is an innocent purchases for value Held and Ratio Yes, via Art. 160 of the CC and not Art. 116 of the FC o CC is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the FC o Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal o When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs to said spouse No o While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. Relevant provisions of the CC and FC first require the liquidation of the conjugal 451
properties before a regime of separation of property reigns. o Pending the liquidation following the dissolution, the CPG is converted into an implied ordinary coownership. In the pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the CC shall govern (each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it but such shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership). o Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the CP on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Florencia therefore has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half undivided interest on the disputed property even without Nicholsons consent. The rights of the Metrobank as mortgagee are limited only to undivided portion that Florencia owned. o Waiver allegedly executed bore Nicholsons forged signature. A furious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all. No need to discuss o Where the mortgagee of the land is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable situated in Fairview, QC. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, single. Subsequently, Bonifacio, for P 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. Thereafter, on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan, Manila. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had former TCT cancelled. They secured the issuance in their names of a new TCT from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers title and the issuance of new TCT, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of QC to protect their rights over the property. Very much later, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in QC. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. In support of their case, they presented the following documents: 452
Tarrosa vs De Leon (salamat sa sponsor) Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot
a. A Real Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on July 22, 1977. b. A Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on November 27, 1979 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage. c. The Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, promulgated on July 30, 1982, nullifying the Real Estate Mortgage. The Tarrosas averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. And, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC: Deed of Sale void ab initio; cancel TCT in the name of Tarrossas CA: affirmed Issues: WON properties were fully paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property. Held: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not valid. The nullity proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. The sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs. Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. 453
Nevertheless, SC is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration in the amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. Did the Court of Appeals err when it entertained respondents appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of execution? Held and Ratio The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further presentation of evidence on the incidental matters he had previously raised before the RTC. Since the RTC resolved these matters in its Orders dated November 28, 2003 and April 12, 2004, disregarding its previous order calling for the reception of evidence, said orders became final orders as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the parties common properties. As such, it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal a. Liquidation procedure, FC 129 (supra) b. Cause other than death, FC 129 (supra), FC 43 (2) (supra), FC 63 (2) (supra) c. Termination due to death, FC 130, cf FC 104 Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of 454
Sales vs Sales Facts Present controversy stemmed from Civil Case filed by Marywin Albano Sales against her husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties, and Civil Case filed by Mayor Reynolan T. Sales for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. The RTC rendered judgment5 declaring the marriage of Marywin and Reynolan void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It also ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership Marywin filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them partitioned. After the decision became final, Marywin filed a motion for execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them partitioned Accordingly, he prayed for the deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution, maintaining that no partition of properties can be had until after all the matters he raised are resolved after due notice and hearing. Issues
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a) o That Noel give a P15,000.00 monthly regular support to Javy Singh Buenaventura o That custody of Javy is to his mother o That Isabel can revert back to the use of her maiden family name Noel appealed to the CA Isabel filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support Noel filed an opposition praying that it be denied September 2, 1996 CA issued a resolution increasing the support to P20,000 Noel appealed but appellate court dismissed such Noel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied Noel filed an instant petition for review on certiorari November 13, 1996 through a resolution, CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration of the September 2 resolution Noel filed a petition for certiorari to question the two resolutions July 9, 1997 Petition for Review on Certiorari and the Petition for Certiorari were consolidated by the court In the petition for review on certiorari, Noel contends that CA decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence In the petition for certiorari, Noel contends that CA gravely abused its discretion when it refused to set Isabels motion for increased support for the parties son for hearing Issues (on the topic): WON assets of conjugal partnership property be liquidated in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage Held Yes Ratio In case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and ditributed is that of equal co-ownership 455
Buenaventura vs. CA Facts July 12, 1992 Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura Isabel then filed an answer but Noel then amended his petition stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated Isabel denied the allegation July 31, 1995 RTC promulgated a decision o That marriage is null and void ab initio o That Noel pay Isabel moral damages of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest, plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00 o That Noel pay Isabel expenses of litigation of P50,000.00 plus costs o That assets of the conjugal partnership property be liquidated
The parties were legally married on July 4, 197 and therefore all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition have been made, contracted, or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved Art. 147 of the FC: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. In this case, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found both by the trial court and the CA to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a) 13. Applicability of Rules of Court, FC 132 Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a) 14. Support During CPG Liquidation, FC 133 Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (188a) Santero vs. CFI of Cavite Facts: Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero, and Willy Santero (petitioners) are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero w/ Felixberta Parcusa Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, Miguel all surnamed Santero are 4 of the 7 children of Pablo Santero w/ Anselma Diaz All children are natural children of Pablo since he did not marry either of the two women Pablo who died on Nov 30, 1973, was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero (died in 1970) and Simona Pamuti (1976) The two families are sharing in the yet to be liquidated intestate estate of Pablo Respondents, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, filed a Motion for Allowance on June 30, 1982 456
12. For Marriages Before FC, FC 131 Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
o The allowance is for the school expenses of her children o They have been granted allowance from a similar motion the previous year Petitioners allege that the respondents are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship o That the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance bec whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged owner of the Kawit properties from w/c said administrator derives the only income of the estate Respondent admitted that some of her children are already of age and that they are not enrolled in the 1st semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the allowances o Cited article 290 of CC: Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. (124a) o And Sec 3 of Rule 83 of the ROC: Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the Court, such allowance as provided by law. CFI granted the motion of the respondents o They need further education w/c should have been provided to them if their father were still alive o The estate of the Santeros is vast and the amount to be released for the allowance is insignificant Before the SC could act on the petition of the petitioner, respondent filed another motion for allowance to include the 3 other children, Juanita, Estelita, and Pedrito CFI granted the same CFI directed Anselma to explain the inclusion of the 3 other children Respondent said she did not include the 3 children since they were already of age but Art 188 of NCC states that all children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Issue: WON the respondents are entitled to an allowance Held: YES Petitioners argue that: o Respondents are not entitled to allowance since they have already attained majority age, 2 are gainfully employed and one is married as provided for under Sec 3 of Rule 83 of ROC o There was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for school expenses for AY 1982-83 bec these wards have already attained majority age and are no longer under guardianship o Administrator does not have sufficient funds SC: o The question of whether or not the respondents are entitled to an allowance concerns only the intestate estate of Pablo and not those of his parents based on Art 992 of NCC: 457
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) As stated in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin, bec of the barrier present in Art 992 of NCC, the respondents herein are not entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of Simona This present petition lacks merit The controlling provision is not Sec 3 of Rule 83 of ROC but Arts 290 and 188 of CC Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (1430) The fact that the respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is not important and should not be regarded as a determining factor of their right to allowance under Art 188 ROC limits allowance to the widow and the minor or incapacitated children; NCC gives allowance to the surviving spouse and the children w/o distinction So, the four children, are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father (the decision did not include the 3 additional children probably because the allowance w/c was supposed to be given to them was withheld) Since CC is a substantive law w/c give the surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by ROC w/c is a procedural rule o However, w/ respect to spouse, it should be the legitimate spouse and not the common law-spouses who are the mothers of the children here (I think this means that common-law spouses are not entitled to allowance during the liquidation process) G. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY 1. When applicable a. in the marriage settlements, FC 143-146 Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory. (212a) Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a) Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a) Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. 458
o o
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The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. (215a) b. when mandatory, FC 103 and FC 130 (supra) Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extrajudicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n) c. reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66 (2) (supra) 2. Property covered, FC 144 (supra) 3. Administration a. by the owner-spouse, FC 145 (supra) b. by the other spouse, FC 142 Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) c. FC 100 (3); 101 (supra) 4. Family expenses, FC 146 (supra) 5. Conveyances between the spouses, FC 87, NCC 1490 Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a) Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191. (1458a) H. JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY 1. When possible, FC 134 Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. (190a) Maquilan vs. Maquilan 459
Facts: Virgilio (petitioner) and Dita (respondent) Maquilan are spouses They had one son Their marriage turned sour when Virgilio discovered that Dita was having an affair He filed a case of adultery against his wife and her lover from w/c the two were convicted Afterwards, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of CPG imputing psychological incapacity on the part of Virgilio During the pre-trial of the case, the two entered into a compromise agreement, partially settling their CPG w/o prejudice to the litigation of other properties (for the agreement, refer to page 170) The agreement was given judicial imprimatur in the Judgment on Compromise Agreement (January 11, 2002) w/c is now being assailed Virgilio filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration of the judgment on compromise agreement on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the agreement RTC denied the motion CA affirmed o The conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property especially since her penalty does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction w/c deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos o FC Arts 43 and 63 do not apply considering that the petition for nullity of marriage under 36 has not yet been decided; hence, it is premature to apply the said provisions Although adultery is ground for legal separation, Art 63 finds no application since no petition to that effect has been filed by the petitioner against respondent The spouses voluntarily separated their property through the agreement w/ court approval under Art 134 of FC The agreement is valid and binding in all respects bec it had been voluntarily entered into by the parties That the petitioner was not duly informed by his counsel of the legal effects of the agreement is untenable since mistake or negligence of the lawyer binds his client The agreement was simply worded that a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequence thereof Application of Art 2035 of CC is misplaced since the agreement was made during the existence of the marriage Cooling-off period under Art 58 of FC has no bearing on the validity of the agreement The agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy The presence of the Sol-Gen or his deputy is not indispensable to the execution and validity of the agreement since it did not touch on the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage The agreement is merely an agreement bet the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially w/o prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of nullity of marriage 460
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Issue: WON the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid Held: YES Petitioner contends that the agreement is void because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property o Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child under Art 43(2) and 63 of FC o It is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; therefore, the agreement is void and did not become final and executory o Cites Art 2035 and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the agreement is void SC: o Art 43 refers to a marriage where a subsequent marriage is terminated due to the reappearance of an absent spouse o Art 63 applies to the effect of a decree of legal separation o The case herein is for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity o Art 2035 is also inapplicable since the agreement is just about the partial division of CPG and does not deal w/ the validity of marriage or legal separation Not among those prohibited by the provision o Under Art 143 of FC, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval Such is the nature of the agreement entered into by the spouses This is applicable even while the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage is pending But the court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the CPG and other persons w/ pecuniary interest Petitioner claims that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation during the pendency of the case is also void SC: o The settlement had no relation to questions surrounding the validity of their marriage nor did the settlement amount to a collusion bet the parties (Art 48 of FC and Sec 3(e) of Rule 9 of ROC) o The purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the SolGen is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion bet parties o Their appearance is mandatory but the failure of RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the agreement o The conviction of adultery does not carry w/ it the accessory of civil interdiction w/c deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos See Art 34 of RPC, Art 333 and Art 43 Negligence or mistake of the counsel is binding on his client 2. For sufficient cause, FC 135 cf. FC 55(10) 461
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property. (191a) Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. 3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136 (supra), FC 74-75, FC 134 (supra) 462 Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local custom. (118) Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a) Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson Facts: Alfonso (petitioner) and Carmen (respondent) Lacson were married on Feb 14, 1953 and they had 4 children January 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and resided in Manila March 12, 1963 she filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself However, the spouses reached an amicable settlement respecting custody of their children, support and separation of their property April 27, 1963 They filed a joint petition embodying their amicable settlement o Separation of their property Carmen is waiving all her rights to whatever property Alfonso might have since they did not acquire any property of consequence
o The right to administer and dispose of whatever property they will acquire after the separation of property o Custody of the children (this is the issue in the case) The 2 elder children will go to Alfonso The younger 2 will be with Carmen o Monthly allowance of 300 for the support of the children w/ Carmen o Rights of visitation of the children in custody of the other at their respective residences and during the summer, the 2 children in the custody of each spouse will be given to the other except for this summer wherein all children will remain w/ Carmen until June 15, 1963 after which the two elder children, Enrique and Maria Theresa, will be returned to Alfonso The CFI approved and incorporated in toto the compromise agreement after finding that it was conformable to law Alfonso then delivered all the children to Carmen (since it was summer) and remitted money for their support May 7, 1963 Carmen filed in the JDRC a motion alleging that she only signed the petition so she could have immediate custody of her minor children who are all below 7 yrs old o She wanted to be relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody of the children o Since the children are now in her custody, she wants their custody to be awarded to her pendente lite May 24, 1963 Alfonso moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens JRDC ruled in favor of Alfonso and dismissed the case Upon appeal to CA by Carmen regarding the validity of the agreement in connection only w/ the custody of the minor children, the CA certified the case to the SC May 15, 1963 Carmen filed a motion in the CFI regarding the custody of the children June 1, 1963 Alfonso filed a motion for execution of the agreement and a charge for contempt against Carmen CFI denied Carmens motion and granted Alfonsos and stated that Carmen should deliver the 2 children on the agreed upon date Carmen questioned the validity of the agreement regarding the custody of the children in the CA CA granted Carmens petition and declared null and void both the compromise agreement insofar as it related to the custody and right of visitation of the 2 children and the execution of the said judgment Issue: WON the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are conformable to law Held: NO insofar as it related to the custody of the children The agreement is valid w/ respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership o The law allows the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership as long as judicial sanction is secured beforehand (NCC Art 190 and 191) o Besides, the spouses have been separated in fact for five years and the Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together o However, this does not accord recognition to nor legalize their de facto separation w/c is a state w/c is abnormal and fraught w/ grave danger to all concerned It was the JDRC w/c first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support of the children o But when Carmen signed the petition on the same matter and filed it in the CFI, she, in effect, abandoned her action in the JDRC 463
o Alfonso had the right to cite the decision of CFI and to ask for the dismissal of the case in the JDRC on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens o JDRC acted correctly in dismissing the case since it is no defense against the dismissal of the case that the case before the CFI was filed later than the one filed before the JDRC The CFI erred in depriving the mother the custody of the 2 older children who were then below 7 yrs of age o In the 2nd sentence of Art 363, the CC states that No mother shall be separated from her child under 7 years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. This is to avoid many a tragedy where the mother has seen her baby torn away from her No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age The use of the word shall in this provision is mandatory It prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below 7 yrs unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by the court o The order of the CFI awarding the custody of the 2 older children who were then, 6 and 5 years old was null and void neither does the award fall w/in the exception bec the record is bereft of any compelling reason to support the lower courts order depriving the wife of her minor childrens company the lower court only hinted that there were compelling reasons but the court cannot proceed on mere insinuations; they must be confronted w/ facts before they could adjudicate However, the children are no longer under 7 years since 5 years have already elapsed o Carmens petition has been moot and academic o But SC cannot uphold the spouses agreement regarding the custody of the children o Art 356 of the NCC provides: Art. 356. Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. o This provision grants every child rights w/c are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less whims and caprices, of his parents. o The court should determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law; evidence should be presented regarding this matter o Enrique, who is now 11 years old, should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live w/ o Alfonso should increase the monthly support he gives for his children 4. Effects of judicial separation of property a. liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 (1) Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. b. Support pendente lite, FC 137 (2) 464
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children. (192a) c. Regime after JSP, FC 138; FC 66 (2) (supra) Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. (191a) d. Binding effect on third parties, FC 139 140; of FC 66 (2) (supra) Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property. (193a) Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. (194a) 5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 cf. FC 67 Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1) When the civil interdiction terminates; (2) When the absentee spouse reappears; (3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration; (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other; (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor465 (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; (6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. (195a) Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. (195a, 108a) 6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142 cf. NCC 196, FC 96, FC 124 Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n) NCC Art. 196. With the conjugal partnership subsisting, the administration of all classes of property in the marriage may be transferred by the courts to the wife: (1) When she becomes the guardian of her husband; (2) When she asks for the declaration of his absence; (3) In case of civil interdiction of the husband. The courts may also confer the administration to the wife, with such limitation as they may deem advisable, if the husband should become a fugitive from justice or be in hiding as a defendant in a criminal case, or if, being absolutely unable to administer, he should have failed to provide for administration. (1441a) Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. 466
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a) Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: I. PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a) Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82) Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. 467
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a) 1. Unions under FC 147 Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. 468
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Maxey vs. CA Facts: 1903- Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) started living together Their children (3 of w/c are the petitioners herein) are claiming that their parents were married in the military fashion w/c both the trial court and the CA rejected During the period of cohabitation, 1911 and 1912, Melbourned acquired the parcels of land in question 1919 the two got married and Regina died some time after the wedding Melbourne married Julia Pamatluan Maxey and in 1953, using an SPA, Julia sold the properties to the respondent spouse Mr. and Mrs. Macayra January 6, 1962 petitioners filed a case for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the land in question and to recover their possession from the defendants o Allege that the properties were common properties of their parents having acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital o The sale of the land was executed by their father w/o their consent o They only learned of the sale in 1961 Respondents alleged that they were lawful owners of the properties in question having purchased them in good faith o They believed that the properties were exclusive properties of Melbourne Trial court applied Art 144 of the CC: o Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n) o Declared the sale null and void and ordered the reconveyance of the lands in question CA reversed the order o The lands are Melbournes exclusive property since there is no showing that Regina had any means to contribute to the purchase of the land since she did not own any property nor was she employed (as testified upon by her sister-in-law Juana Morales) o Melbourne, on the other hand, held high positions Deputy Gov of Zamboanga, School Supervisor in the East Coast of Davao Issue: WON the lands in question are the exclusive properties of Melbourne Held: NO On the military fashion marriage, the trial court and CA were correct in rejecting this argument On the ownership of the lands: 469
o Petitioners argue that even if their parents were married after the acquisition of the land (Feb 17, 1919), the properties still belong in equal shares to the two since the same were acquired through their joint efforts and industry Suggest that their mothers efforts in performing her role as a mother to them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to constitute the parcels of land as common properties acquired through their joint efforts o CA assumes that joint efforts means monetary contributions and since Regina had no earnings, she could not have contributed to the purchase of the properties o SC: For justice and equity, Art 144 of CC should be retroactively applied since there are no vested rights w/c would be prejudiced and since the properties were sold in 1953 when CC was already in force Even before the effectivity of the CC, the rights to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation of a man and wife not legally married have been recognized by this court Art 144 is the law established by the judicial precedents w/ the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a 50-50 sharing to the two of them It would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply The provisions of the CC is premised on the traditional and existing, normal and customary gender roles of Fil men and women wherein it is the wife who holds the purse and the man hands over the paycheck and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household The real contribution to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of the woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the familys material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife Vested rights definition: property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished from an expectant or contingent right The petitioners were entitled to half of the properties Obiter (hehehe): In the Phil, the best man is the woman. Gov. Gen. Leonard Wood Domingo vs. CA (from our previous digests) 470
Facts: The petition seeks to reverse the CAs ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property Backstory: o May 29, 1991 Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the RTC of Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation property against the petitioner in this case (Roberto Domingo) o She alleged the following: They were married on November 26, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg (as shown by their MC with ML) She did not know that Roberto had a previous marriage until 1983 when they were sued for bigamy by the first wife, Emerlinda dela Paz From January 23, 1979 to the present (1993), she has been working in Saudi Arabia and would come to the Phil only during her annual one-month vacation From 1983 to the present (1993), Roberto has been unemployed and relies only on her for support Out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties amounting to P350,000 which were under the possession and administration of Roberto In 1989, while on vacation, she learned that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman She also discovered that he was selling some of her properties w/o her knowledge or consent She appointed her brother Moises Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties Roberto failed and refused to turn over the properties to Moises She alleges that Roberto is not authorized to administer and possess the properties since their marriage is null and void She prayed that a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration over the properties That their marriage be declared null and void That she be declared sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage And that her brother be declared administrator of her properties Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss (MD) on the ground that the petition has no cause of action That since their marriage is void ab initio, declaring it to be such would be superfluous and unnecessary That no property of Delia is in his possession August 20, 1991 MD was denied for lack of merit The lower court relied on the precedent of Vda. De Consuegra vs. GSIS which states that there is a need for declaration of nullity of marriage An MR was filed stressing that the use of the precedent is erroneous and that there is no justiciable controversy as to the nullity of marriage September 11, 1991 MR was denied and petitioner was given 15 days after he received the order to file his answer The petitioner filed, instead, a civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied the motion to dismiss 471
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o Feb 7, 1992 CA dismissed the petition stating that the case Yap vs. Ca cited by the petitioner and Consuegra vs. GSIS relied upon by the RTC do not have relevance to this case because these cases dealt w/ successional rights of the second wife while the case here prays for separation of property corollary w/ the declaration of nullity of marriage Separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship bet said parties The declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together w/ the partition and distribution of the properties involved The alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for w/c the remedy ordinarily would be to file an answer, proceed w/ the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal o The petitioner filed an MR w/c was also denied for lack of merit Issues: 3. WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If it is, WON the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage 4. WON Delias petition is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively Held: 3. Yes. The Court held that Roberto and Delias marriage is indeed void ab initio since Robertos 1st marriage was still subsisting when he married Delia. However, as in the Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy case and as explicitly stated in the FC, a judicial declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. This is to protect both parties from committing bigamous marriages. Also, this declaration cannot be made solely for the purposes of remarriage. This could also be invoked for purposes wherein the validity of marriage needs to be ascertained like in cases of liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of properties, as well as an action for the custody and support of the children and delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes. (there are a lot of explanations for this, but since this is no longer part of our present topic, di ko na sinali) 4. Yes. CA concluded that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The private respondents prayer for separation of property is a necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. (as stated in Arts 43 and 44 of FC) The petition is denied. Note: Art. 40 of FC: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) Petitioner argues that the word solely means that judicial declaration should be had only if one wants to remarry. But during the deliberations of the Committee, according to Judge Diy, solely refers to the final judgment. Concurring Opinion: Vitug: 472
Void marriages are void from the very beginning and no judicial declaration is required to establish their nullity except: a. For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Art 40 of the FC; viz Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n) b. A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the FC in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply w/ the essential marital obligations of marriage (art. 36) As for the regime of property: o Neither the CPG nor the ACP will apply o Instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either Art 147 or Art 148 of the FC Belcodero vs CA (from previous digest) Facts July 27, 1927 Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday They had 3 children: Flora, Teresita, and Gaido 1946 Alayo left the conjugal home and started to live with Josefa Rivera They had 1 child: Josephine August 23, 1949 Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. He indicated his civil status as married to Josefa Bosing, the common-law wife October 6, 1959 he authorized Magdalena Estate to transfer the lot in the name of Josefa Bosing October 24, 1959 final deed of sale was executed November 9, 1959 Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Josefa Bosing June 6, 1967 Alayo married Josefa March 11, 1967 Alayo died September 17, 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of lot in question, which was there described as conjugal property of Josefa and Alayo; In the deed, Josefas supposed interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her interest as heir, was conveyed to Josephine, thereby completing for herself, along with her interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full ownership of the property; Such was published June 6, 1974 a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued October 30, 1980 Juliana (Alayos real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court an action for reconveyance of the property Trial court ruled in favor of Juliana and her children Aggrieved, Josefa and Josephine went to the CA which affirmed the Trial Courts decision, but reversed the decision on the award for damages Hence, the petition
Issues WON the property purchased by Alayo from Magdalena Estate Inc. remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana WON the respondent court erred in finding that the action for reconveyance had long prescribed WON a new trial must be granted on the ground of newly found evidence Held and Ratio Yes 473
o Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the Old Civil Code (Article 1407), All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. o Such presumption has not been rebutted o It cannot be seriously contented that simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayos request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property was acquired unquestionably by Alayo. And Alayos letter merely authorized Magdalena Estate to have the title to the property transferred to Josefas name. o Moreover, Josefa implicitly recognized Alayos ownership when she and Josephine executed a deed of extrajudicial partition which upon observation whould have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of Alayo. o As regards the property relations between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry. No o The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of property by the beneficiaries is 10 years. Ordinarily, that period starts from the establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of action would be considered to have accrued. Unfortunately, for Josefa and Josephine, however, the property involved is a realty titled under the Torrens system. The prescriptive period is thus to be Issue: Does Art 147 apply in this case? Held: Yes. FC 147 applies to void marriages regardless of the cause thereof. The co-ownership evoked in this provision applies when a man and a woman, with no legal impediment, exclusively live together as husband and wife with a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. 474 counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the corresponding issuance of new certificate of title. From June 6, 1974 (issuance of new title) to October 30, 1980 (filing for reconveyance), only 6 years and 4 months had elapsed. The case therefore has been initated seasonably. No o Assuming that such is granted, a new trial would not serve a useful purpose in altering the result of the questioned decision
Valdez vs QC-RTC (from previous digest) Facts: The marriage between Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez was declared null and void due to the psychological incapacity of both parties. In the decision, three of the children were given the choice as to whom they wanted to live with (they chose their father), while the other two were put under the care of their mother. Also, the court directed that the liquidation of the property be commenced according to Art. 147 in relation to Art. 50, 51, and 52 of the family code. Consuelo filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that there are no provisions in the FC that govern the procedure for liquidation of common property in unions without marriage, therefore, Art 147 could not apply.
Cario vs. Cario (from the previous digests) Facts: The issue here is the validity of the 2 marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy bet the two Susans he married June 20, 1969 SPO4 married Susan Nicdao (petitioner) with whom he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee November 10, 1992 he married again, this time to Susan Yee (defendant) with whom he had no children after almost ten years of cohabitation starting from 1982 1988 SPO4 fell ill and bedridden because of diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis November 23, 1992 SPO4 passed away under the care of Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses Both Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various govt agencies Nicdao collected P146k while Yee got P21k December 14, 1993 Yee filed a case against Nicdao for collection of at least one-half of the P146k Nicdao failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to hold her in default Yee admitted that her marriage to SPO4 took place while his 1st marriage was still existing and w/o a judicial declaration of the nullity of the 1st marriage She claimed that she didnt know such marriage existed until during the wake of SPO4 where she met Nicdao who told her she was SPO4s wife Yee contended that the 1st marriage was void ab initio since it was solemnized w/o an ML and even presented the MC w/c had no ML no. and a cert from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila which states that they have no record of the ML bet Nicdao and SPO4 RTC ruled in favor of Yee CA affirmed RTCs decision Issues: 5. WON there is a need for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage 6. WON Yee is entitled to half of the death benefits received by Nicdao Held: Yes, even though the marriage bet Nicdao and SPO4 is, indeed, void for lack of ML (the two were married before enactment of FC). However, it does not mean that the marriage bet Yee and SPO4 is valid. It is also void ab initio since it was contracted w/o the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. No. Since both marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime is not absolute community or conjugal partnership of property but, rather Art. 147 and 148 of FC: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. Yees marriage to the deceased falls under Art. 148 since it is a bigamous marriage. In this property regime (actual joint contribution), wages and salaries of each party belong to him or her exclusively. This includes contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration. The disputed money is the earnings of the deceased and unless Yee can prove that she contributed money, industry, 475
or property in the acquisition of these benefits, she has no right to claim the same. Instead, these benefits will pass to his legal heirs Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. xxx xxx xxx When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) Nicdaos marriage falls under Art. 147 since they were legally capacitated to marry but whose marriage was nonetheless void for other reasons. Under this provision, wages and salaries earned by either party shall be owned by the parties in equal share and will be divided equally between them even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Art 147 creates a co-ownership, entitling Nicdao to half of the benefits if there is no allegation that the marriage was entered into in bad faith. Since both parties of the first marriage is presumed to be in good faith, Nicdao will get half of the death benefits while the other half will go to her children w/ SPO4 The petition is GRANTED.
Fehr vs. Fehr FACTS: The trial court declared the marriage between petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr and respondent Bruno Fehr void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. The conjugal partnership of property was dissolved. Consequently, regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses was established. The custody over their two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO and PATRICK FRANZ was awarded to petitioner, the innocent spouse. The Court held that the Bacolod property and Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium as exclusive. The condominium was declared as the exclusive property of Bruno. Accordingly, the court ordered Elena to transfer the ownership of Suite 204 in the name of Bruno. For the conjugal properties, the court gave Elena the Ground Floor, LCG Condominium and a Tamaraw FX; for Bruno, the court gave the Upper Basement, LCG Condominium and a Nissan Sentra. They were also enjoined to jointly support their minor children. The petitioner did not agree to the parts of the decision about 1. adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium. According to her, this 476
was acquired when they were living together without the benefit of marriage and thus should be governed by the rules of co-ownership. 2. the support of the children. She proposed that the Upper Basement and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from the lease of said premises for the support, instead of regularly claiming support from Bruno. The court said that since the marriage was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common. However, the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale proportionately among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also maintained that Suite 204 is Brunos exclusive property. In the Court of appeals, Elena issued a notice of appeal but withdrew and issued a writ of certiorari instead but was dismissed. Reconsideration was also dismissed. ISSUES: 1) PROCEDURAL: WON Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner. 2) SUBSTANTIVE: WON a. Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is Brunos exlusive property and b. how should the properties acquired by petitioner and respondent be partitioned. HELD: 1. YES, case should be treated as an exception to the general rule 2. NOT Exlusive, Rules of co-ownership should apply RATIO: 1. DISMISSAL OF THE SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION FOR CERTIORARI Petitioner claims that certiorari should have been granted because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. She asserts that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion: a. when it held that Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium was the exclusive property of respondent, although it was established that they were already living together without the benefit of marriage even before the acquisition of the property and b. she also claims that they did not agree to the division of the properties by three because what was agreed by the parties was a division by four. Bruno on the other hand, aside from contradicting the aforementioned claims of Elena, claims that the decision is already final and executory. Certiorari is usually only granted on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. GENERAL RULE: a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. If the court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion, any error committed by it will usually amount to nothing more than an error of judgment that is only reviewable by appeal and not certiorari. However, SC held that this is an exceptional case where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; and thus, should be relaxed. SC further believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. 477
SC also held that the decision being assailed by Elena is not yet final and executory because it is not about the declaration of their marriage as void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. What is being questioned is the decision regarding the dissolution of their property. However, the dissolution will only be properly addressed if it is treated as the result of the declaration as void ab initio. 2.a. SUITE 204 AS EXLCUSIVE OF BRUNO SC held that Suite 204 was acquired during cohabitation. According to the facts used SC (from the trial court) after two years of long-distance courtship, the petitioner left Cebu City, moved in with respondent, bore their first child, and got married. SC finds that Suite 204 was acquired in between this events. SC used the Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 as evidence. It was executed by Bruno as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Elena also signed as the witness and was named as the owner of the property upon full-payment. According to Art 147 FC this should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. Because the property was acquired during cohabitation prior to their marriage (and its subsequent declaration as void ab initio), Suite 204 should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. 2.b. SETTLEMENT OF COMMON PROPERTIES Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. No agreements have been made by the parties to the 1/3 division held by the trial court. Instead, they agreed to a four way division for Elena, Bruno, Michael and Patrick. Joaquino vs. Reyes FACTS: The case stems from a complaint for reconveyance and damages by the petitioner wife Lourdes against the defendant concubine Milagros. Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981. Lourdes P. Reyes is his widow and former legitimate wife; Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are their legitimate children. Before his death, he had illicit relations with Milagros Joaquino. Before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month. After his retirement, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,011.79 that was never received by the legitimate wife. A house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of Milagros B. Joaquino. Lourdes et al alleges that: a.) the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes, b.) Joaquino was without the means to pay for it; c.) Milagros executed an SPA in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the purchase price; d.) Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation to guaranty payment, secured a life 478
insurance policy with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation; e.) the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life Insurance policy. As a summary, Lourdes et al alleges that the funds used to purchase the property were from Rodolfos income and life insurance. Milagros B. Joaquino on the other hand alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the mortgage. She also said that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the mortgage as her attorney-in-fact, the money came exclusively from her. She further alleges in her answer, that during all the 19 years that she lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to his death, she never had knowledge that he was already married to to respondent Lourdes P. Reyes. She also said that she never received any pecuniary benefits of Rodolfo because she had the financial capacity to support herself and their children. Lourdes died before the court granted her complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court that the funds were from Rodolfo but held that it should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners children. It said, that that issue were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose. ISSUES: WON the house and lot on Baghdad Street BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila is Lourdes-Rodolfo conjugal. 2) WON it is proper to rule on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners children. HELD: 1. YES. Presumption of conjugality prevails. 2. NO PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON FACTS AND LAWS: The applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. The marriage with Lourdes and the purchase of the house and lot was conducted under the Civil Code; and thus, CPG is the regime. Presumption of the ownership of the house and lot is in the CPG, and the burden of proof falls on persons who want to prove otherwise. Art 144 does not apply to a couple who is incapacitated to contract marriage. It is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case because this will create an absurdity of co-ownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. Art 148 for such case should be applied: when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. 1. BAGHDAD STREET, BF HOMES PROPERTY: The issue hinges on the source of funds used for the purchase of the property. SC invoked the rule on affirming the same findings of facts by the trial and appellate court. SC found no reversible factual findings: a) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner, Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he received a sizeable retirement package; 479
b) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly purchased, he applied for a mortgage loan -- intended for housing -- from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; c) that he secured the loan with a real estate mortgage over the same property; d) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the loan as well as the semi-annual premiums for a Philam Life insurance policy, which he was required to take as additional security; and e) that with the proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company. All told, presumption of conjugality is maintained. Property was bought during the Lourdes-Rodolfo marriage. The loan used to purchase was from Rodolfos income which is conjugal. Milagros failed to prove that she was financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments. She was not gainfully employed at any time after 1961 when the property was purchased. SC rejected the Affidavits and the undated Certification she had presented to prove that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business. The affiants were never presented to testify on these matters. Thus, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. Article 739(1) NCC states that such donation was void, because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Art 87 prohibiting donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations. Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name it has been held that property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the common-law wife. Article 1456 NCC states that If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining would be merely considered as a trustee. The registration on Milagros name was designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. Thus, she was just a trustee of Rodolfo. 2. RULING ON FILIATION: Milagros alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed property, because they were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. Claiming that the issue of her childrens illegitimate filiation was duly established in the trial court, she faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper. SC held that this issue should undergo proper proceedings. The rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. This case, was for the recovery of property. Furthermore, the issue was never raised in the complaint and following proceedings before the ruling of the trial court. Gonzales vs. Gonzales Facts: 1977, Francisco Gonzales and Erminda Gonzales started living as husband and wife. After 2 yrs, they got married, had 4 children 1992, Erminda filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, also prays for dissolution of CPG (alleges that Francisco is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty.) During their marriage, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business. Francisco averred that it is Erminda who is psychologically incapacitated. He denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties existing during their marriage. 480
She alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza representing 80% of the total management of the same and that all income from said business are conjugal in nature. Each party submitted a list of the properties with their valuation, acquired during their union Evidence show that he used to beat her without justifiable reasons, humiliating and embarrassing her in the presence of people and even in front of their children. He has been afflicted with satyriasis, a personality disorder characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his indiscriminate womanizing. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. 2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50 (supra) Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a) Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount 481
RTC: Francisco psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage although such incapacity became manifest only after its solemnization, marriage NULL and VOID ab initio, custody of minors to Erminda, Francisco to give monthly support and Ordering the dissolution of the CPG and dividing the conjugal properties between them CA: affirmed Issue: whether the properties should be divided equally between the parties. Held:CA decision affirming RTC is affirmed. Ratio: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Juaniza vs. Jose Facts: Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on 1969 which resulted in the death to 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for 16 yrs CFI: ordering Eugenio and Rosalia to pay Victor Juaniza, the heirs of the deceased passengers (basis: Art. 144 of NCC) Rosalia filed a Motion for reconsideration (denied) CA affirmed Issue: whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry, and whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held liable for damages with Eugenio. Held: Under Art. 144 of the NCC, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership of Eugenio and his legal wife. There is no basis for the her liability for damages. Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein. Ratio: CFI: Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads: When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Yap vs CA Facts: Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and second, to Nancy Yap on 1948. Maning and Talina were married in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the Islam religion professed by both of them. after the marriage, the couple lived in the house of the parents of Maning. They had 4 children; two died in infancy during the Japanese occupation, while the two others are Shirley and Jaime (petitioners). While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning married Nancy in a civil ceremony performed by a District Judge. Nancy entered into the marriage in the belief that Maning was not a married man. They had four children (respondents). 1964, Maning died in the crash of an airplane of PAL. Talina filed Special Proceeding seeking the issuance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning. it was opposed by Nancy and her minor children (she is the legitimate widow of Maning and that their 4 children are their legitimate children). 482
Talina was initially appointed special administratrix however, after a formal hearing and on recommendation of Talina, Shirley was appointed as regular administratrix. After paying all the debtors with Manings property, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the Maning and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate. Issue: how will the property be divided Held: Marriage of Talina to Maning was valid and the second marriage was illegal and void. The real and personal properties were acquired during the 1st marriage. Hence, these properties are considered conjugal properties. Considering that there was no liquidation of the CPG during the lifetime of Maning, such liquidation must be carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning. Pursuant to Arts. 142 and 185 of NCC, the net remainder of the CPG after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning approved by the lower court have been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning and Talina as their shares. The one-half share of Maning would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. Maning's legal heirs are Talina, her children and the children of Nancy by Maning. Nancy cannot inherit from Maning because their marriage was void ab initio. Ratio: Article 2263 in the NCC states: Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a) 483
RTC: declaring Talina and her children as the legal heirs. CA: reversed and set aside the decision. estate of Maning should be equally divided into two equal parts: 1/2 to Talina and her children and the 1/2 to Nancy and her children. CA Ratio: Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4 ... [W]here two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed until the contrary is positive proved. A woman who is deceived by a man who respresents himself as single and who marries him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. ...
Act 3613 SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless; (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court. Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides: By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. and Article 185 thereof states: The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements. Bienvenido vs. CA Facts: 1942 - Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio contracted another marriage with Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, Chito born on 1961. There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. 1967 Aurelio met Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. They lived together for 20 yrs until Aurelio died. Her daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Chito who lived with them for about a year in 1976. 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot in which they were staying. In the deed of sale and TCT issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single. 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of Nenita Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. (Luisita claims that Nenita called her residence several times, looking for Aurelio because he had allegedly left their dwelling place, introduced herself as Mrs. Nenita Camacho.) Nenita claims it was the other way around that it was respondent Luisita who had called up their residence many times, also looking for Aurelio to urge him to file an application for American citizenship. 1988, Aurelio died. Nenita took care of the funeral arrangements. Luisita was then in the US with Chito to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and Chito came home. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred. Luisita paid for the funeral services. 484
Luisita was granted death benefits by the AFP as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to settle their dispute failed. Luisita and Chito filed a case seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to Nenita. (alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.) Nenita claimed that she and Aurelio had purchased the property using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for 14 yrs, that the sale of the property by Aurelio to her was with Luisita's consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith. the abandoned spouse, and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo, his subsequent marriage to Luisita was void for being bigamous. the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation with Nenita which lasted for 20 years. While she knew Aurelio has a son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. Aurelio represented himself to be single. She is therefore a buyr in good faith
RTC: upholding the sale of the property to Nenita. Nenita claimed that the sale of the property to her was with Luisitas consent and that she was a purchaser in good faith. CA: reversed, holding that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and that the sale of the property to Nenita was void for donations b/n persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art 379 of the Civil Code Issue: WON Aurelio and Luisitas marriage was valid (If marriage was valid, then the property was property of conjugal partnership and Luisita is the proper party to question the validity of the sale to Nenita) Held No The first exception in par 2 of Art. 83 cannot be invoked in this case because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his first wife. The first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of
Ratio Art 83 provides that Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) Note: Because marriage b/n Luisita and Aurelio was void, conjugal properties do not exist, hence Luisita was not in position to question property. The sale of property to Nenita Bienvenido must be presumed. 485
Agapay vs Agapay Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on 1949 when he took Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. 1950 their only child, Herminia, was born Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother. as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with her 1973, the Miguel (63 y/o) contracted his second marriage with Erlinda Agapay (19 y/o). Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land. TCT covering said rice land was issued in their names. A house and lot was likewise purchased on 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT was later issued in her name. Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by Cornelia. They agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher, born 1977. 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. 1981, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda They sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation. Erlinda contended that while the riceland is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son. She added that the house and lot is her sole property, having bought it with her own money. She added that Carlina is precluded from claiming the properties since the she had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia. RTC: dismissing the complaint; declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel. Confirming the ownership of Erlinda of the residential lot including the old house standing there; Confirming the ownership of 1/2 portion of the agricultural land to Erlinda Agapay; Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his father the 1/2 of the agricultural land provided that he executes, within 15 days, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia of all conjugal properties of her parents otherwise, the estate Miguel will have to be settled in another separate action; CA: reversed. Declaring Carlina and daughter as the owners of the properties in question; Ordering Erlinda to vacate and deliver the properties in question; Issue: who is the lawful owners/heirs of properties in question Held: CA affirmed Sale of two properties were valid. The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on 1973, said union was void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the de facto separation. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but 486
failed to show that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland. On the date of conveyance, shewas only around twenty y/o and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. It is unrealistic to conclude that she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of property. She now claims that the riceland was bought 2 mos. before they actually cohabited. She intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148. No proof that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. Even assuming that the property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Fernandez spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of the subject apartment building, that through tolerance they had allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without payment of any rent, that it was agreed upon that after a few months, the Tumlos will pay per month; however, the demands for payment went unheeded and so the Fernandez spouses prayed that the Tumlos vacate the apartment and pay the unpaid rentals Guillerma Tumlos averred that she is the co-owner of the apartment as evidenced by the Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property together with Maria The defendants (Tumlos) alleged that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest, that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two children for around 10 years and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage Furthermore, the defendants averred that Toto was just recently accommodated in one of the rooms and Gina acted as nanny to the children (in short, their presence was only transient and they were not actual tenants of the Fernando spouses
Ratio: Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez Facts Mario Fernandez and Lourdes Fernandez filed an ejectment suit against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos
Issues WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the subject property Held and Ratio No o The relationship of Mario and Guillerma is governed by Article 148 of the FC for clearly, Mario was incapacitated to marry Guillerma because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez 487
o Guillerma herself admitted that she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage o Under Art. 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. o In this case, Guillerma fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. She anchors her claim of coownership merely on her cohabitation with Mario. o Her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. o Clearly, the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of Fernando spouses. Malilin vs. Castillo Facts Eustaquio Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of co-ownership share, accounting, and damages against Elvira Castillo They are both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship in 1979 while their respective marriages subsisted During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, Eustaquio as president and chairman of board of directors and Elvira as vice-president and treasurer The business flourished and so the two acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name 1992 couple separated Eustaquio demanded her share in the subject properties, but Elvira refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name Also, Elvira denied that she and Eustaquio lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses TC ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the CC cannot be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them. CA maintained that Art. 144 had been repealed by Art. 148 of the FC
Issues Can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife Held and Ratio Yes. Art. 148 of the FC now provides for a limited coownership in cases where parties in union are incapacitated to marry. If the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry. Such applies to this case. Consequently, whether Elvira and Eustaquio cohabited and whether the properties involved were alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the FC took effect. With respect to the property acquired before the FC took effect if it is shown that it 488
was really acquired under the regime of CC, then it should be excluded. Legal relation of the parties is already covered by Art. 148 under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their joint actual contributions of money, shall constitute coownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other. Eustaquio should be given his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal properties. Case is remanded Saguid vs. CA Gina Rey was married but separated de fact from her husband She met Jacinto Saguid in July 1987 The two cohabited Jacinto made his living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid Borthers Gina worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 1996 the couple separated 1997 Gina filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal property with receivership o She alleged that from her salary as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute on the completion of their unfinished house, and that she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, furniture and household effects o She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount she contributed to the construction of their house be reimbursed to her o She said that she has a share in the joint account deposit which she and Jacinto maintained in a bank Jacinto contended that Ginas meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute to the construction of the house and that Gina did not continuously work in Japan, and that she did not share in the expenses Issues WON Art. 148 of the FC applies in this case considering that the actual cohabitation commenced in 1987 Held and Ratio Yes, Art. 148 of the FC applies in this case. This provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Art. 144 of the CC. Before the enactment of 148, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the FC, 148 governs. The controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Gina alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the records are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November and December 1995 in the total amount of P11,413.00. On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with the bank. There is no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Art. 148, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Each get a share of P55,687.50. All in all, Gina can reimburse a total of P67,100.50.
Facts
Villanueva vs. CA Facts: Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, 489
they begot 5 children. They resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired 22 real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Also, Nicolas, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of these properties above-mentioned earn income from coconuts and the other lands/houses are leased to the following: a) Mandaue Food Products Company b) Barben Wood Industries, Inc. c) Metaphil, Inc. d) Benedicto Development Corp. e) Benedicto Development Corporation f) Visayan Timber and Machinery Corp. g) House lessees In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him up in order to walk. Natividad knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time Nicolas suffered a stroke on 1985 and until the present, it is Procopio, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. Natividad went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. Eusebia then complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by her to Procorpio, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties. Further, Natividad testified that the parcel of land was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. RTC: Family Code Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the contrary is proved. The trial court ruled that the documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute solid evidence which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. Thus, the trial court ruled that Eusebia had proved that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. On the other hand, the trial court found that petitioners failed to meet the standard of proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas. The trial court added that Pacita presented no factual solidity to support her claim that she bought Lot No. 152[2] exclusively with her own money. (Return everything to Eusebia) Villanuevas filed a petition to CA. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebias heirs substituted her. The CA eventually 490
upheld the Decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorneys fees, ruling in this wise: Issue: whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias complaint; WON the 6 properties were conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia; WON the presumption under Art. 148 on co-ownership should be applied. Held: Since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they cannot now raise this defense for the first time on appeal. The properties are conjugal. The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias witnesses, establish this fact. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists unless the contrary is proved, stands as an obstacle to any claim the Villanuevas may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Nicolas and Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed conjugal. Ratio: ROC Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. Finally, reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. It shows that there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Facts Joaquino vs. Reyes 491
Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981 [respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any benefits on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a property consisting of a house and lot was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as [petitioner] Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same [petitioner] executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the purchase price Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life Insurance [p]olicy Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the mortgage as attorney-infact of [petitioner], the money came exclusively from [her] Issues The nature of the subject house and lot The propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners children Held and Ratio Conjugal o The disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in petitioners name o Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. o It is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3, 1947. It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually living with petitioner. It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in petitioners name. o The applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property o Under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the 492
properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. o In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. Respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code. Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights January 13, 1986 Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonilo Cando for a loan of P157k w/ Eduardo affixing his signature to the deed June 11, 1990 Eduardo, General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought bags of cement from respondent MIWCC but failed to pay MIWCC filed a complaint against him wherein the court ruled in favor of MIWCC In the writ of execution, the lots in question were levied upon Josefina filed a 3rd Party Claim alleging that the properties were her paraphernal properties and that her husband had no proprietary rughts or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver o Requested for the cancellation of the levy But the auction of the properties pushed through Josefina filed a complaint against MIWCC reiterating her allegations MIWCC cited Art 116 of FC and averred that the property was conjugal since it was acquired after their marriage o That Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver to evade the writ of execution; hence, the affidavit is null and void Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that when they were married, Eduardo was already married to Carmelita Carpio o Josefina and Carmelita testified for this case o Josefina declared that during their marriage, she acquired the lots in question w/ the help of her sisters and brother and that Eduardo did not participate in the acquisition of the properties RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage as null and void for being bigamous 493
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation Facts: Josefina Castillo (petitioner) was 24 when she married Eduardo Francisco on January 15, 1983 August 31, 1984 Imus Rural Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco for two parcels of land w/ a house in Paraaque The purchase price of the lands, P320, 000, was paid to the bank via a check drawn and issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila The lots were registered in the name of Josefina married to Eduardo Francisco Feb 15, 1985 Eduardo executed an Affidavit of Waiver where he declared that the lots and house were purchased by Josefina w/ her own savings before their marriage and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property
In the case she filed against the respondent, Josefina declared that she was able to purchase the lots in question when she was still single and w/ the help of her mother o She was engaged in recruitment when Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver o That she learned that Eduardo was previously married when they already had 2 children but she continued cohabiting w/ him and had 3 more children w/ him o Bec of Eduardos 1st marriage, she had him sign an affidavit of waiver Eduardo testified that he was in Davao when Josefina bought the properties and he only learned about it a week after his arrival from Davao o Lolita, Josefinas sister, wanted to collect money from him for the money his wife borrowed from her and their mother to buy the property but when he said he had no money, Lolita said he need not pay but he should not have any participation over the said property o He got angry bec when Josefina purchased the property, he was giving her P5k for the support of the family o Josefina made him sign the affidavit bec the property was given to her by her mother and sister RTC declared the sale null and void o The property were paraphernal applying Arts 144, 160, 175 amd 485 of FC o MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo contributed to the purchase of the property CA ruled that the property is conjugal and that Josefina failed to rebut this presumption o The affidavit signed by Eduardo is contrary to Art 146 of FC; hence, had no force and effect Issue: 1. WON the properties in question are conjugal 2. WON they could be held liable for Eduardos personal obligations Held: 1. NO Petitioner asserts that since her marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no CPG o To rule otherwise would render moot and irrelevant the provisions on the regime of special co-ownership under Arts 147 and 148 in relation to Art 144 of NCC o Since their property relationship is under Art 148, respondents must prove that Eduardo actually contributed to the acquisition of the properties o That she purchased the properties w/ her own money w/o any contri from Eduardo (ang dami lang ng versions ng babaeng to); hence, the properties are paraphernal to her o The properties are not liable for the debts of Eduardo Respondents contend that the properties are conjugal since there is nothing in the records to support Josefinas claim that the funds she used to buy the properties were her personal funds or came from her mother and sister o If the properties were indeed paraphernal, she should not have asked Eduardos consent when she mortgaged them SC: o Petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the properties w/ her personal funds before her cohabitation w/ Eduardo o Art 144 of NCC does not apply to this case bec this provision talks about a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other and does not apply to cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts to concubinage 494
o Art 148 of FC is the provision that applies to this case and under Art 256 of FC, the law can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights Petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested rights over the properties o Since there can only be one valid existing marriage at any given time and since the properties were acquired during the subsistence of Eduardos marriage w/ Carmelita, eventhough the two were married before FC, the properties are considered their conjugal property (Art 105 allows for the retroactive application of FC to CPG before the effectivity of FC ) o Art 148 cannot work in favor of Josefina since in order for co-ownership to ensue, the parties should be able to prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon The petitioner failed to adduce preponderance evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the properties in question and, hence, is not a co-owner of them 1. Offered nothing to prove her allegation that she borrowed the money from her mother and her sister 2. Even failed to divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her income and that of her sister 3. In the other case, she said that the money was borrowed from her brother but she failed to divulge his name, how much money she borrowed from him and when 4. She failed to present evidence to prove that her mother and sister had P320k in 1984 5. In her 3rd party claim affidavit, she alleged that the properties were acquired through the fruits of her own exclusive effort o The affidavit signed by Eduardo is barren of probative weight The Court is convinced that he signed such document in anticipation of claims by 3rd parties against him and hold the property liable for the said claim Petitioner failed to prove she had any savings before her cohabitation Despite the affidavit of waiver, Eduardo still affixed his signature in the real estate mortgage The petitioner testified that she borrowed funds for the purchase of the property from her mother and her sister She alleged that she made Eduardo execute the affidavit after learning that he had a 1st marriage This was belied by Eduardo who said that he executed the affidavit bec his mother-in-law and sister-in-law had given the property to Josefina Note: This is so magulo. But from how I understood the case in relation to the regime of property, the property in question belongs to the CPG of the 1st marriage since Josefina failed to present evidence that she bought it w/ her own money or that she contributed to its acquisition.
495
Atienza vs. de Castro Facts: Lupo Atienza (petitioner), Pres and Gen Manager of Enrico Shipping Corp and Eurasian Maritime Corp hired Yolanda De Castro (respondent) as accountant of the 2 corps. The relationship between the 2 became intimate and despite the fact that Lupo was married, they lived together sometime in 1983 They had two children After the birth of the 2nd child, their relationship turned sour and they separated ways May 28, 1992 Lupo filed for the judicial partition between him and Yolanda of a parcel of land w/ improvements located in Bel-Air Subd. o Alleged that the said property was acquired during his cohabitation w/ Yolanda as common-law husband and wife; hence, the property is co-owned by them o The property was acquired by Yolanda in 1987 using his exclusive finds and that the title thereto was transferred to her name w/o his knowledge and consent o Did not interpose any objection that time bec their relationship was still thriving o After their separation and upon learning that she is living w/ her new live-in partner in the said property, he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner Yolanda denied Lupos allegations o Acquired the property for P2M and 600k using her exclusive funds o She bought it through her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman RTC ruled in favor of Lupo and ordered the partition of the property Upon appeal to CA, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and adjudged the property as exclusively owned by Yolanda Issue: WON the property is co-owned by Yolanda and Lupo Held: NO Lupo alleged that under Art 144 of CC, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the property bec w/ or w/o the contri of either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof o That under Art 484 of CC, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on co-pwnership, w/c apply in default of contracts or special provisions SC: o The property regime between the parties falls under Art 148 of FC w/c applies to relationships that are bigamous, in a state of concubinage, adulterous, etc. and under this regime, only those properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions o Proof of actual contribution is required o Even if the relationship of the parties began before the FC, Art 148 still applies since CC does not have provision governing property relations bet couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage o The burden of proof is upon the petitioner who alleges that the property is co-owned by him and respondent 496
Lupo alleges that Yolanda has no financial capability to acquire the property and that she manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his 2 corps to raise the money for the purchase of the property He diverted the burden imposed upon him to Yolanda by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman w/o capacity to purchase any property instead of proving his ownership He relegated his complaint to mere attack on the financial capability of Yolanda Presented documents to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of his 2 corps but these failed to prove his actual contribution to the property The fact that Yolanda had limited access to the funds of the corps and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the money used for the purchase of the property was from these withdrawals o It is true that the mere issuance of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under coownership w/ persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title o However, respondent was able to present sufficient evidence that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings w/ her clients Presented her bank account statements and bank transactions w/c reflect that she had financial capability to purchase the property The contract to sell, the deed of redemption, and the deed of transfer of the property were all entered into by Yolanda and the vendor of the property to the exclusion of Lupo
