IIhRENCE D!

PI}
SEPTEMBER 1945 VOLUME XXV NUMBER 6
Major General C. L. Mullins, Jr., f.ommanding the 25th
Infantry Division in the Philippines. in a letter to the
Editor in Chief of the MILITARY REVIEW. made the fol
lowing interesting statements which it is believed are well
worth quoting:
Anything that I or any of my staff could write would
be to repeat and emphasize those basic things that you have
been emphasizing at the Command and General Staff
School for years. Knowledge of terrain values. photo in
terpretation by commanders and staffs. the old tried and
true simple tactical principles. a knowledge of weapons
and their use to best advantage. disciplined soldiers and
and a definitt' Insistence on the part of the higher
commanders that they teach and require to be utilized the
advantage of aggressiveness. To stop on today's objective
without pushing on, 1 feasible. is to - insure increased
tomorrow. Increased casualties have the same
effect on the other soldiers as they always have had.
If we have done anything particularly well. I attribute
it to discipline and the demand that junior leaders do not
let today's sympathy for the tired soldier kill or wound
him tomorrow. It's a tough -game, and the juniors m$t
realize it but not fear it.
Any sketches I could send would look exactly like the
"School Solution" WIth its wide envelopment arrows or
penetration arrows with the holding shoulders.
VOT.UME XXV SEPTEMBER 1945 NUMBER 6
I
Editor-;n-Chici
Colonel Frederick M. Barrows
Rditor. SpalUsh.4merican Edition Editor, Brazilian Edition
Colonel Andres Loper.: Major Severino 8ombra, Brazilian Army
.4s8lstutlt Editors
Lt Col C. Montilla. Maj D. E. Gribble, Maj D. Price, Maj J. MeAdams, Capt C. U. Realey.
Capt D.1\:. Mai""lll'llw, Lt L. Lt A. Galvan
l'l'odlll'tlon lUanClgcr: MUJ G. M." Smith, Jr. - Rusinl'88 Manager: CWO C. v/tJiams
trfU'./II'UUfflll It, 1'1'0t! IIlatl{ f: Ll Cut W. H. Van L>ine. 20H47 Pentagon Bldg: T(>l: REpublic 6700, Ex 529R
CONTENTS
Page
So\n: FI1 .... U,\\1l':"'At.S (Il-" ('tlMMA",;t) A!'I.D WonK Field Marshal Sir H. Maitland "'Tilson 3
Till: :\1.\....; Y;I\ .\uc; Tn KII.1. Lt. Col. {"'harles \V. Davis, In! 4
\m-(iltot'\;11 1,n;GIt,\TlOl\. Lt. CuI. Earle It. Thumas. AC 12
.\ Bum... HLV1E\\ of .\CllVITU;:-' tHo TUB AUMY POln A.... U SERVICE Cm.fMAND I .....
H \\\.\11 I'll l).\n: Lt. Gen, Robert C. Richardson, Jr. 15
.11\1.\ '''0 .\"I'IIlUI01''4 (}f'BH.\Tlt)!'I:!'l THE CE1\oTUAJ. PM'lFIC Col. George M. Harvey, esc 23
.-\ULIIJlm'r \\l1'Ll ,,'-' ,\MEIUI'AN .\awl' IN EL'HIII'I: Brig. Gen. Charles E. Hart 29
BY .\m John N. McVay, 38
.\"'I'I.;t T:-. tit' 1'111-; l'!'>'lt'W,I',\TllI1 'Cu .\w NnN-MIWIt'AL On'leERs F. C. Ansanelli, 1l1C 43
SE\ E.... TII .\n:\1'1 TUg :\los<;LI....: RIVER lipadquartpTs. Spventh Army 48
8tH' F{)R ('0I1HT-:VIARTIAL I'" FIEI.D F'tlUl ES. Lt. Col. Byrne A. Bowman. J AGD 56
e.... II'(llnt STHF.'-'nTll Lt. Col. James M. Emigh. FA 62
REAC'lInE"II'" To ViC'TOR\ Col. Edward R. Johnston, Inf 68
.\m F(IRn; St'J'I't.'I I!\" TH!<:ATEU:-' UI'hH.\!III'S Lt. (,,,1. J. W. Wertz, AC 72
('1\11. \FF:\IHS UIl;TAt H'IE!>.T Col. Damon Gunn, GSC 75
\11I1'f,\ln !\:OTES '\nOU'11 THE \\'DRl.l) 79
FOlu.:w, :\11I.1TAH' 85
lfrllaria ('outrol HI tire Southlft''''! /,.'1'11/1' 85
The .1rt of Z...I/(lrrlf 1('111 88
1'he GermcU/ 01ffll!{lrl' i'l ti,t .,tract/Ill" 90
,lIar/ern Strutl[1Y 94
[rlleIllgf IIf'{ {HId 1'ru,,1/1I'1 99
.-lertal A,rtwn 100
Th(' .-trt of (;nlrra[s}up 103
SalHtllry and I...'p!demiuiofjirul .trill'ltl' 'I ,1/ ()lfl'lIl-ln OIlf'rlit/{jIl" 106
Sl'1eIlrl' in SUbllltlr11l1' U'urfHre 108
BTitain's Rumbers 112
The }"u,guslm'wJI Army 114
The Wtnter CampaIgn of n/ illIly 116
.11aU:riel and li'ar J[Qrair 119
Th,. Soviet Sary . .. 120
'('ombat Serurily ul Arlilifry ill Offf'fI::ll'f ()Jlewfw1Is 121
.lfodefn Ril'er Warfare 123
The Defeat of the 126
( O' MMAN DAN D G ENE R A L S T A F F S ( H 0 0 L
MAJOR GENI-:I(AL KARL
BIUGADIER GI;NEI(AI. W. A.
BRIGADIER GE!I1EI(AL R. C. CANIlEI':
BRlGADmR GE!I1ERAL A. W. P(;!I1n:
CAPTAIN J. 13. E.\RLE, {'nil"/ S/III,.8 SlIr!!
COLONEL NALL":, ('II/'It/ry
COLONEL D. C. SrfnIAHL, Field Allillrry
Class Directors
COLONEL J. H. VAN VLIET, 11I!lInlry
COLONF.L W. J. BAmD, IlIj'lll/ry
COLONEL M. F. Mon.;\(, Air (orp.'
COLO:\EI. .J. \V. MOIWAN, Fidd Artillery
Faculty Chiefs
COLONEL H J. SClIIWEI>Ell., Siynnl Corp.<
COLONEL J. S. CHILDERS, Air Corp8
COLONEL C. L. MARSHALL, Injantry
COLONEL T. DeF. ROGlms, l'orp8 of Engineer>;
COLONEL L. H. COOK, Infantry ... .
COLONEL N. D. FROST, .4.ir Corps .. .
COLONEL C. W. HARDY, Medical Corps
LIEUTENANT COLONEL B. F. BOYER, Infwf!lry
Commandant
Acting As,istant Commandant
Dirf'ctor, Air Instruction
Director, Service Instruction
Director, Naval Instruction
Director, Ground Instruction
Executive
Ground
Sprvice
...... Air
Army & Na\'y Staff College
Personnel
,Intelligence
. Operations
. Logistics
Ground
.. .... Air
.Service
Training
MILITARY REVIE\V - Published monthly by the Command and Staff Sl'llOui at Fort Leavenworth,
Entered asseeond-class matter August 31,193-1, at the Offieeat -Fort Leaveuworth, Kansas, under the.Ad of l\'lareh 3, 1891.
Subscription $3,00 (U. R. -currency) per year fur 12 ISSUPS. No ex.tra ('harge for roreign posta.ge on new. or
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';.-.'
l MILITARY REVIEW J
ENGLISH
EDITION
Starting- with the
April 1945 issue, the
Command and General
Staff School broadened
its scope by publi'ihing
the MILITARY RE
VIEW in three lan
guages, namely Eng
Spanish, and Por
tuguese.
The al'ticles that ap
peal' in the Spanish
American and in the
Brazilian editions will
be found that' same
n1<lnth in the English
editIOn,
This notlre is to ac
quaint OUr readers WIth
the fact and to insure
our Spanish-American
and Brazilian neigh
bors that It will be our
most sincere endeavor
to translate the Enldish
telOt faithfully, and to
produce, to the best of
ability, a magazine
that is authoritative,
informative, interest
ing and instrllctive.
The Editors
EDICION
HISPANOAMERICANA
EDI9AO
BRASILEIRA
Con el nlimero del
me, de abl'il de 1945, la
Escuela de Comando y
Estado l\Iayor amplio
sus actividarles con la
puhlicari6n de la
TARY REVIEW en
tres idiomas: e'paiiol,
pOl'tugu>:-, (> ingles.
Log :.ll'ti('uio5 que se
puhlican en las et\ieio
nes y
b4'asIleiia apareeeran en
la edicirin norteameri
cuna dtl mismo Ines.
POI' meulO de estas
Iineas, ueseamos hacer
selo sahel' a nuestros
leetol'es y, asegurades
a nuestros veri nos de
Hispanoameriea y del
Brasil, que dedicaremos
nuestro mas sincero
fuerzo a trallueir con
exactitud la version in
glesa y a presentar, de
acuerdo con los medios
a lluestro alcance, una
revista autoritativa
t
formati"a, interesante e
instl'uctiva.
La Rcdaccion

Com 0 numero do mes
de Abril de J[14fi, a
Escola de Camando e
Estado Maior estendeu
seus horizontes com a
da MILI
TARY REVIEW em
idiomas. 0 portu
gues, 0 espanhol e 9 111
gJes. ,
Os artigos pubJicados
nas brasileu'a e
hi spano-americana apa
recerao tamhem na ecli
em ingles do mesmo

Este aviso tem em
vista dar conhecimento
deste fato aos nossos
leitores e assegurar aos
nossos vlzinhos
leu'os e hispano-ameri
canos que serao envida
dos sinceros na
do ingles, para
apresentar-Ihes com os
meios ao nOSRO aleance,
uma revista' fidedigna,
informativa, interes
sante e instrutiva.
---
Periodical Division,
Detroit Public Library,
5201 UoodHard Ave.
Detroit 2, 12-45 25-9
-f
'"
.1
Some Fundamentals of Comm'and and Staff Work
Digested from Field Marshal Sir H. j\faitland Wilson's lecture to the students of
the Command and General Staff School.,
Field Marshal Sil' H. Maitland Wil
son, head of the British .loint Staff Mis
sion in Washington, was in command of
the B"itish troops ill Egypt ,,-hen the 1M"
bcgan in 19.109; und undel' WU1'eU he
led the troo/IS in the deBat cont/laiyn of
1940-1,1. I/"OII! Ihel'c he went to Greece,
and latc" 1t"aS in command of the SYl'iall
NOII/miOn. In 1.'14.1 he became Cnmmand
<'I' ill Chicf in the .1Tidd[c EaM wllel'c
he ?'elllaillcd 1Intil tl/killg Ol'el' from
Geneml EiHenholccr as Supl'cmc Allied
Commander in Ihe .1leditcrTll1!e(tn in
Jalluary He silcresl<jully elil'celed
Ihe Allied tl'O"}18 ill Ita/1I and the ill
rasinn of the Snuth of' FI'fOlce.-"-THE
EDITOR, .
I
NFORMATloN.-In waT, the importance
of intelligence work cannot be overem
phasized. AII sources of information must
be tapped anti this information checked with
cross bearings whenever possible. All infor
mation must be properly digested, and an
intelligence officer must be as impartial as
a judge in summing up evidence. His own
ideas should not be allowed to obtrude in
any appreciation. There are many examples
where the intelligence staff failed to ap
preciate the enemy's plans and intentions,
although there should have been ample evi
dence: the German advance at Cambrai in
1918, the failure to appreciate the arrival
of German tanks in Libya in 1941, and, more
recently, the German offensive in the Ar
dennes.
SURPRISE.-The element of surprise is
very important on the high levels. num
ber of people in the know must be limited
to the minimum, and as little as possible
must be committed to paper. The British
attack .at Sidi Ban'ani in 1940, for' example,
"when only five people knew the intention up
to the eve of the attack, well illustrates this
point, The troops thought that they were
to carry out a rehearsal. Thus, not only
were the enemy deceived, but there was also
no leakage of information back in Cairo,
which in. those. days was almost equally
important.
.SPEED.-IVe cannot but stress the im
portance of speed, which is achieved not
only by making' troops move fast but also
intelligellt anticipation by the, staff. They
must always think ahead and study require
ment;, and the possible causes of a break
down. Bad and sketchy staff duties will act
as a brake and not as an impetus. The staff
must know their job and not just pass airily
over detail.
COKCEKTRATI!l:-.l OF EFFORT.-As to con
centration of effort, the decisive spot must
he selected and the maximum resources ap
pliecl to it. The flat-wash effort must be
avoided. Resnul'Ces are rarely sufficient to
)!o around amI must be carefully distributed.
If Rllpport is inadequate, a high percentage
of ensualties will be the result and will fre
quently lead tn failure. Whenever possible,
the maximum usc must be made of all the
services, sea, land, and air.
I;--;TEGRATED STAFFS.-Our integrated staff
ii1 the :\leflitelTanean wOI'ked very well. The
heads of sections and their deputies were al
ternately American-British, British-Ameri
can. Judging this example of joint effort
during the Wal', we may be very optimistic
about the achievements this same jOint ef
fort between two nations could make in the
future.
STICKING IT.--The will to succeed, even
when cil'cumstances are most adverse, leads
to success, and many failures have occurred
for want of the extra effort to win through,
both in attack and defense. The enemy's
c.Iifficulties must be considerec.l before taking
stock. of onc's OWI1. This was demonstl'ated
in the first 'battle of Gaza in 1917, when,
after battle had been raging since dawn, the
commanders of both sides decided that they
could no 10nKer stick it out and ordered a
withdrawal for four o'clock in the afternoon.
The Man You Are to Kill
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES W. DAVIS, Injant1"Y ,
Instructor. Command and General Staff School
TJ,f' aut/wI' oj this Ilrticle ,,(llt' actioll
Oil Gumlail'a IInl ill the Solomon I s/(lIIds
//'01/>. Deccm/IN l,Q4': II 'I til Fcb"lW/'y
1!1J"I, dlll'illfl which timr he lOa" E,i'ec/I
til'e Office/' of an infant/'f} batfalioll with
thl' ':5fll IJiI'isiou, Fl'om 1 Augllst uutil
;]i; Septemb('r he !l'aH ill fhe Xrlf'
r;col'yia ('alllj)(liyn (.lIlIlIda nlld Anl/I
c/t'l), tlctillY (IS CO//lllla/IIII'I' of till illjalltl'lI
battalioll Icifh thl' 25th Di,i8ioll.
CO/OII"/ Dal'is lcas aWIlI'ded fh" ColI
yrrs.qi"lItll .1!"da[ of H()IIU,' tiS the /'(,SlIlt
(If his flctiollS dul'ing 12-1.1 .!mwtlry
all UII(ldlllcallll/,-Tl/E EDITOR.
T
HE Jap ('ame That fits the
situation sO far as the Jap is conc<.>rned,
Prior to Pearl Hal'iJOr, cloth<.>d under the
shl'otHls of strict('st secrecy, the Japanese skil
fully prepared for their war in the Pacific,
The); IlPveloped bases, both offensive and de
fensiVl'; they organized, trained, and equipped
11 llli)!;hty land army, patterned, cut out,
and put togpther for thl' type of warfare thpy
knew they would iJel!ome engaged in, They
produced a fOl'midahl.! naval force which was
not to he rpckonl'tl with concur
I'cnlly t'staiJlished an' air force which was
c;lpable of SUllpm'ting- their proposed oPC!'a
tions, To it up once more, the Jap came
clost, !
Priol' to Pearl Harbor, we had underesti
mated the Jap and on the whole regarded him
as a bantam, saki-soused race that could be
wipcd from the face of the earth with one
gl'eat stroke, Then Pearl Harbor blazed into
view and we began changing our ways of
thinking as far as the Jap was concerned.
Due to the many stories, true and otherwise,
that inevitably float from the battle areas, we
hegan .to think of the Japanese as super-sol
diers, In fact, fear of the unknown linked
with reports were enough to bring about a
feeling of uneasiness toward the
Japanese situation: It took the greatest teach
er of all, actual battle contact, to extinguish
this blaze of fear almost entirely, So it has
heen an aim since Pearl Harbor to reach that
mirl-field view conct'l'l1ing the Jap., Respect
him? Yes, but not to such a degree that it will
affect YOUI' comhat efficiency,
certainly fl'el the necessity, whether we '
are the private in thc' ranks 01' the colonel 011
the division staff, of knowing our enemy. Let
Us take a look at a soldier of Japan and his
hackground.
.Japan has been a modern nation for only
a comparatively short tillie, It is a nation
ruled hy force, by strength, While operating
under the policy that excluded all foreigners.
,Japan wag ruled hy the Shogun, The Shogun
had tht country divich'd into large parts,
part hein)!; controlled by a lord, Under each
lord all army was organized with the wani
0I'S known a, the Samurai. They were fig-htingo
men, living by a warrior's code, and did the
hiddin)!; of tlwir lord even if it meant death,
That soulHls familiar toduy, and lIatUt'ally
so, fOl' when Japan modernized ;!l,d
huilt her present army, thes," Ill'inciples so
ci('eply ingruined in the Samurai were carril'd
forth into her present army,
With th.. Samurai going in as om
eel'S in her new Army and we today see
the of th,h' belief,;. 1'h,' Emp""o,- h;:s
!lOW replaced the old lord as thc ohject of ti:e
;;oldier's affection,
Now as to the individual soldier, we lUl'st
accept him as a courageous, well-disciplined
soldier, physicallY and mentally qualified for
the .iob at hand, His training is of a vcry
rugg-ed nature, hut he is well qualified to
stand it since a large part of the Army is
made up of men whose stamina has been de
veloped over years of very hard life, It is
<Iul'ing this training period that the love for
close combat is instilled into the individual
soldier and at the same time the fire of
hatl'ell, intense hatred, of hili enemy is kindled
in the mind of the Jap. He is told that what
ever the odrls may be, the spiritual back
ground of the Japanese soldier will see him
through. This fact has been borne out by the
5 THE MAN YOU.ARg TO KIl.!.
n'nseless attacks of the Japanese when they
wCl'e by far on the short end of the odds, It all
hoils down to the fact that training of the Jap
allese is designed to create n rugged infantry
which they employ as a shock force. They are
bl to believe the Allied soldier does not
the UHe of cold steel. the bayomt. and that
t11(':'o' - to tak<' advuntag{' of fact-niHst
tel', For example, companie,; 1. 2, :1, and 4
will he in the 1st Battaliun; 5, 6, 7, and 8 In
the 2d Battalion; etc, This number of com
panies is not a stcadi,lst rule, howeVE!l" as the
fourth rifle company is sometimes missing in
a hattalion organization, Each of these rifle
('ompanieK will have three platoons. Each pla
loon will hav!' fou!' "'lUna". three of which are
BII II"
1111 11'1
fln Traill
ISO
Hill"
Co
IXf)
Hille
('0
IS'l
11to,,\'v
:\Iachi;,p
(iun CII
(S ;\1(;', ill
.\ Plat,)
14:;
IIIl
(iull
Plat
711
Bilk
Pial
Hili<,
PIal
Hlfl.,
I'l,d
:/,.
(ir(,l1adp
1
Squad
1:1
Hifl"

J:l
H,II.,

I:;
Fllil'HE 1.
.r \P,\:".'E:-.E H.HT'\T.III:-4.
Bdl.,
:-\qllatl
1:1
l'eli,h thl' use of the ba\'oll<'t all offellsi\'('
\,",'apon. comh,;t tmining is all busi
soldiers have bepn ordered to double
tiIlle two 01' three times uround th"i!' harruck,
vjJon completion of a forced lllarch of thil'ty
miles or more, just to prove that it mutter not
what the at hand may be, the .Japanese
,oldieI' has sonH'thing left within him
tITat will take hilll,
Xow we have standing before a well
trained Japanese soldier, about five feet three
and one-half inches in height, with un intense
devotion to duty and Empel'or that makes him
11 tough customer \\ ith whom to deal. Let us
see what a typical infuntry division of thl'se
individuals looks likP. We will stal't with the
infantry battulion (s('e Figure 1).
The Jupanese have foul' riJIe cOlllpanies in
their infantry battalion. and they number
these companies instead of giving them a let-
rifle "quads which contain a light machine
gun ill puch. and the foul'th "quad is a g'1'(,
nade squad. (The grenade dis
('har12'er is n101'C COlllnlonly known as the
"knl'e 11lnl'tal'.")
The hC'avy machine-gun has foul'
platoon" nlHl l'uch platoon has two heuvy ma
chine These guns urc cumhel'some and
!IH'l'cfore difficult to tl'unspol't. hut you will
find thpm present. nonethelpss,
FOl' the hcaviel' gun support thl;' .J llpanese
have a hattalion gUll platoon, which has two
,O-111m hattalion guns. These arc provided
for the pUl'po"e of close support of front-line
unit>; by a lal'gl'l'-caliber weapon,
You undoahhuly have noticed the lack of
lal'gel'-('alih(,l' mortar" Do not be misled. he
the have numel'OUS in,ll'pen
dent mortal' units which al'{' attached to 01'
gunlzatinn:-- within g'iving thenl
MILITARY REVIEW
ample support by mortar fire, This fact is
'being borne out by the large amount of
mortar fire our h'oops in contact with the
Japanese are receiving, The battalion that I
have described will tot:.ll about 1,145 officers
and mell,
The infantry l'C'ginll'nt is mado up of three
battalion:; of infantry, an infantry g1.ll1 COI11
pany which pl'ovid,', do"" ,upport fot, the
reg:ilnpntal a conlpany and a
mOllntl'd platoon, Included in
the infant!'y c,nnpany i, a platoon of t5-mlll
guns and an antitank platoon which is armed
with :l7-nllH antitank g'uns (prohahly re
placed 47mm ant itllnk guns). Thl'
Ftn'ngth of thi< 1't'gimC'nt is officers and
IIll'n,
The .JaIHl!!t''''' ,tandard triangular infan!! \'
divbdon hn:--: tilt' infantry o'f
thl't'll infantn: yt'g'ilUt'111;-;; a l't'l'onnaissttncc
l't,),dnH'nl mw!t' up of t \\'(l motorized l'olllpanit'"
and a light tank ""!llpan:,- ((w,lvl tanks); all
l\l,tilkry !'l'gimen!, which ha" two hattalitlll"
of t\\'C'lv,' 75-mm gun" <'Heh ant! (lilt' hattalion
of IO;;l1lm (how,'ver. th,'l'(,
han'1>(,l'n time, \\hC'll fOlll' of artil
ll'ry w('l'l' in the .Japan('s,' artillery
I'l'g'illwnt) ; an mati(' up of
thl'('l' {'n:..dnCl'l' and a llH1.ttlriah.;
platoon; a signal unit l'olllposed of two wire
platoons and a radio platoon; a tl'ansport
regiment consisting of a h01'scdrawn hattal
ion; the remaining units in thc division arc
the ordnance, medical, anll veterinary units.
It is intel'esting to notc that the Japanese
division is organizC'd similarly to the U.S.
divisions; however, in comparison they are
undel'<'quipped ant! und'1'gunnell. What I
have shown here is a typical standard tri
angular division. You must look for any
variations in this organization, for the Jap
anese lllay alter these units at any time.
pick out a mission for a unit to accom
plish; 'then they design the unit to fit the
operation, Thus, many Japanese units are
cl'ganized as tash forces bearing the name
of a certain command. The Japanese organi
zation is very clastic and we must keep this
in mind. Very often we will find mortar bat
tanons, antiaircraft, and tank units 'attached
to the division.
We met our first armored div'ision oper
ating as a division on Luzon in the PhiliIl.
pines. This division was the 2d Armored
Division. They have a total of four armol'ed
divbions, so in all likelihood we will meet
others, Shown in Figure 2 a diagl'Um of
an arlllO\'l'd division made up of 1:1,500 offi
eCl':-i n nd 111('11.
Th,' Japanese arllled abo contaill
indepl'ntknt tank
Another unit of mention is tIll'
in!lepenlknt mixel] hrig(lde which
to <lat< marl, its prl'sence felt in tlll'
l'aeilic war, It is a unit of variahle
It ('ontains from foul' to independent
infantr,,; battalions, at timp" found with and
at other tilllC's without a tank unit, ant] an
Hrtillery IInit lllanning twelve 75-mm g-un,
PI' l05.111nl howitzPI"; an antiuiJ'craft unit
of ,ix 75-111lll antiaircraft guns; a signal unit:
and an ('n:,,dnel'l' l'Pginwnt. It is
to note that in l'ccC'nt lllonths some of th,,'"
lInit, have ht'ell transformed into division'.
A;.; far as ol'D:unization is concC'l'l1l
1
{t tTl{>
units IbtC'd (01' some variations of th",e
llnits) art' the on('$ we lllust 11l'C'pal'e to de.
feat. A thorough knowledge of enemy or
ganization is all ail] in planning successful
operations. For general information anll
planning purposes, a Japanese 1.l1'l1lY is com
parahle to our COI'pS ancl a J apallese area
army compares favorahly in size with our
field army.
Over the Japanese Arllled Force rests the
Emperor, their God. and it is for him the
Japanese soldiC'r gives his all in combat. He
believes he has reached his goal in life when
he dies on the ficld of battle for the Emperor
and .Japan, so it is up to our men to see that
the Japanese soldier reaches his goal in life
at the C'ar\iest pORsible date.
We have heard many rcports concerning
the Japanese reluctance toward becouling
prisoners of war, and generally they have
been true, Casualties numbering over a hun
dred thousand and prisoners of war lllun
bering in the low hundreds is the rule and'
not the exception.
i
THE MAN YOU ARE TO K1LL
The Japanese carry 110 "missing in action" their favorite type of maneuver., They depend
if a man is not accounted for, the death ulion surprise and speed of movement and gen
gratuity is paid the family and a funeral is crally start a flanking movement of 'some size
11('ld in the homeland. They are led to expect upon contact. The Japs tend to
torture aucl extreme cruelty at the hands of make cloAc envelopments which permit them
the TJwy havt' been told, for example, maxinmm speed of execution and closer con
,-Tank negt 1 Each regiment hI" one company of light
Tank Brigadt' _.: tanh an, I four companies of medium tanks.
'-Tank Illgt I'The lighf tank cOlllpany has b\elve light
tanks and Ihe medium companies each have
I -Tank R<'gt eleven mediullI tanks and four light tanks.
Tank Brlglld,' There is ab" a maintenance company in the
'--Tank UPgt division.
The infantry regiment, muturizeu, has three infantry
:\Iutorized uatlalions, an infantry guu unit of six 75-IOID guns, and It
Infanlry
maintenance company. Each infantry battalion has three
Ucgilllt'nt rifle ('ompanies, a muchine-gun company, and an antitank
company.
1
,\U'IiHILIl Hl'l'Ollnni"''''ance Regiment
1>1\ 1:-, It 1\
II :Lll III "iii, "I" ,'i'l'llllsp"'t H('gimt'ut
ttlltl JlH'H)

f
One battalIon of hH'lve 7.jIIlIll
- .\rttllery guns. Two battalions of eight
Ht'!(illlent llOj-mlll howitzers each,
.\nliairerat't Vuit
.\lItilunk Battaliull
, - Eugineer Hegiment
-- )'lamtenanct' Cuit
l-lIedical lnit
FJGCRE 2.
JAPANESE ARMORED DIVISION.
that. if captul'eu, the bone in their forearms trol over units, One of the favorite missions
woult! be> re>l11oved, shaved down, and sent of the enveloping force is to get astride our
to the White House in Washington as sou main supply routes.
vellir lettel' openers. The large majority of So it is well to be prepared to meet a flank
cllptul'ed have been excellent sources ing attack from either side as soon as contact
of information. It can be readily understood is gained, The main point to remember is not
that if a man is told he is Inever to become to allow Japanese units disposed to our flanks
a prisoner of war, he cannot be taught at and rear to alter our plans of operations. Cut
the same time how to conduct himself in thenl off, take care of them with mobile re
eaAe he is taken prisoner, &erves, but do not allow their presence, only,
In discussing tactical doctrines, it is well to cause a withdrawal of your troops. The
to start with the offense. Especially during Japanese have won some victories at a very
the h'aining period, the spirit of the offensive cheap price by the use of these tactics,
is drilled into the individual soIdieT. In a meeting engagement, invariably the
The Japanese employ the envelopment as Japanese will make an envelopment, but at,
"
MILITARY REVIEW
, the> >lame time pl'es>'Ul'e is maintained fron
tally_ pl'es,;ul'c is ll1aintuilwd
l1lachinl'-g'un and mortal' tirc with fe'\\'
The llleeting' l'llg'ag(,l1lL'llt is \\'ell liked thl'
TI1l'Y havc traitll'd ill
ol'de>1' to he Ill'otki<:nt in (hi" (n'" of l'llgag,'
ment,
They cOlbi<ler thell1sl'Ivcs ,upcl'illl' to tht'il'
in thb of blll'HUH'
they llt'lievc' they ('ontaill a or
mohility \\'ithill tllt'il' lItllt" At (,Ill' "alll,' (inll',
thl'r Ul'lillVt', \\'p :\1'l' :-:IO\\'l'I into
action than tl1<',', that the,' call gaill a !jui,'k
<tech-doll (ivnyiug' u:-: tht' of plan!" of <le
,lioll all'l',ul,' PI'l'p'lI'l'd: abo, th"il' IWl'etoflll'l'
deficit'l1ey "f i, lllll1imizl'ti ,illve \\'<',
h('ing' in l'"ntad, (':tnnot U't' nul" ,m thl! fl'ont
lint', III ntlH'l' \\'01 III a Illt't't in}.!: t'nl.?,'al..!,l'
Illl'nt. tlw vi"tol' i, tIlt' 111:111 that Ill"Ve, til"t
an,1 bl"t. It (it-p,,"(b Il}"'ll a I'ugg('d infant I,."
and thl'l'" tb' ,bp' ],,,Ii,,\'<' th",. h:l",' 1I>'
. \
Pt'nt'(l'atioll' all' Illade' tl1<' ,lapane,,'
with tIlt' PUll'''''' of out til hlltl! _I,{'"
in the n'HI'. di,,'upting oUI' plan, alld thl'''''
oUt' ill {'()nfu:--Iol1. Pt'IH..tl'ntiol1:' UI't'
tt-::-.uully lnadt' at Blg'ht :dun.t!,' lllHl'kt,d I
Re{'Onluti:-.:-.alll't
'
\\'ill havl' hl'l'll thol'oug:h
\\' atd, 1'01' \'llllwrHhle points in YI>U, lin.. " 1'01'
thc' ,Jap, an' apt to lind tiwlll and U,-(' thi,
a.... tht'll' point ttl ':'Itl'ii..:I'.
Intiltration the 1:-- :--nlllt,thtHg
to hl' l'oJl:...;jell'}'ed. :--itH'l' it b 1I1le \)1' thl.'ll' ("'0111
llll}n PI,>\"tkes, .-\, I Sl'(, it. thl'Y lilt"" through
our linl's in ol'del' to (1) gain information,
(2) It" in alllhllsli along our 'lll'l'ly, lines, nnd
(:l) gatl1l'1' at rally pninb in (ll'dl'l' tl}
in,tallati(lns "u<'h as ,uppl,- dUll1l" ant! gun
positions, TId,; tVjl" of operation will gl'ncl'
ally I", ('oIHluct('(i at night--that is. the Hetnal
moving through oIll' lim', -hut tIll' amhush"s
and in oUl' l't.'ar an"as an' (,'Oll
dn('ted day 01' nig-ht.
beJievl' th" discussion of slli<:ide units b
worthy of m('ntion, For a while it \\'as be
lieved an otTicel' "hould accompany thes('
units, but due to the loss of many otticcn.
higher headquarters decit!l'd it would he all
rkht if an XCO aCl'ompanil'd thl'se g'I'OUPS,
Thp point is thiH: they have been elllphasized
gl't'atly have taken their place in the Jap
HlleSt' tadical pl'og'ran). These are not hal)
hazHl'!Il,- organized units; they al'(' units de
siglled fol' a certain mission. thl'Y pl:epal'e
tllt'i}' missiolls, analyze theil' targets, and i
thl'll' ohj('ctiveR arc very eanfully con"idel'ed, .
Th(,Hl' units g'o out aft('r ail' tields. cOlllmand
Ut'l1101'ld al'tillel'Y posi- ,
1ion,. alld othpl' suitahle targets, The trent! in '
t he LIse oj' th",e units on tht' up-grade fol'
thl' ,Japane'H', They Hl'e lliaying down the
110tl' and arc designing' units to Ul'
the,,, ,an\(' missions but l'etUl'n, One
,uch unit j,; tilt' raiding' party. made up of
thl" l' to livl' men including an 1\'('0, They are
l": ally OJ' f"Pf)llL'lltly It'd hy FOl'mos,Il1' }".
cillln.' of thpil' of vbion and hl'ul'in:.,!',
Thc"" pal'ti," ,11'(' equipped with high c'xpl,,
:j\l':-> Hnd iUI;t'Hdial"it'zo,. After taking' {:al't' of u
:--uitahk tUl'g'llt. lhl'Y g'l't away. Thel'c ani
llli.'llY unit:o; that l'ang'l' in fl'lHll tlll'PL'
to l1\'l' on lIJi to sl'v(ll'al hundred. The larg'l'l'
lllllt, "dllallv hav(, hc'en 'knowlI ttl set liP
ha"",,,", of npl'J:ation" bL)hind our linl's.
our ,upply ('01 II III II. patrol I'm' infOl'matioli.
makv "'Ul'p,"i:-.l' attaek-s, and thel\ \\'ith<lJ'tl\\'.
Th"I'\' <11,' ditl'l'll'nt names for the'e
unit ... lllHny difi\)l't'nt SiZl'S also, hut the
poillt to l'(,Illl'lllhl'I' is that all Allied Ul1lts
IllU,t have' pI ('ViOll,IY-l'!'epal'et! plans for de
tt"he' of illstall,ltioll' and that thl'y I1lU,t have
j)(!<,n l'llw:tl spd, Theil thl'''' hefol'P-mentiolled
I will fall tlndpl' the catl'go]'y of nui,ance
1 aid=--,
Thl' ;ll'IIlY favo!'s the night at
tad" ant! they have tl'ail1l'cl thPil' t!'oops in
tIl!' art of night attaek. It gives thelll a llluch
).n'eate'I' chance to achieve ,;ul'prise, and the
achievelllPnt of sUl'pl'ise is all-impOl'tant to
th, Japs, Thl' Japs may tl'y to attain tc.tal
'UI'Pl'j,;C: by attacking in fol'l'l' with no pl'e
viou, til'lIlg', 01' they may employ slllall group>
of ,oldie]'s in hara,sing' roles all night to k('ep
us Oil ('([gl' and thl!n blunch the main attack
ahout dawn or shortly before,
The objectives for the night attack are
chosen; of the' area is 'f'l'
qu('nt and tho]'oug'h; attempts al'e madE' 1:0
draw ti]'e. especially from ou]' automatic
weupon" which upon detpctioll by the :Japs
I
THE MAN YOIT ARI': TO KILL
are ohj(l(,tivC':,,; an' I1lHl'l';t'U to
fot'ward an'as, Thl' frontages aI'''
nllrrow('d at night !In!I plan" m:e simple as
In a night attack th(' ,Ia"" depen,l
upon llL'hieving succesg by the US" of hand
gl'elllH]('S and dos{'-in fighting against a "lll'
pl'i"erl, sCHI'cd, and lll'wiltil'recl foc,
To countC'I' thi;; night nttnd" remain "mart.
plan YOU!' night defense hy skilful cmplace
';ll'nt of w(,,,pon, and th{' b(,,,t m(' of tel'lain
at your nnci have a warning'
\ml'l\{'<1out.
Thi" is an attac1, the I it. It b
,dlLlut lin hour hl'fol'e dawn. Tht' attackinl.\'
tl t)OP:--' have llloved into
has lw('n our own tl'OOP"i
11'l\e h\'<'n IUll'ass"d nil night and 0111' I""i
til"" h.lV(' he.'n thOl'oug-hl;' anal;'z"II. (lUI'
}I<1-.ition:-:: WIll hl' thol'oug'hly ovcr With
Jap mortal' til'C', and now llrtiIlL'r:;
fin', I,idlt Illal'him' gun, al'(' up with tIl<'
,,,,,wit U'oops; their h('avie, are ,ighted on
nul' I<nown point' of rp,btancp, Tlwn the at
th('k WIth a frontal along
marl;cII !'Outl", A f(pr tl1l'Y havl' gain"d ('on
tat't tbt'y will l'pmain aggressive while thl'
main attaeking fO)'t'e movp<;;, in a 01'
double ell VI 1"pllll'nt of our po,itions tow'll'd
tl1l'il' oh,i<-I'tive>, Then after gaining Olll' l'('l\!'
tlwy {llhl(IHV01' to ellt off and
our po.dtiol1:-.. These ('an he anti havp
h"e11 stoPPNI.
TIl<' ,Japanc,e helieve III the inhel'(,11t SUP"I'
'ority rf the offensj\'(', hut on many oceasionH
this superiority is ('ontained in tIll' l11ind of
the Jup "meel' onI;', and he will order an
attach ag'ainst overwh,'lming odds, This
thought must he kept in mind, a, it t('nels to
llial\(, ",aI' the Japane':p a lively

Due to thl' phlCl'd on tl1<' offen-.ive,
we Illu.<:t eertainI;' kpep in 111ino the fact that
if th" ,Japanese is thrown on the defensive
It will he an active defense, Since being
thrown, on the defensive by the Allied etTort,
the Jap has shown that he is adept in the
mt of defensiv,' warfare, far as tl'l'1'ain j,.,
cOll""rned, the Jap uses It admi,'ahly, He
picks the easy ground to clf'fend and if you
want to get him you must play in his own
hal! pari,. The .J up docs not IiI;e t(} fight in
open t('I'I'nin hecause he is enough to
Imow oul' til": and he knows that
th(' llll'U11" we hav(' ut our di:;poFal will be
(.'Ol1U' iJH'I'lw.. ltfective as we 1110ve into
open ,,'al'fan',' Given tlw tillH' to do so, the
,J ap l'Olllllllll1dl'l' will IH ganize hb po:;ition
with' pillboxe,; prt'pared
ill depth, The pilliloxes will contain anything
fl'Olil machine gUll;; to heavier-caliber
",'a1'011>', Th""" gun>' will he givPll close-in
:lll-aiound protl'ctioll hy individllUI riflemen
t "ftt'n ('ollc('aled in >pidel' holes) and hy
"th,,!' pillboxe:" Although. at times, positions
have beell ,ele('tc'd that do not command wide
lil'll!> of tin', you will always fin(; that vital
",','nu," of appl'o<\l'h to thL' p""tion as a
whol!' }In' "tlv,'l'ed, It has bl'l'n Hoted the Jap
(tl1PN' al'l' V(,l'Y effl'etiv(' in the and e111
plating' of' p() .... :-.0 H:-. to bl'ing tht> l1l0st
..rJ'vetivv lire UPOH tl1l'i!' ,'nl'1l1il". Tho Japa
IH.':-,(' ('(in playa waitinp: tnl111P and will aBo\\'
,vou to approach within a f('w ;'al'ds of theii'
fil'(' i:-. opened on your ad
troop", Thi" they Ill'lieve. tends to
<,,,nfuS(' ll> and will not allow OUI' plans to
ht, .... l11oothly. On ol"ca:-:ion:-. it l1as
hepn nb';(,I'Vl'd that lIpon' clost' contact when
it \\'ollId ,b"COllll' for 0\11' tl'{)OPS to
,,'lthdnlw in ttl l'e('('i.\'t' anill('!'y 'llPPOl't,
the ,Japan(',e would follow our wlthdl'awals
it; 01'11<-1' to g'pt out of our a'till,',l"y fire and
c:ive U:-- a when we the
offl'l1,i\'L', Of ('OUl''''', this action can be suc
(t.... f'llly on very terl'ain.
TIll' ,J.IJHlnl',e ddl'nRc' amphibious
opel'alioll' ha>.; chang'ed eonsidel'abl;' since th('
inva,ion of 1'al'>l\\'a h;- the L,S,
Tlll'Y f'll,' tight on the beach if IlO,,,ibh"; hut
it ton to :-.tay on thl' lwHch dur
ll1g' bomh" l'flment, so til'ep Zone' of resi,tance
IllUot Ill' prepaJ'('d with ke;" points sell'ctcd
for purl'osp of counterattack, Res(,l'ves ant!
equipnwnt 1l1U,t be mohil", heav,' artillery
IllU,t be so emplaced and comlllunications so
in,tall"t! tha't they \\'ill fUllction despite bom
hanITl1l'nt. eoa,tal d"f,'nses must be in depth,
Iwo Jima is no\\' the clas,ic Japanes" exaillple
of island defense. There, artillery fire in con
junction with fire was all set to fire
MILITARY REVIEW
on preal'l'anged planned areas. Caves were
constructed on different levels, most of them
connected underground. Some "caves" would
, hold as many as 300 men, All pillboxes were
mutuallY supporting. Jap positions were well
protected from air and naval bombardment.
There, as in so many other places, the burden
of reducing these positions was placed upon
our foot soldier, who can get the Japs out by
digging'them out 01' by hurtling them out.
lt is a lmowtl fact the J aps do not like
intl wIers in tlwil' rear a'reas. On many oc
casions they have with,lrawn after being
outflanked, but do not be ied to believe that
each time you outflank a position the Jap
will pull out, for that is not the fact.
The Japnllcse now carry out their large
scale Ballzai attacks less f1'l''1ucntly, but sit
tight in wC'll-prepal'eci positions, 'contesting
evel'y inch of the g'round. Th"" sit there,
going into dl'l'p holes as our artillery opens
up and' then remanning- their guns when
artillery fire When a position becomes
untenable, they withdraw deliberately to
previously prepared positions. Upon reaching
the final line, as in islanrl wal"fa1'\:', they will
fight until the last man is kille,!.
During thiH ,Ieliberate defensive battling
you may ('xpeet counterattacks nnd infiltra
tion tactics to he carrie,] Ollt, keeping in
mind at all times )llans for j'epelling a Japa
nese amphibious mov,; to our real' areas
whenever it is pogsihle for him to move by
water:
If the Jap is driven off the high ground,
he will fight you in the valley. He is also
adept in fighting from reverse slope posi
tions.
In Burllln the Japanese were known to have
defended river lines on the enemy side of
the river.
Count on the camouflage of Japanese defen
sive positions being excellent.
The' Japanese are slow to react on the
defensive to cope with a sUdrlcn change in
the situation.
We must count on a hostile civilian popu
lation as we move north, I mention this
fact because the Japanese are counting on
the use of civilians :f01' defense of al'e1l!
and are making their plal1s a('cordingly.
On the defense, the Jap is tenacious and
will fight from well-prepared positions on
difficult terrain, but he can be defeated by
skilful execution of the kind of fire and
movt'ment we have available to liS today.
Weapons vf the Japanese 'Army were de
signed orignlally for operations previollsly
planned. They have caught on to the idea
that they must ii11prove their weapons as the
war progresses and are taking steps to do so,
They have realized that the rifleman alone
with his bayonet will not win the victor,';
this is contrary to their eariicr beliefs.
The weapons of the individual rifleman-'
the !"i tic , the bayonet, and'the grenade-are
inferior to ours but are good weapons.
Light machine guns are organic to the
"Cluae! and are effective Wl'apons, They are
used with troops and arC' easily han
dled.
The heavy machine g-uns are difficult to
trap-sport hy hand but are formidahle guns.
They lend tire support to attacking troops
hy eng'aging points of resistance holding up
their advance. The heavy machine gun is
a good ,lefl'nsive weapon.
The Japanese have the 70-111111 battalion
aml the regimental 75-n1111 guns to fur
nish heavier-caliher fire for assault t 1'00ps.
When any Japanese force of a, size worthy
of contest is met. intense mortar til'e in
large quantities will abo be met. Japanese
mortar fire is accurate. Independent m01"
tar battalions have organized and are
attached, to combat units to increase fire
power_ In the offense, mortal' positions are
moved frequently.
The J have taken great strides
forward in the use of artiiIery. In early
campaigns. esp'2cially in the jungle, artillery,
was conspicuous by its absence. They be
lieved it unnecessary in this type of ter
rain. Again they were depending on a rugged
infantryman. In the Okinawa campaign
massed artillery fire from large numbers of
guns was encountered, Many of the guns
were kept in underground positions.
The Japanese are a patient race. Thig
THE MAN YOU ARE TO KILL
virtue of the race is in their use of
\\(!llPOl1R. fire conservatively. They
hold t1wil' fire until a good target is pre
<eHted. You will not find the
wasting' ammunition 011 a large but
tl1l'Y will hold oft' until their concentl'ateu
ti"e will achieVl' maxinnllll l'C'RUltR with a
minimum expenditure of fire'.
TIll' Jap, al'l' well behind the othC'r warring
nations in the com;tl'tlction and use of tanks
and uther armored vehicles. At the start of
the war tlll'ir us!' of minl'S was a haphazard
alfair hut now are beginning to lay
lnine tklds ot' dl'finite llattel'l1s. The Japs ha:ve
ll>ed l'q,ular mines covering depth charges
and in ,OHIP places have installed 1,500
p(ltll1lb of dynamite in one's!Jot.
Hoeket are in use by the .Japallt'se and
must be considered when this enemy..
What "dol'S the J apallt?s(' soldier' think of,
Us as soldiers? It aU boils (10wn to this:
"They lack th(> will to assault; their fire
powel' is good and accurate, but take this
support away from the Allied and he
is annihilated. lIt' lacks the' love of
cold stee1." The Jap admits we are very
skilful in the u"e of weapons.
It may seem that I have played the Jap
into too formidable n position hy the fore
g'oing words. hut I have played down weak
Ill'SSl'S an,1 shown his good Jloints sO we can
pl,m accordingly. Thl' Japanese had several
YC'1(ro' stal't on us but we have I('arned his
gamt', selected his good points, used them,
and institl1t('d others, thereby creating a pupil
that can lick the t('acher.
New Rockets
Digestl'cl at the Command and G('neral Staff School from an article in
AI'my and Nal'y Jourual5 May 1945..
Two new of rockets which add mater
ially to V.S. fire power are disclosed by
the Xavy's Bureau of Ordnance. They are
tIl<' spinner and the high velocity aircraft
rocket (HYAR).
The spinner, first produced in October
1941, was first used in combat at Iwo Jima
in February ID45.
The spinner is a big brother to' t4e 4.5
inch beach harrage rocket that has been used
br both the AI'my and the Navy since the
war's eady all1phibious operations. It is de
;;igned to be launched from a variety of
multipldub(' launchers mounted' on either
ves,els 01' vehicles,
The spinner is stabilized, not by fins as
are the older type rockets, but by rotation
in flight similar to that of a gun-fired
prOjectile, This spinning motio!!, prevents
tumhling, tending to keep the rocket pn Its
rourse. Several methods of imparting spin
have been tried, but an angle dischar,ge of
the gases from the motor's end piece-the
met hod chosen by ordnance experts for these
spinners-has proved most satisfactory.
Initial combat use of the HVAR came in
the Normandy breakthrough last July. They
w('1'e launched from Army P-4,'s against
locomotives, tanks, armored cars, gun em
placements, and concrete defenscs,
The HVAR has proved effective in attacks
on shipping, land instnllations, and other
special targets, and has been used to good
advantage in reccnt aerial strikes on J apn
nese induftrial centers.
The speed of the plane gives the HVAR
sufficient initial Velocity to stabilize it before
it Ieav('s the lightweight launchers under the
wings. With the plane speed plus that im
parted by its own propellant, a high velocity
is achieved. It can penetrate the average
pillbox with no difficulty and its precision
makes it a valuable weapon in kn()cking out
resistance of advancing troops.
Air-Ground Integration
LlEt TF:;o;A;o;T COLO;O;F:r. EARLE R. Ai;' ('n}'I'"
('nmmaTH! and (;pflf'rld RtnfT Schuol
C
ALL it what you will-ail' SUPP0l't,
- <.'ombined ail'-gl'Ound action, coonlinated
air-gl'ouncl elTort, the air-infantry tcam. 01'
any other of many tl'l'Ill"-We arc all talking
ahout thl' "ame subject. Or al'e wc'? Perhaps
this b till' fallacy, We a;,"UillC that Wt' havl'
a comlllon denolllinator when We haven't. \\" e
veet! this denominatol'-a t<,l'm that Wl' all
nndel',;tand, so that, when it b u,sed by ground
and air otlkel's, both will be SUl'l' of tlwir
footing and Iwo.,' what they are talking about.
force and organization is dependent on
two major 0) the strength, size,
and capahilities of the hostil(' ail' force it is
"pposing, and (2) the size and organization
of the ground force with which it is working,
XOl'lllally, a larg('-scale operation against
l'nl'my ail' and ground force8 an army
g'l'OUp and a tactical ail' force, Th(' army
b a force consisting of one 01' mOl'e
"nllic", The tactical ail' force is an ol'gani7.a
lion provided to work with the army group,
Army Group - Tac'ti('ul
Air Fllrt''' Tl'am
Army (iroup
Army-TAC Army-TAC
T"am T"all1
1---
Army TAC Army TA(,
Let's choose "air-ground integ'ratIOn" for
purposeR of this articll', Let's sec.: what
agencies a1'e involved, and then discuss some
basic that should bl' oj"0l'ved
both air and ground commanders,
The air organization in a theater of Wllr
which pulls together with ground forces to
destroy the enemy is an air force. This air
force is normally referred to as a tactical
ail' force becam;e it is equipped, organized
-and trained for a mission requiring, to a
major' extent, the integration of ail' and
,ground operations. The size of such an air
Tal'tical Ta('tical Bombl'r
Air Forr, Command
Rpconnais,;ance
Force
Army-TAC Army-TAC
Tf'am Team
Army TAC Army TAC
I,
Organization of both forces must be the
result of long-range planning by higher
planning staffs. If it is decided that the arm),
g)'OUIl is to be organized of foul' armies, then
normally the ail' force will have four tactical
air commands. These tactical ail' command;
are often referred to as T A'C's and they are
the units of a tactical ail' force that "tcam
up" with the army for the common job, A
l' A C normally consists of 'fighter units which
Hre trained and equipped for air-ground
operations, In addition to the TAC's provided
h, 'h, t.''',,1 .i" fo,,, to fo,m th,' ",m':1
1
AIRGROUND INTEGRATION
TAC team, the tactical air force has a tactical
bomber command made, up of medium and
light bombors also trained alH!" equipped for
integrated air-g'l'ound oj)erations, but not to
the extent that it may team up with an army.
it is normally URed in the furtherance
of army group-tactical air force long-range
plans. The URe of thig force may involve ail'
affecting the overall plans fol' the
cumpaign 01' it Illay involve reinforcement of
aa army-TAC team in a critical ground or
ail' situation. The tactical ail' force also has
a reconnaissance force, normally a wing or
a g'l'OUp dl'pl'n(ling on the of the ground
and ail' force". This force iR truined and
equipped to provide photographic and visuul
. information of the enemy for the benefit of
th" l'ntire uir-groun,l forcc.
Di"positions of the enemy on the til'l,l of
battle often nece;;sitate revbions in the
organiZation of our forces. If such is the
case, both organizations are tlexible anti may
be l'l'organizl'd and shifted about to meet the
given situation. Subordinate units may be
,hiftc,l hom one army-TAC team to another
in the ev(mt that Ruch changes arc necessary.
:\. fter a Ireneral plan for the l'mployment
of air und gTotll1d forces has been developed,
it is at army and tactical air command level
that pick-an,l-shovel joint planning a
If plans are carefully laid, executed,
and cQntro!le<l at this l('vel. desired results,
gratifying to hoth grounl! and air, will be
achieved.
Concerning principJt.R of air-ground inte
gration, there are several importunt ones
that must 1)(' fully uppl'eciated by both COI11
mandel'S. A thorough understanding and
realization of the importance of these several
major principles is the factor that determines
the degree of perfection to be uttained. One
commander is not the answer, but rather
negotiation between two open-minded men
the top ground and air commanders of th"
forces involved.
First, and of utmost importance, is an
integrated plan. To develop a plan for the
ground forces and then call upon air to sup
plement the overall plan with air operations
is a mistake. From the outset, it is essential
that the staffs of air and forces should.
work together on a joint planning basis. The
plan for integrated air-ground action must be
developed c'oncurrently within the framework
of the overall plan for the operation. To
develop the ground logistical and tactical
plan and then ask air to augment the plan
places air at extreme disadvantages which
could easily have been avoided had planning
been conducted on a joint basis.
There must be a favorable uir situation.
That is, our forces should have air superiority
in the area of contemplated operations. We
must first place the enemy's air force "behind
the eight ball," operating disadvantage.
His installations and facilities must be at
tacked time and time again to disrupt and
destroy his air force to a degree which will
enable our air and ground forces to operate
without serious interference. This is a task
that falls only to the air force commander,
and until this job is done .the ground com
lllunder must wuit. It normally involves the
use of the entire tactical air force, and
c('ntralized control of all air under the air
commander is necessary for its' completion.
However, this t;J.sk of achieving a favorable
air situation is not one that is accomplished
and then forgotten-it is a continuing action
and one thut receives first priority from both
air and ground commanders throughout an
entire campaign. The enemy ail' force is
never beaten into unconsciousness. Remember
his air force is flexible also-and at any time
he is capable of massing the remaining opera
tional portion of his force and hitting us
when we least expect it. Because of this
capability, it is essential that the air com
mander always maintain centralized control
of his force. He must be capable of employing
the full weight of his force in any critical
situation resulting from unexpected enemy
ground and air action. Ground CO must
recognize and accept this fact. .
Weather is of vital importance in air
ground action. It restricts the use of the air
force. Air-ground plans must 'Possess a degree
of flexibility that will enable postponement
from hour to hour 01' day to day until weather
favorable for both forces. Weather may be
14
MILITARY REVlEW
such that enemy air forces can operate when
our own forces ai'e grounded. Such is often
the case, and the ground force commander
will find it necessary to make proviRions in
his plans to protect his own forces from
hostile air attack without air assistance:
Ground forces must always accept certain
responsibilities toward the air force. Perhaps
the most in1poltant of these is the provision
of commoni' supplies and the movement of
hoth commbn supplies and air force supplies
for the air forces. Air force movement of sup
plies and units must be recognized and pro
vided for in the overall plan. In many in
stances joint air-ground effort will have to be
directed towards capturing areas for the sole
purpose of providing adequate ail' fields for
air force units. And if the situation demands,
the gl'ound force must provi(le troops to
protect these- advance hast's from enemy
ground attack if air force units are to operate
from them.
Army and tactical air command should
operate from adjacent headquarten; in order
to promote close individual contacts, a con
stant exchange of information, and a frank
interchange of views' between commanders
and their staff officers. However, if adjacent
headqu31ters ate not possible, then a repre.
sentative staff of one service should remain
at the headquarters of the other.
If air.ground plans are carefully laid at
army-TAC level and then properly executed,
it has been proved that maximum results can
be gained from air-ground integration. These
plans will provide for ground direction of air
craft to targets without loss of flexibility or
air force control. In fact, it increases flexi
bility by permitting a forward battalion to
have instant use of air power without curtail
ing the ability of the ail' force control -system
to l'('sume control over all aircraft practically
instantaneously whenever necessary. How
ever, it cannot be overemphasized that opera
tions of this nature are possible only when
the enemy air force has been forced to retire
from active participation in the battle area
and when friendly aircraft are present in
sufficient quantity.
Aft'iean Colonial Navies
Digested at the Command and General Staff School
from The Fleet (Great Britain) May 1945.
THE naval forces of the colonies saved
the Royal Navy incalculable quantities not
only of time but of men and ships needed
more vitally elsewhere.
On the \Vest. CoaRt of Afriea, all foul'
British colonies raised naval forces, prima
rily to defend vital halbol's. Actually, one
of the most important of West Africa's naval
efforts was the contribution of men to the
Royal Navy, but, at the Rame time, volunteers
stood ready for any trouble that might
. approach the \Vest Coast.
The Nigerian Naval Defem;e Force cal'l'ied
out the colony's Naval Control Service,
pl'ovided vessels and personnel for whole-time
minesweeping duties, carried out twenty-foul'
hour patrols, and organized, the Examination
'Service with its pilotage craft and personnel.
The Naval Volunteer Force of the Gold
Coast did good wOl'k in out mine
duties.
In East Africa, the Kenya R:--rVR [Royal
Naval Volunteer Reserve] had a defined role
under the and Uganda Defense
Scheme. At the end of 1939 its functions
consisted of a Naval Control Service and
Examination Service, minesweeping' service,
and ,antisubmarine patrols. As the Kenya
Navy grew, African volunteers joined the
force. Strangely enough, these, for the most
pm't, were not dhow sailors or coast fisher
men, but volunte,ers from inland tribes, and
they showed great promise right from the
start as seamen and signalmen. The Tan
ganyika Naval Volunteer Force, recently
absorbed into the Kenya RNVR, played a
role very similar to that of the latter
force.
A Brief Review of the Activities of the Army
Port an.d Service Command in Hawaii to Date
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT C. JR.
Commnnrhng Gcn(,l'nl. Uniterl States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean At"eas
W
HEN, after the long and impatient
months of all-out preparation which
followed Amer{ca's entrance into the war, the
United States' defensive-offensive period in
the Pacific ended with our routing of a major
Japanese ta,;k force in the Battle of Midway
and our completion of the Guadal
canal phase of the Solomon Islands campaign,
the time tv start planning along purely of
f.ensive lines had arrived. It was apparent
immediately that a reorganization of the
Hawaiian Department was necessary if we
were to meet adequately the tremen.dous and
unprecedented challenge which amphibious
warfare in the Pacific envisioned in this the
atcr. This was to be a type of warfare in
which, in all its history, the Armed Forces
of the United States had had little experience.
Precedents were meager; existing SOP's did
not contemplate the sort of operations that
were projected. \Ve would have to make the
rules as we went along, to experiment, to
correct quickly-in short, we would
have to learn by trial and error the things
that no one then could tell us.
It was obviously desirable, therefore, in the
early part of 1943, that the Command Echelon
of the Hawaiian Department be freed to the
greatest extent possible from the det'ails of
logistics. so that it might concentrate on
broader phases of advance planning for com
bat operations. It became increasingly evi
dent that it would be not merely wise but
imperative that we establish within the De
partment a major echelon whose organization,
mission, and functions would be tailored to
fit a situation which does not exist anywhere
else in the world.
But what sort of an organization should it
be? In the continental United States, or on
any other large land mass, the solution would
be found in the establishment of a Service
Command and of a port of embal'kation
[POE]. But natural insular Iimitations
there is no point on the Island of Oahu which
farther remove.l from the Port of Honolulu
than a two hours' trip by motor-plus the
desirability of achieving the utmost economy
in the use of personnel-made the creation of
a separate Service Command and a POE un
wise. In any event, the pMt could not be caned
nor operated only as a lloi-t of embarkation,
for its functions as a port of debarkation were
and would continue to be of equal importance.
Nor, since it would operate in an overseas
theater of operations, could the contemplated
service organization operate solely as, or in
conformity with, the accepted mainland pro
cedure for a Service Command. What, then,
be the scope and designatIon of the
new ol'i(anization?
The answer found in the creation of
the Port and Service Command," a
line-a.nd-staff type of organization under the
command of Brig'adier General Roy E. Blount..
It was establiRhed by General Order No. 110,
"Reol'i(anization of Hawaiian Department,"
Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 29 July
unuer an effective date of 10 August
1943. As its name indicated, it was designed
initially to combine the applicable' fea
tures of a port with those of a service com
mand. Its fOllr general staff sections wel'e
comparable to those of any other organiza
tion; its special 8taff sections. however, were
rlesignated and manned. and their functions
detailed. not on the basis of precedent--for
there was none-but in accordance with what
was felt would be most appropriate and useful
to the organization in performing its primary
port and service mission.
II
Tne fall of 1943 found plans maturing for
thl first great combined Army-Navy ,offen
in th" Central Pacific: the invasions of
the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. To the- new
young organization were given the tremen
dous tasks of staging and billeting the thou
sands of troops pouring into the area of the
16
MILITARY REVIEW
Hawaiian Islands; of organizing their s p ~ c i a J
training in the use of the new amphibious
vehicles; of h:aining Transportation 'Corps
companies and officers to run the island ports
after the islands themselves had been invaded
and occupied; and of performing the many
thousands of other service details involved in
helping assemble the greatest armadas in
history for the initial offensives which even
tually would lead to the greatest of all-the
invasion of the Japanese mainland. At that
time, Japan looked a long and weary way off.
But, to quote an old Chinese provel'b, U a single
step starts a thousand mile journey"-and we
were about to take the first step.
Initially, the following functions were as
signlld 'to the Army Port and Service Com
mand in SUpP01t of the Gilbert and Marshall
invasions:
To receive and ship the Army supplies re
quired for the operations.
To select, equip, and train th" Transporta
tion Corps personnel scheduled to participate
in the operations.
To contact all Army units participating in
the Gilbert and Marshall Islands assaults.
and to acquaint them with the sel'vices to be
furnished by the Army Port anrl Service
Command of the different phases. of the
assault.
To screen all palletizing, packing, and crat
ing material lequests.
To establish a priority alllong units and
to furnish logistical data and pl'actical sug
gestions to inexperienced units.
To supervise and coordinate all palletizing
activities.
To coordinate traffic control from staging
areas to the troop ships.
To maintain constant security of equipment
and supplies.
To provide adequate facilities for billeting'
and trail)ing, within the Hawaiian Area, and
to provide for their maintenance and upkeep.
The initial planning' by the new Command
for the Gilbert and Marshall Islands inva
sions began simultaneously with, its designa
.tion as a major echelon of what was then
Headquarters, 'United Statlls Army Forces':'
Central Pacific' Area, formerly the Hawaiian,
Department. It followed that the success of'
this first great offensive would depend to no
small degree upon the manner and speed with
which the new echelon could prepare itself
for the enormous jobs of handling an amount
of cargo and personnel heretofore unequaled
by the Port of Honolulu-of making' plans for
the vast building program which of necessity,
had to be undertaken to shelter incoming and
outgoing personnel-of preparing new train
ing camps which had to be activated; and of
taking care of the tremendous amounts of
supplies of all sorts which had to be received,
stored, loaded, and dispatched. All these jobs
the young command had to accomplish with
out halting the normal flow of cargo which
had to be handled through the Pbrt of Hono
lulu.
Even in peacetime the normal port load of
Honolulu was large because the Hawaiian Is
lands, not being self-sufficient, must import
from the mainland and elsewhere virtually
all food, clothing, building materials, petro
leum products, etc., which are needed to main
tain thcl population of the eig'ht inhabited
major islands of the gTOUp. The demands and
requirements of the local populace had not
<It'Cl cased, early in the autumn of In4:1, hut
rathel' were increasing daily with the advent
of thousands of civilian war worKers imported
from the mainland to work on military and
naval projects. The new organization, during
the preparation for the invasion of the Gil
berts and :\larshalls, handled a tJ'emendous
tonnage of incoming carg'o from the main
land, much of which was destined for the
island assaults. In order to handle this huge
tonnage, the organization establisherl within
its own framework a Command g}'OUP for the
over-all_ supervision of military stevedores.
This unit, a provisional organization, was
designated the Port Group and 'it handled all
the training, administration; and allocation
of military stevedores. From its inception the,
Port Group proved invaluable for control,
particularly when the ever-heavy port re
quired twenty-four hour, operation of the
piers.
ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND IN lIAVIAll
1'7
COllCUl'l'ent with this grouping of port com
panies was the development and the carl'ying'
out of a training program which was destgned
to increase the training and skills of all per
sonnel participating in the invasions in the
art of discharging and loading ships. The
most noteworthy feature of this pl'og'ram was
the planning, establishment, an(I operation of
a Quartermaster [TQ:vI] School,
situated in the heart of Honolulu. At this
school, selected teams of one officer and two
enlisted men representing the assault and
garrison units were trained in the duties and
functions of a TQM. The school, which in its
first year and a half has graduated nearly
1,000 TQM teams-3,000 officers and enlisted
men-matriculated foul' classes during the
preparation for the Gilbert and Marshall
operations. Classes were--and still are-con
vened at the call of the task force command
ers. The objective of the TQM School was
to train inexperienced personnel in the prin
ciples and practices of combat and garrison
loading. At first, textbooks were scarcely used.
Later, the school published the Transport
Quartermaster Manual embodying the knowl
edge gained in this field through experience,
The TQM teams contiimed to spend most of
their time studying actual loading' and stow
inp; and discharp;ing operations in the always
bu&y Port of Honolulu.
The Gilberts and Marshalls were seized and
occupied-plans for future operations were
already off the blueprint board and into
operation.
Many lessons were leamed from the Gilbert
and Marshall invasions. In order to show
diagrammatically the changes which occurred
i'll the organizational structure of the Army
Port and Service Command the period
which extended from the planning stages of
the operations to their subsequent completion,
two illustrations are offered (Figures 1
and.2).
For a long time it has been obvious that
the peacetime facilities of Honolulu harbor
would be far from sufficient for receiving and
dispatching the unprecedented volume of war
,time cargo which would stream across her
thirty-one piers. Army engineers in the early
, !'
of 1943 began the great task of
deepening and widening the chanMI and of
constructing additional piers. (By early 1945,
these piers were capable of handling an al
most unbelievable iQcrease in tonnage,) This
building and reconstruction was going on at
, full speed throughout the period of prepara
tions incident to the larger and more west
ward Invasions which were being geared into
operation.
Following the successful completion of the
Gilbert-Marshall Islands campaigns, strategy
dictated a bypassing of the remaining Japa
J;ese-held ,islands in the centl'al Carolines. Our
next target would be only 1,200 miles from
the home islands of Japan-the Marianas.
Initial planning for the Marianas began early
in 1944. By now the Army Port and Service
Command had proved itself an indispensable
element in the Central Pacific Area Com
mand's progress toward the Japanese
land. SOP's were now shaping up. The mis
sion remained the same.
In the planning stage of the preparations
for the assault of the Marianas, it was neces
sary to determine the approximate amount
of tonnage which would have to be handled
in order to determine the number of port
and DUKW companies required. In deter
J'nining the number of port and DUKW com
panies, studies were made of the Marianas
Islands' port and harbor facilities. When
plans for the employment of the 27th and
77th Divisions were known, processing space,
work carriers, stowage space, palletizing, and
billeting facilities of working details were
assigned at Fort Kamehameha, a military
post near Peal'l Harbor. Preparations for the
campaign consisted of clearing Honolulu piers
of all vehicles and of all cargo in traffic lanes
for the embarkation of troops; or' arranging
for escorts to direct convoys into the piers;
of designating assembly points within the
piers to aid the embarking troops in boarding
vessels without delays or confusion; and of
posting security guards within the piers to
prevent pilferage or mishandling of equip
:ment and supplies (one of the lessons learned,
in the previous operation).
As before, during the preparation and sup
ORGANIZATION ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND
Executiv" OMG
Cargo & P""""nger
Control
Srnri"lticg Rr
Fiscal Dr
OfT St,"rvicf' Br
Linison
Navy
Joint
. Logistical BoaJ'd
War Shipping
AdmullslratlOu
' ....gond
Chan";:? (down)
- _ - - - - _Routlnf'
Tn" Commanding Officpr or each division or section
funC'tlOns also as a spt'l'lai staff o-lficer in addition to hja
olhpr dutu';'i.
ORGANIZATION ARMY PORT AND SERViCE COMMAND
_____ _ -.!-I!LS)!!.- ___ --.
COMMANDING GENERAL