Acre vs. Yuttiki Facts: Beatriz Acre (petitioner) and Sofronio Acre, Jr. were married on Nov 8, 1957 and had 6 children (also petitioners) 1972 Sofronio left the conjugal home bec of constant marital dispute Later, petitioners found out that he married Evangeling Yuttiki, respondent, while his marriage to Beatriz was still subsisting Nov 16, 1996 Sofronio died after 24 years of union w/ the respondent During Evangelines marriage to Sofronio, they acquired a motor vehicle and 2 parcels of land one of w/c is registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki married to Sofronio Acre and the other is registered under Evangelines name and that of her sisters Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of the properties and/or partition o Alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the properties w/ his funds RTC dismissed the complaint o The parcels of land were owned in common by Sofronio and Evangeline 497
Upon appeal, CA ruled that petitioners failed to prove their entitlement to the properties and that one of the 2 parcels of land is exclusively owned by Evangeline while the other is coowned by her and her sister Nellie Del Mar Issue: WON the properties in question are co-owned by Sofronio and Evangeline Held: NO The certificates to the lots one of w/c was registered in Evangelines name and the other, registered in her and her sister Nellies name, in their face, show that the properties described therein were exclusively owned by Evangeling and the other lot is co-owned by her w/ her sister In order for Art 148 to apply, petitioner should have presented evidence that Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the said properties Signey vs. SSS Facts: Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of SSS died on May 21, 2001 In his records, he designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) ass primary beneficiary and his four children w/ her as secondary beneficiaries July 6, 2001 Yolanda filed a claim for death benefits w/ the SSS o Revealed in her claim that Rodolfo had a common-law wife, Gina Servano whom he had 2 minor children Ginalyn and Rodelyn July 13, 2001 Gina filed a claim for the same death benefits o Declared that both she and petitioner are common-law wives and Editha Espinosa was the legal wife October 2001 Editha also filed an application for death benefits stating that she was the legal wife SSS denied the benefit claim of the petitioner and recognized Ginas 2 minor children as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law o Also found that the marriage bet Yolanda and Rodolfo was null and void for being bigamous Petitioner filed a petition in the Social Security Commission (SSC), attaching a waiver of rights executed by Editha where Editha waived all her rights to claim benefits due to the deceased Rodolfo and declared therein that she was legally married to a Mr. Aquilino Castillo and not to Rodolfo SSC gave more weight to the SSS field investigation and the confirmed certification of marriage showing that Rodolfo was married to Editha than to the declarations of Editha in her waiver of rights o Petitioner relied only on the waiver of Editha but failed to present evidence that would invalidate or controvert the confirmed marriage cert o Even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits since she herself admitted that she was not dependent on Rodolfo for support in as much as she was cohabiting w/ Aquilino o Since Gina and Yolanda were also not entitled to the benefits, SSC applied Sec 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282, the SSS Law, in force at the time of Rodolfos death and held that the legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the deceased were considered primary beneficiaries o Based on the birth certificates of the children, Yolandas children could no longer be considered as dependents since they were all over 21 years old Edithas child w/ Rodolfo was already dead Only Ginas children w/ Rodolfo were minors during his death o The mere designation of petitioner and her children as beneficiaries by the deceased member was not the 498
controlling factor in the determination of the beneficiaries o The pertinent provisions of the SSS Law provide that dependent legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member and dependent legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate children of the member shall be the primary beneficiaries o Edithas waiver is of no import since she was not entitled to the benefits anyway on account of her cohabitation w/ Aquilino CA affirmed the SSC Issue: 1. WON Yolandas marriage to Rodolfo is valid 2. WON Yolanda has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of Rodolfo Held: 1. NO The existence of Rodolfos prior marriage to Editha is supported by substantial evidence o Petitioner only relied on Edithas waiver of rights for her claim; she did not even try to allege and prove any infirmity in the 1st marriage 2. NO Sec 8 (e) and (k) of the SSS Law provides that it is only the legal spouse who is entitled to receive support o Legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted and illegitimate child (of the deceased member) who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached 21 yrs of age is also entitled to the benefits Yolanda is not the legal spouse; she is not entitled to the death benefits of Rodolfo It is only the 2 minor illegitimate children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, who are entitled to 100% of the death benefits since the legitimate child is already dead Borromeo vs. Descallar Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met Antonietta OpallaDescallar (respondent), a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel Wilhelm befriended Antonietta and asked her to tutor him in English Antonietta agreed since she needed additional income to support her children The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area Wilhelm and Antonietta fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house; afterwards, they transferred to their own house and lots In the Contracts to Sell covering the properties, Wilhelm and Antonietta were referred to as the buyers The Deed of Absolute Sale was also issued in their favor o When this was presented for registration, it was refused on the ground that an alien could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain o Wilhelms name was erased from the document but his signature remained on the document as buyer of the properties o The properties were issued in the name of Antonietta alone Wilhelm also formally adopted Antoniettas 2 sons But the two separated in 1991 o Antonietta found a new boyfriend 499
o Wilhelm also lived w/ another woman in Danao City but continued to support Antoniettas 2 sons for 2 months after the break-up Wilhelm met Camilo Borromeo (petitioner) sometime in 1986 o Camilo was engaged in real estate business Also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby o Wilhelm purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from Camilo and he became indebted to Camilo for P150k o To pay for his debt, Wilhelm sold his rights and interests in the properties in question to Camilo for P250k as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment o When Camilo tried to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that the title to the 3 lots have been transferred to Antonietta and that the properties were mortgaged Camilo filed a complaint against Antonietta for recovery of real property o Alleged that the Contracts to Sell and the Deed of Absolute Sale of the properties w/c identified both Wilhelm and Antonietta as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since Antonietta did not pay anything for the properties o That the properties were purchased through the exclusive funds of Wilhelm o Wilhelm was the real and absolute owner of the properties o Camilo acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment executed by Wilhelm in his favor Antonietta alleged that she purchased the properties in question through her exclusive funds o That Wilhelm is prohibited from owning real property bec he is an alien At the trial, Antonietta presented her alleged financial capability to buy the properties w/ money from a supposed copra business o Camilo presented Wilhelm as witness and documents showing Wilhelms substantial salaries while he was still employed by the Austrian company, SimmeringGraz Panker A.G. RTC ruled in favor of Camilo CA reversed stating that the title of the properties were in the name of Antonietta and not of Wilhelms Issue: WON Antonietta exclusively owns the properties in question considering that these were registered under her name Held: NO The evidence, as pointed out by RTC shows that Wilhelm was gainfully employed at the time of the acquisition of the properties 1985-1986 (he was earning P50k then P90k when he was transferred to Syria) Antonietta, on the other hand, was a waitress from 1984-1985 w/ a monthly salary of not more than P1k o Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated o The business was actually the business of her mother and their family, w/ 10 siblings o She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return o All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire and the last one standing was already scrap o The Child Study Report submitted by DSWD in the adoption proceedings of her two sons showed that she was in financial distress at the time she met Wilhelm 500
o The Home Study Report of DSWD disclosed that Wilhelm offered Antonietta and her children a decent place to live in since they were living in a squatters area w/c is not good for the children o Since she was financially distressed and miserable, she accepted Wilhelms offer Other evidence pointed to Wilhelm as the buyer of the parcels of land o Antoniettas own admission under oath that it was Wilhelm who owned the properties and that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale bec of legal constraints but that his signature, as a buyer, remained in the deed of sale o The money used to purchase the properties was in postdated checks issued by Wilhelm o 1986-1987 Antonietta lived w/ Wilhelm and her 2 children in Syria for 10 months where she was completely under the support of Wilhelm o Wilhelm executed a Last Will and Testament wherein he, as the owner, bequeathed the properties to her o RTC also found that Antonietta is an extravagant person who could not have saved enough money to buy the said properties Based on the evidence, Wilhelm is the real owner of the properties in question and has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the properties to Camilo by virtue of the Deed of Assignment The rule on co-ownership w/c applies to a man and woman w/ capacity to marry but are not married does not apply in this case since Antonietta was still married to another when she and Wilhelm lived together o No co-ownership exists o It is necessary to prove actual joint contribution to the acquisition of the property to be able to lay claim to any portion of it As for the registration of the land in the name of Antonietta o This does not prove ownership o The rule on indefeasibility of title has exceptions: the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration as in this case As for the argument that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land o The constitution prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen o In this case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corp to Wilhelm would have been invalid if Wilhelm did not convey the said properties to Camilo who is a Filipino citizen. This, in effect, cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title is rendered valid The sale of the properties to Camilo is upheld Heirs of Maramag vs. De Guzman This is a case of a legitimate family (legitimate heirs, petitioner, and wife Vicenta and their children) contending for the insurance policy claims of the deceased Loreto Maramag (insured womanizer) allegedly awarded by the insurance companies Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) to the illegitimate family (insurance beneficiary, defendant, and concubine Eva and their children). PETITIONER AVERS: 501
I. Eva is concubine and a suspect for the killing of Loreto; and thus, she is disqualified to receive any insurance proceeds; II. Eva and Loretos children (Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie ) are illegitimate an thus, entitled only to of the legitimate childrens claim. Thus, Proceeds that were released for Odessa and to be released for Karl and Trisha are inofficious and should be reduced. III. Petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, or forced share, which should be satisfied first. In short, the legitimate family wants a share of the insurance claims. The problem is they were not the named beneficiaries INSULAR AVERS: Loreto misrepresented the illegitimate family as a legitimate family. Insular when they ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife, they disqualified her as a beneficiary. They however released Odessas share because she was of age, but withheld the release not because of their illegitimacy but instead because of the shares of minors Karl and Trisha pending submission of letters of guardianship. Furthermore, the company claims that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action: FOR I: Loreto already revoked her designation as such and it disqualified her FOR II: No settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. FOR III: Insulars priority is to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries. GREPALIFE AVERS: FOR I: Eva was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; FOR II: Claims were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation of his age in his application FOR III: The law on succession, including legitimes, does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear. Eva and their children never filed an answer and thus defaulted. RTC first partly dismissed the case against the children for lack of cause of action against them. It however continued the case for the defendants Eva, Insular and Grepalife. Later however, it also dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action against the remaining defendants considering the fact that the companies already disqualified Eva as a beneficiary. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUES: PROCEDURAL: WON RTC erred when it dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action. SUBSTANTIVE: WON Evas share, being disqualified as a beneficiary, should not be distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured deceased. HELD: BOTH NO RATIO: FOR THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE: The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. Absence of the 3 elements makes a petition vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, The ruling should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. According to the SC what was clear in this case is the fact that the legitimate family is of course the legitimate heirs but were not the named benificiaries. Thus, the petition does not have a cause of action to stand on or failed to state a legitimate cause of action. 502
FOR SUBSTANTIVE: Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. SC held that the trial court is correct in awarding the illegitimate heirs the portion of Eva. There are no legal proscribing the naming of illegitimate children of an insured in an insurance. The shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the remaining named/designated beneficiaries i.e. the illegitimate children. SC does not agree to the claim of the petitioners that Evas share should redound to the estate of Loreto. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. X. Family Relations A. What governs family relations FC Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. ALAVADO V CITY OF TACLOBAN (AND WCC) FACTS: Ricardo A. Alavado was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban City. His last day of service was on Apr 19, 1974 since he was on leave from Apr 23 to May 23 (the reason for leave was not mentioned). When he reported for work on Aug 6, and supposedly no longer under the supervision of respondent city, he suffered severe headache while supervising laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following day of Cerebral Hemorrhage. Later, his wife Matilde claimed death benefits, in her own behalf and of their minor children. The hearing officer of the Regional Office in Tacloban City issued an award granting her P5,200 as death benefits and P200 as burial reimbursement. Tacloban City appealed. On Nov 29, 1975, Workmens Compensation Commission (WCC) dismissed her claim for death benefits on the ground of lack of filiation between claimant and deceased. Matilde only presented a copy of the original marriage certificate issued by the Sto. Nino Parish of Tacloban City . For WCC, this copy is not an authentic proof of marital status. WCC wants an original copy of the marriage contract or the marriage certificate duly issued by the local Civil Registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. In absence of the original, if it was destroyed, WCC said that secondary evidence may be presented consisting of an affidavit of the claimant and at least three witnesses to the marriage cohabitation. For filiation, her presentation of birth certificate is not enough. For the filiation of the children, WCC said that a birth certificate is not authentic proof of kinship of a person for it only proves the baptism of a person. The certified copy of the marriage certificate also shows that they were married on August 9, 1939. This and the spouses open cohabitation show that they lived together for 35 years until her husbands death. But as stated, WCC wants other documents. ISSUE: WON the copy of marriage certificate issued by the parish and the birth certificate presented by the wife and their children is sufficient enough to prove that they had the right to claim death benefits of the deceased. 503
HELD: Yes. As in all cases, presumption of the existence of marriage is favored. If the marriage was not denied or contradicted, the presumption of marriage must be admitted as fact. SC said that even public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal certificate are competent evidence. For the SC, WCC did not provide enough evidence to overthrow the presumption of marriage. Thus, the marriage certificate is sufficient to prove the marriage. Also, it is a certified true copy of the original issued by the Local Civil registrar of City of Tacloban. The city fiscal also contended that Alavado was on longer an employee of respondent city government at the time of his death, hence the city is not liable to pay compensation benefits. SC ruled however that this issue was not properly raised before the WCCwithin the period prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act and thus is now beyond challenge. It was also mentioned that the provisions of the Workmans Compensation Act upon which WCC is standing on must be interpreted in favor of laborers (just like the labor arbiter and NLRC). Arroyo vs CA - supra B. Effects of family relationship on legal disputes FC Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a) FC Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a) NCC Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) ROC RULE 16 MOTION TO DISMISS Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with. RPC Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. RPC Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately 504
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. RPC Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. GAYON V GAYON FACTS: Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that: - On October 1, 1952, spouses Silvestre and Genoveva executed a deed where they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land, in the barrio of Cabubugan, Guimbal, Iloilo, including the improvements, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957. The redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre and Genoveva, or any of their heirs or successors, even until the period expired. - The rights to the property was sold/transferred to him by a deed of sale dated March 21, 1961 executed by Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaseo for the sum of P614.00. - Since 1961, he introduced improvements on the property worth P1,000 and he also had fully paid the taxes for the property up to 1967. On the other hand, Mrs. Gayon alleged that: - Her husband Silvestre Gayon died long before the institution of this case - The deed of sale is fictitious, for the signature purporting to be her signature is not hers - She and her deceased husband had never executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor" - Pedro as the brother of the deceased Silvestre, "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint She later filed a motion to dismiss because Silvestre Gayon is dead and there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record." The lower court granted the dismissal because Silvestre is already dead; and according to the lower court, Genoveva has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint. ISSUE: 1. WON the complaint against the husband has nothing to do with the wife. 2. WON heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship. 3. WON failure to seek a compromise, is an obstacle to the present case HELD: 1. No, 2. No 3. No; Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings 505
RATIO: 1. She is the widow of Silvestre Gayon. Thus, she is one of his compulsory heirs. Thus, she has an interest in the property. Also, the wifes motion to dismiss indicated merely "a necessity of amending the complaint," that only indicates replacement of Silvestre Gayon by his other successors as a party in this case. 2. In her opposition to the motion for reconsideration of Pedro, Mrs. Gayon alleged that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship." However, because succession takes place by operation of law "from the moment of the death of the decedent" and "that the inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question. This may be done even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship (provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.) 3. Art. 222 NCC states that: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035. However, the phrase, "members of the same family," should, be construed in the light of Art. 217 NCC: Family relations shall include those: chl law library(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters. Mrs. Genoveva Gayon is Pedro Gayon's sister-in-law, her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Because none of them is included in the enumeration and Silvestre Gayon (his brother) must necessarily be excluded as party in the case, it follows that the same does not come within the scope of Art. 222, Thus, his failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint is not an obstacle.
WAINRIGHT-VERSOZA, v VERSOZA FACTS: On March 4, 1964, Margaret Ann Wainright-Versoza, and their three minor children filed a complaint for support against her husband, Jose Ma. Versoza,. Reasons given are that defendant has abandoned plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains illicit relations with another woman. Defendant's answer, and later motion to dismiss, attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of action because the complaint which involves members of the same family does allege earnest efforts toward a compromise before the complaint was filed pursuant to Art 222 NCC. After lower courts dismissal of the case, the plaintiffs moved to reconsider. Annexed to its motion was an affidavit that action was taken efforts were made to settle the case amicably, but which were fruitless. It was however brushed aside by the lower court. Second motion for reconsideration asserts the same and was similarly dismissed. ISSUE: WON attempt to reach a compromise and of its failure is necessary to be alleged in the complaint. HELD: No, this is an exemption to the general rule because it is an action for support. RATIO: Art 222 states that: "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035."3 This requirement has been given more teeth by Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which states as ground for a motion to dismiss that "the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made." Thus, this arnest efforts to reach a compromise and failure thereof must ordinarily be alleged in the complaint. According to Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge Puno, "the terms of article 222 require express allegation of an attempt to 506
compromise and its failure; otherwise there is no cause of action stated." Thus, compromise agreement and its failure is generally part of the cause of action. However, this is but a statement of the general rule. One of its exceptions is future support. Future support is something that that is indispensable for sustenance or necessary for survival and thus inviolable. The right to support cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. Compensation may not even be set up against a creditor who has a claim for support due by gratuitous title. Of course, support in arrears is a different thing altogether. It may be compensated, renounced and transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title According to Art. 2035 NCC No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (4) Future support. Though Art 222 NCC, as a new satute, seeks to avoid litigation between family members, Art 2035 NCC firmly maintains the ancient injunction (Spanish Civil Code) against compromise on matters involving future support. Also, Art. 222 NCC took good care to add: "subject to the limitations in article 2035." Although the complaint herein seeks custody of minor children and damages as well, the prime object is support. The reliefs sought are intimately related to each other. They all spring from the fact that husband and wife are separated from each other. Practicality dictates that they be, as they are now, placed together in one complaint because multiplicity of suits is not favored in law. Since one of the causes of action, that for future support, may be lodged in court without the compromise requisite in Art 222 NCC, the complaint thus may not be dismissed. Obiter: But even on the assumption that it was error on the part of plaintiffs to have failed to so allege, plaintiffs should not be barred from making an amendment to correct it. After a responsive pleading has been served, amendments may be made only upon leave of court. However, in the furtherance of justice, the court "should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay."An amendment may also be refused when the cause of action is substantially altered. For this case, the alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. Magbaleta vs. Gonong Facts: the suit is to have a parcel of land, covered by a Free Patent Title in the name of Rufino Magbaleta, declared to be the property of Catalino Magbaleta Catalino claims that Susana G. Baldovi is trying to take possession of land from his representative Susana contends she had bought the land from the spouses Rufino and Romana Rufino and Romana filed a motion to dismiss CFI: denied motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Rufinos brother Rufino said that CFI orders have been issued allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (being members of the same family, no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the suit was filed.) Judge Arsenio Gonong refused to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground that one of the defendants, Susana, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger. hence the legal provisions do not apply.
Issue: WON a case can be dismissed on the ground that there was no efforts towards a compromise before the filing of the suit even if one of the party is not a member of the same family 507
Held: Yes. Ruling of judge is correct. The said provision does not mean that efforts towards a compromise is a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of the delay and the complications that wrangling between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the family would settle their differences among themselves. The petition is dismissed and the restraining order lifted. Ratio: Code Commission: "it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family" hence, "it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family" and "it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers". De Guzman vs. Genato Facts: Aurelio En. Jutba and Jovencia de Guzman are husband and wife. Augt 29, 1974, Aurelio filed a complaint against Jovencia and Federico Recario for indemnification of damages because of their adulterous acts, as well as for his share in the fruits of the conjugal partnership properties during the time when the conjugal partnership was administered by his wife. (presided by Judge Melencio A. Genato) Oct 1 and 2, 1974, Jovencia and Federico filed their respective motions to dismiss because of no cause of action (suit between members of the same family and there is no earnest efforts towards a compromise) and venue is improperly laid (should have been filed in the court of the province or city where the properties are found)
CFI: denied motions to dismiss (setting the pre-trial conference for January 5 and 6, 1976) Jan 9, 1976, TRO issued restraining CFI from further proceeding
Issue: WON the case should be dismissed Held: No. (TRO lifted) 1. the husband has exerted efforts to meet his wife and even enlisted the help of the Philippine Constabulary who summoned his wife but the wife refused to see him. 2. The action is purely personal and is for the recovery of damages. Although the real properties belonging to the conjugal partnership are situated in Manila and Davao City, Aurelio is not asking to be declared the rightful owner or lawful possessor nor is he asking for its partition. He merely prayed that the two be ordered to pay him the amounts which represents his share in the fruits of the conjugal partnership properties during the time when the conjugal partnership was administered by his wife because he was sick, which he spent in order to restore titles and maintain a case in court for the cancellation of fake titles, moral damages (for "the sleepless nights, great moral shock and unbearable sorrows and shameful 508
dishonor, great mental tension, and anguish" as a result of their adulterous relationship and breach of fidelity), and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, plus the costs of suit. The husband merely sought to exercise his right, under Article 165 of the Civil Code, to administer the conjugal partnership. OLaco vs. Co Cho Chit Facts: (summary) It involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title with O Lay Kia for safekeeping, (older sister) O Lay Kia insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the property from their conjugal funds. (detailed) 31 May 1943, the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land to Emilia. 17 May 1960, Valentin Co Cho Chit and O Lay Kia (the other spouses na lang ang haba eh) learned from the newspapers that Emilia sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. 22 June 1960, spouses sued spouses Emilia and Hugo Luna to recover the purchase price of the land (asserting that Emilia knew that they were the real vendees in 1943 and that the title was merely placed in her name). They contend that Emilia breached the trust when she sold the land. Emilia and Hugo deny the trust relation. (They aver that Emilia actually bought the property with her own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with the other spouses merely for safekeeping; that when she asked for the return of the documents, they told her that these were misplaced or lost; and, she then filed for issuance of a new title which was granted. RTC: there was no trust relation of any sort between the sisters. CA: reversed (Emilia and Hugo pay the other spouses) Emilia and Hugo contend that the case should have been dismissed. (no earnest efforts toward a compromise were exerted considering that the suit is between members of the same family, and no trust relation exists between them. Even assuming ex argumenti that there is such a relation, petitioners further argue, respondents are already barred by laches) Issue: WON the case should be dismissed whether a resulting trust was intended by spouses in the acquisition of the property whether prescription has set in Held: No. the amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint, thus may be allowed. The other spouses were allowed to introduce evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts had been made (O Lay Kia pester Emilia and pressed her for the TCT of the property in the name of O Lay Kia and Valentin, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo. But, instead of transferring the title, Emilia sold the property.) Yes, a resulting trust was indeed intended by the parties under Art. 1448 of the NCC the document of sale, the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies, receipt of initial premium of insurance coverage and real estate tax receipts were all in the possession of O Lay Kia and Valentin. (reason why these documents of ownership remained with O Lay Kia is that the 509
land belonged to her for 17 yrs before the sale made by OLaco.) before buying the property, the other spouses purchased another property where the certificate of title was placed in the name of Ambrosio O'Laco, older brother of Emilia, under similar or identical circumstances. (did not place these properties in their name because being Chinese at the time of the purchase they did not want to execute the affidavit to the effect that they were allies of the Japanese. Since O Lay Kia took care of Emilia who was still young when her mother died, they did not hesitate to place the title of the in her name.) There was also another case of reconveyance by the other spouses against Ambrosio of the same story as this case. RTC declared the other spouses as owners. Ambrosio then filed a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law stating that he and her sister, Emilia, were used as dummy to acquire property. (Implying Emilia is not the owner of the property.) The other spouses were acquitted because at the time of the purchase of the property, the Anti-Dummy Law was still not enforceable. Emilia obtained a new title by the alleged loss of the old title. Her and her brothers petition were both granted on the same day, recorded at the same time, in consecutive entries (there was in fact a conspiracy between the siblings to defraud and deprive the spouses of their title to the properties.) Until the sale of the property, Emilia actually recognized the trust. (when spouses learned that Emilia was getting married to Hugo, O Lay Kia asked her to transfer the title to her and her husband Valentin, and Emilia assured her that "would be arranged (maaayos na)" after her wedding.) RTC: spouses had some money with which they could buy the property. (Valentin was the Chief Mechanic of the Paniqui Sugar Mills, was engaged in the buy and sell business, operated a gasoline station, and owned an auto supply store as well as a ten-door apartment in Caloocan City. In contrast, Emilia no proof that she was financially capable of purchasing the property. In fact, she opened a bank account only in 1946 and began filing income tax returns that same year, while the property was bought in 1943. Spouses even helped Emilia and her brothers in their expenses and livelihood. Her narration of the transaction of sale abounds with "I don't know" and "I don't remember.") Not yet prescribed. There is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust. resulting trust: the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. Once the resulting trust is repudiated, however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to prescription. A resulting trust is repudiated if: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust; and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing. just before she got married, Emilia continued to recognize the ownership of spouses over the property. Thus, until that point, spouses were not aware of any act of Emilia which would convey to them the idea that she was repudiating the resulting trust. The second requisite is absent. Hence, prescription did not begin to run until the sale of the property, which was clearly an act of repudiation. But immediately after Emilia sold the property, spouses instituted the present suit for breach of trust. laches cannot lie against them. After all, so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition, and ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his 510
rights. Since the complaint for breach of trust was filed 2 mos. after acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action therefore has not yet prescribed. Ratio: SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as, if they had been raised in the pleadings Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trusts may either be resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by operation of law. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil Code, particularly Arts. 1448, 1449, 1451,1452 and 1453, 23 while constructive trusts are illustrated in Arts. 1450, 1454, 1455 and 1456. ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary
Tribiana vs. Tribiana Facts: Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but formalized their union only on 1997. 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus (Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter, Khriza Mae). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only 1 y/o and 4 mos. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina. Edwin moved to dismiss (failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the FC.) 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. (attached a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay) RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and requiring Edwin and Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. CA denied Edwins petition for prohibition and certiorari Issue: WON the case should be dismissed 511
Held: No. RTC immediately resolve the case before it. petition for habeas corpus failed to allege that Lourdes resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Brgy Certification to File Action. This effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were unsuccessful. Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection. Ratio: Article 151 provides: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 213 of the FC, No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in two instances. 1. when any person is deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention. 2. when custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to such custody. The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section 412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Acuna Facts November 24, 2000, Alberto Morenofiled a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage (arguing that he did not secure any loan from the bank, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have executed the contract because he was then working abroad.) Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss (failed to comply with Article 151 of the FC: no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.) Alberto filed his Comment with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. (since one of the parties is not a member of the same family under Article 150 of the FC) RTC denying the Motion to Dismiss 512
Bank filed petition for certiorari immediately without submitting it to the CA. SC reply: instant Petition for Certiorari should have been filed with CA and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Bank failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed. Issue: WON the case should be dismissed because of the noncompliance with Art. 151 Held: No. once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before the action can prosper. Ratio: Article 151 of the FC provides: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Article 222 of theNCC: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 explains: [I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. FC ART. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. NCC ART. 217. Family relations shall include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters. Facts Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national Backstory: o prior to the death of Mediatrixs mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],her nieces father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a 513 Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs People
Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City o It was said that the signed and thumbmark[ed] by Manolita was obtained because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, Manolita was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years o The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato (Mediatrixs niece) has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] o Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her fathers orders. o Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to Mediatrix being that Administratrix of Manolitas estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so William Sato moved for the quash of the complaint, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance o Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line." Issues Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification? Held and Ratio No o In the American legal system, there are two views on the subject: First view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives. The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living 514
issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. Second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. o Second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code First, since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate. Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in general language. Third, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony. Fourth, , the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. o Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. No o The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification. o A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. o The allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa. o Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor. C. The family home 515
1. What constitutes the family home Facts Cayetano Serrano claimed to have acquired the lot by inheritance from his deceased parents, Simeon Serrano (Simeon) and Agustina Luz by virtue of a Deed of Exchange dated February 10, 1961 and by a private deed of partition and extrajudicial settlement forged by him and his coheirs Cayetano also claimed to have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot under a claim of ownership before 1917 by himself and through his deceased parentspredecessors-in-interest or for more than 70 years. The Heirs of Catalino Alaan, represented by Paulita Alaan (Paulita), intervened and filed an application for registration, their predecessor-in-interest Catalino Alaan (Catalino) having purchased a 217.45-square meter undivided portion of the lot from Cayetano during the pendency of Cayetanos application for registration Cayetano raised no objection or opposition to the intervenorHeirs of Catalinos application for registration Cayetanos brother-attorney-in-fact Leonardo Serrano (Leonardo) represented him at the hearings of the application. During the pendency of the case, Cayetano passed away and was substituted by his heirs Backstory o Leonardo declared that his family had lived on the lot since pre-war time, his father Simeon having built a house on it following his acquisition from Julian Ydulzura in 1923 who had purchased it from Lazaro Raada in 1917 Republic vs Serrano o The construction of a family home in 1923 was reflected in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 o After his fathers death in 1931, his mother and his brother Cayetano continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners and Cayetano in fact built his own house and a bodega thereon o Cayetano religiously paid real estate taxes from 1951 up to the current year 1997 o The lot was assigned to him and Cayetano as their share of the inheritance o On February 10, 1961, Cayetano exchanged a titled lot in Butuan City for his (Leonardos) half-share in the lot, thereby making Cayetano the sole and exclusive owner thereof o Paulita, wife of Catalino who represented the heirs of Catalino, declared that in February 1989, Cayetano sold to her husband a 217.45-sq. meter portion of the 533-sq. meter lot subject of the present case as embodied in a deed of absolute sale o She presented an approved Subdivision Plan indicating therein the respective shares of Cayetano and Catalino based on a survey Issues WON the respondents were able to prove that they are qualified owners of the subject property Held and Ratio Yes The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, 516
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Leonardo clearly established the character of the possession of Cayetano and his predecessors-in-interest over the lot. Thus he declared that the lot was first owned by Lazaro Raada who sold the same to Julian Ydulzura in 1917 who in turn sold it to his and Cayetanos father Simeon in 1923; that Simeon built a house thereon after its acquisition, which fact is buttressed by entries in Tax Declaration No. 18,587 in the name of Simeon for the year 1924 indicating the existence of a 40-sq. meter residential structure made of nipa and mixed materials, and of coconut trees planted thereon; and that after Simeons demise in 1931, Cayetano built his own house beside the old nipa house before the war, and a bodega after the war, which claims find support in Tax Declarations made in 1948-1958. When pressed during the request for written interrogatories if Leonardo had any other pre-war tax declarations aside from Tax Declaration No. 18,587, he explained that all available records may have been destroyed or lost during the last war but that after the war, the lot was reassessed in his fathers name. The Court finds Leonardos explanation plausible and there is nothing in the records that detracts from its probative value. Finally, the official receipts of realty tax payments religiously made by Cayetano from 1948 to 1997 further serve as credible indicia that Cayetano, after his fathers death in 1931, continued to exercise acts of dominion over the lot. The totality of the evidence thus points to the unbroken chain of acts exercised by Cayetano to demonstrate his occupation and possession of the land in the concept of owner, to the exclusion of all others 2. Who may constitute the family home Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. Taneo vs CA Facts Petitioners: Pablito Taneo, Jose Taneo, Nena Catubig and husband, Cilia Moring and husband 517
As a result of a judgment in civil case in favour of Abdon Gilig, two of petitioners properties were levied to satisfy the judgment: one was a parcel of land and the other was a family home Feb. 12, 1966 the properties were sold at an auction Feb. 9,1968 a final deed of conveyance was executed Petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void alleging that they are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on Feb. 12, 1977 and Sep. 12, 1984 respectively They contend that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution o Moreover, the constitution of the family home is doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. It was discovered that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house should be constructed on the land not belonging to another. 3. When deemed constituted Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 4. When terminated Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. 5. Beneficiaries Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and 518
Issues WON the family home is exempt from execution (on the topic) Held and Ratio No o The applicable law in this case is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale, or attachment. Art. 243 The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except: (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property; o The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered in Jan. 24, 1964. Thus, at the time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, the petitioners alleged family home is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Art. 243 (2)
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. Facts Marcelino Dario died intestate He was survived by his wife, Perla Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III Among the properties that he left was the residential house Perla and Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased Perla and Marcelino Marc advised MArcelino III of their intention to partition the property and terminate the coownership Marcelino III refused to partition TC ordered the partition CA partially reconsidered the TC decision CA dismissed the complaint for partition on the ground that the family home should continue despite death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof and that the minor son of Marcelino III, who is a grandson of Perla and the deceased, was a minor beneficiary of the family home Issues WON the partition is proper when one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home Held and Ratio Yes for failure to comply with the 3 requisites of being a beneficiary. Thus, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property. Patricio vs Dario o Art. 159 provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. However, to be a beneficiary, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the FC, (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family The Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. o In this case, the minor son was able to satisfy the first and second requisite (for he has been living in the family since 1994 or within 10 years from the death of the decedent). o However, as to the 3rd requisite, the minor cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It 519
is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997. majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. Facts January 29, 1988 A judgment was rendered by CA in Francisco Salinas, et al. Vs Jose Modequillo, et al. A writ of execution was issued to satisfy the judgment on the goods and chattels of Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay July 7, 1988 Sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose Modequillo and a parcel of agricultural land also registered in his name A motion to quash was filed by Jose alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment under Art. 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof o Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. o Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. o Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the 520 Modequillo vs Breva
6. Exemptions Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. 7. When may be sold Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building Issues: WON the final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the FC Held and Ratio Yes o In the case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the FC upon its effectivity on August 4, 1988 o Art. 152 and 153 do not have retroactive effect. Article 162 which provides that The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. o The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the CA on Jan. 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the FC. This case therefore does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC. Siari Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan, et al. Facts: January 30, 1952 The CFI of Zamboanga del Norte rendered judgment ordering Felimon Lucasan (respondent) to deliver to the Siari Valley (petitioner) the cattle inside his pasture or pay its value amounting to P40k and damages in the sum of P40k This decision was affirmed by the SC and became final and executory after which a writ of execution was issued In carrying out the writ, certain parcels of land of the Lucasans were levied on January 14, 1956 - the lands were sold at a public auction to the petitioner January 26, 1957 Lucasan failed to redeem the land so a final certificate of sale was given to Siari Valley February 16, 1957 a writ of possession was issued directing the sheriff to place Siari Valley in possession of the lands o Siari Valley failed to take possession and filed a motion reiterating its motion for the lands to be placed in their possession Felimon filed an opposition alleging that one of the parcels of land sold at the auction is in his possession and that this parcel of land is where he has erected a house and which he has extrajudicially constituted as a family home o The land in question is a registered land in the name of Felimon o On this land is a house worth P23, 270 o Felimon and his wife constituted this house and lot on which it stands into a family home and registered the pertinent document on June 21, 1955 April 30 , 1957 lower court overruled the opposition and directed the sheriff to place Siari Valley in possession of the lands Felimon filed an MR which was denied but on his 2 nd MR (August 23, 1957), the court issued another order which 521
exempted the land where the family home was constituted from those lands given to Siari Valley on the grounds that the levy and sale were not made in accordance with law and so are null and void Issues: WON the levy made by the sheriff on the property in question is legally ineffective bec it was not effected in accordance w/ what is prescribed in Sec 14, Rule 39 in relation to Sec 7, Rule 59 of ROC WON the family home extrajudicially established on the lot and house in question exempt from execution Held: YES o When the property in question was levied, the notice of levy merely described the property as unregistered land o Also, in the notice of sale, the property was merely described according to the boundaries and area appearing in the tax declaration and not accrdng to what appears in the certificate of title o The Rules of Court expressly states that the notice shall contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title and the volume and page in the reg book where the cert is registered This is done so that the debtor as well as a 3 rd person may be properly informed of the particular land or property that is under the custody of the court o Since the notice of levy made by the sheriff regarding the parcel of land w/c is a registered land does not contain the required information, the said notice is legally ineffective and did not bind the property for purposes of execution; the sale is also invalid and of no legal effect NO o Felimon contends that the money judgment against him could not be considered as a debt at the time the family home was constituted for it was still inchoate and cannot come under the provisions of Article 243 of the NCC Art. 243. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration; (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the prosecution of the building. So, the question is, can a judgment for a sum of money be considered a debt w/in the meaning of this provision even if said judgment is still pending appeal o YES o The reason why a family home constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt from execution is to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad faith by resorting to such declaration to defeat the claim against him o If the purpose is to protect the creditor from fraud, it is immaterial if the debt incurred be undisputed or inchoate, for a debtor acting in good faith would prefer 522
to wait until his case is definitely decided before constituting the family home o If the contention of Felimon us sustained, then a debtor may be allowed to circumvent this provision of the law to the prejudice of the creditor So, yes, the parcel of land can be levied on and the petitioners can file a new petition for execution strictly following the requirements of the rule Honrado vs. CA Facts: December 11, 1997 Respondent, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado (petitioner) who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises Premium is collecting P240, 765 as the price of vet products purchased on credit by Honrado Honrado and his counsel did not appear at the pre-trial conference and were declared in default; Premium presented the evidence ex parte Apparently, Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado had filed a petition w/ the RTC of Calamba for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrados name, located in Calamba and the house thereon, as their family house In his declaration, Honrado listed Atty. Luciano, P & J Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced as their creditors and that the property is not more than P240k RTC rendered judgment in favor of Premium Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal w/c was dismissed for his failure to file his brief as appellant April 26, 2000 entry of judgment was made Oct. 10, 2000 Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution w/c was granted and issued on March 29, 2001 The Sheriff levied on the land in question and a public auction was set on April 4, 2001 Honrado was served w/ a copy of the notice and he filed his opposition May 17, 2001 the property was sold to Premium for P650, 204.10 May 23, 2001 Certificate of Sale was issued Honrado failed to redeem the property April 29, 2002 RTC Calamba declared the property a family home May 3, 2002 Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Art 155 of FC o Alleged that the property is exempt from execution bec it is a family home w/c had been constituted as such before he incurred his indebtedness w/ Premium o He and his family had no other real property except the land in question Premium opposed the motion o Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from claiming the exemption o The claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to redeem the property o Averred that Honrado and his family vacated the property after the sale and re-occupied only in April or May 2002 o Averred that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution RTC denied Honrados motion on the ground that he has waived the exemption when he failed to object to the sale of the property on execution on May 17, 2001 Oct 14, 2002 Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance and Writ of Possession asserting that the one-year redemption period had already lapsed 523
Honrado opposed the motion claiming that the RTC of Calamba had already declared the property a family home o Averred that his family resided in the house before the FC became effective and was entitled to the exemption under the Code April 14, 2003 RTC granted Premiums motion On a petition for certiorari, CA dismissed the petition on the grounds that Honrado failed to assert his claim for exemption at the time of the levy or w/in a reasonable time thereafter o Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court Issue: WON the family home can be exempted from execution Held: NO Petitioner contends that the ruling of RTC of Calamba has already become final and can no longer be disturbed o The family home cannot be levied upon considering that the debt was incurred bet the period from Nov 18, 1996 and June 30, 1997, after the FC took effect o Family home is exempt under Art 155 of FC Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a) o He and his family had been occupying the property as their family home as early as 1992 o Under Art 153 of FC, his house was constituted as a family home in that year Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a) o Even if he failed to contest the levy on his property, he cannot be deemed to have waived his right to claim the exemption since it would be contrary to public policy w/c is to allow a family to occupy, use and enjoy the family home and that the waiver must be shown by overt acts and cannot be presumed Respondent contends that Felimon is estopped from claiming the property is exempt from execution and from assailing the levy o That petitioner agreed to the levy and sale of the property and even surrendered the key to the house and vacated the property o That petitioner was only hoping to get a higher amount than his debt o That it was only after RTC of Calamba rendered its decision that petitioner re-occupied the property and claimed that it is exempt from execution SC held that although the ROC does not prescribe the period w/in w/c to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, settles that the right of exemption must be claimed by the 524
debtor himself at the time of the levy or w/in a reasonable period of time: o Claim of exemption must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff o Petitioner failed to include in the petition for judicial constitution of his family home that Premium is one of their creditors considering that the collection case was filed in 1997 before the petition w/c was in 1998 o The exemption argument was not raised before the trial court before and during the auction sale but only after almost a year from the auction o This reveals an intention to render the sale on execution null and void o In fact, he never objected to the levy and the projected sale on the ground that it was a family home and even vacated the property after the sale and when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution under Art 155, he did not present evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home o He only informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba has rendered judgment on November 25, 2002 and did not justify why he did not reveal this information sooner o In the absence of express provision, claim for exemption must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is present, w/in a reasonable time/ promptly or before the creditor has taken any step involving further cost, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or w/in a reasonable time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced Cabang vs. Basay Facts: Deceased Felix Odong was the owner of the lot in question w/c was issued on March 9, 1966; however, he and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot The Basays (respondent) bought the property from the heirs of Felix Odong and were issued a title in their name on August 6, 1987, but they also did not occupy the property The Cabangs (petitioner), on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the land since 1956 to the present o They were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot no. 7778 and occupied the lot o Afterwards, they learned that the lot they were occupying is actually Lot No. 7777 June 23, 1992 the respondents filed for recovery of property against the petitioners Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners Upon appeal, CA reversed the decision Petitioners filed a petition for review in the SC and was denied Feb 15, 2000 SCs decision became final and executory and the case was remanded to the lower court for the determination of the value of the improvements introduced by the petitioners o There were 3 residential buildings on the property owned by Mrs. Virginia Cabang and a concrete house owned by Bernardo Mendez o Upon the verbal request of the petitioners, the court declared that the tie point of the survey should be the Bureau of Lands Location Monument and authorized the Bureau of Lands to conduct the survey of the property Respondents offered to pay P21k for the improvement of the lot but was rejected by the petitioners Respondents filed their Manifestation and Motion for Execution alleging that the petitioners refused payment and 525
should now be ordered to remove the improvements at their expense or if they refused, an Order of Demolition be issued Petitioners insist that the property in question is a constituted family home and is exempt from execution Issue: WON the property in question is a duly constituted family home and exempt from execution Held: NO First, the decision has already become final and executory and can no longer be modified in any respect and when it was remanded to the lower court, it was only to enforce the judgment of the appellate court Also, during the start of the case, it was already of judicial notice that the improvements made by the petitioners were residential houses and not family homes Even if the said properties were family homes, they still wont be exempt from execution o The family home must be established on the properties of a) the absolute community, or b) the conjugal partnership, or c) the exclusive property of either spouse w/ the consent of the other. It cannot be established on property held in co-ownership w/ third persons. However, it can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse w/ the consent of the latter. This is where the problem of the petitioners lie since the property where their alleged family home stands is owned by the respondents and their stay thereon is only by mere tolerance of the respondents Modequillo vs. Breva (supra) Cabreza vs. Cabreza (nakakalito ang case na to. Ang daming procedural issues. Basta kaya lang yata di nag-succeed ang girl is bec she did not have a lawyer. Nagmaganda sya at nag-lawyer para sa sarili) Facts: Ceferino Cabreza (respondent) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner) Jan 3, 2001 the RTC granted the petition and declared the conjugal partnership dissolved and that it must be liquidated in accordance w/ Art 129 of FC March 7, 2003 respondent filed w/ the RTC a Motion for Execution of the dissolution of conjugal partnership o Sought that their only conjugal partnership, a house and lot in Pasig City, be sold and the proceeds be divided and distributed The RTC granted the motion July 30, 2003 RTC issued an order granting respondents motion to allow buyers to inspect the property Oct. 2, 2003 RTC granted respondents motion for the approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the authorization for respondent to sign the deed in behalf of Amparo and for an order requiring Amparo and the children to vacate the property Amparo filed an MR questioning the Oct. 2, 2003 order but was denied May 12, 2004 RTC issued another order granting Ceferinos prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession to the buyer, BJD Holdings Corporation June 25, 2004 a writ of possession was granted to BJD July 5, 2004 a Notice to Vacate was served on Amparo July 8, 2004 Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate o Art 129 (9) of the NCC provides that, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on w/c it is 526
situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse w/ whom majority of the children choose to remain o She asserted that the family home should be given to her since the majority of the children chose to remain w/ her RTC denied the motion contending that the decision in the case has already become final and executory after appeals before the CA and SC were dismissed Aug 6, 2004 petitioner filed an MR but was denied Sept. 2, 2004 Sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate Oct. 4, 2004 petitioner filed w/ the CA a petition for Certiorari but was denied o Contend that Art 129 (9) is applicable only when there is more than one property between the spouses w/c is not the case at bar o Moreover, the decision being appealed from has already become final and executory Issue: WON the order of possession, writ of possession and notice to vacate vary the dispositive portion of the January 3 RTC decision bec the same authorized the sale of the family home Held: NO Amparo contends that there is another property aside from the property in question so Art 129 (9) applies o That the order to sell is not part of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court o That it is not true that the challenged order has become final and executory o If the Order to Sell is valid, the Deed of Sale is void for lack of her consent and signature o If the sale is valid, the order to vacate is not valid for lack of delivery of price Ceferino contends that the petition must be dismissed bec the issue raised has already been resolved w/ finality SC: o In her petition, petitioner seems to be hiding the fact that she had filed petitions in both the CA and SC and both were dismissed o Also, there is another case w/c petitioner filed w/ the CA questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale bet Ceferino and BJD on the ground that it is not valid because of her lack of consent w/c the CA granted and was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; so, this could no longer be the proper subject of the petition o The petition must be dismissed because the order of the RTC has already become final and executory o On the issue that there is still another property, this cannot be a subject of this petition since the SC is not a trier of facts o In her first appeal to the CA, petitioner failed to raise her arguments herein when they were already operative then o So, it would be unfair to allow her to raise these arguments now o Her petition in the CA was filed w/o the services of a lawyer and was dismissed on procedural grounds o Her appeal in the SC was also filed w/o the services of a lawyer and was again dismissed on technicalities XI. Paternity and Filiation A. Concept of paternity, filiation, and legitimacy FC Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n) B. Legitimate children 527
FC Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a) FC Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a) NCC Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (109) NCC Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. (n) NCC Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (1412a) TAN V TROCIO FACTS: School owner and directress, Felicidad Barian Tan filed a complaint seeking disbarment of Atty. Galileo Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the school, overpowered her inside the office and against her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her. She said that this resulted to the conception of a son whom she named Jewel Tan. She further alleged that he used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest and stopped. She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years from the incident because of Trocio threatened her with the deportation of her alien husband, Tan Le Pok, and because she was married with eight children. Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family but denies he sexually assaulted her. ISSUE: WON he had, in fact, sexually assaulted the Complainant, as a consequence of which the latter begot a child by him and is thus a ground for Trocios disbarment for immoral conduct. WON the evidence proves that Jewel is Trocios son. HELD: Complaint for disbarment dismissed The court found insufficient basis for the allegations. The alleged threat to deport her husband could not hold because she 528
admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned of the respondents transgression that very same evening. The fear had thus become inexistent. Also, even after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the respondentwith Trocio acting as her personal and familys legal counselas though nothing happened. Complainants contention that Respondent continued supporting the child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him criminally, has not been substantiate. In fact, the fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be construed as condonation. It is likewise strange that an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called Jewel. Witness, Elueterias (domestic helper) testimony did not hold as how near she was to the crime scene, considering it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. Testimonies of Felicidad and witness Marilou (another helper) to show unusual closeness between Trocio and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. Pictures of Jewel and Trocio, allegedly showing their physical likeness to each other, is inconclusive evidence to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of Complainants person. More importantly, Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy (as son of Felicidad and Tan Le Pok) unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok. ANGELES V MAGLAYA FACTS: Aleli Corazon Maglaya letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. She claims that Francisco died intestate on January 21, 1998 and there is a need to appoint an administrator of Franciscos estate. She also claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, Franciscos second wife, are the surviving heirs of the Francisco. Belen Angeles, on the other hand, contested the petition and wants to be the administratrix. Angeles averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Also Angeles claims despite Alelis claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, Aleli has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove it. Also to the disprove her claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Aleli claims that the records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. Aleli also dismissed the claims regarding the adoption because she introduced with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Upon trial, Aleli testified that Francisco and Genoveva were indeed legally married and that she have been in an open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf. She also offered in evidence:1. her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); 2. Pictures taken during her wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. 3. Others evidences like her scholastic and government service records. 529
RTC dismissed Alelis petition for failure to state or prove a cause of action in view of her failure to prove filiation. Court of Appeals held otherwise. ISSUE: WON Aleli is the legitimate child of Francisco-Genoveva AND should be appointed as administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate. HELD: NO, insufficient evidence. AND No, preference on surviving spouse. RATIO: A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Failure to prove lawful marriage equals no presumption of legitimacy. For SC, Aleli failed to prove such. Save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. She did not present a marriage certificate or marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; solemnizing authority; the persons present, none of the 4 witnesses she presented is a solemnizing authority and failed to prove anything about the celebration of the marriage for they only proved that she was Franciscos daughter; and like significant details. Aleli even failed to allege that the Francisco-Belen marriage is void bigamous. If it is true that the Francisco-Genoveva is a legal marriage, the Francisco-Belen marriage took place during its subsistence and thus should have been contested long ago by Aleli as void bigamous. Aleli on the contrary, in her petition to be appointed as administratrix, alleged that Belen is the second wife. SC also said that the Birth Certificate failed to prove legal filiation because it was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. It was signed by the attending physician only. Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. All the evidences presented could only declare her as a natural child and not a legitimate child. On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased. SC thus held that the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
SSS V AGUAS Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner died. His surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death. She also indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled later. Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, sent sworn letter to SSS contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pea. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela Pea, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Pea, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990. SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension. After an investigation SSS found the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna and that Jenelyn and Jefren were Rosannas children with one Romeo C. dela Pea and also confirmed the other allegations of Letitica. Mariquita, who was interviewed by the investigator, also confirmed that Pablo was infertile or not capable of 530
having a child as he was under treatment. This allegation of infertility was also confirmed by the investigator with Dr. Manuel Macapinlac. Thus, SSS stopped the pension of Rosanna and Jenelynn and asked them to refund those formerly given to them. The claimants presented photocopies of documentary evidence to disprove the allegations: (1) Pablo and Rosannas marriage certificate; (2) Janets certificate of live birth with Pablos signature; (3) Jeylnns certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablos certificate of death. They also presented a Joint Affidavit by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the latters death. For the infertility issue, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for tuberculosis. In compliance with the SSCs order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports15 signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peas birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnns birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablos death on December 8, 1996. The SSC then decided to set the case for hearing. The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia AguasMacapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn affidavits. Vivencia - testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years. That they were neighbors for four years until they (Vivencia) moved to another town. She however said that she would often visit the two. Also, she claimed that the other child of Pablo and Rosanna, Janet, was only an adopted child. The spouse later transferred residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in the old house. Carmelita Said that she had been a neighbor for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors. She confirmed that Janet and Jeylnn were the children of the spouse but she did not know whose child Jefren is. Leticia - Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna. She was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children. However, there were no legal papers on Janets adoption. She claimed that when Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn and after the latters baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Pea was claiming that he was the father and got mad because the child was named after Pablo. Pablo also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna and thus drove them away from the house. Since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated. SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as claimant because it appears that she contracted a bigamous marriage with Romeo. As for Jeylynn and Janet, SSC held that they were not Pablos legitimate children. CA reversed and set aside ruling that they were entitled for SSS benefits. CA relied on the birth certificate of Janet and Jeylynn. CA also believed that the allegation of bigamy was not duly proven ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet and Rosanna are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo. HELD: YES for Jeylynn; NO for Janet ; NO for Rosanna Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latters death. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage. Pursuant to Art 164 FC, she can thus be defined as a legitimate child. Questions regarding her legitimacy may only be raised by the father. Pablo never contested such. Also, Pablo signed her birth certificate and a birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 FC cannot extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. The photocopy of Janets alleged birth certificate cannot be given weight because it was not verified in any way by the civil 531
register. It thus stands as a mere photocopy. The witnesses also were unanimous in claiming that they were not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janets adoption did not undergo any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Because of the absence of proof of the legality of adoption, Janet cannot be held as a primary beneficiary. For Rosanna, SC said that to be a beneficiary one should be a dependent immediately before the death of the deceased. SC believes more on the claim of Leticia. They gave great weight to SSCs observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Pea. SSC believes that they are one and the same person. They believed that after the altercation involving Romeo dela Pea, the second birth certificate was executed and Rosanna lived with him. Thus, upon the death of the deceased, she was no longer a dependent and thus cannot be a beneficiary. RIVERA V HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA Petitioners are allegedly related to the deceased Pacita Gonzales as half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-inlaw (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia). Respondents are full and half-blood siblings of Romualdo Villanueva: Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano. They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death. The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, of the late Villanueva. 1927-1980 - Pacita and Romualdo cohabited without the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Amanda Musngi who died on Apr 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the properties contested in this case. Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will (intestate). Aug 8, 1980 - Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale (an extrajudicial settlement of Pacitas estate). Petitioners filed a case for partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo 2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo. CA affirmed. Petitioners contend that the Courts erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter despite the RTC's ruling in another case, Special Proceedings No. SD-144 (SD144), entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Pacita C. Gonzales, Epifanio C. Rivera, petitioner, v. Romualdo Villanueva, oppositor. According to them this case bars by res judicata the RTC and CA from ruling on the legitimacy of Angelina on this case SD857. ISSUE: 1.WON the findings regarding respondent Angelina's filiation in SD-144 are conclusive on SD-857 and therefore res judicata. 2. WON Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent Gonzales. 3. WON real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by them. HELD: 1. NO 2. NO, not biological daughter nor adopted 3. The properties are subject to the time when they acquired the property (before and after the death of Romualdos legal wife.) RATIO: 1. A number of factors militate against the existence of res judicata. First, the parties in the two cases are different. Epifanio C. Rivera, who incidentally is not a party in this petition, filed SD-144 seeking letters of administration over his dead sister's estate. Villanueva was his lone opponent. On the other hand, although both Villanueva and respondent Angelina were parties in SD-857, Epifanio Rivera was not. Petitioners never alleged that Epifanio represented their interests, and vice versa. Furthermore, in SD-144, the trial court never actually acquired jurisdiction over respondent Angelina's person. She was not even a 532
party there. Most significantly, there was no identity of cause of action between the two suits. SD-144 was a special proceeding while SD-857 was an ordinary civil case. The former was concerned with the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Epifanio Rivera while the latter was for partition and annulment of titles, and damages. Thus, there was no res judicata. 2. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to their decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was named as her father." The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' illegitimate child. However, a closer examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. SC finds that this case is one of the exceptions to the general rule that lower and appellate court facts should be upheld. SC reiterated its pronouncement on Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals that the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Mere registration of a child in his birth cert as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, it does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Thus, she cant inherit from Pacita. Pacita was 44 yo, on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living childless with Romualdo for 20 yrs. Under the circumstances, SC held that it was not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Pacita Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Pacita. Since she could not have validly participated in Pacita Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Romualdo Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid. 3. Because Gonzales and Villanueva lived together without the benefit of marriage, their property relations were governed by Art 144 NCC (co-ownership). However, the contending parties agreed that the relationship of Romaualdo and Pacita was adulterous, at least until the death of Amanda Musngi. Because the cohabitation of Romaualdo and Pacita from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by the said statute. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. Only four properties acquired by Romaualdo and Pacita during these 36 yrs which they registered in both their names. Following Agapay case, apportionment is subjected to the actual contributions of each. Records show that Pacita did not contributed anything to the acquisition of these properties. On the other hand, it was clearly demonstrated that Romualdo was the municipal treasurer of Talavera for many years and therefore the lone breadwinner. Thus, none of these four parcels of land should accrue to petitioners (Pacitas). Only one parcel of land was registered solely in Pacitas name, which was acquired between 1927 and 1963. Romualdo never actually challenged the validity of the registration in her name. Thus the efficacy of the title in Pacita Gonzales' name remained unrebutted. As Romualdo Gonzales' sole property, this should accrue entirely to her heirs. Only one property was acquired after Musngi's death in 1963 and registered in the names of both Romaualdo and Pacita. This is governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Art 144 NCC. The apportionment of this should be half for each side. The rest of the properties registered solely in Gonzales' name were also acquired after the death of Amanda Musngi in 1963. These properties were governed by co-ownership under Art 144 NCC. Again, half should accrue to Pacita's heirs and the other half, to Romualdos. ON THE HEIRS OF PACITA: The trial court in SD-857 did not establish the exact relationship between petitioners and Gonzales, a relationship the respondents denied. In view of this, there is a need to 533
remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination and identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs. 1. Who are considered legitimate children a. Conceived during marriage ROC RULE 131: Burden of Proof and Presumptions Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. FC Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a) 1. Valid marriage 2. Terminated marriage FC Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n) FC Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; 3. Void marriages FC Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. FC Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if 534
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227) 4. Voidable marriage b. Born during marriage c. Conceived by artificial insemination NCC Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a) d. Adopted children e. Legitimated children 2. Rights of legitimated children FC Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. FC Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a) NCC Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. NCC Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. NCC Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. NCC Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. (808a) NCC Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. (931a) Moore vs Republic Facts: Elaine A. Moore (American citizen) was formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde(also an American citizen). They had a son, William Michael Velarde. ( now 14 y/o, born on Jan 19, 1947 at LA, Calif, U.S.A.) They had a divorce in California on 1949. Elaine contracted a 2nd marriage with Don C. Moore on 1956 at LA, Calif, U.S.A., and the cild lived with the spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. 535
Elaine wanted that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde (William Michael Velarde Moore.) Naldoza vs. Republic Facts: Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on 1970. They had 2 children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto husband left her after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never returned. He allegedly swindled Congressman Maglana, one Galagar also Eloy Gallentes and other persons. The classmates of the children allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. Zosima filed a petition that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname RTC: dismissed Issue: whether two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname. Held: No. To allow them to bear only their mother's surname and to discard their father's surname, removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration. the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them. The reasons for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would 536