I
________________ ____J

:;;;
EFOFSTA F Llal!'iOn to
Ports or EmbarkatIOn

rn

L-------J...---r--.L.-- ____
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
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I-f'gE'nd
1...:.---1 Z
---Command Chanrwl


20
MILITARY REVIEW
port of the Marianas assault, the normal 'flow
of cal'g() through the Port of Honolulu, was
not interrupted. Stevedores, both military and
civilian, were still working 'round-the-clock
shifts as established prior to the Gilbert and
Marshall assaults, Transportation of a'Ssault
forces from staging areas to piers was ar
ranged by the Army Port and Service Com
mand, which also was charged with the
responsibility of maintaining liaison with
garrison "forct's and of informing the operat
ing agenci('$ of personel allocations, <'mbar
kation sch('dules, and any changes in basic
plans.
All paeking', crating', and palletizing ma
terials for the 27th and 77th Infantry Divi
sions, together with those for the three gar
rison forces, were screened by the Command.
To eliminate errors by the using' troops in
submitting' supply requisitions amI to CO.
ordinate all packing', crating', and palletizing
operations, an SOP on these methods was
prepared and issue,l by the Command.
Space does not permit a description of the
many details which were taken care of by
the Command in this opcl'3tion. It trained
many participating troops in military as well
as stevedoring and amphibious subjects; it
trained Transport Quartermaster teams for
all units with the exception of the 27th
Division; it moved more than 25,000 men to
and from the staging areas; it handled a
truly staggering amount of coordination in
volving the billeting, movement, and em
barkation of troops. In brief, an organization
which was, militarily speaking, without a
counterpart but born of necessity, had proved
itself of immense value to the over-all plan
of conquest in the Pacific.
III
Within a matter of months the Gilberts,
Marshalls, and Marianas had been invaded
and secured. Shortly after the echo of enemy
guns on these islands had faded, the Army
Port and Service Command was given plans
ror the invasion of the Palau Group islands
of Angaur and Peleliu and of Yap, in the
'Western Carolines. The Command had now
assed throu h what mi ht be termed the
adolescent period and was able 'to function ,
with the ease and adaptability which comes
only from experience. Consequently, when
strategy dictated that Yap, the largest of the
three targets, was to be bypassed and the
troops initially designated for the opera.;,ion
were to be used instead for the contemplatpd
conquest of Leyte Island in the Philippines.
the change in plans cauRed no perturbation.
The diversion of troops from this theater to
the Southwest Pacific Areas command of
General Douglas ;\IacArthur was aCCOJll
plished smoothly and the change of target fIll'
those troops created no new problems.
Initial planning for the Palau invasion an,l
for the participation by troops from fhis arpa
in the Philippines campaign commenced in
June of 1944. Units designated for these two
actions were the XXIVth Corps, a ga1'l'ison
force and the 7th, S1gt, and 96th Infantry
Divisions. Basically the mission of Army Port
and Service Command waR the same as tho:-e
which had been assigned to it for the inva
sions of the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the
Marianas. But the tempo and Rcope of opel'l\
tions had multiplied enormously. Experimen
tal makeshiftR, the methods of trial and error
which circumstance had demanded in the be
ginning because there were no precedents to
go by, were now no longer required nor de
sired. The Command was on sound footing
now, Its officer and enlisted personnel were
old hands at the intricate and never routine
business of aRsisting the combat troops to
prepare for their primary misgion of killing
Japs.
The Command handled arrangements fo1'
the billeting spaces, headquarters, and trai n
ing facilities for the many thousands of men
from this area who were to take part in these
operations. It rendered invaluable aid in ob
taining for the units great quantities of ma
terials for palletizing, packing, and crating
the huge tonnages of supplies and equipment
that had to accompany both the assault and
the garrison echelons. Physical loading of the
task-force ships had to be performed by the
troops themselves, acting as stevedores-a
move dictated not only by. the shortage' of
trained stevedoring persot:\nel but; rinci
ACTIYITIES OF THE ARMY PORT AND SERVICE COMMAND IN HAWAII
pally, by realization that, troops would be
better able to discharge their ships in the
forward area if they had also dOll(' the load
ing; to. help these inexperienced stevC'dores
nver the shoals of t11l'i I' own lack of training
in loading and stowing, the Command loaned
the advisol'y services of trained tC'chnicians
fl'om the Port Group.
The Command's Transportation Division
helped provide the assault units with the all
important high-lifts and I'ollel' they
needed to their ships. For the movement
of cargo to the piers it prllvidC'd l,!lGl freight
cars of all kinds; for troop movement, 1,1311
cars; and for the hauling both of men all!1
cargo the Division furnished :?OSfl trucks.
On 11lOl'C than Dne th<.l
l;arrow-g'Ullgf> Oahu railway movl'<! 10,000
soldiers to the piers in a sing'le day.
The Conunan!1 was chaq.!'ed with and car
ried out the training of lhe Transportation
Corps units and the amphibian truck compan
ies scheduled to ]nlrticil'ate. The technical
training of stevedore:; re'1uirl'd, of
the help and of port company and
battalion personnel whORe major and simulta
neous responsibility was llloving' Army troops
and cargo across the piers of Honolulu ex
peditiously by the Rimply ;;taled but not 51>
simply executed method of loading and dis
charging ships as faRt as it is humanly pos
sible to do so. That our port offi<:ers and ell
iisted men accomplished their mi,sion of help
ing train outgoing units, and at the same time
kept the Port of Honolulu at or near the top
of the list of all the of the world in
rapidity of ship turn-around time, is .jndica
th:e of the soundness of the COlllmand's 01'
g'anization as well as of the efficiency and
loyalty of 'its personnel.
Of the divisions scheduled to take part in
the operations, only the 7th-veterans of Attu
and the Marshalls-had men experienced in
Transport Quartermastel' work. TQM's of the
XXIVth Corps' included personnel who had
served 'as observers during previous assault
landings. But the ganison units and the 8bt
and 96th Divisions especially needed help in
readying their TQM sections for their first
combat operations. To them the
rendered great assistance through the medium
of its by now veteran TQM School. For the
school, 'too, had benefited greatly by the
pcrience of previotis operations. Its files of
spips' characteristics and stowage plans
now covered many of the vcssels that were
,chedule to cmbark for Palau and the Philip
pines. At school the TQM teams learned not
how to load a theoretical ship with theoretical'
cargo but were given practical instruction,
based on practical lessons actually tested
under actual conditions by other TQM teams
aboard vessels that soon were to be loaded
under the direction of the students. After
graduation from school, the TQM teams re
joined their units. When they found out to
what vessels they would be aSSigned for em
barkation, the team members returned to
school for a comprehensive and detailed re
view of the characteristics and stowage pos
sibilities of their ships and for direct assist
ance in preparing- a workable plan.
In these and in many other ways a very
high degree of service was rendered to the
embarking troops. For essentially, renclering
service is the One :\lission of the
Command.
IV
The success of preparations for a military
,operation can be determined only by the
eventual outcome of battle. Modern warfare
is too vast and too complicated for one man
to understand and appraise all of
its minor but vastly important details,
ticularly when they are component parts of
an operation as far-flung as that against the
Philippines. The fact that it used troops from
two theaters, that planning was going on
simultaneously in places many thousands of
miles apart, and that the coordination under
the brilliant leadership of General MacArthur'
of all the diverse and scattered pieces of the
master plan had to ,be completed by persons
who in many instances llever saw one an
other, emphasizes one conclusion above all
others: success of the over-all plan of battle
is dependent upon the skilled planning and
execution by all echelons of all of the com-'
ponent parts of that plan, however secondary
they may seem. '
MILITARY REVIEW
In' a war as gigantic as the present one,
the relative importance of an echelon such
as the Army Port and Service Command is
not to be exaggerated. is it to be depre
ciated, for not even the magnitude of the
present conflict has refuted the truth of the
ancient adage that "for want of a nail, the
war was lost." This is especially tl'n,e in the'
Pacific, where the great distances across
which the men and materi;ls of war ,must be
transported serve to m:eentuate the, import-
I
ance of I!aeh link in the chain. When our
troops set foot on the j'inviolable" soil of
Japan's home islands, they will have done
so because they were transported there and
supplied there by a mighty lifeline of ships,
extending for thousands of miles behind
them. Because of the existence along the way
of such organizations as the Army Port and
Service Command, that line will not be
broken.
Germany's Third Secret Weapon
From a British source.
A site of Genllllll\,'R third Reeret
weapon at t;ear 'Calais was de
siglJe<l tv Ill'" a l'(lntinuotlR ,lrellm of roeket
shells on Londo!!. The in:<tnln!l'nts were to
be fifty slllotlth-hu!'e ,,'Ull barrels, eaeh -100
feet long', "utlk :1;;0 fet'l inlo the chalk hilb
at an atl'.!k of aLIIlIt 1ifty-t'ivl' dl'gTl'l'S.
The plm'l'lllelltR fill' lll(' band, had been
arranged in t\"O oj' twenty-five each,
both tmillc.l un Londnn ninety-five miles
away. If they had {'vcr bel'n cOlllpleted they
probably wt)uld h:l\,c rained roeket shells on
London ut the rate of ten pCl' minute,
no llmmunititln was found, it is
estimated that the shells would have weighed
120 pounds with a explosive war
head. Apparently they would have been car
ried to the guns on the standard-c;auge rail
way which had been built up to the site and
into the chalk hill through a tunnel 700 yards
long.
The tunnel is solid concrete thirty feet
high and twenly-th'e feet across and has an
unloading platform inside the hill. Hunning
off from the platform are chmllbel's an(1 gal
leries. Small tunnels run at a lower level. The
whole ,installation is Jllotected by concrete
eighteen feet thick covering several acres. If
the work had been completed, they would
probably have been invulnerable to any bomb
introduced.
Parts were found on the site for building
a lift. Outside of the entranee into the hill is
a -i,OOO-kilowatt electric also en
closed in a concrete structure.
The whole business was being constructed
by the Todt Organization with slave labor,
It is only one of seven large-scale sites that
were under construction along the French
coast. Others were at \Vizel'nes, \Vatten, Lot
t ing'hclll, Sirllcoul't. Sottevaast, :'IIartinvaast,
and on the Cherbourg Peninsula, All were de
sig-ned for different purposes, and all were
uncompleted, The construction at \Vizel'l1es
suggests that it was intended for still an
other kind of secret weapon.
It appears that the pl'oposed German tac
tics relied on keeping the civilian
services of London so swamped with V-I and
V-2 that they would be unable to cope with
V-3. They hoped the disorganization of the
metropolis would then have become so com
plete that London, the administrative center
of the British war effort, would have had to
be abandoned.
Constant heavy bombing' by the RAF
slowed up the work until, in the summer of
1944, the Germans aban\loned the, work on
the sites shortly after the Allied landings in,
Normandy. "
Iwo Jima and Amphibious Operations in'the
Central Pacific '
COLONEL GEORGE M"HARVEY, Staff COI']JR
The authol' was /ol1nerly an ill
structOl' at the' Command and General
Staff School fmd has been a membel' 0/
a Joint Amphibious Staff in the Central
Pacific Area /01' the past eighteen 1I10nths.
-THE EDITOR.
T
HE attack 011 Pearl Harbor, 7 Decem
ber 1941, was the opening of a new
period for the armed forces of the United
States.
The attack not only marked the break be
tween the .Japanese empire and the United
States but it was the bep:innillg of the de
velopment of a relatively unexplored field of
opt'ratiolls-that of amphibious warfare,
It is true that the i\Ia!',ine Corps for
have made a specialty of training for such
type of operations. However, the size of the
Corps was relatively small and the' Anny
suddenly awakened to the need fOl' amphibi
ous doctrines, tactics, and training- facilities.
Few realize how little was known of amphibi
ous operntions and how unprepared the
States was for the war in the Pacific.
It tvas apparent from the very beginning
that we must move step by step across great
distances, destroy the enemy-held bases, and
adapt them to our use, before we could reach
the Empire. Some enemy strongholds such as
Wake, 'Yap, and Truk could be bypassed, but
it was evident that other positions must be se
cured-secured not only for fhe operations of
our fleet but also for air bases from which we
could protect ou! CQnvoys and fro)n which we
could strike enemy positions to the west and
eventually the Empire itself. This has been
accomplished. Step by step we have taken the
Gilberts, the Marghalls, the Marianas, and
finally th(' innl'r ring of the enemy defenses
at Iwo. Jima.
It has been a slow, tedious process against
difficulties never before encountered by the
armed forces. Only through a complete under
standing of the capabilities and l'imitations
of the other services, and- by the clQse co-
Qperation by the Arm,', Navy, ant! 'Marines,
, have these successes been accom]llished.
We, have been >"orkillg against time and
unknown The vast distan<:es have
made supply and resupply difficult.
Reefs, something we knew existed but of
which we had little information, made Ialllling
opel'ations Illost hazardous. Information 011
enemy land defenses was mcal-!:er. Equipment
for amphibious operations was 110t available
and that which we had required modification
and improvement. The armed fQrces in the'
Centml Pat'ific A rca startell from scratch on
7 December 1!l41 amI since that time they
have I]cveloped th<:> present metholls used in
amphibious warfare.
The initial operation, ill this area, was
against the enemy-held Gilbelt Islands. 'Ve
knew the enemy resistance' would be strong',
and it was. The reefs surrounding the islands
were difficult to traverse and the defenses
ashore withstood what we thoug'ht then was
an adequate air anll naval bOlllbardment. 'Ye
learned many things on this operation that
proved invaluable in subsequent strikes. As
we progressed through the l\! a rshalls and
the Marianas, we made ,furthel' progress in
developing amphibious tactics and applied the
lessons learned to subsequent operations.
Shortly after the conclusiol) of the Mari
anas Operation, in which the first enemr-held
territory was wrested from his control, di
rectives were received to prepare plans for
the assault on Iwo Jima.
You may ask, "'Why was the opemtion so.
difficult ?"
It was difficult for many rea,ons. l\\'o J ima
is approximately eight miles square, 750 miles
frQm Tokyo, and 3,400 miles froll! Pearl
Harbor. The island is of voleanie origin and
little authentic information was available on
the beaches or 011 'the island itself. This small
outpost under the control of the J apa
nese Empire in 1897 and has been considered.
by them for years as one of their strategic,
defenses. The enemy spent years in preparing
24
MILITARY REVIEW'
the defense of this island, and while strenzth
'ening this base care waH taken to insure that
,information of their activity was not divll]gP(1.
A sip;n on the l'dge of Airt1plrl 1, date(]
1937, bore a waming in both Eng'li,;h aIHI
Japanese, "This is a military in"tallation and
no trespassing will be ])ermitted,"
The island is SlIlT0l111ded by (lee]) water ant!
no harbor exist::; in its shol'elillc, I{eef",
usually st1l'l'ountiinp: the ill the Cell
tral Pacific, were found here Jonly otf the
westerll bcadles, The g'ra<iient at the water'x
edge is very steep, allt! the amI the al'('
inland is l'overl'<! with a V,}!canic dlldl'r 01' ash
which makes movement, "ven b,,' rnot. Illost
difficult, The terrain f:lethel' inland is rllg'ged
and reminds one somewhat of the badlan'h
of, Arizona, '
The defellse s,,'sH'm, as jll'eparl'd II,,' ilw
enelnYt quite lntl"ieate. h\"
han.l, in .Iepth, well ealHoutlagl'd, and llllt
tually a vl'ritahll' Gihraltar
rounded by the moat in the world,
Prepal'alil1n for the "ei7.llre of the island
was started lllonths prior to the actual land
ing, Lan.l-based Army Ail' Ftll'ee plan(,H
bombe.1 the target on days for
a period of ovel' two an,1 a half months, 1\aval
ships :mtl alul canier uirforce,
struck the i;;lllnd, f()l' three dn,,''; tHio}' to tlw
landing, with the lllost bombardment
ever delivered on all objedi\'e in the Centl"ll
Pacific,
The V Amphibiou,; i\larine COl'l's (reiu
forced), in conjunction with naval attack
forces, was with the mis,ion of at
'tacking', occupying, and .Iefendimr fwo Jima,
The COl'jls Operation Plan calle.1 for the ImHl
ing of two i\larine divisions in the assault,
on the southeastern beach('s, with one :\Iarine
division in Expe(litionary Troop,; Reserve
afloat, The general plan of maneuver provided
for the landing of the assault divisions
abreast with two regimental combat teams
of each: division in line, Upon landin:.(', the
were to drive westward across the
island, and, pivoting on the corps right tl.ltnk,
turn north to ;eize the 0-1 line (see map)
their respective zone$ of action; then,
on corps orders, to advance rapidly and seile
the 0-2 line, Th" right (IHlrth} division was
to Ill'Oil'et till' right (nOl'thealit) tl.ank of thl'
The IL;rt (south) division' was to ehl
pIc):>' kft regimental combat teal\l to seize
(hat pOl'linll "I' tIl!' bland in it" zone of action
south oj' the 0-1 lilll'. mUlldy, the Mount
Smihu\'hi area, Both divisions Wet'l' to bl' pl'e
PU! cd to eXl'('ute further advances on corp"
('1,,1\>1' to th" nOl,tll ll<'yont! tIll' 0-2 line, Th(,
Dh bion was to n.llHtin' afloat and
y. ,IS to he cmpl"ye.{ if ant! when
The landing' was etrected at ODOO, 1 H Feb,
luary, by the 4th and 5th :'IIal'il1L' Division"
with the 4th :'IIurine Division on the right
(llorth), Troops, ,,,upplieli, and equipment
were landed fl'<lm tnlllsports, LS:\I's and
l.SD'" llsing' 1.\''1''-, nUKW'", awl -small
jmats,
The initial lnnding' \\'t(\'es met onl:,; light
"pp""itioll tn their imme,liate front. Thi"
lllay be attribute,l to th" fad that the naval
gUlll!I'e an,] ail' homhardn1l'llt, both heron'
the landing and durin!.!' tht' HPPl'Llach across
the beaches, couplc<1 with the tire power of
tl", small"l' ('raft ,juring th\' Hpproaeh,
ha<l reduced the installations, 01'
had olhCl'wise pinned clown the enemy, How
evcl', artillel'Y. mOl't:Il', and heavy
fire soon develope.1 on the beaches, on th"
boat lalles, and in the LST area from stl'Ongly
defended jl",;itinns on the high l!'l'ound to the
flanks and intel'ior of the island, CasuaItie;;
1<1 personnel and material bel.(an to
Oppo,itioll was "tl'ollg to the front of the 4th
Marine Division as they ern;;se.! the open and
,te,'p ...Iopes to Airtl,'ld 1 an.1
\\'ere TIl(' 5th i.\!arine Division ad
vance\! rnj1i<lly across the island ag'Hinst light
opposition an,l capturl',l the southern end of
Airlidd :-':0, 1. RCT (Regimental Combat
1''',lIn) on the left flank moving' to th('
south was held up by strong enemy positions
and l!'unfire from :'Ilount SUrihHChi. By 18QO,
I{eT's 23 Hnd 25 of the 4th :'IIarine Division,
RCT's 27 and 28 of the 5th Marine Division,
and two battalions of ReT 26 in 5th :\Tat'ine
Division reserve had landed, Two tank bat
talions, fOll!' battalions vf and some
assault, supplies were also ashol'e, The end
of th" first day found OUl' troops holding' all
IWO .11MA ANn AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAl, PACIFIC
'.
'0,..,
(
IWO JIMA
Periodic Front Lines
R..II
o ~ IMi
11"
' ~ I ......,..J,............LI.......~ - ' - ' ,
~ ...L.L,.J..'.....1'....' ... , ...... , .J..'"i,!-____..ir Km.
0..' , , I,0..l'O_O , ......""?0J.,' o.'.J..'.J..,... ___...,;';,oc;OO Yds.
MlLITARY REVIEW
of the area between the eastern beaches and
<Airfield No.1, the southern tip of this field,
west to the coast line and south to the foot of
Mount Suribachi. '
Naval vessels and carrier-based aircraft
continued their scheduled bombardment; ex
cept that due to the very sb'ong defenses,
heavier concentl'ations were fired against the
enemy i?;un and tl'OOP positions on the east
ern part of the island than was originally
scheduled.
Heavy oretll'l'ell to tanks, LVT's,
and DUKW's during- ant! following the land
ing-s. due to soft sand, beach conditions, allll
artillery and 1111>1'(a1' fire.
The steep g-mdient ami the soft \'olcanic
cinders of the eastel'll beaches cnabled a very
moderate surf to pl'P"ent a continuous hazard
to thc beachin!!; anll unl<latlin),!; of all types of
lalHling' craft. Craft which could n(wmally
beach were bro,whl'd, anti the resultant wave
action shifted the soft >'an(ls, making- salva),!;e
most difficult. Beach ('onditions were unfa\'or
able i'm' the mtl\'emcnt of vehicoles :111(1 only
limited allltlllnts of nitical were
lande(1 Lhe fil';;t Due to a(lv('r>'e coondi
inill<li \\'l're Ian til''' Jlrinci
pally by DCKW'" and LVT's. the beach
was clearcli of small-arm fire, landing craft
were calleel in f,;r unloatling- anti nUlllCI'OUS
('raft broached awl werc lost. Unloading' was
lil1lit('d on thi, tlatl" anti during the major
part of the opcration, to LeT's, LSl\l's, amI
LST's.
By the evening of 20 February the beach
head was considered secured and all but the
northern tip of Airfiel,l No. 1 had been cap
tured. Seven battalions of divisional artillery
and one of corps artillery hacl been
landed by 21 February and were in
to SUPPOIt the assault.
As the attack advanced to the north it be
('ame evident that the cncm'y had no intention
of conducting a mobile defense but had com
mitted,' himself to an tllI-oub rigid defense
wherein eaeh tactical locality was to be <le
fended throughout the strongly fOltified de
fensive system. The real' areas and the
beaches were subjected to harassing and de
fir('s intermittently throughout the
operation by enemy artillery, mortars, and
rockets.
The rugged terrairl. inland made the pass
age of wheeled and b'acked vebicles most
difficult and rendered artillery gunfire in-'
effective. The enemy.held territory was strewn
with mines and booby traps, and was honey
combed with heavy buttressed pillboxes, block
houses, and caves, all of which were mutually
supporting' anci org'anized in depth.
The attack settled down to artillery, naval
gunfire, and air bombardment with slow pro
g'ress being made by the foot 1I'oOp5. It had
not been planned to employ the 3d Marine
Division, then in Expeditionary Troops Re
serve, if it could be avoided, but it became
apparent that additional troops were re
(wired. On 21 February ReT: 21 of the 3d
:llarine Division was lanlled, attached to the
4th :lfarine Division, and placed in corps l'e
serve. This RCT was released from corps
reserve anq entered the line on 23 February
on the left of the 4th :lIarine Division zone
of action. ,
RCT 28 (5th Marine Division) had con
tinueci the of Mount Suribachi area
,inel' Dog' Day, anci at 10:35, 23 February, se
eured the crater and the national colors
on its hig'hest peak. One battalion of RCT
was Idt to ch'al' out this at'ea and the> remain
d(,l' of the> r('g-inlC'nt was placed in corps
n'serve. The Commanding General, V Amphi.
bious Corps, assumed command ashore 240955.
The 8d :lIarine Division, less RCT 3 and RCT
21. was released from Expeditionary Troops
Reserve to the V Amphibious Corps and wag
assigned the zone of action then held by ReT
21. The 3d Marine Division, less RCT 21 and
ReT 3, landed 24 February. The Commanding
General, 3d Marine Division, assumed C0111
mand ashore 241530.
Garrison troops began landing as soon as
the beach was cleared of assault troops, and
started base development work. The engineel's
completed a fighter strip on Airfield No, 1
on 26 February, and at 1005 two ()y' ob;;erva
tion planes landed, the first United States
planes to operate from, Iwo Jil11a.
Many enemy defense installations and I
had been destroyed, but sporadiC
J
27 IWO JIMA AND AMPHInIOUS OPERA'l'IONS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC
'nHlrtar, rocket, and artillcry fire continued to
fall on thc beaches, on Airfield No, 1, and in
the l'eal' areas. Garrison trool)s in the asgault
echelons assisted in the de\'elopment of the
beaches and roads. The Artil
lery Group prodded air wuming service and
antiaircraft for the airfield anci
b('uches.
By 26 February approximately one-half of
the island was in our handg. Our lines were
generally from the north edge of the East
Boat Basin to i\!inami and nOlthwest along'
the line indicated on the map 1'01' that date.
Ail' strikes wer{' made daily since Dog
minus Three on Chichi and Haha Jima
[approximately 150 miles north of Two .Jima],
neutralizing enemy installations that coul,\
have intel'ft'recl With the lal1(ling
on Iwo. Army B-24 planes made nightly
harassing strikes on the sallle targets, further
hindering the enemy activities. Several ail'
attacks were ma,je by the enemy' on the as
sault shipping in the area, which effected only
slight damage.
A seaplane base was established on 27
February, and on 28 February the first sea
plane searches were flown. A 4,000-foot air
strip was completed 'on 2 March and was an
nounced serviceable for the landing of larg('
aircraft. Air evacuation of casualties to Guam
was commenced on :l March and continued
until the completion of the operation.
The troop advances weakened the complex
enemy defense system, restricted their ma
neuver area, and destroyed many of their mo
bile weapons. Enemy counterattacks were the
exception rather than the rule. Nevel' did the
enemy counterattack here in force as they did
in ,the Marianas Operation. Few enemy dead
were encountered until late in the' operation
and little enemy material and equipment was
captured. The enemy cleared afl
areas as they withdrew to the north.
The advance to the north continued slowly
under pressure of daily attacks of three di
visions abreast, and on 2 March approxi
mately two-thirds of the islam] was within
our front lines. Airfields No. 2 and 3 were
in our hands and the high ground in their
vicinity gave the troops observation over the
remaining ellemy-held territory. Frequent
Rhifts of front-line battalions pl'ovid,ed the
maximum relief for personllel. The 4th Marine
Division advance was deterred fOI' eight days
by most difficult terrain and a stubborn center
of resistance 200 vm'ds west of :!linalili in
theil' front. The 3d )\J arine Division pushed
forward over more favorable terrain on 28
February and made, a penetration of the
enemy's line of in the vidnity, of
l.\1otoyama. The 3d :rnd 5th Marine Divisjon
pushed to the nO! tb for several
days and by 4 March had extended their lines
. to the southern edge of Kit" and to within
1,000 yards of the northeast coast. The troops
were ordered to reorganize 5 March for an
all-out assault 6 March. This assault pro
duced only limited gains.
The final days of the assault compressed
the enemy into more restl'icted areas. Ad
vances were slow ag'ainst intense small-arms
fire from positions well located in rough ter
rain. Elements of the 3d Mal'ine Division
reached the beach on !) March, and on 11
March enemy forces were restricted to the
northeast end of the island and to !l small
pocket on the rig'ht fln:pk of the 4th Marine
Division . .steady but limited advances were
made agninst these areas of resistance, and
on 16 March the island was an
nounced as secured, all organized resistance
having ceased. Preparations had been made
for the evacuation of assault troops on the
completion of the operation and the 4th
Marine Division began reembarkation 16
March. .
During these last few days the assault de
veloped into hand-to-hand conflicts; each cave
and pillbox was taken by individual effort.
Tanks, artillery, and naval vessels placed
.gunfire on targ'cts that resisted troop assaplt
and aided in the reduction of the enemy.
The ground operations for the capture of
llvo Jima may be described in summation as
an attack 011 a fortified locality wherein the
island and its fortifications were one and the
same. It was' an attack against a series of
strongly organized positions, disposed in
depth, and breadth, so as to be mutually sup
porting all the way from the beach line
28
MILITARY REVIEW
through the main battle position. 'rhe defendel'
had out posted 'the main defl'nRivL' with
concrete emplacements, dugouts, caves, und
pillboxes. The main areas. were a veritable
mass of complex and intricate undel'ground
installations. The terrain by the very natm'e
of its its s(>ries of nlVines, (>s
<;arpments, hills, alHl rockB, was a decided
advantage to the defender and was used to
the fullest degree. The siting of hiR weapons
und his of the tel'l'ain were p:ood.
In spite of the fad that 1\\'0 Jim,! had been
subjected to seventy-two days of aerial bOI11
bardnlt'nt, to naval gunfirt' and air
prior 'to the initial landing' ami until the ('olll
pletion of 'the operation, and in spite of the
".
fact that we had artillery, ai'r, and heavy
'''eapon" ultimate reduction of the
island defenses wus brought about by assault
groups of foot soldiers overcoming each
strongpoint in turn. This smull islund. limited
in area, could not I1rovid,' maneuver space fat'
large bodies of troops. The island had to be
reduced by direct attal'k to
followed by loeal elimin'ltion uf small isolated
arcas.
The opel alion will go dO\\'n in history as
the in the histOl'y of the lVIariI1l'
Corps. A vietory hal'd won but worth its cost
in the furthel'fll1ce of the war against the
Empire,
Ad Astra
SUCH phenomena us changes in the earth's
magnetism and sun spots have a direct bear
ing on the bombing of cities und the torpedo
ing' of for affc'et the accuracy of
the navigation of ships and aircraft.
Thus the work of the astronomers at the
Royal Observatory is helping to place the
bombs and at the exact spots in
tended. For the astronOll1el'S, among other
things, record the variations in the
caused by chang'es in the earth's magnetism
and, once evel'y five years, complete a new set
of magnetie charts of the whole \\'ol'ld fOt'
navigators,
As the changes in the earth's magnetism
cannot be predicted accul'litely, continuous'
observations are needed for the constructi"n
of reliable charts,
Experts working in close contact with the
Admiralty and the Ail' Ministry are making
a continuous photographic record of' these
variations" The observations, whieh started
at the'> Royal Observatory in 18-10, were at
first made visually throughout the
foul' hours of each day, the introduetion
, of photography in 1848 made this painstaking'
method obsolete,
were fuund to be c\lnnedet! with the frequene,\'
of the appearalll'C of hUll spots. The Royal
Obsel'vatory, therefore, photographs the sun
eve I'.\' day, weather pel'mitting, and has done
so since 1873. On when the sun
is not visible in Brituin, photographs are ob
tained from the Observatorie, at the Cape of
Goot! Hope ami Ko.daikamttl, near l\Iadras,
Photographs of the sun are therefol'e usually
available for cvery day of the yeal\
The work has a vital beaI'ing on radio com
munication. For instance, a solar eruption or
tlare was found to be connected with bad
radio reception, especially short wave, which
sometimes suddenly fades out. It wus also
found thut solar flares are often followed by
a magnetic storm, which agitutes the compass
and upsets telephonl' and telegraph and radio
transmission.
The Observatory is therefore able to warn
I3ombel' Command when a magnetic storm is
likely to interfere with navigation and radio
communication. Such data is also helpful to
the Army for sUt'vey work. A magnetic chart
is used for gun-laying to ensure that the true
bearing of the gun can be determined from.
Certain changes in the earth's magnetism its compass bearing.
Artillery with an American Army in Europe
PREPARED BY BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES E. HART
Artillory Officer., U.S. Army
FOREWORD
By COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST U, S. ARMY
The flexibility and power of modern artillery is such that, if properly organized and
coordinated, it constitutes a formidable striking power continuously available to the
commandcr-a power, moreover, that may at any time be applied wide and deep over
the battle area at the. most locality. This broad statement applies to all field
forct's embracing the combined arms, be that force large or small. This has been
dt'monstrated time and again during .the long campaigns of the First U.S. Army in
Europe in 194445. For this reason, I commend the following article as being worthy
of careful reading by senior commanders and glmeral staff officers. Prior to joining
this Command in October 1943, the author, the Artillery Officer, First U.S. Army, served
as II Co,i'ps Artillery Officer throughout the campaigns in Tunisia and Sicily. General
Hart's words carry the authority of several years of intensive combat experience,
lsI Cour.tney H. Hodges
General, U. S. A.,
Commanding, First U,S. Army
T
HERE al'e many factors that con division (including the divisional artillery)
tribute to the combat of prior to the advent of large-scale operations,
the artillCl'y with a field army. Weapon for most officers, artillerymen as well as others',
weapon, OUI' materiel is the best in the world. had only very hazy ideas as regards the
Our communications are likewise superior. organization and employment of the mass
Further, the basic tactical and technical ar of non-divisional artillery required either by
tillery doctrine. as developed at the Field a corps or by an army. This direct statement
Artillery School and improved upon in the of fact reflects po criticism of any officer,
several theaters. has everywhere proved organization, 01' institution. It merey recog
sound in combat. However, the mere pos nizes the fact that the great administrative
session of fine weapons, excellent commu and training problems incident to the build
nications, and outstanding techniques for the ing of new divisions and new separate field
delivery of fire are not, of themselves, a
artillery groups and battalions in the early
guarantee of effective and timely artillery
years of the war served to monopolize the
support in battle. Of equal-if not even time and energy of artillerymen. Concurrent
greater-importance are the more nebulous with this development, active operations in
questions of organization and the achieve
the European Theater were initiated in
nient of adequate coordination within and North Africa. Those artillerymen serving
between the artillery staff echelons at army,
with non-divisional artillery-of which the
corps, and division level. It is with these writer was one-had to "learn their jobs
latter factors-artillery 'organization for
by the trial and error metho<V' to a con
combat and ai,tillery staff organization and siderable extent.
Rction-that this article primarily concerns Prior to turning to a of non
itself. ,Particular emphasis, moreover, is divisional artillery, it is desired to point
given to non-divisional artillery. This empha out that combat experience l).as shown the
sis is deemed important because, whereas need for an additional medium battalion or
all seasoned officers were familiar with the ganic with the infantry division and one of "
general organization and of the the same caliber for the armored division.
MILITARY REVIEW
This is an important because
the relative or "average" adequacy of the
divisional artillery is the basis upon which
the requirements for non-divisional
with an army must be ealeulate(l.
,AI.LOCATION AND ORGANIZATW:-: OF
A vAILABLE ARTILLERY
The artillery required by an army can be
determined only after careful consideration
of many interrelated factors-the army mis
sion, the character and defensive organiza- '
tion of the battle area, the quantity and
quality of the enemy artillery, the artillery
actually available, etc. In the case of the
cross-channel assault, the following' FiTst
Army requirement was set up:
Fo,' each of thrce corJls:
I FA Observation Battalion
3 FA Group Headquarters
2 I05-mm 1\12 Battalions
I 4.5-inch Gun Battalion ,
I
5 155-mm 1\11 Howitzer Battalions
2 155-mm 1\11 Gun Battalions
2 8-inch Howitzer Battalions
For each of three arm01'cd divisiolls:
I I05-mm 1\17 Howitzer Battalion
1 lu5-mm 1\112 Gun Battalion
In support of the army as a whole:
I FA Brigade Headquarters
2 FA Group Headquarters
3 240-mm Howitzer Battalions
2 8-inch Gun Battalions
With the above amounts and types of
artillery usually available to the First Army,
corps consisting of two or three infantry
and one armored divisions were able to al
leviate the shortage of general support with
in the divisions by the attachment of one
I55.mm'MI howitzer battalion per infantry
division and one I55-mm M12 gun battalion
per armored division. Also available for at
tachment to divisions, when required for
additional reinforcement, were the light and
armored battalions (M2 and M7). ,The re
mainder of the non-divisional artillery with
the corps was employed, depending upon the
situation at hand, all 01' in part under corpR
contlo!'
When support by the 240-ml1l howitzel'
and 8-inch g'un units was required for more
than one corpi" the field artillery brigade
of all or the major portion of
the heavy units listed above was given a
reinforcing mission under army control. This
method of employment places in the jm
mediate grasp of the' army commander a
formidable amount of effective support capa
ble of intervening over a zone of great width
and depth in conformity with the situation
confronting the army as a whole, For ex
ample, during the advances of First Army
toward the Hoer ancl Rhine Rivers, .long
mng-e interdiction and destruction missions,
fired on the appronches to and the crossings
themseh'es. were important deterrents to
reinforcement by enemy reserves, In the
operations to date the 240-mm howitzer and
8-inch gun calibers, when employed either
in the attached role or under army control,
have made a major coptribution toward the
sllccessful advances of First Army by well
planned interdiction fires on important points
de"p within the enemy lines, neutralization
and destruction of enemy batteries and in
stallations, and as necessary for reinforcing
the fires of corps and division artillery.
Flexibility should be the criterion through
out the entire structure of the artillery with
an army-not only flexibility of fires but
also flexibility of organization for combat,
Experience has shown that during rapidly
moving the bulk of the non-di
visional should be attached to the
divisions. whereas when progress is slower
or the situation becomes static, attachments
were usually limited to one light and one
medium battalion per division. For special
operations, such as the attack of the organ
ized defenses. of the Siegfried Line or' a
strongpoint established in a town, the at
tachment of a battery of 155-mm 1\1:12 gu'ns
to tlie attacking division has bel!n fOllnd 'to
be an effective employment.
81
ARTILLERY WITH I AMERICAN ARMY: IN EUROPE
,
It is believed that the original concept
of the field artillery group was too loose,
especially insofar as morale, personnel, sup
ply, and general administration were con
cerned. War Department CircuIar 4:19, 14
November 1944, corrertC'd this deficicncy by
making the group an adminbtrative as well
as tactical unit to which thl'C'e 01' fOUl' bat
talions will normally be aositmc(l. The receipt
of WD Circular 430, however. could not and
(id not alter the realities of combat cir
cumstances. In other \vol'ds, it ,vould have
been neither tactically sound nor physically
practicable to retain invariably the Ranle
battalions under the (lire('t and
operational amI/or administrative control of
the parent g-roup comnHlIlder. Notwithstand
ing". in the Fl'st Army eVl'ry ell'ort has bl'('n
made to maintain the integrity of what
became known as "norl1)al attachnlt'nts" to
each corps-namely, three field artillel'Y'
group headquarters and bat
teries, five battalions lii5-llIm howitzcl's. tWI)
battalions 155-mm guns, tWI> .battalions 8
inch howitzers, anel one battalion 4.ii-inch
howitzers. Only in U1lUSlHII eireum,tnnc(,R
were any of these "normal attachments"
detached from the corps; moreover, it was
more or leRs understood that, when the tac
tical situation required the detachment of
one or more of the "normal attachments,"
it was a temporary expedient only and that
the detached units would be reattached at
the earliest opportunity. As a result, each
corps developed a marked sense of responsi
bility for and interest in the "honnally at
tached" units, which made for improved
morale, administration, and operational effi
cieney. As a result of the experience of First
Army, one constructive criticism is made
with regard to WD Circular 430-it is con
sidered most regrettable that the fine old
military term "regiment" was not substituted
for "group" throughout. the circnlar.
The need for org'anizational flexibility ex
terlus down into the non-rlivbional ba,ttal,
ions themselYl's. of this in til<'
First Army experience was the re-equipment
of certain 105-mm howitzer tiattalions with
and the employment of captured enemy
weapons, 75-l11m pack BritiSh 25-
pounder cannon, and 4.5inch rocket launchers.
These expedients were motivated in the first
instance by a shortage of l05-mm howitzer
ammunition. However. the' experimentation
with . rockets is considered of unusual
intere"t, in view of what may be the future
l'ole of these weapons. In November 1944,
one light battalion was temporarily equipped
with s(>venty-five 4.5-inch rocket launchers
(T-27), trained in their use, and successfully
employed onl numerous occasions. Upon de
velopment of' the improved T-66 (twenty.four
tubes) rocket a require
ment' was s t up to provide one light non
t1ivi8ional b ttalion per corps with twenty
four each of these launchers as alternate
weapons for i use when area-drenching fires
are desired. Although much remains to be
learned of the organization and employment
of rockets. it is believed that there is, and
will be in the futUre, a' definite requirement
f<n' an inexpensive, easily manufactured,
"next-to-expendable" weapon capable of
placing a mass of fire on an area target.
The trucking activities of the artillery
with the First <=Army during the early autumn
of 1944 provide another iIIustra.l;ion of the
need for flexibility in organization. At this
time the First Army w!ls moving rapidly
across France and Belgium, with staggering
,upply lines 'more of a to its
continue!\ advance than enemy opposition.
During this difficult period, the Army Com
mander called upon the artillery to help
solve the gigantic supply problem. The 32d
Field Artillery Brigade Commander was
charged with this task and at one time
had a total of eighteen immobilized bat
talions of field artillery reorganized tem
porarily into provisional truck units and
engaged in hauling supplies for the army.
The fact that a total of some 28,000 tons
were moved over 32,000 miles of Western'
Europe. gives a measure of the assistance
lenderNl. Meanwhile, a sizable proportion
of the artillery with each of the several
corps was bolstering corps supply agencies
to the maximum.
<32 MILITARY REVIEW
STAF'FQRGANiZATION FOR THE COORDINATION
AND, CONTROL OF ARTILLERY
Command 'V8 A,tillelY (i.e., Coordination)
Channels.-A realistic appreciation of, dis
tinction between, and employment of artillery
channels of communication, coordination, and
control, as distinguished from command
channels, is essential to the effective control
and employment of the artillery with an
army. This is a delicate subject-that is,
the heavy black Ii'ne down the center of
the organization chart, which theoretically
is the sole link from commander to COln
mander. This writer disagrees with this
concept and feels that this difficult but ex
tremely important question has been in
adequately treated both in our field service
l'egulations and in the general and special
service schools. This is a stubborn problem
and one that turns about the
of the commanders and the staff officers
concerned. The solution can be evolved within
a given headguarters only by acknowledging
the existence of the problem, by frank dis
cussion, nnd. by a considerable amount of
trial-and-error experimentation in day-to-day
operation.
, The concept of the general staff is soun,l,
both in theory and in actual practice, This
discussion in no way challenges prin
ciple. However, it must be recognized that
the efficient and timely coordination and
control of the great maRS of artillery with
an army requires that there be strong ar
tillery channels up and down through the
army alongside the command channels, The
artillery channels do not bear the "move
the such-and-such battalion to so-and-so not
later than noon tomorrow" of comnlU
nication. Rather, the following sequence of
events might more properly take place. The
army artillery officer dete,'mines that a
I55-mm ho\vitzer hattalion should be shifted
from ope corps to another, Time permitting,
he would call the corps artillery commander
who is to lose the battalion and say: "1
feel that so-and-so needs another medium
battalion. I have not talked to G-3 as yet
but I am confident that he will concur. Let
me have your nomination of the required
type, by such-and-such a time; you will
receive the necessary confirmatol'y <orders
through G-3 channels." The corps artillery
commander might agree without protest,and
then advise the corps G-3 of the army's
intentions. In such Ii case, the pl'oblell! is
soon solved. G-3 concurrence is obtained,
orders are published, the army and corps
troop movement sections take over, and the
unit moves to the other corps. However, the
corps artillery commandel' may feel that
the release of the battalion would be un
sound from the corps viewpoint. In this case,
the corps artillery commander would un
questionably register a protest at the con
templated shift, inform the corps G-3 of
the army's intentions, and recommend that
the corps G-3 interpose an objection to the
army G-3. If the' issue were of sufficient
importance, such a case might be brought
to the attention of the army andlor C01'PS
chiefs of staff, or even thc commanders
themselves.
The foregoing illustration is of the most
ordinary, run-of-the-mill character, but it
illustrates the following fundamental aspects
of the problem under discussion:
II. The whole transaction between the army
artillery officer and corps a COlll
mander related to commllnd matters,
b. For all intents and purposes, the army
artillery officer made a cnmmand decision,
confident in his own mind that the army
G-3 (or chief of staff Ot' army commander,
if need be) would support his recommendation,
c. For all intents and purposes, the corps
commander made a NlIl1HW>ld dr
l'is iO>l , confident in his own mind that the
corps G-!"l (or chief of staff or corps com
mander. if need be) would support his r('c
ommcndation that the corps wO\lld or could
not spare the unit concerned.
d. The corps artillery commander obtained
the whole picture at the very direct
from his army artillery office,', thereby in
sul'ing the maximum possible time for, prior
planning both at corp" and by the battalion
concerned.
e. Mutual confidence and understanding
within and between the two vi'tal
WITH AN AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPF.
a:L
to operational efficiency-has been furthered.
t. The prerog'ativ(,s !\lHj of the
'general staff have not boen infringed upon.
By contrast, they have been strcngtheneo
by smooth-fUllctioning ;;tafi' action.
There al'e lltrong chlmnels of communica
tion, coordination, anrl control within the
artillery "'ith the A1'111Y, which are
busy lllany long hours each day handling
the myriad of operational, personn('l. supply,
intelligence, and other categories of business
e,lIltinually confl'Onting the arlllY artillery
otficel'. Although not a commander, he is
involved in COmnHtl1!j matters many times
each day. It is believed thnt it must evel'
be so if the artillery with an army is to
lendl'l' the powerful and continuous support
of which it is capable.
,htillCl'Y Cool'dinatiort leith the Ail' Forces.
-Just ns there is no ndequate guidance
"in the book" concerning the command vs
artillery channel relationship, so it is with
the artillery-ail' relationship. Anticipating
the necessity 1'01' a close working relation
ship between the artillery and the air forces,
the First Army Artillery Officer sought an
understanding early in the planning stage
for the crosschannel operation, with the
Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Com
mand [TAC], which was to support the
Firot Army. The Commnnding General, IX
T AC, returned this urge for n solid under
standing with compound interest. The result
'was a splendid spirit of mutual cooperation.
'To insure that full advantage w:b always
Itaken of the opportunities for artillery-air
'cooperation, one officer from the. Artillery
'Section (sec Organization Chart) known as
(Air) performed his duty at the Joint
Air-Ground Operations Center, IX TAG.
This officer was concerned pri'marily with
the coordination of counterflak artillery fires
and the adjustment of artillery fire by high
performance aircraft. Another officer in the
Section devoted a major portion
of his time to aerial photography with par
ticular attention to the development and
provision for gridded oblique photography
for artillery use. This required close co
ordination with one of the Recon
naissance Groups of the IX TAC. Being,'
work of a pioneer Cha'l'actel', ,a brief dis
cussion of each of these three expedients
is deemed appropriate.
The employment of high performance air.
craft to adjust artillery .fire (short title,
Arty/R) was developed iri order tO,provide
observed fires to the maximum range of
field artillery weapons. Prior to the Con
tinental assault, pilots were trained by class
room instruction, special service practice
periods, and participation in large-scale firing
maNeuvers. Major artillery headquarters,
were issued Ail' Force VHF radio equipment
in order that they might communicate with
the aircraft in flight. A member of the Army'
ArtjlJery Section was attached to the Head
quarters of the Tactical Air Command for
the purpose of processing requests for Arty/R
missions. As the pilots' increased
with experience, effectiveness of artillery fii'e
increased materially. Pilots had little' diffi
culty in handling all types of artillery -fires.
They proV<'d particularly adept ,in firing for
clesh uetion on pinpoint targets-probably
the mo,;t difficult type of artillery fire. Ar
tillery prisoners of war have stated that
they were ordered not to fire when American
fighter type aircraft were in the ncar vicinity
for fear of the retaliatory fire which the
aircraft might brillg' to bear upon them. The
soundness of this operational procedure is
testified to by a total of 419 targets success
attacked over a period of nine months.
Counterflak artillery fire is, as the name
implies, fire delivered for the soJe purpose
of neutmlizing the enemy antiaircraft artil
lery. Initially, these fires were conceived only
for the protection of large "ca'rpet" bomb
ings but were later extended to the point
that practically all close-in air activity on
the army front was furnished this protection.
This counterflak support was extrem,ely suc
cessful. The Air 1>'o1'ce has been able to
carry out low and medium altitude attacks
over areas so heavily defended by flak as
to preclude the attack were it not for care
fully planned counterflak fires. The Air Force
has rendered enthusiastic cooperation in this
development.
MILITARY REVIEW
The purpose of gridded oblique photo
.graphs was to provide a Himple an.l rapi,]
method of obtaining' initial ,latH thHt wO\lld
result in accurate fireR without thl'
loss of surprise attendartt to difficult and
time-colUmming adjustments. PriOl' to tl1l'
assault, g('hools were held for ail' 01'('(',
engineet', and field artillery personnel in the
preparation, processing', and use of gri<lded
oblique photographs, It was found that 011
many occasions visibility wns such as to
prevent high-altitude vertical photography
but not so restrictive as to prevent the taking
of low obliques, Not only has this photography
been used. by field artillery in preparation
of initial firing data but is has pI'oved valu
able fOl' photo interpretation, aerial recon
naisance, and hag hrcome 111tlC'h in .\{('man,1 by
the infantry,
The Army AI,tilk,,!! Sf'cfillll,-A nl'wly ap
pointed army artillery ofllcer will find no
adequate guidance in official
concerning his functions. This is not neces
sarily unfortunate. An is a very great
organization, with telTitorial, tactical, and
administrative functions. Further, our armies
vary widely in size, composition, and the
over-all character of their missions.
In view of this, it is douhtful whdhcr a
detailed listing of the functions and duties
of an army artillery officer would serve any
useful purpose, Rathel', it is fl:lt that an
army artillery officer should, within the lati
tude allowed him hy his commandcr, mold
his section to fit the army mission. Regard
less of all else, he will not go wrong jf he
sets the following as his task:
a. To advise the commander concel'l1ing
the employment of the artmery with the
army.
b. To anticilJate difficulty in the imple
mentation of decisions taken, and to help
tke troops solve the resultant pl'obiems.
As is indicated by the italics, the second
function is of oveniding importance. It should
be burned indelibly into the consciousness
.. of every officer and enlisted man in an army
section.
The function of advising the commander
is very broad in its scope and involves a
good deal J1)ore than the preparation of
tillery annexes tn field orflerfol and the arlllY
Ilrtill('ry offi('('I"s pPI'snnal relationship to his
"Oll1mander. Since an al'my commander' is
('ontinuully gathpI'ing advice anrl counHel
{'I'om his genet'al and special staff offiecl's,
it is of first importance that the army at
tillel'Y officerl1laintain daily personal liaisoil
with certain people. These should include
the army commander himself, the chief of
staff, G-a, G-2, and G-4, This is an essential
part of the artillery officer's function of
"advising the commander," and serves two
-interrelated purposes: first, to keep the arlllY
artillery officel' continuously aware of the
plans being evolved by these critically im
portant people; and second, to keep these
same people "artillery minded." Despite the
vital part that artillery has played in all
military operations the world over, it is a
curious ,fact that, unless commanders and
general staff officers are first made artillery
minded" and kept so thereafter. these offi
cers are apt to forg'et the artillery in the
pressure of other business. This tendency
is entirely unintentional but nevertheless
true in many instances.
A fundamental and inherent characteristic
of warfare, and one sometimes not adequately
recognized, is the fact that in battle the
most carefully prepared plans do not always
work out as planned, ';rhis will inevitably
be the case until some distant. day when
machines entirely replace human beings on
the battlefield, The point is that an army
artillery officer, like any other staff officer,
must plan for trouble, look for trouble, and
do something right now about the trouble
he finds. This is the foundation on which
mutual confidence between the troops and
the staff is built. There are few things more
iml>ortant in the art of warfare.
A functional chart showing the organiza
tion of the First Army Artillery Section
is given on page 35,
The Corps Artillery Commander.-The
. corps artillery commander functions in a
dual role, both as commander and staff offi
cer. He commands the corps artillery, both'
Wl'rH AN AMERICAN ARMY IN F,UROPF;'
ORGANIZATIOX CHART
FIRST ARMY ART1LLElIY S);;C'flQ.:-I
'1'/0200-1 (1 July .t2) as changed by Change No.3, 30 :\larch authorizes the Army Artillery Section ,
a total of IS officers, 1 warrant officer. and 40 enlisted men. [n addition to the above, 2 officers and 4 enlistedv'
. lIlell were allocated the ,\rtillery Sectioll by this Headquarters upon receipt of an allotment of grades an
ratings lIuthorized by Ifcn,lquarters. European Thellter of Operations. However. after cle,'en months in combat.
the First Army fee}, that IS officers. 1 wllrrllnl officer. and 44 enlisted men arc adequate.
FUNCTIONS
I Collection. evaluation. and dis
I semination of artillery intelli
gence. '
:\[ aps and aerial photography to
: S-2 Snhs(>('tion ' 1 I
include gridded obliques.
.1 al!fficers __ Coordination counterbattery
2 ":\1
procedure and activities.
Coordination and preparation of
__ ___ J I Artillery Information Service
(AIS).
Training.
Operations to include Arty/R.
Suilsectioll Communications.
4 Officers I Troop movements.
7 E:\1 l---
\1
Liaison.
(:\ole 3, I i Coordination and preparation of
l_ '(.\YNi.
lIery
[nformation Bulletin
.\HTlLt.F:HY 1';"":<TTln;
i I-Antltnnk'-- --,
OFFH'F:U OFFIrEH
:---j I Subsection
(:\ole 1) I '-- 2 Offi"l'rs .\ntitank activities to include
; ! I 1 E:\1 tank destroyers.
(:\ote 4)
,\ir UP Subsed ion .\ir OP activities !\if regards
3 Officers Training.
7 E:\I Operations.
(:\otc ;)1 Supply and maintenanct'.
PersonnE'1.
.\mmunition.
I i S-4 Suhsection Supply.
. I
4 Officers ;\Iaintenance.
I-!
,
4 E:\1 Replacement and repair of lost
or damaged equipment.
Personnel.
I ' ClllEF CLERK I -------1
,\SSIST.\XT CllIEF CLERK " , . d' t I I
--!------,----, n$ In lea c(
I Clerical :\Iessage 'I Drafting I l _____-.l
\ Section I Centt'r Section I
, .1 ____--1
\TUIO
(I' .. dlrt,,tl., \\ it!. of ,ul..ection" '" ..
12) OUt' Assist alit S-2 ull duty ill Offi"e uf Assistallt Chi!'f of G-2.
\31 Out' A'sbtant ::>-3 i, COllllnunimtions Ollieer. Fuur E;\I are radio opel'll["I" ill ,\rllly ,\rty'Offit'ers' Radio
:\etwith station at
(4) Although atlminislratiwly IIlItier ::>-3, the .\1'0 generally <It'll Is direl'lly wilh th,' .\rtillery Officer.
(5) Two officers perform duties at the 23d l\IR&R Squadron.
,36 MILITARY REVIEW
organic and attached. As a staff officer, he
bears' the same relationship to the corps
commander that the army artillery officer
does to the army commander. This dual role
is a very heavy load. In fact, it appears
to be the opinion of most corps artillery
commanders, who have fUllctioned as such
in combat, that the only perfect solution
would be to have two intlivi(luals, both gen
eral ollieprs. filling the positions of corps
artillelT officer and of corps art ilIery com
mander. However, sinl'e such a solution is
unobtainable nnder the existillg tables of
organization, the following organization or
close aPIirol'imation thereto has been effec
tively employed by most combat-experienced
corps:
Ol)n'atillff ill aJ1(1 ,,"I of l"r)lS Commaild
l'usl:
Corp,; A rtilll'ry COlllllll\ll(lPr
j';Xl'l'utiVl' in T /0 Corps
A rtillC'ry Onlet'r)
Ass't 8-2 (with (;':!)