RTC denied Issue: (1) whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and (3) whether as mother of the minor, she has the authority or personality to ask for such a change. Held: No. if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as the law may permit. For the present the action taken is premature. Ratio: Article 364 of NCC specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Article 369 of NCC provides that in case of annulment of a voidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment can principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.
be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records. "the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage." If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname. During the pendency of the case and before Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence, she died. Her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. 1983, Marquinos filed a Motion to Dismiss. (action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act.)
RTC: dismissed the case. Eutiquio died while the case was pending appeal.
Ratio: The minors, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364, NCC). The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Marquino vs. IAC Facts; Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against Eutiquio Marquino (with Maria Terenal-Marquino, wife of Eutiquio, and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva.) (Backstory) Bibiana was born on 1926 of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio. (Eutiquio was still single.) Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household. She always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.
IAC: reversed Issue: whether or not the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible in character. whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former. Held: Yes. it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was born out of wedlock. Bibiana sued for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died before she could present her proof of recognition. Her death tolled the action considering its personal nature and intransmissibility. No. the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the putative parent. Article 285 provides only 2 exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. 1. the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana. 537
In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case was filed. 2. no document was discovered in which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a natural child. WITH THE NEW LAW: the child can bring the action during his or her entire lifetime (not during the lifetime of the parents) and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. But it cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father. " Ratio: Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. NEW LAW! Article 173 of the FC: The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five (5) years within which to institute the action. The action commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (Emphasis supplied) Ong vs. CA (daming case ganito name, naloka ako) Facts: Miguela Campos Ong is the surviving spouse of Manuel Ong. Manuel died on 1990, while the case was pending appeal in the CA. Backstory: Dec 20, 1953, Manuel, representing himself as Alfredo Go, was introduced to Saturnina at a night club by Constancia Lim and Vicente Sy. They had a relationship. Since Oct 1954, Manuel started spending the night with Saturnina. Saturnina testified that she and Manuel lived together for 4 mos. Manuel gave her money, a sack of rice each month, and other supplies. On June 28, 1955, Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born. He was registered in the Local Civil Registry as Alfredo Go, Jr. On Aug 17, 1956, Robert Ong was born. Because the midwife told Saturnina that the child should carry her surname as she was not married to Manuel, "alias" Alfredo Go, the child was registered as Robert Caballes. the financial support from Manuel started to dwindle, until 7 mos. later when Manuel stopped seeing her. Saturnina looked for him. She discovered his identity as Manuel Ong. Saturnina asked Manuel for financial support of their children, but he refused her request. 1961, Saturnina and her sons again asked Manuel for monetary assistance because of financial difficulties. But he denied them assistance. Dec 25, 1976, Alfredo and Robert Ong visited Manuel in his house where they were entertained and presented to Manuel by Dolores Dy, Manuel's Chinese commonlaw wife.
538
March 29, 1979, Alfredo Ong, Jr. testified that he was given a China Banking Corp. check for P100.00 by Manuel as his gift on his graduation from high school. Later, when Alfredo Ong was in his senior year in college, he saw Manuel in the latter's office and asked him for money to defray his educational expenses. Manuel gave him P100.00 cash and told him to make a list of his school needs. After getting the list which Alfredo had prepared, Manuel told him to come back. Alfredo returned with some friends in Sept 1982, but Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave. Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel. The complaint was amended to include Robert. conceived during the period of cohabitation of their mother with the unidentified paralytic. Manuel was allegedly sterile. Ong claimed that, in addition to Miguela Campos Ong, he lived with a commonlaw wife, Dolores Dy, and with another woman named Anatolia Veloria but he had no child with anyone of them. He said that during World war II he got sick and was treated by a certain Dr. Deiparine who allegedly told him that as a result of his illness he would not be able to beget any child. Ong further claimed that he cohabited with Dolores before and during his marriage with Miguela. His inability to procreate is said to be the reason why he and his wife raised six children not related to them by blood. (In another case, he acknowledged a certain Lourdes Balili as his natural child with Victoria Balili during the War.) this case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 283 of the NCC. The four times during which Manuel met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The father's conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here there are no acts shown of Manuel Ong treating Alfredo Ong, Jr. as his son except on the four occasions during which they met. In the case of Robert Caballes, there is no proof at all that Manuel Ong treated him as his son. no proof of cohabitation. In order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship must be open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. While the parties are not required to hold themselves out as husband and wife, neither must they act clandestinely or secretly, otherwise they will be considered to have merely engaged in illicit sexual intercourse. this case fall under the last paragraph of Art. 283.
RTC: they were found to be the illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the NCC. CA: affirmed Issue: WON they were the illegitimate children of Manuel Held: Yes Saturnina's testimony was corroborated by Constancia Lim Monteclaros. Constancia was the person who introduced Saturnina to Manuel. Constancia and Vicente Sy, Manuel's close friend, lived together in a room in the house of Ong. She knew Manuel very well. No reason has been given why she should testify falsely against Manuel. Saturnina admitted having cohabited with another man before meeting Manuel. However, the man, who was a paralytic, was taken by his mother in 1953, before Saturnina started having an affair with Manuel in 1954. Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born on 1955, more than a year after the paralytic had left Saturnina. Robert Caballes was born on 1956. Hence, they could not have been
Ratio: Art. 283 of the Civil Code state: 539
In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: xxx xxx xxx 2. When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family; 3. When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; 4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Art. 289 allows the investigation of paternity of spurious children on the same grounds specified in this article and in Art. 284. Republic vs. CA (ito din madaming kapangalan) Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was born on 1971 to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres 1972 Pablo left their conjugal abode since then Pablo never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza and her children 1976, Fe Esperanza filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership (granted) 1983, Fe filed another petition for change of name, to drop the surname of her husband, (approved) 1984, Fe again filed another petition for the declaration of Pablo as an absentee (granted) 1986, Fe and Ernesto Yu got married Additional facts: ever since her childhood, Cynthia had not known much less remembered her real father Pablo, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto; she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other related activities confusion arose as to her parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment on 2 occasions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila Red Cross pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu her step-father had been priorly consulted about this petition and had given his consent Ernesto testified for her and confirmed his consent to the petition as he had always treated her as his own daughter ever since.
OSG: opposing the petition. RTC: granted ruled that there is no valid cause for denying the petition. Further, the trial court stated that it could not compel step-father to adopt her, as adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not be a cause for disallowing her to legally change her name CA: affirmed it is for the best interest of her that her surname be changed. allowing the change of surname would give her an opportunity to improve her personality and welfare. discrepancy between her original surname, and the surname of her step-father, caused her embarrassment and inferiority complex. Issue: WON she should be allowed to change her surname 540
Held: No. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. The assailed decision does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Confusion might arise with regard to her parentage because of her surname. But more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if she is allowed to bear her stepfathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. Lastly, when this case was decided by CA, she was already 18 y/o but still considered a minor because RA 6809, lowering the age of majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of her age, conclusion remains considering the circumstances and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname. Ratio: the following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Dela Cruz vs Garcia Facts 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage Sep. 4, 2005 - Dominique died Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting. Parts of which state that: o AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL 541
City Registrar denied such application on the ground that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father o Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. o First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. o Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. o Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months 542
Issues WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" Held and Ratio Yes Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255 provides: ...illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. o Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: o Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS xxxx Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner: xxxx 4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4] Claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child which, according to the Certificate of Fetal Death, died during labor. Hortillanos wife, Marife, was already on her 38th week or 9th month Continental granted paternity leave but not bereavement leave and other death benefits consisting of the death and accident insurance Seeking to reverse Continentals denial of the bereavement and other death benefit, the Union filed a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the DOLE, NCR. 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the issue of whether Hortillano 543
Continental Steel vs Montano (Thank you sa sponsor) Facts: 9 January 2006, Hortillano, employee of Continental Steel and member of Union filed for a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded between Continental and Union: ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE xxxx Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following: 2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days xxxx
was entitled to bereavement and other death benefits with Atty. Montao as the chosen arbitrator. Arguments of the two parties: o Union the CBA did not specify that the dependent should have been born alive first so his death can be covered Other cases in MKK Steel Corp and Mayer Steel Pipe Corp, sister companies of Continental, gave death benefits to their employees with similar case Invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code which states that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer o Continental CBA did not specify death of unborn child, a fetus without legal personality Relying on Arts. 41-42 of the Civil Code, Continental averred that only one with civil personality could die and the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality A fetus which died before delivery is not a person at all and could not be considered a dependent since it never needed support nor did it acquire a right to be supported 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao issued a Resolution entitling Hortillano to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits amounting to P16, 489 Continental filed a Petition for Review of Certiorari with CA 27 February 2008, CA affirmed Atty. Montaos resolution 9 May 2008, CA denied Continentals MR Issue: Can Hortillanos unborn child be considered dependent considering that she died before delivery and did not acquire civil personality? Held: Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA affirming Atty. Montaos Resolution is Affirmed. Continentals reliance on Articles 41-42 is misplaced since Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, Article 41 defines when a child is considered born, and Article 42 states that civil personality is extinguished by death. These articles do not provide a definition of death. C. Illegitimate chidren 1. Who are considered illegitimate (a) Under NCC (b) Under FC Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. Facts Oct. 27, 2003 - Joanie Surposa Uy filed a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Jose Chua Joanie alleged in her Complaint that o Jose, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene) o Jose and Irene had two children, namely, herself and her brother, Allan o Apr. 27, 1959 Jose attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to Joanie, and instructed that the latters birth certificate be filled out with the following 544 Joanie Surposa Uy vs Jose Ngo Chua
names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" (the name of Irenes father) as father and "IRENE DUCAY" (Ducay was the maiden surname of Irenes mother) as mother o Jose Chua had consistently and regularly given Joanie allowances before she got married. He also provided her with employment o Joanie and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as Joses illegitimate children o During peJoanies wedding, Jose sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride o Joses relatives even attended the baptism of Joanies daughter Jose denied such allegations Joanie testified that Jose was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation It turned out that prior to such proceeding, Joanie had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against Jose wherein they eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement o That JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. o That Jose would pay 2 million pesos each (to Joanie and Allan) as a gesture of goodwill Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein effectively bars the filing of the present case Held and Ratio No o For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action o A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. o Like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all o The Compromise Agreement between Joanie and Jose obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners 545
Issues
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement between Jose and Joanie is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. o Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. No o This case is not barred by res judicata for the reason that Jose and Joanies Compromise Agreement was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision allowing such agreement, being null and void could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits. 2. Rights of illegitimate child Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a) Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. Valencia vs Rodriguez Facts Plaintiffs allege that they (except Catalina Osmea) are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio E. Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmea and that the defendants, (except Emilia Rodriguez and Pio E. Valencia) are the illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his common-law-wife, defendant Emilia Rodriguez Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to bear the surname "Valencia," in accordance with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father Plaintiffs point out that, under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children (who are not natural) are entitled only to support Issues WON defendants, being the illegitimate children, may use the surname Valencia Held and Ratio Yes o Plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are 546
legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of their father o Said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to be the surname of their father o Defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all appearances, Pio E. Valencia (the father) acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by the defendants. But even if he objects, the defendants can still use the surname "Valencia," in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname Facts Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, filed a case for support against Perico Jao The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was conducted by NBI The result indicated that Janice could not have been the offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado Trial court initially found the result of the tests conclusive but upon motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits and ultimately declared Janice as the child of Jao CA reversed the Trial Courts decision on the ground of the result of the blood grouping test Undisputed facts o April 1968 Jao accompanied Arlene to the hospital for check-up and confinement Jao vs CA o August 16, 1968 Arlene gave birth to Janice after the formers completion of 36 weeks of pregnancy o December 1967 Arlene must have conceived Janice Arlene contends o She first met Jao in the 3rd or 4th week of November 1967 o November 30, 1967 After several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him o December 16, 1967 she started to live with him at her dwelling Jao contends o December 14, 1967 she met Arlene o January 1968 he dated Arlene 4 times o January 18, 1968 he had carnal knowledge with her o May 1968 he started living with her
Issues WON Janice is the child of Perico Jao WON the blood grouping test is conclusive of paternity Held and Ratio No o Supreme court had given weight to the findings of NBI in its blood grouping test o And it has considered other facts as found by the CA When Janice was born, Jao did not recognize her as his own Before, Jao even fled a petition that his name as Janices father be deleted from the certificate of live birth The attention given by Jao to Arlene during pregnancy ad the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test 547
No recognition will lie for to satisfy paragraph 3 of Art. 283 of the NCC (when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the father), Janice must have been conceived during the cohabitation of the two which in this case is impossible for Arlene herself said that they started to cohabit after Dec. 1967 Arlene, as claimed by JAo, at the critical time of conception, had carnal knowledge with two other men No, it is inconclusive as to paternity, but it is conclusive of non-paternity o The fact that the blood type of the child is possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born of that parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father o The childs paternity appears to have been established by the affidavits of Edna and her 2 witnesses but these alone are not sufficient to order Ambrosio to pay support to the child o It is necessary to prove that he has recognized the child o Although Art 291 w/c enumerates those entitled to support refers to (3) acknowledged natural children and in (5) simply to illegitimate children who are not natural, there is still a need for the IC to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support o While the birth cert is prima facie evidence of acknowledgement of the child, and that until it is proved to be spurious, it must be upheld. Its probative value, however, is impaired by the opposition of the alleged father Issues: WON an illegitimate child can receive support pendente lite Held: YES Petitioner established the paternity of the child through her own affidavit and that of 2 other witnesses o Contends that the child is entitled to support upon proof of filiation to Ambrosio even w/o his acknowledgment Ambrosio claims that the birth cert is spurious since it was sworn before a notary public in Manila when the child was born in Las Pias, Rizal SC: There must be a declaration of the status of the child from w/c the right to support is derived and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits o The affidavits of Edna and her 2 witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the child, and a birth cert was also presented to corroborate the same 548
Mangulabnan vs. IAC (1990) Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan (petitioner) filed an action for actual, compensatory and moral damages and support for her child, Alfie Angelo from Ambrosio Tan Chew Arceo (respondent) Pending the litigation, an application for support pendente lite was filed w/c Ambrosio opposed RTC ruled in favor of Edna and ordered Ambrosio to give P1,500 to the minor child CA reversed
o Therefore, the status of the child has been provisionally established entitling him to support pendente lite Contrary to the appellate courts decision, the requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by laws in particular to a natural child under Art 276 of CC. such a child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception Alfie, whose father Ambrosio was already married to another woman, is not a natural child but an IC or spurious child in w/c case, recognition is not required before support may be granted However, under Art 887 of CC, in all cases of IC, their filiation must be proved by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the IC. Recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. It is compulsory when by court action the child brings out his recognition. Art. 291. The following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or illegitimate descendants of the latter; (4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter; (5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural. Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers and sisters, although they are only of the half-blood, the necessaries for life, when by a physical or mental defect, or any other cause not imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot secure their subsistence. This assistance includes, in a proper case, expenses necessary for elementary education and for professional or vocational training. (143a) Art. 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this Code. (n) Medyo nalilito ako sa case na to. Basta entitled ang bata sa support kasi his status was provisionally established. Uyguangco vs. CA (1989) Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea (petitioner), 4 legitimate (petitioners also) children and considerable properties w/c they divided among themselves Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco, claiming to be an illegitimate child who was left out in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate, filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners o Alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario and Anastacia Bacjao o At 15, he moved to his fathers hometown in Misamis at his and the petitioners urging o That he received support from his father while he was studying in high school o That he was assigned by his father as a storekeeper at the Uyguanco store o That he lived w/ his father from 1967-1973 o That he has been using the surname Uyguangco w/o objection from his father and from the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea and by Sulpicio (one of his half-brothers) 549
o That he has shared in the profits of the copra business of the family o That he was a director, together w/ the petitioners, in the family corporation o That in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement by the petitioners, he was given a share in his fathers estate o However, he had none of the documents mentioned in Art 278 to prove his claim: Record of birth A will A statement before a court of record Or in any authentic writing Petitioners moved for the dismissal of case on the ground that Graciano can no longer prove his filiation under the applicable provisions of the CC o That the only evidence allowed under Art 278 to prove Gracianos claim was not available to him o That he could not resort to Art 285 since he was already an adult when Apolinario died and his claim did not come under the exceptions Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (137a) The motion to dismiss was denied Issue: WON Graciano can still be recognized as an illegitimate child Held: NO Petitioners contend that Gracianos complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child w/c is already barred and is a clear circumvention of the provisions Graciano contend that he has a right to show under Art 283 that he is in continuous possession of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family SC: o The present action has already been overtaken by events, the effectivity of the FC o The pertinent provisions are now: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a) Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 550
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) Under the ROC and special laws, an IC is now allowed to prove his filiation by other means like baptismal cert, a judicial admission, a family Bible in w/c his family name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of ROC However, since Graciano is seeking to prove his filiation under Art 172 (2) of FC, his action is now barred bec of Apolinarios death If Graciano can no longer prove this claim in an action for recognition, the more that he cant try to prove this through collateral action The Court hopes that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in the disputed estate. Blood should tell. Sempio-Diy was quoted here regarding the basis for the need for the father to be alive o Basically, shes saying that unlike LC who are publicly recognized, IC are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and w/o the legit family being aware of their existence. So, it is only the parents who can be sure of the filiation of the child. In order to avoid claims of people pretending to be an IC, it is necessary that the father must be alive to have an opportunity to deny or affirm the childs filiation. And this he cannot do if he is already dead.
Mendoza vs. CA (1991) Facts: August 21, 1981 Teopista Toring Tuacao (respondent), filed a complaint for compulsory recognition o Claims that she is an IC of Casimiro Mendoza (petitioner who was later replace by his illegitimate son, Vicente Toring, after his death) o That she was born on August 20, 1930 to Brigida Toring and Casimiro Mendoza who was married that time to a certain Emiliana Barrientos o That Mendoza recognized her as an IC by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized IC o That it was her mother who told her that her father is Casimiro o That she calls him Papa Miroy o That she lived w/ her mother bec Casimiro was married but she used to visit him in his house 551
o o o
o That when she got married to Valentin, Casimiro bought a passenger truck w/c he let Valentin drive so they could have a livelihood o That when Casimiro sold the truck, he gave to proceeds to her and her husband o That Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito, to build a house on his lot o That Casimiro gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother Vicente Toring o That Casimiro opened a joint savings account w/ her as co-depositor o She presented witnesses: Her son, Lolito, who said he considered Casimiro his grandpa bec Teopista said so That Casimiro allowed him to build a house on his land after learning that he was only renting a house Gaudencio Mendoza, cousin of Casimiro That he was the one who acted as a gobetween of Brigida and Casimiro That Brigida became pregnant w/ Teopista That Casimiro gave him money to give to Brigida for Teopistas baptismal That every so often, Casimiro would give him money to deliver to Brigida Isaac Mendoza, nephew of Casimiro That he knew Teopista to be Casimiros daughter based on his father, Hipolito, Casimiros brother, statement That his grandma, Casimiros mother, Brigida Mendoza, also said the same That he worked for Casimiro and whenever he receives his salary, Casimiro would give him some amount to be delivered to Teopista That Casimiro intended to leave certain properties to Teopista Before he died, Casimiro denied Teopistas claims When he died, Vicente, in his stead, claimed as the only IC o That Teopistas father is another man, Ondoy who later abandoned her o That it was he who sold the lot to Teopista and for a low price bec she was his half-sister o He was also the one who allowed Lolito to build his house on Casimiros lot o That when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never visited him o Presented Julieta Ouano, Casimiros niece, as witness who said she never met Teopista and that it was only Vincente whom she knew as the IC RTC ruled for petitioner: o Teopista never lived w/ her alleged father o Casimiro never spent for her support and education o She was not allowed to carry his surname o The instances when she was given money by Casimiro were off and on or isolatedly periodic o That Teopistas claims are not enough to prove that she had possessed continuously the status of a recognized IC CA reversed on the grounds of the credibility of the witnesses presented by Teopista who they found to be credible and unbiased while Vicente was an interested party since he stood to lose much of his inheritance if Teopista were recognized 552
o That Julietas claim that she doesnt know Teopista is unbelievable considering that they lived in the same barangay since birth Issue: WON Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an IC of Casimiro Held: YES Clarification of terms: o Continuous does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues o Means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and w/o concealment though w/o publicity o There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of parental affection and care SC: o Concurs w/ the RTC that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized IC under both Art 283 of CC and Art 172 of FC o However, she was able to establish her filiation through another method Rule 130 of ROC: Sec. 39.Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. (33a) Isaac Mendoza testified on this question of pedigree by saying that both his father and his grandmother informed him that Teopista was Casimiros IC Requisites that must be complied w/ before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: The declarant is dead or unable to testify The pedigree must be in issue The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue The declaration must be made before the controversy arose The relationship bet the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration All the above requirements are present in this case Both Hipolito and Brigida were dead at the time of Isaacs testimony
553
The declarations were about the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro w/c is the very issue here The declarations were made before Teopistas filing of complaint The relationship bet the declarants and Casimiro was established in the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza wherein Casimiro was named as one of his heirs o These declarations have not been refuted o Teopista has proved that she is an IC and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the CC and the FC to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of the IC, w/o prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status w/ his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology Lim vs. CA Facts: 1978 - Maribel Cruz was 16 and a part-time student o Also worked as a receptionist at Tonights Club and Resthouse where she met Raymond Pe Lim (petitioner) during her 1st night on the job o They fell in love and soon lived together w/ Raymond paying for the rentals of the apartments they lived in o July 1981 Maribel left for Japan already pregnant and returned in October 1981 o The two never married bec Raymond claimed he was not financially stable o January 17, 1982 Maribel gave birth to Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim w/c hospital bills were paid for by Raymond o Raymond was the one who registered the name Joanna on her birth certificate o 1983 Raymond started becoming cold and finally abandoned Maribel and Joanna o Maribel tried to support herself and her child but it was never enough o She asked for support from Raymond but he never gave any o Maribel filed a complaint for support Raymonds version of the story is that he and Maribel were just friends o There never was intimacy between them o That she went to Japan and returned home pregnant o That he helped her pay the hospital bills and the rental of an apartment bec they were friends and Maribel was supposed to pay him back o That he stopped seeing her when she failed to pay o That she is not the father of the child RTC ruled in favor of Maribel CA affirmed Issue: WON Maribel has sufficiently established Joannas filiation Held: YES Based on the handwritten letters Raymond wrote to Joanna, he admits being the father of Joanna and he vowed to be a good father o One of his letters also admits of his knowledge of her pregnancy while she was in Japan It was only after Raymond separated from Maribel that he denied the paternity of Joanna 554
He did not object to being identified as Joannas father until he married another woman based on Joannas Cert of Live Birth He even got a copy of this cert when Joanna started schooling as shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office His love letters to Maribel, pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling Joanna and the Certificate of Live Birth are enough proof of his paternity and Joannas filiation under Art 175 and Art 172 of FC Tijing vs. CA(ok ang kasong to. Madrama)(2001) Facts: Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are spouses and have 6 children, the youngest being Edgardo Tijing, Jr who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez Bienvenida was the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante (respondent), then a resident of Tondo August 1989 Angelita went to Bienvenidas house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job o Bienvenida had to go to the market first and left her 4month old son w/ Angelita like she always does whenever shes in the latters house and doing the laundry o When she returned home, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr were no longer there o She went to Angelitas house in Tondo but her maid told her that Angelita only went out for a stroll o She came back after 3 days and discovered that Angelita had moved to another place o She complained to her barangay chairman and to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance October 1993 Bienvenida read in a tabloid the death of Tomas Lopez, Angelitas common-law husband and that his remains were in Bulacan o She went to Bulacan where she saw Edgardo, Jr. for the 1st time after 4 years o Benjamin Lopez, Tomas brother, pointed out the boy to her and told her that he was already named John Thomas Lopez o Angelita refused to give the boy back to her Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus to recover their son o Presented 2 witnesses: o Lourdes Vasquez the midwife who testified that she assisted in the birth of Edgardo, Jr. and supported her testimony w/ clinical records o Benjamin Lopez claimed that his deceased brother was sterile which was caused when he bumped his private part against the edge of a banca w/c caused him pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas is an adopted son and that he and Angelita dont have children of their own Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother o That she gave birth to John at the age of 42 on April 27, 1989 in the clinic of the midwife Zosima Panganiban o She has 2 children w/ her real husband, Angel Sanchez (puro sila angel) o Tomas registered the birth of their son w/ the local civil registrar on Aug 4, 1989 RTC ruled in favor of Bienvenida on the grounds that it was impossible for Tomas to have children since he was sterile o That the child and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity 555
Angelita peacefully surrendered the child to the sheriff who, in turn, gave the child to the Tijings CA reversed the decision on the grounds that the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that Bienvenida was the mother of the child o Expressed doubts as to the propriety of habeas corpus as a remedy Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy WON Edgardo, Jr. and John Thomas are one and the same and the son of the Tijings Held: YES Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by w/c any person is deprived of liberty or by w/c the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto It is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a 3rd person of his own free will But the question of identity is relevant to know the proper person who has custody over the child YES Angelita herself testified that, after her 2nd child, she underwent ligation in 1970, before she lived w/ Tomas Lopez o If she had that ligation removed in 1978 as she claimed, she did not present evidence that she gave birth o She did not present the midwife as witness o She did not present clinical records, log book, or discharge order from the clinic Tomas was sterile as declared by his brother and as evidenced by the fact that he and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, never had children in their 15 years together It is unusual that John Thomas birth cert was filed by Tomas instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, 4 months after the birth o Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the reg of such birth; only in default of either of the two can the parent reg the birth of his child o Cert must be filed w/ the local civil reg w/in 30 days after the birth o Also, the birth cert of the child states that Tomas and Angelita were married when in fact they were not Trial court observed the similarities in the faces, eyes, eyebrows, and head shapes of Bienvenida and the child and this observation should be given high respect Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in the birth of the child and even presented clinical records as proof Obiter: DNA results can now be admitted as evidence
Eceta vs. Eceta (2004) Facts: 1926 - Rosalina Eceta (petitioner), was married to Isaac Eceta and begot a son, Vicente o The couple acquired several properties including the property in question 1967 Isaac died leaving behind Rosalinda and Vicente as his compulsory heirs 1977 Vicente died leaving an IC, Maria Theresa (respondent) and his mother as his compulsory heirs 1991 Maria Theresa filed for Partition and Accounting w/ Damages alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she 556
became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the property in question (Cubao property) Rosalina alleged that the property is her paraphernal property RTC ruled in favor of Maria Theresa CA affirmed Issue: WON the certified Xerox copy of the cert of live birth is competent evidence to prove Maria Theresas filiation as an IC of Vicente WON the admission made by Rosalina that Maria Theresa is her granddaughter enough to prove the latters filiation w/ Vicente WON the action for recognition has already prescribed Held: YES to all Rosalina is attempting to represent that this case is for compulsory recognition when in fact it is for partition and accounting w/ damages and the filiation or compulsory recognition by Vincente of Maria Theresa was never put in issue since both parties have already agreed and admitted that Maria Theresa is Rosalinas granddaughter Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa has successfully established her filiation w/ Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth cert w/c Vicente himself signed thereby acknowledging her as his daughter Look at Art 172 of FC RTC is affirmed, Maria Theresa has share in the property in question BRIONES V MIGUEL FACTS: Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Miguel and Francisca Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. He later filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. CA issued the writ and ordered the respondents to present the child. Briones alleged that the child was his illegitimate son and. The childs mother-respondent Loreta gave birth to him in Japan and is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Briones caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the Briones enrolled him at the nursery school, where he finished the nursery course. His parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child. The respondents Maricel and Francisca came to Joeys house of in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back. Briones went several times to respondent Maricel but was informed that the child is with Francisca (her mother) who resides at another place. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City. He sought assistance the police and DSWD but all his efforts were futile. Thus, he filed the writ of habeas corpus. Loreta denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement. She likewise denies petitioners allegation that respondents Maricel and Francisca were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latters parents because she was the one who took Michael from Joey when she returned to the Philippines and that Joey readily agreed and consented. She stated prior to the incident, Joey was deported from Japan because of a violation of law and was not ever gainfully employed in the Philippines since. According to her Michaels custody was entrusted to Joeys parents while they were both working in Japan; and that even before this, she has already been living separately from Joey in Japan because he has another woman. She also stated that he 557
married a Japanese in order for her to stay at Japan longer to be able to provide for her son and that she returns to the Philippines every 6 months. CA gave Michael to Loreta finding no compelling reason to separate her from her child. The case was thus dismissed. CA also stated in its decision that once the said child is beyond 10 y.o., the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Joey contends that he should have custody whenever Loreta is not in the country instead of giving the child to Loretas sister (thru Loretas SPA). ISSUE: WON natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away. The child now resides in Japan which renders Joeys argument moot. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Art 176 FC explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. In NCC, illegitimate children were generally classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit. Now, FC only have two types of children: legitimate and illegitimate. Though Joey recognizes Michael as his son, David v. CA held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law gives the rights and priority of custody to the mother. She may not be deprived of this right nor renounce and transfer it except in cases allowed by the court. Only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Here, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent. Art. 213 states that a child under 7 y.o. cannot be separated from the mother except for compelling reasons that can show a mothers utmost unfitness to take care of the child. SC affirmed the visitorial right granted by the CA to petitioner as previously held in Silva v. CA in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. SC however reversed the decision of CA to allow Michael to choose which parent he wants to live with upon reaching 10 y.o. pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. According to SC this is for a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. This mother and father in this case were never married to each other. CABATANIA V CA FACTS: Florencia Regodos is the mother of Camelo Regodos (Son Camelo) who was born on Sept 9, 1982. Florencia testified that she was the one supporting her child. Forencia stated that her husband used to work for Camelo (Mr. Camelo) as a household help. While also working there as a maid, she claims that on January 2, 1982, Mr. Camelo brought her on time they checked in at the Visayan Motel, Bacolod City, had intercourse and after which Mr. Camelo promised to support her in case she got pregnant. 27 days after their sexual encounter, Florencia discovered that she was pregnant. Intercourse between the two was committed again in San Carlos City. Later, Mr. Camelos wife sent her away because she suspects that Florencio is pregnant. She later was readmitted by the wife as a house maid but was sent away again when she confirmed that she was pregnant because of her delicate condition. However, according to Florencia, Mr. Camelo brought her instead to Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. In her aunt, she gave birth to a son, with the assistance of a hilot. 558
Mr. Camelo refused support and denied the alleged paternity. He admitted that they did have sex but she was already pregnant at that time. He denied however the Visayan Motel intercourse (January 2, 1982) which earlier than the intercourse he admitted. He also denied renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod. RTC and CA resolved the paternal relationship between Mr. Camelo and son Camelo based on the testimony of the childs mother and the personal appearance of the child (mix of Mr. Camelo and Florencia). ISSUE: WON RTC and CA erred in resolving the case based on personal appearance. HELD: OFCOURSE RATIO: It is a general rule that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. SC finds that this case in an exception because RTC and CAs findings was merely based on the personal appearance of the child. Art 172 states that filiation of a legitimate child may be proven by 1. record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment 2. admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; in the absence of which it may also be proven by 1. the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child 2. any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175 states an illegitimate child may also establish his illegitimate filiation in the same way. The copy of son Camelos birth and baptismal certificates that was presented by Florencia was prepared without Mr. Camelos consent. When there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of this documents, they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence. RTC and CA also erred in not giving weight to the fraudulent declaration of Florencia that she is already a widow when in fact her husband is still alive and their marriage is still subsisting. SC gave more importance to the presumption of legitimacy even though Florencia declared against son Camelos legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring rights from the revulsion against illegitimacy. SC also mentioned that in this age of DNA analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law. AGUSTIN V COURT OF APPEALS (the first case where DNA testing was the primary issue) FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante alleged that petitioner Arnel L. Agustin is Martins biological father. When Fe was diagnosed with leukemia, are claiming for support and support pendente lite. Fe claims that they had sexual intercourse on her 34th birthday on Nov 10, 1999 which resulted to the conception of Martin. The respondents presented Martins birth certificate which was allegedly signed by Arnel as the father and a tax certificate which purported his acknowledgement of the child. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses. Later however, he refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite being financially capable and even suggested to have Martin adopted. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On the other hand, Arnel admitted that he already has a legitimate family when his sexual relationships with Fe began. He contends however that they already broke up with her a year before the alleged sexual intercourse that led to the conception of Martin because he wants to preserve his legitimate family. He also said that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover and was a manipulative, possessive and demanding woman. He also contends that private respondents documentary evidence (birth and tax certificate) and his signatures in it are falsified. He also pointed out that the tax certificate erroneously 559
reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. Fe and Martin then moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing as provided by Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel of course opposed invoking his right of self-incrimination. RTC held in favor of Fe and Martin and ordered them to submit themselves for DNA testing. CA affirmed. ISSUES: 1. WON a claim for support can convert into a petition for recognition 2. WON DNA testing ordered in a court proceeding for support violates the fathers constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. HELD: 1. NO, but still valid even if yes 2. NO 1. SC held that the order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. Claim for support is based on a proven filiation and a separate action for the two will only result in a multiplicity of suit. 2. Because the sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe was not denied by both parties, the only factual question is WON it produced Martin. For this issue the court cited criminal cases where the admission of DNA was an issue. Most of this cases were of course allegations of rape. SC admitted that in the earlier cases, they were quite hesitant in the admittance of DNA as evidence. They however changed this opinion alongside the advancement of technology. The later rape cases admitted DNA evidence. The court warned however that trial courts should still be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. There is no violation of the right of self incrimination in DNA testing. Right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither. His argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. Right against self-incrimination is only for testimonial evidence and not for objective evidence such as DNA. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy for the SC for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. SC also stated in its epilogue that the former judicial way produces a situation where a child is refuted by a man to be his and gets away with it simply by refuting it. For SC, DNA testing is the solution to guarantee the rights of the child. ALBA V HERRERA (NOTE: NOT INFRA FOR HERRERA V ALBA but connected) Rosendo Herrera wanted to delete the following entries in Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.s birth certificate: 1. the surname Herrera as appended to the name of the child 2. the reference to him as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. 3. the alleged marriage to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He alleged that he is already married to Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered the child. He presented presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office, both stating that they have no record of marriage between Rosendo and Armi. 560
Trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate which is #41 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila. RTC issued an Amended Order that reschedules the day of trial. A copy of which was published in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in Manila. Armi failed to appear in the trial. Return of the notice stated that it tried to serve notice to Armi but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent is no longer residing at said given address. The court then proceeded trial with only Mr. Herreras side presented. RTC then granted the requested deletion. Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because it was their residence when they cohabited as husband and wife. he stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition. ISSUES: 1. WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction. 2. WON the court erred in ordering the child to use his mothers surname. HELD: 1. YES 2. NO 1. An action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. Hence, petitions directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, as in this case, are actions in rem. The filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the court jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. For cases in rem, the service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Also, since the order was published in Today, the absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication. 2. Art 176 FC as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, states that an illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child. It is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child. Because the father strongly asserts that he is not the father of the child, the child is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother. ANGELES V MAGLAYA (SUPRA) FACTS: Aleli Corazon Maglaya letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. She claims that Francisco died intestate on January 21, 1998 and there is a need to appoint an administrator of Franciscos estate. She also claims that she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and 561
Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, Franciscos second wife, are the surviving heirs of the Francisco. Belen Angeles, on the other hand, contested the petition and wants to be the administratrix. Angeles averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Also Angeles claims despite Alelis claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, Aleli has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove it. Also to the disprove her claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Aleli claims that the records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. Aleli also dismissed the claims regarding the adoption because she introduced with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Upon trial, Aleli testified that Francisco and Genoveva were indeed legally married and that she have been in an open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses testified on her behalf. She also offered in evidence: 1. her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); 2. Pictures taken during her wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. 3. Others evidences like her scholastic and government service records. RTC dismissed Alelis petition for failure to state or prove a cause of action in view of her failure to prove filiation. Court of Appeals held otherwise. ISSUE: WON Aleli is the legitimate child of Francisco-Genoveva AND should be appointed as administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate. HELD: NO, insufficient evidence. AND No, preference on surviving spouse. RATIO: A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Failure to prove lawful marriage equals no presumption of legitimacy. For SC, Aleli failed to prove such. Save for respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. She did not present a marriage certificate or marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; solemnizing authority; the persons present, none of the 4 witnesses she presented is a solemnizing authority and failed to prove anything about the celebration of the marriage for they only proved that she was Franciscos daughter; and like significant details. Aleli even failed to allege that the Francisco-Belen marriage is void bigamous. If it is true that the Francisco-Genoveva is a legal marriage, the Francisco-Belen marriage took place during its subsistence and thus should have been contested long ago by Aleli as void bigamous. Aleli on the contrary, in her petition to be appointed as administratrix, alleged that Belen is the second wife. SC also said that the Birth Certificate failed to prove legal filiation because it was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. It was signed by the attending physician 562
only. Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. All the evidences presented could only declare her as a natural child and not a legitimate child. On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased. SC thus held that the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. Guy vs. CA Facts: minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died on 1992 (His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and 5 children) prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Counsel signed their Certification Against Forum Shopping Michael Guy prayed for the dismissal of the petition. (argued that they should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.) He and his co-heirs alleged that the sisters claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason of Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from Michael, they discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. RTC: denied Motion to Dismiss while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. CA: affirmed DIRECTED RTC to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of theminors Issue: 1) whether the minors petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes them from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation. Held: No. So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules. No. Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar the 2 from claiming successional rights. (no waiver of hereditary rights; does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution; merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim.) even assuming that Remedios truly waived the rights of the 2, such waiver will not bar the latters claim. (NCC Art. 1044) Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because 563
repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim is void and will not bar the 2 from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. They could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights that allegedly they do not have. Remand to RTC to answer 3rd issue illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced in proving their filiation. (Under FC, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.) impossible to determine the as there has been no reception of evidence yet. Ratio: Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. NCC ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. NCC ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; 564
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis supplied) ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Verceles v. Posada Facts: 1986 - Maria Clarissa Posada met a close family friend, Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa accepted his offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office starting on 1986. For 5 days, with 3 companions, she accompanied him to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. On the 2nd day of the seminar, he fetched Clarissa from where the seminar was being held. They had lunch together and, he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. A month later, on his orders, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. Something happened between them. But again she kept the incident to herself. A month later, she wrote him that she feared she was pregnant. In another letter the next month, she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter, he replied saying that he did not regret anything blah blah. (He uses an alias Ninoy and addressed her as Chris, probably because of their 25-year age gap. She identified his penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.) After a month, he, aware of her pregnancy, allegedly handed her a letter and pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. 3 months later, he went to see her in Manila and gave her money for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. Sept 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. 565
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. People vs. Umanito (mahaba yung bout sa rape, di ko na sinama) Facts: Rodolfo Umanito was charged and convicted with the crime of rape (a girl 12 18y/o) but was only arrested 5 yrs later. AAA bore a child as a result of the purported rape. (he did not sire the child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis.) Issue: WON he is the father of the child Held: directing appellant, AAA and AAAs child to submit themselves to DNA testing 566
RTC: granted CA: affirmed Issue: (1) WON paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite; (2) WON the filiation of Verna Aiza as the illegitimate child of Teofisto was proven; and (3) WON Posadas are entitled to damages. Held: Yes. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. Yes. His letters are declarations that he sired Verna Aiza. He admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy. No, affirm the grant of attorneys fees (NCC Art 2208 (2) and (11)) NCC Art 2219 states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner. Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Ratio: FC Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar, it shall order the testing. It is also the RTC which shall determine the institution to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice of DNA testing center. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules, to wit: Montefalcon vs. Vasquez (di ko na sinama yung bout sa summons) Facts: 1999, Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against Ronnie S. Vasquez (her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, he signed the birth certificate, he only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993, he also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands, they are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.) RTC: granted CA: reversed Issue: whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. Held: (about the summons) the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the sheriff stands. (Main issue) Yes Laurence is legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial court is neither excessive nor unreasonable. Ratio: FC Art 175 mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Heirs of Maramag vs. De Guzman (sponsored) This is a case of a legitimate family (legitimate heirs, petitioner, and wife Vicenta and their children) contending for the insurance policy claims of the deceased Loreto Maramag (insured womanizer) allegedly awarded by the insurance companies Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular) and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) to the illegitimate family (insurance beneficiary, defendant, and concubine Eva and their children). PETITIONER AVERS: I. Eva is concubine and a suspect for the killing of Loreto; and thus, she is disqualified to receive any insurance proceeds; II. Eva and Loretos children (Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie ) are illegitimate an thus, entitled only to of the legitimate childrens claim. Thus, Proceeds that were released for Odessa and to be released for Karl and Trisha are inofficious and should be reduced. III. Petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, or forced share, which should be satisfied first. 567
In short, the legitimate family wants a share of the insurance claims. The problem is they were not the named beneficiaries INSULAR AVERS: Loreto misrepresented the illegitimate family as a legitimate family. Insular when they ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife, they disqualified her as a beneficiary. They however released Odessas share because she was of age, but withheld the release not because of their illegitimacy but instead because of the shares of minors Karl and Trisha pending submission of letters of guardianship. Furthermore, the company claims that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action: FOR I: Loreto already revoked her designation as such and it disqualified her FOR II: No settlement of Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined. FOR III: Insulars priority is to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries. GREPALIFE AVERS: FOR I: Eva was not designated as an insurance policy beneficiary; FOR II: Claims were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation of his age in his application FOR III: The law on succession, including legitimes, does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear. Eva and their children never filed an answer and thus defaulted. RTC first partly dismissed the case against the children for lack of cause of action against them. It however continued the case for the defendants Eva, Insular and Grepalife. Later however, it also dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action against the remaining defendants considering the fact that the companies already disqualified Eva as a beneficiary. CA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUES: PROCEDURAL: WON RTC erred when it dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action. SUBSTANTIVE: WON Evas share, being disqualified as a beneficiary, should not be distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured deceased. HELD: BOTH NO RATIO: FOR THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE: The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition failed to state a cause of action. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. Absence of the 3 elements makes a petition vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, The ruling should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. According to the SC what was clear in this case is the fact that the legitimate family is of course the legitimate heirs but were not the named benificiaries. Thus, the petition does not have a cause of action to stand on or failed to state a legitimate cause of action. FOR SUBSTANTIVE: Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. 568
SC held that the trial court is correct in awarding the illegitimate heirs the portion of Eva. There are no legal proscribing the naming of illegitimate children of an insured in an insurance. The shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the remaining named/designated beneficiaries i.e. the illegitimate children. SC does not agree to the claim of the petitioners that Evas share should redound to the estate of Loreto. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured. Go vs Ramos Facts Luis T. Ramos filed a complaint before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien o He presented as evidence the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese" o He argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten o Furthermore, he also said that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through fraud managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs Jimmy contends that the complaint for deportation was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings o He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 Such was evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 Having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950 Oath and affidavit were registered on September 11, 1956 He had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog o With regards to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars o Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation on the ground that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine 569
Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well. Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof Board of Commissioners ordered the apprehension of Jimmy Go and that he be then deported to China TC at first enjoined the board of the execution but later on dissolved such its decision CA held that the board has exclusive authority and jurisdiction in hearing such cases Filipino citizen or there were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it would have denied his application. No, Carlos clearly is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his deportation. The court finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts. o One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. The court agrees to such. It has abandoned the principle of jus soli and since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. o Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. o Only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, the court have also ruled that an 570
Issue whether the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed whether the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage Held and Ratio No, because Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. And that The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at such time that he was not a
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him. (eto lang talaga yung tungkol sa illegitimate children) o As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, the Court has no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that the court is ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what the courtis called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And the court is of the opinion that herein petition should be denied. D. Action to impugn legitimacy 1. Grounds. FC 166 Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a) a. Physical impossibility of access Andal and Duenas v Macaraig 89 PHIL 165 Date: May 30, 1951 Ponente: Bautista Angelo, J. Facts: Mariano Andal, represented by his mother, Maria Duenas, claims to be the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal; hence, the owner of the parcel of land left by Emiliano when the latter died. CFI declared him to be the legitimate son and owner. However, Eduvigis Macaraig (Emilianos mother) claims that the land is hers since she donated it to her son. She is the next of kin when Emiliano died because Mariano is not legitimate. She says that Maria eloped with Felix (Emilianos brother) and had sexual intercourse with him.
Issue/s: WON Mariano is the legitimate child 571
Held: Yes Ratio: Art 108, CC: children born after 180 days following celebration of marriage or within 300 days following dissolution/separation presumed legitimate; presumption may be rebutted by proof of impossibility of access during first 120 days of the 300 before birth of child Emiliano died on January 1, 1943 Maria gave birth on June 17, 1943 -> within 300 days, presumed to be legitimate -no evidence presented that Emiliano was absent during the initial period of conception (even if he has tuberculosis, experience shows that this oes not prevent carnal intercourse) -no evidence showing that Emiliano was suffering from impotency Judgment: decision is affirmed Mariano is legitimate Macadangdang vs. Ca SUPRA Ong vs. CA Facts: Teodora Ong conducted her own logging business, and in maintenance of said business she secured from Boix a loan in the amount of 2827.893. However, she defaulted in paying for her obligation and Boix filed for a collection of the sum of the payments due. Teodora and her husband Ramon were declared in default. A writ of execution was issued, and the Sherriff levied and auctioned a parcel of land which according to the tax declaration belongs to Teodora. A writ of possession was issued to place Boix in possession of the property levied upon and sold on execution. Ramon filed a motion asking to quash the writ of possession which the lower court and the Court of Appeals subsequently denied, the CA having found that the land is paraphernal property in view of the fact that in the tax declaration, the land is in the name of Teodora Ong only. Ramon argues before the Supreme Court that subject property is really conjugal in which case could not be used to pay for the debts contracted by his wife alone. Ramon contends that since in the tax declaration, Teodora used Ong which is his surname, the subject property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore jointly owned. Issue: WON the land in question is part of Teodora and Ramons conjugal property Held: No Ratio: The Court ruled that the mere use of a surname is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during marriage therefore making it conjugal. The house erected in the land may be under the name of both spouses, but the land itself is declared solely in Teodoras name. Furthermore, even if it is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of Teodora. Ramon impliedly consented to Teodoras engagement in such business. Also, whatever profits made by her business went to the conjugal partnership anyway. Note: Boix died in the process. Civil cases are dragging. Concepcion vs. CA G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005 Law: Paternity and Filiation; Action to Impugn Legitimacy; Grounds; Physical Impossibility of Access Ponente: Corona, J. Overview: Jose Gerardo is the son of a woman who married twice. He was born during the second (bigamous so void) marriage. Gerardo filed for an annulment of their marriage since void bigamous. Since 2nd 572
marriage was void, Jose Gerardos mom wanted to change his surname to her surname saying that JG is an illegit child of 2 nd marriage. The question of the childs status (legit of 1st marriage or illegit of 2nd (bigamous void) marriage is being settled. Basically since Jose Gerardo was born during a valid and subsisting first marriage and it was not shown that his mom and 1st husband could not have had sex when he was conceived, Jose Gerardo is the legit child of 1st marriage. Presumed legit. Facts: Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and Respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989. They lived with Ma. Theresas parents. Ma. Theresa had a child named Jose Gerardo on December 8, 1990. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have their marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. Nine years ago, Ma. Theresa had married Mario Gopiao and had not annulled that marriage. Mario was not dead. Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario but says that the marriage was a sham and she did not live with Mario anyway. TC ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting therefore her marriage to Gerardo was bigamous. TC annulled their marriage and declared Gerardo to be an illegitimate child. Custody was given to mom and dad had visitation rights. Mom argued that visitation rights should not be given to the putative father of an illegitimate child. She also wants to change the surname of Jose Gerardo Concepcion to Almonte since illegitimate children shall use mothers maiden name. Of course, dad opposed this. TC said that in the best interest of the child, moms motion must be denied. TC thinks that the parties are using the child to hurt one another and that the child needs a father. CA denied moms appeal and affirmed the TCs decision. CA says that if child wants change of name, he should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. After motion for reconsideration, CA reversed its ruling saying that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa with Gerardo, but with Mario during her first marriage since Ma. Theresa was legitimately married to Mario at the time Jose Gerardo was born. Since this is so, he cannot be an illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between mom and Gerardo. (FC Art. 146). Neither custody nor visitorial rights should be given to Gerardo and child cannot carry Gerardos surname since such would prevent the parties of the first marriage to make up. Based on Article 167, the appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married. The law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration but was denied. So, he appealed to SC. Issue: WON the child is the illegitimate child of Gerardos (WON the child is Marios legitimate child); WON Gerardo had legal standing to question filiation of Jose Gerardo Held: Marios legitimate child; No, he did not have legal standing. Rationale: 1) The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is 573
legitimate. Article 167 of the Family Code provides that the child shell be legit even if mom is an adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The presumption may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only four kilometers apart. No evidence was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act. Though Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer to the petition for annulment of marriage that she never lived with Mario, it cannot be relied on since Art. 167 does not allow a mothers assertion to prevail when the child is conceived of born within a legitimate marriage. For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity and the legitimacy of children. 2) Impugning the legitimacy is a personal right which only the husband and heirs can do. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. (Birth certificate is not proof in this case since it was not presented as evidence. Besides, the status of the child is determined at birth so proof of filiation is only needed when the legitimacy of the child is questioned.) Judgement: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed. Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo. b. Biological or other scientific grounds Jao vs CA Facts Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, filed a case for support against Perico Jao The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was conducted by NBI The result indicated that Janice could not have been the offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado Trial court initially found the result of the tests conclusive but upon motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits and ultimately declared Janice as the child of Jao CA reversed the Trial Courts decision on the ground of the result of the blood grouping test Undisputed facts o April 1968 Jao accompanied Arlene to the hospital for check-up and confinement o August 16, 1968 Arlene gave birth to Janice after the formers completion of 36 weeks of pregnancy o December 1967 Arlene must have conceived Janice Arlene contends 574
o She first met Jao in the 3rd or 4th week of November 1967 o November 30, 1967 After several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him o December 16, 1967 she started to live with him at her dwelling Jao contends o December 14, 1967 she met Arlene o January 1968 he dated Arlene 4 times o January 18, 1968 he had carnal knowledge with her o May 1968 he started living with her two which in this case is impossible for Arlene herself said that they started to cohabit after Dec. 1967 Arlene, as claimed by JAo, at the critical time of conception, had carnal knowledge with two other men No, it is inconclusive as to paternity, but it is conclusive of non-paternity o The fact that the blood type of the child is possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born of that parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father People v Tumimpad (G.R. No. 109144) Date: August 19, 1994 Ponente: Kapunan Overview: Sandra Salcedo, a 15-year old mongoloid (weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal consent), complained of constipation so she was brought to the doctor. Her condition did not improve and she even became irritable and moody. On another check-up, it was revealed in her urinalysis test that she was pregnant. Since her mom could not believe such, she was brought to an OB-GYNE. In an ultra-sound examination, the results yielded positive and revealed that fetus gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. Later, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy named Jacob. Her mom, then, filed a complaint. During investigation, Sandra was asked to point her assailants through pictures and police line-up. Therein, Sandra singled 575
Issues WON Janice is the child of Perico Jao WON the blood grouping test is conclusive of paternity Held and Ratio No o Supreme court had given weight to the findings of NBI in its blood grouping test o And it has considered other facts as found by the CA When Janice was born, Jao did not recognize her as his own Before, Jao even fled a petition that his name as Janices father be deleted from the certificate of live birth The attention given by Jao to Arlene during pregnancy ad the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test No recognition will lie for to satisfy paragraph 3 of Art. 283 of the NCC (when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the father), Janice must have been conceived during the cohabitation of the
out security men (assigned to her dad) Tumimpad and Prieto. During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test be conducted on the Sandra, child Jacob and the two accused. Tumimpad was convicted but Prieto was acquitted since the latter has a different type of blood with Jacob. Tumimpad appealed on the grounds of (1) impossibility of convicting the offense charged; and (2) that he was convicted based on major blood grouping test and not a paternal test. Facts: * Sandra Salcedo 15-year old mongoloid; had mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up; her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by emotions; weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal consent; Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accusedappellant Moreno Tumimpad. The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and his wife, and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial HQ, in Oroquieta City. o Upper Storey: Col. Salcedo, Pastora, Sandra o Lower Storey (2 rooms): (1) 4 security men, (2) Alexander and his wife August 7, 1989 Sandra complained of constipation. She was brought to the doctor and was given medication. Her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy. August 8, 1989 Sandra saw Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother, Mama, patayin mo yan, bastos. Pastora worried about her daughters condition and brought to the hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit. Sandras second check-up: The examining physician ordered a urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. Since she could not believe the result, Pastora brought her daughter to an OB-GYNE. She was subjected to a pelvic ultrasound examination and the results were positive. o Fetus gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. January 11, 1990 Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, this complaint by the mother. During the investigation, Sandra was asked to point her assailants. o Pictures of assailants: Moreno Tumimpad, Ruel Prieto o Police Line-up: Moreno Tumimpad, Ruel Prieto Pastora requested her daughters-in-law to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her. In Joys testimony: Sandra, revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her; and, even demonstrated how it was done. Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her. During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test (Major Blood Grouping Test, Pheno Bloody Typing) be conducted on Sandra, child Jacob and the two accused. o Jacob Type O o Sandra Type B o Ruel Prieto Type A o Tumimpad Type O * Convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto since the latter has a different type of blood with Jacob. Tumimpad assigns the following errors: 576
o Impossibility of committing the offense charged without detection Victim was always in the company of mother Tumimpad was always with Prieto Should have shouted out of pain (cause she was a virgin) Sandras drug-user brother could have raped her o That he was convicted based on major blood grouping test and not a paternal test Issue: WON Tumimpad is guilty of the crime of rape? Held: Yes. Ratio: (1) It was possible to commit the crime of rape without detection. o There were times when Sandra was left alone in the house with the accused. During the investigation, Sandra singled Tumimpad and Prieto among the 30 different persons shown to her; and, pinpointed them at the police line-up conducted. In open court, Sandra without hesitation pointed to accusedappellant as the perpatrator of the crime. (2) Tumimpads culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type. Janica Marie Jao v CA o Paternity - Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child. People vs. Quitoriano Facts: December 24, 1992 - Edna Pergis (private complainant) was in the kitchen located at the back of their house and about 3 arms length away from the main house 9:00 PM, Edgardo Quitoriano (accused-appellant) entered the kitchen, poked a knife on her neck, and dragged her to the bamboo bed where he successfully raped her Edgardo warned her not to tell anybody about the incident or else he will kill her June 1993 Edna learned that she was pregnant and had no choice but to relate the rape to her aunt and her parents August 2, 1993 a complaint for rape was filed October 31, 1993 Edna gave birth Eduardos defense is alibi o That he was in a friends house from 7-10pm having drinking sessions 577
o At 10pm, they went to another friends house to attend a party RTC found Edgardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt Issue: WON the trial court erred in convicting Edgardo of rape beyond reasonable doubt Held: NO Edna was able to positively identify Edgardo as the rapist because she was able to see his face during the rape Edgardo failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene on that day especially since the house he stayed in was in the same barangay as that of Ednas and it was a mere 200m away w/c Edgardo said he could finish walking in five minutes; thus, it was possible for him slip from his friends house to do the evil deed He was not able to prove that Edna had motive to indict him of rape The delay in reporting the sexual assault is understandable since Edna was threatened to be killed if she tells anybody about it The fact that Edna gave birth more than 10 months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony o Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy o It was Ednas first pregnancy; thus, it was possible that the child was conceived on December 1992 Tijing Facts: 578 Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are spouses and have 6 children, the youngest being Edgardo Tijing, Jr who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez Bienvenida was the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante (respondent), then a resident of Tondo August 1989 Angelita went to Bienvenidas house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job o Bienvenida had to go to the market first and left her 4month old son w/ Angelita like she always does whenever shes in the latters house and doing the laundry o When she returned home, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr were no longer there o She went to Angelitas house in Tondo but her maid told her that Angelita only went out for a stroll o She came back after 3 days and discovered that Angelita had moved to another place o She complained to her barangay chairman and to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance October 1993 Bienvenida read in a tabloid the death of Tomas Lopez, Angelitas common-law husband and that his remains were in Bulacan o She went to Bulacan where she saw Edgardo, Jr. for the 1st time after 4 years o Benjamin Lopez, Tomas brother, pointed out the boy to her and told her that he was already named John Thomas Lopez o Angelita refused to give the boy back to her Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus to recover their son o Presented 2 witnesses:
o Lourdes Vasquez the midwife who testified that she assisted in the birth of Edgardo, Jr. and supported her testimony w/ clinical records o Benjamin Lopez claimed that his deceased brother was sterile which was caused when he bumped his private part against the edge of a banca w/c caused him pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas is an adopted son and that he and Angelita dont have children of their own Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother o That she gave birth to John at the age of 42 on April 27, 1989 in the clinic of the midwife Zosima Panganiban o She has 2 children w/ her real husband, Angel Sanchez (puro sila angel) o Tomas registered the birth of their son w/ the local civil registrar on Aug 4, 1989 RTC ruled in favor of Bienvenida on the grounds that it was impossible for Tomas to have children since he was sterile o That the child and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity Angelita peacefully surrendered the child to the sheriff who, in turn, gave the child to the Tijings CA reversed the decision on the grounds that the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that Bienvenida was the mother of the child o Expressed doubts as to the propriety of habeas corpus as a remedy Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by w/c any person is deprived of liberty or by w/c the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto It is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a 3 rd person of his own free will But the question of identity is relevant to know the proper person who has custody over the child YES Angelita herself testified that, after her 2nd child, she underwent ligation in 1970, before she lived w/ Tomas Lopez o If she had that ligation removed in 1978 as she claimed, she did not present evidence that she gave birth o She did not present the midwife as witness o She did not present clinical records, log book, or discharge order from the clinic Tomas was sterile as declared by his brother and as evidenced by the fact that he and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, never had children in their 15 years together It is unusual that John Thomas birth cert was filed by Tomas instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, 4 months after the birth o Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the reg of such birth; only in default of either of the two can the parent reg the birth of his child o Cert must be filed w/ the local civil reg w/in 30 days after the birth o Also, the birth cert of the child states that Tomas and Angelita were married when in fact they were not Trial court observed the similarities in the faces, eyes, eyebrows, and head shapes of Bienvenida and the child and this observation should be given high respect 579
Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy WON Edgardo, Jr. and John Thomas are one and the same and the son of the Tijings Held: YES
Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in the birth of the child and even presented clinical records as proof Obiter: DNA results can now be admitted as evidence Herrera v Alba 460 SCRA 197 Date: June 15, 2005 Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts: Rosendo Alba (child), represented by his mother, Armi Alba, filed for compulsory recognition, support and damges from Rosendo Herrera (father). Herrera denied that he is the father (See previous case: Alba v Herrera kasi walang facts sa case na to.) and filed a motion to have a DNA test. TC ordered the child and the father to undergo DNA paternity testing. Child filed an opposition saying this violates his rights to self-incrimination but CA ruled that this only applies to testimonial evidence and upheld TCs orders. Issue/s: WON DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction (as in Philippines) to determine filiation Held: Yes, but with conditions Ratio: -guys, theres a long lecture on DNA being unique and genetic pero alam niyo na yun. -DNA tests are conclusive on non-paternity (when theres no match, definitely not the father) but inconclusive on paternity (when theres a match, it can be used as corroborating evidence) -US jurisdiction: Admissibility of specific test results in some cases depends on laboratorys procedures, standards, availability, publication, potential rate of error, technique, etc. -Philippine Jurisdiction: evidence is admissible when it is relevant (i.e. when it has relation to induce belief of existence or non-existence of a fact) to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or Rules of Court :no legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence -but! courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence: complete match between the DNA profile of the child and putative father does not necessarily establish paternity :they should require at least 99.9% as minimum value for Probability of Paternity prior to paternity inclusion -policy of FC to liberalize rule on the investigation of paternity and filiation, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses Judgment: orders of TC/CA are affirmed directed to undergo paternity testing Agustin Facts: 1992 - Arnel Agustin (P) courted Fe Angela (R). After which, they entered into an intimate relationship. November 10, 1999 Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday. August 11, 2000 - Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. 580
o The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. o Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. o Arnel also denied having fathered the child. January 19, 2001 - While Fe was carrying five-month old Martin Jose Prollamante (R) at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. July 2001 - Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. March 5, 2002 - Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. In his answer, Arnel denied having fathered Arnel for the following reasons: o His affair and intimacy with Fe ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. o Fe had a secret lover a certain Jun. Also, He alleges the following: o Fe was a scheming and overly demanding and possessive (ex. resorted to devious ways and means to alienate him from his wife and family). o Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop where she worked. o Upon his and familys return (from USA) in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was sometime in 1998. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body. o Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. Marital status was single when in fact he was already married. His birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. May 17, 2002 Pre-Trial Brief: Arnel denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. July 23, 2002 - Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and by saying that DNA testing is not recognized by the Courts as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father (i.e. child must first establish his filiation in a separate suit). RTC denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the o 581
expense of the applicants. CA affirmed. Issues: WON Fe and Martin have a cause of action against Arnel? WON a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition? WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnels constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination? Held and Ratio: Yes, Fe and Martin have a cause of action against Arnel (i.e. on rights and duties). o It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. o Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. o Precedents: Tayag v CA (filiation and inheritance); Briz v Briz Yes. DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnels constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. o Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from ones mouth and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results are now similarly acceptable. o Ople v Torres: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. o Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his 582
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. o For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. o Also, there was no showing that there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. History of DNA Testing (Philippines): People v Teehankee: while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result. Lim v CA: DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father. Tijing v CA: Opens possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage People v Vallejo: DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine Jurisprudence (Rape and Murder case) People v Janson: How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts! Tecson, et. al. v COMELEC: In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing People v Yatar: DNA test results used to affirm conviction of the accused for rape with homicide. o SELF INCRIMINATION: The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Jimenez v Canizares Ople v Torres US Cases and Laws: Wilson v Lumb: DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. NY Family Court Act: No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best 583
interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. R.E. v C.E.W: used DNA testing to prove paternity Greco v Coleman: Constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary. Michigans Paternity Law: Included the use of DNA Testing Rafferty v Perkins: DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage M.A.S. v Mississippi Dept. of Human Services: It was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. Estate of Rogelio Ong vs. Minor Joanne Diaz A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong Facts: Jinky and Rogelio fell in love with each other while Jinky was already married (1993) to a Japanese, Hasegawa Katsuo. 1994 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together During that time, Joanne was conceived and was born (1998) Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home after delivery, paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of Joannes needs recognizing the child as his. After 7 months, Rogelio abandoned minor them and stopped supporting Joanne, alleging that he is not the father of the child. (and so this case was filed)
RTC: Ordered him to recognize the child and provide monthly support Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration (he was then in a dilemma on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.) Next day, he filed a motion for new trial
RTC: granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial RTC Held on the new trial: Joanne is his child and he should give support (motion for recon denied) the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (FC Art 164) and the child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (FC Art 167). The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the grounds provided for in FC Art 166, Par. 1 which provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse. husband is a Japanese national and he was living outside of the country and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and 584
no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne. (Jinky also had a relationship before she met Rogelio but there is no proof of her sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. (Joanne is her 2nd childe, the first may be with her husband) Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband. FC ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously 585
During the pendency of the case with the CA, Rogelio died, a Notice of Substitution was filed to be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong (granted) CA: RTC decision set aside and remand the case to RTC a DNA or blood testing volunteered by Rogelio, a sign of good faith however, he died, such procedure can be availed of with whatever remaining DNA samples Issue: WON Joanne is the child of Rogelio is it proper to remand the case to RTC Held: To answer the first issue the case shoulde be remanded. the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. (biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.) Ratio: NCC Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. c. FC 166 (3) supra 2. Effect of a mothers declaration, FC 167 Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a) Guan in a previous case where he similarly filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Chua Bing Guan, insisting that he is a son. (Obviously that petition was not granted.) Issue: WON Chua Keng Giap, as he insists, is a child of Sy Kao and Chua Bing Guan, hence giving him cause of action to file for settlement of Sy Kaos estate Held: No Ratio: The issue of Chua Keng Giaps filiation with Sy Kao and Chua Bing Guan had long been settled and with finality. In Sy Kao vs Court of Appeals, which was decided in 1994, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally denied that Chua Keng Giap is her son by Chua Bing Guan. Sy Kao knows best. (medyo ganyan drama ng court) Rodriguez vs. CA Ponente: Quiason, J. Chua Keng Giap vs. IAC Overview: Chua Keng Giap claims that he is a child of Sy Kao and Chua Bing Guan. He filed a petition for settlement of estate of Sy Kao when she died, but this was not granted for when he filed for a petition for settlement of estate of Chua Bing Guan before, the court established that he is not a child by virtue of Sy Kaos outright denial of maternity. Facts: Chua Keng Giap filed for a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao, and insists that he is the son of the deceased. Chua Lian King (I dont know who this person is. A legitimate child of Sy Kao and Chua Bing Guan, I guess?) moved to dismiss the petition for lack of cause of action, saying that Chua Keng Giap had already been declared as not the son of the spouses Sy Kao and Chua Bing Facts: This is a very simple case which tries to answer the issue, promise, not much facts. On October 15, 1986, the respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos filed an action for compulsory recognition and support against Bienvenido Rodriquez before the RTC. In order to prove Bienvenidos paternity, Alaritos side proposed to present his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as witness to reveal the identity of Alaritos father. Herein petitioner Bienvenido then objected to the move to the CA, arguing NCC 280 which provides that: When a father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had 586
the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified. Much to Bienvenidos dismay, CA allowed Felicitas testimony. Issue: WON CA erred in allowing Felicitas (Alaritos mother) to testify regarding the identity of Alaritos father (i.e. Bienvenido, who was trying to deny it). Held: No, CA was correct in doing so. Ratio: SC ruled that the prohibition in NCC 280 applies only to voluntary recognition and not to compulsory recognition, which is the concern of the present case. This reasoning is inferred by the SC through analyzing the sequencing of the provisions in the Spanish Civil Code which preceded the NCC. In the sequencing, the provision similar to NCC 280 went after the provision concerning voluntary recognition; hence, prohibition applies only to that. Much like the reasoning done in the majority opinion of De Castro v. JBC, just so you get the idea. SC also said that the action of Alarito in claiming recognition falls under NCC 283 which added new grounds in an action for recognition, namely: 4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Also worth noting is the fact that under the FC, NCC 280 was already repealed. FC already allows illegitimate filiation to be proved in the same war as legitimate filiation is proved (FC 175). And in FC 172, legitimate children (as well as illegitimate by implication, per FC 175) may prove filiation 3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169 Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a) Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a) People vs. Quitoriano (supra) 4. Presumptions, FC 170, 171 Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. 587 through any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Judgment: CA affirmed.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a) Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) Cabatbat Lim vs Intermediate Appellate Court (now CA) Overview This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the respondents are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child. Facts Sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat filed a complaint praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory The factory is now in the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo They alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings On one hand, the evidence presented on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza were: o the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born o the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the hospital for the years when Violeta was supposedly born o certification of the Civil Registry that the office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat o certification that when Violeta studied in school, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents o testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth 588
to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat. On the other hand, the evidence presented by Violeta to support her contention were o Violeta Cabatbat's birth record showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat o testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza o testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that child o the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride o deed of Sale wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat o another Deed of Absolute Sale wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat Trial Court held that Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatba IAC affirmed the Trial Courts decision Hence, this petition should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs) Held and Ratio No o The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon the SC No o The legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. 5. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy
Issues WON Violeta is a legitimate child of Violeta and Proceso WON the court erred in not considering Art. 263 of the New Civil Code in this case (Art. 263: The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband
Gaspay vs. CA Facts: Oct 14 1983 - Flaviano Gaspay, married to Agueda Denoso, died without a last will and testament. The spouses were childless. He left properties. 589
July 6 1988 - Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro filed a petition to be the Gaspay estates administratrix. She alleged that she was Flavianos acknowledged illegitimate daughter with Claudia Pason. - Flaviano Gaspay Jr (adopted son of Flaviano) and Eriverta Salvatieva (not a relative) opposed Guadalupes petition. They said she was a stranger to the case and that there was no proof of her recognition or acknowledgment. RTC said Guadalupe is not acknowledged. The action for recognition has to be filed within the lifetime of the putative father. CA said she was. It said that actions based on voluntary recognition can be filed even after the death of the putative father. Issues: 1. Whether Guadalupe was an acknowledged illegitimate daughter of Flaviano. 2. Whether her right to file an action has prescribed. Held: 1. YES 2. NO. She was a voluntarily acknowledged daughter. Actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the fathers death. Ratio: 1. There was a principal witness in favor of Guadalupe. He is Martin Garin, a fellow government official of Flaviano. Theyve also been in business for 18 years. There were 2 letters written by Flaviano expressly acknowledging Guadalupe as his daughter. Gain has convincingly testified that those letters were indeed written by Flaviano, seeing the penmanship. He has also testified that he was a neighbor of Flaviano and Claudia Pason while they were having an affair, and that Guadalupe was indeed a fruit of that affair. (*Penmanship does not change radically, the SC said. Even though Garin last received a letter from Flaviano in 1961 and he only testified in 1980 as to the penmanship, there was no evidence presented that Flavianos penmanship has changed so much.) 2. There were a lot of evidence showing that Guadalupe was voluntarily recognized: She has been using the surname Gaspay since childhood, up to her marriage with one Bartolome Alfaro When she filed the 1988 petition, she used the surname Gaspay, thus telling the world that Hey, Im the daughter of Gaspay! Thus, Guadalupe is entitled to the administration of the estate. The 2 opposers did not even try to file for that position first. 6. Who may impugn BENITEZ-BADUA V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: The spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. Isabela died followed seven years later by the husband. The private respondents, Vicente's sister and nephew filed a petition for issuance of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of Feoder Aguilar, another private respondent. Private respondents contended that Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir. Marissa Benitez-Badua filed a petition which contended the petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of Vicente Benitez and capable of 590
administering his estate. She submitted documentary evidence: 1. Certificate of Live Birth 2. Baptismal Certificate her as his daughter 4. School Records. She also testified that she was reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the private respondents contended, mostly thru testimonial evidence, 1. that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; 2. that Isabel, then 36 y.o., was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 y.o, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate. RTC held in favor of Marissa. CA reversed. ISSUES: 1. WON Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 FC in this case and in adopting and upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an ACTION TO IMPUGN THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD. 2. WON Court of Appeals erred in finding that Marissa is neither a biological nor an adopted child. HELD: 1. NO 2. NO RATIO: 1. The mentioned provisions in this issue cannot be sustained. Art. 164 basically describes who are the legitimate children. The other articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) wants to deny a child of his wife as his own: Art. 166 states ways a husband can impugn or disprove the legitimacy of a child and Art. 170 & 171 speaks of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of the child. For this case, the private respondents were not contending WON Marissa was not the legitimate child of the HUSBAND. Rather, they were contending that Marissa was not a child, biological nor legally adopted, of the spouses at all. 2. SC basically held that Marissa was in fact adopted but not legal and thus cannot be a legal heir. They are of the opinion that Marissa was unable to prove her biological or blood kinship and gave more weight to the evidences proving that the deceased Isabel did not in fact conceive a child and were impotent: a. Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant. Dr. Lino Chipongian, her brother, said that the spouses were already married for 10 yrs and she was already 36 yrs old but still unable to conceive a child. This is why he referred him to the late ob-gyne Dr. Constantino Manahan, who tried to treat her for a number of years. Victorio Benitez-Lirio, Vicentes sister, testified that her brother even wanted to adopt her youngest daughter. Upon her refusal, Vicente found 2 baby boys which they can adopt but Isabel wanted a daughter. Upon finding a baby girl, and the subsequent consent of Isabel, Vicente told his sister that they would register it as their own. The court said that she was a credible witness because she is old and dying, thus, does not have any material interest in the outcome of the case. This testimony is likewise corroborated by the other witnesses (neighbors, town mates and her personal beautician) who basically attested that they never saw Isabel pregnant. The beautician testified that when she saw a baby in a crib in the house of the decease and inquired about it, Isabel said "that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it." Pregnancy is a fact that is easily noticeable by the public eye. b. The court held that the birth certificate Marissa presented is suspicious. The specific contention is it states that Marissa was born at the Benitez residence without a doctor or even a midwife. Isabel was already 36 yrs then; and thus, pregnancy can be a threat to her health and life. Also, she was already under treatment by Dr. Manahan who is a noted obstetrician-gyne but was not called upon to administer the pregnancy. This leads to the courts conclusion that the Benitez spouse 591
probably adopted the childe and made it appear that Isabel conceived it to avoid time-consuming and expensive court proceedings or really intended to adopt her later but failed to do so. Registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not give the legal rights to the child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of a public document. c. After Isabels death, her husband and brother executed an extrajudicial settlement which states "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants." For SC, this is tantamount to an admission by the two that Marissa is not a legal descendant. d. Isabel wrote a note to her husband stating her wish that if ever she dies, she wants Marissa to inherit the share of her property. SC finds this odd because if Marissa was really hers, this request is not necessary. e. The birthday of Marissa and Vicentes mother are both Dec 8. Victoria testified that Vicente told her that he intended such and SC thinks that indeed this is too coincidental. The weight of the evidence presented by the private respondents is enough to rebut the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. Lim vs. IAC Overview This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the respondents are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child. Facts Sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat filed a complaint praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory The factory is now in the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo They alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings On one hand, the evidence presented on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza were: o the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born o the absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the hospital for the years when Violeta was supposedly born o certification of the Civil Registry that the office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat
592
o certification that when Violeta studied in school, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents o testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat. On the other hand, the evidence presented by Violeta to support her contention were o Violeta Cabatbat's birth record showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat o testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza o testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that child o the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride o deed of Sale wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat o another Deed of Absolute Sale wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat Trial Court held that Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatba IAC affirmed the Trial Courts decision Hence, this petition Issues WON Violeta is a legitimate child of Violeta and Proceso WON the court erred in not considering Art. 263 of the New Civil Code in this case (Art. 263: The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs) Held and Ratio No o The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon the SC No The legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Law: Paternity and Filiation; Action to Impugn Legitimacy; Who May Impugn Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J Overview: This is about the petition for review on certiorari assailing 593
the June 4, 1999 CA decision which reversed the RTC decision that declared William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit. Facts: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams death on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children, Enrique Yulo and Bernadette Yulo, from her subsisting marriage. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. He claimed to have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao and to have been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. On August 31, 1993, the TC rendered a decision in favor of William Liyao, Jr. and declared him as the illegitimate son of William Liyao. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition. Issue: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao; WON the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter Held: No, he cannot impugn his own legitimacy. No, they did not. Rationale: (1) The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not definite. Article 255 of the New Civil Code says that children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This can only be rebutted by evidence of physical impossibility that the husband fathered the child. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs since he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. (2) The case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette 594
Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Judgement: Petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners side of the story. Pictures were presented showing William Liyao with Corazon at several social gatherings. On William Liyaos last birthday (November 22, 1975), William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon. Testimony of Maurita Pasion who knew Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy. He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon. Gloria Panopio testified she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia. Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia. Respondents side of the story. Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. Her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. He suffered a stroke at the office so he could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. She knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their marriage. Once in 1973, Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Corazon, while Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens 595
a. b. c. 7)
1) 2)
1) a. b.
3) 4) a.
c. d. e. f.
b.
5) 6)
g.
clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas. 2) Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. a. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. b. Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. c. After the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. d. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. e. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office. 3) The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974. a. He usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. b. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. c. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. d. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital. e. Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. f. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer. g. Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. h. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping. E. Proof of Filiation 1. Of Legitimate Children, FC 172-173 Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) 596
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. Diaz vs CA June 22, 1984 129 SCRA 621 Ponente: Melencio-Herrera Facts: Isidro Azarraga died in 1911. He left behind 10 children, 7 of which are proven illegimate children with mistress Valentina Abarracoso. There are 3 other problematic children: Leodegario, Filomena, and Pastora. Filomena is a legitimate daughter of Isidro with wife Calixta Lozada. In Sep 10, 1949, Leodegario died intestate without any spouse or kids (note: Spanish Civil Code governs here). He had some properties in Capiz. The two factions contending for the Letters of Administration of Leodegarios estate are: Maria Diaz (and her heirs), legitimate daughter of Filomena, and Amador Azarraga, one of the 7 illegitimate children. Maria alleges that Leodegario is the full blood brother of her mother Filomena (dead), so he is a legitimate child of Isidro, and thus making Maria his niece and his closest relative entitled to his estate. Amadors side contends that Leodegario is their full blood brother and fellow illegitimate brother, thus they are the ones who should administer the estate. In 1950, the CFI handling the case found Maria to be the one qualified for the position. The conditions that boosted her claim are: Pastora, the legitimate sister of Leodegario, is living with her, and Pastora agrees to her being appointed administratix, and Maria is educated and capable. In Aug 17, 1970, Eduardo Azarraga, heir of Amador (died 1957), filed a petition to remove Maria as administratix for failing to present a proper accounting of the estates money. He wanted to be Administrator. So they argued, the substance of the argument almost the same as the one in the 1949 case. RTC favored Marias side. CA favored Eduardos side. Issues: 1. Is Maria the proper administrator of Leodegarios estate? Or is it someone else from the Amador side? 2. What was Maria able to prove, Leodegarios legitimacy or illegitimacy? (note: If hes legitimate to Isidro, then he is Filomenas full blood brother, and Mariasfull blood uncle. If hes illegitimate, then the Amador clan members are Leodegarios full blood relatives). Held: 1. Yes, Maria is his closest surviving relative. 2. She was able to prove his legitimacy. Ratio: Spanish Civil Code Art. 943 (now NCC 992): A natural or a legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child. Leodegarios legitimacy was proven by these evidence. Take note that each of these, by itself, is not enough to sustain his legitimacy, but these were considered collectively. Preponderance of evidence. - Leodegarios UST undergrad and law school records (1897-1904) show his name as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. - Though his Philippine Bar certificate (1904) and a number of letters show only Leodegario Azarraga, it does not mean hes 597
illegitimate. Not using the maternal surname (or middle name) is commonplace anyway, for the sake of brevity and convenience. Even when he practiced law, he used only Leodegario Azarraga. Take note that these first 3 conditions were practiced even before Isidro died in 1911. Pastoras Last Will and Testament indicated Leodegario to be her full blood brother and fellow legitimate child. Remember the 1949 action and 1950 division. Pastora said there that she is only the living sister of Leodegario. This was not contended by Amadors side then. Only now, by Eduardos action, more than 20 years later, was this contended. In 1915, in Isidros will, he named Leodegario as his executor. Reyes v CA 135 SCRA 439 Date: March 19, 1985 Ponente: Makasiar, J. Facts: Petitioner: Irene Reyes (alias Irene Delgado) Respondents: Placida, Domingo, Paula and Maximina Delgado The Delgados prayed that Irene be order to execute a deed of reconveyance for parcels of land in favor of them; and that thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and other falsifications, Irene was able to have the tiles issued to her name. They also claimed that Irene is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco (the one who owns the lands) but the daughter of Genoveva and Justino Reyes. Irene said that Genoveva and Justino were already separated and she was born during the cohabitation of Genoveva and Francisco; hence, making her the illegitimate daughter and is entitled to represent her father in the inheritance left by the grandmother. She was also treated and reared as their childsent her through college. TC dismissed action for reconveyance and declared Irene as the lawful owner. CA found that although Irene was the spurious daughter of Francisco, she cannot inherit because she was not recognized voluntarily or by court action. The lot also cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs because it would prejudice other possible heirs and creditors. Issue/s: WON Irene is a recognized child and is entitled to inheritance? Held: No Ratio: Classifications of illegitimate children 1. Natural born outside of wedlock of parents who at that time had no legal impediment to marry 2. Spurious born outside of wedlock of parents who at that time has legal impediment to marry (incestuous, adulterous, illicit) An illegitimate child other than natural must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action in order to be able inherit. - An unrecognized natural childs does not spring from filiation but from the acknowledgement by the natural parent - No sufficient recognition by Francisco was proved in this case a. Birth certificate not signed by Francisco; placing of his name by the mother/doctor/registrar is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child b. Baptismal certificate not proof or recognition, evidence only that sacrament was administered on the date specified c. Irenes secondary student permanent record not an authentic writing; not signed d. Marriage contract of Irene stated that Francisco gave his consent or advice not signed and not even in the handwriting of Francisco e. Family pictures do not constitute proof of filiation 598
- Irene only proved that she had been in continuous possession of an illegitimate child who is not natural; but without valid recognition in a record of birth, will, statement before a court or authentic writing, she cannot be considered a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural - Irene was also 35 years old when her father died, therefore, action to compel recognition is already barred Judgment: Decision of CA is affirmed in toto Dissenting Opinion (Aquino, J.): rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for spurious children is not mandatory; and that rules applied to natural children may also be applied to spurious children Tison v CA 276 SCRA 583 Date: July 31, 1997 Ponente: Regalado, J. Facts: Petitioners: Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller (niece and nephew of Teodora Guerrero; their father, Hermogenes, is Teodoras brother) Respondent: Teodora Domingo (buyer of parcel of land from Martin Guerrero, husband of Teodora Guerrero) Corazon and Rene filed an action for reconveyance over the parcel of land owned by the Guerrero spouses, claiming that when Teodora G. died, they and Martin were the surviving heirs and that they seek to inherit by their right of representation (for their father who was already dead). However, they found out that Martin executed an affidavit of extrajudicial settlement adjudicating unto himself the land and sold it to Teodora Domingo. Martin also died. During the hearing, Teodora presented: a family picture, baptismal certificates, certification of destroyed records of birth, death certificates of Hermogenes and Teodora G., affidavits of people attesting to the marriage of their parents and their births. Teodora Domingo filed a demurrer of evidence and stated that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation in accordance with Art172, FC. TC dismissed complaint for reconveyance. CA upheld the dismissal stating that the evidence presented were inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Issue/s: 1. WON petitioners were legitimate children 2. If they are, WON they have provided sufficient proof to establish filiation with Teodora G. Held: 1. Yes 2. Yes Ratio: 1. Though the evidence presented are not sufficient proof of legitimacy or pedigree, there is a presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This issue cannot be attacked collaterally (like in this case for reconveyance). Also, Teodora D. is not a proper party to impugn the legitimacy of the petitioners (only father and heirs). Lastly, the burden of proof shifts to Teodora D. who is trying to overcome the presumption. 2. Primary proof used was the testimony of Corazon to the effect that during the lifetime of Teodora G, the latter declared Corazon as her niece. This declaration about pedigree is admissible. - The 3rd element of pedigree which is that the relationship of the declarant and the one whose relationship is in question should be shown in other evidence. The Court held that this does not apply when what is sought is the estate of the declarant himself and not merely establish a right through his declarations of some other family member. 599
Teodora D. has failed to refute declaration made by the Teodora G., and this failure equates to the waiver of any objections thereto. Judgment: Upon the death of Teodora G, of the property went to Martin, while went to her heirs (Martin and Hermogenes); so, went to Martin and this was the onlt share that he could validly sell to Teodora D. Property: to petitioners; to Teodora D. Trinidad vs Court of Appeals 289 SCRA 188 April 20, 1988 Ponente: Panganiban Overview: Arturio Trinidad, son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, filed an action for partition of four parcels of land against Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, siblings of Inocentes. Felix and Lourdes refused to comply with the partition of the land, arguing that Arturio is not Inocentes son, and therefore has no right over said property, due to Arturios failure to present his birth certificate and his parents marriage contract. However, this was overturned by the weight of the evidence presented by Arturio. Facts: The subject property is a land originally owned by Patricio Trinidad, father of Felix, Lourdes, and Inocentes. Patricio died in 1940, leaving the four parcels of land to his children. Inocentes died in 1944, while Felicidad Molato, Arturios mother, died in 1964. In 1970, Arturio demanded from Lourdes and Felix to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the 1/3 of the land that is the share of his father. Lourdes and Felix refused, and in 1978, Arturio officially filed an action for partition. Arturio avers that he and his family has been living with Lourdes since the death of his father and that he has receiving produce from the subject land as well, until he tried claiming for his part of the property. At that point, Felix and Lourdes immediately disowned him and made them vacate the house. However, according to Lourdes and Felix, Arturio is not their brothers son, and that is why they refuse to partition the land and give 1/3 to him. Lourdes and Felix capitalized on the fact that Arturio is unable to present his birth certificate and his parents marriage contract. Arturio can only present his baptismal certificate, arguing that the other pertinent documents were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation. Arturio also presented two witnesses to prove his filiation with Inocentes aside from himself: Jovita Gerardo and Isabel Meren. Gerardo is the barangay captain and has also been in the barrio council for years. She testified to Arturios relations with Inocentes and Felicidad, and Lourdes and Felix. Upon presentation of family pictures, Gerardo identified the people in the picture to be the family of the Trinidads wherein Lourdes was carrying Arturios child. Isabel Meren also testified to Arturios filiation with Inocentes and Felicidad and that Arturio lived with Lourdes when Inocentes died. Lourdes and Felix presented witnesses who contradicted Arturios testimony, saying that Inocentes died in 1940 and was never married. These testimonies had been easily disproved by the court. The RTC and the CA ruled that due to to Arturios failure to present his birth certificate and his parents marriage contract, Arturio was not able to prove filiation with his father. Issue: WON Arturio is a legitimate child of Inocentes Held: Yes. Ratio: Arturios failure to present his parents marriage contract is not proof that no marriage took place. Moreover, Arturio was able to secure a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar to the effect that all records of births, deaths, and marriages were destroyed during the Japanese occupation. In Pugeda vs Trias, the court previously ruled that when the question of a valid marriage arises in litigation, said marriage 600
may proven by relevant, competent evidence such as the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation, etc. The testimonies of the witnesses presented by Arturio gave rise to the undisputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Felix and Lourdes never questioned Arturios consistent and continued use of the Trinidad surname presumptive proof of his legitimate status To prove filiation, Arturio presented: o Two family pictures (which include Lourdes and Felix) --- although they do not directly prove Arturios filiation to Inocentes, the pictures show that he was accepted by Lourdes and Felix as Inocentes legitimate son before the lawsuit was brought o Baptismal certificate although not a conclusive proof of filiation, the Court ruled in Mendoza vs CA that it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws in Art 172 (previously Art 267) of the Family Code o Gerardos testimony not given credence. It cannot be used to establish legitimacy because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family thus her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Jison vs CA Overview: This is a case about Monina seeking to be recognized as an illegitimate child of Francisco. Monina presented 11 witnesses, a birth certificate issued by the civil registrar but without Franciscos signature, school records, and notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to her filiatio. She however submitted a notarized affidavit attesting that Francisco is not her father, which she said that she just did under duress. Facts: Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such On one hand, Monina alleged that o Francisco had been married to a Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 o At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (employed as the nanny of Francisco's daughter, Lourdes) o As a result, Monina was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo o Since childhood she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family o That Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner On the other hand, Francisco alleged that o He could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then o He never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child o And that Monina had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. Francisco thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint 601
Monina presented 11 witnesses, a birth certificate issued by the civil registrar but without Franciscos signature, school records, and notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation Monina however submitted a notarized affidavit attesting that Francisco is not her father relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. o Complaint stated that Francisco had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. The court agrees with Monina of the said year, hence her birth on August 6, 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between Francisco and Moninas mother. o Court concludes that the testimonial evidence by Monina, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, coupled with the testimonies of her 11 witnesses presented overwhelmingly established that Francisco is Moninas father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former and that Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts (sending Monina to school, paying her tuition, uniform, books, board and lodging, defraying Moninas hospitalization, providing her allowance, paying the funeral expenses of her mother, allowing MOnina to use his surname, etc.), and that such 602
Issues: WON Monina was able to establish her filiation WON Moninas reliance on the certification issued by the local civil registrar concerning her birth is misplaced WON Moninas use of school records as evidence is admissible to prove paternity WON notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation are admissibile to prove paternity WON the affidavit presented by Monina convinces the court that she really is not the child of Francisco Held and Ratio: Yes o Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) o For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph. which MONINA
recognition has been consistently shown and manifested through the years publicly, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner Yes o If the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the inscription of his name by he mother or doctor or registrar is null and void o The mere certificate without the signature of the father is not proof of acknowledgement by the latter No o But despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of Moninas claim that Francisco spent for her education No o Contents may not be admitted because there was no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and Monina shown by evidence other than the documents in question o Section 40 of ROC provides that witness must testify and that Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portrait and the like may be received as evidence. o Private documents are not part of family possessions enumerated above. o But despite such inadmissibility, they may still be used to strengthen her claim No o It was found out that such was a mere ploy by Francisco o His lawyer asked for Monina to sign the affidavit at the cost of 15thou o Furthermore, Franciscos contention that there is a need to quash rumors circulating in the company regarding the identity of Moninas father is negated by the fact that Monina had resigned 5 months prior to the execution of the sworn statement o Also, the defense used by Francisco are mere denials and from his witnesses, nothing substantial was obtained Labagala vs Santiago 371 SCRA 360 December 4, 2001 Ponente: Quisumbing Overview: Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession against Ida Labagala, who claims that she is a daughter of Jose Santiago and that she is actually an Ida Santiago. Facts: Jose, Nicolasa, and Amanda Santiago, siblings, own a parcel of land in Manila. In 1984, Jose died intestate. In 1987, Nicolasa and Amanda filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against Ida Labagala for recovery of 1/3 portion of the property which was Joses but became Labagalas sole possession upon Joses death. Nicolasa and Amanda aver that they are the only legal heirs of Jose, and that the alleged sale of the property was executed with malicious intent, and was a forgery, for having been able to graduate from college, Jose never merely signed with a thumbmark but always signs his name in full. The arguments of Nicolasa and Amanda are as follows: That it is highly improbable for Labagala to have paid for the property because she was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood 603
That it was unusual that the deed of sale was registered only 8 years after the execution of sale That Ida is not a child of Jose at all The arguments of Ida are as follows: That her true name is Ida Santiago and not Ida Labagala, because she is a daughter of Jose That she had always stayed on the property since childhood and that the property was in fact a donation to her That nothing could have prevented Jose from signing the sale with a thumbmark only The RTC ruled in favour of Labagala, saying that the deed constitutes a valid donation, and that even if it were not, as Joses daughter, Labagala would still be entitled to Joses part of the property. The CA, however, reversed the judgment pf the RTC, after noting that Labagalas birth certificate showed that Labagala was not born of Jose and his wife, but of Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabringas. The CA also took into account the statement made by Jose in a previous litigation that he did not have any child. Issue: WON Ida Labagala is a daughter of Jose Santiago, and is indeed an Ida Santiago. If she were, she may inherit from Jose through intestate succession, in the event that the sale or donation as invalid Held: NOO Ratio: The Certificate of Record of Birth clearly stated that Ida was the child of spouses Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. Labagalas denial that said certificate is hers and her failure to present her own that would state that Jose Santiago is her father cannot stand. She admits to having no certificate which states that she is Ida Santiago, and she failed to obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry. Labagala could only present a baptismal certificate that says that Jose Santiago is her father. However, a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person, as held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais vs Court of Appeals. Labagala argued that she has been using the name Ida Santiago all her life. The Court ruled that use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree Judgment: Sale/donation not valid. Labagala not Santiagos daughter. Ruling of CA affirmed. Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR 161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151824] En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1 on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official leave, 3 dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted 604
his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the Philippines. Ratio: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed. De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon 605
G.R. No. 142877 (October 2, 2001) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of QC. Ponente: Vitug, J. Facts: This is about the petitioners Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus who are legitimate to the marriage of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus, but in this petition claims to be the illegitimate children of their mother to a certain Juan Dizon. August 23, 1964- Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married. During their marriage, the petitioners Jacqueline (born on March 1, 1979) and Jinkie (born on July 6, 1982) were born. June 7, 1991- A certain Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie as being his own illegitimate children to Carolina. This was through a notarized document he executed. March 12, 1992- Juan Dizon died leaving behind shares of stocks in various corporations and real estate properties. July 1, 1993- Jacqueline and Jinkie (P) filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate on the strength of the notarized document that Juan issued. The surviving spouse, the legitimate children, and the corporations in which Juan was a stockholder (R) sought to dismiss the case because this would in turn alter the status of Jacqueline and Jinkie (P) from being legitimate to Danilo and Carolina to being illegitimate. RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss for lack of merit. March 20, 1994- upon motion of respondents regarding the denial of their motion to dismiss, CA affirmed the RTC and caused the case to be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. January 3, 2000- After filing of several briefs, respondents again filed an omnibus motion moving for the dismissal of the case because it is in fact a move to compel Jacqueline and Jinkies (P) recognition as illegitimate children of Juan. RTC, on the basis of respondents omnibus motion to dismiss, dismissed Jacqueline and Jinkies (P) complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper.
Issues: 1. WON Jacqueline and Jinkie (P) can be recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon on the basis of the notarized document that the latter executed. 2. WON an action to impugn their legitimacy as children of Danilo and Carolina is first needed for the current petition to be properly raised. Held/ Ratio: 1. No. a. Records show that the petitioners were born during the marriage of Danilo and Carolina and their certificates of live birth also identify Danilo as being their father. b. It is of sounder morality to presume that children born during a valid marriage are legitimate to that marriage. This presumption is conclusive upon absence of proof that: 1) husband is physically incapacitated to have sex; 2) that the husband and wife are living separately that sex is impossible; and 3) serious illness of husband. c. It was also not for Jacqueline and Jinkie (P) to assail their own legitimacy especially that this is opposed to the entries in their birth certificates. 2. Yes. a. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally. It is one that must be directly contested on a separate suit brought only for that purpose. 606
Judgment: Petition denied. Agustin v CA (June 15, 2005) Date: March 18, 1997 Ponente: Romero Facts: 1992 - Arnel Agustin (P) courted Fe Angela (R). After which, they entered into an intimate relationship. November 10, 1999 Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday. August 11, 2000 - Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. o The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. o Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. o Arnel also denied having fathered the child. January 19, 2001 - While Fe was carrying five-month old Martin Jose Prollamante (R) at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. July 2001 - Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. March 5, 2002 - Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. In his answer, Arnel denied having fathered Arnel for the following reasons: o His affair and intimacy with Fe ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. o Fe had a secret lover a certain Jun. Also, He alleges the following: o Fe was a scheming and overly demanding and possessive (ex. resorted to devious ways and means to alienate him from his wife and family). o Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop where she worked. o Upon his and familys return (from USA) in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was sometime in 1998. o On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body. o Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. Marital status was single when in fact he was already married. 607
His birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964. May 17, 2002 Pre-Trial Brief: Arnel denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case. July 23, 2002 - Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and by saying that DNA testing is not recognized by the Courts as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father (i.e. child must first establish his filiation in a separate suit). RTC denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed. sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. o Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings. o Precedents: Tayag v CA (filiation and inheritance); Briz v Briz Yes. DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnels constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. o Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of morphine from ones mouth and the 608
Issues: WON Fe and Martin have a cause of action against Arnel? WON a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition? WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnels constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination? Held and Ratio: Yes, Fe and Martin have a cause of action against Arnel (i.e. on rights and duties). o It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results are now similarly acceptable. o Ople v Torres: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. o Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. o For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity. o Also, there was no showing that there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. History of DNA Testing (Philippines): People v Teehankee: while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result. Lim v CA: DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father. Tijing v CA: Opens possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage People v Vallejo: DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine Jurisprudence (Rape and Murder case) People v Janson: How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts! Tecson, et. al. v COMELEC: In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing 609
People v Yatar: DNA test results used to affirm conviction of the accused for rape with homicide. o SELF INCRIMINATION: The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Jimenez v Canizares Ople v Torres US Cases and Laws: Wilson v Lumb: DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. NY Family Court Act: No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman. R.E. v C.E.W: used DNA testing to prove paternity Greco v Coleman: Constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were necessary. Michigans Paternity Law: Included the use of DNA Testing Rafferty v Perkins: DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage M.A.S. v Mississippi Dept. of Human Services: It was held that even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be the biological father. Estate of Rogelio Ong vs. Minor Joanne Diaz A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong Facts: Jinky and Rogelio fell in love with each other while Jinky was already married (1993) to a Japanese, Hasegawa Katsuo. 1994 - 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together During that time, Joanne was conceived and was born (1998) Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took Joanne and Jinky home after delivery, paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of Joannes needs recognizing the child as his. After 7 months, Rogelio abandoned minor them and stopped supporting Joanne, alleging that he is not the father of the child. (and so this case was filed) RTC: Ordered him to recognize the child and provide monthly support Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration (he was then in a dilemma on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.) Next day, he filed a motion for new trial
RTC: granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial RTC Held on the new trial: Joanne is his child and he should give support (motion for recon denied) 610
the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (FC Art 164) and the child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (FC Art 167). The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the grounds provided for in FC Art 166, Par. 1 which provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of c) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; d) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse. husband is a Japanese national and he was living outside of the country and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of Joanne. (Jinky also had a relationship before she met Rogelio but there is no proof of her sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. (Joanne is her 2nd childe, the first may be with her husband) however, he died, such procedure can be availed of with whatever remaining DNA samples Issue: WON Joanne is the child of Rogelio WON it is proper to remand the case to RTC Held: To answer the first issue the case should be remanded. the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. ("biological sample" means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.) Ratio: NCC Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband. FC ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 611
During the pendency of the case with the CA, Rogelio died, a Notice of Substitution was filed to be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong (granted) CA: RTC decision set aside and remand the case to RTC a DNA or blood testing volunteered by Rogelio, a sign of good faith
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case; (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a) Castro v CA (G.R. No. 50974-75) Date: May 31, 1989 Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. Overview: Pricola, a woman with a celebrated but not consummated marriage, cohabited with Eustaquio, a widower. During cohabitation, Benita was born. Pricola died. Eustaqio died. Eustaquios brother and sister, as well as his surviving spouse, filed for the partition of properties. In her answer, Benita Castro-Naval says that she is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio Castro; therefore, (1) she is entitled to participate in the partition of properties left by him; and, (2) the complaints for partition filed have no cause of action. Facts: May 23, 1913 Pricola Maregmen, the natural mother of Benita Castro Naval, was wedded to Felix de Maya against her wishes. While the celebration of the wedding was going on, she secretly left the party and went to the house of her first cousin and there she cried that she did not want to get married. That evening, Pricola went to her real sweetheart, Eustaquio Castro, the father of Benita. A few days later, Eustaquio informed the parents of Pricola that they were already living together. Pricolas parents submitted to their daughters wishes, so Eustaquio and Pricola lived together as husband and wife until the death of Pricola on September 11, 1924. NOTE: There is no dispute that Eustaquio Castro at the time he lived with Pricola Maregmen, was a widower, and was, therefore, free to marry Pricola. 612
2. Of illegitimate children, FC 175 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
March 27, 1919 - As a result of their cohabitation, Benita was born. o Eustaquio caused the registration of said birth in the civil registry wherein he indicated that he was the father of the child. o Baptismal certificate indicated that she was the child of Eustaquio and Pricola. August 23, 1961 Eustaquio died. o Pictures were taken wherein the immediate members of the family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita. With this evidence, Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, brother and sister of Eustaquio, later admitted that defendant Benita is the forced heir and compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. Due to Eustaquios death, (1) Juan and Feliciana filed an action for partition of property alleging that they are the forced heirs of Pedro Castro (father of Eustaquio Castro). Likewise, (2) Marcelina Bautista (surviving spouse of the deceased Eustaquio) also filed an action for partition of properties against Benita alleging that she is also a compulsory heir of Eustaquio. In her answer, Benita Castro-Naval says that she is the only child of the deceased Eustaquio Castro; therefore, (1) she is entitled to participate in the partition of properties left by him; and, (2) the complaints for partition filed have no cause of action. TC acknowleged and recognized Benita as a child of Eustaquio. CA affirmed. Held: Yes. There is no dispute that Benita enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and that the action of Benita in defending her status in this case is similar to an action to claim legitimacy brought during her lifetime. Ratio: Voluntary recognition by Eustaquio was established through Benitas birth certificate. It was shown (records of civil registry where Eustaquio Castro appears under the column remarks) that Eustaquio himself went to the municipal building and gave all the data about his daughters death (so issue WON father signed it is of no moment). o There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do so. The certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition but they add to the equities of this case favoring the Benita. Eustaquio gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. Benita lived with her father from her birth to his death. In the amended complaint, Juan and Feliciano admitted that Benita Castro was the compulsory heir of Eustaquio. They cannot now contradict their own allegations. The rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because Benita and her 613
Issue: WON Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro?
mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita. * FC retroacts (re: establishing filiation). No vested rights. * This was also mentioned: Since Eustaquio Castro was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita is his natural child. However, from the viewpoint of the mother who had a subsisting marriage to Felix de Maya, Benita was her spurious child. Notes: Under the Civil Code, whether "new" or "old", illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other; and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.ch Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment voluntary and compulsory. Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the child's acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true or real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as such a child. Lim vs. IAC Overview: This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the protagonists are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child. Facts: Violeta, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision of the IAC, which affirmed the decision of RTC finding that Violeta is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of Esperanza. The sisters of Esperanza filed a complaint in the CFI praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza, who died on 1977 without a will. Part of her estate was her interest in the business partnership (Calasiao Bijon Factory) now in the possession of Violeta who claims to be the child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat. Esperanza was survived by Proceso, her 3 sisters, and the children of her 2 deceased brothers. They alleged that Violeta is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward of the spouses who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings. evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza were: 1) no record that Esperanza was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day Violeta was born; 2) no birth certificate of Violeta in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification of the Civil Registry coordinator that his office has no birth record of Violeta 4) certification Principal II that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso and Esperanza were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 614
5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquainted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat. evidence of Violeta consisting of. 1) Violeta's birth record which was filed on June 15,1948 showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child of the spouses; 2) testimony of Proceso that Violeta is his child with Esperanza; 3) testimony of Benita denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta is that child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale wherein the vendee Violeta, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale wherein Violeta was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat. RTC: Violeta is not a child by nature of the spouses and that she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza. CA: affirmed Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of the spouses and WON she is entitled as an heir Held: No to both. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply to Violetas No. 5 Evidence. This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948 The day Violeta was alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza, the records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of Benita gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named Baby Girl Lastimosa. Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of the hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate of Violeta and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa. no record of the birth of Violeta in the Office of the Civil Registrar General
Ratio: Violetas recourse to NCC Art 263 is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but their action to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. Baas vs Baas
615
Facts: Raymundo Baas was a natural child (born out of wedlock on 1894) of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown. During this time, Bibiano Baas was still single It was Bibiano Baas who shouldered Raymundo's school expenses. Theres no evidence to show whether or not Bibiano Baas lived with Raymundo and his mother. 1922, Raymundo used to go to the place of Bibiano once or twice a week, and it was in one of his visits that he met Trinidad Vecino, a niece of Faustina Vecino Baas the wife of Bibiano Trinidad lived with the family of Bibiano and took care of his children ever since she was a young girl 1926, Raymundo married Trinidad. In their marriage certificate, the name of the father of Raymundo was stated to be Bibiano (Pedro Baas After their marriage, Raymundo and Trinidad lived together with Dolores until she died. they transferred their residence where they were sometimes visited by Bibiano and his wife 1928, Raymundo and Pedro executed sworn statements wherein Raymundo declared that he was the natural son of Dolores and of Pedro and in his marriage certificate, an error had been committed in that the name of his father stated Bibiano (brother of Pedro) This was notarized. (to put on record the true state of things) Pedro in his sworn statement, declared that he has a natural son named Raymundo whom he had with Dolores, and whom he recognized as such (notzarized) 1930, Pedro wrote again to the Justice of the Peace to reiterate his recognition and to request for the necessary correction in the certificate of baptism of Raymundo as well as those of the latter's children, The next day, Bibiano executed a sworn statement stating that Pedro had a child, Raymundo with Dolores. (notarized) 1931, Raymundo and his family moved to another place. The property there which belonged to Bibiano Baas was transferred to Raymundo's name in 1936 by virtue of a Deed of Sale 1954, Bibiano died survived by his wife and children 1955, Raymundo wrote two letters to Atty. Andres Faustino in which he complained bitterly about the alleged injustices done to him by Faustina Next month, more than a year after the death of Bibiano, his heirs textra-judicially settled his estate by means of a deed of extra-judicial settlement among themselves. After 5 months, Raymundo and Trinidad executed a mortgage over their house and lot in the property they bought from Bibiano in favor of Angel V. Baas. After the spouses had paid more or less Pl2,000, the mortgage was cancelled by Angel 1962, Raymundo died survived by his wife and children 1965, almost three years after the death of Raymundo, his heirs filed this complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and damages against the heirs of Bibiano. Trinidad testified that after Raymundos death, she discovered certain documents in his aparador which established his filiation. (1) a handwritten note of Bibiano to Raymundo preserved in a glass frame where he signed as Your father (2) a directory and homecoming souvenir program of the San Beda Alumni Association with the entry: Baas R. CS'06" (3) two original copies of receipts of payments for matriculation,
616
matriculation certificates of Raymundo in San Beda College wherein it is stated that Raymundo is theson of Bibiano (5) report cards of Raymundo for Grades 5 and 6. The signatures in this spacethe space for parent/guardian had been erased, although not thoroughly, so that it can still be seen at close examination that the signatures appear to be that of Bibiano (6) a type-written statement of Raymundo setting forth his alleged personal circumstances (7) the carbon copies of the typewritten letters sent by Raymundo to Atty. Andres Faustino (8) the typewritten autobiographies of Raymundo and contains intercalations, alterations and spoliations They also presented the marriage certificate of Raymundo and Trinidad as evidence The heirs of Bibiano presented Bibiano Baas Jr., who testified that after the death of Bibiano the following documents were found in the latter's safe: (1) Duplicate original copies of the sworn statement of Raymundo and Pedro (2) Duplicate original copy of the sworn statement of Bibiano (3) Duplicate original copy of the letter of Pedro to the Justice of the Peace (4) The envelope wherein the documents were contained (may annotation in Spanish na di ko maintindihan)
(4)
RTC: dismissed the petition Issue: It is not disputed that Raymundo had the status of a natural child. What is being disputed is WON he was an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano Baas. Held: there was no voluntary recognition
The complimentary ending, Su padre," taking into consideration the context of the entire letter, is not an indubitable acknowledgment of paternity. It is a mere indication of paternal solicitude. It is clear that the rule of incidental acknowledgment does not apply to the first evidence presented by the Heirs of Raymundo since it is not a public document where a father would ordinarily be more careful about what he says. In fact, it is merely a short note whereby a 13-year old boy is being admonished for staying out late and not staying at home studying his school lessons or helping his mother. Regarding the evidence nos. 2-5, it is held that the authentic writing upon which the claim to filiation rests must, to be effective, be one made by the putative father himself and that the writing must be the writing of the said alleged father although Bibianos signatures appeared at the back of the report card of Raymundo, still it does not constitute a sufficient act of recognition for it could very well be that Bibiano affixed his signatures on the report card as a guardian and not as parent. Raymundo and Pedro had acknowledged the paternal relationship between them when they executed sworn statements The records show that Raymundo obviously bitter and discontented because he was not given a share in the estate of Bibiano failed to file a formal claim or demand during the eight-year period between the death of Bibiano and his own. Finally, that Raymundo was not an acknowledged natural son of Bibiano is further shown by the fact that the documents tending to prove Raymundo's filiation were only discovered after the latter's death defies belief. The bitterness of raymundo could have been shared with Trinidad and anything of sentimental value, such as old school records, 617
autobiographies, letters, etc., is normally shared between husband and wife. Other points Raymundo should and could have filed an action for compulsory recognition during Bibiano's lifetime, alleging continuous possession of the status of a natural child by direct acts of Bibiano or of his family, and that he has in his favor proof that Bibiano is his father. Considering that Raymundo was born in 1894, and was already of majority age in 1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he should and could have filed such action either under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of the New Civil Code. Raymundo's failure to institute an action for compulsory recognition during Bibiano's lifetime under either of the law, militates against the complaint for partition or recovery of hereditary share, fruits and damages. Article 137 of the OCC and Article 285 of the NC provide that the action of the natural child for compulsory recognition prescribes, if not taken during the lifetime of the alleged parents, unless the case falls within the exceptions which allow the filing of such action even after the death of the alleged parents Ratio: The formalities of voluntary recognition under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is that recognition shall be express and made either in the record of birth, in a will, in a statement in a court of record, or in any authentic writing The Filipinos are known for having very close family ties. Extended families are a common set-up among them, sometimes to the extent that strangers are also considered as part of the family. In addition, Filipinos are generally fond of children, so that children of relatives or even of strangers are supported if their parents are not capable to do so. This is a manifestation of the fact that Filipinos are still living in a patriarchal society In Re: Christensen (L-11483-11484) Date: February 14, 1958 Ponente: Felix Overview: Edward and Bernarda, both unmarried, lived together as husband and wife. Out of this relationship, Lucy and Helen were born. When Edward died, he declared in his will that he had but one child that is, Lucy and that he is giving her his estate. On the other hand, Helen and Bernarda were given a meager P3,600 and P1,000 respectively. Of course, they opposed the will saying, among other things, that it was illegal because it was unfair. Helen also alleged that she is the natural child of Edward. Facts: As of 1913,Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located therein. In 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Cebu, arrived to work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl, Bernarda Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, the girl and Edward, who was also unmarried started living together as husband and wife. They lived continuously for over 30 years until the death of Christensen on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born. In his will, naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor, he declared that he has but one child, Lucy and that his estate valued at $485,000 be left to her. In the case of Helen, he said that she was not related to him nor has he adopted her. Notwithstanding such, he left her P3,600. Bernarda was left with P1,000. 618
Helen and Bernarda opposed the will saying that (1) it lacked formalities required by law; (2) dispositions were illegal as shares left were unfair; (3) Aznar was not qualified as an administrator due to his interest adverse to the estate; and, (4) Bernarda was entitled to of the estate due to her relationship with deceased (NOTE: This was dismissed by the probate court as she was only a common-law wife; hence, she has no successional right that might be affected by the probate of the will.). Helen filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward, alleging that she was conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda was living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying relations with 3 different men including Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in the plantation; that during the lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased. As for Bernardas claims, executor said that she was not a co-owner as Edward acquired the properties through his own efforts. LC declared that Helen is the natural child of Edward and ordered Lucy to acknowledge her as a natural child of Edward. Lucy and executor appealed to the CA. CA elevated the case to the SC since estate exceeded the value of P50,000. Issues: WON Helen had been in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child of Edward? WON LC erred in directing Lucy, recognized daughter and instituted heir of the decedent, to acknowledge Helen as such natural child? WON Bernarda be regarded as a co-owner; therefore, entitled to of Edwards properties? Held and Ratio: Yes. This was established through a preponderance of evidence. o Even with Zosimo in the picture and the fact that at the time Helen was born, Bernarda was living in Paligue, Davao and Edward stayed in Davao City, it cannot be deinied that Helens mother and the deceased were generally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife. o Edward provided for her maintenance. Education exclusive college for girls in Manila o Edward tolerated her to carry his surname. o Edward gave her attention and care as a father to his offspring. Introduced by Edward to his circle of friends and acquaintances as his daughter Family portraits, greeting cards, letters o Nothing on the record shows that Edward entertained any doubt or disputed Helens paternity. His repudations of her relationship with him came about only after he and Bernarda parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same and got married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. 619
The testator' last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child or one who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of the person against whom such action is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of compulsary recognition. Yes. Its improper. o We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect. No. o Not shown that properties were acquired through their joint efforts. Allegation that she took a hand in the management was incredible. Illiterate woman who cannot remember simple things such as dates and ages of children. o It cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirs of the deceased Edward Christensen would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed Ilano vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994 Ponente: Nocon Overview: Leoncia eloped with Artemio with his promise of marriage to her. They cohabited and produced offspring, but Artemio is married to someone else. Merceditas, Artemios daughter with Leoncia, is filing for acknowledgment and recognition. Artemio, however, denied him completely. Facts: With Artemios promise of marriage, Leoncia eloped with him in 1962. They stayed in an aparatment located behind the office of the company of which he is the president and general manager. He came home to Leoncia 3 to 4 times a week. Said apartment was procured by Melencio, one of Artemios employees. Melencio also took care of the bills of the house. Everytime Leoncia is pregnant (ie twice), Artemio often accompanied her to pre-natal check-ups. In 1962, Leoncia delivered a still-born baby, the death certificate of which was signed by Artemio. The following year, Leoncia gave birth to Merceditas Ilano. Artemio left instruction to the nurse to give the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early. He was not able to sign the birth certificate. Support for Leoncia and Merceditas from Artemio came in the form of cash or check, variably delivered by Artemio himself, Melencio, or through the bank. 620
Artemio signs Merceditas Report Card, brings her candies, toys, etc. He would take her out to a drive, to eat, and cuddles her to sleep. Artemio is the one Merceditas recognizes as Daddy. However, Artemio denied any relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned tha handwritten answers and signatures in the death certificate of the first baby. He practically denied everything except the check. He said that on the day Merceditas was born he was home because he was sick so he couldnt have been there. Artemios wife and daughter corroborated his testimony. On the other hand, Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals, and bought the necessities. He also claimed that he and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. The RTC dismissed Merceditas petition for acknowledgement and recognition. The CA, however, reversed the RTC s decision and held that Artemio is the father of Merceditas. Issue: WON Merceditas is an illegitimate child of Artemio Held: YES! Ratio: Melencio Reyes was merely an employee of Artemio. He frequented the place of Leoncia upon instruction of the defendant to take care of Leoncias needs. His admission regarding the procurement of the apartment and living together with Leoncia was an instruction from Artemio, evidently. It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio Use of pet names (Ne, Nene) Any other evidence or proof" (last par of A283) that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (FC Art 203) Baluyut vs Baluyut 186 SCRA 506 June 14, 1990 Ponente: Medialdea Facts: Victoria, Ma. Theresa, and Ma. Flordeliza, all surnamed Baluyut, are the daughters of Norma Urbano. They wanted to be declared as Enrique Baluyuts illegitimate children so theyd have an interest over dead Enriques estate. They argued (the 2 girls were then minors so they were represented by Norma) that (1) they were conceived and born during Enrique and Normas cohabitiation while Enrique was married to Felicidad Baluyut, (2) that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the deceased during his lifetime, because Enrique allegedly supported and maintained them, and (3) they were deliberately excluded from Enriques estate. Of course, Felicidad, appointed administratix of Enriques estate, opposed them. There are a lot of notices of appeal and MRs and briefs and many many actions presented. RTC declared the 3 girls as illegitimate children, eligible for monthly support and that they are forced heirs of Enrique. CA affirmed their illegitimacy but removed the monthly support and their interest in the estate. 621
Issues: 1. WON the 3 girls are acknowledged, spurious children of Enrique. 2. WON the 3 girls have a share in the estate of Enrique (as acknowledged children). Held: 1 and 2: NO. Ratio: * proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer hereditary/succesional rights to a putative parents estate. An illegitimate not natural child must establish a filiation that is acknowledged by the putative parent. Two modes of acknowledgement 1. by the voluntary recognition of the putative parent made in the record of birth, a statement before the court of record, or in any authentic writing (then NCC 278) 2. by compulsory recognition (then NCC 283) of the father in these cases: a. in cases of rape, abduction, or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception b. when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family c. when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father d. when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father There was no evidence to prove that the 3 girls were acknowledged by Enrique as shown by these facts: - There was no signature of Enrique on their birth certificates - There was no authentic writing or any court statement of recognition The alleged cohabitation of Enrique and Norma was testified to by only one witness (Liberata Vasquez, their landlady). In fact, he only visited Norma twice a week to satisfy his urges. - Norma said Enrique personally paid the hospital bills for the 2 of the girls. However, Liberata herself said she, Liberata, was given the money by Enrique as he requested her to be the one to pay the bills. This shows that he did not intend to announce to the whole world his alleged paternity. He did not even visit Norma at the hospital. - He did not even take the 3 girls out to show them publicly as his children * for compulsory recognition, since its compulsory, the rules are strictly applied. Acknowledgement must be direct and express. Mendoza v CA 201 SCRA 675 Date: September 24, 1991 Ponente: Cruz, J. Facts: Teopista Tunacao claims that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza (married to Emiliana Barrientos) to Brigida Toring, and that her father treated her as such and accorded her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. Her mother was the one who told her that Casimiro was her father, she called him Papa Miroy and that she used to visit him in his house. Casimiro also gave a truck to her husband for livelihood, allowed her son to build a house on Casimiros lot, gave her money, and opened a joint savings account with her as co-depositor. Casimiro denied claim until he died. Witnesses for Teopista: 622