8,\
Artilll'ry Air OtTIcl'r
AidC'
Ass't Antitank Officerl aJltlitjolls by
Antitank Officer S TI]('ater au
thori7.ntioll.
7 Enlbtell Jll?lI-,clerks alltl (1I'aft5men
Z Enlisted men-antitank subsection
additions by 1'11<'ater authorization.
Opcmting in and Ollt of the Corps AJ'tillc)'y
(Fil'c-Dil'cction Cenlc)'):
Deputy Corps Artillery Commander
Oistc'd in T/O as Executive)
8-2
8-3
Ass't 8-4
Plus 12 officers-operations; to include
counterbattery group, communications,
fieJd artillery liaison pilots, and aide
for miscellaneous . 0;,' gnments.
1 Warrant Officerl 1,' ttery headquar
86 Enlisted nfen \ tel's, operations
:,. duding counter
battery, commu
r.' 'ations, and
maintenance, to
inchlde Air Ob
(
servation Post
requirements.
The artillery brigadier general, although
still the corps artillel'y commander, will have
to dellgate a. numhe'r of the duties in connl'C
tioll with his command responsibilities to
the deputy commander (the colonel at the
corps FDC). In general, the duties and
responsibilities of the artillery section at the
corps cOlllmand post are essentially the same
but on a reduced scale as those of the artil
lery section of an army headquarters. It is
to be emphasized that the responsibilities of
the corps artillery commande!' and his staff
extend to all of the artillery with the corps,
both divisional and nOll-divisional.
As it is true in al'my so it is in corps
that for smooth and efficient operation, to
gether with effective accomplishment of
mission, it is imperative that the artiJIel'Y
section at the corps command post wOi'k in
the closest harmony with all members of
the corps general and staff sections.
The corps artillery commander, or in his
absence the exccuti\"e (the colonel at the
corps command POHt), should be I'eatlily
available to advise the COI'PS commander.
The assistant 8-2 should operate in the
office of the COl'pS G-2; the assistant 8-3,
although normally not ill the office of the
eorps G-:1, should maintain the closest liaison
with that section. 8-4 has a similar responsi
bility with respect to the ('orps G-4 and
the supply services, namely ordnance, quar
termaster, signal, and engineer.
The tactical grouping of non-divisional
artillery battalio.. s with the corps is ac
complished field artillery groups,
certain aspects of which have alrC'ady been
discussed.
The next major echelon with which most
officers are familial' is division artillery, Like'
the corps artillery commander, the division
artillery commander has a dual role. He
commands the division artillery, both organic
and attached, and is the artillery officer on
the staff of the division commander, in which
capacity he is the assistant and adviser to
ARTILLERY WITH AN AMERICAN ARMY IN EUROPE
the division commander on all artillery mat
ters. The staff principles and functions ap
propriate to the size of the -unit apply to
the'divisio:p artillery staff. 'The administra
tive and supply functions of the staff are
mostly supervisory and informative, subordi
nate units -normally conducting all adminis
trative and supply matters directly with the
division.
Lastly, when army retains artillery units
under its control, a brigade headquarters is
the appropriate unit to control the units so
employed. The composition, organization,
and functions of the brigade staff are similar
to those of a division artillery staff.
CONCLUSION
The fact that American artillery is ac
credited with an outstanding performance
in combat is not questioned. Artillerymen
of all ranks will testify to the soundness
of doctrine as written in our texts and
taught at the Field Artillery School. How
ever, these statements should not be con
strued to mean that combat lessons have
not been learned and put to profitable use.
This has most certainly been the case, and
within First Army the publication of the
Artillery Information Service :\Iemol'anda
(AIS) has provided an effective means for
the collection. evaluation, and dissemination
of this helpful information.'
As previously the writer of
this article _has had an opportunity for
nearly three years to observe and deal with
the Varied problems of boto divisional and ',
non-divisional artillery in combat. Based'
upon this experience it is thought fitting
to rc-emp,hasize a statement made .in the
earlier, portion of this article: "Combat ex
I)(>rien('e has shown the need for an additional
medium battalion organic with the infantry
division and of the s'ame caliber for the
armored division." There has seldom been
an instance during our operations in North
Africa, Sicily, and on the Continent when
both types of divisions have not required
attachments to supplement their organic
general support. If this situation nas proved
necessary during those major operations,
then it would appear desirable to incorporate
the additional unit organically into the
division.
In howevel:. it shoul,\ be' pointed
out that the field artillery with an army
which has been successful ill' combat per
forms its effectively by the well
coordinated, accurate, and prumpt deliver,
of supporting fil'e regardless of whether it
be organic, attached, or reinforcing. This
we have achieved in First Army through
an ol'ganization carefully integ-rate.l up and
down through all echelons, together with a
spil'it on the part of all artillerymen to
provide continuous support to the limit of
their capahilities. Let it continue to be
music to the Doughboy's ears when 'he hears
the time honored artillery phrase, "0:< THE
WAY."
The experience of more than three years of war has demonstrated the sound
ness of our concept of a fleet," in which aircraft and ships work together
as a coordinated team. There has been no dispute as to "carriers versus battle
ships." Aircraft can do things which ships cannot do. Sliips can do some things
which aircraft cannot do. Working together. surface ships, submarines, and air
craft supplement each other so that the strength of the unified team is greater
than the sum of the parts.
-From the report of Fleet Admiral
Ernest J. King to the Secretary of the
Navy covering combat operations from
1 ,1\1arch 1944 to 1 March 1945.

Supply by Air
MAJOR JOHN N.. MCVAY, Air C(}1'PS
Instrl1ctor, Command and Ge.neral Staff School
T
lilt' Wal' has pn1v\:<1 one method of sup
that Il('W method supply by air
tl'unsports, '
In past w,an; we have' used' the horse or
Illull' and wagon, the river barge, the railroad
trnin, alHI to some extpllt the motor truck.
Between tIl<' two great war;; the automotive
inilustry built higg'er and hetter trucks,
:rhe army adopted many of these designs and
put thelll to work. We jilld in every theater
tocl;IY va"t llumhcrs of supply trucks cal'l'ying
the necessary fighting' supplil's to the mcn
at the ballkft'ont. One of the oustanding'
f('ats of lllotor transport was the "Red Ball
E,]lI'l'SS" in tlw European Theater of
Opl'I'atillIlS e1Ul'lng' the last half of
In ,pitl' of this g'reat anll n1l'ans of
hringing' into hattie areas, the air
l'lam' has (;'llllll' to the fot'e as an i111]lOl'tallt
C;lrt'it'r of al! <.'IUSSl'S of supply, Evel'y day,
l"']lOI'tS from th,' tlll'aters hring out clearly
tLat thl' ,lll'cl'ssflll of opcl'ations have
bl.'l'n dC'eidl'd hy the sp,'ed, flexibility, and
mohility of ail' tl'l.lllSport,
Which Ail' Force is l'hm'g<:u with
th(' carrying' llf in the combat thea
t('I'';' Tht' answer to this Question can be
fOLlnd hy U Quick g'lance at the mission of the
Troop Canier COml111lncl. We finel that Troop
CaniL'r j" HSHig'IH'" a primary ane! a second
ar)' mission, The mission of trans
porting' airborne' troops into combat and of
1 csuppl;,ing these troops will not interest
at this time, Howevpl', the secondary mis
l'ion of Troop Caniel' will. This secondary
mission calls fol' (a) enwrgcncy supply and
evacuation, (h) fel'l'ying of troops and sup
plil'S, and (e) routine fl'ITying- of mail, per
sonnel. and supplies,
Here the Army has an agency charged with
a (;'ombat zone supply mission and, of course,
being' chm'gL'd with supply, it will be trained
lind "quipped to perform this type mission,
Troop Carrilel' will not only jJl'ovide the
trained crews and the airpi;llles 'equipped fo)'
these missions but will work out the route
planning, load planning, and also provide
personnel to supplement the labor needed to
package supplies, In addition to what the
Troop Carrier can furnish th(!re is a very
special unit available to the I!'roop Carrier
through the Air Force Servih
units are caller Air Cargo Resupply
Organization, These Air Cargo Resupply
Organizations can rig chutes, package sup
plies, load supplies, and kick them out the
door of the plane if supply is by parachutp,
01' unload them if the craft lands on an avail
able strip,
Members of the Ground Forces may say
"These planes are not property of the Groupd
FOl'ces, so how can we expect to get any
henefit from them?" We can find the answpr
to this question in War Department circulal';
which that Troop Carrie" avjativn j,
U theater of operations force and as such iR
controlled hy the highest agency in the
tht'atC't' with jurisdiction over all land, sea,
and ail' forces, From this statement the
commanding general of a theater of opera
tions can cont,'ol the Troop Carrier avia
tion in his theater, If these transport
aircmft are needed for supply work, the
commanding general can direct that their
efforts be given to that task. The result
be that all agencies receive the bene
fit of air-transported supply,
In some theaters the terrain is such that
the main lines of communications run parallel
to instead of perpendicular to the combat
lines, Here it is vital that air-transported
supplies be plentiful. In other theaters,
where islands are separated by large water
al'eas, it is necessary to call on aircraft
for delivery of supplies, In the European
Thellter of Operations we find that because
on the fast armored drives, th" demolition
to ground means of supply, and the vastness
of operation many critical periods developed
wherp success and failure hung in the bal
anct'. The balancing factol' was ail' supply,
W" have discussed the importane" Of this'
type supply, how it is controlled, ancl \vl!y,
it is necessary, Let us take a look at the
SUPPLY BY AIR
methods available to air fO,l} carrying out
lnissions. f
AIR LANDIN(;
The first and the best method of supply
I,r air is to airlalld the supplies. This, of
cotlrse, mcuns that a landing strip must be
available nE'ar the tlsing agency. When sup
plies are airlanded it means that on ill'l'ival
all packages will he intact. There is very
hUle loss am! fll'eakage and the full payload
of the type airplane used can be utilized.
This method should always be used wh"n
jln,sihll'.
GLIDER LANDING
A second method, and a very good one, is
tn ylh/CI' la lid the supplies. The reason this
trIll' transportation is not frequently used
j, hecausc of thE' "scarcity and the expense
(.f gli(il-,'s. However, when it is carried out
t Ill' results are V{-I'y much like the first
1111'lhod mention"d. We need a strip an
open field with a fairly smooth surface un
\\ hieh to land the glider. We can utilize the
full payload of the glider and slight loss and
breakage is (>ncountered. I reemphasize that
"lidel's must be availahle.
PARACHUTE LAKDIKG
.\nother method u"('(i frequently, although
fal' fl-om the best, is to puruc/l1Itr land the
supplies. This method is used for airborne
troops, isolated waves, front-line troops,
and units in mountainous areas. In order
to accomplish supply by parachute much
work mmt be done and plently of equipment
must be available.
For every supply package, on'e 01' two
chutes must be available and rigged. Each
bundle is limited in size and weight,
eontainers must be available, and personnel
trained in rigging chutes, packaging supplies,
and loading the planes are essential. In
addition to all these limiting factors, the
full payload of the airplane cannot always
be used. If the mission happens to be a
"one pass" aft'air, only four to ten packages
ran be ejected fast enough to get the sup
plies out at the right instant. If morp are
"kicked out" of the ship, they will in all
probability fall into the enemy's hands.
FOUl' packages can be ejected. from the' side
door at one time, w11'ile six can be released
from l}araraeks on thl' nn<ll'l' side of the ship,
at the same instant. .
Loss and hreakage is extl'(mlely high when
;,upplies are pa,[tchuted. The bundles are
often scattered and cannot hl' gathered up by
the men on the grouncl, as enemy fire may
cove,' the spot where the bundle landed.
Where more than one pass can be made
with a degree of safety, accuracy of dropping
b increased. This will not prevent break
age, however.
It has been that bomber-type' planes
capable of dropping twenty 01' more packages
by the "salvo" method can be to great
advantage. This type plane is not always
available and will only bt- lIsl'd in an emer
gency.
Because initial resupply fo,' airborne units
is accomplished b:, parachute, the
Ail' Forces haY!' (]Pveloped many types of
packaging containers to insurE' a minimum
of bl'l'akage. These are expensive and are
necessary in large quantities fOI' this tYIlt'
,,'supply. 'Vhen any fOI'ce is supplil'd
chutes, these containers should be used.
\Vhile parachute landing of suppli,-s is not
desirable, combat conditjons make its lise
imperative.
FREE DROPPING
A fourth and last resort method of supply
is that of f,'cc dl'OJllJjilU the items. "Last
resort" is a very accurate description. Loss
and breakage is almost prohihitive. Very
little time should be spent discussing this
method. "It has been mentioned hecausc it
is a possibility.
Having this brief pictUl'e of the different
methods 'of aerial resupply we mig'ht consi<!er
at this time how a theater might organize
theil' ail' transport syst..m so that units
needing air supply can ask for and receive it.
The highest headquarh'rs in the theater
will. in all probability, set up thejr air sup
ply system to get the results it needs for
su('cess. The degTel' of organization net-ded
in the theater ail' supply system ('an he jud
40
MILITARY REVIEW
, ged aceurately' by this headquartcl's and steps
,'can he tnkcn to insu.l'c that each force in
the theater can hellefit hy air-trans
ported snppli('s.
The and most illlportant stcp is to
estahlish c('ntl'alized control by setting' up a
Combined Ail' Transport Command Post,
Op(,l'atiolls Room. ())' ('hit'f Dispatchel's Office.
Much of the following information shou!.l
be available in this oftice at all tinll's:
1. A ,tatus b01\nl showing' the number ant!
Im'alion of all the cargo aircl'aft availabho.
..? The ,lepots where all of tiUp
ply arc available. The proximity of thes('
depots to airfiel,ls 01' theil' location at
airfields. (Engineer" couhl build a strip
at or Iwar ,u<'h depob, ant! it woul,\ save
time allll \abO!' to have s"llle TI'Oop Can'iel'
units statiOlll'd oil thts\, dC'IJ<)t-air ,trip
l'om1" nations.)
.1. ,cfhe condition of "trips the using

\, :'I:,,\\' built neal' using units.
5. The alllount of additional personnel
nvailahk to aid in loading amI unloading
supplies.
6. The signal for t'aell days' cotle
httcrs 1ll1el signals.
With this information oil hand, the mell of
the ait' supply control rOOHl, of
Air, Service, Grounel, and Signal
tatives, will b(' able to dircpt enti]'('
ail' sU\lply opcration.
A hoard might he set up in this supply
control heatlquarters in 01'1\(:1' that propel'
precedem'c Ill' givl'll to supplies fol' certain
units, just as a is given a raterl
prececlence. Prop('!' priority will aid each
subordinate unit in ohtaining necessary itlms
of supply.
The using units shoultl filter thcir requp,t,
direct through their highcr headquart(:rs anti
requisitions sh01J1d come to this control
1'oom from army 01' tactical ail' force. Direct
I'equests fl'om regiment or division ,vill not
reach the centTal control room.
Requisitions shoul'd contain the necessary
opel'ationlll information for setting' up the
aircraft for the mission 'and an itemized
lil<t of l'upplies required by the user.
An adequate signal system wiil help to
ke('p high-priority requ('sts from being
en route,
The men at the central control room on
J'E:reiving a request. will get the mission
up, Immediate notification is sent to
a depot to have the number and quantity of
:mpplies available at a given airdt'ome at a
given time. At the same time a Troop Car
rier unit will receive instructions to have
the Jlroper number of airci'aft at this given
airdrome at the time loading is to begin.
Troop Cal'1'iel' will also receive information
on when, where, and how to deliver these
Abo ielentiflcation procedures. The
u,.,ing unit will receive information as to
\\'Iwn the 111atel'ial will arrive and how they
will for it if a parachute drop is

It \You1,\ \)(' a great help if Troop Carrier
unib were permanently assigned to airdromes
located at these supply depots.
Additional information must go to the 80S
to replenish depot stocks and aiso to high!'r
11l'H,lquartt'rs notifying them that the supply
has 1)('cn made.
In order to keep this system up to the
minute, airstrips must be made available
lI' close to thE' combat units as is ,rossihle.
Enginl'('rs should constantly prepalje these
for opel'Ution. A forward control party act
in.!!: as an advance command post should
handle ail' traffic in the vicinity of the for
wun! airdrome, traffic on the ground, the un
loading of the loading of wounded,
the movement of trucks and ambulances on
the gTountl in conjunction with the movement
of the aircraft, and should provide liaison
betwee,n the Ail' Force and the using agency.
In supplying air'units this is much simpler
as the ail' unit will have regular airdrome
facilities.
There arc many situations whicl1 will have
to be handled correctly. For instance. trans
port crews ordered to report to a given
airdrome should be able to begin loading on.
arrival. There are instances when a twenty
four hour wait was not 'uncommon, Another'
________
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Q'I'I'I" ANII
>\!B!lTlW".
SUPPLY BY AIR
FRONT l.INES
xx

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8

SUGGESTED PLAN FOR AIR SUPPLY COMMUNICATION NET
MILITARY REVIEW
trouble-causing condition j", the fact that as
filst as forward combat air strips are built
or captured the fighters of a Tactical Air
Command move in. This to get
attack aircraft up front to hit targets in
the battle Hrl':\. Proper coordination must
{'xist lll'twecn the thpater ail' transport
('ontrol and fight pl' unit" in order to
gl't thl' maximum ont of tllL'sl' advance

Dth"l' to augment
al'rial of other nations' transports
may hp lwedcd, Stratl-gil' anc! tactical con
of tIll' war. along with wpathel', will
cause l'hanges in cargo
To smooth nut and solve these prob
Il'Jlls, dost' Ilt'twl'en the c('ntral con
I 1'01 an.1 theall'r hl'ad'luarters should
ill' 111uintaitH.ld.
SUPJlb' by ail' in eadl tht'att'r a,
the tactical situation differs.' I have not.
yet touched on all-out air supply missions!
such as the1(peration of the IX Troop .
Command during the December 1944 Germa'n
bleakthrough. The supply of General Patton's
tanks by flying ga80line forward is an out
"tanding example of what can be done by ait
trunspo\'ted supply.
There is no reason why a theater should
not be ahle to develop their system of sup
ply by ail' to a point where the results
will he extremely high. In one theatl'r
an ail' force is assigned supply as its
primary mission. In performing that mission
the vital statistics from that air force show
the results to be tremendous. Supply by ail'
cannot he overlooked in any theater, A g'lanee
at the results of actions in China show a
",lid dl'ppndency on air-transportC'd supply,
.Japanese :\!anpower Pool in China
RAY :\1. STROUPE,II1{alltI'Y
Staff nnt! FaCilIty, Command and (;pneral Staff Schonl
,\ ran,ly-.hscn""d ,ource of Japanese
'nanpO\\'l'l i, tIlt' lllale civilian popu
lation in .Jap-ol'\'upiPd In an
,lferl to maintain their divisions at maxi
lllUlll strpngth, th,' invad,'!', of the Chinese
mainland initiatC'd thl'ir p,'ogl'am of ('0111
"'l'vil'l''' in Hl42,
l'pon rem'hing the age of l'lghteen, all male
Chinpsl' must l'egist,,\' fo\' military training.
Failure to "C'gist"r 01' to I'('port for duty
whl'n SUl1l11lOnl,t! hrings severe pl'nalties upon
the family of tbe offl'ml"'l'.
In O!'der to l'pndC'1' the enf(!r('ed (luty mo\'e
attnlctiv(', the J apaneRe Offl'l' officpr train
ing' to high ]';chool graduates. Selected can
didates study at the Peiping officeI' Candi
date School under the direction of a puppet
offiel'l', . Gen",ral Tu
The length uf till' training' l'our,e depend,
IIpon the branl'h of, service in which' the'
aspi.rant is tn be conunissionell. To become
the of a second lieutenant in the
infantry. a Chinese soldier must complete
three y"ars of training. For
as 11 Quarternulcltel' officer. two years of
training al'e re'luiretl, Candidates for COll!
missions as legal officers must hold law
degrees; in addition, must complete a
course in the military
h'gal school. Military polic(0. officers ar'c
required to finish three years of infantry
training a prerequisite to the
;\lP course.
It is not clear that the Japanese arc de.
I iving substantial benefits fl'om their im
pressment program. Many Chinese are said
to desert and join gUC'lTilIa forces in the
mountains outside of Peiping.
In gE'nel'al, there is friction between the
"selected" troops and the native
.'oldiel's. However, the former appeal' to have
no alternative but tu fight alongside the
invaders, Failur", tu du often causes un
pleasant rcciprocal action to he taken
the soldi.ers' relatives. The Japanese have
burned houses and slaughtered families as
examples for incipient Chinese recalcitrants;'
Military Aspects of the 'Psychopathic Personality
to Aid Non-Medical Officers
MAJOR F. C. A.NSANELLI, Medical Corps
Chil'f. H"'''pitlli,
W
HILE. the diagnosis of the psycho
pathic personality'!' must be made by
the medical officer, preferably by the neuro
psychiatrist when available, the military
Kystelll of channeling such cases also requires
,e"vices of non-medical officers in contributing
to final disposition. In order for officers, other
than medical, to contribute properly in their
duties requiring contact with such cases, it
i, necessary to have a general understanding
of the psychopath, management and dispo
It is the purpose. of this composition
to contribute data concerning psychopathic
lll'rSonaJities that may serve for practical
military purposes, to give the non-medical
officer, in as simple terms as posKible, in
formation that will increase his understand
ing and thereby allow integrated collabora
tion with the medical officers. This will
increase total military efficiency in handling
such cases, since by common understanding
unity in purpose can be obtained. These
data will be of special concern for officers
serving 01' who will be asked to serve on
Section VIII boards, members of Judge Ad
vocate offices, commanding officers, etc.
;\!any such officers have repeatedly requested
simplification of the subject for their prac
tical needs in their duties.
Definition.-A psychopathic personality is
a chronic social maladjustment that expresses
itself outwardly by actions that neither
conform to nor that are acceptable to society,
be it in civilian or military spheres.. Such
an individual realizes no law but his own
in1l11ediate desires and needs, fails to learn
from experience, and has little to no interest
in adjusting his actions to conform to the
social code. He repeatedly breaks rules to
gain short-time pleasures with no regard'
of othe'rs or his obligations. His behavior
in action is usually antisocial, hostile, or
*"Psychopathie personality" means the same as
"( 1I11stitutionai psychopathic
. irrational in type. Abnormal sexual desires
and practices such as homosexuality may be:
assocfated in some cases. Totally, the psy
chopath, by his antisocial acts, will interfere
group purpose and efficielll!y and cause
those about him to be much troubled and
disturbed. Theil' acts are classified under
"bad habits and traits."
The psychopath is 1I0t insane nor mentally
deranged. He knows the diffe"ence between
right and wrong' and call adhere to the
right if he so desires. He therefo"e is re
sponsible for his behavior and actions.
In my experience to date, many officers
have asked questions on this subject. By
reviewing the most common question and
by giving direct anowers, further data will
be presented.
1. Q. How do these individuals indicate
their undesirable type of behavior?
A. By their ac/.i(JIIs that are visible and
can be recognized by anyone.
In the mifitary, suc.h acts are repeated
A W drunkenness, difficulty in getting
ong with others, weari)1g unauthoi'ized in
'ignias, forging checks or passes, demanding
epeated special privileges, gener!)1 careless
ness, poor response to discipline, chronic
sick call riders, unusual lying, malingering
("goldbrick"), abnormal sex interests and
practices, emotional outbursts of temper and
excitability usually associated with improper
verbal utterances, brooding, wicidal threats <
or attempts, justification of his behavior by
always blaming others, drug addiction, lack
of interest in correction as evidenced by
continued misbehavior, weak effort in ad
justing or learning from past experiences,
and a satisfied acceptance of his own way
of doing things.
With rare exception, when such an indi
vidual is questioned about his civilian be-.
J.avior, it will be found he has had his behav
ior disorder dating frum .'arly childhood or
44
MILITARY REVIEW
.manifested from cal'ly youth. The most com
mon data include frcquent truancy in grade
scliool, problem' with teachcrs and parents,
difficulty in getting along with others, fre
quent alcoholism, poor civilian work record
rarely holding jobs more than a fcw months,
no goal in life, past abnormal sexual prac
tices, outbursts of temper with
acts, civilian arrests, stubbol'l1ness, insisting
on his way, disregarding his obligations to
others, irresponsibility, etc.
It is thus seen that the actions of such
individuals are characterize(l by ell )'Ollie rr
petition of behavior that becomes scrious
enough to cause severe friction with society
or conflict with the law and that thosc
actions continue with an abnormal frequency
without any to themselves or
,to the demands of the social cnvironmcnt.
It must not be concluded frolll what has
been said that all inelivic\uals with delinquent
01' antisocial behavior, even those of
repeated offenses, wiII provc to be psycho
pathic personalities. Defects in character
may be due to certuin experiences that havc
produccd special attitudes, to the cultural
cnvironment in which one has lived, and to
otnt'r factors. Tlwrdol'c. Jbychiat ric study by
the medical officcr is necessary to aiel you"
for certain deviations in the strivings, emo
tional, unci charadet' aspccts of the indi
vidual personality must bc found in oreler
to arrive at a conclusion of psychopathic
personality.
2. Q. What are the sourccs that can aid
in the detection of the psychopathic per
sonality?
A. The line officer, stockade, Judge
Advocate, sick call clinic, ancl any othcr
officer in charge of mcn.
3. Q. What suggestions can bc offered to
the non-medical officer as to when a ca8e
should be sent to the psychiatrist in order
to avoid unnecessary consultations?
A. Evcry case of homosexuality in act
and every casc that has committed any act
serious enough to bcgin General COllrt
Martial proceedings should have an appoint
ment arranged with the neuropsychiatrist
as soon as possible.
As to other less serious offenses; the non
niedical officer should interview his enlisted
man personally and make every effort to
correct him in future An enlisted
man with misbehavior that is not deep rooted
in his personality can frequently be 'adjusted.
within his own squadron if the commanding
officJr shows personal interest in helping the
inditidual.
If the enlisted man's misbehavior does not
improve and attains a character of disturb
ing repetition in his acts, then such an
individual should be sent for psychiatric
opinion and recommendations. An itemized
report of improper actions, prepared by the
commaneling officer, should accompany the
cnlisted man at examination time.
From such a group presented for psy
chiatric evaluation, some will be found to
have psychopathic personalities. Those not
found to be so will be classified accordingly,
depending on psychiatric evaluation and
diagnosis. The psychiatrist will try to aid
in each problem with recommendations
and disposition.
4. Q. Why is it important to detect such
cuses?
A. Most of these individuals are abso
military misfits and are not desired by
the, military. It is known, and has been
proved in evcry army of past' wars, that
the I psychopath, because of his chronic bad
habits and traits, is not desirable in military
service because he impairs morale and effi
ciency of others and may also be of great
danger in important situations. While the
psychopath may have little to no effect on
stable individuals, his repeated misbehavior
is bound to infect unfavorably those indi
viduals who are borderline or mildly un
stable persons. Furthermore, the presence
of two or morc psychopaths in a group can
cause serious disruption of purpose of the
squadron. Ask those commanding officers
who have such "bad boys" and you will need
no convincing. The trouble caused by the
psychopath far outweights his duty contri
bution during his brief periods of proper
behavior.
45
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PERSONALITY
5. Q. Is every psychopath, regardless of
degree, a "military misfit?
A. No. It is known that some psycho
paths, particularly of the milder types, have
attained satisfactory war records. The war
may have a g'ood effect on a small number.
However, it must be stressed that the mili
tnry must not be cmployed to act as an
erlucational 01' reform institution for those
who are unreliable and a detri
ment to the morale anel efficiency of theil'
organizations.
6. Q. Docs punishment significantly im
prove the psychopath?
A. Usually not. However, when he com
mits acts calling fo!' punishment, it must
be gh'en, not to improve him, but rather
to discoul'llg'e him from Illany added acts
and also to have a favorable effect on the
morale and of the squadron. It
i,; n{)t uncomlllon to heal' connnan(ling' officers
state, "A kick in the pants will make a man
of the chronic rule-breaker." Such ideas are
entertained when the commanding officer is
in a state of emotional disturbance. We must
control our personal emotions ane1 make
decisions in coolness.
7. Q.' Does 01' other types
of sexual perversion always indicate a psy
chopathic
A. No. Sl)xual perversion may be a
symptom of psychoneurosis, psychopathic
personality, psychosis, or of lesser personal
ity maladjustments.
8. Q. Is there any difference in type of
discharge or in interpretation in cases of
practiced abnormal sexuality,
ity,. etc.) since much can be assoeiated with
the various diagnoses mentioned above?
A. Yes. All homosexuality is given a
blue discharge (without honor) regardless
of the underlying psychiatric diagnosis e.'
cept in cases of psychosis (insanity). The
-reason for this is that the psychotic is the
only one who cannot differentiate right from
wrong and does not have the mental ability
to .adhere to the right. The milital'y law
coincides with the civilian law in judging
these cases. It is the violation of the social
code in act and not in thQugh t that is
punishable.
9. Q. If a soldier is known to be a homo- ,
se..'{ual but is able. to restrain himself in
act while in the military, is he eligible for
discharge?
A. No. As was mentioned above, a man
is not punished for his desires or thoughts,
but rather for his llnl'cstl'aillcd acts. There
fore, provided the soldier refrains from
abnormal sexual practices and conforms to
the military code in all his behavior, he
is retained in service.
10. Q. If a psychopath has Eneuresis (bed
wetting), is he entitled to an honorable
dischm'ge? (Seetion VIII) 615-369.
A. If. he has manifested misconduct
01' bad habits and traits while in the mil
itary, he still is a candidate for discharge
without honor regardless of the chronic bed
wetting.
11. Q. Does psychopathic personality indi
cate insanity?
A. No. He knows the difference be
tween right and wrong, and has the ability
to adhere to the right if he so desires. This
is important to remembel" since many officers
have interpreted any diagnostic term
with the word "psychopath" to mean "nuts,"
"insane," etc. The diagnostic ex
pression of psychopathic personality (con
stitutional psychopathic state) definitely in
dicates no insanity.
12. Q. Do some psychopaths merge into
insanity? (Psychosis)
A. Yes. However, when there is no
progression into insanity, the case must be
viewed as not insane.
13. Q. Is there any medical treatment or
any rehabilitation measure that would COI'
rect the psychopath? .
A. Generally, no. The psychopath, with
few exceptions, does not respond to medical
care in his adult stage." He himself neither
seeks medical care not correction, for he
is perfectly contented with his type of be
havior that serves his own inner needs. Only
in childhood, before his behavior becomes
fixed, has medical management been success
46
'.,;'
MILITARY REVIlfW
ful in many, but not all, cases. In that early
stage, the drives of the individual and the
parent's guidance, etc., can be COl'l'eeteo.
As to rehabilitation in the military, thE>
psychopath is not a candidate, for as a
rule, he does not respond. The reasons given
above also apply for rehabilitation failure.
Thus again it is evident why the principal
aim with the psychopath is separation from
the military service, since his retention would
only serve to contribute in a deleterious way
by impairing morale and efficiency of others.
14. Q. What type of discharge does a
psychopathic personality get and why?
A. He gets a blue discharge (without
honor) according to AR 615-368 (Section
VIII). Such a discharge is given because
of chronic "bad habits and traits or mio
conduct."
It may be suprising for you to know that
misinterpretations have given many such
cases honorable discharges (white). Lack
of understanding has been the cause of er
ror by non-medical officers and by some
medical officers. It is obviouR that an incli
vidual who knows right from wl'(\ng' should
not be rewarded for bad conduct by an
honorable, discharge. It is also obvious that
he neither deserves it nor that such a prac
tice would have a favorable effect on others.
The military does not j'elNlI'd misconduct
any more than cil'ilian la19 OI'YOH yourself do.
15. Q. What has been the new revision of
Section VIII of AR 615-360? '
A. There has been no change in con
tent. Section VIII, AR 615-360 c?vered (a)
cases of inaptness or non-adaptability by
white discharge (with honor) and (b) bad
habits and traits or misconduct by blue (with
out honor). Beginning 20 July 1944, Section
viII of AR 615360 has been subdivided
into AR 615-368 for cases with "bad habits
and traits <of misconduct" caning for a dis
charge without honor (blue) and AR 615-36!J
for "inaptness, non-adaptability, or unex
plained eneuresis" calling for honorable
discharge (white) pl'ovided there is no as
sociated misconduct. By this new AR de
signation, there is a clean-cut distinction
< the types of discharge, rather than <
havh}g two different types of discharge dl'
Fignaterl by the same AR section as formerly.
16. Q. What are some Fimple comparative
differences of psychopathic personality, psy
choneurosis, and psychosiFl that will allow
the non-medical officer to have further under
standing of the psychopath?
A. The psychopath (01' known to yuu
as the "chronic misbehavior problem") has
no symptoms and does not suffer himself,
but causes those about him to suffer by
acts. The psychoneurosis (01' known to you
as "excessive nervousness") does not caU,e
others to suffer, but rathel' suffers within
himself by such symptoms as headaches,
pains in the body, weakness, fears, shaky
sensations, disturbing heart action, etc. The
neurotic must frequently describe his inner
sufferings to be recognized and seeks medical
or other aid, whereas the psychopath is
recognized by his outward misbehavior of
antisocial acts and rarely seeks the aid of
a doctor 01' anyone else. The neurotic realizes
that there something wl'Ong with him,
whereas the is satiFlfied with
himself and puts the hlame on others whom
he claim,; are at fault fo\' interfering with
his desires and actions. As to psychosis
(known to you as "insane"), it differs from
the above two conditions in that ability to
differentiate rig'ht from wrong <and adhere
to the rig'ht is lacking and that such all
individual his facial expression, state
ments, or acts, will impl'ess you that the
man is severely odrl and 'lllt of group
relationship.
The above brief descriptive differences
should suffice for youI' general idea. How
ever, remember that your job is well done
if you help detect abnormal cases for med
ical examination. The diagnosis will have
to rest entirely on 8cientific evaluation by
the medical office)'.
17. Q. After a case has been judged to
be a psychopath by the medical officer, what
type of a report should be expected by a
Section VIII board or other hearing groups? <
A. A certificate should be prepared,
MILITARY ASPECTS OF TilE PSYCHUPATHIe PERSONALITY
a sample being presented. Note 'in the diag
nosis, details of the individual's misbehavior
are given. Stereotyped statements to describe
any psychopath are worthless unless accom
panied by the detailed action misbehavior
of each case. The following is one for Section
"III boat'<l:
___ HOSPITAL
FIELD
(Current dald
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that (name), (rank),
number). (outfit), (field), (state),
was e){amim:!(\ for neuropsychiatl'ic status
on (date) at this hospital and the following
are the conclusions and recommendations:
1. Diagnosis: Constitutional
State, Emotional Instability Type, manifested
bv chronic abnormal behavior child
being a severe problem in school, ne
cessitating 18 months in a Truant school.
very poor civilian work record, having nu
merous jobs and never holding' one more
than two months, weak will to alcohol with
frequent drunkenness from the age of 18.
no interest in any goal in life, misbehaving
for immediate pleasures without consequences
of the future, arrests fo;' drunkenness and
disorderly conduct; and then continuing this
chronic social maladjustment behp.vior pat
tern in the military as evidenced by numerous
A \VOL's, being confined to the Stockade for
about one-half the time of his military stay
of three years. teing unaffected by punish
ments, showing no interest in learning or
adjusting from his experiences, pcriodk
mood swings, irresponsibility, impaired judg
ment, and a lack of interegt to confol;m to
the demands of the military or any other
group.
2. LOD (line of duty), No. EPTS (existed
prior to term of service). Partially due to'
willful misconduct and not exaggerated by,
military se1'vice.
3. He not a candidate for rehabilita
tion, nor is he eligible for reassignment
since his retention in service would only im
pair morale and efficiency of the squadron.
4. Strongly recommend separation from
military service by AR 615-368 because of
undesirable habits and t1'aits.
"5. Attached to this certificate are copies
of the Red Cross survey and of misbehavior
incidents, the latter being itemized by this
EM's CO.
Isignedl
Chief of the Neuro
psychiatric Service
A similar certificate is presented in cases
studied prior to general court-martial, but
in addition, should dearly state there is no
insanity and also that the individual can
conduct his own defense with aid of counsel.
With such a certificate, the officers on
variolls boards will have 'ample medical de
,tails to enable them better to carryon their
d'uties.
CONCLUSION
Practical aspects of the psychopathic per
sonality have been given for the non-medical
officer. Psychiatric terms and approach have
been purposely eliminated in order not to
cloud your understanding. The material of-,
fered to you is in strict ,.,ith
military views. It is hoped that the data
presented will be of "reference" service to
you in your future duties, thereby enabling
you to interpret such cases in their t1'ue
light with tIJe ultimate aim of serving the
military well.
"'The items in paragraph 5 in the certificate are
attached when available. but are not mandatol"Y.
Seventh Army Crosses the Moselle River'
Received from Headquarters, Seventh Army.
the Seventh Army reached the
l\'f-o-scl.le River on 20 September 1944,
W
l'apid enemy Avithdnlwal ceased. FOI' the first
time since D-day, Seventh Army forces met
an oignnized foe, entrenched in prC'pal'ed
defensive positions which formed an eRtab
lisheci line. By thC' clewr URe of the 11th
Panzel' Division in blocking' and gcreening,
the German Nineteenth ArlllY had effected
a vast turning movenlC'nt, uRing -the Belfort
Gap as a hinge with the Rivcr
and the Vosges Mountains as a new dcfengive
line.
The German plan was to pro\C'ct the' PlI"
ses and to the V MgeR. to I,pcp
open the Belfort Gap, and, when eVl'ntllally
forced to do so, to pull hack to the RhinC'.
Along the l\Ios('lIe itsplf a lack of heavy
artillery concentrations Wa" an indication
that the enemy intended to tig-ht only "tuh
born delaying actions to l'rl'v('nt an l'arly
crossing of the river anci to (,O!H','ntrntl' his
main efforts on defending n linl' 'which ran
roughly through Rl'mirel1l0nt to St. Die on
the foothills of the Vosgc's. withdl'llwing
his extended right flank the l'nemy now
in position to join with the newly constituted
Fifth Panzer Army to the north.
Arcordingly, Seventh Al'IlIY plan" Wt'!'l'
changed to meet a new tadieul situation.
Ekments of the \,1 WCI'" to he I'eli<,'ved
by the French First in the R('lfort
area, whel'<! the Fl'ench wpre ordel'l''] to cap
ture Belfort and clear thl' bank of the
Rhine in zon ... The American VI COI']1s. aft('l'
legrouping, would adVHnl'(, to the north
along the axis \' esoulSt. DieStl'1lsbolll'g',
('stuhlish and maintain contact with the U.S.
Third Army, and eaptm(' th(' <'it:. of Stl'as
bourg'.
In ol'<Ier to comply with
VI alerted the ad, :)lith. and 45th Divi
sion"; t;) he prepur('li to the :\[o"('lIe.
Division commmHkl'" \\'l'rl' told. tt) udvHllce in
at least two columnh with one regin1('nt in
reserve to be committed only on corps orde),.
Warning against overextension in dpth and
failure to close all combat elements on each
phase line: as rapidly as possible was also
emphasized, The bolrlest use was to be made
o{ reconnaissance elements to maintain con
tact with the enemy and to hm'ass his move