1. Lolito Tunacao (Teresitas son) considered Casimiro as grandfather, kissed his hand when they saw each other, Casimiro gave him money and jackfruits, allowed him to build a house on Casimiros lot 2. Gaudencio (Casimiros cousin) knew that Brigida was Casimiros sweetheart, Casimiro sometimes gave him money to be delivered to Brigida and once to Teopistas baptism 3. Isaac (Casimiros nephew) his father, Hipolito, and grandmother, Brigida Mendoza told him that Teopista is Casimiros daughter, Casimiro sometimes gave him money to give to Teopista, and that Casimiro intended to give Teopista some properties Witnesses for Casimiro 1. Vicente Toring (Teresitas half-brother) claims that he is the illegitimate son of Brigda and Casimiro and that Teopistas real father was Ondoy 2. Julieta Ouano (Casimiros niece) affirmed Vicentes testimony and claims that she never met Teopista Casimiro died, and Vicente substituted for Casimiro. RTC states that Teopista failed to show sufficient evidence that she had possessed continuously the status of a recognized illegitimate child. CA reversed the decision. Issue/s: 1. WON Teopista was in continuous possession of status of illegitimate child 2. WON Teopista is an illegitimate child of Casimiro Held: 1. No 2. Yes Ratio: 1. Casimiro did not openly and continuously recognize Teopista as an illegitimate child -continuousmeans concession of status shall not be intermittent while it continues -> father has treated child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity -in this case, Teopista lived with mother, act of giving money was on-and-off, Casimiro did not pay for support or education 2. She established her status through another method Art 175, FC illegitimate children can establish their filiation in the same way as legitimate children. Art 172(2) prove legitimate filiation by (2)any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws Rule 130, Sec. 39, of the Rules of Court act or declaration about pedigree -Isaacs testimony was taken into consideration and it was able to comply with the 4 requisites of this provision to make the declaration regarding pedigree be admitted to evidence a. declarant is dead or unable to testify (his father and grandmother were both dead at the time of Isaacs testimony) b. pedigree must be an issue (filiation of Teopista and paternity of Casimiro are the issues) c. declarant must be a relative of person whose pedigree is in issue (declarants were brother and mother of Casimiro) d. relationship between declarant and person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than declaration (an extrajudicial partition of sale of Florencio Mendoza stated Casimiro as one of the heirs) -reasonable conclusion that Teopista is an illegitimate daughter Judgment: Teopista was declared an illegitimate daughter and entitle to the rights of such status Marquino v. IAC 623
G.R. No. 72078 (June 27, 1994) Nature: Petition for certiorari of a decision of the then IAC. Ponente: Puno, J. Facts: This is about Bibiana Romano-Pagadora who filed a Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio Marquino. However, in the course of the case, Bibiana died, then later on, Eutiquio also did, can the case still prosper then? January 10, 1971- Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed a Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio Marquino before CFI of Negros Occidental. Also impleaded as defendants are Eutiquios wife, Maria, and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva. Records show that Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 of Gregoria Romano and allegedly Eutiquio, when the latter was still single. Bibiana became known to Eutiquios legitimate family when she was hired as a domestic helper. She always received financial support from the Marquino family, as well as she enjoyed the status of an acknowledged natural child through the unequivocal acts of the family. The Marquinos denied this. March 17, 1979- While the case was pending, Bibiana died, without being able to present her proof of recognition yet. March 23, 1979- Bibianas heirs were asked to substitute. May 17, 1983- Marquino family filed to dismiss case as the action is a personal one, hence intransmissible. CFI dismissed the case. Heirs of Bibiana appealed to the IAC. August 20, 1983- Eutiquio died. IAC reversed the CFI, saying that it is unfair that the case would be extinguished just because the case took so long that Bibiana already died in the course of it. MR of Marquino family was denied.
Issues: 1. WON the right of action to compel recognition is intransmissible. 2. WON after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former. Held/ Ratio: 1. Yes, intransmissible. a. NCC 258 provides that an action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of presumed parents except in two instances: 1) If the parent died during the minority of the child, and 2) If after the death of the parent, nothing had been heard and in which the parent recognizes the child. The reason for the general rule is to give the parents an opportunity to be heard, while the exception is to protect the heirs. b. It was held in Conde v. Abaya that the action cannot be transmitted as the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. It is personal in nature. c. An argument of presumption cannot be based on a lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one. d. In Heirs of Raymundo Banas v. Heirs of Bibiana Banas, it was even held that the case is intransmissible to the heirs of the natural child for it is personal in nature. 2. No. a. The one in the best position to answer the claims of filiation is the alleged parent. 624
b. NCC 285 only provides for 2 exceptions and neither of it covers the case at bar. c. Public policy argument: before an illegitimate child can be admitted into a legitimate family, every requisite of the law must be completely and fully complied with. No one should ever be permitted upon doubtful evidence to take from legitimate children the property which they and their parents have, by industry, fidelity, and frugality, acquired. d. FC 173 providing that the action does not prescribe as long as the natural child exists cannot be given retroactive effect because it would prejudice vested rights of the petitioners Marquino. Judgment: CA decision set aside. Case in CFI dismissed. Fernandez v CA (G.R. No. 108366) Date: February 16, 1994 Ponente: Puno Overview: Violeta filed for support for her children Claro and John Paul against Carlito, the alleged father. Carlito denied such allegation. Facts: Violeta Esguerra, daughter of a tennis instructor and mother of Claro and John Paul Fernandez (P), and Carlito Fernandez (R), a Meralco employee and tennis enthusiast, met in 1983 at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship 6 months after their first meeting. This resulted in the birth of Claro (March 1, 1984) and JP (February 11, 1985). In her petition for support, she also said that she did not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage license which they used was spurious. She also presented the following: o Birth and baptismal certificate identifying Carlito as the father o Baptismal photographs o Family pictures o Rosario Cantoria, Dr. Villanueva and Ruby Cu Violeta introduced Carlito to them as her husband. o Fr. Fernandez Carlito presented himself as the father of Claro during his baptism. Carlito denied Violetas allegations. o Did not know that he was declared the father in the birth and baptismal certificates o He only acted as a sponsor in the baptism with his officemate Rodante Pagtakhan o Fidel Arcagua (waither) He disputed the claim that Violeta and Carlito frequented the Lighthouse Restaurant. TC ruled in favor of the minor children. TC ordered Carlito to recognize the children as his sons and to give them support. CA reversed TC because of proof relied upon by TC to establish paternity and filiation is inadequate. Res judicata also applies due to the dismissal of a previous case.
Issue: WON Carlito should be ordered to recognize Claro and JP as his sons? Held: No. Paternity and Filiation not established by the evidence presented. Ratio: 625
Photographs are far from proofs that Carlito is the father. He was there as a sponsor. Pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing Carlito showering affection to Claro fall short of evidence required to prove paternity. Baptismal certificate has scant evidentiary value. No showing that Carlito participated in its preparation. Birth certificates are not competent evidence. No showing that Carlito had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. On cross-examination, Fr. Fernandez admitted that he has to be shown a picture of Carlito by Violeta in order to recognize Carlito. o He officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out. He cannot accurately remember all the parents of the children he has baptized. Violetas testimony is self-serving. Jison vs CA Overview: This is a case about Monina seeking to be recognized as an illegitimate child of Francisco. Monina presented 11 witnesses, a birth certificate issued by the civil registrar but without Franciscos signature, school records, and notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to her filiatio. She however submitted a notarized affidavit attesting that Francisco is not her father, which she said that she just did under duress. Facts: Monina prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such On one hand, Monina alleged that o Francisco had been married to a Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 o At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (employed as the nanny of Francisco's daughter, Lourdes) o As a result, Monina was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo o Since childhood she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family o That Francisco gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner On the other hand, Francisco alleged that o He could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then o He never recognized Monina, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child o And that Monina had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. Francisco thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint Monina presented 11 witnesses, a birth certificate issued by the civil registrar but without Franciscos signature, school records, and notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation Monina however submitted a notarized affidavit attesting that Francisco is not her father
Issues: WON Monina was able to establish her filiation 626
WON Moninas reliance on the certification issued by the local civil registrar concerning her birth is misplaced WON Moninas use of school records as evidence is admissible to prove paternity WON notes and letters written by Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation are admissibile to prove paternity WON the affidavit presented by Monina convinces the court that she really is not the child of Francisco Held and Ratio: Yes o Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) o For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph. which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. o Complaint stated that Francisco had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. The court agrees with Monina of the said year, hence her birth on August 6, 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between Francisco and Moninas mother. o Court concludes that the testimonial evidence by Monina, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through the years, coupled with the testimonies of her 11 witnesses presented overwhelmingly established that Francisco is Moninas father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former and that Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts (sending Monina to school, paying her tuition, uniform, books, board and lodging, defraying Moninas hospitalization, providing her allowance, paying the funeral expenses of her mother, allowing MOnina to use his surname, etc.), and that such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested through the years publicly, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner Yes o If the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the inscription of his name by he mother or doctor or registrar is null and void 627
o The mere certificate without the signature of the father is not proof of acknowledgement by the latter No o But despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of Moninas claim that Francisco spent for her education No o Contents may not be admitted because there was no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and Monina shown by evidence other than the documents in question o Section 40 of ROC provides that witness must testify and that Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portrait and the like may be received as evidence. o Private documents are not part of family possessions enumerated above. o But despite such inadmissibility, they may still be used to strengthen her claim No o It was found out that such was a mere ploy by Francisco o His lawyer asked for Monina to sign the affidavit at the cost of 15thou o Furthermore, Franciscos contention that there is a need to quash rumors circulating in the company regarding the identity of Moninas father is negated by the fact that Monina had resigned 5 months prior to the execution of the sworn statement o Also, the defense used by Francisco are mere denials and from his witnesses, nothing substantial was obtained Eceta vs Eceta 428 SCRA 782 May 20, 2004 Ponente: Ynares-Santiago Overview: Maria Theresa, the illegitimate daughter of Vicente Eceta prays to be co-heir and co-owner of property of her deceased father which was left with her grandmother. Facts: Rosalina Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta, and they begot a son, Vicente. During their marriage, they acquired several properties such as the disputed property located in Cubao. Isaac died in 1967, leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died as well. In his lifetime, Vicente had an illegitimate daughter, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed for Partition and Accounting with Damages against Rosalina, alleging that she become Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property. Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal (irrelevant, but I just had to say that). The RTC granted the partition, entitling Maria Theresa to of the property. On appeal, the CA appealed the ruling but modified it to the effect that Maria Theresa only gets 1/8 instead. Issue: WON Maria Theresa has rights over the property her father inherited Held: Yes Ratio: Maria successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate. Illegitimate children have rights over properties of their parents. Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan vs. CA G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009 Law: Proof of Filiation; Of Illegitimate Children Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J. 628
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision which affirmed the RTC decision that was in favour of Lourdes Evero Pacana and reconveyed the land to her as the heir of deceased Juan Overview: This is about a parcel of land that the granddaughter of the owner is trying to claim from the siblings of the owner and the siblings heirs. However, granddaughter Lourdes was not able to prove her filiation. So, SC ruled against her. Facts: A 1.1062 hectare parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the RTC complaint, respondent Lourdes Pacana alleged that she was the sole owner of the lot by inheriting it from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero. She said that Hermogena was the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. When Juan Gabatan died, the lot was allegedly entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan and Teofilos wife, Rita for administration. When T&R died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the land despite Lourdes demands. Petitioners are saying that Juan Gabatan was single when he died in 1934 and he was only survived by his brother and two sisters. These siblings and/or their heirs have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than 50 years. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis is the husband of Teofilos daughter and Catalino Acantilado is just a caretaker. A similar case was filed against Teofilos wife in 1978 but it was dismissed for lack of interest. Also, the petitioners are saying that the complaint lacks of states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches. RTC declared that the land should be reconveyed to Lourdes Evero Pacana. Petitioners appealed to the CA but CA just affirmed RTC since they believe that Lourdes had sufficiently proven that she was the heir of Juan Gabatan. CA believed that Teofilos family acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Teofilo via the Deed of Sale executed by Hermogena that was signed by Teofilo and Teofilos nearest relatives which stated Hermogena was the heir of Juan. Regarding the prescription, Teofilo never held the property as an owner. Issue: WON Lourdes Pacana is the heir of Juan and thus the owner of the said lot Held: No Rationale: Rights of filiation and heirship must be made in a special proceeding for the purpose of determining such rights. However, in this case, there is only one lot being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. So, no need for special proceeding. The SC finds that there is insufficient evidence to prove her filiation with Juan. Based on Articles 265-267 of the Civil Code, it can be proven by a certified record of birth etc. Two records of birth were presented. Respondent showed one which said Hermogenas maiden name was Hermogena Calarito Gabatan while petitioners showed a certified true copy of Lourdes birth certificate which showed that Hermoginas maiden name was Hermogena Calarito. SC rules that the petitioners birth certificate is the real one (as opposed to what TC said) since that one had been actually signed by the persons involved and seemed to comply with the standards of birth certificates at the time Lourdes was born. Respondents record was typewritten and looked like it was done only in 1977. Plus there were no signatures on respondents copy except for one by Noriga but Noriga was never presented as a witness to certify 629
the document. Though petitioners copy was hand-written, it was duly authenticated by two competent witnesses. It was the same copy found in the records of NSO Manila and was the one transmitted by the Local Civil Registrar of Cagayan de Oro. Besides, even if record of birth presented by respondent was the real one, it doesnt prove that Hermogena was the daughter of Juan. To prove such, evidence must be a record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgement. Absent these, she should have proven that her mother was enjoying continuous possession of status as legitimate child. None of these were presented by Lourdes. She only presented witnesses who testified that they knew Hermogena was the daughter of Juan. However, these witnesses were not at the wedding or at the birth of Hermogena since they were too young then or were not yet born. They were also not credible impartial witnesses. The photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale presented as evidence cannot be admissible since respondent had not proven that the best evidence the true authenticated original needed to prove her filiation was lost. Also, the action had prescribed. Juan died in 1933. Her excuse of waiting for Rita Gabatan to die in order to refile the case was not acceptable. She unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. She has herself to blame. Judgement: The petition is granted. CA decision is reversed and set aside. Dela Cruz v Gracia 594 SCRA 648 Date: July 31, 2009 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Jenie Dela Cruz and Dominique Aquino cohabited and resided in the house of Dominiques parents. Dominique died 2 months before the birth of his alleged son to Jenie, Christian Dela Cruz. She applied for registration of the childs birth together with certificate of live birth, affidavit to use the surname of father (AUSF), affidavit of acknowledgement by Dominiques father, and a document entitled Autobiography written by Dominique during his lifetime. The Autobiography stated that: We (Referring to him and Jenie) fell in loveas of now she is pregnant and for that we live together in our house now. City Civil Registrar denied Jenies application because he was born out of wedlock. Dominique is also dead and does not have the capacity to acknowledge paternity. Jenie filed a complaint with the arguing that Art176, FC states that an illegitimate child may use the surname of his father when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography was unsigned, and in violation of paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of Administrative Order 1. OSG claims that Art176 should be read with Art175, FC which states that illegitimate children may establish their filiation the same way and on same evidence as legitimate children (Art172, (2), FC private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned) Issue/s: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father can be considered as recognition of paternity in a private written instrument within contemplation of Art 176, FC. Held: Yes, if accompanied by relevant and competent evidence Ratio: Dominiques autobiography, though unsigned, satisfies the requirement a. He died 2 months prior to the childs birth 630
b. Relevant matters in the autobiography are handwritten and correspond to facts from the testimonial evidence of Jenie c. Affidavit of Acknowledgement corroborated by Dominiques father and brother *rule on requirement of affixing signature: 1. private handwritten instrument is LONE evidence must be signed 2. private handwritten instrument is ACCOMPANIED by relevant and competent evidence made and handwritten by acknowledging parent would suffice Art 3(1), United Nations Convention on Rights of a Child: best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration it is in the childs best interest to allow him yo bear the surname of his deceased father Judgment: City Civil Registrar is directed to immediately enter the surname of Dominique as the surname of the child Puno v Puno Enterprises, Inc. 599 SCRA 585 Date: September 11, 2009 Ponente: Nachura, J. Facts: Carlos Puno, an incorporator of Puno Enterprises, Inc., died. Joselito Puno, claimed to be an heir of Carlos with his common law wife and entitlement to the rights and privileges of his father as a stockholderthat he be allowed to inspect corporate book, render and accounting of its transactions and give him the profits, earnings, dividends, and income of the shares of his father. Puno Enterprises countered that Jose didnt have a legal personality to sue because his birth certificate is Joselito Musni Muno, and there should be a judicial decree that they are one and the same person. Joselito corrected his birth certificate to state Joselito M. Puno and had it certified by the Civil Registrar. TCs decision allowed respondents claims. CA reversed this and ordered for dismissal stating that Joselito was not able to establish paternity of Carlos. His birth certificate was prepared without the participatory acknowledgment or intervention of Carlos. Issue/s: 1. WON Joselito was able to establish paternity 2. If yes, WON he has a right to inspect Puno Enterprises books and receive dividends owned by Carlos Held: 1. No 2. Not automatically Ratio: 1. Birth certificate is not competent evidence when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. There was also no evidence that Carlos acknowledge Joselito as his son. - The baptismal certificate can only serve as evidence of administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the veracity with respect to the entries of childs paternity 2. Inspection is open to any director, trustee, stockholder, or member when there is a written request from them. They have the right to be intelligently informed or corporate affairs. Only stockholders are entitled to receive dividends. Upon his death, heirs do not automatically become stockholders. Stocks must be first distributed to heirs in estate proceedings. Until a settlement is effected, stocks are held by the executor. - Joselito, even if he presented sufficient evidence, still cant inspect the corporations books or be entitled to 631
receive dividends because there is no proof that sshares of Carlos were transferred to him Judgment: Joselitos petition is denied Nepomuceno vs. Lopez G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010 Law: Proof of Filiation; Illegitimate Children Ponente: Carpio Morales, J. Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA Decision which reversed the RTC Order. Overview: Alleged illegitimate child of Ben-Hur and Araceli, Arhbencel, is seeking for recognition based on a hand-written note promising support. Court held that this hand-written note does not meet the requirements set in the FC for recognition as an IC since it merely states that Ben-Hur would support Arhbencel but does not state that Ben-Hur is the father of the child. The certificate of birth does not have fathers signature. There was never any recognition of her as his child and in fact, he openly and continuously denied it. (CA decision was based on the supposed payment of hospital bills but that is not enough proof of filiation and in fact, no proof of his payment of hospital bills was presented.) that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999 o Based on the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army. RTC dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencels Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners signature; That petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; That there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note. On appeal by Arhbencel, CA reversed the trial courts decision and declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter saying that petitioners payment of Aracelis hospital bills when she gave birth leads to the only logical conclusion that he was Arhbencels father and that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support. 632
Facts: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother Araceli, filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner). Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli;
Issue: WON the hand-written note of Ben-Hur is sufficient evidence for establishing filiation. Held: No. Rationale: Petitioner states that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel and without his acknowledgement, he cannot be required to give her support. He also says that his payment of Aracelis hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial and that Arhbencels claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence. In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads: Manila, Aug. 7, 1999 I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income. Since the note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) with respect to Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The note is not a notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera (Art. 278 of the CC) since it was not notarized and the note does not say that the Ben-Hur is the father. Not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions, he has also consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. Judgement: The petition is GRANTED. CA decision is SET ASIDE. RTC order dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED. 3. Rights of Illegitimate Children, FC 176 Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 Law: Paternity and Filiation; Action to Impugn Legitimacy; Who May Impugn Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J Overview: This is about the petition for review on certiorari assailing the June 4, 1999 CA decision which reversed the RTC decision that declared William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit. Facts: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams death on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children, Enrique 633
Yulo and Bernadette Yulo, from her subsisting marriage. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. He claimed to have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao and to have been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. On August 31, 1993, the TC rendered a decision in favor of William Liyao, Jr. and declared him as the illegitimate son of William Liyao. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition. Issue: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao; WON the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter Held: No, he cannot impugn his own legitimacy. No, they did not. Rationale: (1) The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not definite. Article 255 of the New Civil Code says that children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This can only be rebutted by evidence of physical impossibility that the husband fathered the child. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs since he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. (2) The case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Judgement: Petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners side of the story. 8) Pictures were presented showing William Liyao with Corazon at several social gatherings. 9) On William Liyaos last birthday (November 22, 1975), William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, 634
look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. 10) William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon. 11) Testimony of Maurita Pasion who knew Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. a. During William Liyaos birthday on November 22, 1975, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy. He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring. b. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon. 12) Gloria Panopio testified she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia. 13) Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. a. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. b. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. c. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. 14) Enriques testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia. Respondents side of the story. 4) Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. a. Her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. b. He suffered a stroke at the office so he could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. c. She knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. d. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment of their marriage. e. Once in 1973, Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. f. Corazon, while Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again. g. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas. 5) Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. a. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, 635
Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2, 1975. Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. After the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office. The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974. He usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda LiyaoOrtiga were the first to arrive at the hospital. e. Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. f. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer. g. Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. h. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE PONENTE: Corona FACTS: Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores filed under Rule 103 ROC. Giovanni N. Gallamaso is a Filipino citizen, 16 y.o. and resides with her at San Juan, Southern Leyte. He is an illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity FC. His mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and been known by that name since birth as provided in his registered birth certificate. His fathered failed to take up his responsibilities on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. Her mother is now in the US and he desires to change his name because she might petition for him soon and the surname might complicate it. In a summary proceeding, the lower court ordered that the petition should be published in a newspaper of general circulation in 636
b. c.
d. e. 6) a.
b.
c. d.
the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks and no opposition was filed. After the reception of evidence, the trial court affirmed the petition. Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding citing Rule 108 ROC (correction in names for clerical error.) CA affirmed Trial Court. Republic claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding adversarial. ISSUE: WON purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made respondents to make it adversarial. HELD: NO RATIO: Art. 366. NCC, effective court when Giovanni was born, states that a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from birth. SC believes that the records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him. Art. 176. FC, which repealed the aforementioned code, states that Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. FC provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. Also it was for the benefit of the child and the court does not want to prevent the child from reunifying with his mother. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. However, SC held that Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy of it. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Go vs. Ramos G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009 Law: Paternity and Filiation; Illegitimate Children; Rights of Illegitimate Children Ponente: Quisimbing, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision and February 16, 2005 Resolution of the CA that affirmed the January 24, 2004 Decision and May 3, 2004 Order of the RTC of Pasig which upheld the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go. (Imagine, tagal na niyang nagstay sa Philippines, 2009 pa nadecide yung case. Haha) (Actually, three cases are involved but the Court decided to consolidate them.) Overview: This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit was filed for the deportation by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that Jimmy is an illegal and undesirable alien. Facts: In the complaint-affidavit, Luis alleges that Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen but as seen in Jimmys personal circumstance and other records indicate that he is not. Jimmys birth certificate says he is FChinese. Luis says that Jimmys parents tampered with their records and stated that they were Filipino citizens via handwriting these entries as opposed to all other parts of the record 637
which were type-written. He also says that Jimmy was only able to get a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs through stealth (NINJA!), machination and scheming in order to cover up his true citizenship. In Jimmys counter-affidavit, he says that the complaint-affidavit filed by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy insists that he is a natural-born Filipino. His father, the son of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, had elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. (Evidence: Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship on July 12, 1950.) Father was said to be born and raised in the Philippines- speaks fluent Illonggo and Tagalog, not an undocumented alien, voted during 1952 and 1955 elections. Birth certificate error of FChinese was a typo by Local Civil Registrar who presumed him to be Chinese based on his surname. Parents citizenship may have been changed when they realized their error thats why it was hand-written. Siblings birth certificate said father was Chinese. Jimmy says those were erroneous since father was not consulted before making the entry. Bureau of Immigration Associate Commissioner dismissed the complaint on Feb. 14, 2001 believing that Jimmys father had elected Filipino citizenship. On March 8, 2001, Board of Commissioners reversed the decision since Jimmys father did not elect Filipino citizenship on time. It should have been done within three years upon reaching the age of majority. The board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. On July 3, 2001, a Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy for violating the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Carlos, Jimmys dad, and Jimmy challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings. Meanwhile, the Board ordered the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. Father and son tried to petition once more but their petition was dismissed. Jimmy was apprehended but he got out on bail. They tried to appeal to the CA saying that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for was the nullification of March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet. CA dismissed the complaint and held that the Board had the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien and determine their citizenship. They agree with the trial court that the election of citizenship was not done on time and that the delay in registering the affidavit was not explained fully. Father and son filed this petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, Jimmy was apprehended and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center pending his deportation to China. On December 6, 2004, TC dismissed their petition for habeas corpus in order to release Jimmy since a deportation order had been given by the Bureau. On appeal, CA enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the issue had been settled with finality in Court. Issue: (1) WON the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (2) WON the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party therein; (3) WON the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage; (4) WON due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; (5) WON the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed. Held: (1) Cause of action had not prescribed. 638
(2) Carlos is not an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgement of the suit. (3) The Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of fact of the appellate tribunal. (4) Yup. They got to explain their side and present supporting evidence. (5) Yup. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. Rationale: (1) As in Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, the decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with finality since a person may reacquire or lose his citizenship at any time. Even if ones citizenship had been decided upon by a court, it is still open to future adjudication. (2) An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant. To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgement of the suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship will not prejudice Carlos. (3) The question of fact is beyond the Courts power of judicial review for it is not a trier of facts. None of the exceptions in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if the Court evaluates again, they will reach the same conclusion. The Court has abandoned the principle of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth). Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 not the Jones Law of 1916 will make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father was a resident of the Philippines, without any evidence to support that, will not suffice. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Illegitimate children of a Filipina, is automatically a Philippine citizen. However, absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the rule cannot apply to him. As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, the Court has no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. (4) As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgement is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. (5) When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the regional trial courts have no power to release such an alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. (HC -> moot an academic since the Board still has jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings) Judgement: December 6, 2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of the RTC are reinstated. 4. Compulsory Recognition, cf. RPC 345, RPC 46, 59 Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be sentenced: 1. To indemnify the offended woman. 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing. 3. In every case to support the offspring. The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in a 639
separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for damages caused to the offended spouse. Solinap vs. Locsin, Jr. 371 SCRA 710 December 10, 2001 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: This is a case where there were 2 records of birth presented, one proving illegitimacy, the other proving legitimacy. Dec 11, 1990, Juan Jhonny C. Locsin, Sr. died intestate. He was not survived by a wife. Nov 11 1991, Juan E. Locsin, JR. filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for Locsin Sr.s estate. His arguments are: he is an acknowledged natural child of Locsin Sr, that Locsin Sr has a lot of properties (including Srs undivided 1/6 part of inherited properties which he shared with his 5 other siblings Jose, Manuel, Maria, Lourdes, Ester), and that he is the only surviving legal heir of the deceased. The order setting the hearing was published. Thus, the opposite party surfaced on Jan 10, 1992. They are the heirs of Locsin Srs siblings (except Lourdes). They said that JR is not a child or even an acknowledged natural child of Locsin Sr, who apparently never used Sr in his lifetime. Another party appeared on Jan 5 1993. Its composed of Lucy Solinap (sole heir of Maria), Manuel Locsin, and the heirs of Lourdes, saying that JRs claim as a natural child is barred by prescription. And another oppositor came, the estate of Jose Locsin, and another, Ester. WTH all of them opposed JR, saying that he is not related to Locsin Sr. Here comes the exciting part (I guess). JR presented a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (the first CB). Its one of the pages of a bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. It stated that Juan C. Locsin Sr. is the father of JR, and that he produced the info stated there, and Locsin Srs signature. Its existence and authenticity was testified to by Rosita Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She also produced the bound book where the alleged original was included. He also presented as additional evidence a photo showing him and his mother beside the coffin of Locsin Sr. OMG. The opposite party said the first CB was spurious. They presented (the second CB) a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila. The document presented the info as provided by JRs mother Amparo Escamilla, and this does not contain the signature of Locsin Sr. They pointed out that while JR was born on Oct 22 1956, and his birth was recorded on Jan 30 1957, the first CB was recorded on a Dec 1 1958 form. The second CB was recorded on a 1956 form. They presented a handwriting expert Col. Pedro Elvas, who said that Locsin Srs and then civil registrar Emilio Tomesas signatures on the first CB are forgeries. RTC found first CB as genuine. Thus, JR is an illegitimate child of Locsin Sr and was appointed as estate administrator. CA affirmed RTC in toto. Issues: 1. Which of the 2 birth certificates is genuine? 2. Is JR a son of Locsin Sr? If so, what kind? Held: 640
1. The second CB 2. Naw. Ratio: Some terms in estate proceedings, interested party: one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. next of kin: those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes (from Gabriel vs CA) In the appointment of an estate administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed administrator. Here, JR says he is an acknowledged natural son of Locsin Sr. Thus, he is an interested party and is considered as the next of kin. So, he says he should be administrator. (from Vitug: The filiation of IC is established by: 1. the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or 2. an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by 1. the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The second CB is genuine. The first CB suffers from these irregularities: 1. Pursuant to Sec12 Act3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births of all cities and municipalities in the Phil. are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. The Manila employees have no time to falsify a CB, since they have a lot of work, and its too difficult to find one single CB. If it were a local Civil Registrar, then forgery is easier. 2. Rosita was not the civil registrar when JR was born. Thus, she doesnt know how it worked and how the records were processed before. 3. About the using of a 1958 form in first CB: Rosita said that maybe the 1956 forms were used up. But it doesnt explain how a 1958 form existed in 1957, the year when JRs birth was recorded. The second CB used a 1956 form. 4. The back cover of the bound volume that Rosita presented is torn. Rosita said she is not a bookbinder so she doesnt know how why it was torn. 5. And the entry of the first CB was just pasted, not sewn like the other entries. Rosita explained that they sometimes paste torn entries. But why was the first CB the only one which was pasted on that volume? 6. And it was just a carbon copy, not an original like the others in that volume. 7. Also, it was typewritten, unlike the other entries which were handwritten. 8. The first CB is also lacking in pertinent info about the father, like his religion, occupation, address, business. But it has a signature of Locsin Sr. 9. The Local Civil Registrar copy and the Civil Registrar General (in Manila) copy of a persons birth certificate should be identical. If not the same, it should alert the courts to possible irregularities. 10. Even though a birth certificate is the prima facie evidence of filiation, it may still be refuted by contrary evidence. Here, the first CB was obviously falsified! 641
* also, the taking of ones picture beside ones alleged parent is not and will not constitute proof of filiation. This is too easy to do anyway. So, JR is not an interested party! He failed to prove his filiation! He cannot be administrator of the estate! The second client is Congressman Romeo Jalosjos of the 1st Dist. of Zamboanga del Norte, at the Ritz Tower, Makati who for eight (8) times committed acts of lasciviousness on AAA when he kissed her on her lips, private organ and even raped her. Details of which may be found in People v. Jalosjos. SC in that case even referred to appellant as the second clients "suking bugaw. According to AAA, she was induced by Delantar by telling her that they needed money for some obligations and debts (e.g. debts, electric bills and tuition) and fear because the accused physically abused AAA and her brother whenever hes angry. She was also afraid of being sent away if she did not agree with the accused. Delantar dismissed this claims. He admitted that he delivered AAA to the clients but not for purposes connected with prostitution. He claims that he made no promises to AAA that he would give her money or anything. He tried to prove that AAA never made any objections. He claims that the fear that he would send her away is a mere conclusion or presumption. He also claims that the thought that he would get angry if she refused is merely imaginary. The courts gave more credence to AAA. On appeal, CA also held him guilty but for violation of RA 7610 for one count only. SC affirmed the decision. However, it was not proven that appellant is the parent or guardian of AAA. Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31(c), relationship is not a qualifying circumstance but only an ordinary generic aggravating circumstance. The establishment of either relationship (parent or guardian) would justify the imposition of the penalty provided in the law in its maximum. If not established, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty which could properly be imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. ISSUE: WON appellant is the parent or guardian of AAA. HELD: NO (BOTH) RATIO: The only evidence presented to establish AAAs alleged relationship to appellant is her birth certificate which mentions 642
PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR PONENTE: Tinga FACTS: Simplicio Delantar is accused to have induced AAA, his daughter and a female child below 12 y.o. to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other consideration. The trial court says he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Sec 5(a), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) for two counts (two clients Arab Mr. Hammond and Cong. Jalosjos.) According to the victims testimony, she was first brought to an Arab national by the name of Mr. Hammond from their house sometime in 1994, selling her in prostitution to that man who committed acts of lasciviousness by kissing her on her lips, breast, private parts and even rubbing his penis against her private parts. Transactions occurred at least 11 times from 1994-June 1996. After the first incident, AAA told the accused that he doesnt want to come back there anymore because the Arab is bastos and he agreed. The promise was broken and the accused rationalized time and again that what theyre doing is just ok because the clients private part is not inserted in AAAs private part. It only stopped when on 6/1996, accused told the Arab that there will be no further transactions if he will not give them 5k but the Arab said that its only ok if there will be penetration.
appellant as the father but without his signature. Appellant denied that he is AAAs father. He claimed that AAA was brought to him by a certain Salvacion Buela, AAAs real mother, who could not support her. Salvacion Buela told appellant that AAA was born on 11 May 1983 and that her natural father was a Japanese national. The birth certificate indicates that AAA was born on "11 May 1985" to "Librada A. Telin" (mother) and "Simplicio R. Delantar" (father). There is only a for "Librada T. Delantar" as the mother. According to appellant, Librada A. Telin is his sister and they did never got married to each other. Under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of birth appearing in the civil register. However, the rule is if the birth certificate presented was not signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the alleged filiation. SC thus held that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. It was never asserted that he is the AAAs father. On guardianship, SC said that the term "guardian" a legal relationship. The guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. Gapusan-Chua v CA 183 SCRA 160 Date: March 15, 1990 Ponente: Narvasa, J. Facts: Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate but her husband, Prospero, or other relatives did not move to settle her estate. Ligaya Gapusan-Chua claimed to be an acknowledged natural daughter, instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of estate and sought to be the administratrix. TC appointed her, but Prospero opposed and denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child. During the hearing, Ligaya presented the following evidence: -Felisas sworn statement of assets and liabilities where Ligaya is named daughter -Felisas GSIS life insurance application which states Ligaya as her daughter -GSIS check paid to Ligaya her share in death benefits -family photo Prospero presented the following: -Felisas application for a teachers federation naming Ligaya as adopted daughter -GSIS check allocated P1000 for Prospero and only P500 for Ligaya -Felisas sister and Vice-Mayors testimony that an unknown drifter sold Ligaya to Felisa TC appointed Ligaya as regular admininatrix. CA set aside TCs order and appointed Prospero as administrator because Ligaya has failed to establish that she had been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Art 278, CC. Ligaya contends that the sworn statement and GSIS application were authentic writings under Art 278. Prospero counters saying that to compel recognition, the action should have been brought during the lifetime of the putative parent. Issue/s: WON sworn statement and application are authentic writings under Art 278 which operated as recognition of Ligaya as a natural child even if an action wasnt brought during lifetime of Felisa Held: Yes Ratio: There are 2 kinds of recognition: 643
1. Voluntary: made in record, birth, will, or in any authentic writing 2. Compulsory or judicial: decreed by final judgment of a competent court; action may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent Sworn statement and applications are authentic writings: - genuine indubitable writings of Felisa - Ligaya had been continuously treated by Felisa as her daughter Judicial approval is not needed if recognition is voluntarily made: 1. Of a person who is of age, only his consent is necessary 2. Of a minor whose acknowledgement is effected in a record of birth or will *needed if recognition of minor is through a statement in court or authentic document Absence of judicial approval did not negate effect of the authentic writings because: - If Ligaya was of age, there is evidence of her consent to the recognition - If Ligaya was a minor, the absence of judicial approval was cured by her initiation proceedings for the settlement of Felisas estate upon reaching the age of majority *implied consent to the acknowledgement may be shown (acknowledgement papers and use of parents surname) Judgment: Ligaya is an acknowledged natural child and is appointed regular administratrix PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BARTOLOME BARRANCO PONENTE: Gancayco FACTS: Rosalia Barranco is a 19 y.o. single woman and the eldest daughter of Jaime and Aurora Barranco. Every Saturday, she is left alone in their house because her siblings and their parents works on their farm about 3 KM away. She is left to look over their pigs and their house. Bartolome Barranco is married with one child. He is the second cousin of Rosalias father and resides in the house nearest to the victims abode with a distance of about 100 M. in Baranggay Madong. His wife is a friend of Rosalia ay kumare ng asawa ni Bartolome. Nang katanghalian ng ika-10 ng Pebrero, 1980, Feb 10, 1980 Rosalia is alone and asleep in their house. She woke up when she felt a great weight upon her. When she opened her eyes, she discovered that it was Bartolome that was already naked. She thought that it was just nightmare but confirmed that it is real when he pointed a butchers knife at her neck. Ordinarily, her threatened that he will kill her if she screams or moves. Because of fear, he was able to remove her underwear and accomplish his intention of raping her. After the crime, he again threatened her. Mar 19,1980 9 AM - While Rosalia was preparing pig fodder, Bartolome came from behind, grabbed her and appears to have the intent of raping her again. She was able to evade such by hitting him with a piece of wood and running out of home while saying that she will scream for help if he will not stop. 11 AM Rosalias mother found her weeping and she disclosed to her about the crime that occurred on Feb 11. Mar 20 They went to Janiuay, Iloilos Chief of Police who advised them that they should go to NBI Iloilos physician. NBIs Dr. Ricardo H. Jaboneta positive pregnancy test. Apr 16 1980 Municipal Circuit Court of Janiuay-Badiangan, Iloilo. Rosalia sued Bartolome for the crime of rape. Bartolome pleaded not guilty. 644
Apr 3, 1981 The court held him guilty of rape w/ the use of a deadly weapon. He was also ordered to give recognition to the child that is the fruit of his sin. ISSUES: 1. WON Bartolome is guilty of rape w/ the use of a deadly weapon 2. Pertinent - WON Bartolome can be ordered by the court to recognize the child. HELD: YES and NO (but he should pay support for the child and pay P30k for damages.) RATIO: 1. SC sees no reason why they should overturn the lower courts decision. Bartolome tried to defend his case by pointing some inconsistencies in the victims testimony and SC found that none of these are sufficient or great inconsistencies: First Earlier testi: She said that the accused ordered him to part her legs. Cross-examination: she said that he was the one who opened her legs. SC held that there are no great inconsistencies and it can be deduced from both that the act was accomplished due to fear. Second Earlier testi: She said that the accused ejected his penis after ejaculation and inserted it again to rape her for the second time. Cross exam: She said that he never ejected it. SC held that because the victim was devirginized, she felt extreme pain and she was also consummated by fear. Thus, she is not expected to memorize these details. Third It is not true that he intended to rape her on Mar 19 (which was foiled when she hit him with a piece of wood.) SC finds nothing wrong with this claim. He also claims that they already had sexual relationships before that said event. NBI physicians findings however show signs that she was recently devirginized (hymen.) He also claims that she was the one who tempted him. Accdg to his wifes testimony, she saw the victim brushed her breast to her husband. Upon telling her to stop, she allegedly said that "wala kang pakialam sapagkat ako ay puta! SC finds this incredulous even for an indecent woman. 2. SC however finds that the court erred when it ordered Bartolome to recognize the child. He is already married and according to SC, a married person cannot be held to give recognition to a child who is a fruit of his sin. SC however held that he should pay support for the child and pay P30k for damages. Dempsey v. RTC 164 SCRA 384 (August 15, 1988) Nature: Special civil action for certiorari to review the decision of the RTC of Olongapo. Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: This is a very confusing case about criminal complaints filed against Joel Dempsey (R) by his partner Janalita Rapada (i.e. mother of present petitioner Christina Dempsey) for abandonment and the alleged failure to give support. January 30, 1986- Two separate complaints were filed against Joel Dempsey (R) for violation of Article 59 (2) of PD 603 (i.e. abandonment of minor child Christina Dempsey) and Article 46 (8) of PD 603 (i.e. failure to give Christina adequate support as defined in NCC 290 even if he had the means to do so). 1. According to the complaint filed by Janalita Rapada, in their cohabitation, she and Joel (R) were given a child named Christina. Christina then in her birth certificate bears the name of Joel as her father. Janalita alleged that Joel promised her that he would declare Christina 645
as his dependent and she would follow his citizenship so as to entitle the child with the benefits and privileges given to American US Navy servicemen. 2. Janalita further stated that currently her child receives US $150 monthly support and she wants him to continue it even after Joel abandoned them. Upon arraignment, Joel pleaded guilty. August 26, 1986- The MTC rendered a decision convicting Joel of 3 months, 11 days to 4 months of imprisonment for his abandonment of Christina. MTC also ordered Joel to continue supporting Christina, which stands as his civil liability. And ultimately, MTC ordered Joel to recognize Christina as his natural child. Joel (R) appealed to the RTC praying that the award on civil liability be set aside and that the imprisonment be replaced with fine only. November 28, 1986- RTC rendered a decision saying that: 1. MTC was not the proper forum but the DSWD on cases of abandonment of minors. 2. A person cannot be held criminally liable for failure to support a child. 3. MTC determined a case that is not within its competence and authority. Chirsitina (P) as represented by her mother then brought the court to SC arguing that the penalty of imprisonment and fine in both cases is sanctioned by the law and jurisprudence and that the award of civil liability is justified. (The case becomes confusing when it was brought to the SC because MTC and RTC committed a lot of errors that SC had to tackle several points including those that were not even raised by the petitioner). Issue: (Re: Compulsory recognition) WON MTC rightfully ordered Joel to recognize Christina as his natural child, this being part of Joels civil liability. Held: No. Ratio: The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the NCC and now in the FC. This case involves a criminal prosecution based on Joels plea of guilty, which means that the action for recognition was not properly heard and tried. The MTC could not merely order Joel to recognize Christina as his natural child just because he pleaded guilty of abandonment and failure to give support. Ang tanga tanga mag-explain ng SC. In short, they only mean that an action for recognition requires a different suit and cannot be a mere consequence of the criminal charges filed. SCs other points: Joel did not assail the validity of PD 603 and the judgment against him by the MTC, as he even impliedly recognized the authority of MTC by merely asking that imprisonment be changed to a fine. Thus, the jurisdiction of the MTC over the case was never really assailed. It follows that RTC erred in suddenly declaring MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. SC also ruled that RTC erred in saying that Christina is not entitled to the rights arising from parental responsibility of her father because she is only an illegitimate child. PD 603 recognizes all children, not only the legitimate ones. Also, FC (although not yet effective during this time i.e. August 15) already erased any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children insofar as joint parental custody is concerned. And lastly, MTC has jurisdiction over the case because Christina was not really abandoned in the strict sense of the word in that she still has her mother. Therefore, the Department 646
of Social Services and Development need not come into the picture as it only needs to when the child has been left by both her parents. Judgment: MTCs decision reinstated with modification re: imprisonment, lowering it into 1 month and a fine of P300. People vs. Bayani (1996) (this is a rape case. I will no longer write all the details about the rape. Just the summary.) Facts: June 28, 1992 Maria Elena Nieto, a 15 year-old girl who went to a Catholic School with her boyfriend, was raped by Moreno Bayani, her familys neighbor who she calls uncle, a 32 year-old, married policeman Bayani held a gun on her head and threatened to kill her and her family if she says anything After the rape, Elena got pregnant and her stomach started showing After being confronted by her boyfriend, Elena related the rape incident which, later on, was related to her family Bayani denied the rape; instead, he said that Elena is his mistress and admitted that they had sexual encounter on the day in question and in many other days o He said that he promised to support Elena should she become pregnant o He also averred that Elena concocted the alibi of rape in order not to lose her boyfriend, but ended up losing both her boyfriend and him (Bayani) who promised to sustain her and the fruit of their love March 21, 1993 Elena gave birth to a girl Bayani was convicted of rape The Solicitor General recommended that Bayani should be made to support his IC in conformity w/ Art 345(3) of the RPC Issue: WON Bayani is required by law to recognize the child he fathered through rape WON he should support the child Held: NO and YES Recognition of the offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the absence of evidence; however, in this case, Bayani has expressly admitted paternity of the child, thus giving rise to the obligation to provide support Because of his judicial admission twice recited, he has indisputably admitted his paternity of the child ART 345 of RPC provides that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be sentenced to: o indemnify the offended woman o acknowledge the offspring unless the law should prevent him from so doing o in every case, support the offspring Art 283 of the CC says the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and seduction when the period of the offense coincides, more or less, w/ the period of conception It has been held, however, that acknowledgment is disallowed if the offender is a married man, w/ only support for the offspring as part of the sentence With the passage of FC, however, the classifications of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction have been eliminated. Today, children are classified as only either legitimate or illegitimate, w/ no further positive act required of the parent as the law itself provides the childs status. So, natural children under CC fall under the illegitimate children under FC Art 176 of FC confers parental authority over IC on the mother, and provides for their entitlement to support in conformity w/ 647
the FC. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married w/c would vest parental authority in him Therefore, under Art 345 of RPC, the offender in a rape case who is a married man can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring if there be any People vs Magtibay 386 SCRA 332 August 6, 2002 Ponente: Ynares-Santiago FACTS: This is a rape case. Prosecutions version: Sep 15 1997, around 8pm. Rachelle Recto went to a store 40 meters away from her home to buy yosi and ice. When she got there, she saw accused Raymundo Magtibay staring at her. When she started back home, he pulled her right hand and covered her mouth and told her that he will kill her if she shouted for help. He pulled her on a grassy place and there he forced himself on her. Rachelle did not tell anyone about this until her mother Gaudiosa noticed that she was 8 months pregnant. Apparently, Magtibay threatened to kill Rachelle everytime he saw her. Rachelle eventually gave birth to a boy. Defenses version: Magtibay (plus wife) said, at the time of the rape, he was bedridden due to flu and that he recovered only on Sep 19 1997. Issue: WON the baby boy born was the accuseds son, and what does this entail? Held: YES. Magtibay must support the child. Ratio: RPC 345: 3 kinds of civil liability for persons guilty of crimes against chastity (rape, seduction, abduction): 1. to indemnify the offended woman 2. to acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing 3. in every case to support the offspring But, since rape is punished by reclusion perpetua, and the parent so punished automatically loses parental authority over his children, he should only be ordered to indemnify and support the child. (On proving the rape): - Rachelle was a credible witness for the prosecution. - She was not able to resist because he threatened to kill her - It is not a requirement for rape victims to resist their attackers. They were forced nga eh. - There is no rule that a woman can only be raped in seclusion - She was able to positively identify him because he laid her face-up. She was able to identify him because she often sees him in the barrio. In fact, she even attended the wedding of Magtibay 6 months before this crime! - His alibi is stupid. He was able to cure himself of the flu only after taking a tablet or two. His house was also too near the scene of the crime. - There was no showing that Rachelle was raped or that she had sex before, thus increasing the possibility of Magtibay as being the father. People v Abella (G.R. No. 177295) Date: January 6, 2010 Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro 648
Overview: Abella raped AAA. AAA got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl. Abella was convicted of the crime of rape and was ordered to pay damages and to recognize and give support to his offspring with the victim. Facts: Sometime in December of 1999 (1 pm), Abella, a person known to AAA since he was a child (a cousin of AAAs mothers husband), while armed with a balisong and under the influence of liquor, by means of force and intimidation and with lewd design, entered the house of AAA, a woman of feeble mind (i.e. She was 38 years old but manifested a mental age of between 7-8 years old [retard]; She also suffered from dwarfism being only 3 feet and 8 inches tall.) and there have sexual intercourse with her against her will. Several months after the incident, AAAs stomach became big. Thinking that she was ill, she drank some bitter solution (mahogany seeds given by Abella to AAAs mom so that AAA could have her menstruation) upon her mothers instruction. As her stomach continued to grow, AAA was forced to tell her mother about the rape incident. Thereafter, AAA consulted a doctor who confirmed that she was pregnant. Consequently, she gave birth to a baby girl (Aug. 16, 2000). Abella also tried to settle the case for the sum of P20,000. AAAs party refused. He was convicted of the crime of rape and ordered him to pay civil indemnity and damages (exemplary damages were later deleted by CA due to lack of basis) and to acknowledge and support his offspring with AAA. He appealed saying that allegation was ill motivated due to the bad blood and personal animosities between their families. He claimed that AAA was coached by her family to testify against him. Also, that it was a certain Mang Ben, a construction worker, who has raped her. Finally, P20,000 offer was merely concocted. Issue: WON Abella should be convicted of the crime of rape? WON Abella should acknowledge and give support to his offspring with AAA? Held and Ratio: Yes. AAAs testimony is credible despite that fact that she had a mental age of a child. o Psychiatric evaluation proved that AAA is generally coherent and relevant. o Extensive examination on the witness stand shows that she could distinguish good from bad and truth from lies. o AAA identified Abella without uncertainty as her offender. o Mang Ben question was sort of misleading and confused her. But this mistake was rectified and/or clarified in a subsequent examiniation. o Candid, sincere straightforward and simple Yes. o Abella is the biological father f the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their striking facial similarities and features. The order to acknowledge and support said offspring is in accordance with RPC 345. o Award for damages is also appropriate. Egap vs People (Egap Madsali, Sajiron Lajim and Maron Lajim vs People of the Philippines) G.R. No. 179570 February 4, 2010 Ponente: Peralta Overview 649
The case is about a minor who had been raped, illegally detained, and was forced to sign documents pertaining to her marriage with detainer. Facts AAA rape victim BBB mother CCC father In Palawan on July 1, 1994, AAA was fetching water with a certain Inon Dama when Sajiron, carrying a bolo, ran towards them and caught AAA by the hair. Sajiron threatened them; that AAA would be killed if she did not go with him, and Inon Dama would be killed if she(?) does not leave. Inon Dama left and reported the incident to AAAs mother. As Inon Dama left, Sajirons father Maron appeared and asked them to go with him. AAA refused but her hands were tied behind her back and she was brought to the forest. Sajiron raped AAA thrice, with Maron standing by as look-out. The next day, they all left for the house of Egap, where she was detained for 5 months (July 2 1994 Dec 15 1994). BBB came to Egaps house in July 2 but Egap refused and threatened that AAA would die if she reported to the authorities. AAA was asked to sign an unknown document which she was not able to read, and on July 11 1994, she was married to Sajiron by Imam Musli Muhammad. Defense Sajiron and AAA had been engaged for 3 years prior to their elopement. The sex was consensual. AAA merely filed criminal charges against Sajiron because he did not pay the dowry in the amount of 10k to AAAs parents. CCC testified that Sajiron courted his daughter and proposed for marriage after 3 years of courtship. CCC also claimed to have talked with BBB that they were both amenable to the marriage. CCC alleged that he and BBB were present during the marriage. Issue WON the marriage between AAA and Sajiron is valid Held No. Ratio 3. AAA testified that she had never seen her father since she was a child, as her father had abandoned them. It was surprising that after his long absence, CCC suddenly appears and testifies for the defense. CCC was not able to prove any form of constant communication with his family that he was claiming to have had. 4. The Imam who solmenized the marriage testified that the parents of AAA and Sajiron were not present during the marriage. That makes CCCs claims of being there during the marriage questionable (?). 5. PD 1083 Art 15 (b) provides that no marriage shall be perfected unless the essential requisite of mutual consent of the parties be freely given. AAA was forced to sign the marriage contract in the absence of her parents/relatives. The Imam solemnized the marriage despite lack of consent for fear of Egap who threatened him. 6. SHE DID NOT LOVE HIM!!! hahaha F. Legitimated Children 1. Who may be Legitimated, FC 177 Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a) Abadilla v. Tabiliran, Jr. 249 SCRA 447 (October 25, 1995) 650
Nature: Administrative matter in the SC. Gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. Ponente: Per curiam Facts: This is a very straightforward case regarding the complaints filed by a Clerk of Court against Judge Jose Tabiliran. On September 8, 1992, Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jose Tabiliran, filed a case against the Judge for gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. Abadilla (P) alleged the following: On gross immorality: Judge publicly and scandalously cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Judge even married Priscilla on May 23, 1986 while his first marriage was still subsisting. Judge misrepresented himself as single in his marriage contract with Priscilla. Teresita even filed a case before against Judge for abandoning their family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son. On deceitful conduct: Judge falsely registered his 3 children with Priscilla as legitimate even if he is fully aware that they are not as his first marriage was still subsisting and that his second marriage with Priscilla was void bigamous. Judge falsely executed separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration of the three as legitimate was merely due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight. On corruption: Judge engaged in a private practice of law by preparing and notarizing documents, out of which he charged fees beyond the allowable rates. Abadilla (P) showed pieces of evidence such as an affidavit of one of Judges customers and receipts. Judge allegedly accepts bribes. Judge prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he collected the amount of P500. Judge Tabiliran Jr. argues that his wife already abandoned his family since 1966, hence, pursuant to NCC 390 (i.e. that a spouse absent for 7 years shall be presumed dead for all purposes except succession), he contracted his 2nd marriage in good faith. This also is the reason why he represented himself as single as he could not say that he was divorced nor was he a widow. Furthermore, as to the charge of corruption, he asserts that there was no other notary public in their place, hence, he was authorized by the Mayor to stand as one. He then denies charges of bribery and his alleged preparation of an Affidavit of Desistance. RTC rendered a decision declaring that Judge is only guilty of 2 charges of corruption and nothing else. Issue: WON Judge Tabiliran, Jr. is guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. Held: Yes to all. Ratio: 1. On gross immorality a. According to the record, Judge and Priscilla had been openly living with each other since 1970, as evidenced by their first child born on July 14, 1970. Hence, if Teresita had been absent since 1966, 1970 was only 651
four years from Teresitas alleged absence. Judge then could not presume that Teresita was already dead. b. His second marriage with Priscilla is against the inviolability of marriage as a social institution. c. Judge violated the trust reposed to his high office and the law profession. 2. On deceitful conduct a. Judge should know that his children with Priscilla could never be legitimated by her marriage with the latter because he had a subsisting marriage with Teresita. b. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations per NCC 269. This is reiterated in FC 177. According to Sempio-Diy, this prohibition is because legitimation of children born of adulterous relations is unfair for the legitimate children in terms of their successional rights. This is also against public policy. c. It is also erroneous for the Judge to argue that Teresita had been absent since 1966 because on December 8, 1969, Teresita even filed a case against the Judge for the latters abandonment of their family home. d. Although the case filed by Teresita did not pursue, the Judge was reprimanded for executing a Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately from Bed. It was also in this deed that Judge declared that he only has two legitimate children, the ones he had with Teresita. This further proves that his declaration that his children with Priscilla are legitimate is misleading and detrimental to his real legitimate children. 3. On corruption a. Judge is guilty of acting as Notary Public because even if he would have been allowed to do so due to the fact that there was no other in their place who can act as one, he had to properly account for it and turn it over to the municipal government. However, he failed to do so. b. His denial of collecting the legal fees on the Affidavit of Desistance is not substantiated by evidence, hence it should be treated merely as self-serving and should not be given credence. Judgment: Judge is guilty and dismissed from office. 2. How legitimation takes place, FC 178, FC 180 Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a) Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a) 3. Retroactivity and Effects, FC 180 (supra), 181 Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (274) 4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC 182 Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues. (275a) 5. Rights of legitimated children, FC 179 Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a) XII. ADOPTION RENATO LAZATIN vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR 652
PONENTE: Teehankee FACTS: On January 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon, Irma Lazatin. One month after, his widow commenced an intestate proceeding. Mariano, Oscar, Virgilio and Yvonne, claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Dr. Lazatin with one Helen Munoz, intervened. Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. Two months after widow Margarita, also died, leaving a & holographic will which contained legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara. During her lifetime, Margarita kept a safety deposit box at a bank which either she or Nora could open. Five days after Margarita's death, Nora, accompanied by her husband, Bernardo de Leon, opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her mother. She said that it was in good faith and when she was to close the deposit box and duly informed by a bank personnel that she needed an authority from the court, she removed everything from the box. Upon knowledge of which, Ramon Sta. Clara, claimed that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the opening of the safety deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will in it. Judge Alcantara, ordered the safety deposit box to be opened, and was of course already empty because of Nora. Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, Renato Sta. Clara intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano, as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. On that date, Ramon also filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Margarita to examine private respondents on the contents of the safety deposit box. The probate court ordered respondent Nora to deliver the properties taken from the safety deposit box to the Clerk of Court. Subsequently, however, the two cases were transferred to respondent Judge Jose C. Campos, Jr. Nora deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened upon order of the court. Later, Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano, stating that Renato was an illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. Judge Campos found Nora of contempt of court for not complying with the orders requiring her to produce and deliver to the court and the papers and items removed from the safety deposit box. Her former counsel was also found guilty of contempt, sentenced to pay a fine and suspended from a appearing in the two cases because Nora said that she acted upon his advice. On hearing, the court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita. He presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove that: 1. He had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; 2. He had been supported by them until their death; 3. He was formerly known as "Renato Lazatin" but was compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; 4. At first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Margaritas father, but a few months later, transferred to 653
the Mercy Hospital owned by the deceased spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present. He also wanted to present photographs (photograph of Irma Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis and petitioner when he was a boy) and a document showing that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." The respondents objected to the admission of such evidence. Respondent Court barred the introduction of petitioners evidence and held that it does not tend to prove that he was an adopted child but only a natural child. Nora later deposited with respondent court the items she had removed from the safety deposit box and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and stock certificates. ISSUE: WON the court erred in ruling that the evidences would not prove adoption. HELD: NO RATIO: Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between 2 persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. An adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established. The evidences Renato wanted to present will not prove in any way that a certain court approved a proceeding that was executed by the deceased couple to adopt him. No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. There are no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding or to the adoption decree. On an assumption that the adoption proceedings occurred in Manila, a certification furnished by his counsel from the Court of first Instance of Manila which states that no records where found regarding such in spite of a diligent search and a report by the Local Registrar which states that the Liberation of Manila (World War II) destroyed or burned judicial records does not furnish any legal basis for a presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. He could also have conveniently secured a copy of the newpaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court (formerly Section 4, Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing house to that effect. Evidences which shows acts and delaration by a deceased that he/she has adopted or intends to adopt a child cannot sufficiently prove legal adoption: that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated like their own will not prove adoption; feeding, clothing, providing a home and an education; that he/she expressed that the child is adopted or intends such. Pedigree testimony could be admitted but, in proving an adoption, there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in those courts where adoption is usually granted would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an order. Secondary evidence is also admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the existence of such instrument must first be established. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. He failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis. Cervantes vs. Fajardo Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. 654
SC: issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, RTC. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court. 1987, Executive Judge submitted to the Court his report and recommendation the minor was born on 1987 to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child for adoption to Gina's sister and brotherin-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes who took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also executed by Gina The petition for adoption was filed over the child (granted) The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. RTC: the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate ." 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the Fajardos demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. They refused to accede to the demand. After 5 or 6 month, while the Cervantes were out at work, Gina took the child from her "yaya" at the Cervantes residence Gina brought the child to her house. Cervantes demanded the return of the child, but Gina refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She will, however, return the child if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Issue: who has the right for the custody of the child Held: Cervantes spouse It is undisputed that Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, Gina had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost 3 yrs but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Cervantes who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted with the full knowledge and consent of the real parents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 655
Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 y/o, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. Republic Act No. 8552 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Promulgated February 25, 1998) Article I. General Provisions Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the child's extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered. (b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. (c) It shall also be a State policy to: (i) Safeguard the biological parent(s) from making hurried decisions to relinquish his/her parental authority over his/her child; (ii) Prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s); (iii) Protect adoptive parent(s) from attempts to disturb his/her parental authority and custody over his/her adopted child. Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as "legally available for adoption" and his/her custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child; (iv) Conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption; (v) Ensure that sufficient capacity exists within government and private sector agencies to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications, and offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and counseling; and (vi) Encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the child's identity and culture in his/her native land, and only when this is not available shall intercountry adoption be considered as a last resort. Sec 3. Definition of terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as: (a) "Child" is a person below eighteen (18) years of age. (b) "A child legally available for adoption" refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a 656
duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption. (c) "Voluntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s) knowingly and willingly relinquishes parental authority to the Department. (d) "Involuntarily committed child" is one whose parent(s), known or unknown, has been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect; abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. (e) "Abandoned child" refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such. (f) "Supervised trial custody" is a period of time within which a social worker oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopter(s) and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship. (g) "Department" refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (h) "Child-placing agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents, and preparing the adoption home study. (i) "Child-caring agency" is a duly licensed and accredited agency by the Department that provides twenty four (24)-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children. (j) "Simulation of birth" is the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his/her biological mother, causing such child to lose his/her true identity and status. Article II. Pre-Adoption Services Sec. 4. Counseling Service. The Department shall provide the services of licensed social workers to the following: (a) Biological Parent(s) Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the birth of his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of his/her child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished his/her child for adoption. Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all alternatives for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided. (b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others, shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare him/her for effective parenting. (c) Prospective Adoptee Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she understands the nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on adoption in accordance with his/her age and level of maturity. Sec. 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). It shall be the duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned. Sec. 6. Support Services. The Department shall develop a preadoption program which shall include, among others, the above mentioned services. 657
Article III. Eligibilty Sec. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. Sec. 8. Who May Be Adopted. The following may be adopted: (a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption; (b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse; (c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy; (d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; (e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or (f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; 658
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. Article IV. Procedure Sec. 10. Hurried Decisions. In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the biological parent(s) has been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child, and to sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged stay of the child in his/her own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest. Sec. 11. Case Study. No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department, the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is registered. The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that the documents to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine intentions and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child. The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and records pertaining to the adoptee and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department. Sec. 12. Supervised Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been given by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter(s). The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must complete the six (6)-month trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii). If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s). Sec. 13. Decree of Adoption. If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known. 659
Sec. 14. Civil Registry Record. An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her surname. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue. Sec. 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used. Article V. Effects of Adoption Sec. 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s). Sec. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. Sec. 18. Succession. In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. Article VI. Rescission of Adoption Sec. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. Sec. 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and restore his/her original birth certificate. Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. 660
Article VII. Violations and penalties Sec. 21. Violations and Penalties. (a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the following acts: (i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts; (ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or (iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation. (b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). .Any physician or nurse or hospital personnel who, in violation of his/her oath of office, shall cooperate in the execution of the abovementioned crime shall suffer the penalties herein prescribed and also the penalty of permanent disqualification. Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents, and communications of adoption applications, cases, and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), at the discretion of the court. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated offense under this Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two (2) or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided, shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations. When the offender is an alien, he/she shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and perpetually excluded from entry to the country. .Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the aboveprescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said government official, employee, or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case. Sec. 22. Rectification of Simulated Births. A person who has, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child shall not be punished for such act: Provided, That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that he/she has been consistently considered and treated by that person as his/her own son/daughter: Provided, further, That the application for correction of the birth registration and petition for adoption shall be filed within five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and completed thereafter: Provided, finally, That such person complies with the procedure as specified in Article IV of this Act and other requirements as determined by the Department. Article VIII. Final Provisions 661
Sec. 23. Adoption Resource and Referral Office. There shall be established an Adoption Resources and Referral Office under the Department with the following functions: (a) monitor the existence, number, and flow of children legally available for adoption and prospective adopter(s) so as to facilitate their matching; (b) maintain a nationwide information and educational campaign on domestic adoption; (c) keep records of adoption proceedings; (d) generate resources to help child-caring and child-placing agencies and foster homes maintain viability; and (e) do policy research in collaboration with the Intercountry Adoption Board and other concerned agencies. The office shall be manned by adoption experts from the public and private sectors. Sec. 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Within six (6) months from the promulgation of this Act, the Department, with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Office of Civil Registry General, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, and two (2) private individuals representing child-placing and childcaring agencies shall formulate the necessary guidelines to make the provisions of this Act operative. Sec. 25. Appropriations. Such sum as may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter. Sec. 26. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified, or amended accordingly. Sec. 27. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting. Sec. 28. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in any newspaper of general circulation or in the Official Gazette. [A.m. No. 02-6-02-SC 2002-08-02] RULE ON ADOPTION A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino children. Sec. 2. Objectives. (a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care, custody and adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally, and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption. (b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall: (i) (i) ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided with love, care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. Only when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the childs extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered. (ii) safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in relinquishing their parental authority over their child; (iii) (iii) prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents; 662
(iv) conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for adoption; (v) ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption inquiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption-related services including, but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and counseling; (vi) encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the childs identity and culture in his native land, and only when this is not available shall inter-country adoption be considered as a last resort; and (vii) protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their adopted child. Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared so as to establish the status of the child as legally available for adoption and his custody transferred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule: (a) (a) Child is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the filing of the petition for adoption. (b) (b) A child legally available for adoption refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of adoption, his guardian or adopter(s). (c) (c) Voluntarily committed child is one whose parents knowingly and willingly relinquish parental authority over him in favor of the Department. (d) (d) Involuntarily committed child is one whose parents, known or unknown, have been permanently and judicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment; substantial, continuous or repeated neglect and abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. (e) (e) Foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a foundling. (f) (f) Abandoned child refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parents have deserted him for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared as such. (g) (g) Dependent child refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian or one whose parents, guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is dependent upon the public for support. (h) (h) Neglected child is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or inadequately attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian. (i) (i) Physical neglect occurs when the child is malnourished, illclad and without proper shelter. 663
(j) (j) Emotional neglect exists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or placed in moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices. (k) (k) Child-placement agency refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department to provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption home study report. (l) (l) Child-caring agency refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department that provides 24-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily committed children. (m) (m) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (n) (n) Deed of Voluntary Commitment refers to the written and notarized instrument relinquishing parental authority and committing the child to the care and custody of the Department executed by the childs biological parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the childs legal guardian, to be witnessed by an authorized representative of the Department after counseling and other services have been made available to encourage the biological parents to keep the child. (o) (o) Child Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker of the childs legal status, placement history, psychological, social, spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural background and that of his biological family needed in determining the most appropriate placement for him. (p) (p) Home Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker of the motivation and capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to provide a home that meets the needs of a child. (q) (q) Supervised trial custody refers to the period of time during which a social worker oversees the adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopters and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship. (r) (r) Licensed Social Worker refers to one who possesses a degree in bachelor of science in social work as a minimum educational requirement and who has passed the government licensure examination for social workers as required by Republic Act No. 4373. (s) (s) Simulation of birth is the tampering of the civil registry to make it appear in the birth records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose his true identity and status. (t) (t) Biological Parents refer to the childs mother and father by nature. (u) (u) Pre-Adoption Services refer to psycho-social services provided by professionally-trained social workers of the Department, the social services units of local governments, private and government health facilities, Family Courts, licensed and accredited child-caring and child-placement agencies and other individuals or entities involved in adoption as authorized by the Department. (v) (v) Residence means a persons actual stay in the Philippines for three (3) continuous years immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption and which is maintained until the adoption decree is entered. Temporary absences for professional, business, health, or emergency reasons not exceeding sixty (60) days in one (1) year does 664
not break the continuity requirement. (w) (w) Alien refers to any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and remains in the Philippines and is in possession of a valid passport or travel documents and visa. SEC. 4. Who may adopt. The following may adopt: (1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16-year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptees parent; (2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child. Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. (3) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of one spouse by the other spouse; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the illegitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. SEC. 5. Who may be adopted. The following may be adopted: (1) (1) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been voluntarily committed to the Department under Articles 154, 155 and 156 of P.D. No. 603 or judicially declared available for adoption; (2) (2) The legitimate child of one spouse, by the other spouse; (3) (3) An illegitimate child, by a qualified adopter to raise the status of the former to that of legitimacy; (4) (4) A person of legal age regardless of civil status, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopters as their own child since minority; 665
(a) (a) The jurisdictional facts; (5) (5) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or (b) (b) Sub-paragraph 1(b) above; (6) (6) A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parents. (7) (7) A child not otherwise disqualified by law or these rules. Sec. 6. Venue. The petition for adoption shall be filed with the Family Court of the province or city where the prospective adoptive parents reside. Sec. 7. Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be verified and specifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleading whether the petition contains an application for change of name, rectification of simulated birth, voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, or declaration of child as abandoned, dependent or neglected. 1) 1) If the adopter is a Filipino citizen, the petition shall allege the following: (a) (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) (b) That the petitioner is of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights; is of good moral character; has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children; is at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, unless the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptees parent; and is in a position to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family and has undergone pre-adoption services as required by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8552. 2) 2) If the adopter is an alien, the petition shall allege the following: (c) (c) That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (d) (d) That he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country and his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child and reside there permanently as an adopted child; and (e) (e) That he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition and he maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. The requirements of certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his country and of residency may be waived if the alien: (i) is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or (iii) is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his spouse a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. 3) 3) If the adopter is the legal guardian of the adoptee, the petition shall allege that guardianship had been terminated and the guardian had cleared his financial accountabilities. 4) 4) If the adopter is married, the spouse shall be a co-petitioner for joint adoption except if: 666
(a) one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other, or (b) if one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child and the other spouse signified written consent thereto, or (c) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. 5) 5) If the adoptee is a foundling, the petition shall allege the entries which should appear in his birth certificate, such as name of child, date of birth, place of birth, if known; sex, name and citizenship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage. 6) 6) If the petition prays for a change of name, it shall also state the cause or reason for the change of name. In all petitions, it shall be alleged: (a) The first name, surname or names, age and residence of the adoptee as shown by his record of birth, baptismal or foundling certificate and school records. (b) That the adoptee is not disqualified by law to be adopted. (c) The probable value and character of the estate of the adoptee. (d) The first name, surname or names by which the adoptee is to be known and registered in the Civil Registry. A certification of non-forum shopping shall be included pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec. 8. Rectification of Simulated Birth. In case the petition also seeks rectification of a simulated of birth, it shall allege that: (a) (a) Petitioner is applying for rectification of a simulated birth; (b) (b) The simulation of birth was made prior to the date of effectivity of Republic Act No. 8552 and the application for rectification of the birth registration and the petition for adoption were filed within five years from said date; (c) (c) The petitioner made the simulation of birth for the best interests of the adoptee; and (d) (d) The adoptee has been consistently considered and treated by petitioner as his own child. Sec. 9. Adoption of a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child. In case the adoptee is a foundling, an abandoned, dependent or neglected child, the petition shall allege: (a) (a) The facts showing that the child is a foundling, abandoned, dependent or neglected; (b) (b) The names of the parents, if known, and their residence. If the child has no known or living parents, then the name and residence of the guardian, if any; (c) (c) The name of the duly licensed child-placement agency or individual under whose care the child is in custody; and (d) (d) That the Department, child-placement or child-caring agency is authorized to give its consent.
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Sec. 10. Change of name. In case the petition also prays for change of name, the title or caption must contain: (a) (a) The registered name of the child; (b) (b) Aliases or other names by which the child has been known; and (c) (c) The full name by which the child is to be known. Sec. 11. Annexes to the Petition. The following documents shall be attached to the petition: A. Birth, baptismal or foundling certificate, as the case may be, and school records showing the name, age and residence of the adoptee; B. Affidavit of consent of the following: 1. The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; 2. The biological parents of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the child-placement agency, child-caring agency, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; 3. The legitimate and adopted children of the adopter and of the adoptee, if any, who are ten (10) years of age or over; 4. The illegitimate children of the adopter living with him who are ten (10) years of age or over; and 5. The spouse, if any, of the adopter or adoptee. C. Child study report on the adoptee and his biological parents; D. If the petitioner is an alien, certification by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his own adopted child unless exempted under Section 4(2); E. Home study report on the adopters. If the adopter is an alien or residing abroad but qualified to adopt, the home study report by a foreign adoption agency duly accredited by the Inter-Country Adoption Board; and F. Decree of annulment, nullity or legal separation of the adopter as well as that of the biological parents of the adoptee, if any. Sec. 12. Order of Hearing. If the petition and attachments are sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue an order which shall contain the following: (1) the registered name of the adoptee in the birth certificate and the names by which the adoptee has been known which shall be stated in the caption; (2) the purpose of the petition; (3) the complete name which the adoptee will use if the petition is granted; (4) the date and place of hearing which shall be set within six (6) months from the date of the issuance of the order and shall direct that a copy thereof be published before the date of hearing at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the court is situated; Provided, that in case of application for change of name, the date set for hearing shall not be within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice nor within thirty (30) days prior to an election. The newspaper shall be selected by raffle under the supervision of the 668
Executive Judge. (5) a directive to the social worker of the court, the social service office of the local government unit or any child-placing or child-caring agency, or the Department to prepare and submit child and home study reports before the hearing if such reports had not been attached to the petition due to unavailability at the time of the filing of the latter; and (6) a directive to the social worker of the court to conduct counseling sessions with the biological parents on the matter of adoption of the adoptee and submit her report before the date of hearing. At the discretion of the court, copies of the order of hearing shall also be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General through the provincial or city prosecutor, the Department and the biological parents of the adoptee, if known. If a change in the name of the adoptee is prayed for in the petition, notice to the Solicitor General shall be mandatory. Sec. 13. Child and Home Study Reports. In preparing the child study report on the adoptee, the concerned social worker shall verify with the Civil Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the social worker to register the adoptee and secure a certificate of foundling or late registration, as the case may be. The social worker shall establish that the child is legally available for adoption and the documents in support thereof are valid and authentic, that the adopter has sincere intentions and that the adoption shall inure to the best interests of the child. In case the adopter is an alien, the home study report must show the legal capacity to adopt and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child in the absence of the certification required under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8552. If after the conduct of the case studies, the social worker finds that there are grounds to deny the petition, he shall make the proper recommendation to the court, furnishing a copy thereof to the petitioner. Sec. 14. Hearing. Upon satisfactory proof that the order of hearing has been published and jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, the court shall proceed to hear the petition. The petitioner and the adoptee must personally appear and the former must testify before the presiding judge of the court on the date set for hearing. The court shall verify from the social worker and determine whether the biological parent has been properly counseled against making hasty decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up the child; ensure that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted; and ascertain if any prolonged stay of the child in his own home will be inimical to his welfare and interest. Sec. 15. Supervised Trial Custody. Before issuance of the decree of adoption, the court shall give the adopter trial custody of the adoptee for a period of at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. The trial custody shall be monitored by the social worker of the court, the Department, or the social service of the local government unit, or the child-placement or child-caring agency which submitted and prepared the case studies. During said period, temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter. The court may, motu proprio or upon motion of any party, reduce the 669
period or exempt the parties if it finds that the same shall be for the best interests of the adoptee, stating the reasons therefor. An alien adopter however must complete the 6-month trial custody except the following: a) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or b) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his Filipino spouse; or c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse the latters relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity. If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter through a pre-adoption placement authority issued by the Department, the court shall order that the prospective adopter shall enjoy all the benefits to which the biological parent is entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with him. The social worker shall submit to the court a report on the result of the trial custody within two weeks after its termination. Sec. 16. Decree of Adoption. If the supervised trial custody is satisfactory to the parties and the court is convinced from the trial custody report and the evidence adduced that the adoption shall redound to the best interests of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be issued which shall take effect as of the date the original petition was filed even if the petitioners die before its issuance. The decree shall: 670 A. State the name by which the child is to be known and registered; B. Order: 1) the Clerk of Court to issue to the adopter a certificate of finality upon expiration of the 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal; 2) the adopter to submit a certified true copy of the decree of adoption and the certificate of finality to the Civil Registrar where the child was originally registered within thirty (30) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. In case of change of name, the decree shall be submitted to the Civil Registrar where the court issuing the same is situated. 3) 3) the Civil Registrar of the place where the adoptee was registered: a. to annotate on the adoptees original certificate of birth the decree of adoption within thirty (30) days from receipt of the certificate of finality; b. to issue a certificate of birth which shall not bear any notation that it is a new or amended certificate and which shall show, among others, the following: registry number, date of registration, name of child, sex, date of birth, place of birth, name and citizenship of adoptive mother and father, and the date and place of their marriage, when applicable; c. to seal the original certificate of birth in the civil registry records which can be opened only upon order of the court which issued the decree of adoption; and d. to submit to the court issuing the decree of adoption proof of compliance with all the foregoing within thirty days from receipt of the decree.
If the adoptee is a foundling, the court shall order the Civil Registrar where the foundling was registered, to annotate the decree of adoption on the foundling certificate and a new birth certificate shall be ordered prepared by the Civil Registrar in accordance with the decree. Sec. 17. Book of Adoptions. The Clerk of Court shall keep a book of adoptions showing the date of issuance of the decree in each case, compliance by the Civil Registrar with Section 16(B)(3) and all incidents arising after the issuance of the decree. Sec. 18. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. All hearings in adoption cases, after compliance with the jurisdictional requirements shall be confidential and shall not be open to the public. All records, books and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential. If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for security reasons or for purposes connected with or arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interests of the adoptee, the court may, upon proper motion, order the necessary information to be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used. Sec. 19. Rescission of Adoption of the Adoptee. The petition shall be verified and filed by the adoptee who is over eighteen (18) years of age, or with the assistance of the Department, if he is a minor, or if he is over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, by his guardian or counsel. The adoption may be rescinded based on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter: 1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling; 2) attempt on the life of the adoptee; 3) sexual assault or violence; or 4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations. Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. Sec. 20. Venue. The petition shall be filed with the Family Court of the city or province where the adoptee resides. Sec. 21. Time within which to file petition. The adoptee, if incapacitated, must file the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within five (5) years after he reaches the age of majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within five (5) years after recovery from such incompetency. Sec. 22. Order to Answer. The court shall issue an order requiring the adverse party to answer the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. The order and copy of the petition shall be served on the adverse party in such manner as the court may direct. Sec. 23. Judgment. If the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render judgment ordering the rescission of adoption, with or without costs, as justice requires. The court shall order that the parental authority of the biological parent of the adoptee, if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated and declare 671
that the reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. The court shall further declare that successional rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, as of the date of judgment of judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. It shall also order the adoptee to use the name stated in his original birth or foundling certificate. The court shall further order the Civil Registrar where the adoption decree was registered to cancel the new birth certificate of the adoptee and reinstate his original birth or foundling certificate. Sec. 24. Service of Judgment. A certified true copy of the judgment together with a certificate of finality issued by the Branch Clerk of the Court which rendered the decision in accordance with the preceding Section shall be served by the petitioner upon the Civil Registrar concerned within thirty (30) days from receipt of the certificate of finality. The Civil Registrar shall forthwith enter the rescission decree in the register and submit proof of compliance to the court issuing the decree and the Clerk of Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decree. The Clerk of Court shall enter the compliance in accordance with Section 17 hereof. SEC. 25. Repeal. - This supersedes Rule 99 on Adoption and Rule 100 of the Rules of Court. B. Inter-Country Adoption Sec. 26. Applicability. The following sections apply to inter-country adoption of Filipino children by foreign nationals and Filipino citizens permanently residing abroad. SEC. 27. Objectives. The State shall: a) a) consider inter-country adoption as an alternative means of child care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot, in any suitable manner, be cared for in the Philippines; b) ensure that the child subject of inter-country adoption enjoys the same protection accorded to children in domestic adoption; and c) take all measures to ensure that the placement arising therefrom does not result in improper financial gain for those involved. Sec. 28. Where to File Petition. A verified petition to adopt a Filipino child may be filed by a foreign national or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad with the Family Court having jurisdiction over the place where the child resides or may be found. It may be filed directly with the Inter-Country Adoption Board. Sec. 29. Who may be adopted. Only a child legally available for domestic adoption may be the subject of inter-country adoption. Sec. 30. Contents of Petition. The petitioner must allege: a) a) his age and the age of the child to be adopted, showing that he is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted at the time of application, unless the petitioner is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent, in which case the age difference does not apply; b) b) if married, the name of the spouse who must be joined as copetitioner except when the adoptee is a legitimate child of his spouse; c) c) that he has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has 672
undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his country; d) d) that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; e) e) that he is eligible to adopt under his national law; f) f) that he can provide the proper care and support and instill the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted; g) g) that he agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child, as embodied under Philippine laws and the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 8043; h) h) that he comes from a country with which the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption of a Filipino child is allowed under his national laws; and i) i) that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in this Rule, in Republic Act No. 8043 and in all other applicable Philippine laws. Sec. 31. Annexes. - The petition for adoption shall contain the following annexes written and officially translated in English: a) a) Birth certificate of petitioner; b) b) Marriage contract, if married, and, if applicable, the divorce decree, or judgment dissolving the marriage; c) c) Sworn statement of consent of petitioners biological or adopted children above ten (10) years of age; f) f) Police clearance of petitioner issued within six (6) months before the filing of the petitioner; g) g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the petitioners employer and a member of the immediate community who have known the petitioner for at least five (5) years; h) h) Full body postcard-size pictures of the petitioner and his immediate family taken at least six (6) months before the filing of the petition. Sec. 32. Duty of Court. The court, after finding that the petition is sufficient in form and substance and a proper case for inter-country adoption, shall immediately transmit the petition to the Inter-Country Adoption Board for appropriate action. SEC. 33. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on August 22, 2002 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. A. Requisites to be an adopter 1. Age and capacity required Sec 7 2. Husband and wife jointly Sec 7 Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Zenaida Bobiles G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 673 d) d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation of the petitioner certified by a duly licensed physician and psychologist; e) e) Income tax returns or any authentic document showing the current financial capability of the petitioner;
Law: Adoption; Requisites to be an Adopter; Husband and Wife Jointly Ponente: Regalado, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 in granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat Overview: This is about an adoption filed by wife alone that was granted by RTC, being contested by the Republic since the FC had been implemented AFTER RTC decision and during CA case. (DUH di pwede) Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the proceedings. RTC granted the petition, releasing the natural parents from all legal obligations and changing the surname of Jason to Bobiles. The petition for adoption was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code which says that a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. On appeal to the CA, the republic said that since the trial court rendered its decision when Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988, joint adoption by husband and wife became mandatory and therefore the petition must be dismissed since Zenaida filed alone and without her husband. However, CA affirmed RTC. Issue: WON the Family Code can be applied retroactively so the Zenaida must have filed jointly with her husband in order to adopt Jason Condat; WON CA should have dismissed the case since FC applied during the pendency of CA case. Held: No, FC cannot be retroactively applied; No, CA did the right thing in affirming RTC decision. Rationale: The FC code can only be applied retroactively if there are no vested rights impaired. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. When the case was filed by Zenaida, the court had jurisdiction in accordance with the governing law at that time. The law then allowed Zenaida to petition for adoption alone. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. (He lived abroad too so he was probably advised that written consent was enough.) In the case at bar, the rights given by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the 674
consent of his natural parents. Even the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption and the child had been living with the adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters. Every reasonable intendment regarding adoption should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. Judgement: Petition denied. CA and RTC affirmed. In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim Facts: Monina P. Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist married to Primo Lim The two are childless Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban These children were registered by the spouses to make it appear as if they were their parents The children were named Michelle P. Lim (barely 11 days old and born on 15 March 1977) and Michael Jude P. Lim (11 days and and born on Aug 1, 1983) The spouses took care of the children, sent them to exclusive schools, and let them use their surname in their school records and documents 28 Nov 1998 Primo died 27 Dec 2000 Monina remarried to Angel Olario, an American citizen She also decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child She filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle (who was already 25 and married) and Michael (who was 18) Both Michael and Michelle and her husband gave their Affidavit of Consent Olario also gave his Affidavit of Consent In the certification of DSWD, Michelle and Michael were considered as abandoned children and the whereabouts of their natural parents were unknown RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that Monina should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband o Joint adoption by the husband and wife is mandatory under Sec 7(c ) of RA 8552 and Art 185 of FC Issue: WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt Held: NO Petitioner contends that the consent of her husband is sufficient and that since the children are already emancipated, joint adoption is no longer necessary since it is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority o Also contends that the law on adoption should be relaxed since it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted; dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases SC: o The law is explicit. Sec 7, Art III of RA 8552 reads: Sec. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position 675
to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.chan robles virtual law library In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. o The use of the word shall in the provision means that joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory o Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by Monina w/o her husband, the trial court was correct in dismissing her petition o Petitioner does not fall under any of the three exemptions either The children to be adopted are not her and/or Olarios legitimate children The children are not her illegitimate children She and Olario are not legally separated from each other 676
o Consent does not suffice since there are certain requirements Olario must comply w/ being an American citizen under the pertinent provision Prove that his country has diplomatic relations w/ RP Must be living in RP for at least 3 continuous years before the petition is filed Must maintain that residency until the decree for adoption is granted Must have legal capacity to adopt in his own country Adoptee is allowed to enter adopters country as the latters children These requirements cannot be waived since the children are not relatives w/in the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity of Monina or Olario and the children are not the LC of Monina o Parental authority is just one of the effects of legal adoption. The other effects: Sever all legal ties bet the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter Deem the adoptee as a LC of the adopter Give adopter and adopter reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: Right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known The right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other o So, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a LC of the adopter w/ all the rights of a LC such as: To bear the surname of the father and mother To receive support from their parents To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights o The adoptive parents, on the other hand, shall enjoy all the benefits to w/c biological parents are entitled such as support and successional rights Petitioner contends that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the LA Superior Court o SC: The filing of a case for dissolution of marriage is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage bet petitioner and Olario, therefore, the marriage still subsists She would still have to file the petition jointly w/ her husband 3. Need for consent Sec 9 Santos vs. Arasanzo (1966) Facts: Spouses Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed for adoption of Paulina Santos (17 years old by then) and Aurora Santos (8 years old) The petition alleged that the whereabouts of the childrens relatives, especially their parents, are unknown o That since the outbreak of war, these minors have been abandoned by their parents 677
o That the spouses have been taking care of the children since they were infants The court appointed a guardian ad litem (during the interim of an action or proceeding, e.g. appointment of a guardian for a minor) in the person of Crisanto de Mesa who gave his written consent for the adoption Since Paulina was over 14 years old, she also gave her written consent After publication and hearing, the trial court granted the spouses petition o The spouses have been married for 27 years and have no children o They want to adopt the 2 minors who, for a long time, have been in their care and custody o Both parents of the children have long been unheard from and despite diligent efforts of the spouses, they could not locate them o The guardian ad litem gave his consent to the adoption o The spouses have enough income to support and educate the children 8 years later, Juliana died w/o a will (lesson to be learned, dont die w/o a will) Simplicio filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juliana and stated in the petition that he, Paulina and Aurora are the surviving heirs o He also prayed that he be appointed administrator of the estate Gregoria Arasanzo, alleging that she is the 1st cousin of Juliana, filed an opposition to the petition asserting that Simplicios marriage to Juliana is void-bigamous and o That the adoption of the 2 is also void ab initio since it was w/o written consent of their parents who were then living and had not abandoned them Demetria Ventura, another 1st cousin (biglang dumami ang first cousins nya), alleged that she is the mother of Paulina and she also adopted Gregorias pleadings as her own CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption could not be assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings CA reversed and ruled that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the absence of consent by the natural parents of the children w/c it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to collateral attack Paulina and Aurora Santos (petitioners) filed a petition for review in o They also filed for preliminary injunction and a supplemental petition to stop the trial court from allowing Gregoria and Demetria plus 2 more persons (yes, may dumagdag pa), Consuelo and Pacita, to intervene in the settlement proceedings or to withdraw cash advances from the estate o Apparently, the trial court issued an order allowing all the parties, including the first cousins (kapal ng fez!), to withdraw P7k each Issue: WON Gregoria and Demetria could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and Aurora Held: NO!!!!!!!!! CA contends that the failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio o It also stated that consent was not properly dispensed w/ not only bec the evidence presented in the adoption proceedings was insufficient to support the finding that the parents had abandoned the children, the court also failed to expressly and spefically state that such abandonment in fact occurred SC contends that consent by the parents to an adoption is not an absolute requisite 678
o SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.) o Meaning, if the natural parents abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem suffices o Also, it is not accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of the fact of abandonment; in fact, it stated in its decision that the spouses have exerted all effort to find the biological parents to no avail and that the children were under the care of the spouses since their infancy o Abandonment, based on American rulings, means any conduct on the part of the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child/ neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support w/c parents owe to their children o The CA erred in reviewing, under collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora had abandoned them based on allegations that Simplicio concealed the adoption from the natural parents, thereby the judgment obtained therefrom was secured by extrinsic fraud A judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose and not by way of collateral attack As for the alleged lack of notice, adoption is a proceeding in rem and constructive notice, such as the publication made by the court, is enough where the residence of the parents is unkown Notice, moreover, is not required in adoption cases in regard to the abandoning parent o Assuming that Simplicio was not validly married to Juliana, it will not make any difference as far as the right of the respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings is concerned Juliana should be deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person whose status is single and not married The defect would only be on the part of Simplicio who could not adopt the two w/o his legal wife joining the petition But since the issue is the settlement of the estate of Juliana, this flaw would not affect the succession rights of Aurora and Paulina as adopted children of Juliana to the exclusion of respondents o Therefore, the respondents do not have the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as long as the adoption is considered valid MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (sobrang gusto lang talaga ng pera ng mga to) Issue 1: 679
Long absence and status of being unheard from on the part of the natural parents and their having left their children since infancy to the care and custody of others is not abandonment for the reason that abandonment must be willful and that time is not an element of abandonment SC: a strong basis for a finding of the parents abandonment of his or her child is found in the case where the parent has left the child permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to another, or surrendered it entirely Issue 2: The findings of abandonment had totally no support in the evidence according to the CA SC: for CA to arrive at this conclusion, it has to review the entire proceedings in the adoption court and the CA cannot do so in a collateral suit, but only in a direct action for that purpose o It must be remembered that what was before the CA was not an appeal from the decision of the adoption court but an appeal from an order in the settlement proceedings where the adoption was collaterally attacked Issue 3: Parental ties are too noble and sacred to be lightly severed in the absence of a written consent of the parents SC: Parental consent required by the law refers to the parents who have not abandoned their child o It is rather something remarkable that the natural parents of the children involved here paid no attention to the sanctity and nobility of the selfsame parental ties for almost 20 years and only when a fortune was bequeathed and about to befall upon their children, did they come to the fore, not to assert parental rights in order to enhance the welfare of the children, but to defeat their claim to the estate as adopted children, so as to succeed to said estate themselves, as collateral heirs. In this case, the sacredness of the parental ties cannot be invoked. (in your face!!!) Issue 4: Simplicio is not validly married to Juliana SC: even so, it would be deemed that Juliana alone filed the petition and that Simplicio signed on her behalf o Besides, personal signature by the petitioner of the petition to adopt is not among the requisites of the law o At any rate, any defect has already been cured during the prosecution of the adoption case However, the respondents are not barred from instituting a direct attack in invalidating the adoption. Daoang vs Municipal Judge Facts: Antero and Amanda Agonoy (respondents) seek to adopt the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang (petitioners), assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, opposed such petition for adoption on the ground that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code The petition for adoption was granted Issues: WON the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code Held and Ratio: 680
No o Words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. Art. 335 provides that the following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction o Legislators, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. Duncan vs. CFI No. L-30576 February 10, 1976 Law: Adoption; Requisites to be an Adopter; Need of Consent Ponente: Esguerra, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CFI that dismissed petitioners petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. Overview: This is about an abandoned baby who was about to be adopted but the consent given by the guardian was question. Facts: Petitioners British Robin Francis Radley Duncan and American Maria Lucy Christensen are married and have been residing here in the Philippines for the last 17 years. They have no children of their own and had already adopted a child before. Atty. Velasquez received the infant from the childs unwed mother who told him to never reveal her identity because she did not want to destroy her future. She told him to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. She did not provide maintenance and support for the child. In May 1967, a 3 day old child was given by Atty. Velasquez to petitioners for them to adopt. The child was baptised as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. They petitioned to adopt Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. The CFI dismissed their petition for adoption since the consent given in the petition was improper and did not meet the express requirement set by law in Article 340 of the Civil Code. Since the one who took care of the newly born child, witness Atty. Velasquez, knows the natural mother, the person who should give the parental consent to the adoption should be the mother. However, Atty. Velasquez says that she cannot reveal the identity of the mother since it will violate their privileged communication from their client-attorney relationship. The Judge said that there is no such relationship between them with respect to this case. Also, it is not about just revealing the identity of the mother; it is about giving consent to the adoption of the alleged unwed mother. The baby cannot be considered as abandoned and Atty. Velasquez cannot give consent as a guardian since whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to anyone, only the natural mother can give the written consent to the adoption. 681
Issue: WON the person who gave the consent for adoption, Atty. Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give the consent. Held: Yes. Rationale: In Article 340 of the Civil Code, it is stated that the written consent for adoption needs to be done by the parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted. However, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, says that it is the known living parent/s who have not abandoned the child. The fathers consent is out of the question since the child is illegitimate and unrecognized. Since the childs mother had abandoned the child completely and absolutely, she does not have parental claims to the child. Atty. Velasquez can be called the guardian of the child since no one else had been shown to have been the childs guardian (Art. 349 of the CC). It was she who had actual physical custody of it and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate as what happens to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The Court recognizes her good deed and extends to her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child. (The child must be around 9 years old already. Since the time he was turned over to the couple who had loved him, he had known no other parent.) Judgement: The CFI decision is annulled and the child is considered the adopted child and heir of Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. Landingin v. Republic G.R. No. 164948 (June 27, 2006) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J. Facts: This is a case about an aunt wanting to adopt the children of her dead brother. However, she was not allowed by SC to do so because of: 1) lack of consent of the childrens natural mother; 2) unauthenticated consent of her own legitimate children; and 3) her failure to show her financial capability. May 19, 1990- Manuel Ramos, brother of petitioner, died. Hence, his three minor children were left to his mother Maria (i.e. the childrens paternal grandmother). The childrens biological mother Amelia then went to Italy and remarried there. November 23, 2000- Maria died. February 4, 2002- Diwata Ramos Landingin, sister of Manuel and a US citizen based in Guam, decided to file a petition for adoption of Manuels minor children, namely, Elaine, Elma, and Eugene. March 5, 2002- the court ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study of as mandated by Article 34 of PD 603 and for it to submit a report. Since the petition was unopposed, Landingin (P) was allowed to present her evidence. She presented herself as witness and Elaine, the eldest of Manuels children. May 24, 2002- The Social Welfare Officer II submitted a Child Study Report recommending that the children be adopted by Landingin (P). According to the Officer, she was able to talk to Amelia, the childrens natural mother, when the latter was here on a vacation and Amelia consented to the adoption. November 23, 2002- RTC granted Landingins petition for adoption. December 2, 2002- The OSG appealed the RTCs decision to the CA alleging that Landingin (P) failed to present the written consent of the childrens natural mother, the written consent of her own legitimate children duly authorized, and the fact that she is financially capable of adopting the children. 682
April 29, 2004- CA reversed the RTC. Issues: 1. WON Landingin (P) is entitled to adopt the children without the written consent of their natural mother. 2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by Landingins legitimate children sufficiently complied with the law. 3. Won Landingin is financially capable of supporting the minor children. Held/ Ratio: 1. No. a. The Courts position on liberally construing adoption laws and procedures should not be misconstrued as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of the law. It should be interpreted also with due regard to the natural rights of the biological parents to the child. (Please refer to Section 9 of RA No. 8552 which enumerates whose consent is necessary to the adoption.) b. If it is true that the DSWD officer was really able to talk to Amelia while the latter was here on a vacation, she should have asked for the latters written consent. c. Also, it could not be alleged that Amelia already abandoned her children as abandonment refers to neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. The eldest child and the report of the case admitted that the Amelia was still providing for her childrens financial support, although the amount may not be enough for them. d. More pieces of evidence have to be shown in order to prove that Amelia already emotionally abandoned her children. 2. No. a. Landingin (P) failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and the Joint Affidavit of Consent allegedly executed by her legitimate children. b. The authenticity of which she also failed to prove. According to Section 2 of Act No. 2103, a document executed in a foreign country has to be made before an ambassador, minister, etc., duly authorized by the Philippines. If it is however made before a notary public, it still has to be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, etc. duly authorized by the Philippines. 3. No. a. According to the Home Study Report, Landingin would rely on the financial backing of her children and her siblings. However, the law states that it should be the adopting parent herself who possess the capacity to support the children. b. Landingin (P) was proven not to be supporting her legitimate children anymore as they already have their own families. c. She is also already 57 years old and only employed as a part-time waitress in Guam, earning $5.15 an hour with tips of around $1000 a month. Her house is still being amortized. Hence it is doubtful if she can sustain the children herself. d. The ability to support the adoptees is personal to that of the adopting parent. Judgment: Petition is denied. 4. Aliens as adopters Sec 7(b) De Tavera vs Cacdac, Jr. 167 SCRA 636 November 23, 1988 Ponente: Melencio-Herrera 683
Overview: The Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) challenged the Resolution of the RTC, ordering said agency to issue a travel clearance in favour of adopted minor Anthony Gandhi Gordon. The MSSD also sought to annul the Decision of the RTC which declared Anthony the lawfully adopted child of George and Gail Gordon. Facts: On June 19, 1986, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor Anthony Gandhi Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. The evidence disclosed that the Gordons, as British citizens, are allowed by their country to adopt babies specifically from the Philippines, that they are financially capable and can provide for Anthony (George Gordon was employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel), and that the Case Study Report submitted by the Social Worker of the trial court approved of the adoption, after observing that there existed a parent-child relationship between the Gordons and Anthony. Also, according to the Social Worker, despite Adoracion having second thoughts, her aspirations for the betterment of Anthonys future prevailed so she agreed to the adoption. The RTC declared Anthony as the lawfully adopted child of the Gordons. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to issue a passport for Anthony due to lack of a Case Study of the MSSD, the Gordons wrote to the MSSD for a travel clearance. The MSSD opposed the grant of a travel clearance based on several grounds: That the report of the Court Social Worker cannot take the place of a report from the MSSD That the required 6-month trial custody period had not been met That the Gordons gave 10,000 to Adoracion which is reflective of a commercial venture That the Gordons had previously filed for the adoption of a baby girl, but because that girl died the Gordons tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same name and represented that she was the very same girl they were adopting That there being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai and the Philippines, there is no guarantee that the child will not be sold, abused, etc. The RTC ordered the MSSD to issue the travel clearance of Anthony, saying that the report of the Court Social Worker could replace that of the MSSD; that the court had dispensed with the 6month trial custody considering that the Gordons were foreigners and earned a living abroad; and that the RTC order had become final and executory Issue: WON RTC decision was final and executory, therefore upholding the adoption of Anthony Held: Yes Ratio: The Case Study Report by the Court Social Worker was sufficient. Prior to E0 91 which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the MSSD did not have exclusive authority over adoption cases. Moreover, the MSSD did not allege that the report of the Social Worker was incorrect and objected to its contents. That the Gordons were making a commercial venture out of the adoption cannot stand. The amount handed to Adoracion was a gesture of assistance. About the girl which the Gordons adopted but died, it was found that the adoption proceedings for her were actually aborted upon knowledge that she was a mongoloid. She was surrendered to the International Alliance for Children where she died. The trial court held that the questionable attitude of the Gordons could not be proven. The Gordons are British citizens. Law in Dubai not applicable. 684
It is not bureaucratic technicalities but the welfare of the child that must prevail in adoption cases! Republic vs Toledano Overview: This case is about the spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen, and Evelyn Clouse, a naturalized citizen of the US, who sought to adopt Solomon Alcala, a young brother of Evelyn Clouse. Facts Spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of Evelyn A. Clouse Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America June 4, 1981 He married Evelyn, a Filipino August 19, 1988 Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of the Clouses Solomon gave his consent to the adoption His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption Judge rendered a decision granting the petition for recognition Petitioner appeals in the courts granting of the petition for adoption on the ground that the Clouses are not qualified to adopt under the Philippine law Issues: WON the Clouses are qualified to adopt under the Philippine law Held and Ratio: No o Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines" Clouse spouses are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law o There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her 685
Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988 o Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. o Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184 Republic Act No. 8043 Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (Promulgated June 7, 1995) Article I. General Provisions Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "InterCountry Adoption Act of 1995." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every neglected and abandoned child with a family that will provide such child with love and care as well as opportunities for growth and development. Towards this end, efforts shall be exerted to place the child with an adoptive family in the Philippines. However, recognizing that inter-country adoption may be considered as allowing aliens not presently allowed by law to adopt Filipino children if such children cannot be adopted by qualified Filipino citizens or aliens, the State shall take measures to ensure that inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall prove beneficial to the child's best interests, and shall serve and protect his/her fundamental rights. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act. the term: (a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines. (b) Child means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated by law. (c) Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development of the Republic of the Philippines. (d) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (e) Authorized and accredited agency refers to the State welfare agency or a licensed adoption agency in the country of the adopting parents which provide comprehensive social services and which is duly recognized by the Department. (f) Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. (g) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship. (h) Board refers to the Inter-country Adoption Board. Article II. The Inter-Country Adoption Board Sec. 4. The Inter-Country Adoption Board. There is hereby created the Inter-Country Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption. It shall act as the policy-making body for purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and 686
coordination with the Department, the different child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities. As such, it shall: (a) Protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child; (b) Collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the adoptive parents; (c) Monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through authorized and accredited agency; (d) Prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter improper practices contrary to this Act; (e) Promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption; (f) License and accredit child-caring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children; (g) Accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children in their own country; and (h) Cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation of any provision under this Act. Sec. 5. Composition of the Board. The Board shall be composed of the Secretary of the Department as ex officio Chairman, and six (6) other members to be appointed by the President for a nonrenewable term of six (6) years: Provided, That there shall be appointed one (1) psychiatrist or psychologist, two (2) lawyers who shall have at least the qualifications of a regional trial court judge, one (1) registered social worker and two (2) representatives from non-governmental organizations engaged in child-caring and placement activities. The members of the Board shall receive a per diem allowance of One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for each meeting attended by them: Provided, further, That no compensation shall be paid for more than four (4) meetings a month. Sec. 6. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board shall have the following powers and functions: (a) to prescribe rules and regulations as it may deem reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act, after consultation and upon favorable recommendation of the different agencies concerned with the child-caring, placement, and adoption; (b) to set the guidelines for the convening of an Inter-country Adoption Placement Committee which shall be under the direct supervision of the Board; (c) to set the guidelines for the manner by which selection/matching of prospective adoptive parents and adoptive child can be made; (d) to determine a reasonable schedule of fees and charges to be exacted in connection with the application for adoption; (e) to determine the form and contents of the application for intercountry adoption; (g) to institute systems and procedures to prevent improper financial gain in connection with adoption and deter improper practices which are contrary to this Act; (h) to promote the development of adoption services, including postlegal adoption services, (i) to accredit and authorize foreign private adoption agencies which have demonstrated professionalism, competence and have consistently pursued non-profit objectives to engage in the placement of Filipino children in their own country: Provided, That such foreign private agencies are duly authorized and accredited by their own government to conduct inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the total number of authorized and accredited foreign private adoption agencies shall not exceed one hundred (100) a year; (j) to take appropriate measures to ensure confidentiality of the records of the child, the natural parents and the adoptive parents at all times; 687
(k) to prepare, review or modify, and thereafter, recommend to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Memoranda of Agreement respecting inter-country adoption consistent with the implementation of this Act and its stated goals, entered into, between and among foreign governments, international organizations and recognized international non-governmental organizations; (l) to assist other concerned agencies and the courts in the implementation of this Act, particularly as regards coordination with foreign persons, agencies and other entities involved in the process of adoption and the physical transfer of the child; and (m) to perform such other functions on matters relating to intercountry adoption as may be determined by the President. Article III. Procedure Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. The Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in thePhilippines before the child is placed for inter-country adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years. Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board: (a) Child study; (b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate; (c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d) Medical evaluation /history; (e )Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and (f) Recent photo of the child. Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent: (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country; (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law; (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted; (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act; (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws. Sec. 10. Where to File Application. An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and 688
accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated in English. (a) Birth certificate of applicant(s); (b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable; (c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement; (d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and psychologist; (e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s); (f) Police clearance of applicant(s); (g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and (h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family; The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings. Sec. 11. Family Selection/Matching. No child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. The clearance, as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall form part of the records of the child to be adopted. When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines. Sec. 12. Pre-adoptive Placement Costs. The applicant(s) shall bear the following costs incidental to the placement of the child; (a) The cost of bringing the child from the Philippines to the residence of the applicant(s) abroad, including all travel expenses within the Philippines and abroad; and (b) The cost of passport, visa, medical examination and psychological evaluation required, and other related expenses. Sec. 13. Fees, Charges and Assessments. Fees, charges, and assessments collected by the Board in the exercise of its functions shall be used solely to process applications for inter-country adoption and to support the activities of the Board. Sec. 14. Supervision of Trial Custody. The governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of six (6) months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption beissued in the said country a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child. During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall set up a system by which Filipino children sent abroad for trial custody are monitored and checked as reported by the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency as well as the repatriation to the Philippines of a Filipino child whose adoption has not been approved. 689
Sec. 15. Executive Agreements. The Department of Foreign Affairs, upon representation of the Board, shall cause the preparation of Executive Agreements with countries of the foreign adoption agencies to ensure the legitimate concurrence of said countries in upholding the safeguards provided by this Act. Article IV. Penalties Sec. 16. Penalties. (a) Any person who shall knowingly participate in the conduct or carrying out of an illegal adoption, in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished with a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200.000), at the discretion of the court. For purposes of this Act, an adoption is illegal if it is effected in any manner contrary to the provisions of this Act or established State policies, its implementing rules and regulations, executive agreements, and other laws pertaining to adoption. Illegality may be presumed from the following acts: (1) consent for an adoption was acquired through, or attended by coercion, fraud, improper material inducement; (2) there is no authority from the Board to effect adoption; (3) the procedures and safeguards placed under the law for adoption were not complied with; and (4) the child to be adopted is subjected to, or exposed to danger, abuse and exploitation. (b) Any person who shall violate established regulations relating to the confidentiality and integrity of records, documents and communications of adoption applications, cases and processes shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years, and/or a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000), but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), at the discretion of the court. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under this Article shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit any of the acts herein enumerated. Acts punishable under this Article, when committed by a syndicate or where it involves two or more children shall be considered as an offense constituting child trafficking and shall merit the penalty of reclusionperpetua. Acts punishable under this Article are deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any of the unlawful acts defined under this Article. Penalties as are herein provided shall be in addition to any other penalties which may be imposed for the same acts punishable under other laws, ordinances, executive orders, and proclamations. Sec. 17. Public Officers as Offenders. Any government official, employee or functionary who shall be found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this Act, or who shall conspire with private individuals shall, in addition to the above-prescribed penalties, be penalized in accordance with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations: Provided, That upon the filing of a case, either administrative or criminal, said government official, employee or functionary concerned shall automatically suffer suspension until the resolution of the case. Article V. Final Provisions Sec. 18. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Inter-country Adoption Board, in coordination with the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of Justice, after due consultation with agencies involved in child-care and placement, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the provisions of this Act within six (6) months after itseffectivity. 690
Sec. 19. Appropriations. The amount of Five million pesos (P5,000,000) is hereby appropriated from the proceeds of the Lotto for the initial operations of the Board and subsequently the appropriations of the same shall be included in the General Appropriations Act for the year following its enactment. Sec. 20. Separability Clause. If any provision, or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected, shall remain valid and subsisting. Sec. 21. Repealing Clause. Any law, decree, executive order, administrative order or rules and regulations contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly. Sec. 22. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. B. C. D. E. Who may not adopt Who may be adopted Who may not be adopted Procedure in adoption OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that alternative protection and assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned, surrendered, or neglected. In this regard, the State shall extend such assistance in the most expeditious manner in the interest of full emotional and social development of the abandoned, surrendered, or neglected child. It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under the jurisdiction of the Department of Social Welfare and Development for the declaration of a child legally available for adoption of abandoned, surrendered, or neglected children are the most expeditious proceedings for the best interest and welfare of the child. Section. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: (1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to implement the provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority to issue the certification declaring a child legally available for adoption. (2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or a person over eighteen (18) years of age but is unable to fully take care of him/herself or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of physical or mental disability or condition. (3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous months, which includes a founding. (4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended or inadequately attended within a 691
Republic Act No. 9523 March 12, 2009 AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603,
period of three (3) continuous months. Neglect may occur in two (2) ways: (a) There is physical neglect when the child is malnourished, ill-clad, and without proper shelter. A child is unattended when left by himself/herself without proper provisions and/or without proper supervision. (b) There is emotional neglect when the child is maltreated, raped, seduced, exploited, overworked, or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health; or is made to beg in the streets or public places; or when children are in moral danger, or exposed to gambling, prostitution, and other vices. (5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose favor a certification was issued by the DSWD that he/she is legally available for adoption after the fact of abandonment or neglect has been proven through the submission of pertinent documents, or one who was voluntarily committed by his/her parent(s) or legal guardian. (6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose parent(s) or legal guardian knowingly and willingly relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-placement or child-caring agency or institution. (7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a private nonprofit or government agency duly accredited by the DSWD that provides twenty-four (24) hour residential care services for abandoned, neglected, or voluntarily committed children. (8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a private nonprofit institution or government agency duly accredited by the DWSD that receives and processes applicants to become foster or adoptive parents and facilitate placement of children eligible for foster care or adoption. (9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director of a licensed or accredited child-caring or child-placing agency or institution managed by the government, local government unit, non-governmental organization, or provincial, city, or municipal Social Welfare Development Officer who has actual custody of the minor and who files a certification to declare such child legally available for adoption, or, if the child is under the custody of any other individual, the agency or institution does so with the consent of the child's custodian. (10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD or his duly authorized representative. (11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place frequented by the public, where by notice of the petition shall be posted for information of any interested person. (12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to a written report of the result of an assessment conducted by a licensed social worker as to the social-cultural economic condition, psychosocial background, current functioning and facts of abandonment or neglect of the child. The report shall also state the efforts of social worker to locate the child's biological parents/relatives. Section 3. Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall state the circumstances surrounding the abandonment or neglect of the child. The petition shall be supported by the following documents: (1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD, local government unit, licensed or accredited child-caring or childplacing agency or institution charged with the custody of the child; (2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the parent(s) or any known relatives of the child. The following shall be considered sufficient: (a) Written certification from a local or national radio or television station that the case was aired on three (3) different occasions; 692
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of general circulation; (c) Police report or barangay certification from the locality where the child was found or a certified copy of a tracing report issued by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), National Headquarters (NHQ), Social Service Division, which states that despite due diligence, the child's parents could not be found; and (d) Returned registered mail to the last known address of the parent(s) or known relatives, if any. (3) Birth certificate, if available; and (4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph of the child upon abandonment or admission to the agency or institution. Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. The petition shall be filed in the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned. The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form and substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the petition conspicuous place for five (5) consecutive days in the locality where the child was found. The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation not later than five (5) working days after the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation. Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. Upon finding merit in the petition, the Secretary shall issue a certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within seven (7) working days from receipt of the recommendation. Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local civil registrar of a foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the founding certificate to the National Statistic Office (NSO). Section 6. Appeal. The decision of the Secretary shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals within five (5) days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the same shall be final and executory. Section 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of Involuntarily Committed Child and Voluntarily Committed Child. The certificate declaring a child legally available for adoption in case of an involuntarily committed child under Article 141, paragraph 4(a) and Article 142 of Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be issued by the DSWD within three (3) months following such involuntary commitment. In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, the certification declaring the child legally available for adoption shall be issued by the Secretary within three (3) months following the filing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment, as signed by the parent(s) with the DSWD. Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal guardian who voluntarily committed a child may recover legal custody and parental authority over him/her from the agency or institution to which such child was voluntarily committed when it is shown to the satisfaction of the DSWD that the parent(s) or legal guardian is in a position to adequately provide for the needs of the child: Provided, That, the petition for restoration is filed within (3) months after the signing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment. Section 8. Certification. The certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process administrative in nature. The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8552 and in an intercountry adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8043. 693
Section. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, together with the Council for Welfare of Children, Inter-Country Adoption Board, two (2) representatives from licensed or accredited child-placing and child-caring agencies or institution, National Statistics Office and Office of the Civil Registrar, is hereby tasked to draft the implementing rules and regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days following its complete publication. Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the drafting of the implementing rules and regulations, petitions for the issuance of a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption may be filled with the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned. Section 10. Penalty. The penalty of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person, institution, or agency who shall place a child for adoption without the certification that the child is legally available for adoption issued by the DSWD. Any agency or institution found violating any provision of this Act shall have its license to operate revoked without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of its officers and employees. Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the government official or employee concerned to appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and forfeiture of benefits. Section 11. Repealing Clause. Sections 2(c)(iii), 3(b), (e) and 8(a) of Republic Act No. 8552, Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Title VII, and VIII of Presidential Decree No. 603 and any law, presidential decree, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby reprealed, modified or amended accordingly. Section 12. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting. Section 13. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette. F. Effects of Decree of Adoption 1. On status 2. On parental authority Tamargo v. CA 209 SCRA 518 (June 3, 1992) Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the CA. Ponente: Feliciano, J. Facts: This case is about the heartless biological parents of the minor Adelberto Bundoc who want to pass on the responsibility of paying Adelbertos liability for having shot another child with an air rifle to Adelbertos adopting parents, i.e. the Rapisura spouses, even when the incident happened while Adelberto was still with them. December 10, 1981- The spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. October 20, 1982- Adelberto Bundoc, then 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, thereby causing the latters death. Due to this, the petitioners Tamargo, the adopting parents of Jennifer, filed for a complaint for damages against Adelbertos natural parents, i.e., the Bundoc spouses. November 18, 1982- The petition to adopt Adelberto was granted. This was after the shooting incident. Hence, with 694
these, Adelbertos natural parents argued that they could not be held liable for the civil damages anymore because the adoption of the Rapisura spouses was already approved. The Bundoc spouses believe that the responsibility for payment of the damages transfers to the Rapisura spouses by virtue of the retroactivity of the decree of adoption. December 3, 1987- RTC dismissed Tamargos (P) complaint for damages against the Bundoc spouses holding that by the decree of adoption being approved, they could not be held liable anymore. The Tamargos then had several problems with complying with procedural requirements of complaints and with the deadline of the reglementary period. Hence, the RTC denied their MR and appeal. They went to the CA for mandamus and certiorari but the CA dismissed their petition holding that by not being able to file the case on time, they already waived their right to appeal. b. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in his natural parents, or the Bundoc spouses. Therefore, they as the ones who were in actual custody of Adelberto then are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. c. The determining factor is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them, over whom, the law presumes the parents to be exercising supervision and control. FC 221 reiterates the same idea. d. The adopting parents Rapisura had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the shooting as they were still in the US. It would be unfair to hold the adopting parents Rapisura as the ones responsible. e. And lastly, even Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides a trial custody for adopting parents. The fact that this have not yet even started for the Rapisura spouses fortifies the conclusion of the Court that they cannot be held liable. Judgment: Petition granted. Cervantes vs. Fajardo Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. SC: issue the writ returnable to the Executive Judge, RTC. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his report and recommendation to the Court. 1987, Executive Judge submitted to the Court his report and recommendation 695