The town of Epinal on the left flank of
the Seventh Army 8('('tor to th(' north is the
most important communications cellt('l' in the
High \'osges region. Two main routes pass
froll! Epinal through the mountains, one
through St. Die and the Saales Pass to
Strashourg. the Oth(,I' by way of Gerardmel'
through the Schlucht Pas" to Colmar and the
Alsacl' Plain.
At Epinal the j\.[o,elle River is a rapid-run
ning stream, eig'hty fel't wide and with al
mMt vl'rtical banI", in placl's twenty feet
high. Farther south bPlween I{emiremont and
Le Thillot, the width and (lepth of the river
are thus making fording possible for
foot troops. Howevl'r, a swift cLlrrent, steep
and wooded apP"oachl's, and numerous big
boulders ill t he river ma,le the transporta
tion of Iwavy equipment the a
ditlicult prohh'lll.
a, 1 Seph'mher intelligence re
ports indicated a German build-up along the
Ilelfort-\'o,ges line. Latl'l' in the month
tactical I'econnabsanc(' airel'aft reported COI1
l'lll'l1IY lllovement from east of the
Rhilll' and work on fortifications along the
wholl' crest of the \'MgCS. On 1V September
the \"1 ('OI'PS G-2 \Val'ned that the "Vosges
will mak,' an ('xcellent position
from whi('h to defend and it douhtful if
t hl' will evacuate without h('ing forced
to do :-:'0."
By 20 September the Seventh Army had
finished regrouping. The 45th Division, which
had heen threatening the Belfort Gap, was
now llIoved into a line facing the Moselle
Hive'r ,outhwl'st of Epinul. Thi" position be
(we,'n the :lllth Divbioll and the XV Corps of
tIl(' American Third Al'lllY the
Al'l11Y's Il'ft flnn]" At Rupt the i'ight
liunk was being held by the 3d Division,
\\ hich was in contact with French units far
ARMY THE MOSELLE RIVER
t.:t:l
\ 0
i
I
i
THE MOSELLE CROSSING
10 0 ;0 Mi.
.'""=-::>oi:et:::l!!Cio..................
10 0 10 Km.
.. -
50
I
MILITARY
thel' l<outh in the Vil!ersexel arl'a. 1'11(' Sl'V
rnth Army :\om' up\lroximatl'ly t",plv!'
widE' and on tlw nOI'!
from the Anwriran Third Army hy the towns
of Epinul, ann RamvervillQI's; on th,'
southeaRt it WUR fI'nm thr Fint
French Army hy Lur<', )!l'!isey, and I.e Thil
lot, all in the French zone. By Sl'ptemher
units of VI COI'PH \\'('I'e in position to !'t'sume
the attack.
At 1900 hours, S,,'ptt'lI1hel', (il'IH'l'al Lu
cian K, Truscott, the COlllllulIHlin).'; General
of VI Corps, iRRued a fi"ld mes,;,,).';l' outlining'
the plan of advance, The IIlo';l'lk \\'a:" tIl be
crossed in order to ohtain the communi
cations centers in the \' os).';e,; \\'hidl would
op",n a IHIRsage tn the Ab'H'<' Plain and till'
Rhin,', The 45th on the lefi, was
to seize Epinal and ';CeLl!'" a CI'll"sill).'; in that
vicinity, then advance ll-tll'theHsl ttl
RamlH.'l'villcr, and Baelarat. ill tIll' dit','ctillll
of the Savel'lle Gap, Th", ::lith Division. in
the centcr, wa;; to C\'os,; t h(' :\iose'lle in thl'
EloYl!s an'a and advance' without deJay t,)
seize St. ni" neal' the Saal,'" Pas,. On the
right flank, th,' ;Id Division was to
erogsings in the Rupt arca and uuvanee to
,eize Geranlmel' n('al' the Schlueht I'a". The
45th and ;ld Divisions werl' to 11I:lIntain liasioll
with the Thinl ArlllY an,l tl1(' Fi!',t French
ArlllY und were to Plotcct the eOl'lb lIanl,s,
Upon alTival on the line. Ralllhl'!'villcl':;-St.
Die, the VI ('OI'PS was to (,Ol1tillue its
advance with its weight on the axis Baecarat
Sarrehourg-Strashour).'; throug'h the' Savel'ne
Gap. Th(' pnem,', dug ill north of the )loselle
and in the approaehes to the Vosg"ps, was
prepared to OPPOSl' this nllHleUVpl'.
1n the center of the Sen'nth .-\ I'my zone
the :l6th Division wag sehe,lukd to make the
fll'st crossings of the ;,\loselle in the vicinity
.of Remircmont, CivilianR reported a ford
Eloyes, five miles north of Remirelllont,
but a, reconnaissancc was to he made all
along the river. As eady as the midd](' of
September river-crossing equipment was
brought forward, ami' by the night of 20
September sixty-five assault boats had arrived
in the 141st Regimental area twenty-five
DUKW's en route,
During the aftpl'llOOn of S(>ptcillher the ..
1,llst lnfant!'y be).';<ln a -in'
force of th" p!'opoHed cl'<lssing area. Sh"l't
Iy aft!'!' 140.0 hours tht' Rpgimental (',,111
mand,,!' !'eport(>d to thl' :16th Division that
l'hane
n
, WerE' good for a cl'ossing neal'
sint'' no pill'my activity was npparent in that
Furthermore. there was excellent
ohsel'vation available from the high ground
l,OOO southwest of the town, The Divi
,jon Commandel' ordered the 14bt Infantry
to l'!'O"" and secure Eloye8 and the high
).';round around it. It was planned that the
1,I::d Infantl'Y woul,] pass th" l,Ust,
as soon as a bridgehead had. been secured,
Advancc clements were guid'ed thl'ough the
dl'lIH' woods hetween Raon-aux-Boix and the
)!osl'llc River by the Mnyor 01 RaOiI-aux
Bois. a I'elit'e'd French naval office!'. His in
timatt,'lmowledge of the tet',rain made it po,;
sibil to loeate a route away fr0111 the roads
:.lId nails. thus l'l'('vcnting the Germans fl'olll
dbcllvel'in).'; allY mo\'t'ment until the last po,
",ble moment. At 0:100 hours on 21 Sevtclllhel'
the l::bt and 155th Fidd Al'tillery Battalion,
bl').';al1 firing on em'my positions across the
river; alld, as dawn approached, all op'-I'a
t IOns \\'l're hy fog in the river valley
TIll' 141:,t Infantry was now in to
jump off.
Shortly after 0700 the 141st ReginwlIt
no,sl-d the riVet' and brgan advancing north
ward along' thc east bank. Little oPlw8itlOII
encountered, though it grew heavier a,
the advance continued. The 14:1<1 Infantry
('ro,"e<l Ht the same place at 1515 hours on
Septcmhcr in a column of hattalions. The
Il'ginwnt was opposed only by scattered small
:lI'IilS fire and before nightfall had seized
the htll overlooking the area, While the
141st and 14:ld Reg'iments were securing the
hridgehead over the Moselle, the 142d oc
l'upied that portion of Remiremont west of
the river. By nightfall an infantry support
bridge had Qeen constructed, and the first
vehicles and armor began crossing.
Heavy fighting took place before Remire
mont could he cleared of the enemy on 23
September, but by the following day the
(>ntil'(> !lflth Division had succeeded in cross'
51
AHMY THE RIVE}!
ing the :Moselle and in estahliRhJng a bridge
, head from Remil'emont north to Jal'menil, A
, BHiley bridge at RClllirelllont and a heavy
pontoon bl'idg'e constructed at' Jarmenil in
sUI'c'd communkation fOl' heavy traffic ,up
IHH'ting the bridgehead, The division ad
vance ami huild-up continued while the I'll
nllllnlll'l' of till' VI Corps Cl'oss(>d at I,'{'ations
ahov(> and helow Hp
min'mont.
On the' !c'ft lIank
of thp :Wth
thl' 45th waR advanl"
to the northeaht
to cross the ;\\ohclk,
By In S,'ptL'IllUel I'\?
lief of the division
had be,'n eOlllpll'tl'd,
and it:-i' fOl'luer
had passed to the
l'onU'o\ of thl' First
French Anu,', The
45th moved to a posi
lion of
Ellinal and Ill'l'llal'ed
to regUml' the attal'k,
Plans call1',1 fOl' the
157th Infantl y 10
crll>" on thl' left "c
tW('pn Epinal ancl
Chatel. the 180th in
the ccutl'r at 1':pinal, anel the 1,!Jth on tlw
I'ip:ht at A j'ches. ant' COl1lIHlIlJ' of the 120th
Engineel' Combat Battalion, the division
engineers, was placed in sUl'pol't of each
regiment, Sixth Corps also fUl'/lished ad
ditional t'ngineel' hupport. By nig'htfall of
21 Septemher the engi neers wel'p in position
to 'support the infantry crossings.'
ThE' 157th Reginwnt was to he on the north
ern flank of tht' division, occupying a kl'Y
position between thl' Thil<l and Sevl'nth AI"
mil-so On 19 and 20 Septcmher the rl'giment
shuttled approximately c:ig'hty miles, moving
through Bain,;-lcs-Rains to th" vicinity of
Dal'l1ieulJes, Patrol". wei'" sent along th,'
rivel' to lind UndalllUg..:1 1!I'idgl-s or fordable
points, A bridge that could be uscd was
found, although it was inside the Third
Army sector. It had llC'cn bnilt at Chatel
hy the American XV Corps, On the night of
21-22 September elements of the 157th crossed
at this site an;l also in the vicinity of Igney,
Attacking south through dense woods toward
Epinal with two battalions abreast, the 157th
Infantry met enemy small-arms fire, which
the advance and inflicted a number
of casualti""" By 24 Septl!mber, however, the
THF :\-III.... I-:I.I.E HIVlm '1<:\lt '\, FltAXCF. A MEMUEIt QF THE
l'fU\\ {IF' .\'\ AI"III[U-:O Hf.CO:'\. ..... \ISAXCF. !'AR GI E,s FilM. AJiJ
l'eg'il1lt'nt hu,1 occupied the town of Girmont
and h"d captured Hill :17:l (altitude in
HlPters) .
The 180th I{c'g'iment of the 45th Division
g'iven the tagk of clearing the town of
Epina!. For a month the Germans' had been'
fotl'en?:thening the sUl'I'ounding forts, and
A IIiI'd agentg reported about seventy strong
pointg in and about the town. Three qat
talions of enemy infantry, rl'inforcerl by aljl:il-
1<-I'Y, mortars, and antitank guns, defended
Epina!. All approaches were not only heavily
mined and booby-tl'apped, but they were
als\) defended by road blockticovered by
llHlchine-gull 'and automatic rifle fire, Along
tIlt- westt'l'll bank of the river, elements of
UII SS- ullit had automatic weapon" spaced
['vel',> t\'w Prepared charges were
plac'<1 at likely cl'ossing points to cave in
52 MILITARY REVIEW
-the, bank,; of the Moselle, and many of the
town's streets were mined, The FFI [French
FOl'ces of the Intel'iorj and civilians stated
that all but two bridges across the Moselle
in Epinal had been blown.
On 20 Septembl'r the 180th Infantry re
gTOtlpeti and prepared to assault Epinal. The
llttack waR planned that the town would
be allPl'oachl'rI from- both flanks. During the
[Jiternooll of the 21 st, tanks and tank-scal'
Hicrs of the Hllst Tank Battalion leveled
road blocks and succeeded in occupying the
high ground overlooking Epinal. The 180th
held its position during the night through
heavy c!ln(:'entrations of enemy artillery,
tank, and rocket fire.
Throughout 22 Septcmbcr thp 180th In
fantry was engaged in clparing' the west side
of the town against determine(1 enemv resist
ance. Patrols Were clashing, ancl was
conRiderable house-to-hous" fig'hting. Exten
RiVe mine tiehls and roa(l blOl'ks had to be
cleal'ed. Tanh wel'e placed in firing position
along the Wl'st bank of the !'iver to as;;ist
in th!' -attack. At On:lO the 45th Division
notified the rl'ldment that eightl'en aggault
boats and seven rafts were being sent for
ward in 1l1"t'IHll'ation for the rivel' crogging.
. InfantrYllll'n in the meantime continued to
fight their way into that portion of the town
west of th!' Moselle. At 1:120 the 180th re
portell to 45th Division headquarters that
"we are sending a couple of girls __ FFI
agents __back to your place. They have a lot
of information, They report there are two
bridges in town __the girls came over one of
them. They have a map of the that
ghows all road blocks and all the mined
areas. They report enemy dug in for 500
yat'ds __that has been substantiated. We can
see them and are firing on them__There had
been a lot of Krauts dug in on the north
side of that hill. We haven't had much luck
in driving them ouL_They, report the place
is heavily mined and there are a considerable
of road blocks all' around the town.
There is about a half a regiment on both the
, east and west sides of the town; a majority
on the east side of the town are in the
wood8__"
In the afternoon of 22 September the Ger
mans appeared to be pulling out of Epinal <>n
roads leading eastward. American artillery
began shelling traffic which could be ob
served moving' along these escape routes. The
;]5th Division, which was then engaged at
Eloyes, was notified of this enemy movement
toward its zone to the southeast and was abo
informed that the 45th would probably enter
Epinal that night. Shortly afte.' 1600 hOl"'"
till' rCl10rt was confirmed that the Germans
had pulled out IllOst of their troops west of
the river ancl had blown the last two remain
ing- hl"idg'C's. The 180th pushed forward pa
to ascertain what holding forces re
mained and it was found that a crossing
coul,l be made after nightfall. That night the
engineers made a reconnaissance for a
crossing; but enemy small-arms and mortar
fir!', particularly from the east bank of the
river, interfere(1 with the operation. All fixed
brirlgC's had bpen but it was
thoug'ht that a Bailey hridge could be rapidly
constructed at "ither of two sites.
On 2:\ September the 180th Infantry forced
three river crossingfl in the face of heavy
mortar, and tank fire. One bat
talion !.'nten'<i that llortion of Epinal on the
east hank with thl' of clearing out
bolatf'd groups of enemy who were still using
how''';' and other buildings as strongpoints.
All sitt's were coverecl hy machine
guns plaeeLj on the west bank, and riflemen'
were instalfetl in buildings close to the river
to keep the enemy pinned down.
With the capture of Ellinal. the Seventh
Army gained control of the key communica
tion center in the Vosges. In the town were
found fifteen locomotives; a large number of
railroad cars; and dumps of ammunition,
maps. and military supplies. Epinal was to
become a vital base for future operations in
the Vosges. The Commanding General of VI
Corps sent his personal congratulations to
the 180th Infantry Regiment on the success
of its operation. '
On the right flank of the VI Corps. the
3d Division encountered the most difficult
terrain ancl the most determined enemy op
position on the Moselle line. It was the
53
SEVENTH ARMY 'CROSSES THE MOSELLFJ RivER
of the three divisions to' cross the
Moselle: The routes from the division po
sitions at Mclisl'Y and Faucogney to the
river at Rupt-sur-l\loselk and Le Thillot led
through a heavily forested section of the
foothills and
wns pal'ticul>al'ly a
dapted fot, enemy de
fensive-and d('laying
al'tions, The glow
nl'<s of the French
mlvancl' l'XPORC(\ the
division's right flank
and retnl'ded its pro
greg", In the :ld Di
ybitlll zone the ap
pl'ollch to the :.\10
,'elIe, und not the
ri"(,l' its"lf. \\'as tIll'
d,il'f oh"tal'le,
At dayhl'l'Hk ,.n :!tl
Sept('mi>el' tIll' :ld Di
vh-icn l'estnned t11l'
nttae1, to
wut'(l
the
with the 7th and
Regiments mov
ing gt'nl'l'ully along
thl' main highway
north,'a;.t) out of
Faucogney. The 15th
lnfantl'y remained
in reserve with one
battalion still in the process of heing relieved
by the French, By mid-morning the advanc('
of the 7th and :lOth Regiments had, been
practically halted because of stubborn enemy
resistance in the village of This
mountain village lay near the French zone
on the right flank of the Americans, and its
reduction was essential before the advance
coulll continue. The enemy was operating
largely in isolated groups and taking full
advantage of the thick woods and high
gl'Ound: Road blocks consisted of a series of
logs covered by 'thirty or forty infantrymen
armed with machine pistols, machine guns,
and antitank guns. In order to envelop Melay
from the north the 1st Battalion of the 30th
Infantry moved out from Faucogney and ate
tacked southeast to secure Le Mel', Armored
support was not available because continuous
rains had made the poor mountain roads
impassable for tanks and tank destroyers.
CFH'IA'.' I'ItI"n.... T.\Kf-:,,\ Ix" EPINAL, FRA::"CE. ARE MARCHED RACK TO
TilE P!tbO:S-FEt-of'\\ An CAGE. MOST OF TltE;\t ARE fi.NIPF.Rf;
During the afternoon artillery heavily shelled
('nemy defenses and in return' received
devastating flanking fire from the heights
north of the town of Melisey, not ye't cleared
hy the French. At dmk Melay fell after
Litter house-to-house fighting.
Throughout 21 September the attack con
tinued against stiffening resistance, and it
was two days later before the 7th Infantry
was in position to cross the Moselle and at
tack the town of Rupt. About midnight of
the 23d a bridge WaS found intact; advance
elements crossed the river and began to fight
off enemy attempts to blow the bridge, which
had already heen prepared for demolition
with nineteen boxes of TNT, By 0500 hours
MlI,ITARY REV,n:W
, till' llPXt lllOl'ning an hridgehead
had hel>ll firmI}' and hy mid
morning' all of til(' rl'g'll1ll'nt had crossed
tilt' :-'[,"elll',
'The' French Fir,;t had only rl'ached
the "Ui>UI'l\" of ,\11 the 22d,
lellving- the :1t1 rig'ht tlank
on a !w\,lv('-milp front from :\[eligev north
t hrollgh tn
Th("I,,(h in l'c"prve, and thC' Jl7th
Squadron cnvcl't..Jd
this expn,.:"d flank, hloeking all roarl" and
traib that ('ut the >teep, wooded hill"
"nd \\"'1'(, availahle' to the ll1,nltnlting' Plll'my,
On 2:: September tIll' German infiltrated hacl,
into E,mouli,'re", tlll'Catl'lling', tlw en
til''' nperation, hut WCl'l' drivell out the follow
ing: day, TIl\' \-1 Corp, ,'omman,ler visitc,l tl1('
Fl'elll'h II ("Il'P' ('Omnulnrl,'l' tn a \Tangl' for
the jlro!edion of thb flank, Howl'vel', the
i'rl'lH'h "dVHlll'P n'Il,th lll'v('r nlatel'iali'l.cd,
;,ntl tlwir r"l'(,.. tinal!,' had to mov,' through
I Ill' Anlcl'iea!l ZIlll(' til lakp up tIll' !lallk po,.:i
timl, nftel' 11ll' :!d Divi,joll had the
:'IIo,l'lk and \Va, lig:hting- two miles
tlwir III idg-C'hl'ad,
i'he :;nth attack made ,low I'rog'
1 agnin:-:t :--tuhhlll'n holding'
an,l had ",('atlll'l'. poor and ruggct!
t('!Tuill added to th,' ditlicl1lties nf th,' ad
\'anc,', On S,'ptel1llll'r the )'C'gllllellt was
:'till t \Yo llIiles ,.:nll! h\\'cst of I{upt, hel,1 up hy
(;C'l'lllan dd"I1"" at I.e Chene, u villagl' on
I h(' )'oall rUnnhlg' alollg' tIll' wcst bank of the
1Insl'Il(', The \\'lb impa,.:sable hc'cause
of a ,cncs of road blocks,
\\' ,,11 II('I\'n<le,1 po, it ion,.: on the ftnnks
lln't the Infantry',.: advance with fire
f!'Om slllall ll1ortal", and
2(1-1lI1l1 tlak g'un" The infantry wa,.: fOl'c('t! tn
make its way forwart! throug-h ]louring rain
and dellSl' \\'oods, I.e Clwne \\'a,.: tak('n on the
afternoon of the :!5th, and till' )'('g'imental oh
jl'ctiv{'s on till' hill overlooking: Lie Thillot
Wel'e seeure.] bd'ol't' 110,>11 till' follLlWlllg'
TIll' area was tlll'll tutll"d OVlel' to th" French;
ant! the :lOt.h Infalltry was O\'t!l'l'et! to movie
by motor to Rl'mirenlOnt ant! to l'I'O":" to till'
ea,.:t bank,
During' th,' la"t week of Septemher, \'.[
COI'PS had successfully crosserl the Moselle,:
The 'em;t hank within the Seventh ,\rmy ;l.otie
, \Va,.: being rlem'ecl of the ent'l1I Y ; and bridge's
at Epinal. A)'ehes, Jal'l11cnil. Eloyes, Remite
mont. :'.Ioxol1champ, and RUpt were in ope)'a.
t ion, stated that initial orders had
heen to withdraw to the Rhine; but they
added that thes!' were latcr chang'ed and Ulllls
told to hold for twenty days, because fortific'a
(ion, along the crest of the Vosg'es would
!lot he completed until that time, Get'
'man" hut! fought stubhornly to hold the
line and now continued to cont<'st
foot of the advance toward the
passe":, Ea,t nf the l\Io":l'lIe, tmops ran illto
-tI'nng- outpost and suicide real' guards rail\!'
ing from company to hattalion streng-th,
Th",.:" poel,ct,.: could not Ill' hY]HI>,,,'d hecau,"
th,'re werc no availahle, res,'rve tl'OOPS to
c1l'all them \lP,
The last few days of the month wpre nH\ll\
!,' utilized to consolidate tIll' hridgeheads of
thp three infantry divihion,.: compri,ing the
Seventh A)'my, The 4nt h Divisioll hcgan its
advance northeast to seizc Bnccarat and fo) ce
"pen thl' Savl'me Gap: the :lfith Division
movl'Il Oll St. Di" l1L'al' the Saale" and
the :!d Division pushed toward Ger<lrclmct'
neal' the Schlucht Pass, Thc city of Stm,
hourg', nn the Rhine, wa,.: the most important
oh.ieetiv,' nf the Sevpnth in coming
nperations,
On the' hIgh ground cast of the the
(Cl'man,.: nnw o('cupi,'d a dl'finite defpnsl'
line, Thpi!' withdrawals l'l'a"cd; and held
on tenaciously, counterattacking: freqUl'ntly,
The enemy resorted to. jung-le tactiC's in the
heuvily-won<!pc! terrain hct\H'en the
and :'.Ioselotte Rivers and frcquently infil
trated behind the Americlll1 lines to :lmhu,.:h
SUIl]1ly trainB, Thus as thl' battle ]lI'llgTl'SBCtl,
the pnemy became mOl e d{'tL'l'll1ined to make
p\'e)'y advarice a, cost]:, a,.: p(),.:sibh"
This determinl'd polil'Y of I he l'!ll'lllY, alulIg
with the mOVelllc'lIt Llf uU!'
j)"utliciellt rest, long periods ill tht' lin", ('oll'
action, inclement \\'leather, diftil'ult
terrain, and the' increasing use hy the G.'r.
n1>ms of mines, mortars. and
, ','.
SEVENTH ARMY CRQSSKS THE MOSELLE RIVER 65.
to"k a heavy toll of American fighting lill'n, attacked the VORgt'S deft'nse line before
DUl'ing the month of Sc-ptt'l1lhor alone the I>1'>1 \; inil: th1'Ough to thc Alsace Ph\in, With
:;<1, :lIith. anc! 45th Divisions. whieh marl" Uj! Ills hack to tIll' Rhine. tlw ('1)('111;" fought cun-"
Ih,' VI ('Ol'jl<. "utl'el't'rI 5.1;;!l ningl;.' and t('nariow;ly g'iving gl'oUlld only
For it period of fifty-nim' from 2tl ",\1('n fO",'cd lo_ Th.. tin,al hattlc for (;el'many
:"'jltt-mher to Ul tlw Sevl'nth Ann;.' bat! now hegun.
"Technical" Pdnciples of Division 1'ranspol't Operation
I'l'l'pal'l'd fill' till' :\Ill.ITARY REVIEW by :'IIaintplH\nct' Divi"ion, A,'my Sl'rVlct' Fol'l't's.
1:-; an al'tide in tIll' DC'l'el1lbe!'
lilH of :\IILlTARY 1{1';V1E\\, :\iajol' F. ,J.
01'lln1\m'I' Depal'tllll'nt, says, "Thl'
\"hicle'o and at'companying perl;onnd whieh
,,!'l'ratl' prillHlril?' in tIlt' ,upply, evacuation,
,tlld maint(,llallcl' of thc divbion are thl' life
bluoc! of thl" infantr;. divi,ion." HI;' th"n
"I':-'<.'l'illl';-' tht, f((cflctti {)f the
tlll11 \)f'division tl'UI1;o;POl't.
.\ '10th",' of pl'incipll". ('qually 1111
l'",'tant, Wen' not indnded in the :\Iajor'"
HI tlell'. fill' ohvious l'la.... Thl'Y art' \vhat
III Ii-!'ht hl' e.dll'd tl1l' t!'('h/lintl jlrincipll'';, Bl'
tau"" thp tactienl pl'indpho< an' depl'ndent
up"n propl'l application of thl'
pl'incipl"" thl' lattcr are PI ""enled fOl' the
},!"Hldallt'l' uf !--taff Otiil'(ll':-- concerned wlth
"i,1tl11 U'all'port opemtion. They involve thl'
lllaintl'llalll'l' of l'quipment, without wh,ch Ili
"I ,ion transport cannot function with full
tltlicienl'Y. or. in l'xtl'ellh) casl':--. cannot func
t inn at all.
Thl' first prillt'ipie, which appli'" to thl'
jy"lividual "ohlier, is that the performance of
preventivl' 11laintpnance sPl'vices ll1USt be
hahitual. The soldil'r must be SO indoctrinated
with the nece"sity of performing authorized
m,rintenance sc'lvices that he considers them
a matter of life and dt'ath. Since equipment
fmlure" in combat actually (Ire a matter of
1ife and death, not only for the vehicle
ojl,'rator hut also for the men he supplies or
l'val'uates, this is a lesson the soldier can hp
made to "take seriously.
The' ;,e(ond principle. which applies to of
that the administration of the pn'
vlntive maintenance program must be in
""rdalll'!' ,,",ith authorizc>d jlroc"clUl'es and
must he ('losl'ly ('t)ntroll"d, Luxity in plull
llln::!', l'l'<.'ol'd kl'l'pill.U:.
training. 01' in the allotment of time' and
faeiliti", for jll'eventiv" mainlt'IUllll't' i" uoulld
to result in loss of vital trHnRl't1itatioll.
The third l'r-ineiple, which involve''' Loth
t and llll'n I 1'01' ol"g-<lnizu
t iOlla! nlall1tenance, is tIlt' PI'OPl'I' application
elf i1"II'Uellllllh pn'scrihl'd in T:\l :l,-2XIO, Thb
followinp,' lhe fin... t l'ehelon 111ain
tenant'\' proc'"durl'< lis(ed on thl' hack of
FOI'm "DriVl'r'" Trip Tiekl't an.] Pre
\"'ntlVt' Service HecOl'd"; ill:
,,(ruction, in the tl'chnical manual and \Var
Depal tllwnt Luhrication Ol',h'!' for the'
\'('hide; illteliigl'llt u"" of WD A(;O Form
;';0. -l50, "Prevl'ntivl' :\laintl'nHncl' Roster";
\\. D A(;O Forlll :\0. \1-,;;, "Daily Dbp:ttehing
Ret'ord of ;\10101' Yehicll's": WD ,\GO FOl'm
;\10. 1:\-1, "Automotive Disahility Heport of
Yehicles Disabled i\lore than Thrl'e Days";
WD A(;O Form 1'\0. and "Iajol'
Fnit Hl'placcmellt Record-Or
ganizational Equipment Fiho"; and the sede"
of preventive maintenance service and tech
nical inspection work "heds for val'ious
clas",'s of vehicular equipment, WD AGO
Forms "'os. 461-4G4, is required, For stafr
"fficers, making occasional personal ingpec
tions using the spot-check inspection reports
-WD AGO Form No. for wheeled "nd
half-track vehicles and l)-Gl) for full-track and
tank-like wheeled vehicles-is essentiaL
\Vhen these principles are followed, motor
transport elMS beeonw the "Iifehloodof the
infantry rlivi"ion." When they are not fol
I"wed, motor transport slowly bleeds to lkath, '
and there is no plasma that can I'Pstol'e it.
--, ,
SOP for Court-Martial Charges in Field Forces
LIEUTENANT COLONEL BYRNE A. BowMAN,Jlldge Advocate Genc1"al's
Di"bintl JUlh.re AI.f"ocntt', lOfilh Inrllntry Divbiun
For a ('omplete outline of JIiliian)
Justice Pro(,cdure, the reader is I'e/ared
to TJI ;!7-255, Febl'lta/'y 1H!';;.
-THE EDITOR.
P
REPARATION, investigation, and trial
of court-martial continues to
be a mystery and a difficulty to many officers
and enlisted nll'n. l\Iany have no oc
casion to be familiar with such administra
tive matters. Oth('r8 bog down in the details
of the l\I,mual for Courts-;\Ial'tial or the
advice of various individuals who ullUally
stress c('rtain sacred cows, fOl'lllalities, and
taboos that whip you het'ol'<: you
An SOP be simple aJHl practical,
yet legally soun,l and 'lfl'ctive. It should
meet the l'('quirellwnts of the :'Ilanual in all
respects. It should furnish the commanding
officer all the information available about
the accused as well as th<:> cabe, so that the
commander ('an act intelligently on the char
ges. It must not unduly burden busy oHirers.
It must be fast and thoroug'h.
Company cll'rks function better if there is
one fixe(1 for them to prepare papers,
and instructions for doing' it are in front of
them. For one thing', no one else can tell
them a different way of doing it. The same
is true of officers. Usually, all personnel
strive to accomplish what is but are
not sure as to exactly what is desired and
exactly how it is desired to be accomplished.
The accuser has an opportunity quickly to
take signed, sworn statements in longhand
on the spot, when the offense happens in his
company area; but he should not have to do
any typing. The investigating officer can
easily take signed, sworn statements in long
hand from the witnesses while he interviews
them; but he should not have to type the
&tatem,ents and then go back and get the typed
ones signed.
The unit personnel section has much infor
mation in the service record and on the Form
20 that should be considered by the investi
gating officer, and the commanding' officer;
but they should not have to go dig it out.
A set of fOl'm has been designed, and is
in use, which furnishes an' SOP to meet the
above requirements, and which also gives the
trial judge advocate some instructions. Here
tlll'Y art': '
______________________ (Hq)
_____________________ (Sta)

____________________ (Date)
8CBJEC'T: COlll't-:\Iartial Charges
TO Commanding Officer, ____ (Orgn)
1. Conrt-llliil'tial charges against the above
pl'l'son are hereby forwarded, within 24 hours
aft,'r his confinement at this station (or if
not within that time, r!'ason for delay is:)
2. A brief summary, in longhand, of the
availabl ..' evidence to support the chat'ges,
is (or s.eparate sworn statements, in long
hand, of the ('ssential witnesses, are) at
tach",!. All es,,'ntial copies of morning
,'cport ", arrest reports, pa"ses, service
record showing prior convictions, etc" are
attached, except the following which are not
availahle for the following reasons:
:.L Following information concerning this
mun is submitted for your consideration:
a. AGCT Scor(': ; Group
h. Education: yrs in
c. Civilian Occupation: yrs as
@$ per
d. 1\108 Xumber: ; Classification or
Duty:
e. Number of admissible previous con
victions:
f. Present Character:
g. Present Effici!'ncy Rating:
h. Other pertinent information, by way I
of background
l
such as punishments:
under A W 104, prior convic- '
tions that cannot be considererd by
a court-martial, fui:loughs, unsuccess
ful efforts to rehabilitate the' man in
the unit, wounds, decorations, etc., is
(not) attached as a separate inclo"'
4.
Io':::;' 0p'o',", tho , ..
SOP FOR COURT.MARTIAL CHARGES IN FORCES
tally responsible, and a psychiat"ic examina
tion is (not) necessary, .
5, In my opinion, the will ___ be
of eventual uReful service to the army be
enUR-e:
n, Trial by a court-martial
is recommended,
_.Inej,
1 - Cha,'g-e Sheet (in t "i,,)
"
"
4
5
(j
7 -
201- IRt Ind
HQ
TO:
You are herehy designated to inv<'O'tigat ..
the indoRed charges against the above ac
cused, in accordance with A \V 70, pal' ::5(1,
:\I,C,i\!" and the instructions on the hack
IIel'eof (see "Instructions to Investigating Of
tk('l''' below-Ed,), You will r('n(l('r your
report within 48 hours. llnh-ss additional
time is granted hy this head'lmlrkl's.
By order of
_.Incls nfe ,\djutant
201- 2d Ind
Investigating Officer, ______ (Sta & Date)
TO: Commanding OfficeI'. ________ (Orgn)
I. The inclosed chal'ges have been cfl,'efully
and eompletely investigated. The accused was
informed of the offenses charged against
him; the names of the accuser and of the
witnesseR; the fact that the charges .were
about to be inveRtigated; his right to crOS"
examine the witnesseR against him if they
were available and to present anything he
desired in his own behalf either in rlefense
or mitigation; his right to have the investi
gating' officer examine available witness('s
Jequested by him; and his right to make 01'
submit a statement in any form subject to
the risk of having such statement used
against him,
2. Signed sworn statements of all available
witnesses (including any made by the ac
cused) and all pertinent documents, are at
tached, properly marked and listed as
inc1ostll'es, Such witnesses were either ex
amined in the prcsencc of the accused and
he affordl'd an opportunity to cross
examine them and the statements then
prepared, 01' the statements were first ob
tained and then submitted to the accused
and he stated in writing on each that he did
not care to cross-examine the witness, The
following witnesses and documents are not
available for the following reasons:
11. The facts in the case are sufficient to
the elements of proof of the offenses
('harged. as required by l\1.C,M.. except:
4. In my opinion the accused is ____ men
tally respoJ1:,;ible, I have (not) obtained a
examination,
5, I have _. __ interviewed the unit com
mandel'. first sergeant and squae! or Rection
It'adl'l'. ane! examinN] the accused's service
I ecol'd, in an effort to understand the ac
('used and hiR offpnseR, A hl'ief discussion of
my findings is ____ attached. properly
nUll'ked, and listed as an inclosure for your
consideration in (letermining disposition of
the case,
(j, I have considered the nature of the of
fenses. the eviclence, the age of the accused,
his military Rervice. the necessity for pre
ferving- the manpower of the nation in the
present emergency and of salvaging all
]loRsibl" military material, and the estab
lished policy of the War Department that
trial by general court-martial will be resorted
to only ",hE'n the charges can be disposed of
in no other manner consistent with military
discipline,
' I recommend:
;:
. a. That no changes be made in the
specifications 01' charges. except:
h, Trial hy _. __________ court-martial,
"
I nvestigating Officer
__ Incls
1
2
3
MILITARY REVIEW
5
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Iii
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I -
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1:;'
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:!(II - ::I'd llid

To: ('ollllll:lll,lllll! (;l'lll'"d. lillHh Infantl'Y
Ilivi"ioll,
{'pon t'al'dul ,'on'ld"latloll ,,1' thl' ,'a"e.
1'('('Olllll1(,.llhl
C0I111nan,ling
_Iud n "
I :-;sl'flCt"I'l":-;S Til :\,'(TSEfl
1. COllsult the illd", in th,' :\1.c.:\I.. and
thf' pagt' IHllllhpl ..... f'OI' thp dL--eu:..;:don of
tht, oti'"n,,, IIlld till> f01'1ll nl' '\ll'citication,
1{,'u,I,lmth,
:!. Spnd t hi' unit \ll'I',onl1l'l otliccl' ,igned
R\\'ol'l1 ,tut,'I11<:l1ts in IOll,Q'hand of uvaiJahlt
anel a notl' iii llng'hand ---tating
what ehal'gt' .. ou want' pl'el'<ll'cd, If ;,ou are
unahlp to get 'tHtellll>nt,. get the hy
intel'vi,'w, tC'i<:ph01W. I'cpol'b, It'ttel", etr.,
alH\ ,end th,' UPO a note in IOllghand giving
a, many of tIl{> facts a, p",,,ihlt', covedng'
who, what, when, Wh"l'P, II'h:>' and how,
INSTRUC'T!o:\,S TO UNIT i'ERS():\'NEL SF.CTI(l:\'
1. C!WI'{j(' 8h('( t. u. Detel'll'ine whether the>
UPO fjl: the unit ,'ommand1' b to sign the
ehal'gl' shel't, 1I11d th,'n Pl'eI'HI'" it in tl'ipli
(utt'. (Sec ill ... at png'p:-: 17. atl<I
i\1.t'.I\I.)
b. PIlg'e I. .\'II II/(' : Do not N!lII {)r J0
and .<10 not abhr'viatc, Abbreviations else
where, except in the are permis
Age: Age at dllte of filing charg,s.
PI1Y: Base plus longevity. Allotment: State
"none" or the amount and the class, Type
above "Allotment" the "CI F Deduc
tion:" and state "none" 01' the amount, Dala
to Sen'icc: Follow the printed instruc
tions. Do not list all transfers. Show date
was assignpd nnl! joim>c1 present
organization, Data CIS to Jl'itllc.qs('s: StatE'
"AgainBt Accused:" and "For Accused:"
List evidence. Do not list atfi
davits, arl't'st reports, and lettel's. List phy.
sical evidencp, like a knife, an. I the name
and address of the custodian thereof. D/I/I/
"" III N(stNtiu!: "Confined hY'civil Iluthol'i
tips, Chicago, lIlinois, 2 Feh J!J44 , Confinpd
at 1'ost Stockade, Fort Shel'idan, Ill., 10
Fph 1944, Confined at Post Stockade, Camp
A ttpl'iJllry, Int\., 20 Feh 1!l44." Do not state
"aJlI1l'ph{'nticd. "
('. Do not numhE'I' a single chan!'c
0" a single 'I)(>('itication llnd('l' a chat'g'(',
If mOl'e than onc charg"'. numhej' each with
Homan num(,l'als (I, II, etc.), If more than
Olle 'JleciiicHtion undel' a ('harRc. numher
('ach with Arahic 1111111erab (1, 2. ete.). Ilo
not put the aceusl'd's numh,j in the
On A\vOL. s]lPcify ahs"IIt'" as
frolll "his romlllund,"
d. Pag'(' ::. A /fidlll'il: If the accusel' d"ps
not have knowledge. strikc out that
pal't of the affidavit. Statc specification(,)
'If the> l'hllI'R"'(S).
". Statl.' vuluc of pl'opl'ny: "a 'coat, value
about $5,00"; ant! valuc of money: "ahout
1 000 frane" Belg-ian Clll'l'ency, of the ex
(hange valuE' of about $22.50." State Repa
I'ately the value of each article If tht'
value is over $50.00, ll1C'rely state: "value
oV{,j' Do not hurden specifications
with immaterial details which add to the
hUI'<ien of proof. Omit serial numbers on
equipment and Use the word
"wrollg:fully" in each specification under
AW 96,
:!, (If 1'1</118111111/. a. litfon' vre-'
paring' the letter make all pavel's in tripli
('ate except voluminous one!> such as an IG
rcport, (Make typewritten copies of each I
SOP Fon C'OURT-MAWl'IAI. CHAnGES IN FmLD FonCES
long-hand statement, attach tho orig-inal tY!le
",l'ittl'n on(' on top of the on(' in longhand
ntHI t 1'('at tlwm lH< ont',) Put all paper!' in a
pIl.. , with til{' sht'pt on top. Beginnilig
at tIll' lop, nllll'k thpl1l (anrl the ('ol'ie1' tlwre
of) ill p('neil in the low"r left cornC'rs as
Ind I, 2, :1, etl'.
h. Type the letter in tl'iplicate for sig
l.ature the person who is to sign the
(harA'l' shed. the they
\\tort' l1HU'lH.(L For llxnmpk:
X Inc!
1 - Chante Sheet (in trip)
:! - 11[/R Co G, 424th Inf (in trip)
" Ant'st Report (in trip)
-l - Notl' fl'Olll Capt Conner (in trlp)
f> Rpt of Inv hy IG with 2 inds and fi
('"hibits
Ii Ltr frolll 1\11''' Smith, ,I !\Iar 44, with
1 ind and 1 inc!
, - Evident'e of Prior Cony (in trip)
X Sworn stHtellle'nt of Sg-t Smith (in
trip)
I;-';STRUl"Tlo;-';S 1'0 I r-;VE8TIGATI:-Ir; OFFll'ER
1. YOUl' investiy:ation will he t 1/11/"1'/19II ,
;'11/1((1'(;((/, cotu.;eiclflwus, ancl IlI'ow/d. Half
hl',!rtl'<l, "lip-shod work show" a lack of at
f<>ntioll to Your organization eOIll
m:uIIle, upon you to furnish him with
Illfol'luation for a complete of
th(' caee amI the man,
Fi, sf. Consult the index in the l\I.C.1\I.
;!1lrl find and read the discussion and required
proof of the charged. Check the
ltlcmorandml1, sworn statements, extract
of morning reports, etc., submitted by
the aCCLIsel', the wording- of the specification,
atHI the maximum puniHhment at pug-e
;\J.C.l\I. ['/lOl!' the cas!'. .
:L SCC(}/lti. Intel'view the accus('d privately
in a quiet, fail', and orderly manner. Tell
hill! who you are, what your duty is, who the
at'euser is, what the charges are, who the
\I ,tnesses are, ,md what the maxi!11um pun
is, Show him the entire tile. Tell
him YOU are to make a report of th" case to
the officer so that he can de
termine what disposition to make of the case.
T,'ll the accused that you are to interview
all availahle and that he can ,('1'058
,'xamin(' nf thelll, 01', can til'S! obtain
,worn ,tah'nl<'nts fl'nm tl1<'lll and show th"!11
,to him and then h(' ('fill t'l'oss.(';o;amilll', or.
!lotl' on tIl<' RtHtf'nWl1tR that lw dOl'R not
to do Inform him that hl' lllay
anything he may in his own
behalf, {'itlwr in defense OJ" mitig-Hticl1. Ask
hitl! if he has any hl' wants you
to interview, Tell him that he can make a
statenll'nt Dr not as he desires. that he is not
required to makt' one, and that if he makes
Olll' it can he used against him,
4. 1'1;;, rl. \Vhen you int(,l'view a witness he
tactful. friendly, and patient.. Don't con
stantly intel'ru!'t him. W rite up his statl'
llH'nt in longhand in the tirst person, while
he talks. "My name Pvt John Dol', Service
Co., Inf. I was at PX No. 1 at 2000
O!l 21 Ap"il ID41." If you take a statement
fl'om thc,accused: ":\fy nanll' is Pvt John
Doe, SerVice Co., 424th InL I have Iwen
",al'nl',l r do not have to make a stnte
ment, and that if I make one it can be used
nlt'. I make thl' following statement
fll'ely and the person to
write "Sworn to and suh"crihl'd hefore me
this ____ of ____ " and "ign yOlll' name
as Investigating' DUker. If he not desire
to sign' the statemE'nt, write "This statement
was nladl' to Ill<' all the __ of ____ .
Thp nfusl'd to it" and sign your
name as lnve"tigating Dtikel. If yoti have
to interview a witne:', hy telephont' hundle
it that way.
5, F"I/dlt. If the aCl'tlst'd a
men!. take it dowll jm;t as he says it. DOlI't
edit it. J)Oi/'t xl/bRfitlllr !Jill'" 1I'''rds (or his.
In mal,ing tht' statellH'nt he expects you to
present it to the cOlllmanding- otliC't'" just
it is givt'n to you, Be 8lH'P that the ac
ha:::; opportunity to 111ake a <:0111
plete statt'men!. If hl' oVl'l'looks ,ome phase
it is proper to inquire if he cares to include
anything- in his statement ahout that. If
of remarks are obviou81y wholly
il'l'l'lpvant, It is unnecessary to take them .j
down. .
6. Fiflr. Have you secured statements C9V
rring all evidence for hath prosecu
<
MILITAltY REVIEW
'60
- ti-on and defense? For example, where ac
'cused is charged' under A W 75 of running
away while hig orgnnization was before the
enemy, do you have statements showing the
tactical situation, covering location, objec
tives, and activities of accused's unit, and
the location and activities of the enemy? 01',
where accused is charged under A W 94 01'
96 with wrongfully taking' and using a
government vehicle, do you have
showing tha1: he hUll no authority to take
the vehicle? If he is charged un,ler A W 9:1
for theft of a vehicle, do you have any
evidence indicating that he inten,\t,d to per
nlUnently the owner thereof? In guard
cases, do you have statements showing how
the guard was operated, inspt'cted.
and relieved; and what the g'('neral and
5pccinl ol'<Icrs Wcrt', if any, particularly with'
respect to nccused's post; and have you ob
tained extract copy of the g'Utm\ book. if
any. authenticated by the custo,lian thereof,
and statements from the Oflicer of the Day,
and the Officer, Sergeant, and Corporal of
the Guard?
7. Si.l,th. Assemble all the "tatemC!nts and
oth,-r papers you have obtained into a pile.
Put the inclosures thnt caml' with ap
)Jointment on top. in nUl11el!icul order. Then
numher ,sour additional inclosures. in proper
Then draft your report with its
of Imclosures. in pencil. (See back of
accusel"s letter.) Have all your inclosures
and your report typed in triplicate. Place
paeh longhand statement under the first type
written copy thereof. staple the two together
and treat them as one. After typing. sepa
rate your report. with inclosure,;. into three
sets. !\lark one "For the Accused."
INSTRUCTIO:-;S TO TJA OF SPECIAL COURT
1. Pi/sf. Trial normally will be held
within ten days after the offense. or the
delay explained. General instructions for
the TJA will be found at pages :l0 and 258.
M-.C.!\l: Immediately study the file. Kuow
what evidence is availahle. Study the l\LC.l\I.
for the proof required. If the evidence ap
pears insufficient, notify the appointing
authority. Immediately prepare in longhand
<lny stipulation you want to obtain. "It is
herehy stipulated and agreed by and b'etween
the Trial Judg'e Advocate, the Defense Coun.
sel. and the Accused. that if Policeman John
J. Kearns were prl'sent in court he would
tpstify (as stated jn .the attached arrest
report) or (that he apprehended the accused
at 4211<1 St. and ,Broadway, New Yory City
at 2300, 11 !\lay 1944 in uniform.)" Draw
for all three signatures and sign your
name at once. Tell the President of the court
that you have the case and ascertain where'
and when he wants the trial. and the uniform
desired.
2. Second. Tell the DC you have the case,
Take him with you to serve the charges. Give
the a complete coPy of the file. in
eluding the charge sheet. Immediately sign
the certificate of service 011 the back of the
original charge sheet. Introduce the accused
to the DC. Hand the DC any proposed stipu
lation and ask him to accomplish the proper
signatures. and return it to you. if agree
able to the accused.
:l. Thil'd. Immediately interview the named
and any others whose testimony
may he necessary or desirable. (Notify the
DC of the names and probable- testimony of
any new witnesses you intl'nr\ to use.) Know
thl' whol!' story of each witness. Explain to
"ach witness how the court will be seated,
how he js to salute the President. what
que,tions are to be asked, how objections are
handled, and how and why cross-examina
tion is conc\ucted. Tell the witness to answer
the qUestions, get to the point and stop
not ramble.
4. FOlll'th. Put all your documentary evi
dence (including stipUlations) in a pile, and
beginning at the top, letter each separate
document as an exhibit beginning with the
order appointing the court as "A", the charge
sheet as "B". etc. (You will not actually
offer "A" and "B" in evidence. however; you
will state that they will be so marked. The
first exhibit you offer is "C".) Put in sheets
of paper with brief descriptions to be sub
stituted by the court for pistols. knives, etc,
When there is some technicality of proof
required before an exhibit can be offered,
note what it is, and how you will meet it,
SOP FOR COURT-MARTIAL CHARGES IN FIELD FORCES
on a she.et of paper and attach it to the
exhibit. Then make an outHne of your order
of proof that is logical and in keeping with
the sequence of events, as nearly as possible.
If you are planning to announce an oral
stipulation in court. note how you will
express it and that you will aRk the accused
in court if he agrees to it.
5. Fifth. Having determined time, place,
and uniform for the trial. send out notices
to all concerned; arrange a detail to clean
the courtroom, and al'l'unge the furniture;
prepare typed copies of the charges and spe
cifications (not the whole charge sheet) for
distribution to the court when the case is
called for trial; prepare your legal cita
tions for authorized punishment. essential
"1,,n1<'nt5 of proof, admissibility of evidence.
etc.; arrange for attendance of accused in
proper uniform and for guard: arrange for
attendance of witnesses; get a supply of
scratch pads anti pencils, a form for
ings and sentence, and a form for report 0:(
result of trial. Study the procedure at .pages
260 and 271, or in the Outline of Pl'oce,dure.
Be prepared to act ,with confidence and
dignity with careful regard for the accused's
rights at all times.
6. Site!h. When the trial is over, report
the result to the appointing authority, and
if the accused is to be confined, send him
under guard, with report of trial for Prison
Officer to the appointing authority.
up the record of trial on the mimeographed
form therefor, putting in extra sheets where
needed. Summarize the testimony fully and
show which part was brought ont by cross
Examination. Get the -record authenticated.
If the is absent. get another
n1('mbor to sign. (See page 268. l\I.C.M.) At
tach the original file underneath the record
and exhibits. The entire case should be on
the desk of the appointing authority within
three days after the trial.
British Science and the Royal Navy
Erom an article in The Fighting Forces (Great Britain) April 1945.
BRITISH scientists played a big part in
helping to win the V-boat war and constantly
caused the enemy to change his V-boat tac
tics.
, Some details of a pep-talk Admiral Diinitz
made to German flag-officers at \Veimar
in the early days of 1944 can now be revealed,
and his comments on British ,Ilcience, par
ticularly l'adiolocation, are very interest
ing. "At the end of last year and the
beginning of this," he said. "one development
Lecame very obvious which long ago, even in
peacetime, had been feared; that the enemy
might deprive the U-boat of its essential
feature-the element of surprise-by means
of Tadiolocation. With these methods he has
conquered the U-boat menace.
"The scientists who created radiolocation
have been called the saviors of their country.
So it, was not superior strategy or tactics
that gave the enemy success in the U-boat
war, but superiority in scientific research.
"Germany made the great mistake of
calling up her scientists into the armed
forces instead of letting them continue their
researches, anu it was not until months
latcr that the Reichswehr ordered the release
and exemption of scientists from military
service."
Britain did ,not make this grave error.
Her scientists were immediately marshalled
011 priority research within and without the
armed Services. The Admiralty. for example,
employing over three thousand scientists in
its various laboratories and departments, has
gone a step further than in any other coun
try and embodied them into the newly formed
Royal Naval Scientific Service.
The Royal Navy is thus the first in the
world to recpgnize the importance of main
taining research in war and peace by creating
this special service, which includes the men
who mastered the magnetic mine.
Uniform Strength Reports
LIEUTENANT COLONF.L .JAMF.S i\T. EMIGH, Field Artillcl'lI
.Milital'\ 1't'I"M1111Wl lIi\ il'itlt\, .\I'nn !--('I \ l\'t' 1-',,1'\'\';
F"I'nHTb' Inl-tl'lu'tl\'" j',lnlnwllll linll
" 1\ business of :!f10,onn <'Illplny"",
.n. is difficult tn till' ex
pansion of stich a by thirty-two fnld,
to over 8,000,000 in little OWl'
four years, is beyond in the
business world, l\lultitu,linou8 personnel
problems would be involve,l, not the least
of "which would be pel's,lIlnel accounting.
Such a feat, hO\\'l'ver, accomplish0,l by
the War Department in expanding' fl'OIll a
peacetime army of 25(),OOO ill ;\Jarch 1 !l.tO,
to a war machine of QV(,I' K,OOO,OOO nll'n ill
September lf144, ('arh a ,peeialbt ill
own right.
The personnel accountin).!; jlrohlt'll1h of ,uch
a tremendous entel'p)')sP, with pprsonllel
to the far corners of til<' world, arc
of such magnitude to Ilt, without parallel,
and are further amplified tht' illllUilH'nCe
of large-scale redl'ploynwl1t for f'urtht'l'ance
of the war in the l'acitic and 1>).' the pro
posed relea." of upward nf 1,I)(lO,IHIO men
following V -E day,
At th(' tinlt' of the illltmi t'nu'y Ilf CnitL,d
A I'I1IY FOl'ct's into t',lIl1bat III \Vorld
War II, theaters of operation were given
authol'iZt'c1 in thl' 1'01'111 of Tables of
Organization for unit,; lind of Allot
ment:-; for ovprhead Hl:.::tallatIOll!-.. plu::; an
authorized l'eplacl'll1C'nt stocka).!;e providing
a reserve from which to maintain units at
authorized strength, plan l'l'hultl',1 iii
a situation under which th('aters requisi
tioned haRed upon their de,il'cs, but with
no direct control excel'cise,l over them hy
War Department, and with the tlow of r('
placements heing govel'l1(>,1 hy theater de
mands,
PERSONNEL A(,COUNTING
In eal'ly 1944, when the tI'oop ceiling was
reached, and induction werl' levell'd
off with a view t{) induction of only such
numbers of personnel as wouhl be rcquired
for repI'acement of losses in of,ler to main
tain troop ceiling, it became impossibl..
for zone of interior pools to fill requisitions
1'01' l'l'pIH('oJ1ll'nts in th.. amounts requ/ilst.;d
loy t hl'Htl'l's, \\'hi('h in many cases were In
of actual losses,
At thb tilllP the delicacy of the situation
which wah aJ'ising was realized, as well as
the for positive control over
theatcr strength against authorized strength
and for control of depot stockage, For the
time it becnme evident that a standard
I't'jll)!'! iug' was nt'ccssary in QI'der that
the tlwaters and the War Dppartment would
h(' 011 a ('ommoll accountill).!; basis, '
J)Ul'iIlg' !h(' ('llrIy pni't of lfI44 the War
Ih'paJ'llllPul ulldt'l'took a thol'ough study oj
the ,itllation th,'n txistillg' ill active the
,ter,. ill which a ove)'strength
,xi"ted and among' which there was a surplus
of which could not be placed
within tIll' tlll'att'r, This study presented
,111 Opportllll,' tlllle for consideration by the
\\'al' Dt'pal'tJlwnt (;('nei'al Staff of a proposed
I:t \\" P") o<HIII('I ac('ounting' system. which was
n'vit'\\'"d hy ) called in from
two, of tIll' major thC'aters, and adopted by
til(' War Department with minor changes,
In 1!l-l-1. a War Department directive
iSHll'd a uniform Person
nt,1 c\('('()untillg' Sysit'l1I, under restricted
It'lt,,1' filp A(; :)20,2 (1:: ;\lay42) OC-E
SI'(;Art. dall'.! 15 l\lay !fI,lA, subject: Oversea
Rcplaceml'nt S::stpm-Estimates, Reports,
and Requisitions, to Commanding Generals,
Ov('!'sea Theaters, and Bases, Defense Com
mand" and DcpRl'tmento, The first reports
unde!' tht, nt'W system were submitted in
June as of :n :\Iay ID44,
(For a rletailed of Oversea
Rl'jl]acellwnts-Personnel ACCOUnting Sys
km, sec an a!'til'ie of this title by the
author in the February 1945 issue of the
:\IILITARY REVIEW,)
STRENGTH ACCOUNTING AND
REPORTI;>;C OFFICE
In April H)44, an ad hoc committee was
set up by the Deputy Chief of Staff to
amine CUl'l'ent pl'ocedures in personnel con- '
I
UNIFORM STREN(;TH REPORTS
trol and strength l'eporting, On the basis
of the findings and recommenrlations of this
committee, the Strength Accounting and Re
porting Office (SARO) was t'stal;lished in
the, Office of the Deputy Chi-ef of Stnff.
SARO relates the foul' strength figures
Troop Basis Strength, War Dt'pal'tment Au
thorized Strength, Opel'ating Strength, and
Actual Reported Strength, It fi relate'"
War Department to the Troop
Ba"iR, th(>n obtains operating' stl'L'ngth
figurl's comparahl(' to actual rl'ported
"uength through lhl' uoe of the machinery
of the Strength Reporting This
yi"lds two sets,of related stn'llg'th figures
Authorizerl and Troop Basis, llnd Operating
and Actual. The final step b to relate the
t\\'O steps, providing l'l'con('iiiatitll1 of
all foul', Afle'r the tlg'ures have he0n re1al('(1
h:, this SA RO prepares con"ist('nt
strength reports fO!' use the \Val' D"part
lllPnt in planning and controlling thl' stl'l'ngth
of' the Army,
tht fall of 1 !l.J4 SA 1{0 was in
rOlllpll't(, O]H'rati(>n, mal w,\>; publi"hing
monthly. fOl' u>;e of the \Val' Departllw{lt,
the various I'epol'b ;f0l' which It wa" es
tablished, It was thl'n found that the
1'treng,th reports of the P,'r:,onnel Account
ing for OVl'rsl'as Replac('ments and
of SA RO wpre not on a ('ammon basis he
cause of the existencp of varying' tyP('S of
planned 01' authoriwd "trengths, and varia
tions in the manner in which c('\!'lain ac
tual strength figul'es were being reported,
with the result that th!.'re was an apparent
di/ferenc(' and some duplieHtion ill the re
sulting streng,th figures,
U STRENGTH REPORTS
In early 1!)45 a stuely was ma(le by th,'
War Department, together with I'cprps('nt
atives of two active theaters, with a view
to definitely relating thp P(>rsonnel Ac
counting System fOl' Overst'as Replaceml.'llt'
to the sxstem of unifol'lll strength
thl'n in effect. in orde'I' to obtain strength
l'pports Anuy-\vide on a cOJllmon and
possible of preparation with the vtmost
simplieity by the standardized Machine
Record System then in effect' in the zone
of the in'teriol' and in all overseas commands,
On this ba:;i's, strength reports would prQvide
" consolidated and related of tke
CUl'l'ent of the War Depart
ment for strength and replacement rcports
from theat!.'I's. commonly acceptable to the
Wal' DcpartnH'nt an(1 to the theaters, and
form a context ill which all strength infor
mation cnuld be presented and considered,
Upon completion of the proposed directive
and implementing' instructions, and prior
to publication to overseas commands. rep
of one of th.. major theaters
llHHI(' a trial run of the nl'W system for one
month and advi"ed that, with minor changes
which Wl're adol'tt,d, th.. present standard
ized Record System could readily
produce tllt' d,,"il'l,d l'eporb,
In Fehruary nJ45 a War Department direc
tive wa;; i,,"ued establishing Uniform
Strength Reports, undel' classified WD AGO
letter til" :120,2 (2:) Feh 45),
>uh.iect: t:nifol'lll Strength Reports, dated
Fehl'lIH ry 1!145, with inclosures consist
of CUI n'nt DirE'ctiVc',-Strength Reports,
:n l\!areh 1!l.j5, together with a compilation
of detaiit'd Implementing instructions, This
dir(,l'tiv(' all instructions and
report, und(')' the PersonnE"l Accounting
System for Oven;eas Replacements then in
{'ffl'c!. excl'pt for WD AGO Form No. 658,
Requisition fnl' Rotational Personnel, cov,
el'e<i hy "epamtE' lette!' directive. and es
tablished a system con"isting of the fol
lo\ving
I, ;\!onthly Stl'ength Rt'port Unit and
T::pe of Personnel. submitted by mail,
.!, Strength Troop Basis and Branch,
:-uhmitted mail.
,I, Streng-th StHtUs Report, submitted by
teletype, radio, 01' air courier,' and
of the followiI1g sections:
S('ctiol1 1 Theater Stl'('ngth' Status,
,of twenty lines, each
showing
rc'portl'd .autllll1'1zl'd' rength. actual
strc'ngth, and ovpr 01' under authorize.1
strength,
2-Theater Replacement Status
MILITARY REVIEW
<End of Month, consisting of fourteen lines,
Volume
each showing Total, Officers, Nurses and
D & PT, WO & FO, and Enlisted.
Section 3-Gains and Losses During
Month, of nine lines, each
showing Total, Armored, Field Artillery.
Infantry, Engineer, Medical, <Combat
Crews, and Others.
Section 4-Projeeted Theater Replace
ment Status, consisting of ten lines for
<each of eight months projecte,!, each line
showing Total, A l'I11on'd, Field Artillcry,
Infantry. Eng'ineer, :\Iedical. and Others,
.9. Requisition Status ant! Projected Re
placement Requirements Report, submitted
by mail, with first lint' totub for all columns
submitted by priority nl!lio. and consisting
of (1) Requisitioned from Zone of Interior
for each of two months. and (2) PI'ojected
Estimates of Requirements from Zone of
lntel'iol' for the thiJ'd to eighth months hence,
both by arm and service and "howing' Total
and Otficers.
5. Current Theater Rt'plaeenwnt Status
Report. submitted hy mail. and "howing
ilrm and service. total and officers, (1)
Desint! Distribution of Authorized Stock
age, (2) Replacement Depot Storkage. (:n
Over or Short in Units and Overhead. and
(4) Theater Replacement
6. Replacement Availahility and Retrain
ing Status Report, suhmittecl quurter
monthly by radio. by activt' theaters only.
and consisting' of twelve items on Replace
ment Availability, Unfilled L'nit Requisi
on Hand, and two items on Retrllining,
each line shOWing Total. Armored. Infantry,
and Others.
7. Personnel Requisition. suhmitted by
radio and confirmed by mail.
STRENGTH REPORTS OF TilE ARMY
One of the most important applications
of the Uniform Strt'ngth Reports is their
use in the publication by the Strength Ac
counting and Reporting' Office of Monthly
Stl'(;ngth Reports of the Arl1lY. which pro
vide a series of l'elatl'd datn, commonly
acceptable to the War Department and to
thl;! theaters, in two VOlumes as tollows:
Section I Gl'aphic Summary.
Section II '- Total Army Strength.
Section III - Three Major Commands and
\Val' Department Groups.
Section IV - United States Army Forces
Administered Directly by the War De
partment.
Som'ces of Data
1. Troop Basis Planned Stl'ength-WD
Basis.
00 \\,D Tt'oop Deployment Strength-WD
Troop Deployment.
:L WD Authorized Strength-WD Troop
Basis.
-1. R('ported Authorized Strength.
Rtportl,1 Actual Streng,th.
Strl'ngth Reports Submitted by Com
manders of each L.S. ArlllY Force
Administen',1 Directly by the War De
partment (OVl'l's\,us theaters and U.S,
D"fen,,, Commands), t'ach of the Three
:\lujor Command" and War Department

Volume II
Total Army Strength.
Three :\lajor Commands and WD Groups.
unite,1 States Army Forces Administered
Din'ctly hy the \Var Department.
Section I - Strength,
Secti,ll1 II - Replacetm'nt Status and In
fOl'nlational Items.
Sources of Data
Strength Reports Submitted by Comman
ders of each U.S, Army Force Adminis
tered Directly by the War Department.
each of the Three ;.\Iajor Commands and
War Department Groups.
Among' other related strength studies, these
reports provide various studies of United
Stutes Arll1Y assigned strength. including
th(' following specific types of assigned
"ll'eng-ths:
1. Unitl'd States Army Af;signed Strength
by three major continental commands and
\Val' Department groups, and United States
Army Forces administel'ed directly by the
War Department. '
:!. United States Army Geographical
UNIFORM REPORTS
Strength, of the zone of the interior, in
cluding the three major continental com
nuwds, War Department groups and Defense
Commands, and strength en route to overseas
commands, as wt:ll as strength by geograph
ical location outside the zone of the interior
which is aoministercd directly by the War
Dl'partment.
.1. Theater Ration Strength, including
United States Army transientg, United
FUNCTIONS:
ESTIMATE OF TOTAL
division of the schedule into (I) Functions
and (II) Processes.
I. Functions:
1. Revfsed estimates of total neto theater
replacement requirements, projected for the
third to eighth months hence, are received
monthly and, after study and adjustment by
War Department, serve as a basis for induc
tion and training. Thi-s process requires a
maximum of three months.
,"
ADJUSTMENT OF
DISTRIBuTION SHIPMENT
.OISTRI8UTlON TO BRANCHES ALLOCATION ASSIGNMENT
PROCESSES'
INDuCTION TRAININiG
DfPOT. STG AREA. Wftdff
888BBBB8B88
OEQU'S'TlO' DATE l
suel<ISS'O' OF
REQu'SIT,O'
THEATEA MOS RATE TABLE
SUBMISSION
ALCOCATION .-J
DECISION
FIGURE 1
Tpll:\G SCHEflULE- S)'SIElf.

LEAVE Z I SHIPMENTS ARRIVE
, IN THEATER
States Navy transients, permanently sta
tioned, prisoners of war, allied military
strength, civilian personnel, and. miscella
neous personnel.
REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
Uniform Strength Reports provide the
basic figures frolll which all strength studies
are made in connection with the Overseas
Replace)TIent System, and serve as the basis
for induction, h'aining, and al1ocation of re
placements to overs.eas commands. A study'
of the Timing Schedule-Replacement System
(Figure 1) is most easily approached by a
.!. Overlapping the study of estimated re
quirements and the induction period. distri
bution to lnajor continental commands and
branches is made. This process also re
quires a maximum of three months and is
concurrent with input for training.
J. During and after basic training, further
adjustment of distribution is necessary up
to completion of training.
1,. Allocations of replacements are made
to overseas commands concurrently with the
final adjustment of distribution, the last
month of training, and the beginning of
MILITARY REVIEW
furlough period, a ]H'l'io,\ of aPJll'oxi
mately two
5. After have hl'()n matle.
shipments to oVt'l'"eUR t'olllmun<is must then
be sot up and H perioll of two
months i" for arrival ill d<'pot and
!)l'(la and tl'avt.'!. dul'ing
whieh tim(, the tlwatel's. having been noti
fil'd of initiate' til<'
pl'o{'edu1'p:-, for ns:--ig'n111Pnt of' penmnnel to
theatC'I' ,I"llot" :\Ild ":l'ntual1y to umt,..
11. PI'OCl""l''':
The al'tual ]l!'O('L'"'''''' \\'hil'h mu"t ill' g'one
thl'ough in 01'<1<:1' to lllake l'C'plael'Ill(,l1t,,'
flvailahh fOl' ovel'Rt>lt:-. t'oI11111and:-: H1'0 as fol

1. Induetio]l. from till' 0[' till' ill
dul'tion call h'bl'd upon ",,\ illHllLd l'l'rtuire
mellt" to cOlllpletion of al'lllal indlll'tion. l'e
rtuiring' apPI'oximal"ly till , ... l\1ollth,.,
..:. Input for tnlinilll! alld l'ompi<-tlOn of
t)'aining'. l'l''1uil'ing' :tp]lI'",imatl,I>' fOUl'
tnolltl,,;,
,:, l'poll l'Ompl,'lion "I' Ilaining', fllr10\1gh
and t rav,,1 to P"l'""nnel I(,'p!:,,,'mt'nl Depot.
l'Prtllil'ing' apl11'oximnt('ly one 1111l11tll.
in Pt'!''-otlIlPI nl plal't'l1H.'lH
n..,pot, pro('(',,,ing' till <)lll.,]\ Stag'llll!' :\lea. and
Il'avel tilll<' to th,' (lVer,,'a, COl\]
mand, l't'qllil'ing' appr(),illlall'ly t\Yo l\]onth".
.J. in t hl'Hit'l d!'pnt:-. and
to unit. l'lljuirinl.( al'Plllxilllall'Iy
one mOllth.
.\.:-. n fOl' tl'anllllg aft(}'
to oraneh"s ha" hc'ell made. Ratc'
I'evjs"d and Hlitlllittc'd <luartcr1y ily
theater,. adju>'>ted anti puhIi,hcd hy War De
jlat'tnH'nt. and npplhd against hl'anch
hut ion >It the ]wgin.ning of thl' training PE'
riod to dt'tel'millt' training' output hy :\IiIital'Y
Occupational for each branch,
Upon compll'tion of training'. the Rate
-fOi' a particular theater are as
a for shipnll'nt of
bulk fol' that thl'atl'r,
\{cquisitio-lls al (. Hlbllliltl,d lIIollthly ami
a hasis fOl' alloeation dul'ing' the
last month of training and thp ensuing fur
lough period, during which tin'le de-finite' War
Dl'pal'tll1ellt allocation are made and
fo), are issued, .
Upon issuance of directives for shipment
ami publieation of neceSSRl'y orders, person.
lwl proc'eed from furlough to Personnel Re
nhu:t'l1H'nt Depotg. through staging area, and
l<l'l'i", in commands within from Ol)e
to t\\'o months of iRRue of shipping instruc

STATeS AND PROJECTED
REQUIREMENTS
In tIll' dircct application of 'Uniform
Rl'l)o\'ts to the theater and War De
partll1l'nt ]1)'ol>lel\1 of Requisition Status atHI
PI'OjPctl'd Replacenll'nt Requirements, the re
,,,.rting' ,y"tcm provides the necessary 11<-x
ill estimating anticipated net require
tht'atel', and over-all. for the third
to eighth month hencl', anel provides fol'
l'c'quisitioning' of I'l'placements in advance to
],uild a r('s(,l've ],(plaeement "tockage for ('s
tilllatc,d nct lo,,,e,, in planned futura opera
\ ions (FigUl't' 2),
ColulI\n ] in 2 repl'C'sl'nts authorized
Tahk of Org'anization and Tahle of Distribu
t ion ,tl'lllg'th. as well as total authorized
t h('atel' "tl't'ngth, including authorized I't'
lll:u..'l'lnent
Column prl'Sl'nts for ihc
('lId of the month fol' which, reports arc
,uhmitt(,1. actual TablE'S of Organization and
of Distribution strength, aO'; well lI:"
<It'lpal total tht'att'l' strength, including actual
1"placen1Pllt stockagl',
Column" :: to 10 show for the l'ucceeding
eig'hl months an estimatt' of anticipated net
losses, based on normal attrition and 0]1
("timatc,d nt't losses in planneel future O]l
,rations.
Actual strength of Tahles of Organization
and Tables of' Distribution is maintained at
01' npal' authOl'ized stl'ength by drawing on
I'eplaeemeut stockage for necessary replace
ment". euusing' a monthly fluctuation in
I hl' l'I'l1glh of replacement stockage.
:1 and 4.-Personnel on requbi
tion ,for arrival in theater during the first
UNIFORM S'i'RF.N(i'l'H REPORTS
and !<ccond succeeding month" should h... sutfi
dent in each month to maintain authorIz.>.1
gtl'ength. including replllt'Pl1wnf stopkag.. "
('olumns i) to lO,-Anticipllted nl" l'Pquil'1'
l11f'nts planned to he requisitiol1!'cI for an'ival
during tht' third to eighth month hpnt,,, should
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
110-----------
tmally hc('ollll' tirll1 in a, requisition
;11 I ivaI in thp connnnnrl during
H>"OIl" lllont 11 ,;ftpr of thp requi.
,it ;(111, t h<;I'I'hy makin/(' availahlp in t h" Thea
I",. Hl'pI:H'Pll1('nt ... m of th" overseas
(OI"Il111Hncl i:l 1'f'!'(l]'V(' In anticipation of
115., -
-10 COL 1
-
AUTHORIZED
T/O & TID STRENGTH
c:::::::J
NET
LOSSES
lGEND C=:J
I/O & TID
STRENGTH

REPLACEMENT ON
STATUS REQUISITION
FIGlltE 2.

N[l
REQUIREMENT
STATt ANfJ PltoJr:CTEL) l{El'l \.rE)'lf,:-.T RFql
be sutficient in each mOl)th to maintain au
thorized strength, including replacement
,tockage. and where deemed necessary, to
offset anticipated heavy losses resulting from
planned future ,operations (Columns 7, 8,
and 9), and serve as a zone of interior tmin
ing basis against which future requisitions
will be placed,
These anticipated net requirements for the
third to eighth month hence al'e revised
monthly by each overseas command, and
pnd making it to maintain at
01' neal' authorized
For a more detailed "tUlly of' this wbject,
attenti,un invited to chl5sified 'VD AGO
letter file AGO:\IE-F :\20.2 (2:\ Feb 45),
, subject: l:niform Streng'th Reports, dated 23
Fehruary 1!J4'5, with instructions consisting
of CUl'rent directive-Strength Reports, ;11
March l!l45, together with a compilation of'
dt>lailed implementing instructions,
Beachheads to Victory
COLONEL EDWARD S. JOHNSTON, Infantry
Staff rpul Command nnd Staff School
Vornwrly Infitructor. Naval ,\Var College
I
'F have been the gateways to
victory in pl'evious wars, the beachhead
has ustll'!wd their function in this one. The
war passed into the phase of coming Allied
victorr with the establishment of the bl'ach
heads in French North Africa in 1!l42. From
that point on, the continuing attack was by
way of one b('achhead after another. Even
whell the Western Allies were well
Western Europe, there were Htill beachheads
to be won. Great amphibious operations were
executcd well into the int!'rior of the conti
ment. Until the InRt, almost, there was al
ways one more beachhead to win.
It has been so, also, in the Pncific. There
the island war has had to hazard everything
on the beadlhead, Thl' beachhead was, first,
the ohjective to be l'l'ached; then, to be
secured, Aftt'r which the beachhead wa>; the
navigation-head, tIll' railhC'ad-everything
in the manner of a terminus to (until it be
came in turn a mere way-point on) the line
of cOllllllunications.
A beachhead is a world ill itsl'if. Its ef
ficient creation and maintenance, from the
logistics viewpoint alone, is a complex mat
leI' of intl'icate ol').(anization. Its inherent
problems are indicated by the time taken to
work out their souml solutions. It has al
ways b('en so in history, whether ancient
modern, or very recent.
The beachhead technique of the Pacific be
gan with the :'IIarine Corps landings on the
island areas in the south. The technique was
essentially what had been employed in peace
time and in their recent :'IJarine Corps train
ing on our East Coast. The struggle that en
sued, to maintain our hold on Guadalcanal,
emphasized the necessity for a thoroughgoing
development of all that is implied in "beach
approach, the assault, the exploi
tation inland, and especially the logistics
organization of the beach. The result has
been an amazing development of beachhead
te,chnique.
The contributions have been manifold. In
Africa and Europe, the original Marine Corps
technique expanded into (almost) a new art.
In successive landings, this was developed to
a new height, Its accomplishments contribut
ed to the Pacific development. In the latter
Rrea, the forces of the Southwest PaCific
work,,!1 out their own variants and tested pro
cedures; at the first oPPOI'tunity, in an ad
vance all calculations for rapidity
and for minimulll losses, they island-hopped,
-sldpPl'd, and -jumped to ;\lanila. In the
Philippinp landings, all the developed pat
t('l'l1 of Pacific war was applied with such
succ('ss, notwithstanding the employment of
many new and untried troops, as to dazzle,
"vpn at a distanc(', any professional eye that
looked toward the glint and glittet' of those
tropic heaches.
It has been a magnificent piece of work,
ant! the process has gone on inexorably to
\' ard its only acceptable conclusion. The great
hl'achhe:\!l on the shores of the last vital
at'ea of Japan will no doubt be, if a landing
thel (' is necessary, the beachhead of
them all.
******
Beachhead technique has, until recently,
been prctty weII omitted from the public pic
tun', Popular writers have done a good job
of it, in general terms. But the underlying
detail has seldom revealed itself because of
the overlying stamp of "secret," "confiden
tial," or "restricted." Soon after VE-day,
however, the curtain began to lift, officially,
Wcll-organized beachneads are like clocks,
in that every part has to work as it should,
or the clock will develop eccentricities,
There is, of course, a central theme of ap
plied technique, but that is what the heart
of the works really is; there is no one "piece"
that explains the whole picture. The whole
picture, indeed, would take a Pantheon de
Guerre, not a mere frame among frames, to
depict its major elements. It is the inte
gration of the mass of concordant detail that
really makes an ,organized beachhead.
, .
BEACHHEADS TO VICTORY
69.
In writing, the whole assembly woultj re
quire a bible, not a mere hook, to do it jus
tice. The U.S. "biblp" of Joint Action, it
s!'lf, is, of course, a mere booklet; but it
is in fact a mer(' outline. The elaboration
of this doctrine is essential Fi\! and SOP
would easily fill tl1(> classic five-foot shelf,
or sevel'al of th('m,
In simplest of technique, the whole
process has been describcd by our highest
seagoing authority as "the opening up of
beachheads for our ground forces." In the
Pacific, this has been a naval task. It is
preceded, flanked, ringed around, and pro
tected by far-flung naval ail' stl ikes (e.g.,
tIl(' fast carrier force) and by land-hased ail'
bombardment,;, with attcn(lant raids by big
gun surface forces. But, on the spot, the pro
cess is: (1) ensure the safe arrival of the
(2) neutralizc enemy resistance
through elllploymcnt of own ail' and gun sup
port; (:l) clear the path to the heachhead;
(4) effect the aC'tuallanding of assault waves
and imm('diatc supports; (5) maintain neu
tralization of enemy defenses during- the
advance inhll1(1 from the beach; (j) assist in
the organization of the beach; and (7) ensure
local ("covel''') during the actual
vperation. All in all, the naval objective is:
utmost contribution in evC'I'1' concC'ivable way
[0 the accomplishment of the assault mis
sion (the infantry mission) with the mini
mum loss.
It is no easy job. Tn all history it has
been recognized as the hardest, riskiest
military undertaking when the defense is
I1nywhere ncar reasonahly a(lequate for the
perf,?rmance of its mission. .
* * * * *"
The convoy of the attacldng Annada,
though only the first stage, is intricate enough
even if no serious surface resistance is en
countered. The transports are rclatively un
armed lind vulnerable-helpless against seri
ous attack; yet all depends on what is in
them. The troops, the equipmel!t, the sup
plies are indispensable (or they would not be
there), and protection from enemy aircraft
alone is a complex task. The convoys are,
g'1'C'at aggrcgations of 800 to 1,000
vesscls (less shipbol'l1e landing
craft). There were almost 1,200 ships in the
1\\'0 Ji11la attael;, Ilndmol'e at Oldnawa. Pre
liminary Ilt'Rea is necessary for ef
ft'ctivc antiail'craft protection. There is anti
,ubmal'ine control to be maintained through
out (as to them, one 1/(,!'(,)' knows, until
perhaps-too late). And there is the interior
org'lInizatioll of the convoy to be created, to
be maintainC'd, to be changed from time to
tillle, and always to be watched and covered.
The final disposition in the transport area
is a distribution to be carried out with clock
work precision, if the little boats are to
fe-llow their chosen courseS to the right
when the time comcs.
* * * * *
comes the "softening-up" bombard
ment. You soften him "up" so that yOu may
Blol'C beat him "down." This is of ut
most importance to the assault soldier about
to make the boat approach to the beach. As
to all emplacements from which ef
fl'ctive Ii:',' can be brought upon the approach,
thl' g'unfile-;.upport objective is destruction of
)It'I',onnel to ensure neutralization of its
tin' potl'ntialities. These gunfire bombard
ments, with reinforcing'. ail' bombing and
(when l1l'ighboring terrain permits) integrat
PC: lanel-artillery firc, Itave become famous both
in Europe and Asia. Their effectiveness is
Hot challeng('ll. The consumption of ammuni
tion is considerable. The last "prewar" es
timates made at Newport were not conserva
tive; the calculators r. Jt wholly satis
tkd with available data and had no hesitancy
in doubling and tripling their estimates, but
"vcn so their calculations have been far
exceeded. The expenditure is necessarily
great if, it is to knock out the enemy's
installations ane! disrupt his dispositions, and,
more ('sjlC'cially, if the fire continues (as' it
does) night aJ;)d day.
During the .Philippine campaign, the naval
R/f 1'1J{I)t forceR were engaged almost contin
uously, frol11 19 Octoboer to 1 March. The les
son of Guadalcanal had been that enemy

MIJ.11'AHY
naval g'unfin' hard to take; t11(> {tl'cision
was to incl'easl' our own, It has l)(:l'n incl'eas('<i
"in('(' that time. At Okinawa, <t('('ording- to a
puhlic Btatl'111l'nt mad.. Ihl' SI'Cl'<,laI'Y of
thl' a I'l'ison'1' ('a]Jed our
naval gunfire thl' "most fean'd, destructive
force" with which the E1I1Pl'\'OI"S had
to cOl1t('nll.
is a real fulfilment of the hopes of
prewar days, when expectations were far
from sanguine on the bu,is of experience in
the preccdinl-( wal'. There were difficult prob
lems to solvl' liS to type of ammunition, fire
control, and storal-(<' of cOlllponcnts on ship
board; hut those pl'ohlellls have heen dealt
with. The expenditure of amlllunition at !wo
Jima inerl'a'l'd ul'mlnuolIsly. Plans were
thl'n in the making furtl1l'r to accelerate' th<.'
1 ate. Availability of sll<:h amll1unition for use
without i, a tremelHloll' faetol' ill re
dlletion of In,',' of life for till' attack,,\,. But
this is not all the stolY. The I-(un support
from slllallP\' chlibels. I'ocket fire. a'lId tIll'
USl' nf smokl' arc all parb of the COlllpletl',1
l'attl'l'll.
Cll'aring the path to the beach olle of
the eritiral It is an excl'",ling'ly
dangerous mihsion, alld detail", at the time
of writing. \\'l'n' ,till mattel'.
When the time comes to \\'1'ltl' it up, it will
be one of the thrilling chapters of war his
tory. :\1l'1I have died in ml're l'xppriments with
such work. To do it successfully against
htrong resistance is a 1'l'lllarkable accompli.h
ment.
The actual assault calls for a positive
control OVl'l' a vast organization of landinl-(
<:raft of all Compared to the strained
efforts of 1D42, from which (however) all
this perfected technique actually ,,(ems. this
now a smooth opel'Ution. But it is only
because it is thoroughly prepared and profp,,
sionalry executed, Discipline and seamanship
'are the all-important factors in the forming
up of the bont waves and in the maintenance
of formation during the approach. hundnds
of boats moving- abreast-not an easy ac
complishment in rough weather. Fire support.
HEVIEW
local an,l intense, from landing cmft of an'
t,'Pl'S if' an important featul'!' of this pnase,
'I'll<' Navy's joh In organization of the
heachhl'ad itself is the work of the l1l'ach
party in the hundling and unloading of ,;up
pli(,R. ill conjunetion with the (Army) shol'('
party. The job includes necessary hydlo
graphic: work and the i\avy share (where
allottl,d to the beach party) of Joint Cotll
lllunications.
Thl' I'email1lng function of those listed is
that of the CoI"", illY lol'{'(', which providl"
what gToUlHI troops call "local security,"
1-'01' amphibious operations, however, it may
lIlvolv(' (and has) a far-tlung system of Jlro
teetion. This fOI'ce is typkally a strong ago
gregation of and wan:ihips-usl1al
Iy thl' fast calTiel' fOI'Cl' aforementioned
-whieh stands off the beuchhead to protl'ct
the great of merchant ,;hips and
NflJl/ll1I filiU naval vessels.
It was our covpring force that cngagl'd in
the two gTe'at spa hattie!; of IV44. First of
thl' two was the battle of the Eastern Phil,p,
pine,; in June. when the Japanese undertook
a g'reat sea-ail' attack on our forces assaulting
Saipan and Guam. Second of thl' two battles
was thl' l'ffort of the J ap:ilwse Fleet to put a
finbh to OUI' and other forces entering
Leytc Gulf. The r<,,,ults Wl'I'(' a real back
hone-breaking expcrience for the enemy Since
then he has 110t been able to muster a force
able to conte"t the control of the hig'h seas.
Th" Japanese etl'orts, both in the 1IarianaR
and the Philippines, had the ohjective of
slIlking our convoys so as to isolate OUl'
hl'achheads, Theil' theory was to reenaet the
Buttlt, of Savo Island (August I(42) on a
!tll'gel' "cule-cume' in at night fl'om converg'
mg directions and destroy as many combat
ves,eIR as possible in order to facilitate the
complete destruction of the help
les,; transports, However, in these two d
of June and October 1!J44, the Japan..
twenty-st;ven wal'shipH, with of
leducing- their Navy to a medium-sized t,lS\;,
foree. There may, thelefore. never be
BEACHHEADS '1'0 VICTORY
7t
in this \VIII' II naval hattlt' of tilt' magnitune
of either of these.
this fact. tht're is still
of covel' for the beachhead. The Ger
l11ans rluring' this war had available only two
,'1'('at modern ships of the line and some six
or s('ven of model'll cruiser type. with ap
pl'opiate destroyer hut this l'elntivc1y
mlllll foret' was suffici .. nt to keep till" British
llllmohilizeli in 01' pinnell to the an'a of th!;'
:\,ll'th Stu and the Korth Atlantic fOI' three
OUI' Allies had control of the sea. hut
tllC')' had to he to nwet tht Elis"'lII ('I.
<lllll Til'/,itz should th('sc l'edouhtahk oppo
nt'nts eonw out to contest it or defy it. The
(,(,I'mans had in fact "u tlt't't in heing'," larg'l'
enough to constitute a constant majol' threat.
So long as the Japapese have such a force,
our troops will need naval cOl.'eri'lI(! jOI'CflS in
the Pacific.,
Even after the Japanese Fleet has all been
sunk, our sea forces will have mlljo!' taRks
to perform in convoying, in isolating tar
gt'ts. anrl in attacks thereon until no more
targets exist within range ancl until there is
no longer need of protection for conv,oys. So
long as there is a bellchhead there to he sup
plied under naval and ail' thn'at. the U.S.
:\avy will he waging war in the Pacific to
,upport th(' estahlishment and maintenance
of that lwachhean.
.J apanese Pilots
From The ."il,h",, (Great Britain).
CIIARAC'rt:RIHTICS of tIll' .Japallt'st pilot are
Hllllt'thing ahout which A Ilil,d air pl'rsonnt'l
around Australia are of g'l'lleralizing.
fuperiences have hel'n so varil'd that no on"
b anxious to outlinl' a universal paUl'rll. But
fOI'. all that. our pilots havl' t'ncountcrl'd,
froll! tin1l' to time. soml' n'CUlTl'nt typC's of
.Jap comhat hehavior and tactics,
It is the experience of SOIllI' pilots III
thl'ater of war that .J apalWSl' pilots are, main
ly. "exhihitionistR." On the ft>\V occaf'ion:-.
during attacks on their airdromes wh,'n
were ahle to get their fighters up into th(' ail'
ltl timC', the Jap pilots have ht'haved oddly.
The most diagnosis' has heen that the
Japs wpre "turning on a show." Belo\\' thelll
011 'thE' ground were their own peonle and ill
,tallations; thE' spectators were .1 apallt'sE'; thl'
Japanese fliers had to put up a performanl'(,.
As a result, the Japanese havt' been greet
ing the Allied pilots with tactics resembling'
aerobatics. Zeros and /loatplane" have heen
toming in at weird angles, twisting thE'm
hI,lvles ,in hut lIeVl'r g't,tting very
,iangl'l'ous. From the ground itprohahly
spectacular. Thllt is ahout all.
Over the past fiftct'n months the )
is that Japanese fighter-pilot '1uality has dc
tel'ioratE'd. It is a dangerous thing to hut
thl' expt'rit'nec of thE' Allied Air Arm
gpsts it.
No Lightning. Airacohra. or Thunderbolt.
pilot nogfights with the Japanese. The Kitti
hawks, flown by Australians and Americans,
{'omE' nE"arest to th.. dogfight. But fighter
tactics from our side have chang'pd. In a
sens{', thl':..- have hecome sim1'lt'r. Our fighters.
with their superb strength and pOWt'r, grind
tht' air {'lean. skid down ill formation,
destroymg l'verything that crosses their
sights.
As can be guessed. tIll' capahilities of th('
.JapanE'se fighter pilot art' no subjeet for gt'll
{'ralization. Their ail'<:raft are 1I0t up to
Allied aircraft if our ptlots {'ompel tlwm to
fight our wa,'. Some of the Japane"p art' 1'<'1'
sistent and valoroUl'; others follow the letter
of all ancient book. But therE' seeillS no doubt
that our fliers havl' got thpjr nlt'aSUl'e. And
there seems 'no reason to thut the
situation will alt"I.
Air Force Supply in Theaters of Operations
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. W. WERTZ, Ai?' Corps
Instrnctur. Commnnd antI (lC'n\'rnl Staif Sehllul
T
HE problems of supply to <lfr units are
" varied and complex ami no two theater:;
the same difficulties. Earh attacks the
in a slightly different I\\t\nner, and
the result is a situation wherein it is impos
sible to say that organizations for supply to
air units in all theaters are st('l'cotyped.
There are no two theaters organiza
tions for supply of air units HI'e exactly the
same. Organization varies both as to the
Theater Air Force mission an(1 according to
the wishes of the commanding' g'eneral; but
.. all follow AAF Regulation
65-1 which prescribes the ('ll1pIOYlllC'llt of
service units.
Theater Air Scrviec have be('n
organized in all tIwaters, and in lllOt tJll'
aters Air Force S,'rvice Comll1HIHls. TIll'att'I'
Air Service appeal' on the sanll'
command l('v('l with the Tact ielll Ail' For('l'
and Strategic Air Force, on the a,,,igIH'd
basis of one to the theater. Ail' Force Serv
ice Commands organized on the baeig uf
one per air force, and arc crellted to scrvice.
maintain, and supply the ail' forcC' to which
it is assigned.
In some theaters such as the Europcan
Theater of Operations where two or mo\'('
air forces are operating, each air force has
its own Air Force Service COlllmand and ill
addition there is a Theater Air Servic(' Com
mand on the next higher ('('h"lon of com
mand.
The Theater Air Serviee COlllmand is not
organized to command the activiti('s of ('aell
of the Air Force Service Commands, but
exists primarily to coordinate th('ir funl'
tions, to allocate levels of supply, and to act
as a consolidating headquarters for requisi.
tions from the theater to the zone of the in
terior.
Overseas AAF depots are organized to
maintain, supply, and service combat units.
Depots are not all known the same name
in all theaters-however, differing in name,
their functions remain the same. For ex
Strategic Ail' D{'pots in the Eighth Air Force
alHI Tactical Ail' Depots in the Ninth Air
Force.
Depot, are located in the vi
cinity of ports of debarkation, These depots
are created with the primary role of clearing
the port area of AAF equipment and supplies,
alld sl'gl'eg'ating AAF supplies from ground
force ('qllipment. AAF Intransit Depots are
ojl('rat('d by Ail' Force personnel, trained and
in the art of handling fragile and
expl'nsivt' AAF equipment. Prior to the crea
tion of AAF Intl'ansit Depots, Army Service
Force personnel, inexperienced in ha..!ldling
AAF eqllipl11{'nt, unloaded the vessels at the
ports, and as a result supplies were damaged,
and sonll'times late in arriving at the forward
,It'pots. In order to correct deficiencips,
were assiglH'd to the port areas to
Ojll'rat" .\AF Intransit Depots which serve
rcc()nsignnll'nt points for deliveriC's for
ward. and as clearing houses for Air FOl'ce
"upplil's for the port area.
Base Ail' Depots are also located in the vi
cinity of ports of debarkation. These depots
are normally established on the basis of on('
pC'1' theater for the purpose of bulk storage,
Inajor overhaul of aircraft and accessories,
lllajor engine overhaul, modifi
cation of aircraft, and fourth echelon
lllaintenance beyond the capahilities of the
1110re advanced depots.
One of the biggest ,probl(,1118 of a Base Air
Depot is storage and issue of supplies and
pquipmont. In echeloning supplies within the
theater. most of the theater reserve of AAF
technical supplies will be within the Base Air
Depot area. This comprises a sizeable task
when considering bulk storage of ninety to
1fiO of technical supplies for all the AAF
units' with the theater.
Ail'Cl'aft shippecl by water to the theaters
are assembled in the Base Air Depots. This
will include the necessary modifications
needed on each aircraft in order that it may
meet operational demands of that particular
ample, Air Force General Depots are called theater.
.
1
AIR FORCE SUPPLY IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS
Base Ail' Depots operate tllldi!r the OHl
lIland of the Theater Air Sl'l'vke Command.
and function to render srrvice to nil of tIlt"
ail' forces of the theater.
Forward of the Hase Ail' Depot are the AII'
Force General Depots org-anized to provide
fourth echelon supply and l)1aintc'IHlncl' to
the operations of a minimum of fO\lr com hat
groups. Til(' of Ail' Forc!' General Depot-;
may vary. S01ue nui.y include nunlCrous at
tached units and may be org-anized to Sl'rve
Ill! ail' force; otl1<'r8 lllay be small.
created to take care of four or five comhat
groups. The Ail' Force General Dt'pot is a
semi-permanent installation. owing- to the
keavy equipment to perforlll fourth
echelon maintenance and repair of AA F
equipment. Operating in conjunction with
the Ail' Force Gl'nerlll Dtpot arc other depots
such as the Ordnance' Amlllunition DC'pot for
the purpose of furnishing till' combat group'
with bombs and AF ammunition. an A F gas
and oil depot to fnels and luhrirant"
of the higher specifications for air
craft operation. and other depot,; a,;
Quartermaster Class I and Ill, Enginel'r
Class'II and IV, which bl' attach"t! a"
t1)e situatIOn dictates,
The air forces, whl'nevl'r pORsibJe, depend
upon ground sources for common supplil's,
This necessitates cl(\se coordination between
the activities of the: Theater Air Service
Command, All' Force Slrvice Commands. and
the communications zone, Combat groups
operating in the army arl'a normally requisi
tion their Class I and III supplies from the
.\rmy Quartermaster by means of the daily
telegram. This requires that Communica
Zone Depots supplyillg- army must be
aware of air force requirements. Air units
likewise obtain eommon ammunition and
clothing from army supply points by means
of requisitions sent through army, Combat
groups operating in the communications zone
operate in a similar manner with referl'llce
to eorr:mon' items. requisitioning on a Com
munication!! Zone Depot. When the occasion
arises in that ground depots are not cen
trally located;' 01' they are unable to serve air
units, then attachments are made to the Air
Force Gencral Depots for the purpose of pro- .
viding these services. QUartermaster sub
sist(,llce cQll1panies arc attached to operate a
(PI Class I Depot. Chemical en
and othel' T/O units may be attached
to operate a depot whe'n ground depots are
unable to provide those RCl'vices.
In many situations the c0I11l11l1nications
zone, through depots. mny handle all AF
aviation gas and oil. Early in the Normandy
campaign. l'omll1unicatiolls zone pipe lines
ami truck companies furnished vital aid to
[,il' units. working ill' close coopt'l'ation with
gToun(1 forces.
The advanced used by
combat units of the air forces are the Service
C(,IHl'rs olwrated by third echelon and
n'uintenallce ul'its called Air Groups.
Early in the war before thl' air forces had
ohtaine,l thl' high <leg-Tee of air superiority
!loW maintained. combat operated
from dispcrsed airdromes, One corn.bat group
cOlllposl'd of four squadrons generally op
erated from foul' difierel!t "irdromes. .\ ir
S('rvice Groups were organized to serve two
combat groups each. which meant serving as
many as eight different dispersed squadrons
')11 eight difl"erent airdromes. The Air Serv
ice Group, together with attachments from
ot her and services. operated the Service
(":Pnter centrally located in order to serve
all eight airdromes.
As the air forces continued to grow, group
airdromes or concentrating all the squadronlO
of a group on one airdrome became the rule
rather than the exception. The Service Cen
ter soon beg-an to appear on one of the air
dromes. This systl'm tended to reduce the
mobility of the combat groups; the next so
lution was Air Service Teams.
The Air Service Team was an expedient
way of serving two combat groups with one
,,'rvic(' group-divide the Air Service Group
and its attarhments forming two teams each
to service one combat group.
The latest development in third echelon
supply and maintenance organizations is re
ferred to as the Air Service Group (Special).
This Air Service Gl'OUp (Special) was 01'
g'anized to provide service to one combat
::,po lnntond of h,"i". n""hod th' ",,"ill' po,"onn,1 montb,J
augment the Ail' Sun ice Group, additional to move with the' combat group in order that
l)(>\'j::onnel from oth('l' and sPl'viceg sUf'h
ag Quartel'lllat'ter, Signal, ltnll Militarv Po
lice, w('re int('gratQII into thc new Air
Group.
Another advantage of the Ail' Servicp
Group (Special) the gaving; of trans-
pOl'tation. No long;er was it necessary to
erve man,' squadrons on displ'l'sell air
dromes, as all squalh'ons including thc' Ail'
Service Group were on till' "anil' fit'ld, Thl'
eommanders of the ta<'tical units were hettl'r
able to shift echeloml of maintl'nancp, tnus
preventing onc' echclrHl of maintl'nanCl' 01'
supply from bping ovel wOl'k('<I, whil'h would
cause a gelwral l'l'c1uction in the combat "f
ficiency of the j!l'onp,
The Ail' Service GI'\lllll, wlll'tlwr it be of the
old opl'rating' thl SI'l'vi('1' Cl'nter or tilt'
lll'\\' type serving: oIll' l'lHllhat gTOUp, has thL'
basic for kCt,p thl'
('onlhat squadl'nns it in operating eon..
<lition, hoth by ancl maintaining-,
All requisitions for sllpplips (,OI1W to tl1l' Ail'
Servil'l' Group_ who consolidate them. obtain
ing; comlllon Rupplies frolll gTOlll1c1 c1"pots 01'
supply points. and Ail' Force tl'chnieal sup
plies fl'olll Ail' Foret' Gl'neral Depots.
The Ail' Sl'rVICl' (;rou]ls arc hig;hly mobile,
as mugt keep up with the combat
they "ervt', \\'IH'n th<' group mOVt's to a new
operations may continue at the nC'w location.
The of air units must be 'flexible,
'and for that reaSon ,no hard and fast laws
('an govern their organization, Air supply ,is
complicated by many factors, One of the big
gC'st is the factor of variable expenditures.
If the weather is good on Monday, millions
of gallons of gas and millions of pound" of
bomhs may be ('xpended, If the weather is
bad on Tuesday, practically no expenditures
of these bulky items will take. place, If the
target for Wedlll'Rday a deep penetration,
morc' gas tonnage than bcunb tonnage may be
r'onsumed; but if the target for Thursday i,
in close cooperation with ground troops, thl'
mtio might easily be reversed. These variabJp
expenditures demand that the system for
ail' units be highly flexiblc, and
till' service units must be mobile in ordl'\' to
kc'ep up with the combat groups it is serving,
Then' is one salient point conc(-'rning sup
ply to AA F units, and that is interdependent'c'
and close cooperation with ground fort'('
<wpots, supply points, ant! the communiea
tlOns zone. In or<!Pr to maintain fil'xihillt)'
and mobility, air depends, ant! has to n,I)"
on g-round sources for much of its supply,
namdy those items used by both ground ami
air, whether opl'rations are being conduct<'cl
in the zone of the interior or in theaters of
operations.
The American Soldier in the Ardennes
From a statement Field l\IaJ'shal Sir Bernard Montgomery to war corn'
gpondl'nts on 7 ,January 1!145, as reported in TIlt' Tillles Weekly
Edition (London) 10 Janual'y ID45.
BUT when all is said and done, I shall al a marked degree dul'ing the ]lrl'sent battle
waw feel that Rundstedt was reallv beaten by [in the Ardennes], I have spent Illy military
good fig-hting; qualities "f America;1 career with the Bl'itish boldier, and I have
soldier' and by the teamwork of the Allies, come to love him with a great love. I have
The American soldier in battle is a bra\'e 'lOW formed a very, gTeat affection am!
fighting' limn, steady under fire and with the atimil'ation foJ' the American soldier. I salute'
tenacity in battle which stamps the first-class the brave fighting Illen of Amel'ica-l nevel'
>ioldier, All these qualities have heen shown ill want to fight alongside better soilliers.
The Civil Affairs Detachment
COLONEL DAMON M. GUN/'(, Gel1ercll Staff Corps
Ass-i!'hmt Chilf Ill' Staff. G.. 5. First Army
B
ECAUSE a formal organization to
handle civil affairs new in army pro
cedure, the First Army, in the pre-Invasion
Jays, was faced with the task of planning
'l1lel creating- the Civil Affairs organization
to be used on the Continent from tIll' groUp
tIp. Having' no precedent (,n which to basI.'
its claims, the staIr had III obtaining
l1l'cessarj' allotments of jl('rs'll1nd. and for
. months tIl(' status of T ;O's and
T: E's was in doubt. Howev('I', throug'h the ef
forts of staff members, T!O's and T. E's were
finally established, and from then on, or
develojln1l'nt progl'l'sse<i rapidly.
There were many growing' pains, as was only
natural, 'but tl1('Y disappl'arl'd as
(;-5 gained in statun'. As in any IWW or
.r:-1BlzaLion, there were 111Uny unknowr,
the importancl' of which could not he de
tel'mit1l'd und<'r actual operational
conditions. Accordingly, a cl'rtain ,kgT(,(' of
lkxibility was maintained.
T1w following' excerpts from the I'l'port of
.llajor John J. :llaginnih, an officer l'olllman,]
illg' a Fit'st U.S. Army Civil Affairs dl'tach
ment, ,lell10nstratL' plaillly the I'('sult of all the
planning' that took place in England. By
"iving an account of many of the problems
nlPt and solved a unit in this new army
organization, :lTajor :llaginnis has demon
strated the of the foundation worl;
dCH1e by the army G-5 staff.
Because tl1l' r<'port the inter-re
lationship With Othl'I' >C'l'viccs, it is of value
to men training for future ope'rations, as well
as .being of interest to those not familiar
with the work of Civil Affairs. .
The work and functions of Civil Affairs
organizations have been well established in
the Battle of France as a Ilt'cpssary an,1 in
te2,'ral part of military opcrativns 111 the First
u.S. III out
the missioll of assistillg operatIOn>,
Ule I'clldered IJv lllllllltallllllg' 01'<1"1, prolllot
1Ilg' :;ecurity of 0<:cupy1l1g' forces, preventing'
interference with lllilitary- operations, rt'du('
.ng active or passiv(> sabotage, relieving COlll
bat troops of civil administration, mobilizing
local reSOllrces in aid of military objectives,
and carrying out predetermined governmental
policies of the United States.
Th" work of {lirect aid and assistance to
the civil population is \\ ell understood, for it
has been ca1'1'it'd out in a highly sllccessful
way hy thp finl' tpamwor]; between Civil Af
staffs directing the operation.
Bringing the community, left in the wake
of battle, back to normal has been a major
ohjective of Civil Affairs operations. How
eVl'r, what is possihly not so Wl'1l understood
is that Civil Affairs Ulllts have be'n of con
siderahle assistance dit'l'ctly to both the com
bat and service forces of the army.
Some of the ways in which this assistanc('
has been given are point<:'cl out in this hrief
outlIne. Some of the aids may be the duties
of other army organizations, in whole or in
part, hut the pra"tical asp('ct of the matter
is that the Civil Affairs detachment is on
the ground early, finds the work there to be
cione, and does it. It should be noted that
these observations arl' based on the experi
ence of only one Civil Affairs detachment and
are consequ('ntly limited in scope. The de
tachment served in Cal'entan (l\Ianche),
Domfront (Orne), and the Department of
Ardennes; the length of this service ran con
tinuously from 9 June 1944 to 12 October
1944, all of which time was spent actually
working in the field. During this time, it
might be added, all phases of detachment
control were experiene<:,d--divisions, corps,
army, advanced section, communications
zone, and base.
INFORMATION
A good Civil Affairs' detachment office is
an information center for the territory in
which it operates. More and n10re it is ap
parent that officers, units, or others ill the
military service come directly to the Civil
Affairs office upon arrival in a town with
their questions or their problems.. It has al- .
ways been a basic principle in this deta('h
REVIEW
:ment'that it be prepared to give at all times
courteous and sympathetic attention to such
requests from anyone wearing the uniform.
DUring the days of fast-moving operations,
it was difficult to keep infol'mation available
as to which units were in the detachment ter
ritory and where they werl'. To m10et this
situation an officer wils to check
the location and movements of all ol'ganiza
tions, at frequent intervals, so that prompt
and accurate information would be availahle
for all inquiries. The loan of 'an intel'pl'eh'l",
when the situation demands it, is Vl'l'y greatly
appreciated by the 1)(:'1'SOn who cannot ac
complish his business without onl'. Tlll'sC dl'
tachments have supplied inforlllation on
countless questions and supplicil many wants
--including' such liS finding stone
and cl'ushl'd rock to rL'pail' secl'ctly
-
locating' a p<'1'80n with specific military in
formation wlIlll('d by the taet ical COlll
mander. supplying' tiw' harlll'l's for troops in
the front Iilll's, 01' finilil1/!.'.girb for a soldicr
show. ;-';0 rl'quest fl'om til(' Othl'I'
how<'Vt,1' surprising', is <'\'<"1' tl'eatl'd othcl' than
Thc intclligent and courteous
handling of llll'mb<'rs of the armed forcl's
may be relatively unimportant, but it pays
big dividends, 'Vhen someDlll' in ,mother
branch of the service COIlH'S sppldng help and
information. and g'{'ts I>oth, he g'oes away
feeling that Civil Atl'ain; lllllts are on the
job and know their jQb.
BILLETING
This is a simple operation, but one that
takes a lot of time and often a lot of tact.
,..Jfhe Engineer Officer, the "Town Major,"
charged with this work, authenticated the
receipts in the towns in which these de
tachments operated. Nearly all of the billet
ing work done in almost three months in
Carentan was done by the detachment, lo
cating the space and its owncrs and making
amicable arrangements. Billeting' requires a
survey of the community, so that when a
unit comes into town it can be placl'd in the
, best place available with the least delay. ,It
.is a tremendous help to the commanding of
ficer of an organization, arriving any time of
. the day or night, to be able to call on a Civil
Affairs detachl!lent for help and guidance in
t'stablishing his organization ,in suitable
billets. Officers calling for this service are al
ways very grateful for the assistance they
receive. In this way a friendly contact is
established with the new unit, which makes
lor pleasant relations between the organiza
tions during the period in which they are to
gc>thl'r in the same communhy. Old friends
\\'h1 were "taken care of" in Carentan and
Don front WCl'e helped again in Charleville;
natt rally, such relations are most cordial.
PRISONERS OF \VAR
B f th 't f U S
ecause 0 c scarcI yo. . "I I
organizations in the Ardennes and the close
contacts which Civil Affairs detachments had
with the eivil popUlation and military units
f tl t 't tl' d t h t f l't
0 1C CIT! ory, liS e ae men 0 necess y
operated as an assembly point for enemy
prisoners of war. In Carl'ntan and Domfl'ont
thel'e was little direct contact with such
p1'iSOll('rS, hut in the Ardcnnes area thc re
V<'l'SC was true, For thl' first month, batches
of prisoncl's were continually being brought
in to us; in S01)1e cm;cs t11C'Y were picked up
in outlying districts I;y members of the dr.
tachl1lent itself and brought in. They were
,ecured, and when a group of sufficient size
was assembled, they were turned over to the
military police for transfer to a prisoner-of
war cage. This operation was of definite
value in the clearing up of the back areas
of the tactical forces.
SECURITY
A strict enforcement of circulation, curfew,
blackout, and other security restrictions has
always been regarded as of prime impor
tance in a combat zone. It has always been
]<:It in this detachment that the strictest
supervision in this field was of direct help
to the tactical forces. This was especially
tl'lle in the Ardennes because it is a Depart
ment of rugged terrain, on the frontier, and
Ileal' to Germany. There is a considerable
amount of work i.nvolved in the issuance of
but it has always been done entirely
by this detachment as long as it has operated
under a tactical uni\ fact that this de- .,
"-t}
THE CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT 'rC'
tachment has picked up, through close
scrutiny of all applicants, a half dozen 01' so
persons who. it developed, were under sus
picion and were wanted by the authorities,
justifies the pains taken in this matter. The
prompt check and report of unauthorized
bands' of armed aliens under no central au
:hority, and the arrangement for their re
moval by Provost Marshal, is another way in
which th15, detachment has hl'lpccl the tactical
forces with their security problems.
DEAD AND CASUALTIES
All information regarding military dead
,md wounded, Allied or enemy, was gathered
and passed on to the proper authority. When
reports were received of places where such
dead were buried or unburied, it was in
vestigated and reported directly to the Graves
Registration Service, if possible; if not,
through G-5 Section, First U.S. Army. Pa
pers and identity tags were ,safeguarded to
make the work of the Graves Registration
Service as easy as possible. Every week a
report was received from all civilian hos
pitals in the Department of the Ardennes,
listing military personnel confined or treated
during the period, their condition, and
probable date of release. In this way a close
check is kept on all hospitalized military per
sonnel, whether Allied 01' enemy, who are in
dvilian hospitals.
CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES
The limited means at the disposal of a
Civil Afi'airs detachment for the search and
discovery of captured enemy supplies does
not allow for a complete and thorough ex
ploring of the whole territory. Nevertheless,
by judicious searching and with the aid of
reports received from various sources, much
material can be uncovered. Such stocks were
individually surveyed and reported to First
U.S. Army so that the location, kind, and
amount of such materials could be brought
to the early attention of using services. This
search was further implemented by a ques
tionnaire to the civil officials and by checking
with the heads of the various services. By
means of the press, the importance of se
curing enemy material was brought to the'
attention of the public at larg'e, anu from
the public was received directly much .in
formation'regarding enemy property. ,We
discovered and made available to other army
units for their use stores of such things as
g' oli electrical equipment, office equip
Ille , ness equipment, medical and dental
equipment and snpplies, coal, sugar, wood,
building materiall>, tools, and dozens of other
items, all of which were or' direct and im
mediate use.
CLAIMS
Until a Claims Officer arrives,in a town,
the Civil Affairs detachment advises on and
reports a!l claims agamst the U.S. Army.
Due to the absence of severe battle condi
tIOns in the Ardennes, there were few claims.
However, in Carentan the prolonged opera
tions with the consequent presence of large
bodies of troops gave tise to mal1Y claims. A
system of passing all claims through the
Mairie for scrutiny and comment before
turning them over to the Civil Affairs de
tachment was devised. This saved the Claims
Section much time and effort when they
cpssed the claims, and gave them a truer
picture of the facts, enabling them to make
prompt and equitaiJie settlements. Claims
Officers were most appre,iative of thi$ co
operation.
LABOR
From practically the first in Carentan,
local' labor was supplied to the U.S. Army
through the Civil A trail'S detachment. An
average of about 300 laborers per day was
to the various using services (some
of them outside the Canton) who were in
great need for such labor. At the direction
of the detachment, a labor exchange was
E'stablished, which provided the labor re
quired. Only through such organization
could the number of persons required for
vital army operations have been obtained.
This organization worked so efficiently that
even after the Engineer Labor Officer was
assigned to the town, the detachment con
tinued to supply the labor requirements for
the army.
MIl.lTAHY REVIF:W
SALE OF E:>;EMY l\IATERIAL
Much t'f!uipnll'llt 01' abandOJieti by
,the (>nemy is of 110 use to the army but call
be of great USt' to the civil population, If
prompt actioll nllt takt'n to L':;tablish OWll
c)'ship Hnd to 'l,1I til, SP <tOl'l'S, will dis
appCHr in a I't'mHl'kably short time, This d'
tachment t'OIl('l'lltrHtl'd on thp turlling' of
matt'rial into lash at tIll' "'lI'lh'st pos
sible moment. III this pall mOIl\'Y
hl' ohtailll'd f01' lllHI,'rial 1ll'lnllgin,l!' to tIl('
U.S. ArlllY \\'hil'h ntll(')'\\'i"" would lWH'r Ill'
realizl'll. \\'(' hnn' sold sUl'h IIlah'rials as
condemnl',1 ,'apt lll'l'd !l.ot, l' ('qUiPIlll'llt, et'
l1:1cnt, sel(t eokl' and
chips. hor:-''l'dl'awll cquipnwlIt. do
and tHany ot h(\1':-:'.
In Cal't'ntan, ,;tldl st"l't's \1'Pl'(' sold to till'
amount of l.oOn,OIH) 1'ral1<'<; in tlw Ill'part
nl('nt of Ard,'nll", lip to I:! Odollt'l', Wl'H
<}v<,r I,OOIl,HOl) fl'allt's \1'01'\ h' of "",I! 1I1l'1'
chandbe had been sold, Allot the proceeds"
was money that the lr.S, Government wonld
never have received otherwise, had
it not been for an energetic treatment of this
matter by the detachment,
It is a great compliment to the Givil Af
that wherever these de
tal'hments have been it has been with genuine
that the' civil government and plain
have seen them go, The detachnwnt
(,'l1n<' to aid those people in a time of acute
"('l'd, and they brought confidence and new
:lOPl' with them, But that is largely another
Great, also, and possibly even greater,
is the compliment to a Civil Affairs detach
,!lent for doing these outlined abeve
when a fl,llow member of our own Army
from anothel' branch of the service says to a
Civil Affairs officcr Cluite simply, "You've
Iwen a Illg help, You'v'.' fixed me up with
.Ill,t what I wanh'c]. thanks!"
,\u,-'il'alian Airl'l'aft Pl'oduction
Fr(>111 all al'tll'le ill Fli!!hf (<Treat Britain) 26 June 11l45,
HAil Au,tndia', all'l'I'aft beell
developPd fOlll' callier, the wh,)l('
('otll''''' of the \I'H!' in til{' Pa('itil' have
been chanc:ed, and thi" in turn \Vould havp
had a pl'ofound effed on ('\'<'nt< ill EUl'npe.
It was not till the latt"I' hal1\of 1(.:\!J that
the Commonwealth ('mba rkl,d pl'Odu('
tion of a front-line ail'craft-the Beaut'ol't
torpedo bombl'l'. If 500 BeaufortR had been
availabl(', what a differl'nt story it
have been, but it \l'as llot till Novembel'
194:1 that the 500th Beaufol't rolled off the
assembly line,
Emphasis has ,ince bC'en laid (In the le,;son
thus learned by the splendid 'E'rvice I endered
to the Allied cause in the Paritir by Au,
tl'aliari.built aircraft, The lion', "hun' oj'
the work has bl'en done u;, All,tl alian-built
Beaufort:;, which have pert'ol'llle,l a widl'r
val'iety of function;; than other of
aircraft employed in the Pacific area: UR
torpedo carriers enemy Bhipping';
in bombing rai,ls on important enemy baRes
,ul'h as Rabaul, Gusmata, Kavieng, Buin,
Faisi, Parong'a, W.'wak, and Timor; in Army
and cooperation wOI'k; and on
range reeonnaissance ovel' sea and land,
Beaufurb have also patrolled Australia's
12,000 miles of coastline and convoyed Allied
ships calTying munitionB and supplies and
hundreds of thousands of Allied troops,
This work has been ably supplemented by
the operations of other Australian-built air
craft, notably the Beaufighter, the Boo)11
l'l'allg', anti the 'Virraway, whilst more
l'l'l'ently the Austt'alian-built Mosquito has
gone into action, Moreover, Australian-built
Tig"er Moth" Wackett Trainers, and Wil'l'
have proved invaluable for preliminary
tn \lll1
g
"
MILITARY NOTES
AROUND THE WORL.D
Brit;';" JIl'IT"UJlf ,'\:UI'!f:
Britain started the war with a total (lct'an
going merchant fleet of 17,500,000 1""0"" ton>',
In foul' years, 11,500,000 tOllS mo,'(' than
two-thirds-was lost. Up to Febl'llllry 1 !l45,
;]0,179 British me"chant sealllE'n had been
killed by enelllY action H'HI intelned
the enemy,
Losses of merchant ships and crews of
Britain's nllies during' these periods are not
included in the above nor those <If
British and Allied warships and naval I'el"
gonnel engag'ed in the battle of the At!antic
an,1 on escort duty thl'oug-hout the wodel.
The British merchant ship,< that have been
engaged in this battle of endurance are
manned by Bl'itish Merchant Navy perhonnel.
who though they wear no uniform, may l;p
by the badge M,N.' with Crown
worn on the coat lapel. In Britain an'
rightly considered as part of the forces and
enjoy many privileges as servicemen, Almost
all the officers come from the British rsles anel
the majority of the seamen, thoug'h there are
men from all over the British Commonwealth
and Empire, There are 45,000 East Indians,
more than 6,000 Chinese, an(1 a large number
of Arab firemen serving on B,:itish ships.
They have been in the same fig'ht and f01'111 an
integral part of Britain's :\lerchant Navy.
In 1941 the British Merchant Navy Pool
was started and has been supplying 400 offi
cers and 3,000 seamen per week. It functions
all over the world wherever the ;\lel'chant
Navy sails. Ages in the pool vary from six
teen to seventy-five.
I
I,
Allfi}WI'SVHIIC/ Ail' nontb.... :
T,'phoon fighter-bomber" of the itA F cany
tI new type of bomb load-cluster" of hig-h
ex1""ivc untillcl'sollllel bombs-fol' u,se in
<uppor! of th(' army. These explode without
causlllg th(' cntters which would 'impede the
progress of fl'ie'HlIy l!:1'ound troops. The pic
ture shows how the ne\\' type of bomb load is
fitted to the Typhoon. A canister containing
twenty-six 20-pound antipersonnel bombs is
hoisted on to' the bomb rack, and t!Ien the
nose and tail units are added. One canister is
carried under each wing',
(The Sphcrc, Great Britain)
Ret,'icoeJ'Sen'ice:
The British Army has a Q Branch whose
job is to retdeve equipment and materiel
strewn beachheads and battlefields in
combat, sort and identify it. and arrange for
its return to its owners. This service includes
(British Information Services personal eff('cts as well as war matel"ie!.
Press Service, 17 May 1945) (Mul'illc Cor}lS Gazette)
MILITARY kEVIEW