Issues: 1. WON the spouses Tamargo, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant petition. 2. WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the natural parents. Held/Ratio: 1. Yes. a. The Court should relax on applying technical procedures in order to serve substantial justice. 2. No. a. NCC 2176 (i.e. imposing liability upon the parents of a minor child who is still living with them) is based on parental authority, which includes the instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child.
the minor was born on 1987 to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child for adoption to Gina's sister and brotherin-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes who took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was also executed by Gina The petition for adoption was filed over the child (granted) The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo. common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, Gina had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost 3 yrs but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Cervantes who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted with the full knowledge and consent of the real parents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 y/o, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 696
RTC: the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate ." 1987, the adoptive parents received a letter from the Fajardos demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. They refused to accede to the demand. After 5 or 6 month, while the Cervantes were out at work, Gina took the child from her "yaya" at the Cervantes residence Gina brought the child to her house. Cervantes demanded the return of the child, but Gina refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her. She will, however, return the child if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00. Issue: who has the right for the custody of the child Held: Cervantes spouse It is undisputed that Conrado is legally married to a woman other than Gina, and his relationship with the latter is a
3. On hereditary rights 4. On name Though the use of surname is fixed by law, the law is silent as to the use of the middle name even in laws about the adopted child. The middle name is only mentioned in Article 375 of the Civil Code when there is identity of names and surnames. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her mother and father, as discussed above. (Art. 189 of the Family Code and Section 17, Article 5 of RA 8552) It is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Stephanie is closely attached to both parents. To allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use as middle name her mothers surname, the Court finds no reason why she cannot be allowed to do so. Judgement: The petition is granted. G. Rescission of Adoption Lahom vs. Sibulo G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 Law: Adoption; Rescission of Adoption Ponente: Vitug, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the RTCs decision dismissing the petition to rescind the adoption of Jose Martin Sibulo 697
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005 Law: Adoption; Effects of a Decree of Adoption Ponente: SandovalGutierrez, J. Overview: The natural widowed father adopted her illegitimate daughter and is asking if his daughter can use the middle name of her natural mother. Facts: On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig (petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. She had been using her mothers middle name and surname. He wants Stephanies middle name Astorga changed to her moms surname Garcia and her surname Garcia changed to his surname Catindig. The trial court granted the adoption, gave the father care and custody of the child and freed the mother from all obligations. The childs name became Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration asking that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. TC said no since there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as her middle name. Issue: WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? Held: Yes, she may use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name. Rationale:
Overview: This is about an widow trying to have the decree of adoption of her son rescinded. It was denied because the law no longer allowed an adopter to have the adoption rescinded. Facts: The married couple Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom (petitioner) took care of Isabelitas nephew and brought him up as their own child. Eventually, the couple petitioned to legally adopt Jose Melvin Sibulo (respondent) in 1971. The court granted the adoption on May 1972 and they changed the name of Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom at the Civil Registrar of Naga City. In 1999, Isabelita filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the RTC. Her husband wanted to revoke the adoption since Jose Melvin did not want to change his surname to Lahom, but was prevented by petitioners request. Jose Melvin continues to use the surname Sibulo as shown in his records with the Professional Regulation Commission issued in 1978 until present (1999). Since Isabelita is a widow and since she has been sick, she wanted Jose Melvin to visit her more often and take care of her. However he only visits her once a year and remains indifferent towards her. Jose Melvin tells Isabelita that her nieces and nephews only want her money. She says that it is he who wants the properties of the couple as proven by his recent petition for partition against her. Since there is no more love and affection between them, she thinks that the decree of adoption has been negated given that there is no reason for its existence. According to Section 19 of Article 6 of the Domestic Adoption Act (R.A. No. 8552), implemented before the institution of the case but after the adoption, the adopters no longer have a right to rescind a decree adoption. However the adopters cannot though the adopters may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. She insists that she can rescind the adoption decree since the previous laws had vested her with the grounds in Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code. On April 28, 2000, the trial court held that she had no cause of action since the Domestic Adoption Act deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption. However, even if she did have the right, she should have done it within 5 years of discovery of the cause of action. She filed more than 5 years after and therefore the action had prescribed. Issue: WON the adoption done on May 5, 1972 can still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552; If yes, WON the adopters action has prescribed. Held: No the law at the time of filing of action governs; and right to rescind adoption was not a vested right. Rationale: The Civil Code of the Philippines, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and even the Family Code adopted the principle that adoption is a social and moral responsibility and that the underlying intent was geared to favour the adopted child. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, in a petition to adopt, the Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In Republic vs. Miller, the SC also ruled that the controversy should be resolved in light of the governing law at the time the petition was filed. Following earlier decisions, when this action was filed, the new law had already repealed the right of an adopter to rescind the decree of adoption under the Family Code and Civil Code. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect, or fixed and irrefutable. Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption was subject to a five-year bar rule. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfil the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. 698
The right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree is a right of action which may be taken away by the State. Note: An adopter can still forfeit benefits of an undeserving child. Judgement: RTC decision is affirmed. Petition to rescind adoption is denied. 1. By the adopted 2. By the adopter/s 3. Effects of rescission XIII. SUPPORT A. What Comprises support, FC 194 Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a) B. Who are Obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196 Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood. (291a) Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a)
Pelayo vs Lauron 12 Phil 453 January 12, 1909 Ponente: Torres Facts: In October 13, 1906, when the daughter-in-law of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella was about to give birth, Lauron and Abella requested the medical assistance of Dr. Pelayo. Pelayo said that the value of the services he rendered was 500, but Lauron and Abella refused to pay without good reason. Pelayo prayed that judgement be entered in his favour against Lauron and Abella. Howeverm for proper collection of his claim, the person who is actually liable for payment must be determined first. Issue: WON Lauron and Abella were bound to pay the fees being collected by Pelayo Held: No, the husband of the one who gave birth is liable. Ratio: That it was not the husband who called for medical assistance does not prevent him from fulfilling the obligation, considering that Lauron and Abella called for assistance in view of the imminent danger that their daughter-in-law is facing. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. Within the meaning of the law, the father-in-law and mother-in-law (Lauron and Abella) are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support. 699
Sanchez v. Zulueta 68 Phil 453 (May 16, 1939) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari. Ponente: Avancea, C.J. Facts: This is a case for suspension of support filed by the petitioner father on the ground of adultery on the part of the respondent mother. In the Court of First Instance of Manila, a civil case for monthly support was previously filed by respondents Josefa Diego (mother) and Mario Sanchez (child) against herein petitioner Feliciano Sanchez (alleged father). Josefa and Mario (R) argued in that case for support that Feliciano (P) abandoned them without any justifiable cause and that they do not have any means of subsistence while Feliciano receives from the United States Army a monthly pension of P174.20 On the other hand, Feliciano argues that it was Josefa who abandoned the family home and committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, out of which the child Mario was born. A month after the filing of the complaint in the CFI, herein respondents Josefa and Mario asked that they be given P50 a month as allowance pendente lite. Feliciano (P) opposed this saying that Mario was born of an adulterous relationship (i.e. not Felicianos child), hence, Feliciano could not be made to support him. Feliciano further asked the CFI to be given the chance to show evidence to prove the alleged adultery against Josefa. However, the CFI, without letting Feliciano present any proof, ordered him to pay the support pendente lite of Josefa and Mario. On appeal for prohibition filed by Feliciano in the CA, the CA affirmed the CFI. Issue: WON the CA erred in not letting Feliciano present any evidence to prove his claim of Josefas adultery in order that he may not be compelled to support Mario. Held: Yes, the CA erred. Ratio: Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against support. As to the child, it is also a valid defense that he was the fruit of an adulterous relationship. The defense of adultery should be proved in order to contend support, hence, it was wrong for the CFI and the CA not to let Feliciano present his evidence. Although Feliciano may not have any affidavit to support his claim, he may have other evidence of greater weight. Judgment: CA is reversed. Feliciano should be given the opportunity to present his evidence in defense of the claim of support pendente lite.
Reyes vs. Ines-Luciano No. L-48219 February 28, 1979 Law: Support; Who are obliged to provide support & Source of Support Ponente: Fernandez, J. Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA that dismissed the petition to annul the order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that directed the petitioner to give support pending litigation to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes. Overview: Guy who tried to kill his wife twice, refuses to support her and their three children (using conjugal funds) during the pendency of the case of their legal separation saying that she had committed adultery. Facts: The mom filed for legal separation against dad since dad tried to kill mom. WOAH. He punched her a lot and hit her head on the floor several times with intent to kill. He pushed her down the stairs when she tried to run. He gave her a strong swing in the abdomen which rendered her unconscious. Moms dad saved her. Two months later, when he saw her in the office, he doused her with grape juice, kicked 700
her several times, and hit her with a steel tray. Her driver helped her due to her screams. She asked for support (from the conjugal property) pending litigation and for her three children. Dad is saying she cant ask for support since she had committed adultery with her physician. Court granted petition for support. CA dismissed the appeal due to the plight of the mom and since dad appears to be financially capable. Issue: WON support should be given even if the wife committed adultery. Held: Adultery is a defense in an action for support however in this case, the adultery alleged was not proven with sufficient evidence. The P4000.00 a month granted by the judge is not excessive due to financial ability of dad and inflation. To determine the amount for support, the court can use affidavits or other documentary evidence. Judgement: The petition is denied and CA decision is affirmed. De Asis v. CA G.R. No. 127578 (February 15, 1999) Nature: Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari. Ponente: Purisima, J. Facts: This is about the 1st complaint for support which the private respondents later on waived. On the 2nd complaint they filed, the petitioner argued that such should not prosper because the respondents already waived their right to it on a previous complaint filed. October 14, 1988- Vircel D. Andres, herein private respondent, in her capacity as legal guardian of the minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support (1st complaint) against Manuel de Asis (P) in the QC-RTC. (R) Vircel argued that (P) Manuel refuse to give them support in spite repeated demands. (P) denied his paternity in his Answer. July 4, 1989- Vircel (P) sent a manifestation withdrawing her complaint since it was futile to ask for support from someone who denies paternity. Due to this manifestation, the two parties agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. September 7, 1995- Vircel filed another complaint for maintenance and support (2nd complaint) against Manuel. October 8, 1993- Manuel (P) moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the basis of res judicata because the 1st complaint for support was dismissed. November 25, 1993- RTC ruled that res judicata is not applicable in an action for support because it is not allowed by the law. June 7, 1996- CA dismissed Manuels (P) appeal and affirmed the RTC. Issue: WON the action for support can be barred by res judicata. Held: No, the action for support CANNOT be barred by res judicata. Ratio: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person, according to NCC 301. Also, NCC 2035 (4) prohibits the waiving of future support, hence, the first manifestation entered into by Vircel (R), which is essentially a waiver, is prohibited by law. Policy argument: Since the right to support is for the maintenance of life, waiving it would be like waiving life itself. NAKS! The manifestation entered into by Vircel in the 1st complaint may also be likened to a compromise, which is prohibited as well. As to Manuels denial of his paternity, such must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. Acknowledgment, as it affects the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of a compromise. Judgment: Petition is denied. CA is affirmed. 701
De Guzman v Perez 496 SCRA 475 July 25, 2006 Ponente: Corona, J. Facts: Roberto De Guzman and Shirley Aberde were sweethearts in law school, but the latters schooling got interrupted when she became pregnant and gave birth to Robby Aberde De Guzman, Roberto eventually married someone else, sent money for Robbys schooling twice and helped paid for medical expenses once. Shirley became a factory worker in Taiwan, but almost spent all her savings for Robbys needs. She demanded support from Roberto who managed the de Guzman family corporations and lived luxurious lifestyle. She filed a complaint for abandonment and neglect of child. Roberto claimed that his money, house, cars, and stocks were all his fathers. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for abandonment but found probable cause to charge Roberto with neglect of child. Secretary of Justice affirmed this by stating that Roberto had ample financial resources and a high station in life but still failed to send money for the education of his son. He was charged with neglect of child under Art 59(4), PD 603criminal liability shall attach to any parent who neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in life and financial conditions permit. Issue/s: Can Roberto be charged with neglect of child? Held: Yes Ratio: The elements of neglect of child are: 1. The offender is a parent 2. He or she neglects his or her own child 3. Neglect consists in not giving education to the child 4. Offenders station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the child -prima facie evidence of Robertos financial capacity: notarized General Information Sheet of the RNCD Development Corporation indicating that Roberto owns P750,000 worth of shares :this claim is factual and evidentiary -Roberto cannot claim innocence because Robby is being supported by his mother and her relatives :neglect may be committed by any parent :neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the familys in life and financial condition permit :the irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties Judgment: No determination of guilt or innocence, what is ascertained is existence of probable cause -Guilt should still be proven in trial C. Source of Support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 122 Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. (n) Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) 702
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a) Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for selfimprovement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtorspouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a) Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. 703
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose abovementioned. (163a) Lam vs. Chua (2004) Facts: March 11, 1994 Adriana Chua (R) filed a declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose Lim (P) in RTC Pasay Alleged that Jose was psychologically incapacitated: o Frequently failed to go home o Indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities such as mismanaging the CPG To save the CPG, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their CPG and separation of present and future properties. This was approved by the RTC of Makati. Contains the following provision regarding support of their son, John Paul: o That the spouses shall initially contribute P250,00 each to a common fund, to be increased as required, to be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of their son She also alleged that they had long been separated in bed and board o That they have agreed that their son will be in her custody subject to visitation rights She prayed that their marriage be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child Jose did not respond Adriana presented her evidence She then filed an Urgent Motion to re-open and presented marriage contracts which showed that Jose has contracted two marriages before their marriage RTC declared their marriage null and void for being bigamous o Ordered Jose to give P20,000 as monthly support for John Paul Jose filed an MR regarding the support contending that there was already a provision for support in the amount of P250k in his agreement w/ Adriana RTC denied his MR, CA affirmed Issue: WON Jose should still be ordered to give support to his son notwithstanding the fact that theres already an existing provision regarding such Held: YES RTC and CA are both correct in ruling that the amount of support is by no means permanent In Advincula v. Advincula, SC ruled: o Judgment for support does not become final o The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional For during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs and with the means of the giver o Support cannot be regarded as subject to final determination There is no merit to Joses claim that his agreement w/ Adriana in the case for voluntary dissolution of CPG is a bar to any further award for support in favor of their child The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support 704
However, Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Arts 194, 201 and 202 of the FC: Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in 194 shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196 shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child. In this case, no evidence was presented as to the capacity or resources of Jose and the needs of the child, Adriana just specified that she wants P20k P25k support Such testimony does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give The case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings as to the issue regarding support Lerma v CA (61 SCRA 440) December 20, 1974 Ponente: Makalintal Overview: Teodoro Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against his wife, Concepcion Diaz. In the same year (1969), his wife filed for legal separation, separation of properties, custody of their children and support pendente lite. Lerma opposed his wifes claim for support on the ground of her adultery; also, that his wife and her paramour was already convicted by the CFI Rizal (albeit it was still on appeal with the CA). CFI ruled in favor of Diaz. CA dismissed his petition for review. SC ruled in his favor saying that adultery is a good defense against his wifes claim for support pendente lite considering that she filed for legal separation in bad faith (i.e. She was declared as a guilty spouse.). Facts: May 19, 1951 Teodoro Lerma (P) and Concepcion Diaz (R) were married. August 22, 1969 Lerma filed a complaint for adultery against Diaz and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. November 18, 1969 Diaz filed with the lower court a complaint against Lerma for legal separation (on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life) and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was in her custody. Lerma filed his opposition on Diazs application for support pendente lite setting up as defense the adultery charge he filed against the respondent. CFI ruled in favor of Diaz. She was entitled to support pendente lite from the date of filing the complaint (amended amount from P2,250 to P1,820 monthly). March 12, 1970 Diaz filed with respondent CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the 705
aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. March 13, 1970 CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano (CFI) from enforcing said orders. October 8, 1970 CA set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite. o Diaz moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the Lerma had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. January 20, 1971 CA set aside the decision of October 8, 1970 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. January 23, 1974 Lerma filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order alleging, amongst others (pp. 442-443), (1) that Diaz never sought the enforcement of assailed orders of CFI; (2) Diaz and Ramirez were convicted by the CFI Rizal in 1972 (Note: Judgment of conviction is on appeal); and, (3) that he filed new adultery charges against Diaz and her second paramour. In Diazs comment, she alleges (1) that an order granting pendent lite is immediately executory; (2) that the dismissal of the petition by the respondent Court of Appeals rendered functus oficio (This term is applied to something which once had life and power, but which now has no virtue whatsoever. Law Dictionary, 2010) the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued; and (3) that under Article 292 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "during the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property ...," such support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery. January 28, 1974 Present Court resolved "to issue a temporary restraining order effective immediately and until further orders from this Court." The order was addressed to Judge Luciano, her agents and representatives. February 8, 1974 - Petitioner's urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied. February 28, 1974 Lerma filed instant motion for reconsideration. March 6, 1974 Court issued another resolution setting aside the resolution of February 8, 1974 and reinstated the temporary restraining order previously issued until further orders. Diaz filed her opposition against Lermas motion for reconsideration and later asked that it be set for oral argument. The petitioner's pending motion was set for hearing on April 22, 1974 and then reset for May 20, 1974. On the latter date counsel for both parties appeared. In lieu, however, of oral argument the Court allowed them to file memoranda. Issue: WON Lerma be allowed to present evidence in the lower court in support of his defense that his wife had committed adultery? WON adultery is a good defense against the claim for support pendente lite by the respondent, Concepcion Diaz? Held and Ratio: Moot and Academic. o Concepcion Diaz and Teodoro Ramirez had already been found guilty of bigamy and sentenced to imprisonment. o Diaz falsified death certificate of the premature baby as the child of her friend Rosario Salita. o Diazs paramour after Teodoro is one Jose Gochangco (a policeman). Yes. Adultery is a good defense against Diazs claim for support pendente lite. o Legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse. The fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite. 706
Otherwise, all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless. Article 100 of the Civil Code: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. o A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered within the intendment of the law granting support. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. Article 104 of the Civil Code: After the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. o Diaz lost her substantive right to support. Article 303 of the Civil Code: Support shall cease when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance. Article 921 of the Civil Code: One of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is when the spouse has given cause for legal separation. The loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals of January 20, 1971 and the orders of respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal separation between the parties. No pronouncement as to costs. Notes: Article 292 of the Civil Code: During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order. o Article 292 of the Civil Code is not in itself the source of legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases. The said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. Provisional determination by court of pertinent facts. D. Order of Support, FC 199, 200 Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. (294a) Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. 707
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a) Mangonon vs CA 494 SCRA 1 June 30, 2006 Ponente: Chico-Nazario Overview: Pending litigation of Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, Belen, on behalf of her minor children, filed for support pendente lite for her childrens lucrative collegiate education against Federico and Francisco (father and grandfather of Rica and Rina, respectively). Facts: Federico Delgado (19) and Belen Mangonon (21) were married in February 1975, but because of lack of required consent (NCC Art 85), the marriage was annulled in August of the same year. Nevertheless, Belen got pregnant and gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. With assistance of second husband Danny Mangonon, Belen raised her twin daughters, as the Delgados had completely abandoned them. In 1994, Belen filed a petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support with application for support pendent lite. That time, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States, however, they were financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education despite admissions. Belen averred that as legitimate children and grandchildren of Federico and Francisco, Rica and Rina are entitled to general educational support. Moreover, Belen alleged that under the Family Code, Francisco, or in his default, Federico should be orderd to provide general and educational support for Rica and Rina. Issue: WON Francisco Delgado, grandfather of Rica and Rina, is obligated to provide support for their collegiate education Held: Yes. Ratio: It having been established that Federico is the father of Rica and Rina, the Court ruled that Belen and Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. However, as they do not have the full capacity to provide for the educational needs, Francisco, the grandfather, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. Most especially that it was established that Francisco, being a business tycoon, has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Lim vs Lim 604 SCRA 691 October 20, 2009 Ponente: Carpio Overview: Cheryl, who doesnt have a stable income, and Edward, who earns a meagre 6000 per month, were married and had children. They lived in the house of Edwards grandparents. Eventually, Cheryl abandoned Edward and the home, and since Cheryl has no income, she sued for support. The RTC and CA ordered Edward and his parents to provide support for Cheryl and the children. Facts: Cheryl, Edward, and their children lived together with Edwards grandmother in Forbes Park. Cheryl had no steady source of income, and Edwards family business provided him with 6000 per 708
month. He shouldered the family expenses. In 1990, Cheryl caught Edward in a very compromising situation with the midwife of his grandmother. A violent confrontation ensued after that, and then Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park home along with their three children. Cheryl then sued, for herself and for her children, for support. The trial court ruled that Edward, along with his parents Filomena and Prudencio must jointly provide support to Cheryl and the children. Filomena and Prudencio appealed, saying that they shouldnt be liable for support. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Issue: WON Filomena and Prudencio parents of Edward, are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to Cheryl and the children. Held: Yes, with modifications. The court held that the Edwards parents are only liable for the support of the children, and not Cheryl. Ratio: Filomena and Prudencio themselves admit that their liability, in the sense that they primarily questioned when their liability is trigerred, and not if they are liable at all. The governing text are the relevant provisions on Support, and not on Parental Authority. These provisions differ in some concerns regarding legal support, including the duration of the obligation and concurrence among other relatives. o Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from familial ties lasts a whole lifetime. o The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. o The inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree. As Filomena and Prudencios grandchildren, only Cheryls children can receive support from them. Cherys right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband, arising from their marital bond.
E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-204 FC 200 Supra Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a) Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. (297a) Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand. Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a) Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a) 709
Canonizado v. Benitez 127 SCRA 610 (February 20, 1984) Nature: Petition to review the order of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J. Facts: September 27, 1968- The CA entered a decision ordering (R) Atty. Cesar R. Canonizado to give (P) Bernarda Canonizado a monthly support of P100.00 beginning with October 1964. January 21, 1969- The CA decision became final and executor. October 24, 1969- An order of execution was issued on the amount of P27,900.00. October 28, 1969- The writ of execution was issued following the aforementioned order. However, this was recalled to allow the (P) Bernarda to correct the amount therein. Earlier on October 6, 1967, (P) Bernardas child Christina, already became of age, but since she was still studying then, her support was only terminated in April 1969. The total amount therefore due to Cesar (R) was determined to be P16, 150.00 for the period of October 1964 to April 1969. February 10 and March 30, 1970- Writs of execution were issued on the basis of the new amount but they were returned unsatisfied. July 11, 1973- The parties entered into an agreement which stipulates that Bernarda shall receive the amount of P17, 200.00, aside from the amount due to Christina. February 16, 1976- (P) filed a motion for execution and contempt of court praying that a writ of execution be issued for P17, 200.00 for Bernarda and P16,150.00 for Christina. March 15, 1976- Bernarda (P) filed the required verified statement but (R) Cesar was also given an extension to liquidate the arrears in support. Hence, the issuance of the writ of execution was deferred until April 14, 1976. May 14, 1967- Last extension for (R) Cesar. July 14, 1976- The lower court ordered the issuance of the writ of execution for the collection of P16, 150.00 and P17, 200.00. July 22, 1976- A writ of execution was issued. August 3, 1976- But on this date, the parties entered into an agreement, hence, (P) Bernarda did not push for its enforcement. April 14, 1977- (P) Bernarda filed a motion for an alias writ of execution based on the writ issued on July 22, 1976. September 14, 1977- The JRDC denied the motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution reasoning that: 1) the CA decision became final and executory on January 21, 1969, or 7 years and 5 months have already elapsed prior to (P) Bernardas motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and 2) that Christina already seems capable of asking for support from her father herself. October 13, 1978- (P) Bernarda filed an MR. November 21, 1978- (P) Bernarda filed for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction praying that an alias writ of execution be issued based on the writ of execution issued on July 22, 1976. January 12, 1982- (P) Bernarda filed with the JRDC a motion to require (R) Cesar to pay current support beginning February 1978 based on the decisions of September 27, 1968 and January 21, 1969. March 1, 1982- (R) Cesar filed an opposition on the ground that his obligation to give support has already terminated. July 5, 1982- (P) Bernarda filed another petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction praying that JRDC be ordered to act on (P) Bernardas motion for current support. Issues: 1. WON the JRDC judge can be compelled by mandamus to issue an alias writ of execution for the payment of arrearages in support. 2. WON the JRDC judge can be compelled by mandamus to act on (P)s motion for current support. 710
Held/Ratio: 1. Yes. a. Although there was already a lapse of 7 years and 5 months, Bernarda can still ask for an alias writ of execution because the judgment for support does not become dormant. b. The obligation is a continuing one, hence, the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the same. c. Bernarda was just enforcing a vested right. d. The lack of need for support may only be temporary, it does not entail a permanent suspension of it. 2. No. a. The judge cannot be compelled to grant the action for current support because there exists a valid ground for the suspension of such obligation. Judgment: JRDC is ordered to issue an alias writ of execution for the fulfillment of the judgment on the 1st issue. But JRDC is directed to set the case for a hearing in order to determine whether there is a current need for support. F. Amount of Support, FC 200-208 FC 200-204 (supra) Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a) Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. (2164a) Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a) Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n) Lacson vs. Lacson (2006) Facts: Maowee and Maonaa Lacson (respondent sisters) are LC of Edward Lacson (P) and Lea Lacson Not long after the birth of the two, Edward left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City virtually forcing Lea and the sisters to seek, for financial reason, shelter somewhere o They stayed with Edwards mother, then with Leas mother, then w/ Leas brother Noel Daban, then rented an apt only to return to the house of Leas mom o For a period of 18 years (1976-1994), Lea and her children had no permanent dwelling From the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband for support, relying initially on his promise written on a note dated Dec 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters But Edward reneged on his promise despite Leas effort to make him fulfill the same Edward, however, gave their children meager amounts for school expenses Through the years and up to the middle of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of the 711
children who both took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City In the early part of 1995, Lea, in behalf of her 2 daughters, filed a petition for support The sisters averred that Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976 o Owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had borrowed from their uncle Noel money amounting to P400k P600k Edward, on his part, alleged giving to his daughters sufficient amount to meet their needs o But his lack of income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure to give regular support o Also blamed financial complaint for his inability to provide the P12k prayed for in the complaint TC granted the sisters P12k monthly support pendente lite After trial, TC, following an elaborate formula, ordered Edward to pay P2M, 496K (minus the P124k which they received as support pendente lite) to respondents which represented 216 months or 18 years of support in arrears CA affirmed TC Issue: WON it is correct to order Edward to pay support in arrears provided that no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand had been made Held: YES Edward contends that he should be made to pay support starting only in 1995 since it was the time when the complaint for support was filed The Court said that his contention glossed over the fact that he abandoned his children even before the eldest turned 2 and that he could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to demand support from him when even his wife found it difficult to get in touch with him Also, the demand seems to have already been made sometime in 1975 as evidenced by Edwards note promising for support of the children Although no extrajudicial demand was made in the sense of a formal written demand; nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was definitely made Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea As for the amount of support in arrears, theres no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts considering that they fixed the amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient As for Edwards contention that Lea and their daughters appropriated P5M proceeds of the sale of his exclusive estate and that he should now no longer be obliged to pay the support, this has no merit One, it was not proven that the property was his exclusively Two, the sisters were not party to the sale The petition is DENIED and CA is AFFIRMED
o o
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G. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194 Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; 712
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a) Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a) H. Support Pendente Lite, FC 198, ROC 61 Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a) RULE 61 Support Pendente Lite Section 1. Application. At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof. (1a) Section 2. Comment. A copy of the application and all supporting documents shall be served upon the adverse party, who shall have five (5) days to comment thereon unless a different period is fixed by the court upon his motion. The comment shall be verified and shall be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof. (2a, 3a) Section 3. Hearing. After the comment is filed, or after the expiration of the period for its filing, the application shall be set for hearing not more than three (3) days thereafter. The facts in issue shall be proved in the same manner as is provided for evidence on motions. (4a) Section 4. Order. The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity may require, having the regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible. (5a) Section 5. Enforcement of order. If the adverse party fails to comply with an order granting support pendente lite, the court shall, motu proprio or upon motion; issue an order of execution against him, without prejudice to his liability for contempt. (6a) When the person ordered to give support pendente lite refuses or fails to do so, any third person who furnished that support to the applicant may, after due notice and hearing in the same case obtain a writ of execution to enforce his right of reimbursement against the person ordered to provide such support. (h) Section 6. Support in criminal cases. In criminal actions where the civil liability includes support for the offspring as a consequence of the crime and the civil aspect thereof has not been waived, reserved and instituted prior to its filing, the accused may be ordered to provide support pendente lite to the child born to the offended party allegedly 713
because of the crime. The application therefor may be filed successively by the offended party, her parents, grandparents or guardian and the State in the corresponding criminal case during its pendency, in accordance with the procedure established under this Rule. (n) Section 7. Restitution. When the judgment or final order of the court finds that the person who has been providing support pendente lite is not liable therefor, it shall order the recipient thereof to return to the former the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment, without prejudice to the right of the recipient to obtain reimbursement in a separate action from the person legally obliged to give the support. Should the recipient fail to reimburse said amounts, the person who provided the same may likewise seek reimbursement thereof in a separate action from the person legally obliged to give such support. (n) I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61 supra XIV. PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY OF CHILDREN A. Concept of Parental Authority, FC 209 Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n) Medina v Makabali 27 SCRA 502 March 28, 1969 Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J. Facts: Zenaida Medina, assisted by Dra. Venancia Makabali, gave birth Joseph Casero to a married man, Feliciano Casero. Zenaida left the boy with Dra. Makabali from birth, and the latter treated the child for poliomyelitis and sent him to school. Zenaida never visited or paid for his expenses. It was discovered that Zenaida lived with Feliciano and the latters lawful wife by mere tolerance. Zenaida Medina filed petition for habeas corpus to claim custody of Joseph Casero which was denied by the court. In court, Joseph referred to Dra. Makabali as mammy and never knew his real mother. She also pointed to Dra. Makabali when asked with whom he wanted to stay. CFI ruled that it was in the childs best interest to stay with Dra. Makabali but with a promise that when he reaches the age of 14, he would be free to choose with whom he wanted to stay. Issue/s: WON writ of habeas corpus should be granted Held: No Ratio: Art 363, CC: in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount o for compelling reasons, even a child under 7 may be ordered separated from the mother Art 356, CC: right of the parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual, and civic training and development o Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties: she failed to provide the child with love and care and DESERTED him from birth o Dra. Makabali, on the other hand, expressed willingness to care and educate him Judgment: CFI ordered is affirmed, writ of HC is denied. Unson v. Navarro 714
Facts: Miguel Unson and Edita Araneta were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage Teresa was born on December 1, 1971. on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have been living separately since June 1972. The agreement was approved by the Court. No specific provision was contained in the agreement about the custody of the child because the they would have their own private arrangement in that respect. Unsons allegations: - when Maria Teresa started pre-school in 1976 and later, when she started school at Assumption College, she would stay with him during school days and spend weekends with her mother, but there were times when her mother would not even bother to pick her up during non-school days; - during the early part of 1978 he personally acquired knowledge that Edita has been living with her brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, in an and so he tightened his custody over his daughter, especially after: a. he found out that Agustin was confined at the Makati Medical Center for "Manic Depressive" disorder; b. he found out that Edita delivered a child fathered by Agustin; c. he found out that Agustin had been confined again for the same ailment. - On May 21, 1980 Edita delivered another child fathered by Agustin; - Agustin is the child's godfather/baptismal sponsor; - Agustin and Edita have left the Roman Catholic Church and have embraced a protestant; - Maria Teresa is almost 9 y/o, born and reared under the Roman Catholic faith; Editas Contentions: Since the birth of Maria Teresa, she has always lived with her. She has not in any way spoken ill of nor turned the child against her father; - it was she who was always insistent that he has custody of Maria Teresa every week end and half of summer and Christmas vacation so that the child could establish a healthy and viable relationship with her father; - Unson's parents showed more interest in the child than him; since it was his parents who would more often pick up Maria Teresa and bring her back to and from her home; - she requested him to spend more time with Maria Teresa; - They have always had a cordial and amicable relationship. Even from 1973 when she started living with her brother-in-law, Agustin, they retained a cordial relationship. He always knew about her relationship with Agustin. He was always welcome to pick up Maria Teresa at any time. - When he left for Australia in 1974 for one year, he left Maria Teresa to stay with her. During this time, Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit with and to be picked up at any time by his parents; - Everyone they know have long known of and accepted the circumstances involving her and Agustin; Issue: who should have custody over the child? Held: Unson. Edita is granted visitorial rights over the child. Bagtas vs Santos 606 SCRA 101 November 27, 2009 Ponente: Carpio Overview: Spouses Gallardo, grandparents of Maryl Joy, and Noel Bagtas and Lydia Sioson, are fighting over custody of Maryl Joy. They came up with a compromise agreement, but when the Gallardos violated the court order regarding the compromise, the RTC dismissed 715
Bagtas petition for writ of habeas corpus and in effect, awarded custody of Maryly Joy to the Gallardos. Case was remanded for the lower court to be able to determine who really has rightful custody over the child. Facts: After graduating from high school in 2000, Maricel ran away to live with her boyfriend. She became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy. Maricels boyfriend ran away. In February 2002, Maricel lived with Noel Bagtas and Lydia Sioson, to who she eventually relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy. In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo (Maricels parents) tried to obtain custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and Sioson. When Bagtas and Sioson refused, the Gallardos filed a petition for habeas corpus, summoning Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy. The petition was granted, and in September 2002, the Gallardos, Bagtas and Sioson, entered into a compromise agreement, basically placing Maryl Joy in custody of the parties alternately. That same month that the compromise agreement had been executed, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita Gallardo brought Maryl Joy to Samar. They prayed before the RTC that the Gallardos be directed to explain violation of the RTCs order re compromise, and cited them for contempt of court. Bagtas and Sioson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for the production of Maryl Joy, but the RTC hastily dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the dismissal of the case, saying that the violation of a court order pales in significance when considered alongside the best interest if the minor whose welfare requires that she be in the custody of her grandparents rather than (Bagtas and Sioson)s. Issue: Essentally, (I think), the issue revolves around who has rightful custody over the child Held: Case was remanded. Ratio: In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare is the most important consideration. The RTC erred when it dismissed the petition, because in effect, it awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Gallardos. It should have conducted trial to determine who had the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. Note: Theres this discussion about habeas corpus and its uh, purposes, but I didnt deem it necessary. Also I didnt quite understand :P B. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234 Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a) Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a) Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a) Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twentyone years. 716
Emancipation also takes place: (1) By the marriage of the minor; or (2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. (397a, 398a, 400a, 401a) Art. 235. The provisions governing emancipation by recorded agreement shall also apply to an orphan minor and the person exercising parental authority but the agreement must be approved by the court before it is recorded. (n) Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a) Maria Paz Cordero and Reynaldo Eslao were married and begot two children, Leslie and Angelica. The couple stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. While Angelica stayed with her parents in Teresitas house, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Marias mom in Pampanga. When Reynaldo died in 1990, Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita insisted that Angelica be left with her as she grieve over her son who just died. In 1992, Maria was married to Dr. James Ouye and decided to migrate to the USA to join her husband. In 1993, Maria went back to the Philippines to get her children, informing Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica and James willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education. Teresita resisted. The lower court ordered Teresita to cause the immediate transfer of custody of Angelica to Maria. The CA affirmed the lower courts decision. Issue: WON Teresita Eslao is fit to be retain custody of Angelica Eslao Held: No. Ratio: In Santos vs CA, the court held that parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounce except in cases authorized by law... When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in document, what is given is merely temporary custody and does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Parents are duty-bound and entitled to keep custody of their children. Furthermore, in all cases involving custody, the primary criterion being considered is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties. Upon consideration of the two circumstances, the court held that the childrens future will be brighter with their mother than with the one prevailing in Teresitas house. 717
Sagala-Eslao vs Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 317 January 16, 1997 Ponente: Torres Overview: Maria entrusted one of her children to mother-in-law Teresita after husband Reynaldo died. When Maria was trying to get custody of her child back, Teresita refused. Teresita argued that she is deserving to take care of the daughter; however, the court ruled that parental authority and custody belongs to the mother. Moreover, the welfare of the children being put into consideration, the children were rightfully put in the custody of their mother. Facts:
C. Who exercises PA, FC 211-213 cf FC 49, 102(6) and 63(2), FC 176 Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a) Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n) Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n) Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n) Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n) Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) Espiritu v Layug (G.R. No. 115640) March 15, 1995 Ponente: Melo Overview: Teresita got married to a certain Roberto Lustado in 1984 in California. Less than a year later, she commenced living with another man, Reynaldo Espiritu, in Pittsburgh. She later married Reynaldo without this guy knowing her first marriage. Their union bore two children: Rosalind and Reginald. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Meanwhile, Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines; but because his assignment was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister Guillerma Layug and her family. In 1992, Teresita went back to the Philippines and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody over her children. TC declared 718
that Reynaldo has sole PA over children and that Teresita has visitation rights. CA gave custody to Teresita by applying the age proviso rule. SC sustained TCs findings saying (1) that Rosalind and Reginald, who were over 7 years of age, chose their father as the parent with whom they want to live; (2) that the childrens emotional growth were affected by mothers behavior (i.e. suffered emotional shock by mothers infidelity) as sustained by findings and reports by expert witnesses; and, (3) that there is nothing in the records that show Reynaldo is an "unfit" person. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend. More so, his work in Pittsburgh is only temporary. Facts: 1976 - Reynaldo Espiritu (P) and Teresita Masauding (R) met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. 1977 - Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. 1984 - Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. August 16, 1986 - Rosalind Therese (daughter) was born. October 7, 1987 - While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married. January 12, 1988 - Upon their return to the United States Reginald Vince (son) was born. 1990 - The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. o Teresita: Reynaldo is always nagging her about money matters. o Reynaldo: Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister Guillerma Layug (P) and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. TC: (1) Dismissed Teresitas petition; (2) Suspended Teresitas PA; (3) Declared that Reynaldo to have sole PA over children but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. CA: Gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo. o Applied age proviso: No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. Issue: Who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, welladjusted, and happy young adulthood? 719
Held: Reynaldo, the father, is more suitable and better qualified than the mother; hence, he is awarded the custody of minors, Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu. Ratio: CA erred in their decision. o Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. o The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption. o Should have scrutinized the records to discover the choice of the children and verified whether chosen parent is fit or unfit since kids are already over seven years of age. Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Here, they chose to live with their father. Findings of Rita Flores Macabulos (Child Psychologist): There are feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. Rosalind (who was a little over 5 years of age during this time) tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. Her recommendations show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them. o The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. On expert witnesses: Professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. o Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any litigation. o It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant. Children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her pleadings (i.e. there was a tearful reunion between her and children) could not have been missed by the TC. Furthermore, she demonstrated her temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her failure or refusal to show deference and respect to the Court and the other parties. Best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. Illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to 720
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final. o To dilute disadvantage on her part (re: bigamous marriage with Reynaldo), Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado (contracted marriage with this guy in 1984) on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. NOT TRUE! More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact. o Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales (co-employee of Reynaldo) right there in the house of Reynaldo. Nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend. o The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In essence, he is not exactly leaving his children behind with their Aunt permanently. Notes: Courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be reexamined and adjusted To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian.
Santos, Sr. v CA (G.R. No. 113054) March 16, 1995 Ponente: Romero Overview: Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant and Julia Bedia were married. A year later, their son was born. After which, childs parents agreed to place their son in the temporary custody of Julias parents (i.e. spouses Bedia). In 1988, Julia left for the US. In 1988, Leouel, with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where the son was staying. According to spouses Bedia, Leouel abducted the child. Grandparents then filed a petition for custody of the child. TC and CA ruled in their favor. The father of cause filed a petition for review. Facts: 1986 - Leouel Santos, Sr. (P), an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession were married in Iloilo City. July 18, 1987 Leouel Santos, Jr. was born. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia (R). Leouel and Julia agreed to place their son in the temporary custody of spouses Bedia. 721
o Bedias: They paid for all the hospital bills as well as subsequent support for the boy because the father could not afford to do so. May 1988 Julia Bedia-Santos left for the US to work. o Leouel: Not aware of Julias whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the US proved to be futile. o Bedias: Although abroad, Julia had been sending financial support to her son. September 2, 1990 Leouel, with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where 3-year old son was staying. o Bedias: Through deceit and false pretensions, Leouel abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Negros Oriental. Spouses Bedia filed a Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos, Jr. before RTC of Iloilo City. TC awarded custody of the child to his grandparents. CA affirmed RTC on the following grounds: (1) Bedias demonstrated their love and affection to their grandson; (2) Bedias are well-off financially; hence, could provide a good future (i.e. college education) for the boy; (3) nature of the fathers job prevents him from attending to sons needs; and, (4) child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving care of those who can provide for it. Hence, this review. Leouel claims that CA erred in their decision since it was not shown that he was an unfit and unsuitable father. More so, reasons presented were flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have custody. Bedias aver that (1) they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy; (2) father cannot take care of his son since his job required assignments in different places; (3) father never gave a single centavo for the boys support and maintenance; (4) Julia had entrusted the boy to them before she left for the US; and, (5) fathers use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child, after his hospital treatment, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as parents. Issue: Who should be awarded custody of the minor? Held: Leouel Santos, Sr., the father, is awarded custody of his minor child. Ratio: Although grandparents demonstrated love and affection for the boy, the legitimate father is still preferred especially because there was no showing that the father is an unsuitable and unfit parent. No proof that the father is unable to support his child at the present time. Moreover, who is to say whether the fathers financial standing would not improve in the future? The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth is not a sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to childs custody. While fathers previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. Appeal of unfavorable decision against him and his effort to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to correct his past misdeeds. Awarding him the custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. His being a soldier is not a bar to allowing him custody over his child. Employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, through unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. Law consideres the natural love of a parent to outweight that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been proven. Notes: The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control 722
and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. People v Glabo (Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO) FACTS: Oct 1991 - Mila Lobrico y.o. a mental retardate w/ Judith her 11 y.o. sister were summoned by Glabo their maternal uncle to his house. He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After which, he ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek (200 meters away from his house.) When Judith was gone, Glabo dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He overpowered Mila and raped her. It rained and Judith needed to go back to Glabos house and witnessed the incident. They did not inform anyone about it, however, Mila became pregnant so Judith told their father about it. A complaint was filed in the trial court. Glabo used alibi as a defense in stating that he was plowing the field of one of his sisters. The victims mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified for the defense. She stated that she wanted the case to be settled to restore her good relationship with accused-appellant, who is her brother. The court held that he is guilty and sentenced him reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: WON a rapist can exercise parental authority over an offspring produced by the crime. HELD: NO RATIO:+The Supreme Court gave more credence to Milas witness (Judith). +The fact that the victim was about six months pregnant in Mar 1992 confirms the commission of the rape sometime in Oct 1991. There was no proof that other man had intercourse with her during that time. +It was proven that Mila is a mental retardate, and thus, could not have consented in sexual intercourse. Her condition falls under the definition of a person deprived of reason. +Glabo was positively identified as the perpetrator of the rape by both the victim and her sister. Alibi is weak. +Silence for 6 months is another form of coping to a frightful experience. It does not make their charges are baseless, untrue and fabricated. +SC did not believe defenses claim that the victims father coached his children because normal parents would not subject his child to rape victim-stigma. +Precise date is not essential to an allegation because it is an event that a person would normally want to forger, aside from the fact that they are young and the victim is a mental retardate. +Moral damages, civil indemnity and exemplary damages was awarded for the victim. Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Art 345 RPC provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of FC, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Art 176 FC upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, Glabo should only be ordered to indemnify and 723
support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Art 201 FC. Vancil v Belmes (G.R. No. 132223) June 19, 2001 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez Overview: Reeder, a deceased navy serviceman of the USA, had 2 children named Valeria and Vincent with his common-law wife Bermes. Vancil, paternal grandmother of the children, commenced guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of said minors. She was later appointed as a legal and judicial guardian. Later, Belmes filed a motion for removal of guardian and appointment of a new one. TC ruled in favor of Vancil. CA ruled in favor of Belmes. Facts: Bonifacia Vancil (P) is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the Unites States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen Belmes. May 1987 Vancil commenced before the RTC of Cebu City guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of said minors (i.e. Valerie 6 years old; Vincent 2 years old). July 15, 1987 Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent. August 13, 1987 Belmes opposed to the subject of guardianship proceedings saying that she already filed for the same with the RTC of Pagadian City. June 21, 1988 Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting (1) that she is the natural mother in actual custody and exercising parental authority over the minors in Zamboanga Del Sur, where they are permanently residing; (2) that petition was filed under an improper venue; and, (3) that Vancil is a naturalized American citizen residing in the USA. October 12, 1988 TC ruled in favor of Vancil. CA reversed RTC. o No reason why Belmes, biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as a natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be a grave violation of the very basic tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity. March 10, 1998 Vancil filed a petition for review: (1) Preferential right of a parent to be an appointed guardian is not absolute; (2) Under Belmes custody, minor Valerie was raped seven times by mothers live-in partner; (3) She has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as a judicial guardian; and, (4) U.S. Citizenship is not a statutory requirement (or prohibition) to become a guardian. September 2, 1998 Valerie turned 18; thus, present petition is moot with respect to her. Issues: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian? Held and Ratio: Natural mother of the minor has the preferential right over the grandmother to be his guardian. o Being the natural mother of Vincent, Belmes has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. Grandparent Vancil cannot be the guardian of said minor by way of substitute parental authority. o Mother is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent. o No convincing evidence presented that Belmes is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. o Re: Valeries rape incidents: Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding. 724
o Even assuming that Belem is unfit as guardian of Vincent, Vancil still cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. American citizen and a resident of Colorado Vancil would not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian. Her coming back to this country just to fulfill duties of a guardian to Vincent is not even certain. Has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 Old age Conviction of libel o Court has held that court should not appoint persons as guardian who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. Concurring Opinion (Vitug): Parents are first in rank in matters of PA. Subsitute PA may be exercised by the grandparents only in the case the parents have died or a re absent or declared unfit in proper proceedings for that purpose (FC 214). PA stands to include the right and duty to the custody of the child, excepting only, of course, what might otherwise be best for the childs welfare. Childs illegitimacy does not in an way affect the order of priority in the exercise of parental authority. IC shall be under the PA of the mother who, consequentially, should also be entitled tot eh custody of the child (FC 176). Ponente: Mendoza, J. Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as a secretary of respondent Ramon R. Villar, a married man. Later on, their relationship became intimate, out of which Christopher was born, followed by two more children named Christine and Cathy Mae. Daisie and Ramons relationship became known to Ramons wife when Daisie brought Christopher to Villars residence sometime in 1986 and introduced him as Ramons son to her. After this, Daisies children were accepted by Ramons legitimate family. In the summer of 1991, Ramon asked Daisie if he could bring Christopher to Boracay with his family. Daisie agreed to it. However, after the trip, Ramon would not return Christopher to Daisie anymore. Ramon reasoned that he already enrolled Christopher to a certain school. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher. RTC granted the issuance of the writ with an order for Ramon to give temporary support to Christopher. However, CA reversed the RTC saying that an action for habeas corpus does not apply in the case of adulterous relationships. Instead, there is a need to file an action specific to the purpose of regaining custody and support. CA therefore dismissed the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Issue: WON (P) Daisie can avail of a writ of habeas corpus to regain custody of child Christopher. Held: Yes. Ratio: Pursuant to FC 176, Christopher is under the parental authority of (P) Daisie. Hence, since the latter was deprived of her right of custody, she can then petition for habeas corpus. FC 213 further states that no child under 7 years old shall be separated from the mother. 725
David v. CA G.R. No. 111180 (November 16, 1995) Nature: Petition for review of a decision of the CA.
The fact that Ramon is well-off does not justify his custody of the child. It is enough that Daisie earns enough to sustain her children. Although a claim for support should have been filed in a separate case, the granting of such in this case by the RTC is justified because Ramon seems very willing to provide such that he even wants Christopher in his custody. Judgment: CA is reversed. Tonog vs. CA G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002 Law: Parental authority and custody of children; Who exercises parental authority Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two resolutions by the CA granting the custody of minor, Gardin Tonog, to private respondent and denying petitioners MR. Overview: The illegitimate kid grew up with dad and dad wanted guardianship but mom contested the ruling of the court on the TEMPORARY guardianship/custody of the kid (ruled that kid should stay in dad pending final ruling on guardianship/custody). Facts: On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with respondent Edgar Daguimol. They spent some time living with the family of Edgar in QC. Mom went to the US to work as a registered nurse and daughter was left with dad. In January 1992, Dad filed for guardianship and it was granted to him. She found out on April 1992 and filed a petition for relief on May 1992 so that custody of Gardin will be given to her. The court said that while they are determining under whose guardianship and custody Gardin should be placed, the child should remain with dad so as not to subject the child to an emotional seesaw that will come from being passed from one parent to another. Issue: WON the appellate court erred in allowing father to retain temporary custody of the minor child. Held: No, she shouldnt be placed in unfamiliar surroundings and since she is over seven years old, she can choose to stay with dad. (The rtc/ca court has not yet ruled on the final custody of the child.) Rationale: The paramount concern is the welfare of the child. Article 176, which provides that illegitimate children shall be placed under the custody of the mom, and 213, which says that no child under seven will be separated from mom, of the Family Code shows a strong biased in favour of the mother. However, this is not intended to denigrate the role of the father. A mother may be deprived even of custody of her children below 7 years of age for compelling reasons such as habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment, and insanity, immorality, unemployment, etc. When over seven years of age, the child can choose which parent to be with but the court has the discretion to choose if the childs preference is unfit. Judgement: Petition denied. Laxamana vs. Laxamana G.R. No. 144763 September 3, 2002 Law: Parental authority and custody of children; Who exercises parental authority Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of RTC decision that awarded custody of the three minor children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner. Overview: Dad and mom are arguing over custody of kids. They have three minor kids. Dad was a drug addict. Mom wants annulment of marriage. RTC gave custody to mom based on a psychiatrist who said dad might not be completely cured. No other evidence was presented. Dad contested judgement of RTC. Facts: 726
Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met in 1983 and married each other on June 6, 1984. They had 3 kids: Joseph and Vincent born on March 15, 1985 (twins) and Michael born on June 19, 1986. Reymond became drug dependent and was confined in October 1991. On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner drugfree. However, respondent claimed he was not fully rehabilitated. He was allegedly violent and irritable. So, mom and kids abandoned him and lived with relatives. On August 31, 1999, dad filed a petition for habeas corpus for the kids. On September 24, 1999, mom filed a petition for annulment of marriage. On December 7, 1999, they reached an agreement so the court granted visitation rights to dad and asked both mom and dad to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. Based on the findings of the psychiatrist, Dr. Teresito Ocampo, the trial court awarded custody of the three kids to the mom and gave visitation rights to the dad. Dad was not recommended because he was not completely cured though report of his examination was not indicative of his continued drug use. Dad filed a petition for review. Issue: WON the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent. Held: No. Rationale: A child over seven can choose which parent to live with though the court may deem it fit to assign custody otherwise. In all cases, the sole and foremost concern must be for the physical, educational, social, and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as the social and moral situations of the opposing parents. The court should have conducted a trial in order to promote and protect the welfare of the children. There was no evidence to show that he is unfit to take custody of the children and provide them with adequate support, education, moral and intellectual training and development. There is no showing that the court took note of the choice of the children. The accuracy of the psychiatric report was not raised. So, the court erred in deciding based solely on the psychiatric report. Judgement: The case was remanded to the RTC in order to receive evidence to determine the fitness of Reymond Laxamana and Ma. Lourdes Laxamana to take custody of the children. While case is pending, they will stay with their mom but dad has visitation rights. Briones v. Miguel Facts: March 5, 2002, Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Next month, Joey filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued on March 11, 2002 to produce the living body of Michael Joey alleges that Michael is his illegitimate son with Loreta. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996. Loreta is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Joey also alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, he enrolled him at a nursery school Joeys parents, who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted him in taking care of the child. (backstory) May 2, 2001, Maricel and Francisca came to Joeys house to visit the child and requested to bring the child to SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon. However, they did not bring him back. 727
Joey went several times to Maricel but he was informed that the child is with Loreta. When he went there, Francisca told him that Michael is with Loreta at Tuguegarao City. He asked the police and the DSWD to locate his son and to bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile. CA: gave Loreta the custody (hindi nakasulat yung sa RTC) Issue: Who should have custody of the child? Held: Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right,28 and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law." Award Joey visitorial right Ratio: Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother. Michael is a natural ("illegitimate," under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. Pablo-Gualberto v Gualberto V 461 SCRA 450 June 28, 2005 Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts: Crisanto Gualberto V filed a petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage against Joycelyn Gualberto, and for custody pendent lite of 4-year old child, Rafaello. He alleged that Joycelyn took the child away from their conjugal home and his school when she abandoned Crisanto. He also stated that Joycelyn was having lesbian relations with Noreen Cuidadano. LC awarded custody to Crisanto stating that tha parental authority of the mother is subordinated to that of the father and it is for the physicial, educational, social, and moral welfare of the child. Upon Joycelyns motion to lift the custody pendent lite to Crisanto, LC reversed itself and awarded custody to her. It stated that a child under 7 cannot be separated from the mother unless there are compelling reasonswhich there are none. The father is also entitled to spend time with the minor. CA reversed the order and granted custody to Crisanto stating that the prior order granting custody to the father should prevail because the LC did not resolve the correct incident in the later order. Issue/s: WON custody should be given to Crisanto Held: No Ratio: -I wont go into the procedural issues na kasi wala siyang kwenta. Pinahaba lang niya. Kay. -Art 213 (1), FC: in case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over 7 years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit : this law shall govern in all cases of separation (can be separation in fact, like in this case) : basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care : shall shall be construed as mandatory : the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration (Ascertain who has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social, and moral welfare of the child through previous care and devotion shown, religious background, moral uprightness, home environment, and time availability; as well as childs educational and emotional needs) 728
-Art213 (2), FC: No child under 7 shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise :tender-age presumption may be overcome only by compelling evidence :Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence showing that Joycelyn is a lesbian is not enough, Crisanto must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care :no evidence that the child was exposed to Joycelyns alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper and psychological development suffered as a result Judgment: Joycelyn has the right to keep her son in her custody Silva v CA 275 SCRA 604 July 17, 1997 Ponente: Vitug, J. Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited and had two children, Ramon and Rica. The two eventually parted ways when Carlitos allegedly objected to Suzannes wish to continue her acting career. Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights and claimed that Suzanne refused to have the children in his company during the weekends, as previously agreed to. TC directed Suzanne to allow Carlitos visitorial rights, but he should not take out the children without the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne appealed to the CA and in the meantime, married a Dutch National and emigrated to Holland with the children. CA ruled in favor of Suzanne and stated that allowing the children to stay with the mother on weekdays and with the father (and his live-in partner) on the weekends may not be conducive to the normal upbringing of children of tender age. Art 3, PD 603 states that children have to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude and are to be protected from improper influence to his development. Hence, CA denied visitorial rights to Carlitos. Issue/s: WON Carlitos may be allowed visitorial rights Held: Yes Ratio: Visitation right is the right of access of the noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. Art 220, FC: natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. -read this provision to go beyond the legitimate members of the family to encompass illegitimate relationships (like the one in this case!) -few hours spent with by Carlitos with his children cannot be that detrimental to the children -fears expressed by Suzanne that Carlitos will corrupt or degrade the children are products of her unfounded imagination -if Carlitos was bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, he wouldnt have taken the trouble and expense to institute this legal action for the purpose of seeing his children; it is unlikely that he has ulterior motives Judgment: Decision of the TC allowing visitation rights is reinstated. Salientes v Salientes (Ponente: QUISUMBING) FACTS: Loran S.D. Abanilla (respondent) and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes (petitioner) are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Loran wanted to transfer to another house because of his in-laws but Marie did not want to; and thus, Loran alone left. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Loran filed a petition of Habeas Corpus and Custody of his children in the trial court. The court granted the petition for Habeas Corpus (held nothing about custody). It subsequently denied 729
petitioners motion for reconsideration and the court of appeals denied their petition for certiorari. On SC, the petitioners basically assert that habeas corpus is not correct because there was no evidence of restraint and other compelling reasons. They also assert the mothers right of custody of her children, and thus, is not required to explain the custody of her children. Respondent avers that petitioners argument is only for the custody of the children. He argues that habeas corpus is also applicable for children who are restrained from seeing their parent. ISSUE: WON the court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus of a child filed by a father. HELD: NO RATIO: SC held that CA is correct in not granting certiorari. CA is also correct in pointing out that only habeas corpus was granted by the lower court and not custody. SC maintained that habeas corpus is only an interlocutory order necessary to resolve the issue of custody which is still pending. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Art 211 FC, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Also, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. This consideration regarding custody is also provided by The Child and Youth Welfare Code. Moreover, Art 213 FC deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court but it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. There are no bars in that provision against the father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
Lim vs. Lim (2009) Facts: Cheryl Lim (R ) was married to Edward Lim and they had 3 children, Lester Edward, Candice Grace, and Mariano III The spouses and their children lived together w/ Edwards ailing grandma, Chua Giak and her husband, Mariano in Forbes Park Edwards family business provided him a P6k salary w/c they use for the family expenses Cheryl had no steady source of income 14 October 1990 Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence together with the 3 children (then all minors) after a violent confrontation w/ Edward whom she caught in a very compromising situation w/ the in-house midwife of Chua Giak Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued Edward, Prudencio and Filomena (Edwards parents and petitioners in this case), Chua Giak and Mariano for support Trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6k pendente lite Trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40k monthly support for respondents, Edward will shoulder P6k and his parents will shoulder P34k, subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability Petitioners filed an MR questioning their liability Trial court ruled that petitioners and Chua Giak were jointly liable w/ Edward bec of his inability to give sufficient support CA affirmed: o The law on support under Art 195 of FC is clear. Parents and their LC are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the legit grandchildren and great grandchildren 730
o Art 200 (3) of FC clearly provides that should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Art 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support Issue: WON petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents Held: YES, but only insofar as the children are concerned Even the petitioners admit that they are liable, except that they believe they liability is triggered only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrens minority (based on provisions found in Title IX of the CC on Parental Authority) o Since Cheryl and Edward are the ones exercising parental authority over the children, they are the ones obliged to give support What governs this particular case is not the provisions on Parental Authority but Title VIII of the CC o The two are similar in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support but they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees o Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties lasts during the obligees lifetime o While parental authority under Title IX pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support Both Cheryl and Edward are unable to give sufficient support to their children; thus, this obligation shifts to the ascendants in the nearest degree both in the paternal and maternal lines o To hold otherwise is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void But petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants Cheryls right to receive support extends only to her husband The case is remanded to the trial court to determine Cheryls share from the amount of the monthly support awarded by the trial court Alternative prayer of petitioners: To be allowed to maintain the respondents in their residence This cant be allowed because to do so would force Cheryl to return to the house, which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity
o o
Luna vs Intermediate Appellate Court Facts Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides Maria Lourdes is the illegitimate child of Horacio Luna who is married to Liberty Hizon-Luna Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides, her parents gave her to the Luna couple, a childless couple with considerable means The couple showered Shirley with love and affection and brought her up as their very own She was enrolled at the Maryknoll College and she, together with the Luna couple, whom she calls Mama and Papa, was supposed to go to Disneyland but then her natural parents did not gave their consent The Luna couple left without Shirley When they returned, they found out the Shirley has been transferred to St. Scholastica, worse is that her natural parents refuse to return Shirley to them 731