Airborne Lifeboats:
'Developed by the Emel'g'ency Rescue
Branch of the Personnel Equipment Labol:a
tory, this airborne lifcboat is now in usc for
sea rescues from air. Twenty-seven feet
long and wcighing ovcr one ton, the boat is
securcd under thc bomb of a B-17. It
is carried by three parachutcs which aftcr
wards submerge and serve as a sea ancho)".
Powered with two five-horsepower cngincs
and emergency sails, the craft will do eight
miles pcr hour.
(The /l/1wtrated London .Veus)
Rocket Mosquito:
Against land targets the rocket has been
mostly in demand for short-range tactical
, work b;iT day, for which a single-engine fighter
was obviously the most suitable aircraft; the
outstanding success of the rocket Typhoons
against tanks and troop concentrations in the
Falaise Gap was a classic sample.
Against shipping, however, longer operat
ing range, a navigator, more elaborate 'naVi
gational radio, and the safety of two engines
are necessary. Rocket rails have therefore
been fitted to several mUlti-engine types, the
Bcaufightcl' and now the Mosquito because of
its high speed.
A steady "platform" is necessary for accu
rate rocket launching becausc of the rclative
ly low specd at which the rocket lcaves the
aircraft. The Mosquito, which always attacks
in 11 dive, providcs the stcadiness that is
wantcd, and has allother good feature in the
pilot's cxcellcnt view. It carries the usual
eight rockets with 60-pound heads-and the
lightncss of this form of armament cnables
iulvantage t() be takcn of thc extra fucl tank
age which is a featurc of evcry Mosquito
, \'clsion. Thc absence of gun wcight and rc
coil al'C distinct advantages of thc' rocket
projectile over the 57-nllll gun carried by
othcr Mosquitocs, although the high muzzle
vclocity of thc shell of thc lattcr gTeatly ai,ls
accuracy. The rockct projectile is ten times
as heavy as the six-poundcr shell, but fcwer
of thc rockets can be carried, their number
being limitcd by the number of rails that can
b(' accommodated.
A fcaturc of the Mosquito attacks is the
confusion caused by the antiflak firing with
thcil' 20-mm cannon shells and machine-gun
bullets while the rockcts are being launched,
giving' a very clean swcep of the encmy's
decks. The mixcd grill is sometimes improved
by a few 500-pound bombs and some six
pounder shclls from other fighter-bomber
Mosquitocs all flying in thc same strike force,
Thc cannon-equippcd Mosquitoes are fighters
in their own right and nasty customcrs for
cnemy fighters to tacklc.
(Flight, Great Britain)
BURMA
Glider Ambula ces:
Indian and E st African casualties from,
the fighting areas on the Central Burma front
are now evacuated to base hospitals by gliders
left over from the Wingate-Cochrane expe
dition.
MILlTARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD
Men of the United States Army Air Force
today get the sick and wounded out in one
hour; previousiy the 100.mile journey took
thl'.ee days over monsoon-ruined jungle roads,
writes an Indian Army observer.
Towed from their base by Dakotas, used
for air supply drops to forward troops, the
gliders are released over a landing strip only
a few hundred yards long, while the tow-plane
circles overhead. Half un hour later, when
the sick and wounded are settled in the glider,
the parent plane circles lower. There is a
thud, and the glidel' i$ snatched into the alt,
Within an hour the glider has once again
slipped her tow-rope and glides quietly on to
the airfield, where an .ambulance is waiting
to take the men to hospital.
Apart from the jolt of the forward-area
take-off, the glider flight is "mollth and rest
ful. The only noise is the rush of wind through
the spars, and the patients can look through
the windows at the road up which they might
have been jolted if they had gone in an ambu
lance.
The American pilots, provided the weather
is good, make this trip two 01' n'ore times a
day. At peak periods they have evacuated up
to seventy casualties in twenty-foul' hours,
(/Ildian IlIfnnmlfif)lI)
FRA:'I1CE
Prench T)'(I ille)' Plane S,W:
A French trainer.with a curious history is
being produced in the Paris district at a
small factory with an excellent record of
passive resistance and the quiet but deadly
sabotage of German plans. Three prototypes
of the S,10 were built under enemy occupa
tion, but not one of them got into the air un
til the Germans had been driven out. The odd
thing about these aircraft was that every
time they were made ready for a test flight,
some obscure trouble developed at the last
moment ~ n d they could not take off. As soon
as the enemy had been driven out, the ~ . 1 0
found itself able to fly within a few d ~ y s .
(The Ael'oplane, Great Britair\.)
GERMANY
A Huge Gorman Mortar:
The photographs 'below show details of a
self-propelled 380-mm mortar, or howitzer,
which was mounted by the Germans on> a
fortified Mark VI, 01' R9yal Tiger, chassis.
The vehicle was taken in Obel'embt, Germany,
by an infantry battalion of the 19th Corps of
the Amel'ican Ninth Army.
The front armor of the vehicle is five inches
!leep an!l is mounte!\ at an angle of fifty de
grees, At the rear it is four inches thick. The
mortar barrel is seven feet long and is: rifled.
The base of the shell is fifteen inches' in di
ameter and It is five feet long, weighing 770
pounds. It is loaded into the tank by means
of a crane, and then into the breach of the
mortar by a hoist inside the tank, There is
82 '
MILITARY RgVIEW
no' recoil, but a heavy sleeve encloses the
barrel. The shell is projected by a propelling
charge inside the shell itself, and has the
characteristics of a rocket. Its range is be
lieved to be in the neighborhood of 5,000 to
6,000
Other armament on the vehicle includes one
.34-calibel' machine gun on the right side
(visible in the second photo) and a grenade
launcher of 80 to 81 millimeters. Six men
are estimated to operate the vehicle. There is
no movable turret on top of the tank and it is
maneuvered into firing position with the
of the A Maybach eng'ine powers the
contrivance.
A prisoner of war that twelve rounds
were ustllllly carried inside the vehicle.
(The Sphcl'e, Great Britain)
Flak Special:
Our ground forces COUIlII an abandoned
German train function had becn to
!>erve as a complete flak Rite. Boxcars had
been converte,\ to provide headquarters, living
for the gun crews an,l others. a
kitchen. gun repair shops, and storage for
ammunition an,l gllpplies. There were foul'
128-mm flak gUllS, four 20-1ll11l light flak guns,
a prerlktor-range fin,lel'. an,1 two radar sets.
(Ail' FIJI-rr)
Nets [0/' P"nfrr;inll of Jlriti[JP.,:
To protect the supports of river bl'idges
from floating mines, the Germans user!
"antimine nets." The nets were fastened to
wooden piles having a diameter of thirty to
thirty-five centimeters driven into the bot
tom of the river at intervals of seven meters
along the upstream side of the bridge. Each
section of the net had a length of fifteen
meters and a width (01' height) of 3.3
meters, and was made of hard, galvanized
st.eel cables of various thicknesses. The mesh
consisted of squares thirty ('entimeters
across..
As an examph of thl' WHy ill whit'h th"""
. nets were used, II certain hddg'l' aCI'o;;H thl'
Vistula was pl'Ot",cted by u net extending
from the right bank at a point 250 meters
above' the bridge to a point beyond the
middle of the river. Another net extended'
from the left bank 330 meters above the
bridge and reached to the. middle of the
river. Thus the antimine barrier covered
the entire width of the river, assuring de
tention _of any water or land mines that
might be floating in the stream, at the same
time leaving a passage between the nets
that navigation was not hindered.
(Krasnyi Flot, U.S.S.R.)
u. S. S. R.
Altificial Fords:
The famed Russian cavalry is proud of its
ability to ford and swim rivers, yet its flre
power is not always sufficient to meet the
combat demands of a particular sector, and
the heavier armor and guns must be thrown
across water barriers which are too often
unbridged and still too deep to ford. There
fore, it is a rather common practice to build
artificial fords. Such fords are generally
cOllstructed over the flat-country riverR,
which if not fordable have sloping banks
and are not very deep or swift in current.
Low rivel' banks produce variations in the
ri\'er width, depending on the season of the
year, and when they are extremely wide, it
is !lot always expedient to bridge such
bodies of water. Thus, where the conditiolls
permit, artificial fords are constructed out
of a combination of sandbags rocks.
Sometimes they are built only by hand labor,
other times by the use of machinery and
heavy equipment. La,t year, one Soviet engi.
neer unit built an artificial ford over a
wide rivel' by laying more than 6,000 sand-'
bags and stones in one night. This provided
a solid foundation and reduced the water
depth so that, on the following morning, a
tank force crossed the obstacle, which, the
day before, had impeded its progress for
wurd. Altifkial fords are not immune to
by ellelllY uel'ial reconnaissance,
but they are not, the easiest type (If rivel'
crossings to discover.
(From an article by Major Robert B.
Rigg in The Military Engineer)
MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD
JAPAN
Japanese Tank:
the l'uddl)l', Rhown upl'ig'ht with
the 5tel'n I'll thl) ground.
(Th.. JI/UR/I'fI/N/ .T.ollr/OI1 ,Vell's)
FIGURE 3.
TifF. HOW
This new type of Japanese amphibious
tank was captured on Leyte Island in the
Philippines by United States troops. Figure
1 shows the tank as it is used on land. In
Figure 2 the tank is seen from the rear end.
to which propellers for use in water are at
tached. The bow pontoon, Figure 3, is at
tached to the front of the tank and the real'
pontoon, Figure 4, is clamped on the back
end, making a complete amphibious tank
capable of being used for land and sea op
ratipns. In Figure 4 the rear pontoon, with
FIGURE 1.
'i'.\!,,:1{ AS USED ON LAND.
FIG1'RF. 2.
RF.,\H lit' TA .... K. WITH PftoPEl.l.EIlS.
FiGURE 4.
T I-IE REAR PONTOON WITH RUDDER.
84
MILITARY REVIEW
UNITED STATES SeagoIng Warehouses:
-
,Boeing C.97 T}'(IlIRport Pia/Ie,'
Disgorging' cargo fl'olll the Buein;"; C-U7,
which flew 2,323 miles from Seattle to Wash
ington, D,C., at 38:3 miles pel' hour-a
record. The great loading' dOOl'S at the real'
of the fuselage are among the new features
of this transport ai rplane, The rump is self
contained in the plane and electrically opel'
ated, Two fully loaded l ,,-tOIl trucks call
'
be driven up the ramp into the airplane with
plenty of room left for other eCjuipmcnt or
cargo, or two light tanks mny be accommo
dated,
A New Weapon-Canned Salmon:
The use of canned salmon as a secret
weapon in the aerial war against the by
passed Japanese forces in the Marshalls has
been revealed, For months, Marine airmen
bombed, strafed, and harassed Japanese
forces on Wotje, l\Ii\i, Jaluit, and Maloelap,
In conjunction with many of the daylight
missions, scout bombers and fig:'hters dropped
leaflets pointing out the hopelessness of
their p,osition and urging them to surrender,
In these leaflets, the Japs were told that
American forces had plenty of food and
that prisoners could expect good treatment.
The cans of salmon which accompanied
these arguments served as samples of rations
supplied prisoners.
(Naval Aviation News)
Seagoing warehOtlSes, complete from cotter
pins to camshafts, now back up the combat
and ground crews of the U,S, Army 7tlr Air
Force in the Pacific,
l'owed over thousands of miles of water as
the AA F moves toward Tokyo, the barges can
accompany the amphibious task forces,
moving' in to sel'vice fighters and bombers the
moment a base is secured, They are used in
the crucial"days when permanent or semi
permanent buildings on newly captured bases
al e being constructed,
An 01,1 ;\tississippi River scow, borrowed
frolll thc Navy, was the forerunner of these
new floating' ail' depots, Converted into a
warcl!ollsl', it proved its worth in the Ellice
and Gill]('rt Islands campaigns,
Fully stocke,l. each bm'ge cal'l'ies more than
ii.oOO separate itcms from the smallest nut
to Illl'g'e wing and tail assemblies, A few
1110111\.nts nfter the compact, two-way radio at
the barge's shore station has sent its call for
an aircraft part, the item is whisked by a
small, powerful landing craft to shore, where
it is then relayed to ground crl)WS by j e ~ p ,
For loading and unloading heavy equip
ment, two-deck cranes are operated on power
of Diesel engines, which also. furnish air
conditioning, lighting, and refrigeration.
Crew:; who man these barges are enlisted
mcn with two or more years of 7th AAF
Service Command warehouse training, Other
memhers of the crew include a 7th AAF
officcl' in charge, amI a civilian captain who
i:, in charge while the ship is at sea.
(Army and Navy Register)
"D/'oop-Snoot" :
America's "droop-snoot" bomber is a P-38
Lightning modified to lead standard P-38 for
mations in precision bombings while keeping
its speed and high altitude, The "drop-snoot
er" is a fighter with a combined bombardier
navigator compartment added in its nose
ahead of the pilot's cockpit, The plane directs
its formation's bombing with accuracy pos
sible at speeds fifty percent greater than the'
operating speeds of heavy bombers.
(From a news report)
FOREIGN MILITARY
DIGESTS
Malaria Control in the Southwest Pacific
at the Command and General Staff School from an article by l\1ajor
General G. Covell, Consultant l\ialariologist, General Headquarters (lndi!\),
in The Journal of the United Service Institution of India January 1945.
These imp/'cssions we)'c gained during
a 1'ecent /01/1' in A ltstralia (Iud N"w
Guinea, the pllI'pose of H'hich 2WIS /0
study ?flalal'ia IIToll/ems in the SUI/thwest
Pacific Area, and to sec whcthel' any
special measures employcd fhac might
with advantage be intl'odl/ced ill thc anti
mala)'tal IlJ'ogram of the AssaJ/l-B/(nna
theater.
GENERALLY speaking, the coun,e of events
as regards malaria casualties among the
Allied forces operating in the Southwest Pa
cific Area has resembled very closely that on
the Assam-Burma front, In both theaters the
malaria rate was excessively high during the
first year of operations, and in both the rates
have since been reduced to a small fraction
of the original figures. In recent months,
however, the rates iu the Southwest Pacific
Area among both Australian and American
troops have been very considerably lower
than that recorded on our own eastern front,
Among troops, the malaria
rates recorded in well-established bases in
malarious areas are exceedingly low. Among
operational troops the rates have varied
greatly according to (a) the degree of anti
malaria maintained, (b) the sever
ity of the fighting, as affecting antimalaria
discipline in difficulties of supply, and (c)
the scene of operations.
Malaria figures for the American forces
in IiUtlv .Guinea in recent months have been
lOwer than those recorded by the Aus
tralians.
The overall rate pel' 1,000 ]Jel' week for all
forces operating in New Guinea and the ad
jacent island, is at present slightly less than
the overall rate llel' drty recorded in the
Assam-Burma theater,
A number of factor", however, have an
important bearing on the malaria problem
in the Southwest Pacific:
1, Troops are segregated from the local
population, The area is comparatively sparsely
populated, and any local labor employed is
housed well away from any military camp.
Local inhabitants who may be living near
camps are deported elsewhere. This removes
an important reservoir malaria infection.
:1. The absence of long rail and road lines
of communications necessitating the main
tenance of numerous staging camps in ma
larious areas,
3. There is only a single malaria-carrying
species of mosquito throughout the South
west Pacific Area, breeding almost exclu
sively in small collections of stagnant water
such as wheel ruts and bomb craters. It is
a most efficient vector, but now that its
habits have been thoroughly studied" it is
more easily dealt with formerly.
4. The chamctcr of the cam]1aign. With
complete sea, air, and artillery superiority
there is now'less need for dispersion. Ameri
can troops are usually encamped in compact
areas, completely cleared of jungle, with the
ground surface flattened out with bulldozers,
When landing in enemy territory a location
MILITARY REVIEW
. is chosen wherever possible where no enemy
is present, and since there are usually n<\
local inhabitants either, the mosquit(1(>R aI''
not infe('ted with malaria heforE' th'
land. '
These factors all tend to make the conduct
of antimalal'ia operations a less difficult task
'than on the Assam-Burma front, but
lire not sufficient to account fnl' the g'reat
difference between the malaria ratio in the
t wq theaters,
Two major factors have cOl1tl'ibutcd to tl)('
high standard of antimalal'ial ,lisciplinc in
the Australian Army,
'The Ill'st is the example set br the Com
manding Officer of the 24th Infantry Battal
ion, He set out to prove that a high standard
of antimalaria disciplinc could be main
tained, even when troops are in l'ontact with
the enemy, by meticulllus und unl'emitting
attention to detail on the purt of all con
cerned, After eleven months in intensely ma
larious areas in frequent contact with the
enemy, the admission rate for malaria in
this hattalion was only a fraction of that re
corded among othel' units operatine; under
similar conditions in the same area,
This so impressed the GOr [General Offi
cer Commanding] of the brigade that he in
sisted on a similar regime being' maintained
throughout the formation, with cqually strik
ing results, The example of the 24th Battal
ion probably exerted more influence than any
other factor in convincing the Australian
military authorities of the practicability of
reducing malaria casualties to an inBig'nifi
cant figure in the field, maintaining a high
standard of antimalaria discipline,
The second factor was the convincing re
suits achieved at the research center at
Cairns and the Atherton Tablelan,l regal'd
ing the efficacy of mepacrin (=atebrin) in
suppressing malarial attacks,
The Cairns experiments proved conclusively
that all types of malaria prevalent in New
Guinea can be effectively suppressed by ad
ministering one tablet of lI1epacrin daily,
. provided the dose is actually taken with un
failing regularity. Under this regime, alJ
cases of MT (malignant tertian) malaria',
are actually cured. provided ,the drug is
taken continuously fOI: at least a month aftel'
leaving the malarious area, although BT
(benign tertian) malaria will, in a high pro
portion of cases, relapse when mepacrin ad
ministration is discontinued, This type of
malaria, however, is completely suppressed
so long as the drug is taken regularly el'el'Y
day, In the whole series of cases there was
no single exception to this finding, evcn
though the infected men were subjected to
every conceivable during the period
of observation,
The gl'eat importance of the Cairns ex
pel'iments was the demonstration that the
so-called "breakthrough" of malaria which
so frequently occurs, particularly during a
period of active operations, is due not to the
direct effect of stress and strain, but to the
fact that, under such conditions, antimalaria
discipline is apt to be relaxed and men will
forget to take the drug, unless their training'
has been such that it has become an ingrained
habit,
Two other important points demonstraterl
in these expel'imel1ts were (1) that one tablet
of atebrin pel' day can be administered over
an indefinate period without harm to the
person taking' it, and (2) that persons taking
thig dosag'e regularly cannot infect mosqui
toes which feed on them, so that aU human
malaria carriers are thereby eliminated from
the force,
That the IJrevention of malal'ia in the field
is a function not of the medical services bllt
of the Command was a point which struck
me most, in my conversation with
"enior commanders of Australian and Ameri
can armies, They accepted this principle in
toto, Ii is realized that the medical services
have not the power to enforce the regulations
they advocate, and the problem of malaria
control is treated on exactly the same footing
as the planning of an assault on an enemy
position, ,
Although the regulations in both forces
are extremely rigoroUS, and although mili
tary authorities are detel'fllinelL to enforce
them with the utmost severity, the occasions,
f'OREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
on which it has bel'n founn necessary to take
disciplinary action are comparatively few.
The reason for this is that both forces have
to a large extent reached the ultimate goal
to which we are all aiming, namely, the reali
zation by the individual of the effect that
malaria can have not only on his own health
but on that of the force, and of his personal
responsibilities for its control. Antimalaria
precautions have become such a fixed habit
that they are carried out almost automati
cally.
In the brigade mentioneo above the follow
ing precautions were adopted, in addition tn
those laid down by the medical autho/'ities:
1. Education of the individual soldier in
the effect malaria can have on the force, and
his personal re'ponsibility for its control.
:t. The main basis of malaria control and
supervision within the unit was parades, roll
calls, and reports.
.1. Malaria control became a ritual in the
unit in the same way as weapon and kit in
spections and parades. This call and 1>/IIM br
done in battle, just as it i,. ill tmilling cam)}
4. Every subunit commander was respon
sible, each night, to inform his next higher
commander that his command had carried
out the malaria precautions. Subunit com
manders can be liars, but it affects their con
science to be liars el"CI"1/ night.
5. A daily study of malaria evacuationg
was made by the brigaoe commanoer. Charts
were kept, and action taken immediately any
increase was shown.
6. All individual cases of malaria were in
vestigated. The close cooperation of the field
ambulance by questioning the "patient at
times disclosed a laxness in a subunit. Im
mediate action was then taken, the section.
platoon, and company commanders of the
individual concerned reporting- pen;onally to
the commanding officer.
7. Operationally, the view \Vah taken that
in the main at least two-thirds of the fon:e
could use nets, even in contact, at night, the
remaining third being on protective duties.
There were several occasions When contact
was so close throughout the night that the
use of nets was not possible.
8. All patrols were briefed regarding ma
laria control and were interrogated on their
return. The patrol commanoer, in his written
report, stated the malaria precautions taken,
a paragraph being included in every patrol
I'eport. Nets were always carried on patrol
so as to be available. There are few patrols
which cannot use nets. No sane reconnais
sance patrol bivouacs so close to the enemy
that nets cannot be used-due allowance be
ing made for the necessary protective per
sonnel. It would be- expensive in manpower
to send out a patrol of, say, ten men on a
four-day patrol and lose fifty percent from
malaria casualties.
g. In all operation orders and instructions,
malaria control was always dealt with. It was"
invariably considered as part of the opet'Qr
tion, and never allowed to be" orershadowed
by the opelation .
Some of the main points emphasized in
this brigade are these:
Commanders must realize the necessity for
"conserving manpower by the maintenance of
health.
Precautio'ns laid down fOl' the prevention
of tropical diseases must"be adhered to.
Ensure that ~ v e r y man accepts his in
dividual responsibility for the control of ma
laria, and understands the effects malaria
may have on the fighting force to which he
belongs.
The responsibility of constant supervision
must be realized by every officer ano non
commissioned officer from the commanding
officer downwards. Supervision on an organ
ized disciplinary basis has proved to be most
effective.
Realize the human frailties when the flesh
and spirit is weak from long campaigning,
and take extra measures to combat any laxity
in malaria precautions.
Investigate every laxity relentlessly. Pur
sue the inquiry until the indivinual respon
sible is found. One careless, inefficient officer
8,8
MILITARY REVIEW
or noncommissioned officer may be the cause than from Japs. Malaria control should be-'
of innumerable casualties. come part of the unit battle drill.
Don't ,let the "operations" bOll'ey lesson the Study figures and ch\lrts. These tell a
vigilance on malaria and other pl'ecautiong. story, and from them the commander can
Far more casualties will come from malaria most likely put his finger on the weak spot.
The Art of Encirclement
Translated and digested at tIll' COlllmand an,1 General Staff School from a Russian
article by Major B. Korol in I\l'ltl/llaia XI'c:::dn (Red Star) 2 December 1944.
THE R('d Army has 'carl'h,t! out a number
bf encirclement which haw influ
enced decisively the course of the Patriotic
War and have lUIValll'l'd the
modern military art. In a(ldition ttl thl' cn
circlement of separate and
gal'l'isOIlS, the Soviet troops havl' uncll'r
tak('n lal'g'c'Hcale encirclement "Ill'rations l'n
c'ompaHsing' a:'('<[,.
The method well worked out and lllastl'I'C'\
by the Red Army is that of the double en
velopment and encirclenwnt of larg'l' mass<'s
of enemy troops untier the conditions of the
continuous front. Each encirclement opcl'ution
is carried out, as a rule, on a broad front and
is a culmination of a series of {)peru
tions. The wellging into the Gel'lll,1)1 lincs is
carried out in widely ileparatt,d At
Stalingrad, for instance, tlw (,l1vclopinl:
wedges driven into the German ddl'nse were
300 kilometers apart; at Kor,ulI-Shevc!H'Il
kovskii, about 200 kilometers; at Kishinev,
about 300 kilometers.
The blows inflicted in various direction,
disperse the ICfforts of the prevent
him frol11 regrouping' his troops (especially
tanks), and, what is 1110re important. rcsult
in the commitment of his operational reserves,
which is the general prerequisite of the ma
neuver of encirclement. It should be noted
that many a time the enemy reserves have
also been caught in the encirclement opera
tions. Such was the case in the Yassy.Kishi
nev operation,
In ow' la1'ge operations, we .:,"jJ/oit
the element of Sll1'ptise. The general directioll
,of the attack is chosen so as to take the (>nemy
unawJ\res. Such was the case at Stalingrad.
At KOl'sull-Shevchenkovskii, the enemy
thought that the troops of Koniev
w,'rt' to attack to the southwest, but all
:\Tarshul Koniev's pr('parations were carried
out St'cretly, and that is what misled the en
emy. Surprise is also effected by the advance,
('om\ucte(\ on a broa(\ front. when our troops
strike a series of diversionary blows. In
none of the encirclement opcrations did the
enemy managc to determine the direction of
0111' main effort. He found it out only in the
course of the battle when it was too late.
In all offensive operations. anti especiallr
in encirclement operations, Soviet command
ers achieve a high tt'mpo of action, which is
of primary importance in modern warfan',
The hreakthrough is ihe 0" '\I1ic part of th,'
encirclement operation, anti ,Ile tempo of the
man('uver for encirclement dcpends on the
tempo of the breakthrollgh. This relationship
the most characteristic feature of thc
11rescnt war.
The Rcd Army breaks thl'Ollglz GerHl(f1i
]Jositiolla/ dcfenses n'ith III11ISlla/ )'((pidity.
in the breakthrough sectors, we concentrate
large masses of artillery and aircraft, which
helps the Infantry an,l tanks overcome ra'pitl
Iy the enemy's main zone of defense.
where we have overwhelming superiority in
artillery. In the Yassy-Kishinev operation, in
the sector of the Third Ukrainian Army
Group, we averaged about 230 guns and heavy
11101'ta1'S pel' kil<)meier of the front, and were
faced with thirty to forty German pieces.
Each of the enveloping wedges is driven
;nto the German line on a broad front-the
breakthrough sector is seldom less (han thirty
kilometers wide. Attacks of varying strength
FOREIGN M,ILITARY DIGESTS
,:;::
1I1'e then launched within this sector, The blllk
of materiel and eq!lipment is concentratcd
within small areas under concealment which
is achieved by proper camouflage and feints.
The secrecy in concentrating overwhelming
forces within arcas, combined with
broad breakthrough the
basis of tactical surpris'.
Mobile units are often committed before
the breakthrough area has been cleared of
the enemy. These help complete the break
,hrollgh of the defenses in order to outstrip
the operationall'escrvc of the elll'my und COI11
plete tne planned encirclement maneuver.
Such was the case, for example, in the en
circlement of the German group neal' 1{orsun
Shevchenkovskii. Here the tanks of :\[arshal
Rotmistrov and the caI'alry of General Seliva
nov withstood a short. ,fierce battle in the
very gates of the They foul!,'ht
with the vanguard of the German tank forcl'
rushing to the rescue of their troops. Had
nUl' mobile units delayed engaging the enemy
until the breakthrough area had been COIll
pletely mopped up, would have been
forced to fight not the forward elements of
the .enemy tank unit but th(' bulk of its forces,
':'hat is why the echelon effecting the break
through should closely cooperate with the
mobile troops assigned to the l'xploitation.
Mobile troops try to avoid pl'otl'act('d en
gagements, and the whole operation is plannl'd
so as to prevent these troops from engaging
with counterattacldng enemy groups. OUI'
tanks and cavalry, moving toward the points
the occupation of which will complete the
uperational eneil'element of the enemy group,
boldly bypass his centers of resistance and
retiring columns, or attack tlwl11 from march
formation. Establishing skilful cooperation,
our command repels enemy countuattacks
employing troops especially assigned for
this mission, and take3 advantage of the high
mobility and maneuverability of our artillcry.
A dis,tinetivc feature of all the eneil'clement
operations is the definite sequence of commit
ting to battle the elements of the battie for
mation. We always strive for a constant in
crease in the intensity of attacks in the main
direction. This engages aU enemy troops and.

what is more important, his mobile forces
which attempt to block the route of our tanks
and l,xecuti11g the maneuver of oper
ational pbeil'clcment. The adherence to the
definite s('quence in the commitment of the
("ehclollS Rcrures the rapidity of the encircle
nwnt. Dul' to this and because of tile flexible
control of lind the skilful cooperation among
all arms. the enemy is subjected to a simul
taneous action from the air and from the
gTOlllHl throughout the depth of the operation.
The Of advance of our tanks, motor
ized infantlT, and cavalry in a maneuver for
"ncil'ch'ment has often attained fifty kilo
meters a day. The encirclement of von Paulus'
t;rll1Y at Stalingrad was completed on the
fourth day after the breakthrough. In the
Yassy-Kishint'v operation, our' mobile units
covel'l',l frol11 eighty to 11 0 kilometers, aver
aging from twenty to twenty-five kilometers
a day. The encirclement of the Bobruisk
group was carried out within two days of
the breakthrough. The tanks of General
Panov covered one hundred kilometers with
the average speed of forty-five to fifty kilo
meters a <lay, while the German force
of l\lin,k encircled on the ninth day 0
the offensive in White Russia. The mobile
troops of the Third White-Russian Army'
Group had covered during this period about
250 kilometers, i.e., twenty-five' to thirty
kilometers a day.
Thus, having secured a quick breakthrough
of the defense, we execute a rapid maneuver
for encirclement, mobile groups
composed of tanks, motorized infantry, and
cavalry, while our aircraft is dominating the
air.
The mobile troops are steadily followed by
units of all arms. The distance separating the
infantry and artillery from the tanks and
cavalry is seldom more than one day of
marching. Once the enemy has been caught
ill the lli'ongs of the encil'clement pincel's, the
denl!ity of OU1' battle fOl'mations incl'eases
mpidly.
The art of this rapid strengthening of the
battle formations accounts for the fact that
no matter how furious the Germans may
counterattack, they do not succeed in breaking
90
'MILITARY REVIEW:
out from the ring of encirclement, and their
counterthruRts from the outfiirle invariably
fail.
The rapid stl'engthening of the battle for
mations also enabl!'s us to shift immediately
fl'om the operational to the tactical encircle
ment [literal translation]. As soon as the
ring of encirclement closed around the Kishi
nev German group, the bulk of our infantry
and artillery joined in, started a concentric
attack, and split up the surrounded group.
The narrowing of the ring and the splitting
anrl rout of the encircled enemy constitute ,in
all our operations one inseparable
eallit1g for exceptional1y p1'ecise cooperation.
As the of simultaneously tightening
the ring and splitting the encircled forces im
proved, the tempo of liquidating such groups'
increased. Thus, the bulk of the German Ninth
Army at Bobruisk was encircled on 27 June,
and by 29 June the encircled troops had bel'n
either killed 01' captured.
The German Offensive in the Ardennes
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article by Major E, W.
Sheppard, OBE, MC, in The Fighting Forces (Great Britain) April 1945.
IN mid-November 1944, the Allies, hav
ing opened up the Schelde and secured the
use of Antwerp as a base port, wcre in a
position to resum'e the offensive towards anti
into Germany, (see sketch). The aim, of the
British Second Army was to clear the enemy
from the districts west of the Roer, while
the American Ninth and First Armies on its
right resumed their attempts to penetrate
the Siegfried Line east of Aachen.
All these armies could make only slow
headway under unfavorable conditions of
weather and ground and against a tenacious
hostile resistance in deep, well-designed de
fenses. By the beginning of December they
had been bogged down, and the northern
part of the front had become practically
stabilized,
Farther south, however, where the U.S.
Third and Seventh Armies and the First
French Army were in action, much more im
portant and rapid progress was made. The
great fortress of Metz was surrounded and
captured, and along' the whole front from
the Rhine to the southeastern corner of
Luxembourg the German frontier area was
reached; while the Allied line was pushed
forward 'to the Rhine along the greater part
of the stretch from the Swiss border to op
posite Karlsruhe, though the enemy still re
tilined a large bridgehead on either side of
Colmar extending westwards deep into the
Vosges, which was later to give us a good
deal of trouble,
Meanwhile, however, the Germans wcre
fast recovering from the effects of their
: heavy defeats of the summer and autumn.
They had recreated a considerable reserve
and had re-armed and re-formed their
panzel' divisions with two new and formid
able types of heavy tank. The Luftwaffe
had been carefully economized, and now,
with its new jet-propelled aircraft, bade fair
to he once more a formidable fighting force.
A certain number of the newly raised
V olksg'l'enadier formations had been made
a vail able to take over quiet sectors of the
front. The Germans, in fact, now had it in
their power to paRS from defense to attack,
if they so chose.
The plan was to launch a surprise of
fensive in the Ardennes as soon as the
weather proved suitable. Under General
Model's command, the reconstituted Seventh
German Army and the Fifth and Sixth
SS Panzei: Armies, comprising twenty-foul'
divisions, of which ten were panzer divisions,
were allotted for the task. Their mission
was to reach the Meuse in the stretch be
tween Liege and Sedan within forty-eight
'hours, and thence to drive a swift-moving
and powerful armored wedge forward to
Antwerp, which it was hoped to reach
within three weeks.
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MILITARY REVIEW
The ultimate purpose, prosumably, was to
'l>eeu1'O and hold that city, so cutting off the
. thirty-eight divisions of the four Allied
armies in the north from the three armies in
the south, and depriving the former of their
base and lines of communications. If this
could not be done, it wa" hOjled at to
wreck tIle port and effectiwly
as to render it useless to the Allies as a base
for many weeks to come.
These were eertllinly designs, and
it is lloubtful if, even under tIll' most favor
able circumstances concl'ivable, there was
any possibility of their realizatioll.
Nevertheless, the offl'nsivc gaim'd consider
able ground in the first few ,In:;s. \\'('ather
conditions prevented the Allie,1 ail' forces
from opemting against the Gl'rman panz('l'
units, as tlwy had done with such devu:o;tating
success at Avnlllches in July. an,\ the new
heavy German tanks W('l'l' ditlicult to deal
with, outmatehing the Alliell as
they did. A number of tIll' small American
garrisom; in this thinly hl'lt! amI hitherto
inactive area were isolate,,1 nn<l hypas,ed j
same were overrun anll others C,nl1lwI1e<l to
ealTY out an adventurous retil'l'n1l'nt.
Several of the lar!!,'er ones, howeve)', hchl
out defiantly, and the rcsi"t>tnCl' at such
places as Wiltz, St. Yith, Stavel"t, :\Ialmelly,
and particulal'ly at tlw important nodal paint
of Bastogne, so ,lowe,1 up and disorganized
the Germans that by the time their Il'ading
panzer units were approaching the :\Ieuse
valley in the Dinant area, nat only was
American armor there to head them off but
strong infantry forces sent down by Field
Marshal Montgomery from the British Second
Army in Holland were guarding the )'iver line
itself.
Meanwhile, mobile units of the "C.S. Third
Army had also been rushed ael'oss from Lor
raine to strike at the southern flank of the
enemy salient and regain contact with the
airborne troops holding out in isolation at
Bastogne.
By these means the rate of progress of the
German assault was gradually slowed down
and finally stopped. Then began the slow
process of recovery of the lost ground.
Field Marshal Montgomery, in temporary
command of the First and Ninth u.s, Armies
as well as of his own two, was now conducting
the battle in the north and center, while the
American General Bradley remained in
charge of the operations on the southern side.
Under theil' guidance the jaws of the Allied
pincers inexorably closed in, but only so
'as to permit the hostile force
gripped between them to extricate itself with
out any spectacular loss of men or material.
DUl'ing the course of the battle, Rundstedt
canied out several probing or !1iversionary
attacks <?Isewhcre, an the Saar front, in the
fron! jet' area about Haguenau, and north and
of Strasbourg; but though the Allied
advanced posts were pushed back, no oppor
t unity for converting any of these into a
Iarg'e-scale diversion apparently offered it
fo)' the fighting remained on a minor
scalP only, and the Allied forces were able
to l'l'tai n thl'ir main positions. '
By the llate of the launching of the great
Hlls:,ian winter offensive, which turned all
eyes from the west to the cast,
fornwr penetration the
:\ r<1ennes bulge had shrunk to a strip of
tel'l'ito)'y extending only some twenty miles
to the west of the line from which it had
started a month earlier. By the end of
.January it had been completely liquidated,
and the contending forces were back ,vhere
they had been when the German attack began.
The Allies estimateo the total German cas
ualties in DpCl'l11her and January at 220,000,
of whom 110,000 were prisoners. About 1,450
tanks and assault guns and about half the
tanks of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies
were destroyed. Most of these losses were pre
suffered in the battle in the Arden
nes, in which the Allied casualties had been
some 55,000 only. Over twenty American
divisions fought in the battle from first to
last; only a single British corps had been
engaged, and its losses had been small.
Current views and criticisms of the battle
ti",e111 to have been based on certain miscon
ceptions. The belief that the Allied armies at
the time of its outbreak enjoyed a great
numerical superiority over the enemy appears
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
to have little foundation in, fact. Rundstedt
hud, at his disposal some seventy divisions
and, to judge from the details officially an
nounced, the number of Allied divisions was
then little, if at all, in excess of that figure.
The Allied ail' fOl'ces certainly had full ail'
supremacy, but under wintel' conditions, such
thosc prcvailing during the greater part
of the battle pedod, this ascendancy lost
much of its effectiveness. On the other hand,
the enemy's new heavy tanks were, for the
purposes of a breakthrough battle, better
than anything we had to put against them,
and in this respect, thel'dore, we fought at a
constant disadvantage. On the whole, it is
probable that as regards fighting power on the
ground, the opposing armies in the Ardennes
were i'easonably well matched. and only on
occasions could the Allied ail' superiority
make itself felt. '
Again, a contrast has been somewhat un
fail'ly drawn between the Allied strategy of
attacking all along the line, and Rundstedt's
of making a heavy tbrust on a narrow front,
The Allies, in fact, were not in ;mfficit'nt
strength to exercise pressure all along the
line, even had it been dpsirable or wise for
them to do so; they concentrated their efforts
ag;ainst the most sensitive sectors of the Ger
man front, those covering the Ruhr and the
Rhineland, and they also continued with their
efforts to complete the liberation of Lonaine
and Alsace, which had been held up by supply
difficulties prior to the opening up of Ant
werp. It was necessary, in order to make'these
attacks as strong and effective as possible,
to economize forces on inactive sectors, of
which the Ardennes was the principal one.
HeTe what General Bradley called a "cal
culated risk" was taken in the belief, possibly,
that a German counterattack here was im
probable, and that even if delivered, it was
unlikely to achieve any important success.
This last proved to be a well-judged forecast;
nothing of vital value would be lost unless
the enemy could not only reach but cross the
and in the event he was held up just
short of it, thanks to the stubborn valor of
the comparatively small American forces
holding the area under attack and the swift
and well-thought-out countermeasures ta1s:en
by the Allied commanders. In the final result,
the Allies secured a highly satisfactory:
balance of, comparative battle casualties, and
all the enemy's' gains of ground had quickly
to be relinquished once these countermeasures
bep:an to take full effect.
In view of the final result of the battle, it
must be considered questionable whether the
Gel'mans were wise to embark upon it at all.
If, as likely, the decision to do so and
the gPlleral battle-plan were Hitler's own, "and
R41l<lstcdt's responsibility was confined
merely to cllrrYing out the plan laid down for
him. it must appeal' that,the plan erred on
the side of overoptimism and set the German
Army a task which proved beyond its powers.
That the Meuse could bl2 reached and perhaps
was a reasonable assumption, which
was only fabified by the fine fighting of the
Allll'I'kan t!'Oops; hut it is difficult to believe
that. even on the assumption that this could
and woul,l be done. the project of a further
thrust to Antwerp was anything but the
baseless "fabric of a dream" of an amateur
strategist. It is douhtful if Rundstedt him
self-who called the offensive "an' all-out
gamblc"-ever had any great faith in its
success,
Apart from this, it must be admitted that
he and ;\Iodel fought their battle well and
competently, made the most of their chances,
and gave the Allies some "bad 'quarters-of
an-hour" from time to time. On the whole,
bowever, the Germans certainly came off con
siderably the worse from their enterprise.
Against the disarrangement of the Allied
plans and dispositions for their spring offen
sive. which could hardly have been scheduled
to take place before mid-February at the
earliest, and the capture of a certain quantity
of munitions, material, fuel, and 'stores, which
in view of the fact that the Ardennes area
was held as an inactive sector can hardly
have been large, there have to be set the
heavy losses,in men and tanks suffered by
the Germans, the depletion of their strategic
reserves at the moment when heavy calls were
about to be made on them for help for the
Eastern Front, and the bad effect on morale,
MILITARY REVIEW
both military and civil, of the I:omplete loss
of th' ground init'ially gainprl by an offensive
publicly announced as being Germany's last
great effort to snatch viqtory from the jaws
of ddeat.
History. in fa!'t, will pl'ohably ratify :.\11'.
Churchill's view that the end of the war and
the Allied victory was brought nearer rather,
than postponed by this battle. Should this
prove correct, this fact alone'must condemn
as a strategic error the German decision to
upon their Ardennes offensive.
Strategy
Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a Spanish
article by Colone! Jose Hijar in Ejercito (Spain) March 1945.
UP to the time of I'l'edel'iek the Great,
studiQS of the military lut drew no
tions between tactics anu stratel!:Y. Thus,
since the time of Xellophon, tactics hat! been
defined "the art of assu ring' liberty to
the people and the state." But the victories
of Fre(jcrick impressed the minds of men,
impelling the authol s of tl'l'atises to reflect
on the wherefore of the,c successes, and the
Archduke Chal'les wrote the fir,t treatise on
strategy at tht' ueg'inning- of the Ninetecnth
Century, dcfining- it thl'l'cin as the "science
of the commundel' in chicf."
It was betwel'n the beg-inning' uf the
Nineteenth Century and the Cl'a of great
inventions and heavy industry, which have
been of such influence since the last quarter
of the past ('cntm'y, that the modern eoncept
of strategy uegan to evolve. Military stuuies,
however, dealt solely with the military aSlleet
of the matter, and, according' tu Clausewitz,
strategy was "the employment of eombat and
its relationship with the objecti"es of war."
But the war of 1!l14 came on and its
realities made apparent the necessity for
including in military studies politics and
economics. This meant taking' the state into
account with the totality of its population.
its moral and material values. aIHI its pro
duction which is really the n10dern
concept of total war. Strate!,:y has thus
reverted to the ancient concept of "the
science of seeul'ity and national liuerty," ""
Bulow 'definet! it ill I 87!1. and it was
to 'a place above that of the previous concept
of military strategy. Thus was born general
strategy, which is a set of principles by
means of which the lives of the state ancl
its inhabitants are insured.
General strategy teaches the collaboration
or the various national forces (political,
economic, and military forces) for the so
lution of strategic, or military, problems.
It comprises, therefore, the partial strategies
of each; of the national forces. Its relation
to militaJ!oY strategy is the same as may
exist between general tactics and one of
the llartieulal' branches of tactics peculiar
to each of the various arms.
The object of war is the moral and ma
terial of the enemy, with
the following means employed for the
achievement of this end:
1. The destruction of the armed forces
of the enemy by means of rapid maneuvers
and action in which effort is made to hamper
and delay their movements.
:!. Destl'l1ction of the principal elements
of the enemy's economic force, as factories,
stations, etc., by means of violent action.
,1. Interference with the flow of his sup
plies, especially those which arrive by water
route (by means .of blockades).
4. Demoralizing the enemy by violence
(aerial bombardments) or political forces
(pl'opag-an<ia) .
All these must ue combined. Therefore,
cOl1l111t\lld, which today possesses more numer
ous and val'ied means of action than in the
past, has become more eomplicated and diffi
cult. But its role is a supreme one.
From what has been explained, it can
be deduced that there are three factors on
I'OjmIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
95:',
which general sl;rategy has to base its
decisions, namely, potential military strength,
potential economic stl'l'ng'th, anr.l \)otl'l1tilli
moral or political strength.
The combination of all of thesE' constitutl's
the wal' potentiality of a country, which is,
in short, the degree of aptitudc it" posseSRCS
at the particular timc and the rapidity with
which it is able to adapt itself, if need be,
to the necess.ities of war. This concept, as
is evident, is a concept of the moment or,
at most, one of an immediate future, and
therefore it is subject to revision.
Now let us examine the combination of
these factors. "Every strug'g'le, whether it
be between states or individuals, has common
grounds," says Clausewitz. Hence, just as
in combat it is necessary to divide forces
into three fundamental pal'ts, it is necessary
to act in the same manner in general strateg'Y.
The state establishes a vang'uard which
finds out the strength and intentions of the
enemy. At the same time, the strength and
intentions of its own forces are concealed
from the enemy, and this asst,l'es an ad
vantageous position for the main of
forces for the moment when they go into
action. This is the role of political activity.
The main body of forces acts then in such
a manner as to compel the enemy to employ
all his reserves, at the same time assuring
a good base of departure for their own
reserves. This role belongs to the arme(j
forces; which hurl themselves into the fight,
continuing the struggle begun by political
activity.
The reserves which are to throw them
selves on the enemy with absolute superi
ority at the decisive time and in the
struggle are represented by the economics
of the country, since a powerful economic
system will permit t1'le maintenance, without
decline, of the combat strength of the army.
Lastly, pursuit with mobile forces is neces
sary in order that the enemy may not
reorganize his troops in any other position
in his real' areas and offer resistance again.
The last traees of his resistance must be
wiped out, and this is done by tne political
forces.
STRATEGIC MANEUVER
Befor!:! speaking about this, I shall define
11 few concepts.
Combat'Limits.-The strategic front of
military strategy used to be, for each bel
ligerent formation, the line which joined
the various strongpoints, suc,h as fortifi
cations, natural lines of defense, etc. T'his
concept has been modified today since these
limits have gained enormously in extent
owing to aviation and tanks. It was thus
in Poland and France where in reality these
limits were constituted by areas of great
depth, and they are still more accentuated
in the Pacific.
In genei'al strategy, it is necessary to
augment even this concept, including in it
the frontiers of neu.tral countries assisting
us with all the non-military means which
at the same time are denied the enemy.
For this reason, even this broad concept
enters the category of combat limits.
War Limits.-This is a more universal
idea than the foregoing. The war limits are
constituted by the zones where the strategic
forces of the states may meet one anothel'.
This includes not only the armed but also
the political and economic forces. They rep
resent, therefore, not only the combat limits
but also areas of economic or political
struggles. That is to say, they extend to
the neutral countries which it is necessary
to dominate.
Because of the economic interdependence
of all countries, this politico-economic strug
g'le has resulted in the expansion of the
areas of war and the tendency toward world
wars only.
Jianeuvel.-Just as in general tactics the
aim is to combine the various arms in ac
cordance with theil' particular tactics and
in accordance with a certain situation (de
termined by the mission, the means avail
able, the terrain, and the enemy), and in
military stnitegy, to combine armed forces
capable of carrying out independent actions,
iit general strategy maneuver 'is effected by
means of campaigns in which m;1itaI'Y forces
96
MILITARY a natuI'e Of:1 of ml'!l'tal'y becau.'e
are combined with politkal amI economic ,
lorces,
DECISIVE FACTORS OF TIlE STRATEGIC
l\IA!,;EUYER
Among the of military art, all
of which are applicable to general stratc/!;y,
it will be pI'ofitable fOl' us to cxamine two,
because of the influcnce they cxert on it
and the ,;pecial 1'01'11\ tllPY Thc,:c
are combined actioll aIIII "ul'pl'i,.;".
CUlIlbiJled ActiulI.-ln tactic,.;, all a rill';
have to ';UppOl't thc infantry, which is thc
arm that, in the final analy,;is, eti'ects thc
occupation of the enemy telTitol'Y and brings
it into submission."
In general stl'l\teg;.', all thc fo!'cl''; of the
state aid the arnll'd forces. The politit'al
forces do thi::; by trying' tn Cll'ate favorable'
attitudes ill neutral Coulltrie:., thus provi,linl!:
Allies UIl,I new of ecollomic HllpplicH.
Nevertheless, once the war has starte,l, till'
success of the political elrort depellti.-;
on the success of the arllled fOITes, which
sways the minds of the neutral,.;.
Just as the political force,; provide thl'
spiritual energies for the ,trug:g'le. sn till'
economic fol'l'cs pnwil\e the nJatcriab, and
from thill cOlllhinatioll, wh('n Wl'1l manag'ed,
there springs, through the m'l of general
strategy, the milital',' of one of
the two shies, which will be the "ne that will
conquer,
This infiuel1ec,; thc cncmy in
accordance with the degree to which it up
sets him, and is achie\'ed through the ill
strumentality of an unexpecte,l element
relative to time or place.
. Thus, in 1914, although Fl'<l!1ce and Ger
many mobilized an equal number of men
(France six pel' cent of her population ami
Germany foul' perce,nt of hers), the latter
dispatched immediately to the front two-
thirds of all she had mobilized, and France,
only half. Strategic was thus
achieved, for the Allies had not expected
Germany to put reserve corps on the fighting
line at the very outset.
, Also' the employment of gases and super-
cannon by the Germans and tanks by the
Engli!!h were surprises, all of them strateg'ic
the means employed.
Surprise was also produced in 1939 when
the westerll powers did not believe that
Germany had at her disposal the abundant
modem equipment with which she began
the campaign, equipping great number of
large uHits with it. This, althoug'h it also
possessed the character of a military sur
prisc, was eminently an economic surprise,
"ince the enemy considered Germany incapa
ble of producing the said materiel on account
of the weak economic condition they
she was in.
The factor of contributes to surprise
from the point of view of time and perlllits
action ag-ain,t one's adversary when he is
dill Unl)l'CparCtl. In the g-t'l1eml aspect in
which we are considering- it, the actual
stl'enhh and potential streng-th of each ,ide
must be taken into consideration.
Actual strellgth is the f01"cc.l' that can be
put into action at the beginning' of the wal.
These' cntci' into the sphere of military
,trate!;,y and necessitate previous plans of
lI1obilization an,l concentration. They include:
1. The forces in in time of peaee
and the resel'Ves who had military training-.
.!. The war equipment in the
of the ullits that are in existence in time
of peace, and that which i,.; at their disposal
ill and supply depots.
.1. Fortifications.
Potential forces must be converted into
actual forces in ortler to attack the adversary
with their full weight before the latter has
had time to prepare his own. They are
composed of:
1. The remainder of the manpower of the
nation, taking into account the fact that
the training of the soldier requires a min
imum of six months' time and the training
of a division requires a year, and that
the personnel which is to do the work has
to be provided.
2. The equipment that is not included with
the forces already in existence, and all the ,
resources which serve in the manufacture
of war supplies.
FOREIGN MILITARY.DIGESTS
.97,
8. The geographical position, distance to
coionies, and ease of communication with
them.
4. All means of communications.
5. The time required by industry to change
from the economic status of peace to that
of war. This transformation and the series
production of armament cannot be brought
abo"t in less than twelve to twenty months'
time, and this only in the case of countries
like the United States with industry in an
advanced stage of progress.
All this, as can be seen, is very complex
and appertains to the order of general
strategy for the reason that potential mili
tary and economic forces must intervene:
Theil' action develops in four periods, as
follows:
1. The deployment of the elements already
in existence.
2. The clash' of the forces which are the
strategic vanguards in the military sphere,
in order to pave the way for the intervention
of all the armed forces.
3. Mobilization of the potential forces.
4. The decisive clash, with the entire mili
tary strength.
During the war of 1914-18, the first period
lasted for two weeks (mobilization and con
centration); the second period included the
fOUl' months that passed till the beginning
of trench wadare;' the third comprised the
years 1915, 1916, and 1917; and the decisive
clash occul"l'ed in H118.
As is ('vident, it is well to reduce the dura
tion of the third factor for the purpose of
shortening the duration of the war and for
the purpose of anticipating the encmy in the
final clash. This gave rise to the conception Of
"blitz" warfare, based on the accomplished
mobilization of the greater part of the poten
tial forces at the Iieginning of the war.
In antidpation of the fact that an ad
versary might pursue this course and succeed
in obtaining a quick decision in his favor,
there was developed the idea of the famous
fortified lines (Maginot, Siegfried, Manner
,heim, Metaxas, Stalin) which were to play
the role, in an improved form, of the trenches
of 1\114; permitting the gain of necessary,
time for the mobilization of the pot.ential
forces in those countries which are not
separated from' their possible enemies bYia
great obstacle such as exists in the ('ase of
Great Britain, the United States, and Japan.
PLANS OF VVAR IN 1914 AND 1939
A comparative study of the plans of war of
1914 and 1939 reveals, in the first :place, that
the German Political' vanguard in the latter
case succeeded in coming to an understanding
with Italy and Russia without revealing Ger
many's intentions, in consequence of which
she was able to carry out her political policies.
The entire strategy of the Allies consisted
in a repetition of that of 1914, a blockade of
the Germans.
The vanguard mission which France had
in 1914 corresponded in 1939 to the mission
of Poland, who would wage the battle of the
frontiers of the other war and would with
draw to the line of the Vistula, which would
play the role of the Marne, in order to make
a stand there at least till the spring of 1940.
The main strategic role, which in 1914 fell to
the lot of Russia, would, in this war, corre
spond to the role played by France, who would
mobilize and concentrate all the forces at her
disposal back of the Maginot Line.
England, with her powerful economic sys
tem, would constitute the reserve forces, and
while Germany was wearing her fhrces down
on two fronts, England 'would complete the
mdbilization of her potential forces.
This plan failed of realization. Poland failed
in her role as vanguard for the reason that
Germany hurled at her the grea-t military
might she had accumulated before the out
break of the war and, when the Allies at
tempted to establish air bases north of the
German coast and cut off Germany's supplies
of minerals and lumber from Scandinavia,
the Germans upset their plans with the
audacious strategic maneuver of April 1940,
when they occ1J.pied Norway.
VVhcn the Allies attempted a fairly leisurely
occupation of Belgium and Holland in the
belief that Germany had been weakened by'
previous campaigns, the latter surprised them
98
MILITARY REVIEW
with her of 10 May 1940, the result
of which was the brilliant "blitz" campaigns
in Holland, Belgium, and France, whieh in
the course of twenty-foul' days succeeded in
annihilating thirty French divisions, forty
Belgian ami Dutch, and ten English, capping
it off on 4 June with the Dunkirk disaster in
which 300 of the 800 boats prepared for the
transportation of the English were sunk.
On 5 June, there follo\l;ecl the advance 011
Paris. France was still confident that her
real' was securecl by the ;\{('(literranean
Squadron ancl her NOtth African colonies.
But Italy's entry in the war on 10 ,Junc was
an additional strategic blow which deter
mined the downfall of France. Oil 17 June
she rC'qllcsted an armistice.
Plans of war had to ],e l'evisl'lj, for the
bases on which they re<ted had changed
fundamentally and (in'at Britaill was forced
to change her plans, SIll' had no
other recourse at that mon1('nt than to turn to
America for help, thou!-':h she \\'m, obli!-':c(l to
pay cash, in part from hCl' gold reserves.
foreign exchange, and sccurities, and in part
by the cession of hases.
The limits of the war hnd incl'paserl con
siderably, but the principal theatcr of opera
tions continued to be EUl'opc. Therefol'e, in
the Far East there was ncccssitated a merc
political defense and an cconomic retreat
without any military action.
In the Near East, Asia :'Iinor, and Africa,
there was required a solid military defense
against Italy, accompanied by an intense
political and economic campaign in prepara
tion for a counteroffensive when thc Italian
attack shoulcl lose its force.
In Europe it was necessary for Great
Britain to reinforce the btockade against Ger
many with the help of the Unitcd States, at
tempting at the same time to gain aerial
superiority with which she would compel the
ail' forces of the Reich to pass over to the
defensive. When this had been accomplished,
her political forces wouhl initiate a great
propaganda offensive which would undermine
German prestige and German spirit in Eu
rope.
The first part of the plan failed because the,
English political maneuver of alliance" \"ith
the United States was met by Germany with
the Tripartite Pact signed on 27 September
1940, and the entrance of Japan into the war
"in December 1941 forced Englarld to 'adopt
military measures in the Far East, leading
to the disaster which culminated with the loss
of Singapore.
This, combined with the catastrophe of
Pearl Harbol' and the series I)f Japanese ad
vances in the Pacific which followed in 1942,
may be considered as a critical point of the
pr('scnt war. Up to this point, German strat
egy had pursued its chosen course, setting
the rhythm of the war, determining the fields
of battle and the times of action. The ma
neuvers of the strategy of Germany and her
allies had been more rapid than those of her
('nelllY in all three components, military,
political, and economic.
l:'rom the last months of 1942 on, new
factors appear in the British plan:
1. The achievement of the mobilizatIOn of
the potential forces of the United States.
of. The loss of effectiveness on the part of
the Germall submarine, giving greatel' liberty
in the cmployment of the forces of the United
Statcs which had been mobilized.
,1. The change in the course of the war in
Hussia, where Germany had won a series of
hrilliant victories involving strategic errors
of a military and political nature which had
ca used her to begin a retreat after the fall
of Stalingrad (February 1943).
:. The loss of Germany's Italian ally
which, ill addition to the political repercus
sion, caused her to withdraw forces that she
could have used on the Eastern Front.
5. The paralization of the Japanese blows
through lack of sufficient elasticity to con
tinue in her enterprises.
This life-and-death struggle is still in
progress [March 1945} and there still con
tinue to operate in it the three strategic
factors we have discussed and which will give
victory to the one who is able to hold out the
last quarter of an hour, achieving the
absolute superiority that is the of
all three factors. .
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99..
Intelligence and Training
An article by Colonel D. B. Hogg, CBE, in The A1'my Qualterly (Great Britain)
April 1945.
WRITERS in this journal and elsewhere have
often referred directly or by implication to
the lessons we have learned from the enemy-
both German and Japanese. These
now turned to good account by British brains
and valor-have helped to produce an army
with a capacity for the blitzkrieg unequalled
by the forces of Reichenau, Guderian, and
Rommel. Nevertheless, the learning of them,
and the subsequent changes in our own or
ganization, equipment, and training methods
have been an expensive and laborious process.
The object of this paper is to suggest a mC'ans
of curtailing this process in the future.
The lessons we have learned are not merely
the climax of what the pompous might call
"the natural evolution of military thought."
They are the fruit of intelligence collected
before and during the war and of hard
experience in battle. It is now contended that
intelligence propel'ly studied and p1'Lsented in
peace can save much sweat and blood in war.
It is a commonplace that intelligence must,
in the widest sense, be fought for, and intel
ligence staffs have long since learned just how
much and how little can be obtained in time
for it to be of use to their commanders. The
latter would probably admit that they have
been on the whole well served. Alamein, the
:-';orth African, Sicilian, and Normandy land
ings could scarcely have gone so smoothly
without the "information" on which they were
planned and carried out: the enemy order of
battle and defenses, estimated rates of rein
forcement and the routes by which they would
move-these are some of the more .obvious
items required.
The provision and assimilation of this
"factual" or planning information is now well
understood, and the means for obtaining it
easy to calculate. But there is a vast amount
of other. information, concerned directly or
mdirectly with enemy organization and
methods, which has a training value some
what difficult to assess and to present. This
is' true at all times, but particularly so in
peace, when' the "enemy" is not so clearly
dl'fined and the tasl,s of our own army are
llIultifarious. Nevertheless, it is not impossible
(0 fonsec futUre developments and to train
troops to mect them. Waste of effort can be
avoidC'd if the relevant intelligence is planned,
provided, and distributed with an eye to its
training' value..
While the Intelligence Branch of the Gen
lral Staff is now recognized as some
thing iwtter than a necessary nuisance in
war, "Intelligence" in peace is apt to be
thought of as the playground of secret or
ganizations entirely divorced frol11 the needs
and rC'alitiC's of wal. This is not so, but may
be sufficiently near the truth to make the ordi
nary soldier somewhat sceptical of "Intel
ligence" about a foreign army, as being the
product of a crank without military training.
He is inclined to question the value of observa
t ions-produced, as he bclieves, by a gentle
man in dark glasses watching German troops
marching' down Unter den Linden.
We are not concerned here with the way
information is obtained but with the way it
is preSl'TI ted. Once commanders and training
staffs recognize that the collated intelligence
on foreign armies accepted and issued by the
War Office is the product of trained soldiers,
much has been gained. Next comes the <
problem of selecting and using as a basis for
our own training such items of this intel
ligence as can profitably be applied to our
own troops.
Intelligence work always involves much
sifting ancl sorting, and the tendency of
Intelligence personnel to leave too much of
this to their readers is perhaps a legitimate
charge against them. The normal require
ments of their many users, service, political,
and economic, are apt to conflict or overlap,
and proper presentation is not always easy.
For military training purposes their task can
be clearly defined. Reports of changing or
ganization and-more important-the reasons
for it, of changing equipment and the use for

MILITARY REVIEW
which it is intended, and of tactical and
ttaining nlethods practised by the foreign
armies concerned must be examined. To
obtain the best value from such examination,
it should be done ideally by Inte1!igence
officers who know as much about OUI' OWll
army and its training problems as about the
enemy's. Alternatively, a section of the train
ing staff specialize in the stuuy of
such intelligence. Officers nominateu for at
tachment to a forcign al')uy must be properly
briefed before they go and be thoroughly
rross-examined on their return by Training
as well as Intelligence staff offic('rs before
they write their report. They arc a valuable
source of informatio'n and must be properly
exploited.
The resulting notes, pamphlets, or what
ever they may be called should be issued as
training memol'an<la-niuch in the fO\'1)1 of
the "AI'my Training Manuals" issued dul'ing
the war. Intelligence notes are apt to remain
in the Intelligence Officer's office, and for
many reasons do not receive the practical
study which they deserve. Much has been done
under the i'mpetus of wal' to present the enemy
realistically-hut realism recedes with the
war. If interest in peacC>time training is not
to go with it, some kind of a target must be
provided. Practical study of enemy armies by
means of tactical exercises without troops and
demonstrations in peacetime should be per
fectly feasible provided Intelligence and
Training work very closely together.
None of this should be taken to mean that
we arl! slavishly to copy the German or any
other foreign system. Much of what stJits
them does not suit the British soldier, our
militaty system, the climate of India, 01' the
British taxpayer (though the latter's interests
must n{)t again be allowed to dominate all
others). Such foreign armies as are ever
likely to be a menace to us do not suffer from
the samc cramping limitations as the British
Army has had to put up with in peacetime.
Theil' ideas are therefore worth study. The
use of parachute troops, of airborne main
tenance, and of armor in mass were con
sidcred in England before the war but, so
far as thl' writer knows, not scriously studied
-still less practised-in spite of the many
intelligence reports of their use on German
:.:nd Russian maneuvers.
To SlUll up, there Beems to be a need for
continuous selective btudy of foreign army
organization, equipment, anti training. The
(.bject of this should be not tiolely to estimate,
as an Intelligence problem, the of
dangcl' to the Bdtish Empire which such
forces I'cpl'cgent,. but to assess and make lise
of the informatioll so obtained for our OWl!
training needs. To do this properly, Intel
ligence and Training Staffs must work hand
in hand. The former's views should be ac
cepted as being those of trained soldiers, and
the latter's foresight and imagination will be
indispensable in making use of \vhat can be
obtained.
Aerial Action Against Convoys
Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a Russian
article by Lieutenant Colonel K. Muratkranov in Kmsnyi Plot
(Red Fleet) 13 April 1945.
AFTER the liberation of the city of Pe
chenga by the Red Army, the Germans
started evacuating their troops, supplies,
arllls, and equipment f('Om Kil'kenes. Convoys
began streaming, across the Varanger Fiord.
The enemy used not only transport ships
and self-propelled barges but also small
ships as small patrol vessels, motor
boats, etc. The situation forced them to keep
the convoys going day and night. The Air
Force of the Northern Fleet was given the
mission of disrupting this evacuation and
of sinking the German ships.
This mission was 'carried out by the fleet's
attack planes. bombers. torpedo bombers, and
fighters. A considerable number of Stormoviks
and fig-pters were shifted to advance airfields,
and this doubled their radius of action.
rOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
[Special planes continually informed the often escorted by seven or eight ships, while;
command post of the weather conditions in eight to twelve fighters patroJleld< the aik..
the Varanger Fiord and west of it, up to But even this was of little help, to the
the Porsanger Fiord. Germans. On the basis of detailed recon-
At the same time, our fliers watched care- naissance reports, our staffs resorted to
fully the enemy's communications. In ad- methods which called for the application of
clition t() their systematic ob- ,-:-<---;--:-;---..-7"'":"""".----------.::..;:.----.,
se1'vation of the V urange1' Fiord,
guided our assault groups
toward the detected German
ships. Even in bad weather, our
torpedo planes, bombers, and
Stol'llloviks accurately located
thpi l' targets. Rcconnaissance
planes reported not only the
location of convoys and their
composition, but also their sail
ing order. This information en
abled the staffs to select for each
case the most advantageous
mcthod of action. A number of
stuff officet's Were stationed at
the opel'utional airfields. This
facilitated the control of the
opl'l'ations.
Blows on convoys and naval
hases wel'Q inflicted by day as
well as by night. For night
operations, the most experienced
crews were detailed. In addition
to hombing missions. laid mines in th"
fiords and along the route of the convoys. In
daytime, all types of aircraft participated in
the action. Single planes, pairs, and group for
mations were employed. It was a case of
"free hunting." Fighter-bombers and StOI'
moviks were used to attack nearby com
munications, while torpedo bombers covered
.the outlying routes.
t
The Germans strove in every way to re
duce the losses from our aerial attacks. In
daytime their ships were dispersed in various
bays of the Varanger Fiord; at night they
were reassembled in the Kirkenes port, where
convoys were formed. Our reconnaissance,
however, invariably spotted the ship as
sembly areas and guided our attack aircraft
toward them.
The enemy constantly the
,"moo, of ,hi",_ 0" trem,,,o,t W"
).egl'nd
., Small
Vessel
ex:> (,unboat
c:>Sdf- propelled
Barge..'
---< Stormovlk
>I--fo f orpc-do-Romber
4--i I .ghttr
superior force. torpedo and bomber
attack was preceded by blows of the attack
aircraft, while our fighters dispersed the
enemy planes.
Here is how an enemy convoy was de
stroyed on 16 October 1944 (Figure 1).
Low clouds hung ovel' the Varanger Fiord,
and a thick mist covered the coast of Norway.
Snow and wind coming from the north made
the sea increasingly stormy_ Our reconnais
sance plane detected an enemy convoy in Bek
Fiord. It was moving from Kirkenes to the
north. Four 1\1(' 109's escorted the convoy.
Our reconnaissance planes were then 01'
daed to keep the convoy in sight. Soon it was
reported that five escort vessels had joined it.
When it J:eached Ekkerey, the convoy was
composed of three transports of 2,000, 3,000,
and 6,000 tons, one trawler, two destroyers,
six gun boats, two self-propelled barges, and
'102. MILITARY REV,IEW
thirteen Rmall patrol veRsels. Six Me lOll'"
were in thl' ail'. Onl' fO\lI'-motorell plallf', to
combat suhma rines. waR alB" l'P]1"l'it>d. From
the direction of thp spa. tht> tl'ans]10rt8 wert>
protected b ~ ' a trip]!' ring of escort ships.
Naturally, such an escort possessell a
formidable fire powel. In view of' this, it
FIGt:RE 2.
was decided to neutralize first the fire of
the escort vessels and then deal with the
transport by consecutive torpedo-bomber at
tacks. At 14:lO two groups of 11-2 ]1lanes
[Stormoviks], escorted by fighters, dived at
the convoy. The blow was a surprise to the
enemy. One gunboat was sunk by a direct
hit. Several bombs burst neal' one of the
trawlers. The vessel caught fire. Flames also
burst out from one of the transports. The
convoy stopped. The convoy escorts changed
their positions. Then the convoy moved
slowly northward with fires still raging on
both the tl'ansport and the trawler.
At this time two groups of Stormoviks
joined the fight. Despite strong antiaircraft
. fire, they attacked the escorts at 1501. As
a result of direct hits, one destroyer, one
gunboat, and one small escort vessel were
sunk. Two Me 109 planes were downed by
"Ul' fighters. .
The forthcoming action of the main at
tack forces was thus considerably facilitated.
Three minutes later two groups of torpedo
bombers approached the convoy and attacked
it from the direction of the coast. Thel'e
were only a few escorts on this side, and
all the antiaircraft weapons were still con
centrated on our Stormoviks, which after
the completion of their mission were now
withdrawing to the southwest. The Germans
did not expect our planes from the land
"ide. No more than 800 or 900 meters' sepa
rated the planes from the convoy. The
enemy opened fire. The planes reached the
tal'get and released their torpedoes. The
3,OOO-ton transport, a gunboat, and a small
vessel were hit. All three sank immediately.
A radio report from a reconnaissance
plane notified the command that only nine
teen ships out of twenty-seven were left
in the convoy.
The enemy was now approaching Kiberg
nes. At 1643 the convoy was again attacked
by a group of Stormoviks. One minute later
another attack was launched by torpedo
bombers approaching from the sea. They
were met with intense fire and were attacked
by enemy planes which were in turn attacked
by our eSCOrt fighters and diverted from
their main objective. The battle grew in
creasingly violent. The torpedo-bombers sank
two transports, one trawler, and two small
escort vessels. Our fighters downed four
enemy planes.
Twelve ships were thus sunk by our fliers.
The importance of the operation lay prima
rily in the fact that the enemy convoy lost
its most important ships: all three trans
ports, one destroyer, and five gunboats.
Sometimes the Germans succeeded in pass
ing the Varanger Fiord under the cover of
darkness. In such cases our antiaircraft at
tacked the enemy in the sea. Once a convoy'
left Kirkenes at night and reached Tana
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS,
lOS"
, Fiord. In the morning, however, it was de
tected by one of our planes. Despite low
clouds and a snow storm, the crew of the
plane managed to determine the exact lo
cation and composition of the convoy. Two
transports of 11,000 and 5,000 tons Were
escorted by two trawlers, two destroyers,
.eight gunboats, 'about eight and
one BF-138 antisubmarine plane (Figure 2).
The convoy was moving westward with the
speed of nine to ten knots.
Five torpedo bombers took off to attack
the convoy and found the enemy near Por
sanger Fiord. Flying low over the water in
a line formation, the torpedo bombers at
tacked. The ships laid down a barrage when
our planes were two kilometers away. The
planes answered with machine-gun fire. They
broke through the barrage, reached the
transports, and released their torpedoes. A
reconnaissance plane watching the attack
reporteel that both transpoltes. one trawler,
and one gunboat were sunk.
The success of this operation was due to
the element of surprise in our attack.
After the fall of the ports Kil'kenes,
Vadso, and Vardo, the Germans tried hur
riedly to withdraw their ships from the
waters of northern Norway, but their attempt
faiJed. Our flierg kept the fiOl'ds under
continuous observation. As soon as a convoy
was formed, our aircraft, alerted QY aerial
reconnaissance, took off fot the kill. Within
a short time, our bombers and torpedo
bombers had sunk up to thirty ships in this
remote area.
DU1'ing the period of the Pechenga cam
paign, all air and naval engagements were
very violent. The Germans offered desperate
resistance and spared no effort to defend
their transports. Despite all this, the enemy
was crushed by the victorious fliers of the:
Northern Fleet. During the offensive of our
ground forces, which were attacking the,
enemy on land, our fliers sank 136 ships
totaling 86,050 tons. Nineteen transports,
foul' destroyers, nine gunboats, five self
propelled barges, and seven small escort ves
sels, a total of 73,950 tons of shipping,
were damaged. Fifty-gix enemy planes were
downed in the aerial engagements.
This was the result of the excel
lent training and skill of both the flying
and staff personnel, the well-established co
operation between the tactical groups, and
the incessant observation of the enemy's
lines of communications and ports. Thorough
reconnaissance allowed the detection
of the convoys, the organization of pursuit,
and repeated aerial attacks.
The Art of Generalship
An article by Lieutenant General II.G. Martin in The Daily Tel('gmph and
Jforning Post (London) 11 May 1945.
IN Brussels a few months ago I had the
opportunity to hear once 1110re Field Marshal
Montgomery's views on the conduct of war.
n was a talk of the greatest interest, which
at the time could not be published.
When I saw Field Marshal Montgomery he
was in the middle of the fighting for Holland
and for the clearing of the Schelde in order
to give the Allies the use of the great port of
Antwerp. He spoke as the active conductor
of then in progress. Now the fight
iug in Europe ig over, but I have not at
tempted to adjust my notes to that present
reality. I give them 'as I made them at the
time, with the atmosphere of the war still
around them. Nor shall I try to reproduce the
Field Marshal's words: it will be enough if I
in conveying something of his mean
ing.
The virtue of simplicity-that was the
kit-motif of l\1ontgomery's theme. In 1940, by
no degree of generalship could the Allies have
tilted the balance in their own favor. Now
that they have mobilized adequate resources,
however, their position .is very different. Suc
l'ess today jg a matter of observing certain
:,imple, pl'inciples, Observe them, and
you will win; neglect them, and you will miss
success.
These basic principles of his, l\lontgomery
MILITARY REVIEW
divides into two categories. I n the first
category he places the unchanging laws which
are equally peremptory at all times; in the
second, the variables, whose force will wax
or wane according to the cilcumstances.
. Of these unchanging laws he cites three
examples. The first of these concerns opera
tions. Before you can attack on land, you
must win the battle of the ail'.
The reason is plain. In order to attack. you
must concentrate and you must move; but
neither of these things can you do unless you
command the ail'. To defend, on the other
hand, you disperse. Therefore. though you
have lost command of the air, you may still
defend.
Before Alamein was fought we had won
command of the air-and we hnve l(('pt it.
Thus from El Alamein onwards-in North
Africa, in Sicily, in Italy, and in west('rn
Europe-the Allies have been ahlo to attack.
Conversely, th(' Gcrmans, though they can
still defend, can no longer attack on any
ii!cale.
The second of these laws concerns adminis
tration: Before you can fight a successful
campaign you must ensure adequat, supply.
fhis was the guiding principle alike of th,
Eighth Army and of the 21st Army Group
throughout their respective Odys,.;eys. from
Egypt via Tunisia to central Ituly, un.! hom
Normandy to Holland. Without the nel'Cf;sary
tools you cannot get on with the job.
The third of the unchanging laws concerns
man-mastership: If they are to usc to effect
the tools that you have given them. your men
must be in good heart. So give to each an
understanding of the way in which his httle
bit of the battle fits into the mosaic of the
whole. Give to all the confidence of success.
Treat all as partners in the great enterprise.
Remember that the Army today is the nation.
Thus will create an petite for victory.
So much for the thl' e unchanging pre
requisites to victory: mmand of the air.
adequate supply. hig
Montgomery went 0 to discuss the art of
generalship in its other aspects.
In modern war a commander whose battle
has. taken a wrong turning can reorientate
it only with the greatest difficulty. It follows,
that a commander of land forces mustex-,
Hcise a control much tighter' than that of a
general guidance by directive from a distance.
In battle, it is, Montgomery's
IJl'actice to locate his own advanced "tactical"
headquarters right forward in the neighbor
hood of the tactical headquarters of his
Only thus can he intervene instantly
if and when the situation demands his inter
vention,
I n battle the corps is the tactical unit. Its
composition is not fixe;l-it is merely a holding
company. to which you allot divisions. eit,her
l'rmol'ed or infantry, at wilL No two divisions
ore alike; some excel in one type of operation,
others in another. If you know your job as a
commanrit'r. you will ensure that the divisions
in each of your corps are the right
for the operation in hand; it is all a matter
of thinking ahead and of timely adjustment.
Thl're are no armored corps as such; an)'
corps he given a greater or lesser propor
tion of armored divisions according to the
circumstances, Thus every corps commander
must be capahh> of handling both infantry
and lU'lllor. That is. one stpp lower down amI
at one time or another. he should have COIll'
mandecl hoth t,'pes of division. infantry and
armored.
As I listened I recalled that years ago I
had watched the germination of many of
these ideas. Montgomery been an
original think('r. Already. in distant. prewar
when he was still a colonel. he had
begun to impress his views Qn the Army.
, Indeed; his was the original conception of
the "forward body" in the advance to battle.
a -conception which soon became widely ac
cepted throughout the Army. The forward
body was to be much more than a stereotyped
advanced guard; it was to consist of a vari
able combination of the more mobile and
pard-hitting clements of the formation to
which it belonged. grouped under the orders
of the formation commander himself. and
its role was to precede the formation into
battle in order to initiate the battle in aC-'
cordance with the commander's will.
The points to note in this doctrine from
105
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
the past are these; first, that
held, as he holds today, that if the battIe is
(0 devE\lop aright the commander must be well
up from the outset, in such close and con
tinuoustouch with his forward troops that
he can rule the fight; and second, that the
, forward body-and today this forward body
is l'l'pre"ented by the forward corps of Mont
gomery's 21st Army Group-was, and still
is, the variable product of careful selection
llnd much prior searching of heart.
To return, then, to the present. COlllmand,
)Iontgomery insists, must be personal; orders
be verbal.
Thus it is his practice to meet his army
cOl1lll1andel's befol'e an operation and to give
them verbal orders-orders which may cover
a pt'riod as long, pel'haps, as a week. He
allows no staff officers to attend these meet
ings-neither his own no!" his army COIll
mandel'S'.
After such,a meeting, army Comhl. ndcrs
go off to meet their corps commanders and
to issue 'verbal orders in their tUln, and so
the process continues down the chain of
cOlllmand.
Frequc.'ntly' :l<iontgomery will issue a written
directive in confirmation of his verbal orders.
Contrary to normal practice, however, this
directive he hoth and signs himself.
He maintains with obvious force that if he
were to leave the job to a staff officer he
could not be sure that the directive would
exactly reproduce his verbal orders either in
form or spirit.
Also he insists that, in all these particulars,
his subordinate commanders shall follow his
example. By this insistence on self-reliance,
clear thinking, and clear speech he ensures
that there shall be no weak links in the chain
, of command.
Ideally, every commander from the com
mander in chief downwards shoqld have held
command at every lower level. Miss out a
step and there is a gap in your knowledge. If
there are gaps, your subordinates will find
them-and may bluff you. Particularly im
portant is it that a commander should have
personal experience of command in the two
grades immediat'ely below his own', since it is
with these two grad(;ls that he will be most
intimately concerned.
1'0 a commander, obsession with detail is
damnation. The higher the grade of the com- '
mander the more essential is it that he should
keep himself clear of it. If once he allows him
self to become immersed in detail he will be
swept away downstream-to perdition. He
mU8t lemain free to concentrate on the
simple, vital fundamentals of war-to saf!!
guard the pillars, in fact, which the
whole edifice.
This attitude of detachment, however, be
comps impossible for a commander whose staff
j;. ol'ganizcd' in accordance with accepted
British principles.
Under our organization the Chief of the
General Staff at Army Group Headquarters,
ane! the corresponding general staff officers
at the headquarters of lower formations, can
bsue orders only to their own branch of the
staff-that is, to the general staff branch,
which deals with operations and intelligence;
the work of the other, administrative,
branches they are empowered to "co
onlinate"-blessed word which may mean so
little.
Under this arrangement the heads of all
the branches have equal and direct access to
tbe commander, who cannot fail to find him
,.elf engulfed in detail in consequence.
This is all wrong. The Chief General Staff
Officcr on every headquarters should be-as
in fact, uncler Field Marshal Montgomery, he
is-a genuine chief of the staff in all its
aRpects; that is, he alone should have direct
access to his commander, whose orders for all
branches of the staff alike he should receive
and iSHue. The orders are the commander's;
the sole responsibility for implementing the
orders Rhould be the Chief of Staff's.
The two are poles apart. It is the duty of
the Chief of Staff to master the endless in
tricacies of detail. It is his duty-by his own
infinite self-sacrifice, toil, and sweat-to
preserve his commander's clarity of judgment
for the exercise of the broad and simple
functions of command.
Thus we open and close on the same note
that of simplicity.
106
MILITARY REVIEW
Sanitary and Epidemiological Activities in
, Offensive OperatiC)tts
Translated and digested at the Command and General Staff School from a Russian
article by Brigadier General T'r'oldyrev, Medical Corps, in Voenno
JlcditllifIRJ.-i Zlu!)'}w/ (Journ
THE gravity of the sanitary and epide
miological conditions prevailing in areas
tempol:arily occupied by the Germans an
now hberated by the . Red Army is \\ I
known. occasional hospitals and dis
pensarics which have miraculously egcape(1
destruction may be found in populate,l
places; all other medical, sanitary, ali<I epi
demiological e;;tablishmcnts havc been com
pletely obliterated, A::; a rcsult, \'arious
infectious diseases al'e widcspl'ead and lurg-e
epidemic outbreah arc continuaIl:-' cropping'
up throughout the liberated territory.
TyphuR, the inevitable companion of POV('I'
ty and starvation, been sprCluling' with
out hindrance, and up to sixty pel'cent of'
the population in a number of regiolls have
already had it. Typhoid fever is also ell-
countered very fre'luNltly, paJticularly ill
White Russia nnd in the Baltic area, while
dysentery 'has bel'ome an infection that has
not spared a single populated place. Because
of the absence of prophylactic measures,
smallpox, a disNlse long forgotten in Soviet
Russia, has appeared again in the oecupie,1
territory. Lousiness has become a wi<iespreail
phenQmenon.
The gravity of the situation in the areas
where operations are now conducted is obvi
ous from the mere fact that eighty-five
percent of the typhUS cases among our front
troops has been the result of contact with
the population of the liberated areas.
The primary task of the Medical Service
of the Red Army, therefore, and particularly
of its Antiepidemic Service, has been the
prevention of the appearance and spread of
infectious diseases among the advancing
troops.
The following measures are considered as
essential;
1. 'Continuous sanitary and epidemiological
reconnaissance.-The primary purpose of
sanitary and epidemiological reconnaissance
of l\Iilitary Medicine) June 1944,
i::; the study of the sanitary situation in
areas to be occupied by the advancing
troops. I Information on these areas should
be acquired by various methods, including
special medical reconnaissance operating in
the enemy's rear. When the location of large
epidemic centel'S lying ahead of the ad
vancing troops is known, the Medical Service
warns the approaching units of the threat
ening dangel', takes the necessary prophy
lactic measures, and concentrates antiepi
demic supplies and equipment in the proper
direction. Reconnaissance of the enemy rear
arcas is primarily the duty of the higher
echelon::; of the Medical Service, but should
also be organized, whenever possible, by the
command of troop units. The reconnaissance
parties move with or follow the advancing
troops. Theil' mission is to locate the centers
of infection in the libel'ated areas, to pre\'ent
their contact with the troops, and to liquidate
thelll if possible, or at least isolate them
as soon as they are discqvered. Reconnais
sance in this case is echeloned; the first
echelon is reconnaissance by advance units
and divisional reconnaissance: the second
echelon, by army; and the third echelon, by
al'llIY group. Each subsequent echelon should
maintain contact with the preceding one;
check, amplify, and complete its data; and
take all necessary and increasingly more
effecti\'e antiepidemic measures:
There are several reasons for this eche
lonment. First of all, the epidemic situation
in the liberated areas undergoes abrupt'
changes caused by considerable migration of
the population." Second, the various echelons
of the Medical Service can complete only
certain definite sanitary and
tasks, and therefore each subsequent echelon
completes the work started by the preceding
one. Thus, work begun by the first echelon
may be supplemented an'd sometimes e'ven
completed by the second.
107
FOREIGN jlULtTARY DIGESTS
r' ,
Quite often, the completion of all sanitary naissance to select sites and for
work in ,an epidemic center may require the
participation of the third reconnaissance
echelon.
For example, the first reconnaissance eche
lon may be charged 'only with the location
of the centers of infection and their isolation
from the military personnel, the posting of
affected communities or houses, and the se
lection of water sources for the troops. The
second echelon may be charged additionally
with the liquidation of centers of infectioll
if the tempo of advance of the troops allows
it. It should be noted, however, that the
reconnaissance units of the second echelon
should not lag behind their troops, ror the
, task of liquidating centers of epidemics
should not interfere with their advance if
the situation calls for it. In caRCS, this
task will be completed by the Antiepidemic
Service of army group.
The tempo of advance of the troops always
detl)rmines the scope of the saJ1itary allii
epidemiological reconnaissance, as well as
the scope of the antiepidemic measures to
be taken.
Epidemics among the troops should be
controlled by the lowest echelons of the
Medical Service. Special agencies and experts
in antiepidemic work may be used if neces
sary. Early diagnosis and early initial iso
lation of an the diagnosed and doubtful
cases, combined with thorough disinfection
of the center of infection, is very important
in this work.
In a very rapid advance, the activity of
the sanitary and epidemiological reconnais
sance may be limited to the most important
areas and main directions and routes of ad
vance. Some of the epidemic centers, there
fore, may remain undetected by both the
first and second reconnaissance echelons.
This increases the responsibility of third
echelon reconnaissance (army group). It
should' be borne in mind that leaving un
detected or uncontrolled epidemic centers in
our rear areas is extremely dangerous.
Finally, we should note that it is the duty
of the sanitary and epidemiological recon
billeting army and army group services and
medical installations. Unfortunately" ,there,
have been many cases where }'eserve and
other units and organizations, and even
hospitals, were located in the very centers
of epidemic diseases, This has happened
whenever preliminary sanitary and epide
minlog'iral failed to do its job.
V;.:en a pJpulated place is used for
f!ut1rterillg' troops ful' a long period of time,
in chat'[!'e of sanitary and medical
imtallatiolls must immediately establish con
stant and thOl'llug'h sanitary-epidemiological
,'b"l'l'\'tltIon of the areas within
the I'Hdius of from live to ten kilometers.
.!. /""/,,Iiol/ oj cpidemic cClIte)s.-This is
to be achieved br 11I'astic measures if neces
sary. All suspkious plaees should he immedi
ately placed in quarantine, and all units,
headquarters, 01' Illilitary personnel should
be kept out. Special armed patl'Ols are posted
to prevent the inhabitants and military per
sonnel from leaving anll entering' the popu
lated place. Persons violating this order
should be severely
The entire population should be placed
under obsel'\'a tion. This is to be done
both military and civilian sanitary person
nel. Daily inspections should be the rule,
and all lice-infested individuals should be
immediately deloused. This must be made
compulsory if necessary. All personal effects
and household furnishings should also be
repeatedly deloused, All sick cases detected
during daily surveys must be immediately
isolated. Case should be taken not to skip
a single individual.
3. Personal hygie1le and prophylaxis of
IOllsiness.-This calls for frequent, possibly
daily, inspections of military personnel with
immediate delousing, when necessary, of
thelr clothing and equipment. The inspec
tions should be made by the unit commanders
under superv,ision of the Sanitary Service.
Responsibility for lousiness lies primarily
with units commanders.
Each battalion (in defense) should' have
a mobile bathing unit with a capacity of
ten to fifteen men, an,d a delousing unit
108
MILITARY REVIEW.
with iI. capacity of five sets of clothing
. at a time.
It is imperative that combat units be
regularly supplied with clean underwear.
When the troops are about to move forward,
each man should be issued two pairs of clean
underwear. Specially equipped laundry units
are attached to divisions. They are supplied
with soap, hand laur.)dering devices, and a
small underwear exchange stock. Experience
shows that even under conditions of long
offensive battles, the laundry units ac
complish their task in a satisfactory manner.
Transportation for laundry'units is provided
by the Division Quartermaster,
The troops should not be quartered in
houses together with the civilian pOPl\lation,
The quarters intended for billeting
should be thoroughly disinfested,
Armies and army groups must always'
have at their disposal a numbet of sanitary
crews for the rapid processing of small and
large units joining the reserve following a
period of 'Combat at the front.
4. ThOl'ough aanital'Y contl'ol and pl'ocess
ing of replacements joining the [!tIC lI'ool's
and coming f)'om various rcur echelons,
This work should begin at the army-group
sanitation control posts and be repeated until
the reinforcements have reached the front
line units.
Arriving replacements should be immedi
ately subjected to a thorough sanitary
processing with subsequent verification of
its quality, and only then placed in sC)Jamte
quarters.
During a fourteen-day quarantine. these
men should not be alJowed to mix with other
military personnel.
The replacement echelons on their way
to the front must be composed of 'healthy
and clean individuals and have a sanitary"
pass without which no echelon is
to proceed forward.
5. Well organirted antiepidemic activity on
the routes of evacuation of the wounded and
sick.-The wounded, whose numbers natu
rally increase during periods of active combat
operations, call for special care with respect
to their antiepidemic security. Responsible
medical personnel is assigned to earry out
this work in all the hospitals. This personnel.
as it frequently happens, have no sufficient
experience in practical epidemiology and
need help and instruction on the part of
expert epidemiologists. This help should be
provided for. Expert epidemiologists must
systematically check the work of the regular
medical personnel.
Sanitary segregation of the wounded is
the primary task during all the stages of
the evacuation. Its purpose is to separate
quickly the sick from the wounded and to
prevent the spread of infection through con
tact. Its second purpose is the proper sanitary
processing of the sick and wounded.
The wounded treated in the field hospitals
should be inspected systematically, daily if
possible, and, if pediculosis is detected. the
wounded man as well as his underwear and
bedding, including blankets and mattress,
should be immediately deloused.
Each hospital should have special wards
for doubtful infectious cases. The wounded
with infectious diseases are placed in sepa
rate wards and submitted to thorough medi
cal observation for the entire incubation
period of the suspected disease.
These five prophylactic measures are abso
lutely necessary for successful prevention of
epidemic di,seases. particularly typhus,
Science in Submarine Warfare
Translated, digested, and compiled at the Command' and General Staff School
from German articles by Lieutenant Herbert and Lieutenant
Boltz in Signal (Berlin) No.1, 1945,
THE most dangerous property of the sub of the enemy to pierce this veil concealing the
marine is its invisibility. At the time of the invisible torpedo boat.
first World War it was the constant endeavor At the London Naval Conference of 1935;
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
England agreed to the construction of a
limited number of submarines, as the English
Admiralty believed itself to be in possession
of a positive listening device, the hydrophone,
which would eliminate forever the danger of
enemy submarines.
Up to the beginning of the present conflict,
the hydrophone was the standard listening
device. The particular consh'uction of this
underwater sound detector makes it possible
to hem' perfectly the sounds proceeding from
a moving, submerged submarine and to deter
mine the direction from which they come. But
at least two vessels are required for the
operation of this instrument. During the at
tack on the submarine by means of depth
bombs, the attacking ship switches off its
listl'ning device to prevent its being put out
of order hy the explosions of the depth
bombs. In the meanWhile, the seconJ vessel,
located some distance away. continues to fol
low the movements of the submarine. Th"
attacking boat runs several times oV(>r the
supposed position of the submarine. dropping
depth charges set to explode nt varying
depths. The submarines defend themselves
against these attacks by vel'y simple means.
They either descend to the bottom or slip
away from the ur('(l. In the latter case, the
motors turn over very slowly, all auxiliary
motors are turned off, and not a man moves
on the hoat. In this manner, the sounds that
do come fl'om the submarine are drowned out
by those proceeding from the enemy's own
vessels and that of the water flowing past
their listening devices. The submarines then
follow the movements of their adversaries by
means of their own listening devices, change
their course, and escape. .
The demand made of science was to develop
a device able to detect with certainty a silent
ly-moving submarine and one which at the
same time would not have to depend on the
cooperation of another boat. In the develop
ment of this new device, the English scientists
followed the echo principle. In this case, a
sound is emitted and, when its echo returns,
it is possible-since the velocity of sound is
known-to determine the depth of a body of
water by the interval that elapses betWEl,en
the time of the sound and its echo.
relatively simple matter as long as one con
fined his attention to the bottom of the sea,
but it gave rise to many complications when
the effort was made to use the principle in
hunting for submarines, since these present
but a small surface from which the sound
can be reflected. Long experimentation re
vealed the fact that supersonic waves were
best adapted to this use. ~
High-frequency generators transi'llit super
80nic waves through the water, and by means
of an amplifier their echo can be perceived at
FIGt:RE 1.
WARNING .APPARATUS ON A G E R M A . . ~ SUBMARINE. THIS
PEVTCE Rf:VF.ALS THE PRESENCE OF AN ENEMY EVEN
AT GREAT DISTANCES.
moderate distances. With the help of such an
underwater locating device, the pursuit boat
is able to determine accurately the distance
to a submerged submarine and the direction
in which it is moving without the help of an
auxiliary boat. These devices possess the
defect, however, of detecting the presence
under the surface of the water of any object
capable of sending back an echo. There is no
way of knowing whether one has located a
submarine, a whale, a school of herring, or a
submerged wreck. Nevertheless, under good
com.litions, the English still stood a chance
of detecting au approaching submarine be
fore it was close enough to attack.
Again the German submarine changed
tactics. The big convoys were attacked from
the surface at night. The pack of submarines
attacked the convoy from all sides almost
110
MILITARY REVIEW
simultaneously. The enemy could change his
'course all he wished, yct continued to run
into ,the boats of the attacking pack. To
detect the submarines ill time, it became
necessary to incn.'aRe the range of vision
around the convoy at least' one day's
trayeling (btance. The enC'll1Y W(\S obligcd to
<'mpioy airplanes the
Gradually, thc Atluntic \Vas cllven'd by a n<:'t
work of patrol plane,. But the Rubmarine
could st.ill take advantag'c of tIll'
thl' pL'riod wht'll tIll' airplalll' hlind.
FIGuHE :!.
P1LOl'"S SEAT AND CUNTh(jL of .\ I [IHIT. IlEI.It..'oPTER
0:-; TUB DfCK of' .\ ::,l \l;\I.\HI;';E.
The enemy then invl'nl<'<1 a neW pieec Qf
equipment. In"tea<1 6f employing the usual
Round or supcl'sonic waves, ultl'a-shol't radio
waves and invisible lig-ht waves wc'l'e put to
work. With the help of dil'l'ctionnl Hntl'nnac
(e.g., pal'aholic min'ol's), the radiated energy
is tl'ansmitted in 'the desil'ed dil'cction. When
these' 'electro-magnetic iJeams encounter III I
object above th.., sUI'face' of the water, they
throw back an electrical echo which is am
plified many times in the upparatus carried
by the plane or destroyel' and rendered either
mldible or visible. The exploring beams pos
.sess about the range of human vision over
water on a clear day. In other words,. they
extend as, far as the horizon. They are
dependent of bad wea1;her, fog, mist, or dark
ness. Since the speed of the beam is equal to
that of light, the locator in the cockpit of
the plane, by means of the simple turning of
his directional antenna through an angle of
:)(iO", obtains an accurate view of everything
within the,electrical field of view.
Soon urter the first reports by German
submarine commanders of the existence of
new piece of equipment, German scien
tiRts gave the submarine an ef
fective counter-remedy. Each boat
was now provided with a device
which enabled it to detect the
I'adiated electrical energy sent out
the patrol planes and effect a
timley escape under the surface of
the water (Fig-ure 1).
Then the planes wel'e equipped
with se!lI'chlights in order 'to be
able to make an optica: '/ilearch,
even at nig-ht, of the area':'under
patrol. And again the submarines
reacted, The boats met the planes
that were following the indica
tions of their instruments with a
hail of antiail'C'raft from
their newly acquired armament,
a four-motored plane came
to it, end in the broad Atlantic,
The enemy then changed over to
a method which made use of the
airplane-destroyer team. Regard
less of the visibility, it became
vel'y diffieult for the submarines to effect a
surprise attack on a convoy. It therefore be
came necessary to equip submarines with ap
propriate countermeans to enable them also
to see and hear better, to conceal themselves
more successfully, and to deceive the enemy.
One of the most significant counter
measures that German science has produced
in some time is the Diesel air-mast. It per
mits submarines to operate with their Diesel
motors even wh;;n submerged. This device
extends to the same height above the surface
of the as the periscope tubes. There iS,1
in the mast an intake valve thr\)ugh ,which tne
a
e
r
S
s
a
n
e
..
,0
,e
I
,e
a
)
l
:0
!S
y.
t
:d
t'
el
:e
!e
is
Ie
."
FOREIGN :MILITARY DIGESTS
llr/oo'
necessary fresh air is drawn for the Diesel
motors; also an exhaust valve through which
the burned gases escape. With the help of
this new piec" of equipment, submarines al'<'
able to travel inde'finitely, submerged to thl'
point where the periscopes are just above the
surface of the water, without being forced to
make use of their' electric motors. In arlrlitioll
to this, there is no need for rising to the
surface for the purpose of churging the
batteries. In emergencies, the boats can dive
instantly, for the switch-over from Diesel to
electric operation is automatic.
Another counternwasure was the introduc
tion of the submarine eye in the forlll of a
tiny motorless helicopter, which is cal'l'ied by
the submarine on long runs. The purt" of
this device are stowed in a round, water-tight
compmtment just belwath the sUl-face of the
upper deck. Its take-off urea is behinu the
turret (Figure 2). The craft consists of a
light seat, control stick, and driving mc('ha
nism joined together by a Jig'ht fral11c
work. Attached by a eahle, the hdicopter is
lifted by the speed of the submarine to a
maximum height of :100 meters. At this point,
the observer has a view which extends muny
miles farther than that to be had froln the
deck of the submarine (Figure 3) [see
Editor's Note at end of article J.
Furthermore, it became necessary, on the
basis of the experiences of G('rman submarine
commanders, to devise new means fOI' de
ceiving the r:my. Both the airplane anu the
destroyer h d to be deceived. This was often
aceomplishe by the simplest of means. Just
as the hermi crab, for instance, conceals him
self in the shell of another denizen of the sea,
the ,necessities of \\"ar gave rise to the crea
lion of a protective "animal" for' the sub
marine, the "water donkey" (U'assCi'cscI).
A submarine operating in the vicinity of a
coast particularly infested by patrol planes
and destroyers uses this device till a more
favorable position for attack can be reached.
By means of a steel cable some 2,000 meters
in length, the submarine tows a float behind
it. On this float, just beneath the surface of
he water, a faithful replica of a submarine
bridge is mounted. Between the submarine
and the "water donl{ey" extends an electric
cable. If the commander discovers a destroyer
01' an ail'plnn(' that might be dangerous
him, J1(> f<pts the compressed-air-operated
noise machilll> ill the "donkey" in Qperation.
ff the plnlH' Utt0lUptR to attack the supposed
SUllllHlJ'in0, ail' is released from the com-'
Ill'{'s,C'<!-ail' lank of the float and oil from the
...
FII:I'HE 3
TIlE :-.\ 11M ,\RINE":-:; "E.'lE." HELICOPTER RISING FROM
THE DE(I\: IIF A SL'U':"!ARINE.
oil tank. As a rebult of thiB, there occurs an
upward rush of ail' un<l an oil patch appears
on the surface of the sea. The enemy pilot
now urops his depth charges on the target,
and from the interior of the "water donkey"
iBsue fragments of pneumatic rafts that have
heen stowed there, articles of clothing, tin
cans, etc. Simultaneously with this, the sub
marine commander floods the "donkey" and it
dives out of sight--that is, the supposed" boat
sinks. The plane now drops its entire bomb
load into the ;ortex produced by the sinking
"donkey" and possibly calls on destroyers to
assist in finishing the work of destruction.
The submarine looses the steel cable and
112
MILITARY REVIEW
complacently continues its search for enemy
shipping.
EDITORS NOTE.-The following account of
the "submarine's eye" appeUl'p<! in The Ac/'o
plant' (Grl'at BI'itain) for 2:1 February 19-15:
. "The Cody man-lifting kite fOI' artillery
observation interested the British \Var Office
long before had become general. but it
was supel!seded during the last '\'orld 'Val'
of 1914-1918 by the 'kite' balloon, whieh was
not really a kite in any senHe of the word, for
a kite is essentially heavier than iiiI'.
"Now the old idea .has been revived by the
German Navy for observation from sub
marines, and it has be('n copied by the Japa
nese. The appliance used il< of special interest,
as it is a gyroplnne, and this is the first time
in histor:, that the gyro system been
adaptt'd to a kite for the pl'actical pm'pose of
man-lifting'.
"The little gyro, with its observer, is sent
up on a light-alloy cable from the deck Of a
surfaced submarine traveling into the wind.
The appliance has yariable-pitch blades fo!'
the rotor, like an autogiro, and appeal'S to be
easily controlled by the observer. It is not
used in the North Atlantic, where steady
winds and apPl'opriate sea conditions are all
too rure, but in other seas it may be quite