The Luna spouses filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CFI which decided in favour of them But the CA reversed the decision The SC then affirmed the CA decision The case was remanded to the RTC upon such finality of judgment and the judge directed the issuance of a writ of execution During a hearing to set aside the writ of execution, Shirley said that she would kill herself or runaway if she would be separated from her Mama and Papa and be forced to stay with her natural parents Issue: Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child Held and Ratio: No o When a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution but the stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable o The manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken away from the her Mama and Papa and forced to live with her natural parents, made during the hearing is a circumstance that would make the execution of the judgment inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal o Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. o To return her to the custody of her natural parents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child Dissenting Opinion For the court to award custody over Shirkey to the Luna couple on the basis of her reaction and choice would run counter to existing law and jurisprudence regarding the natural rights of parents to have custody over their child Parent-child should not be disturbed except for the strongest reasons and clear showing of parents misconduct or unfitness or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child Preference of a child is only one factor to be considered, and it is not controlling, decisive or determinative. Thus, the court has a discretion to determine the question of custody. The rights of parents will not be disregarded in order to gratify the wishes of a chid
Cuadra vs. Monfort No. L-24101 September 30, 1970 Law: Parental authority and custody of children; Effects of PA over the childs person Ponente: Makalintal, J. Nature: Appeal from the CFI decision that granted the plaintiffs damages based on a quasi-delict. Overview: A kid blinded another kid while playing in school. The dad of offender is being sued by parents of the injured kid for damages. The CFI granted the damages but SC said that the dad cannot be held liable for the accident since the damage caused was not a result of his negligence or lack of due care. Facts: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962, while weeding grass, Cuadras eye was hit with a headband that Monfort threw in her direction when she looked to see if there was an earthworm. Monfort was trying to scare Cuadra. 732
Cuadra underwent surgical operation and stayed in the hospital for 23 days. She completely lost the sight of her right eye. The court granted damages to the minor, Maria Teresa Cuadra. Issue: WON the parent has liability for an act of his minor child which causes damages to another under the specific facts related in this case and with respect to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code Held: There is no liability. Rationale: Article 2176 says that the fault or negligence accompanying the act or omission may be liable. Article 2180 says that persons responsible for other persons can be liable (father). Nothing implies that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee the damages or the act which caused it. His child was in school under the supervision and care of the teacher. It was an innocent prank which is normal in school. No trait can be attributed to mischievous propensity caused by her upbringing. Parents cannot be blamed. Judgement: The decision is reversed and the complaint dismissed. Pineda vs CA 226 SCRA 754 September 27, 1993 Ponente: Davide Jr. Facts: Prime Marine Services Inc. (PMSI) is a crewing/manning business. It bought a Group Policy (life insurance coverage) from Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. for the benefit of its employees. Feb 17 1986, 6 PMSI employees drowned in Moroccan seas. So, the families of these 6 poor guys sought their respective death benefits. They approached Capt. Roberto Nuval, President and General Manager of PMSI, to help them claim. Nuval was willing to do that. He requested the families to execute Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) authorizing him to followup, ask, demand, collect and receipt (sic) for my benefit indemnities or sum of money due me relative to the sinking. and to sign receipts, documents, pertinent waivers of indemnities or other writings of whatsoever nature with any and all 3rd persons, concerns and entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to my said attorney. By virtue of that SPA, they were able to get their death benefits from PMSI. However, these families didnt know that they were also entitled to benefits from Insular. This Nuval, secretly, claimed from Insular the life benefits due the families using their SPAs. Insular then issued him and PMSI some checks, 4 of which (one P40,000, and 3 valuing P50,000) belong to minor kids of the different families claiming the benefits. These families later came to know of the Insular insurance policies, so they tried to claim from Insular, but Insular said PMSI and Nuval has already claimed their benefits for them. Issues: 1. WON Insular was right in issuing the checks to PMSI and Nuval on the basis of the SPAs. 2. How are the minor children affected by the awarded checks? (sorry I cant rephrase this ehehe) Held: 1. Naw. 2. Their parents or guardians must place a bond. Ratio: 1. The powers of attorney awarded to Nuval were special in nature. They are not general, that is, they do not authorize the holder to claim everything that can be claimed (by reason of the 6 deaths). These SPAs did not explicitly say that they authorized Nuval to claim from Insular, because, the families did not know beforehand that they are entitles to Insular benefits. Also, group policies (of Insular, at least) need not be claimed using SPAs. Group insurance is intended for the employees benefit. 2. FC 225 says that no matter the value of an unemancipated common childs property, the father and the mother are jointly the legal guardians of that property. However, if the market value of the 733
property (or the annual income of the child) exceeds P50,000, the bond has to be posted by the parents to guarantee that they will properly perform their duties as guardians. Sec 180 of the Insurance Code also says that the parent or guardian must have court authorization or must post a bond when there is a minor beneficiary who is to be awarded benefits above P20,000. So when the parents or guardians are the ones who got to receive the benefits due the minor children, the parents/guardians must post bond. Lindain v CA (G.R. No. 95305) August 20, 1992 Ponente: Grio-Aquino Overview: Lindains were still minors when a parcel of land was already registered in their name. Their mother then sold said land to spouses Valiente and Ila. Later, Lindains claim that the sale was null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval. Spouses Valiente and Ila claim otherwise. For them, sale was valid because (1) the value was less than P2,000 and (2) action of Lindains has already prescribed. Facts: When the Lindains (i.e. Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita and Virgilio) were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel of land. November 7, 1966 - Dolores Luluquisin (mother), then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold said land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land to spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. o At first, the spouses were reluctant to buy the property as owners were minors and the sale would not be legal. But upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it registered in their names. Lindains claim that the sale was null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval. Spouses Valiente and Ila claim that the sale was valid, as the value of the property was less than P2,000. Also, considering the ages of Lindains now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed. RTC ruled in favor of the Lindains and declared the sale null and void. CA reversed the RTC. Declared sale as valid since the value of such property is less than P2,000.00. Also, the permission of the court for its alienation or disposition may be dispensed with. Issue: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their mother? Held: Yes. Judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their mother Ratio: Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval. 734
Buyers in bad faith: They knew from the very beginning that the mother without court approval could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children. Prescription: The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987. 2. WON Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, in so far as it sold to the purchaser-spouses the children's share of 5/12, is a voidable contract pursuant to Art 1390 NCC; and consequently, 2b. WON the children should be ordered to restitute the spouses for their (childrens)portion of property and the improvements made thereto. 3. WON the defendants should re-sell to the plaintiffs the remaining 7/12 portion of the property (in the amount of P4,375.00.) HELD: 1. YES 2. NO. It is unenforceable or, more specifically, unauthorized 2b. NO 3. Held as academic because of issue 1 or NO because the mothers redemption period had already prescribe. RATIO: 1. Art 320 and 326 NCC - the father, or in his absence the mother, is considered the legal administrator of the property pertaining to his child under parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of his child's property does not exceed Two Thousand Pesos. Rule 93, Section 7, ROC - goes further by automatically designating the parent as the legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the latter's property does not exceed Two Thousand Pesos. Art 1623 NCC - The period fixed for legal redemption in accordance with this article will run against a minor co-owner duly represented by a judicially appointed guardian, provided that said guardian is served with the necessary written notice by the vendor. Corollary to this, the period fixed for legal redemption will also run against a minor coowner whose property is valued no more than Two Thousand Pesos and who is merely represented by his father or mother with no judicial appointment as a guardian because according to Rule 93, Section 7 of the ROC, the parent in this situation is automatically the child's legal guardian. Of course, the parent-guardian must first be served with a notice in writing of the sale of an undivided portion of the property by the vendor in order that the period for redemption may begin to accrue. SC noted the case of Villador v. Medel where it stated that it would be extremely unfair to the purchaser and injurious to the public 735
BADILLO v FERRER (Ponente: GANCAYCO) FACTS: Feb 4, 1966 - Macario Badillo died intestate survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children: Alberto 16, Nenita 14, Hilly 12, Cristy 9, and Maria Salome 5. He left a parcel of registered land in Laguna, with a house. Hence, each of the five minor plaintiffs had inherited a 1/12 share of the P7,500.00, or P625.00 each, which is less than the P2,000.00 mentioned in Art 320 NCC. Jan 18, 1967 the widow, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of the childred, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of the PROPERTY through which the property was sold to defendant spouses Gregorio Soromero and Eleuteria Rana. Nov 11, 1968 - Modesta Badillo, sister of deceased, was able to obtain guardianship over the persons and properties of the children, without personal notice to their mother, who was alleged "could not be located inspite of the efforts exerted" (ROA, p. 26). July 23, 1970 - their guardian caused the children to file a complaint in the case below for the annulment of the sale and asked that, as coowners, they be allowed to exercise the right of legal redemption. The lower court annulled the sale with regards to the childrens participation and allowed them to redeem their share (5/12 of the property). ISSUE: 1. WON the 30 days redemption period had already elapsed.
welfare to keep in a state of suspense, for possibly as long as 20 years or more, what his co-owner might do when he becomes of age. While the uncertainty continued the purchaser could not make any improvement on the property without running the risk of losing his investments and the fruits of his labor When the mother received her copy of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, Clarita Ferrer Badillo in effect received a notice in writing of the said sale in behalf of her minor children. After the minors' father died Clarita automatically became their legal guardian. As such, she acquired the plenary powers of a judicial guardian except that power to alienate or encumber her children's property without judicial authorization. When Clarita signed and received on Jan 18, 1967, her copy of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, the document evidencing the transfer of the property in question to the appellants, she also in effect received the notice in writing required by Art 1623 NCC in behalf of her children. On the other hand, the judicial guardian of the minors, Modesta, was only appointed as such on Nov 11, 1968. She thereafter manifested her desire to redeem the property from the appellants, formalizing such intention in the complaint that was finally filed for this case on July 23, 1970. Since the required written notice was served on Jan 18, 1967 and the offer to redeem was only made after Nov 11, 1968, the period for legal redemption had already expired and the appellants cannot now be ordered to reconvey to the appellees that portion of the undivided property which originally belonged to Clarita. 2. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Art 1390 NCC. It only renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party's consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this case, however, the minors are not even parties to the contract involved. Their names were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them, purportedly in accordance with Art 320 NCC. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 NCC. These provisions state that: "ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: "(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; . . ." "ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him. "A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party." Clearly, Clarita has no authority or has acted beyond her powers in conveying to the appellants that 5/12 undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her children. The children never ratified this Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale. In fact, they question its validity as to them. Hence, the contract remained unenforceable or unauthorized. No restitution may be ordered from the children either as to that portion of the purchase price which pertains to their share in the property or at least as to that portion which benefited them because the law does not sanction any. 3. The third error assigned need not be discussed further because of the pronouncement on the first assignment of error has rendered it academic. Suffice it to state that since the 30-day period for redemption had already lapsed, the appellants cannot be ordered to re736
sell to the children and their guardian the remaining 7/12 portion of the property in question. Chua v Cabangbang 27 SCRA 791 March 28, 1969 Ponente: Castro, J. Facts: Pacita Chua, a hostess in nightclubs, cohabited with several men. (1) Chua Ben (2) Sy Sia Lay (2 children, Robert and Betty Chua Sy) (3) Victor Villareal (1 daughter-she gave away to a comadre in Cebu) Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife acquired custody of a child barely 4 months old and christened her as Grace Cabangbang. Pacita Chua filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus saying that it that Grace is her daughter, Betty. Victor took the child away when they were together and gave it to the Cabangbangs. The Cabangbangs claimed that they found the child outside their gate. LC rule that the child was given by Victor but with the consent of Pacita; and ruled that it was better for the welfare of the child to remain with the Cabangbangs. Issue/s: WON child should be returned to Pacita Held: No Ratio: 1. Pacita argues that Art 363, CC (children under 7 shall not be separated from mother) should apply but this is already moot and academic because the child is now 11 years old! (and if ever, the courts may deprives parents of their parental authority for valid reasons) 2. Art 332, CC: courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they shouldabandon (the child) :waited 5 years before filing an action for custody :she wants the child back so the father would resume providing support which he ceased to give when he found out that she gave the child away :expressed willingness that the child stay with the Cabangbangs in exchange for a jeep and money :she only wants the child for leverage! Bad! :this is not the first instance that she gave away her child :Cabangbangs can take care of the child moresent her to an exclusive school 3. Pacita did not ever report to authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter and had not taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that it was in the custody of the Cabangbangs (her excuse that the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential cannot stand because a mother who really wants her child would do everything) 4. Absence of kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs cannot bar the court from awarding them custody :the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of the child, or commit it to any suitable asylum, childrens home or benevolent society :Cabangbangs had a genuine desire to retain custody of Betty/Grace by asking for the childs custody pendent lite, seeking the dismissal of the paetition, and general prayer for other reliefs just and equitable Judgment: Pacita is deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and moral claim to Betty/Graces custody, and the CFI decision is affirmed.
De Guzman v Perez 496 SCRA 475 July 25, 2006 Ponente: Corona, J. 737
Facts: Roberto De Guzman and Shirley Aberde were sweethearts in law school, but the latters schooling got interrupted when she became pregnant and gave birth to Robby Aberde De Guzman, Roberto eventually married someone else, sent money for Robbys schooling twice and helped paid for medical expenses once. Shirley became a factory worker in Taiwan, but almost spent all her savings for Robbys needs. She demanded support from Roberto who managed the de Guzman family corporations and lived luxurious lifestyle. She filed a complaint for abandonment and neglect of child. Roberto claimed that his money, house, cars, and stocks were all his fathers. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for abandonment but found probable cause to charge Roberto with neglect of child. Secretary of Justice affirmed this by stating that Roberto had ample financial resources and a high station in life but still failed to send money for the education of his son. He was charged with neglect of child under Art 59(4), PD 603criminal liability shall attach to any parent who neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in life and financial conditions permit. Issue/s: Can Roberto be charged with neglect of child? Held: Yes Ratio: The elements of neglect of child are: 1. The offender is a parent 2. He or she neglects his or her own child 3. Neglect consists in not giving education to the child 4. Offenders station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the child -prima facie evidence of Robertos financial capacity: notarized General Information Sheet of the RNCD Development Corporation indicating that Roberto owns P750,000 worth of shares :this claim is factual and evidentiary -Roberto cannot claim innocence because Robby is being supported by his mother and her relatives :neglect may be committed by any parent :neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the education which the familys in life and financial condition permit :the irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties Judgment: No determination of guilt or innocence, what is ascertained is existence of probable cause -Guilt should still be proven in trial NALDOZA v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (ponente: AQUINO) FACTS: Zosima Naldoza and Dionesio Divinagracia are the parents of two minor children named Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Zosima's husband left them after she confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled money from Congressman Maglana, one Galagar, Eloy Gallentes and other persons. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about their father being a swindler. Because of disgrace, they wanted to change their surname. They also claimed that he had abandoned them and that his marriage to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the children's adoption of their mother's surname would give a false impression of family relationship. The trial court finds this causes insufficient. ISSUE: WON two minors should be allowed to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname because of disgrace caused by the father and his abandonment of the family. HELD: NO RATIO: +Under Art. 364 NCC, the minors are presumably legitimate and are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname. It is thus a prima-facie evidence of their paternal 738
provenance or ancestry and a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration. Sec. 5, Rule 103 ROC states that the change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change. The courts should also take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them. +SC cited the following cases: Oshita vs. Republic GRANTED. The court finds sufficient cause when Oshita argued that he wanted such because Filipinos hate and has a prejudice against the Japanese. Alfon vs. Republic GRANTED. Alfons name in civil registry is Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte but the since infancy has used the name Estrella S. Alfon, particularly in the school and voting records, In both cases, the petitioners were already of age (vis--vis in this case where the children are still minors). + The Court did not find any justifiable cause. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records. + In In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of surname. Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic No. L-20306 March 31, 1966 Law: Surnames Ponente: Sanchez, J. Nature: Appeal from a judgement of the CFI which granted the petition to change petitioners different names on different documents to one name Keng Lee Uy. Overview: A Chinese person who used a lot of aliases (and violated the law against the use of many aliases) is asking to have his records all changed and placed under one name. CFI granted but SC reversed the CFI order. Facts: Ng Yao Siong, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names: 1) Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate of residence, 2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, Uy Keng Lee Jesus in his school records, 3) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, 5) Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns, and 6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration. In order to avoid further confusion and unnecessary delay, he petitioned the court to authorize the change of all other names to Keng Lee Uy. CFI ruled in favour of petitioner. Republic appealed saying that change of name is a public interest and so there should have been publication of the order reciting the purpose of the petition and the date and place of the hearing thereof for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Change of name is not a right but a privilege. Issue: WON the court can grant the change of name; WON the publication done complies with the requirements for the court to gain jurisdiction; WON a court of justice can grant an application for change of name where he has violated a law regarding the use of aliases; WON there is a proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. Held: No, no jurisdiction. No, for a publication of a petition for change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include his real name and his aliases. No, it would mean condoning his violation. No, he had been using the names for a long time so not enough weighty reasons. Rationale: 739
Article 408 of the Civil Code says that a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The name in the civil register is the real name since the civil register is an official register of the civil status of persons. Therefore, an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code only applies to the name recorded in the civil register. The order of publication was published in the Negros Time, a weekly newspaper of Dumaguete City. It said .. the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong... But that is not the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication. His name in the civil register is Jesus Ng. The failure of the heading of the application is fatal so the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Also, his other names should have been included in the title of the petition since he is known via all of that. This will help catch the newspaper readers interest. Petitioner violated Commonwealth Act 142: An act to regulate the use of aliases. To grant the petition now is to sanction an unlawful act. Judgement: CFI decision reversed. Change of name denied. Llaneta vs Agrava 57 SCRA 29 May 15, 1974 So of course she filed for a petition to change her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. Her arguments: everyone knew her to be a Ferrer, Serafins closest kin accepted her use of the surname Ferrer (and hid her illegitimacy from her), and if her name doesnt change, it will result in confusion and she would be required to present affidavits and explanations regarding her name. Issue WON Teresita was allowed to change her name. Held: YES. Ratio: Even though there are precedents saying that change of name might give a false impression of family relationship and might prejudice the original family surname bearers, in this case, Teresita was supported by the relatives of Serafin, namely, Serafins mother and 2 brothers. Even after the petition was published, there was no opposition raised by the Ferrer clan and friends. Clearances from government agencies show Teresita as having a spotless record. And the SolGen did not even oppose the petition after having grilled Teresita and her witnesses. Serafin might object to this, but hes already dead. SC: One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her. Telmo vs. Republic (1976) Theres a procedural issue here about jurisdiction which I did not include na. Facts: Mrs. Milagros Llerena-Telmo was married to Pedro Telmo, they had 4 children who are all adults now The children were baptized w/ the surname Telmo but have been using Thelmo since kindergarten When she and her husband lived in the US, Pedro, following the American style, changed the spelling of his surname to Thelmo and in his diploma as mechanical and marine engineer issued by 740
Ponente: Castro Facts: Atanacia Llaneta was married to Serafin Ferrer. They had a kid named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942, Serafin died. In 1946 Atanacia had a boyfriend and she produced Teresita. After Teresita was born, Atanacia took her and Victoriano and the 3 of them lived with Atanacias mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the Ferrer household. She used the surname Ferrer in her schooling and everything else. When she was 20 years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate as a scholarship requirement. Then, she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta, being the illegitimate kid of Teresita and an unkown father.
the University of Michigan, his surname is allegedly spelled as Thelmo Mrs. Telmo is a lawyer who was appointed justice of the peace in several areas in the country where several administrative cases were filed against her using the names Telmo and Thelmo She filed a petition to change her husbands surname Telmo to Thelmo Pedro did not join as a co-petitioner but he executed an affidavit saying that he has no objections to his wifes petition Mrs. Telmo presented documentary evidence showing that her sons are using the surname Thelmo (high school diploma, certificates of the Board of Medical Examiners, college diploma) and that she is also using that surname (telegram sent to her, articles of incorporation of 2 companies) She alleged that she initiated the addition of the letter h to her husbands surname Telmo in order to distinguish her sons from other Telmos who are the illegitimate children of the relatives of her husband City Fiscal of Zamboanga, in his opposition, contended that the real party in interest is the husband and the couples 4 sons who are of age should have been impleaded as co-petitioners Lower court granted the petition The Republic appealed: The reasons of Milagros are not enough to justify the change of her husbands surname The fact that she has been using Thelmo for a long time is not sufficient justification for authorizing a change of name Milagros desire to distinguish her sons from her husbands illegitimate relatives surnamed Telmo concerns her sons and not herself That to allow her to change her husbands surname w/o granting a similar judicial authorization to her husband and sons would generate confusion since the latter may still legally use the family name Telmo o That Milagros left the judiciary as a result of some administrative cases against against her under the name Telmo and the surname has become objectionable to her for reasons other than the ones alleged in her petition Issue: WON there is enough justification to allow Milagros to change the spelling of her husbands surname Held: NO A married woman may use her husbands surname It is axiomatic that if she desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of his surname, her husband should initiate the proceeding In the case at hand, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for judicial authority to change the spelling of his surname; it was his wife who filed the petition The irregularity of the petition is obvious o The lower court sanctioned the wifes change of the spelling of her husbands surname but no similar authority was granted to the husband because he did not file a petition for that purpose Her husbands affidavit of conformity to the change in the spelling would not prevent him and their children from using the old spelling; confusion and error might arise Therefore, the reasons Milagros presented are not substantial and cogent enough to sustain her petition Lower courts decision is REVERSED Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals No. L-41427 June 10, 1988 Law: Surnames Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. J. Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision which reversed the TC decision that ordered Consuelo to stop using the surname of her ex-husband. Overview: Facts: 741
o o o o
Constancia is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. They got married on April 21, 1945 and theyhave three kids. Consuelo David was married to the same man in February 8, 1931 but they ended their marriage in September 15, 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of desertion and abandonment (3 continuous years) by the wife. Arturo had married Pilar Adorable but she die after their marriage. Constancia Tolentino filed a complaint against Consuelo David who has been using the surname Tolentino. Consuelo had been using the surname with the consent of Arturo and Arturos family. Constancia wants to stop Consuelo from the continued use of the surname. The TC issued an order granting the petition of Constancia and thus ordered Consuelo to stop using the name Tolentino. On appeal by Consuelo, the CA reversed the TC decision. Issue: WON the petitioners cause of action has prescribed; WON a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latters present wife from using the surname of her former husband. Held: Yes. No, the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge the rights of the petitioner. Rationale: Article 1150 of the Civil Code states that prescription shall be counted from the day they may be brought. Article 1149 says that it is five years from the time the right action accrues. Though the respondent says it should be 4 years. SC says that petitioner should have brought the action immediately and she should not have waited 20 years. Art. 370 of CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art. 371 is not applicable since it is about annulment when in this case, it is about absolute divorce. Respondent has entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties, and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show how she would suffer any legal injury due to the continued use of Tolentino by the Respondent. There is no usurpation of surname since there will not be any possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper. Petitioner is the legally acknowledged wife of Arturo. Consuelo never represented herself as Arturos legal wife, only as Mrs. Consuelo David-Tolentino. Consuelo also has legitimate children who have every right to use the surname Tolentino. She has not remarried. Judgement: The petition is dismissed. The CA decision is affirmed. Legamia v IAC (L-63817) August 28, 1984 Ponente: Abad Santos Facts: Corazon Legamia y Rivera lived with Emilio Reyes for 19 years until Emilios death. During their live-in arrangement (1) Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes and was introduced by Emilio as Mrs. Reyes; and, (2) they produced Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes on October 18, 1971. Emilio was Branch Claim Manager of Agricultural Credit Administration when he died. Shortly after his death, Corazon filed a letter claim in behalf of her son Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed Corazon L. Reyes. The voucher evidencing payment of Michaels claim was also signed Corazon L. Reyes. For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes, who was married to Emilio, filed a complaint which led to Corazons prosecution. CA 142 (Sec. 1): Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which 742
he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Issue: Did Corazon violate the law in the light of facts presented? Held: No. She did not violate the law. Ratio: It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own Corazons. Separate Opinion (Aquino): I concur for the sake of the son but the practice should not be encouraged. If there is no impediment, common-law husbands must marry their wives. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia (G.R. No. 148311) March 31, 2005 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez Overview: Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia was adopted by her father, Honorato Catindig. TC granted the adoption and declared her to be now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a petition for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name. TC denied. Facts: August 31, 2000 Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged (1) that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; (2) that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; (3) that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and, (4) that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He also prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia (mothers surname) and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig (his surname). March 23, 2001 TC granted the adoption and declared her to be a legitimate child and legal heir of Honorato. Pursuant to FC 189, minor shall now be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. April 20, 2001 - Honorato filed a petition for clarification and reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name. May 28, 2001 TC denied. No law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Honorato: o No law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent. o Customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother. 743
o Middle name or initial is part of the name of a person. o Adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child; hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated. o Permitting the use of Garcia as middle name avoids the stigma of illegitimacy. o Continued use of Garcia is not opposed either by Catindig or Garcia families. OSG: o Necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under FC 189, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. o No law prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her mother as middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. o Customary for every Filipino to have a middle name which is ordinarlity the surname of the mother. Issue: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption of her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? Held: Yes. The illegitimate child, upon adoption of her natural father, can use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. Ratio: Use of surname is fixed by law (p. 547- 548; CC 364 CC 380). In the case of an adopted child, he/she shall bear the surname of the adopter upon issuance of the decree of adoption. In this case, Catindig. Law is silent as to the use of middle name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. o Drafters of FC recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. Herein, members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. o Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. o Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. o Stephanies use of Garcia as her middle name maintains her maternal lineage. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. o Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to user her moms surname as her middle name with not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mom, but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. Liberal construction of adoption statutes in favor of adoption. o Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father to use as middle name her mothers surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG (ponente: TINGA) FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. She wants to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. His parents are Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. 744
They wanted to stay in Singapore for a long time and want their children to study there. They claim that Singaporeans do not carry a maiden name and are afraid that Julian would be discriminated against because of this. The trial court rejected the petition and stated that its only for the convenience of the child but finds no sufficient cause to overturn her right to bear a maiden name as provided by Art 174 of FC. TC added that he could decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name upon reaching the age of majority.
The Singaporean ways also does not justify the petition since Filipino law still governs.
ISSUE: WON parents are allowed to delete their childs middle name because of possible discrimination in another State. HELD: NO.SC affirms TC RATIO: SC basically states that they find no reasonable cause and Singapores norms or laws do not govern in the Philippines. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. The law does not allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name. The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. This does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. [20] FC gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and 745
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname. + SC finds that this petition is only for the childs convenience and that is not a compelling reason for a change of name. REYES v ALEJANDRO (ponente: PATAJO) FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Cavite dismissing the petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband Roberto Reyes declared an absentee. In October 1969, Erlinda claimed that her husband Roberto had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 (more than 7 yrs) due to some misunderstanding over personal matters and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. She alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts. She said they acquired no properties or debts during marriage. She said her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New ROC and Art 384 NCC. CFI dismissed the case and stated that the petition is not necessary because Roberto did not leave any property. ISSUE: WON the husband may be judicially declared absent even if he did not leave any property. HELD: NO RATIO: The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property or the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to he living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is: + when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Art 384, Civil Code); + the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Art 191, Civil Code) + or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Art 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80). MANUEL v PEOPLE (Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.) FACTS: 1975 - Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa Jan 1996 - He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, they went to a motel where Eduardo succeeded in with his intentions. Tina: Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single. Mar 1996 Only a little more than 2mos later. Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo. Apr 22, 1996 - They were married before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, RTC of Baguio City. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single. They allegedly had a happy marriage during the 1st three years of their marriage; and of course, it eventually turned sour. He started to be scarce from their home and would slap her if she would ask for money. He eventually left for good and did not provide support. 746
Through the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Eduardo: He met Tina in a bar where she works as a GRO. He claims that he informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. He claims that they had a happy marriage until he noticed that she had a love-bite (chikinini?) on her neck causing him to abandon her. He claims that he declared himself single because he believed in good faith that his 1 st marriage is invalid and did not know that he had to go to court to seek for its nullification before marrying Tina: Eduardo claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. He thus argues that in believing in good faith that the first wife is presumptively dead, he thought that he is legally allowed to marry again. RTC held that he is guilty of bigamy beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed. ISSUES: WON a husband who believes that his first wife is presumptively dead (Art 390 NCC) can contract a subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration (Art 41). HELD: NO RATIO: Basically, SC rules that belief in good faith is not sufficient for a person to contract a subsequent marriage because Art 41 FC requires judicial declaration first. The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law. The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. SC also discussed alternative views of other legal scholars who believe that dolo or fraudulent intent should also be considered. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. SC stated that if he really acted in good faith or wants to prove it, he should have presented a judicial declaration required by Art 41 FC. The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings in Art 349 RPC was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. It is for the benefit of the State. Under Art II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Thus, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. Art 349 RPC has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse. The petitioners sole reliance on Art 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration. However, Art 41 of FC, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, Par 2 reads: 747
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. With the effectivity of FC, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Art 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse. SC rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of FC is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Art 349 RPC, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs Josephine Lucero, et al Facts Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon Under the contract, his employment was good for one round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. And it was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. However, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office all at the same date o At 7:00 That there is a violent weather whose winds are pitching the already inclined vessel o At 15:30 That vessel is still laboring violently o At 21:50 That, if possible, immediate assistance be sent immediately for seawater is entering the inclined vessel (in danger and preparing to abandon anytime) Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel The Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board for payment of her accrued monthly allotment which the Company had stopped and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila. The Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero is no longer entitled to such allotment because the loss of the vessel is already confirmed and the Company had actually paid the corresponding death benefits Issue WON the presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided for by Art. 391 (1) of the CC had not yet expired Held and Ratio No o It is undisputed that the Company received 3 radio messages from Capt. Lucero. And that after the last message, nothing was heard from the vessel until the present time. o There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead to a 748
moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. o The Court cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message Olaguer vs Purugganan Jr. February 12, 2007 515 SCRA 460 Ponente: Chico-Nazario Facts: Eduardo B. Olaguers version: Eduardo Olaguer (PET) is the owner of 60,000 shares of stock of Businessday Corporation (BC) with a total par value of P600,000. He was then employed in BC as Exec. VP. He was also, with Raul Locsin (RESP1)and Enrique Joaquin, an active oppositor of Marcos. Olaguer anticipated that he might be arrested or detained, so he, Locsin, Joaquin and one Hector Hofilea, made an unwritten agreement. It said that if ever Olaguer was arrested, the other 3 would support his family by the continued payment of his salary. In May 26 1979, Olaguer also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), where he appointed Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea as his attorneys-infact for the purpose of selling or transferring his shares of stock with BC. He also agreed that the SPA also included the power to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, he wont be identified as a BC stockholder when Marcos prevails. The SPA was acknowledged before Emilio Purugganan Jr, (RESP2) the Corporate Secretary of BC and also a notary public. Dec 24 1979 Olaguer was arrested and detained. While he was detained, Locsin ordered Purugganan to to cancel Olaguers shares in the BC files and to transfer them in Locsins name. One time, Locsin borrowed Olaguers Certificate of Stock (which Olaguer carried while in detention), and when he returned it, it was marked cancelled. Olaguer became upset. Olaguer also admitted that BC made regular deposits to his inlaws accounts, amounting to P10,000 every 15th and 30th of the month. Olaguer argued that these were his monthly salary, which BC supposedly agreed to pay even when he was detained, to support his family. When the total amounted to P600,000, the payments stopped. Locsin went to Olaguer to ask for the remaining stock certificates, but Olaguer refused. Jan 16 1986, Olaguer was finally released. He found out that he was no longer listed as a BC stockholder. He also found out that they were now in Locsins name. He demanded that the full ownership of the stocks be returned to him, but Locsin refused. Raul Locsins version: Locsin said that Olaguer himself requested him to sell, and if necessary, buy the latters shares, to assure support for his family if ever something happened to him. Locsin said he did not know that Olaguer was a part of an opposition group. Locsin denied that he agreed to pay Olaguers salary while hes in detention. While Olaguer was detained, Locsin tried to sell the stocks but no one wanted to buy them, and Olaguers reputation as an oppositor affected BC. Locsin then decided to buy them at par value, and that he paid in installments of P10,000 twice every month. Trial court: Sale of stock between Olaguer and Locsin is valid. Olaguer wanted to have his stocks sold to anyone interested, in order to be able to provide for his family even when hes in detention. Olaguer also apparently consented to Locsin buying the stocks. The P600,000 total of the deposits were also declared by the court as the payment for the stocks and not his salary. CA: affirmed trial court. Issue: Whether Locsin had the power and authority to sell (and buy) Olaguers stocks while the latter was detained. Held: Yes. 749
Ratio: 1. Olaguer said that the SPA only authorized Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea to sell his stocks only in the ff conditions: (1) when he is absent and incapacitated and (2) for the limited purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioners subsisting obligations with the companies named in the SPA. Olaguer wanted to follow the definition of the word absence as defined by NCC 381 (when complete whereabouts unknown, court appoints his representative) and incapacity as defined in NCC 38 (minority, insanity, imbecility, deaf-mutism, prodigality, civil interdiction). SC: that cant be allowed. The purpose of the SPA will be defeated. Olaguer himself appointed Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea to sell his stocks. No need therefore for NCC 381. If the NCC 38 definition of imbecility will be followed, the SPA would be ineffective, because NCC 1919(3) says that when death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency kicks in, the principal (Olaguer) and the agent (Locsin) wont have any principal-agent relationship anymore. Its also ridiculous if we wait for Olaguer to be an imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA activates. Absence should be construed as the everyday meaning of not being present, and incapacity as inability to act, which 2 definitions had while he was in detention. 2. The P600,000 payment was also with Olaguers consent. He only reacted in 1986, 4 years after the last installment-deposit was made. He did not complain while the deposits were being made. Olaguer has also authorized Locsin to negotiate the means of payment for the sale of his stocks. It was even a good thing that Locsin did not deposit the payments to Olaguers own account, for if he did so, it would be seized by the government. Olaguer did not even try to send back the P600,000, even after he knew that it was for the payment of stocks. This shows that he really consented to the sale. Also, the P600,000 was clearly not for payment of salaries. One, Olaguers monthly salary is P24,000, not P20,000. And the deposits were not made for the duration of Olaguers detention, but were only made until the P600,000 was paid fully. Anyways, had there really been an agreement to pay him salaries while hes detained, it will be a form of donation, according to NCC 726. NCC 748 in turn requires donations exceeding P5,000 in value to be in writing. Remember that this SPA was unwritten, so, hes not entitled to these salaries. 3. Remember the cancelled certificate. Olaguer did not try to ask what it meant, nor tried to institute an action to, er, un-cancel the certificate of stock when it was returned to him. It just showed that he consented to Locsins purchase of his stocks. He and his relatives did not also try to seek more money after the P600,000 had been completely deposited, so Olaguer apparently consented. 4. Sec63 of the Corporation Code requires the transfer of the certificates of stock from the seller to the buyer. Olaguer really did not deliver the certificates to Locsin. It is his mistake and it cant be allowed. He cant keep the payment without delivering the certificates. Also, even though Locsin (without possessing the certificates of stock) is named the owner of these stocks in the BC books, this was actually beneficial to Olaguer because it hid him as the former owner of the stocks. Had the government known that they belonged to Olaguer, it would have seized these stocks. In Re: Petition for the correction of entries in the birth record of Rosario Barretto, Known actually as Domingo Barretto vs The Local Civil Registrar Facts 750
According a record of births of the civil register of Manila, a female child named Rosario Barretto was born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino Barretto and King Lian, both natives of Amoy, China On the other hand, a record of baptisms of the Parroquia de Chinos in Manila, a child born on June 29, 1944 to the spouses Faustino Sy Barretto and Diana King Luan Ty was baptized on May 21, 1950. The name of the baptized child is Domingo Sy Barretto In 1967 Domingo Barretto requested the local civil registrar of Manila to issue a certified copy of his birth record which he needed in connection with his application for a marriage license. He discovered that his name in the record of birth is Rosario, a female. Domingo filed for a petition for the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in his birth record regarding his name and sex Domingo Barretto testified that he is the same person known as Rosario Barretto in the birth certificate King Lian testified that her son, Domingo Barretto, was born on June 29, 1944 and that she came to know that his name is Rosario when he showed her his birth certificate Vicente Royo testified that she was a neighbor of the spouses Faustino Barretto and King Lian; that she was present at the birth of Domingo Barretto at four o'clock in the afternoon of June 29, 1944; that she held the baby and she knew he was a boy because she saw his male organ Issue Whether or not the supposed erroneous entry as to the sex of Rosario Barretto, as indicated in the birth record, is a clerical error that may be changed by means of a petition for correction filed by one Domingo Barretto who claims to be the same person as Rosario Barretto Held and Ratio No o If the name in that record of birth were Domingo Barretto and his sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that the error would be clerical. But that is not the fact in this case. The situation is more complicated. A person named Domingo Barretto claims that he is Rosario Barretto and that the word "female" in the latter's birth record is a mistake. o correction of entries are confined to "innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding" o The alleged error in this case cannot be corrected by reference to the record. There is a need to determine whether Rosario Barretto and Domingo Barretto are one and the same person and to ascertain why Domingo was registered in the record of birth as Rosario. Republic vs. de la Cruz 118 SCRA 18 November 2, 1982 Ponente: Guerrero Facts: Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng had been living together without being wed since June 1952. As a result of this cohabitation, 6 kids were born, all surnamed Lee: Ruben, Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando, Romeo. Lee Tieng is also familiarly known as Uping; his Christian name is Alipio and his mothers family name is Wee, and this resulted in the confusion in the childrens birth certificates (BC). When the oldest child Ruben Lee was born, Felicisima said that she and Lee Tieng were married, and so the nurse put that in Rubens BC. So her civil status in that BC is married instead of single, and the child was put as legitimate and a Chinese citizen. This info was also followed in the BCs of the 5 other kids, so as to avoid confusion. Also, Felicisima was indicated as a Chinese citizen instead of Filipina in Rogers and Romeos BCs; her maternal surname was also 751
mistakenly spelled as Olbila in Rogers BC and Orbita in Romeos BC, when it should have been Olbita. So Felicisima filed a petition to change these BCs in the CFI, alleging that if these were not corrected, there would be future difficulties in school records and in their functionalities as Filipino citizens. The changes prayed for: Info From To Kid affected Nationality (of Chinese Filipino Ruben, Cynthia child) Legitimate Yes No Ruben, Cynthia, Son/Daughter Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando, Romeo Name of Father Lee Lee Tieng Ruben Uping Civil Status of Married Single Ruben, Cynthia Mother Fathers first Alipio Tieng Cynthia, Roger, name Rolando Fathers first Ting Tieng Reynaldo name Date and Place of 1952 Not Reynaldo, Roger, Marriage of /1953, Applicable Rolando, Romeo Parents Naga City Middle Name of Olbila, Olbita Roger, Rolando Mother Orbita Nationality of Chinese Filipino Roger, Romeo Mother CFI granted the petition and allowed the changes sought. It said it was filed in good faith. Republic of the Phils. appealed, and said that the changes prayed for are substantial, because it affects citizenship and status. Issue: WON the changes sought for can be granted. Held: No. But the change of the Mothers middle name from Olbila/Orbita to Olbita is allowed, because its merely clerical in nature. Ratio: 1. NCC 412: No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. This has been interpreted by a long line of decisions to mean as an authority for the Court to direct the correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature, i.e., those harmless and innocuous changes, such as, correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc. or those that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding or an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing. It does not extend to important controversial matters, such as those which affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. 2. ROC Rule 108, the procedural law on changing names, meanwhile is limited to the application of NCC 412. ROC 108, according to jurisprudence, also, may not be relied upon to effect changes in citizenship not only because it merely prescribes the judicial procedure on the matter but also because it limits the entries subject to cancellation or correction to those enumerated in Section2 of Rule 108. 3. Good or bad faith has never been considered material to the granting or not of petition for correcting Civil Registry entries. Neither also the prejudicial results that the denial of the change may result in is considered material to the case. 4. The alleged variations in the name of Lee Tieng in the BCs, namely Alipio, Lee Uping, and Ting Wee Lee do not necessarily point to just one person. These names are substantially different, and may actually pertain to different persons. 5. Even though Felicisima had an election case that declared her not married to Lee Tieng, thus still a Filipino citizen who can vote, this was not made known to the Republic/SolGen so she cant use this in this case. Also, there is no proceeding established by law, 752
or the Rules, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Dissenting De Castro He is in favor of the changes Rule 108 was crafted precisely to address the limitations of NCC 412. Though the changes might not be clerical in nature, still, let the parties present their evidence. Republic of the Philippines vs Valencia Facts Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu o The petition seeks a change in the nationality of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from Chinese to Filipino, their status from legitimate to illegitimate, and the status of their mother from married to single Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors Trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province Lower court granted the petition, ordering the civil registrar to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the entries Republic appealed contending that entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous Issue: WON even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected/ changed Held and Ratio: Yes o The Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding Appropriate adversary proceeding - One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. o Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system as opposed to a summary proceeding o The court is of the opinion that the petition filed by Valencia in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice 753
and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. o In addition, apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1) other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. Also, Leonor Valencia and her siblings are all registered voters. o It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed. Republic vs. Marcos Facts: March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen, she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen she had resided in Baguio City since her birth (1930) she was previously married to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on 1958 in Manila 1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned them her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at home and in school where she studies 1966, Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo Her daughter desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" 1968, RTC issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, why the petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published in the Baguio and Midland The order also commanded that the OSG and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished copies of the order and petition. 5 months later, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Marcos authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of Pang Cha Quen. RTC: authorizing the name of the minor to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. OSG appealed. Issue: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction WON the name of the child can be changed even with a lack of reasonable cause Held: No to both the caption of the verified petition and the published order read:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions defeats the purpose of the publication. And so, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings The reasons offered for changing the name of the child are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo as her own father"; (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security; and (3) that "Alfredo agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading". 754
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists Another reason for disallowing the is that it was not filed by the proper party. The petition must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Only May Sia, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. Ratio: The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the change will avoid confusion; (4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage; or (5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide: SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. SEC. 2. Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) The name asked for Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic No. L-53417 December 8, 1988 Law: Entries in the Civil Register Ponente: Gancayco, J. Nature: Petition for review of the CFI order directing the civil register to correct entries in the birth certificate of petitioners child (entries: the petitioners name, civil status, and date of marriage) Overview: A mom wants to change her civil status on the birth certificate of her daughter via summary proceeding. CFI granted the petition but SC reversed it the order saying that it should have been through an adversary proceeding. Facts: On November 18, 1970, Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for correction of entries in the civil registry asking to correct her name, civil status, and date of marriage on the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat Jr and Victoria Miclat. She testified that she is not married and never was married to Vicente Miclat,the father of the child. Her name is Emperatriz J. Labayo. The date and place of marriage are not true. Vicente was the one who wrote the entries. She was presently married to American William Rowe. The CFI judge issued an order on January 25, 1971 directing the civil registrar to correct the entries and change the mothers name from Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo and to change her civil status from married to single. Also, civil register was asked to change date and place of marriage from 1953-Bulan to No marriage. The Republic sought the reversal of the order, questioning the propriety of such order to correct the civil status and date and place of marriage of the petitioner on the birth certificate of her child. Issue: WON one can effect correction of entries in the civil registry involving the correct spelling of the surname as well as the civil status of the mother at the time of birth of the child via summary proceeding Held: No. You need adversary proceeding. 755
Rationale: Art. 412 of the Civil Code says that no entry in a civil registrar shall be changed or corrected without judicial order. The only corrections covered here are clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding. Hoever, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings so that all the parties who may be affected can be notified and defend themselves. The civil register documents are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. If these entires can be changed or corrected through mere summary proceedings, the door to fraud or other mischief would be opened. What the petitioner is asking for affects the legitimacy of her child. From legitimate, Victoria will become illegitimate. Right to inherit will become impaired. She will be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment. Rule 108 of the rules of court says that all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case. This supports Sec. 13 of Art. 8 f the 1973 Consti which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. . Judgement: Order is modified; cannot change the civil status of the petitioner and the filiation of the child. Zapanta v. Local Civil Registrar of the City of Davao G.R. No. 55380 (September 26, 1994) Nature: Petition for review of an order of the then CFI Davao. Ponente: Vitug, J. Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. Florencio died on August 11, 1965. When Gliceria then requested for a certified true copy of the death certificate of her late husband, she was surprised that her husbands name was stated as Flaviano Castro Zapanta when all other information about her husband was correct. Hence, Gliceria prays that after due notice and hearing, the Local Civil Registrar be ordered to correct her husbands name on the death certificate. After the publication of the notice of hearing, the Assistant City Fiscal of Davao City filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that Gliceria seeks to correct a substantial error, not merely a clerical one. On January 31, 1975, the CFI dismissed Glicerias petition asserting that the change of name asked for was substantial in nature and that it did not have the power to grant the relief prayed for. Issue: WON the CFI erred in dismissing Glicerias petition on the basis of its alleged lack of power over the relief prayed for. Held: Yes, CFI erred. Ratio: Any change or correction in a civil registry record is not allowed without a judicial order. In Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, it was held that what is forbidden is entering of material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action/ In Republic v. Valencia, it was explained what an appropriate adversary proceeding means: On who must be made parties: The civil registrar All persons who have claim or interest On the duty of the court: Issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition. Cause the order for the hearing to be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Likewise entitled to oppose the petition: The civil registrar All persons who have claim or interest 756
It was explained that if the aforementioned procedure was followed a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries of the records filed under Rule 108 of the Revised ROC may no longer be considered summary. The records show that the publication requirement has already been complied with. The court then should hear the petition in its substance. Judgment: CFI judgment dismissing the case is set aside. They are ordered to hear the case. Leonor vs CA 256 SCRA 69 April 2, 1996 Ponente: Panganiban Facts: Virginia Leonor was married to Mauricio Leonor Jr. in Mar 13 1960. They had 3 kids. However, for most of their married life, they were apart: Virginia is here in the Phils. while Mauricio was in Switzerland studying, working, and eventually getting a mistress. Virginia sued for separation and alimony, Mauricio counter-sued for divorce. The lower court of Switzerland granted the divorce in Feb 14 1991 but denied alimony. Mauricio wrote to that court on March 1 1991 and introduced the issue of the alleged non-existence of the marriage between him and Virginia. Meanwhile, Virginia found out that the judge who solemnized their marriage had failed to send a copy of the marriage contract to the Civil Registrar. So, she filed for a late registration of their marriage on July 11 1991, and the Civil Registrar granted that order. Mauricio, abroad, appealed the Swiss trial court decision and asked for the cancellation of his marriage to Virginia (I dont know why, he was already granted divorce, maybe that was only a relative divorce). 2 Swiss appellate courts only granted alimony. Then, Mauricio, thru his brother, then filed here in the RP a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage, pursuant to ROC Rule 108, alleging the lateness of the registration and the non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage. Dec 14 1992, the RP trial court declared the marriage null and void for being a sham marriage, and ordered the cancellation of the marriage contract registration in the Local Civil Registry Book. So, Virginia appealed. But the trial court dismissed her case for being filed after the 30-day reglementary period. Issue: WON Mauricio can have their marriage registration removed/cancelled from the civil registry? Held: Naw. Ratio: The lack of marriage requirements were explained as: the marriage was done only to cover Virginias pregnancy, that there was an agreement that they wont live together as husband and wife, that they never lived together, that they were always quarreling. The trial court portrayed Virginia as an opportunist, basically, and this was the basis of the RTC decision to declare their marriage null and the cancellation of the civil registry record of the marriage. This, SC said, is unacceptable. Mauricio tried to use this tactic just to save himself from paying alimony to his wife (because if he succeeds, then there would be no marriage in the 1st place). ROC Rule 108 (a summary procedure) only allows the cancellation or correction of errors in the Civil Registry when the errors are typographical or clerical in nature, but not when they are material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. When the reasons for changing are of this kind (affecting the status of the husband and wife and their kids from LC to IC), the procedure must be adversarial. Rule 108 (and NCC 412) cant be used to change these kinds of errors in the civil registrar. You also cant use Rule 108 to declare a marriage void for the purpose of having the record of marriage cancelled in the civil registry. 757
Clerical error: one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis-statement of the occupation of the parent (I just copied :) (if you have time, please read this case. The RTC decision was written in, uhh, Dan-like but ungrammatical language. At least Dans is grammatical. Hehe.) Lee vs. CA (2001) Facts: This is a story of two sets of children sired by the same man, Lee Tek Sheng, but begotten by two different mothers, Keh Shiok Cheng (lawful wife) and Tiu Chuan (concubine) Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng were married in China, had 11 children (respondents), and went to live in the Phil 1948, Lee Tek Sheng facilitated the arrival in the Phil of a young girl named Tiu Chuan who was introduced as the new housemaid but actually became his mistress As a result of their affair, Tiu Chuan gave birth to 8 children (petitioners) Unknown to the legal family, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth, their father falsified the entries in the records of birth of the petitioners by making it appear that their mother was Keh Shiok Cheng Since the birth of the petitioners, they all lived, together with their mother, in the same compound w/ Keh Shiok Cheng and respondents All was well before the respondents discovered the deception of their father However, when Keh Shiok Cheng died on May 9, 1989, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including that of the petitioners be included in the obituary notice that was to be published in the newspapers. This raised the suspicion of the respondents Upon the investigation of the NBI, the respondents learned of their fathers deception Respondents then filed petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower courts Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: 1. Resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners 2. The petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely 3. The action to impugn has already prescribed Lower court denied the motion to dismiss for failure of the petitioners to appear at the hearing The lower court took cognizance of the case after the respondents complied with the requirements set in Rule 108 Petitioners appealed to the CA adding to their grounds: o The petitions are part of a forum-shopping spree CA dismissed Issue: WON substantive changes in the records of birth are allowed Held: YES Petitioners contend that what respondents are doing is not merely to correct clerical errors but a change in the name of their mother which in effect would result to their bastardization The Court held that it is the province of a special proceeding such as the one in Rule 108 to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact o The petitions of the respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/o biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners o The petitions in the lower courts were not to impugn legitimacy/to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that they are actually not her children. 758
There is nothing to impugn since the petitioners are not related by blood to Keh As to the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register will be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Art 412 of the CC, the Court finally sets down the rule with finality (kasi ang dami nilang rulings sa magkakaibang case na contradictory): First of all, Art 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. (n) It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order; it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature Second, It is impt to note that Art 412 uses both the terms corrected and changed To correct means to make or set right; to remove the faults or errors from To change means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as substitute The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have Thus, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Art 412 But what are these entries? Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. (325a) Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. (326a) It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the provisions above include not only status but also nationality Third, RA 9048 substantially amended Art 412 in such a way that clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed w/o need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar of consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left in the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in the entries of the civil register But the case at bar cannot be decided based on RA 9048 because it has prospective application The petitioners contend that the respondents have no cause of action since Art 171 of FC allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn legitimacy of his children only after his death Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; 759
o o
o o
o o o o
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) However, Art 171 applies to instances wherein the father impugns the legitimacy of the wifes child; the provision presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother; in the case at bar, Keh did not give birth to the petitioners. The case here is not to declare the petitioners as IC of Keh but to establish that they are not her children at all Petitioners contend that respondents cause of action has already prescribed since more than five years has lapsed since the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 is without merit Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n) The right of action accrues when there exist a cause of action w/c consists of three elements: A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen The cause of action of the respondents arose only at the time they discovered their fathers deception which is in 1989 and not during the time their father registered the births or 30 years ago It would be an injustice to the respondents to start the count from the registration of the births especially since they had no reason to suspect that their father would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mothers estate Also, unlike a title to a parcel of land, a persons parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. Petitioners accuse respondents of forum shopping Respondents filed a criminal complaint for falsification of entries in BC against their father and petitioners A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization cert of their father A petition for partition of their mothers estate SC ruled that there is no forum shopping in this case since the cause of action and reliefs prayed for in each of the cases are different from each other Forum shopping is present when in the 2 or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought Petition is DENIED
o o o o o
o o o o o
RULE 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY Sec. 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization 760
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. Sec. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.chanrobles virtua law library Sec. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Sec. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. Sec. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. Barco vs.CA Facts: 1970, Nadina Maravilla married Francisco Maravilla. 1977, the spouses opted to live separately, and in the following year they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage June 1978, Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June Salvacion. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco as the father, and Maravilla as the childs surname. Nadina signed the birth certificate shortly after it was accomplished. Nadina subsequently claimed that all along, the real father of her child was Armando Gustilo, a former Congressman with whom she had a relationship. At the time of Junes birth, Gustilo was married to Consuelo Caraycong, who died 1981. 1982, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the United States. This marriage took place two and a half years before Nadinas marriage to Francisco was annulled in the Philippines. 1985, Nadina apparently was able to obtain a judicial declaration annulling her marriage to Francisco. 1983, Nadina filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter alleging that she had been living separately from her lawful spouse Francisco since 1977, and that Gustilo was the real father of June. She claimed that she did not allow Francisco to have any sexual congress with her within the first 20 days of the three hundred days preceding the birth of June. She prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June to the effect that the latters full name be made "June Salvacion C. Gustilo," and that the name of her father be changed from "Francisco Maravilla" to "Armando Gustilo." (no objrction from Gustilo) RTC: granted Gustilo died in 1986. Two estate proceedings arose from his death, Among the participants in both estate proceedings was Jose Vicente allegedly a biological child of Gustilo. 1993, he filed with the CA a Petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Order (dismissed by the CA) 761
Nadina countered that Jose Vicente had not sufficiently proven that he was a child of Armando, and there was neither extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction that would justify the annulment of the RTC Order. Nadina also pointed out that the Makati intestate court had approved a compromise agreement wherein the parties had agreed that the only heirs of the Armando are "the surviving spouse, Nadina, the daughter, June, the son, Jose Vicente, and another daughter, Mary Joy Ann."(voided by CA, the Civil Code prohibited compromise as to the civil status of persons.) Barco is the guardian of Mary Joy (filed for Intervention on annulment of RTF Order)dismissed by CA Issue: Can the name of the child be changed/has it prescribed because Gustilo died? Held: yes/no answe RTC Order contravenes the legal presumption accorded June of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Nadina. Theres an insufficiency of the evidence offered to defeat the presumption, against which the only evidence admissible is the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. The testimony proffered by the mother has no probative value as regards Junes paternity. The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. The inevitable conclusion is that the RTC Order, despite its apparent flaws, is not null and void, and thus cannot be annulled. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed decision. Assuming that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the party whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the reality that under the law the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for correction. Prescription and lack of capacity to bring action cannot be ignored by a court of law in properly resolving an action, to the extent that a finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the action.63 It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the capacity to file the action which led to the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted the Order only characterizes the decision as erroneous. It is not a void judgment.
Ceruila v. Delantar G.R. No. 140305 (December 9, 2005) Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the CA. Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J. Facts: Petitioners Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila want the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, the child victim of Jalosjos, cancelled and nullified in order for Jalosjos to prove that it was not statutory rape. Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained of child abuse against her father Simplicio Delantar as the latter was prostituting her. Simplicio was then convicted and Rosilyn was sent to the DSWD since her mother Librada Ceruilas whereabouts were unknown. On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be cancelled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified the following entries: 762
The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin. The signature of Librada T. Delantar was forged. Simplicio Delantar was not biological father but only the foster father. The parents in the birth certificate where full blood brother and sister, therefore the marriage between the two is impossible. The status of Rosilyn as a legitimate child. The date of Rosilyns birth. The name of her physicianDr. Santos. On April 11, 1997, RTC rendered a decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas and declaring Rosilyns birth certificate as null and void since there was no objection made. On June 15, 1997, Rosilyn with her legal guardian the DSWD, filed with the CA for the annulment of the RTC decision stating that they were not informed of the said petition regarding the nullification of Rosilyns birth certificate. They also aver that the RTC judge did not have the capacity to suddenly declare her illegitimate. On June 10, 1999, CA reversed the RTC as Rosilyn and the DSWD were not made as parties in the previous case. Issues: 1. WON the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a special proceeding. 2. Won the Ceruilas complied with the requirements of Rule 108 of the ROC on notifying the indispensable parties to a case. Held/ Ratio: 1. It is a special proceeding. a. This is considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry. b. Hence, the Ceruilas properly filed the case in accordance with Section 3 (c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the ROC. 2. No, they did not. a. It is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate but Rosilyn herself since it was her filiation and legitimacy which are at stake. b. Summons must still be served in spite of the publications made in order to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. c. The petitioners purpose for cancelling Rosilyns birth certificate is obviousin order to support Jalosjos contention that Rosilyn was not a minor at the time of the rape incident, hence, to disprove statutory rape. d. CA did not in effect replace the RTCs decision which it sought to annul. CA only acted on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction committed by the RTC. Judgment: Petition is denied. Note: Magulo ang facts ng case na to, nagpapalit-palit ang mga tao ng first names at surnames, so I suggest we read the other case.
Republic vs. Cagandahan Facts: On 2003, Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate she alleged that she was born on 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. 763
At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. The petition was published in a newspaper for 3 consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff. OSG authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf. Testimony: Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH. He issued a medical certificate stating that her condition is known as CAH, explained that genetically she is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male, testified that this condition is very rare, that her uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period, testified that her condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because she has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. RTC: granted Issue: WON she can change her name and gender on her birth certificatre because of her condition Held: Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. She thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Ratio: Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, 764
and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Art 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. Braza v City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental 607 SCRA 638 December 4, 2009 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza were married and had 3 children, Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann (Ako pala to!) and Gian Carlo. When Pablo died, a Lucille appeared and began introducing a Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablos son. Patricks birth certificate stated that he was acknowledged by Pablo and legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents. There was also a marriage contract showing the said marriage. Ma.Cristina and children filed a petition to correct the entries of Patrick in his birth record claiming that Patrick could not have been legitimated because the subsequent marriage was void bigamous. TC dismissed the petition and held that a special proceeding for correction of entry should be filed under the Family Court. TC has no jurisdiction to annul the marriage of Pablo and Lucille or impugn the legitimacy of Patrick. Petitioners insist that main cause of action is correction of records and not the nullification of marriage and filiation stating that they are only incidental to the petition. Issue/s: WON TC has jurisdiction over the case Held: No Ratio: -Only clerical errors (spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors) visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding -substantial errors or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed -SC held that the main cause of action of the petition is actually to nullify the marriage and impugn Patricks legitimacy; hence, it should be filed in a Family Court -validity of marriages, legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably by the proper party, an not through the collateral attack (such as in this case, for correction of entries in a birth certificate) Judgment: petition is denied.
765

Supreme Court rules on enforceability of unpublished laws

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Supreme Court rules on enforceability of unpublished laws

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Digested by: De Guzman, Gravador, and Hernandez in cooperation with Yu, J.

, Flores, Castillo, Felizmenio, Madarang, Morales, Salanguit, Yu, A.

Issue: Whether the first assessment is binding

Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. 39

YAO KEE v SY-GONZALES Facts:

Issue: WON Cipriano can remarry under Art 26 of the FC

PUSE v. PUSE Facts: 151

Alcazar vs Alcazar 231

REPUBLIC v ORBECIDO III

Laperal vs. Katigbak 363

Issues Held Ratio

Ratio: Art. 283 of the Civil Code state: 539

Issue/s: WON Mariano is the legitimate child 571

Issues: WON Monina was able to establish her filiation 626

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