"For instance, when the observer, who is
always in telephonic communication with the
sign>lls,(ln Allied convoy and gives
its position, he is hauled down and the U-boat
proceeds to attack the convoy. If, on the
contrary, he signals "Enemy aircraft ap
proaching," they just cut him adrift and
cra8h-dive. The obscl'ver has his little dinghy
and parachute, so he just stays put in the
middle of the Pacific or any otlwl' ocean, hop
ing for the b0st."
Britain's Bombers
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in Canadian
Aviation May 1945.
COLOGNE, commented a wal' correspondent
who entered the city with the first Allied
units, was taken by Bomber Command many
months ago.
This arresting phrase cl'Ystallizes the
magnitude of the effort which. the Royal
Ail' Force has directed to the extinction of
the Ruhr. No less than -150 square miles
of that vital region, with its coal and iron
and heavy industries, now contain not a
single town of any industrial importance
and not a single major factol'y of any value.
Beyond the Ruhl', Bomber Command has
played the greater part in the destruction
of many other centers of German industry
and transportation. About seventy-four per
cent of. Hamburg, or 6,200 acres, is in ruins;
the Germans estimate that it will take five
years to clear the rubble alone. One fifth of
the fully built-up area of Berlin is totally
destroyed.
Truly, the Germans, who sowed the wind,
reaped the whirlwind. Their heaviest raid
on London, in l\Iay 1941, saw 450 tOllS of
bombs dropped 011 the English capital ill
80me ten hou rs. Comnient is needless.
When the war began, the standard British
heavy bomber carried up to 4,500 pounds of
bombs-a little more than the present-day
Mosquito carried on its nightly run to Berlin.
It could not then carry the 4,000-pound
bomb, which, indeed, was not yet perfected
by the British scientists who have led the
world in this fearsome branch of war
engineering.
As the big four-engined bombers' beg'an
to flow from the production lines, so in step
advanced the development of the big bomb.
First 2,000-pounders became commonplace.
Then came the 4,OOO-pound missile; next, the
8,000-pound; third, the 12,000-pound "earth
quake"; and now the 10-tonner.
The new bomb is based on the '12,000
pound bomb, which, incidentally, sank the
German super-battleship Tirpitz. While it
was being evolved, experiments were
113
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
with scale models. Tests were conducted in
the wind tunnel, and 4,OOO-pound models
wcre dropped from different heights. Powers
of .penetration were calculated from the
l'Nmits of firing special models from a gun
at a velocity estimated to be the striking
\'"Iocity of the bomb when (l!'ollped from a
p,'iven height,
Finally, a full-sized 10-t0I111CI', fiIled with
inert material, was dropped from oper
ational height on to open ground at a secret
experimental station, It penetrated so far
that eighteen men wOl'king twelve a
day took nine duys-l,728 m:m-hoUl'o-to dig
down and unearth it,
Today's standard British heavy bombers
carry up to ten tons of bombload.
The success of Bomber Command has its
roots deep in the past. Great Britain. where
the tendency to develop military aviation as
a separate arlll apart from the Army and
I he Navy found expression as long ago as
1!)18 witn the forlllation of the Royal Air
Force. was the first country to recognize that
."uc"cessful bombing demandeo the big bomber
able to cuny big bombs. The first Br\tish
twin-engined "heavy" bomher was in design
and production in 1915. Fleets of these air
planes did valuable work. and initiated stra
tC'gical bombing' with the fndependent Ail'
For!'e in the later phases of the war. 'Vhen
the Armistice was signed in
1918. their successors-four-engined biplanes
weighing fully laden nearly fifteen tons ane]
designed to carry J ,000 pounds of bombs
to Berlin-were waiting for the ol'oer to
attack the German capital.
Because the fundamental need was to
carry the biggest possible destructive load.
Royal Air Force heavy bombers were de
signed primarily for night operation. De
fensive ar'mament. especially in these days
of power-operated gun turrets, shell-firing
cannon, and heavy ammunition, drastically
curtails the permissible bombload, Twenty,
even years ago night operation also
implied slower permissible speeds. because
intel'ception by enemy fighters and gunfil'e
, is hampered by darkness, The slower aircraft
r could .again carry more load than
contemporaq; aircnlft cnjploying the same
available engine power.
Nowadays, British designcrs and engineers
have overcome the pl'oblem of con1bining
high speed-the bomber's best ally-and big
for load. It ig g.i!!niticant that our
leading hig'h-spee,] "light" bomber, the Mos
quito, with a crew of two, actually carrie.
ahout the same hOl1lbload as 11 Flying
FOl'treSg. with its ere'w of tell men, a.nd
('unit's it one hundred miles
PCI' hOllr faster.
Step gtep with the perfection of the
heavy bomber--dc>fined an airCl'aft
able to carry at five tOilS of bombs.
and big bombs at tbat--B,'itish scientists in
other fields. and notably in radio. have
invented and developed new and remarkable
instruments which have made bombing by
night at least as accurate as British
bOl1lbl'I's cany with them the amazing' "magic
cyc" which pie,'ccs cloud and dal'kncos to
gIve the bombanlie,' a clear vicw of the
target, and the lesser chances of fighter
interception by nkht mean that. generally
speaking. the night bomber gets a steadier
"un up to the target than the day bomber.
Critics who are ignorant of the
technique of night bombing sometimes talk
a" though the Royal Ail' Force. afraid to
bomb by day. ('ontented it"eif with the in
discriminate hurling overboa,'d of batches
of bombs from the ;;afe of night.
without ally real idea where they were g'oing.
The I'ecord of the Royal Air Force answers
any slur on its courage and morale. and
the rest of the statement. as every informed
person will know. ig nonsense, Let one
example of British night-bombing HCClll'HCY
speak; some :35,000 tons of bombs. by far
the greatest part of them dropped by Brit
ish bombers at nig'ht, ha"e fallen on Cologne.
Although the is egtimated to be more
than 'percent with more
than 2.000 acres literally laid flat, the ca
thedral. is in close pl'oximity to im
portant military targets that are now rubble.
is; virtually intact.
The technique of the Pathfinder and of
the Master Bomber have, indeed, produced
114
MILITARY REVIEW
. in association with Bl'itish inventiveness a
destructive weapon of the highest ol'der of
accuracy. A major contl'ibution is that of
the men who produced the new wondel' flares
which turn black night over the target
into day,
And Bomber Command is also proficient
in the science of the low-Ieyel high-precision
attack when the target warrants-illustrated
in such famous raids as the blow at Gestapo
headquarters in Oslo an(\ Aarhus, when
individual buildings ancl even rooms were'
pinpointe(\ and leaving virtually
unharmed buildings not only adjacent but
actually contiguous.
The Ail' Staff visualized the four-engined
bomber of ,,0.000 to 70.000 pounds all-up
weight as long ago as IH36. They sought.
in addition to the capacity to carry bip: loa(b
of big' bombs. the operational economy of
the big airplane. On many missions the big:
bomber may be operated with a crew no
more numcI'ous than is normally sent out
with a smaller bomber. yet the big airplane
may calTY mOl'e than fOUl' times the bomb
load fol' a given I'ange. Traffic density at
ail' bases wh(,I'e the bombel' squadrons take
off and land is le:<s(,lIe<l. Hn(] the ta"k 0('
airdrome control is great]:,; simplitie(l.
Before the first foul'-('ngined bomb('l'''
rolled from the production Jines the biggest
bomber in service anywhere in the world
was about 30,OOO-pound all-up weight. The
Germans, obsessed with the view that the
airplane was rightly considered only as an
adjunct of the army, neglected the heavy
bomber and, even when the Royal Ail' Force
was greatly outnumbered and our antiair
craft batteries were few, were quite unable
to unleash a really decisive blow on Lom]on
and the main English industrial towm'.
Further, the German bombers lacked the
ing'enious power-driven gun turrets evolved
by Bl'iti"h engineers, which enaoles Allied
bombers to encounter fighter aircraft on
rca:<onable terms. So the Luftwaffe failed
utterly in its effort to bomb Rl'itain out
of the war.
::\Ian for lllan of aircrew, British heavy
bomber" pack by far the heaviest punch in
the ail' war, They carry the biggest bombs.
Guided by amazing instruments, assembled
over the target with the help of the Path
finders and controlled when there by the
::\Iaster Bomber. these g'iants wrecked venge
alice twenty-fold for the destruction
by the Luftwaffe in Great Britain and many
other peace-loving nations, They did inr!eer!
"occupy" a great part of the doomed !=iernuln
empire,
The Yugoslavian Army
Excerpts from an interview with Marshal 1. Broz-Tito, translated at the Command
and (;enern] Staff School fl'om a Russian article in KI'flS)1((irr
Z,'rzr/a (Red Star) 15 April 1945,
OUR army was bol'll and hardened in furious
and unequal battles with an enemy armed to
the teeth. We startc(l as guerrillas. organized
in small grou"ps of ten to fifteen men armed
with rifles. The of the partisans grew.
but there were not enough Early in
1941 we organized in Serbia the production of
'rifles ill1d ammunition and armed tens
of thousands of men.
After our withdrawal from Serbia. we were
forced into a large-scalt> battle on an eighty
kilometer front. While directing this battle.
I, noticed that our partisan units, despite
their supr'eme courage. had some serious
wcalmesses. Each unit fought its own way
and lacked proper leadership. I saw the neces
sity of creating regular units with appointed
commanders, This soon resulted in the or
ganization of the First Proletarian Brigade.
We called it "Proletarian" because it was
composed chiefly of workers. Two days after
it was former!. it was attacked and had its
baptism of fire. The brigade gained a erushing
victory over the attaeking Italian units and
captured considerable booty. In the subse
quent battles this brigade accomplished mira.
FOREIGN MILITARY DlGESTS
des. Its odifficult march into Bosnia and
,Montenegro was also crowned with success.
Some time later we formed five more fairly
well-armed brigades. Thus, paraIlel to the
widely eJ!;tending partisan mOV('ment grew
algo our regular units. Y
Discipline in the People'$ Army of Lihera
tion was based on the consciousness of it&
l1lt'mbers. Great attention was paid, despite
the difficult situation, to their political and
moral education. From the very first days of
the fighting we cultivated comradeship toward
the women who joined us by the thousands.
We were ruthless with those who attempted
to plunder the population. For picking an
apple in a farmer's garden we inflicted severe
punishment. Pillage was punishable by death.
All this our prestige in the eyes of
the population, which considered us not only
as fearless but also as honest patriots who
had dedicated their lives to the liberation of
the enslaved country.
For three years we waged a warfare of
movement, applying tlie tactics of rapid
thrusts, sudden raids, and quick attacks on
the most vulnerable points. This was our
guiding principle and it saved our armed
forces from annihilation by an enemy armed
with powerful modern weapons.
Th('n the situation chang('d. We had to
engage in modern warfare along a definite
front line. This signified a new stage in the
development of our armed forces, and the
transition period was difficult. Our men were
used to mobile warfare, to action in the
mountains. When we reached the plains, we
fought with less confidence. The Germans
tried to take advantage of this weakness, 'but
our men quickly became adapted to the new
conCiitions and now, largely due to the utiliza
tion of the experience of the Red Army, we
learned how to beat the Germans on the
plains.
The achiev('ments of our artillery should
be mentioned. Our man became familiar with
the war, materiel received from the Soviet
plants and used it quite successfully. The
successes of our First Army, fully equipped
with Soviet weapons, should be particularly
stressed. .
When most of the Yugoslavian territory
had been liberated, thousands upon thousands'
of men streamed into our ranks. We began
building a real modern army and establishing
an iron mi'litary discipline. .
One of our most serious problems was the
creation of our officer cadre. After the rout
of the old Yugoslavian army. most of its
officers joined the encmi()s of the people. Our
officers were trained in: combat. 'They come
from the people. In the course of the war they
howed examples of outstanding gallantry
nnd combat initiative. They know how to fight,
yet they have had but little instruction. As
the formation of regular brigades progressed,
this problem became increasingl"y acute. In
H142 we established schools for officers. These
courses were attended by all our officers and,
despite the brief period of instruction, they
enriched considerably the military knowledge
of our commanders. Recently we created the
Academy of the Yugoslavian Army. Two
thow-and students are attending it now.
In order to consolidate the victory won at
the cost of so much blood, to make our country
invulnerable, and to establish a lasting peace,
we need a strong army. And we will create
such an army. This is dictated hy the great
extent of both our land and sea borders. In
old Yugoslavia four and a half billion dinars
out of the total national budget of twelve
billion dinars went to military appropriations,
yet the army had neither 'tanks nor planes.
As a result of this, Yugoslavia was smashed
by the Germans within ten days. Our nation
will not have another catastrophe. Our pur
pose is to equip our army with modern war
materiel. Infantry and especially mountain
troops arc of utmost importance in our situa
tion. Our !\Iontenegran and Bosnian mountain
units inflicted defeats on the best German
.Jaeger troops. We must arm our
units with the most modern weapons. Great
attention should also be paid to the artillery.
We have' all-eady our own aircraft and shall
develop it in every way. The Yugoslavian
army will also have tank troops. ,
The army has great prestige in new Yugo
slavia. Our nation knows that the country
has been saved by the People's Army of
Liberation and will spare no effort to make
this army strong and eff('ctive.
i
"
"
116
J
"'1'"
MILITARY REVIEW
The Winter Campaign of 1943-44 in Italy
Digested at the Command and Genet'al Staff School from an article in TILe Army
Qliartcl'iy (Great Britainl) April 1945.
Till': of the wintcr t'anlpaign in Italy
has b(,Cl1 tilt' mOl't' spectacu
lar sucecsst's which fo11o'\\,(',l tht' launching of
the SUl\\l\\t'l' ofi't'n,ive. Some details of this
campaign Illay be revt'aled, in which the Allied
armies, although fig'hting on battl"fields of the
enemy's choosing, in tt'1'l'ain hlt'ally suited to
defense, succeede;l. llL'vel'thelt'ss, in denting
the Gt'rman line and the hl'idgehl'u<is
needed for the 8Ul\\nWr victory.
One of the strong"st ddl'n,.,jvl' positions in
Europe guarded the ovt'r1and route to Rome
up the vallt'y of the river Liri (3l'e sketch),
-:::]'"
,....:;;. :.'Nc .. N/
. J),:,., 4
\ - . Sl
t ,;.'\ .};'\tf!...
I
I _ cAs IND-'
b
'" . AURUNci.fiii,>' \ I
o '0 .0M.> ....", ,
__'OKI1'I '. -" 1
____.____ ..--1
where General Clark's Fifth A rilly poised
at the beginning' of January In.!.!. The }.even
opening .intu the Liri valley was
flanked to the II,: the l'<KHlll's" AlII'unci
mountains covl'ring' the whole rl'gion between
the Liri and the coast, and to the north
by the main Illassif of tht' Apennines, where
the few roads. rising' high ahov!! the snow
lint', wel'l' impassahle to an army in winter.
The battlelield>" ovC!' which the winter
campaign fought fr011l 17 January to the
end of arch. were of two sorts: flat, water
logged river valleys, always elosely overlooked
by the, enemy-held high ground; and bare
rocky mountains where each craggy height
had to be scaled and stormed, and failure
meant exposure in the open to all weapons of
'which .the enemy disposed,
A seabo.rne landing south of Rome, and a
,frontal thrust into the Lid valley, combined
with tuming movements on either side of the
valley, were the elements of Genera! Clark's
plan for breaking the GE'rl11an line. Its suc
cess clepended on the value the Gel'lnans ,et
on Rome, ability to hold the main front
again,t Ul.l assault was beyond dispute;
equally gl, was the fact that could not
('om pete ,vith II simultaneous landing in their
rear by foul' divisions without rapid and
powl'rful reinforcement.
On 17 January, when General McCreery's
10th British Corps attacked across the lower
reaches of the Garigliano to begin a turning
Illov('ment against the German right flank. it
faeed problellls typical of the wiriter cam
paign, The ground was waterlogged and
hoasted Ii tt Ie covel:. The muddy banks of the
/'lvcr al1l1 the primitive tracks which led up
to it allowed the minimum number of sites
fot, building ra'ft ferries for the heavy equip
ment that must follow the assaulting infantry,
The,l' and the only possible site for a heavy
road bridge Wl're well known to the enemy,
were protected by mines and covered by his
guns and mortars.
By careful planning and concealment of
their preparations, 10th Corps overcame many
of these difficulties, and in a night attack
achieved complete surprise. By dawn on 18
.January, seven battalions had crossed the
Garig'liano and secured a footing on the
enemy hills. The enemy, not slow to realize
the threat to his flank, rushed thl'ee divisions
sOllth tb meet it; and on 21 January, 10th
Corps, stl'ongly outnumbered, faced a deter
mined counterattack on its entire bridgehead.
In two days of heavy fighting, however. it
drove the enemy back. and then advanced
again to capture fresh positions and a firm
base for the summer offensive.
The 10th Corps attack had drawn almost
the whole of the enemy reserves to the coasta'!
sector, and the situation was promising. 'I'he
next blows fell swiftly. The 2d (U.S.) Corps
began the frontal assault across the river
Rapido into fhe Lid valley on 20 January, and
a few hours later the French Expeditionary
I'OIU;[{;N MILlTAIlY OfGb:STS
117
COI'I)S moved forwlII'd throug-h th... niounwins
north of Cassito to thr'aten the othel
flank Then, at dawn on 22 Janu;ry, 6th
Corps, comprising- British and AmC'rican
troo]l& undei' an Anwl'ican comnmncll'r, Iundt'd
at Anzio,
At this point the g'I'cat stl't'ng'th of the
winter line ckfcnses, and the a(lvantag'e which
thl' cnemy t'njoyed of intc'riol' lines of com
Illunication, began to make thenl>elv('s felt,
The enemy );ent his last inllne(liate l'e,el'Vl'S
to tIlt' Fl'l'nch advance and foug-ht stuh
bOlllly and for the line of th('
Rapido, Here, althoug'h the :lr>th 1.:.S. Division
crossed the rive\', they ('oul(1 make little pro
gress in the maze of obstacles and fortifica
tion,; bmt confronted them on the west bank,
In addition, tIll' river itsl,lf Was so heavily
cOVl'n'd by tire that it proved impossible to
l'aS$ and g'un, across to the
ing' rpginwnts, 'Ind, on 2-1 J anUtlry, after two
dl'(PI'nline(\ attplllpts had bel'n made. the :llith
U,S. Division had to withdraw to .lId posi
tions.
This was an unfortunatc' H,thack; and at
Anzio too our dimcultic's Wel'e growing,
Having- been taken comjllC'tely by surprise by
our, landing- and having' (!t-cit!t-d that Rome
was a prize worth commItting- all his army in
Xorthern Italy to hold, thl' built up his
strength rapidly round the sl11all Allied
bridgehead with the intention of (/J'iving it
into the sen and scol'ing a sJll'ctacular if not
a major By 2 February, when lith
C01'PS was already outnumlwred by five divi,
sions to four, and when a hattll'
to break out of the bridg'ehead had ended in
stalemate, the initiative had to the

The Allied air forces fought unfiringly to
<.lelay the German build-up at Anzio. and it
was not until 11 February that Kes
selring felt strong enough to ordel' II full,
scale counterattack on beachhead. When
it was launched, the German divisions out
numbered ours by two to one; were ;;up
ported by tanks and for the fil'"t time in
months hy an effective ail' fOI'ce; whik for
some time past, their heavy g'uns had rangeu
at will over the beaches and strategic points
of the beachhead, pounding oUr ships \.tp .0
Ileady lllil('s <lllt at $Ca.
nfter dawn on 16 February, five
(;erl11an attael,eel down the Albano
Anzio 1'oa(1 Oil a five-;l1ilP front, after a very
artilIL'I'y hal'ragt'. The 5Hth British and
45th (U,S,) DiviSions fong-ht back skilfully,
and, althollgh l'lll'lIlY tanks pel1('trated our,
lines, Wel'l' counterattacked and forced
to withdraw, Allied bomhel's were
thrown into thl' hattll', in the unaccustomed
role of attacking' thl' enemy in his forming
up a !'l'a , and OUl' artillery slaughtered his
concent!'ations. Fighting !'aged for foul' days;
then, having gained nnly along
the roud to Anzio, at a Vl'l'y heavy cost in
men. the enelllY for a week, On 29
February thl' second counterattack began,
thi, time u few miles farther to the south,
on the front of till' ad Amel'lcan Division,
Th" .\ IlIl'ricans stood firm and intlicted very
heavy ctlsuulti,'s on the mas.cd formations of
infantry which assaulted theil' lines, For two
days thl' (;e1'l11an$ their assaults crul1lble;
on :! ;\larch they abandoned the attempt, and
in doing so accepted tinal deft'at in the most
unlbitlOlIs counteroffensive yet launched in
the italLan peninsula,
On the main front, l1I1'anwhile, the fighting
had cl'y'tallizl'd into a Jlrotmct0d battle fOl'
till' }[onte Cussino heights, to which the 2d
(C,S,) COl'!," WHo at the end of
.January. when their frontal assa,ult on the
LlI'i had failed. The :\[onte Cassino
,pur dOlllinated thp entrance to the Liri
valle,y, ant! was the key to the whole German
wInter line; the high, roa(lless mountains to
till' north otfered no chance of either by
01' ioolating it, The town of Cassino
la;' at thl' foot of the steep eastern f'ace,
pal'tl:, in the low-lying' waterlogged valley
and partly on thl' 10\\'er slopes of the spur;
tilt' approache, to it wen' completely exposed
to nhs('rvaticn from the high ground above,
On the 'pu r ibelf. on the l.HOO-foot peak,
stnoel Cassino Abbey, converted into a fortress
in, the nineteenth centllry, and !Jl'Otected by
wall, tifteen feet high and ten feet thick. The
abbey fitted into an intricate df'fensive system
of elosl'ly interlocking fortified heights,' The
118
MILITARY REVIEW
'whole fOl'lllE;!d a position which the I taBan
Staff College had previously declared to be
lmjll'cgnable, since when the Germans had
. added steel and concrete pillboxes.
The 2d Corps fought with great gallantry
to reach both the town and the abbey; one
force succeeded in penetrating the northern
outsldl'ts of the town. and another, attacking
along the high gl'Otll1,j to the north, reached
on 5 February to within 300 yards of the
abbey itself. This was the high point of
their success; the po,;itions gained in front of
the abbey were under fillc>h close amI accurate
fire that it was impossible to remain there,
and the rocky ground precluded digging.
on 14 February. when repeated at
temptg hlld failt'd, the Americans were with
drawn to I'<,,,t, and th,' 1tll In,lian and 2d New
Zealand Divi"ion took OVer their sector.
The bombing of Cassino Abb('y became a
military necessity wl1l'n the Germans took
refuge hehin,l its impregnable walls. No artil
lery was Hunlcit'lltly powerful, and it was re
luctantly decided th<lt only heavy bombers
could force g,l,l)S through which infantry coulu
follow, When thl' Germans had been duly
warned, to enable them to evacuate the monks
and civilian refugel's, a force of two hundred
and fifty bombers made the attack, reducing
the principal buildings to ruhhle, and gashing
the outer walls.
When the 4th Indian Division's attack 'on
the abbey failC'd, General Freyberg's New
Zealand Corps prepared immediately to
explore the 'only other means of securing it
to assault Cassino town from the north and
scale the steep eastern face of l\1onte Cassino,
The buildings in the town were immensely
solid, interspened with pillboxes, and pro
tected by mines and booby traps. A new
experiment in town fighting was therefore
tried; on 15 March the narrow confines of
Cassino were blasted with 800 tons of heavy
bombs, before a New Zealand Brigade ad
,#
vanced into the ruins, The indescribable dev.
astation caused by the bombing and the ellOl"
mous cratel'S mude it diffictllt even for the
infantry t9 move forward, but during the
afternoon the New Zealundel's ovel'l'anl1lore
thnn half. the town and ('aptul'et! the Castle
Hill whi('h dominattd the northern appmach,
The First Parachute Division, the best Ger
man troops in Italy, fought back with
fanatical COUl'ag'e when tlw stunning effect of
the bombardment had passl'd, emerging fl'om
(ellars and cavl:s at the ba"e of :lrontc Cas,;ino
which had the bombing.
The eight days' bnttle which followed will
be reckoned among the sternest of the war,
Rain on the first night dltrkl'ned the skies
and hltll1pet'l'd the IJldian Brigade whose task
it was to pick their way through the rubble
and seale the heights of :lIontc Cassino. The
Indians nevertheless captured important
heights and fought furiously for the slrong
points which held out at the end of the first
assault. The enemy jJQsitions into-locked
c1nsPly, ant! accurate machine-gull and mortar
fire made lllovement in daylight almost im,
From the SHI\1(' murderous
fire was poured into thl' New Zealanders in
the town, where ('very defended building had
to be blabtpd hy the fire of tank guns, At the
enu of a we"k's fighting. the "hotel district"
of Cassino ,tillmaintained a vigorous defense,
Before the attack was ahan(,lon('d, a vast
regrouping was already under way, bringing
the Eight ArlllY across from the Adriatic
coast unobtrusively into the line beside the
Fifth. As in Tunisia and Sicily, 'when Gell
eral had <'x('cutt'<\ 5imilar hold
maneuvel'S, this paved the way fOJ' an over
whelming success. On 11 :\1ay both armies
attacked. \Vithin a week Cassino hat! fallen,
and on 4 June the hastily and un
willingly abandonl'd Roml', to con,luct a .lis
ordel'lY retreat to the Apennines.
The most difficult thing is to guess the enemy's plan, and sift the truth from
the reports as they come in. The rest requires only common sense; it is like a
boxing match, the more you punch the better.
-Napoleon
FOREIGN MILITARY D}GESTS
119, .
Materiel and War Morale
Translated at the Command and General Staff School from a German article by
Rear Admiral Gadow in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 26 January 1945,
TilE pessimistic saying that "wars are
begun with the same tactics aml technical
equipment with which the last war ended"
has not been substantiated in this war.
Le:<sOlls were learned in China, Abyssinia,
and Spain which were not forgotten. A,
l'c.ca1'ds our own nation, we were operating
in new fields nt the vcry outset with' OUl'
!ll'nlll1'('d wedge tacties and the Stukns an!1
g'li<lcl's; nnd on the seas with our pncks of
submarines and man)" another. new wcapon.
The enemy was at first outtlistancecl, but
Jegaine(1 his lost g'l'otlJ1cl. A cursory review
may at .least give the (',sential features of
the developments.
Fl'Ol1l the water-cooled heavy machine
g'uns. even on horse-drawn ca1'
riag'C's and of which Lord Kitehcncr con
,id(,1'L'<1 three to the battalion as sufficient.
the various air-coolc,1 lig'ht machine guns
'Udl as the Lewis, the Bren, and other
and, with us, the all-surpassing
rapid-fire machine gun of the present uay,
hu\,(' become wen pons . of
whieh hnve dominated the field of battle.
AlolH!'side this the modern machine
pi>;tol, miles ahead of the machine pistol of
tIl(' first World War, the wcapon of surpJ:is('
attack and close combat. The case has been
1I1uch the same with hand grenades, auto
matic pistols, bayonets, and trench tools.
The sharpshooter's rifle with telescope sights
has found increased emplorment. Semi-auto
matic rifles as the normal weapon have
made their appearance in the case of the
enemy. The difference between th'e clumsy
,heet-iron contraptions of 'Vorld Wat' I
an!1 tanks of the type of the
ShE'I'mans, Chuichills, T-:l4's, Tigers, Panth
ers. and King' Tigers. is truly astonishing.
Against them arose the PallZel'/aust [tank
and the PlIlIzNsclll'eck [tank terrol'].
Thl' rocket pl'ojectors and mortars, flame
throwers an!1 gUlls on self-propelled mounts.
the "Goliath" for use against obstacles and
strongpoints, the assault gun, the a rm01'ed
personnel carrier, the long-range cannon,
the giant, howitzer. the hollow-charge and
magnetic antitank mine-all these show the
advance made in artillery, ballistics. ,and
the technique of explosives. From the modest
Krupp anti balloon gun before Paris in 1871
has evolveu the heavy antiaircraft gun which
hurls its shells to a height of over 9,000
meters. The techniques of signal communi
cation and engineer activities have reached
new heights of perfection.
In on the seas, the submarine,
which at first gave proof of its ability to
cope with enemy defense, and increased the
destructive powel' of its torpedoes as a reply
to the enemy's acoustic pursuit and observa
tion of the approach of the torpedoes, was
then forced to because of "radar," the
enemy's radio 10catOJ' and supersonic under
water pursuit equipment-but later found
holes in the defense and was making use
of them. Present-day naval artillery shoots
with an unknown in the past. at
maximum rang'es; massed antiaircraft fire
pl'Ovides security for the ship; while the
airplane-ca\'l'ier has assumed a leading place
without, however, rendering' battleship
unnecessary. Undreamed-of variants are
found in mine construction; magnetically and
acoustically detonated tY]les and combination
types are "(Juntered by equally varied methods.
The greatest innovations al'e the individual
combat weapons. the oneman torpedo, the
assault and the explosive boats, the minia
ture submarine of the "Sturm-Wikinge," the
combat swimmers of the Schelde and Meuse.
;\Tany of these things originated with our
allies, the Japanese: the Samurai swimmers
of Wake and Hong Kong, the miniature
submm'ines of Pearl Harbor, ancI others. 'Of
,,11 these, only the submal'ines were known
to the enemy.
In the case' of aviation, it suffices to caIl
attention to the altitudes attainable pres-. <
ent-day aircraft. their operational ranges
and speeds, the heavy weapons carried by
MILITARY REVIEW
them, stratosphel'e flights, rel1l
n
te ('ontrol:
photographic recpnnaissance, ml'l the "V"
weapons in the face of which (,llly recently
a confercnce of in London
concluded with great eoncern and hmo
ranee relative to any method of the
problem facing' it as when it opelled, Thc
first World War do"",l with airplanes of
plywoocl with wire brat'ing, Iig'ht maehine
guns whkh fired betwecn the p,'opeller bladps
(their had .. !1 cal'billrS and iron
darts as weapoIH;), an,] a yain ]onj.!'ing'
"death rayf',"
The dfect of the tel'1'ifie mass of materiel
cmploYl>d in World War I hud forced the
t,'oops to remain un!le,' cnvel' almnst con
stantly, but at thl' sal\l(' time had pl'<ldll,'ed
the fearless assault detachlll(,llt as the so
lution for it. A "traidlt lin(' It>ad"
from this d('(achment to t he' individual
fighter of our tinws, to tl1(> 111<'11 of t he anti.
tank units, to the al'morrd ,.)I1(,IIIPll,
to the nwn of tlw \'olkssturm 1
4
11,) attaek
the tank in the open terrain, t(l the assatllf
weapons of the coast, to the night fig-htel'
OJ: the "Kamikaze" of tQe
Is hnot H striking fart that these modes
of fighting'. deathdefying, often accompalller!
by l'ertain death, are almost entirely limited
to us and OUt' allie,? To be the oth"1'8
have al",o their pamtmops, theil' l1ntitnnk
lI'n"jl", and theil' Illiniatul'r submarines, and
there is no question of their personal vul Il 1',
but thb of thing' is not in the f(lIe
gToun(1 \\-ith them as it is with us. With
thenl l'eliUlll'C' on nuttedel, PI'o<iuctioll,
ami mass prevails to a much
g'l'eatl'l' extl'lIt than with us, They call ou)'
fighters "fanatical," alld are "1,
toni<hl'd at them, But these, our
a l'e over('oming' taeth-al n",thod" the war
of luatel'ieI ,iust (1:-. oUl' <..'01l1l1HulCl 0\"(11'
(,<lming' the handit-ap impo-ed
thp World \\'a,' lInd which, in 1018,
appeal'cd insupel'ablr,
The Soviet Navy
Digestp,1 at tl10 Command and (;cn(,l'al Staff School from an artil'le by i.icnt<.>nant
Pdp!, p, .\nchcrsky in Th .. Sal'U (Great B\'itain) April 1945,
Til" Hussii1l1 FlePt, forl'runnPI' of tilp
So\'i('t A rlllY, was founded :!5() I'S ""!''',
Under the guidancp of PetrI' I ("th,' (;r<.>at")
the first men-of-\\'a,' \\'er<.> built. and the
first sailors tl'ail]('d ill val'ious institutions
set up for the preparation of naval officel's
and marine P<.>ter J drew up the
first maritime laws, in which he 'l't f'll'th
the of Russian naval Hrt. ('nder
Peter the Rus1'ian Freet won its fil':,t vic
tories over the Swedish Fleet at Gang-nt
and Grengam.
In more than 2()O yea rs, from 1714 tn
1918, the Russian Fleet fought twenty-foul'
major actions against superior enemy
and Wa'!; victorious in twentyonc of them,
In Soviet (lays, the fig'htin/l.' of
the Russian have been !';rently de
veloped, and as a rcsult have coped
and are coping well w'ith all thcll' waI'time
tasks.
TIll' Soviet Xavy has not only suc('essfull),
jlrotl'l'ted the flanks of the Red ..hmy a!';ainl't
the en('my at sea. it has also ,dealt bl"\\,,
to till' flanks and hintelland along
the Cl>ast, \\'<.>11 at Th<.> \\'ell-exec'llten
operations of the' at Fenrh,,ja,
Kel'(-h, J'.:ovormiSiisk in the and a
llumber of in, the nortn pl'o\'ed of
invaluuhlp nI<l to the advancing Red AI'm),
force:',
Each of the Soviet fleE'ls has been huilt
tn fig'ht undel' the specific of it,
own theater, The Red Banner Baltic Fleet
supportecl the Red Al'llIr during the defense
of L('ningl'ad, All German attempts to pene,
trate to LeningTad fl'Ol1l the sea were foiled
b,l' the Suvi<.>t sailors, The marines helped
to breaeh the German defensE'S at Leningrad
and 'in the liberation of the Soviet Baltk
const. 1II0tor torpedo boats and submarines
played an active paxt in attacks on the
121
VOREWN MILITARY DIGESTS
German Fleet. In the Baltic German"
hundreds of ships 'with II total
ment of moro than two million
The Northern Fleet 0[' the Soviet Nav,y
safeg'lll\rded eonilllunipations linkinp; the
USSR \\'ith its DUl'lng' the war it has
sunk more thun 5()O Gel'nuII\ [!'ansports carry
inp; troops am! \\'al' lllall'I'iuls, nnt! \nollll'ht
down mOl'., than I,O()O Gl'rJnHn plune",
Coordinating' Its actions \\'ith those of the
Red Ann,,' ,Iu ring' tIl{' defense of Soviet
naval the Nav,,' lande,1 many task
forees in the Cllelll.l"s real', TOg'ethel' with
the soldiers, the sailors drove the Germans
fl'olll Pcehl'ng'a alId Kirkenes,
The a,llllinistl'utiv(' Olg'all uf the Soviet
naval furees is the Cnllllllihsariat
of the Navy of the l!SSI{, cOlll}h"ed of the
Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of
Politk'al AdministI'ation, varlOUh adminb
lrative branches U1Hl depaltments dealing'
\\'ith specific tasks of shipbuilding', training',
supplies, alHI fiO on,
The Soviet Navy is eOlllpogcd ,,1' fOUl
fleetg-the Northern, Baltic, B1aek Sea, and
Pacific Fleets, In ad,lition, thel'e are the
flotillas of the AllIur River, the Caspian Sea,
the Danube, amI the Dnieper Hivers,
TIl(> Soviet l'\avy derives its manpo\\'er on
the principles of l'ompubory military tmin
ing', The draft a!.!'e nineteen, The terms
of service nrc five years for men in ,hip"
foul' year, 1'01' mell in shore defenses and
a\'iation, two years for other branches, \\'hen
thei I' terlll of sel vice has ended, seamen
and petty officel's are transfcl'l'ed to reserves
and remain elig'ible for servicc until the
of fifty, At <:ertain intervals, however,
they underg'O COUI'ses,
When thl'Y reach a naval base, recruits
undergo preparatory tl'aining in ships. In
their l'es\wctive training' detachments they
prepare for theil' val'ious callings for a
period of' twelve inonths, Petty officers and
speciali<;(o.; Il'om the ranks, seniol' specialists,
an,1 company commal](iers Illay remain with
the Fleet for extended service if they so desire,
The war has produced a new form
tmining', Ollicers and sailors underg'O special
tl'aining' bctwl'en actions, On o!le of the
lal'gc-scale landing' opcrations (Kerch and
NovOl'o"ibk) training' was carried out under
anticipated battle ('on/litions, Dummy de
fenses wei e "et up resembliIlg' those of the
Germans, Speci'al ta,k /'OI'Cl" were landed,
lllarine aetiollS were as \vere the
various [01' the capture of enemy
strong'puillts, Hand-to-hand fighting received
special attention,
The mam org'anizing' furce of the Navy
is its Offiecl' ,tafl', Theil' tmining' is conducted
in accordance \\'ith Sen'lee rcp;ulations, Most
of the officers graduate f!'Om naval establish
ments, Other' are drawn from reserves or
from amon!!; the petty officers \\'ho are given
special preparatory tmining,
Promotions are carried out after fixed
terlllS of sel'vice, which vary in proportion
to rank,
Officers may be promoted for distinguished
service, Petty officers havlllg' sufficient knowl
and fig'hting experience lllay also be
advanced to officer's I'ank. The Soviet Fleet
has some admirals who beg-un service twenty
to twenty-five years ago as o!'dinary seamen,
Combat Security of Artillery in Offensive Operations
'l'mllslated at the Command and General Staff Sl,hool fmm a alticle
by Lieutenant Colonel V, Smirnov in 1\1'III<lIlIi(( Zl'('zda
(Red Star) 28 January 1945,
WHEl'.' an offensive operation rapidly foresee where, alld when there will occur a
spreads ovel' a broad Rectol' of the front, clash with' the enemy or what its character
especially in wooded areas, cl'itical moments will be, But wherever anr unit may be, it
in the fighting are very likely to occur. Under lllU8t always be ready to repel an attack by
sllch circumstances it is extrelllely diffieult to thp enelllY from flanks, front, and real'. All
122
MILITARY REVIE:W
around defense at all times is an indispensable
condition of success in mode}'n comhat opera,
tions,
The matter of self-defense assumes, of
course, a special aspect in the case of artil
lery, We should consider the volume of equip
ment and supplies carried by artillery and
its ability to no great damage to the ene'my
even under the most complex conditions of
battle, It seems to us that in taking comhat
security lll(,<lSUl'es we should also keep in
mind that the constitutes a power
ful striking force capahle at any moment of
exerting a decisive infiupnce on the g'eneral
situation. In other words, in the exploitation
---
-
N
1
o 1000
I I I 1, I I J' I I
.\1 eters
Legend:
RUSSian Dcfc:nwe
A Obscrvanun P",>!
Germ',n Inf I!n
phase in the enemy's rear areas, we should
employ our artillery in the decisive as weB
as in the dangerous directions. .
In 'suPPOl't of this contention, we shall cite
an intereBting 'and instructiye example from.
the of the artillerymen of the 2jf
Al:my Group, For the sake
of bl'evity, we shall note only those details
which have a direct bearing on our subject.
Our artillel'y regiment atHI its reconnais
sanCl' battalion ha,l approached the village of
Silwlo (see 51;etch) and had been ordered to
halt, Strong forces of Germans still remained
in the rear of our attacking forces, hiding in
the vast forests. It wm; cleal' that sooner 01'
later the bypas,;t'd ent'my would attempt to
break through to the west. On this account,
immediately upon arrival ut the Sinelo area,
the artillerymen began the organization of an
ull-al'ol1lHl defense. More att('ntion, naturally,
waf; giVl'll to the eastcl'n approach('s to the
villag'c,
A nd it was from the east that group, of
enemy infantr'y accompanicd hy self-propelled
artillery Wl're discovered approaching our
positions at about three o'clock in the morn
ing, The enemy was a,lvalll'ing mainly along
two roads, hoping', appan'ntly, to malw Ube
of the two bridges across the river. The direc
tion of their march and their strength are
shown in the sketch. The Germans on the
north flank, that the bridge had
bel'1l destroyed, turned off the road and at
tempted to get aroulld to the rear of the 1st
Artillery Battalion. which had betrayed its
presence by its fire, The Germans, however,
were quickly dispersed by our fire on the ap
proaches to the northern edge of the village.
The remaining elwmy groups were just as
unsuecessful. Even their self-propelled equip
ment di,l not help them, so powerful and ac
elll'ate was the fire of our artillery. Only on
thl' south did the enemy succeed in getting
into the area occupied by the 2d Battalion
ohsl.'rvation posts. Yet here also. owing to
the firm rpsi,tance of our artillery, their at
tack was repulsed,
After having' suffered heavy losses, the
Germans were forced to leave in search of a
crossing at some other placC', At the begin
ning of their attack they numhered ap
proximately 1,500 men, but afte\; six hours
of fighting, scarcely half of them were left.
It was learned later that the remnants of
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
123.
this enl'my group were destl'oyect by our other
. The artillerymen WOli a complete vic
tory, They did not pel'mit the em'my to reach
th.. cI'ossings" inflictc(1 S"VCI'C iosscs on him,
and forcC'd him to with
out )'il'lding a single foot of their positions,
What tactical lessen can Wc' 10arn from this
exanlplc'? First of all, let us examine the
arca whel'(' tIll' artilkI'Y rl'g-iment had haltet!.
It \\'oul(1 havl' hpl'n llIueh !c'ss hazal',lolls to
con('c'ntratl' an)'whl'rc to north or south
of tIll' villag'l! of Silll'lo. It would havl' 1.(>(>n
Nbil'I' tn cOllcellI tIll' aJtillel'y in the woods,
and the ,'nl'IlIY woult! huve passe,1 hy to one
,ide of tlll'm unllwal'(, of thcir presence. But
evl'lI if the Gl'l'manS had 1I0ticC'd them, they
would not hav<, PIlg'ag-e<i thl'ln, hut would have
hastl'lle.1 on t,) join their other units, If the
urtilll'I'Y hall haltt',1 in the forest it would
hu\'(' b"l'n tantamount to g-iving clear pa;;sage
to tIll' (;ermans, to op('ning fOl' thC'm a way
of l',,'ape. It must he admitted. then, that
bridge's ant! road forks, handy for enemy
1 11I0\'Cllll'nts, an' very sllit:.l1.le places for the
of al'tillel'Y.
1'1", \\'ere abo ('oITeet in
tnking- up a 01\ the east bank. The
pos'ihility of a surpl'be frontal attack by
the pnemy was l'xclu,lel\ hecallse tIll' !'l'con
battalion \vas on the
bank. But if the Gel'luans had att,'mptl,d such
an attack with "tJ'ong forces, as serious an
obstaele as the rivel' woul,1 have weakeneci
the force of their hI ow considerably. The loca
tion of the various batteries, observatiqn
posts, and sUbmachine guns all hore the
marks of readiness for self-defense, Thus;
locations chosen for the observation posts
were not far from the batteries, Removal of
these to a greater distance would only have'
scattereci theil' forces and means in case of
an attack on this ,Iefensive position. There
would be no n('('d for rcsorting to long-range
fin', ,m,1 this also was taken into account in
the Ol'ganizution of the position, The offic(>r
],cl'Sonncl was full)' uble, even fronl the closest
of the o]'cervation posts, to control the fine of
t I\l' fOl' a vanety of miBsions.
The gl'nl'l'al conclusicn to he drawn from
an anal)'sis of the fi;!;ht ahove will
Ill' a, follows: The enemy, withdrawing under
thl' attack of Soviet forces. often counter
attackS: attempting to check our advance and.
regain lost defcngive position" At times,
strong German forces participate in these
counterattacks, and under such circumstances
critical moments are entirely possible when
the artillery will be obliged to use its fire
for sC'lf-defense. It is true that this engage
ment occurred under 5ingular circumstances,
when powerful forces of the enemy that had
not yet been neutl'alized remainl'd in the rear
of OUI attacking forces, But nevertheless, it
"haws just as convincingly the capacity of
QUI' aI'tillery units for all-around defense, It
is important constantly to take this capacity
into account during operations in enemy rear
areas.
Modern River "Tarfare
From an article in The Times (London) 27 March 1945,
Although til i,. arUde may apI'NU' to
be out o[ elate, it is [01' the
tacticallcssolls it which
111((11 SOO/1 be utilizeel ill the Fm' East
ill d/'i<'il1[J the Japane.se out of China.
THE. EDITOR.
h has always been a maxim of military
art thut a river is not an insUl'mountable
obstacle. For Napolon, rivers came third
in importance after deserts and mountains'
as geographical barriers; and so it has
turned out in this war, for all the delay
imposed by the enemy by flood and the threat
of flood. But all the time the Rhine has
loomed as the ultimate in
the far-off days when the Seine and the
Marne still had to be crossed, before the
breathless race that brought us to the Mo
selle, the Schelde, and the Dutch Maas.
The interlude on the Roer, lengthened by
Rundstedt's spoiling offensive in the Arden
124
MII.ITARY 'REVIEW
n forests like the Rcichswahl the HJ nes, stands in plat,, apart Qt'eaURe of the
enemy's ('ontrol of the
through which he ('oult! ,,(>nd tiond watel'S
pouring- into thf' vallcy helow and ,,0 eng'ulf
the ::mppi;; lint'" nf un ad\'ancing- Hrmy, But
evel';' l'i\'el', evel'Y ('l'o""ing', was a hnt!
mark on the man'h to the Hhine,
The military l'nj,!.'inNI'" who, on the Rhine,
lIl'C SUl'pu><"ing- ('veil thl'ir In'eat ]'c"",'d of
hchievcment, have 1I0t laeke,l expCriel1('l' in
handling- the wealth (If hl'i<!g'ing- mat..,rial
with whkh the modern al'llly l''luipp('d,
fot' thoug-h thc hav(' ""llletillle,
becn stampeded into lCH\'I1Ig- a vital bddg'e
intnct-Nijmc)!.'el1 and Helllag't'll a 1'(' th" out
cxamples-thdr delllolition t('('h
nique has been mORt thol'oug'h, Fidd )lal'"hul
i\Iontg-m1wl'Y'" TWl'nty-Fil';;t A I'm,' Group
alone has constructe!l more than 1,000 Bail,,\,
bddg-e>< .luring- it" ad\'alll't'--and Whl'll Oll't'
of the Bailt'y hridg-e, t!H'!'l' in a llut
"hell is the <I1l..;Wel' to most l'i\'('I' pl'ohlt'mH,
This admirable Ilriti"h invt'l1ti.n1. \\'ideh
a<lopte.l by tht' .'\nH'rkan a1'miL-s, \\'a..; m."t
e:\rt'fully thout!:ht ..ut beforp beillg' j,sllt'd,
and has "t.,..d th" lc"t or evpl',' type of
neat. f.cetion:'o, in whkh
bit of steel is doill'" its dul,', hn""
alm"st lim1tle,,' pos'lbl!ities, But pl'rhaps
its main virtu" b that th,' "appt'rs like' it.
alII' Hpprel'Jatillll .. I' tllt' l'nt'lllY'" intcn
tions has always fOl'eseen that hl' would
attempt to sland on rive1' lines, whil'h providp
such stl'nllC', natural covel' tt)
frontiers, One nftel' another they have been
forced, But for a lIumber of special Ieason,
the Rhine, whieh after all has been t1'a\'ersed
by very few invading' armies, could nllt bp
treated like other rivers. Its wi,lth and ""ift
current, and its to rise and fall
rapidly, called for a vast technical plan
on a scale second only to the Nornmndy
landings, Assault alHI bl'idging e:luipnH'nt
running into scores vf thousand, Ilr ton,
had to be hauled over battered roads,
strained to the utmost by the demunds (If
ammunition and and l1ulI'shalled ill
tacticaCorder on the \\'pst bank within neal'
range the enemy',; gunR, even thoug-h the'
greatest smoke screen in history and lal'ge
l;lntl
",aJd hid mllch of tht' pJ'epamtiol1 fro111 hiS
vi",\\" The storming' of the Rhin(>, imjpcd,
beeame a D-day, Valuable as they
are, tht' di\'el'siolls ereated the surprise
l'l'o"sings at Remag-en and fnr,thel' upstl'eam
on General Patton's 1'1l11\t in no ",'ay di
the tactieal ne<:t'"sity for a g-enPl'al
assl\l1lt ae!'oss the low('r
:lI01w determined that-and the \\'01111('1' i>
lhat the in all its l'olllplexit,' and
(l'l'millt!: activity, eoul,1 be llIounted so S(lon
,after the we,t bank of th" Rhine was \\on,
By the l'olHlIlander's ubility to ('oneentl'ate
force at l..,dvcn poilltl-'. nothin:..!,' l'an pl'event
H dyPl' t't'O:--:-'lllg', e'Spp('ially WhPll it it'> lununt
t'd a "'Pl-pi(,('0 nttaek and ha-.; the ('over
of ail' HtHl snpp lit.
Fil'"t then' al'(' thc SWarlllS of po\\,pl'e<l
,tO!'l1l and assault l'raft, small cnoue'h to
lop puddled where ,ill'lll'e is th(' first e"
"":'t'nt iH 1; t hl)ll ('0111(' t h(' hig'g'el' boats and
!'afb and fl'nips, and thc whole r,t'ng'e Ilf \
amphibians like tlw "duck" and "huffal,,"
<lnd "\\'('as('I." astonishing' fmlll a
\\'l'lIsian \\ orld that h<lve Hl fully proved
them",lve, in the flooded Then,
til I" Ile('ed with thi..; O\'l'r-simplitkation, the
t1oating' hridg'l's and t readwuys, <lesig-ned to
cany motor v('hides, would Iw t,h1'II\\'n
a<.'1'o"':-', followed. a:-; the bridge
Ill'ad dl'pI'j-,(,"; the enemy of obt-erved a rti!,
tin', by l'l'rhaps a Bailey ponton bIidge
for the pa""ag'e of tanks, many of \\'hich
would have been fen'ied over,
Finally, olll'e the Lit('s we"e out of urtil,
I':lngl', would ellmc the s('mi-permanent
bride'es, or wooden structures laid on
pile tre,tles--and pile-,Il'iving in the fast,
tlowing' Hhine will not be the of these
Ill<lllifoid operations, 'When the pie!'>" or a'
perillanent ,tl'uetul'e" are unda11lag-ed it
"ften I'elatively simple to, bridge the de,
lllOlished spans, as I sawin many an instance
a recent journey ucross France and
Bdgiulll to the Rhine, Since the approaches
lin eithl'I' side of the river are obviously as
illlportant us .the itself, and gen
erally involve the nlaking of I'oads across
country still soft and muddy from, flood
FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
wa;ter, the repair of, a permanent bridge,
if at all feasible, is clearly thc most desirable
procedure. .
These many URpects of river crossings,
though in the main normal bridging equip
n1l'nt is being used, have been accentuated by
the of the Rhine itRelf. At Em
llwl'ich, not far below the Bl'itiHh and Amer
ican sites, the river i;; more than
1.000 yards wide, with a flow of from six
to nine miles an haul'. The watch on the
Rhinc, indeed, takc,.; on a new meaning, for
an unseasonal touch of on the
an(l snows in the S\viss Alps whcre it rises
might brinJr an immense amount of water
down. and an extensive sYHtem of flood
warning has been evolved, including a care
ful check on the level ot' thc rivel"s main
tributalies. Here the position of the French
ArlllY alonJr the Rhine's upper reaches has
bcen a valuable of information.
The bl'idg'inJr of thc flooded l\faaH, which
be regarded thc drcss rehearsal for
the Rhine assault. provided plenty of cx
amples of what can happen, About a doz('n
cl'OssinJrs were established along the British
front on which, an enOrmous difference from
the Rhine, the great bri(lge at Nijmegen
had already been intact. The floating
bridge at Gennep, which set out to be ,XO
feet long'. measur('d mOl'e than 4,000 feet
when 'the sappel'S had completed their task,
owing to a suddcn rise in the floods-a con
dition to which the Rhine is especially sub
ject! Apart from the mud, there would be
no serious difficulty about the banks of the
Lower Rhine, which flows across more 01'
less flat countlT below the Ruhr' valley, al
though the selection of crossing points nearly
always represents a compromise between
, the conflicting needs of the engineer
and the tactician.
More than 300 miles of steel rope were
used for the British crossings on the Maas,
and much more of it will be necessary on
the Rhine, as a means of preventing Jig'hter
craft from drifting with -the current. A
good deal of boat-drill, indeed, has been
going on quietly on the Moselle, the Meuse.
and the Rhone, for the crossing of the Rhine
clearly required a higher standard of watel'
manship than anything' needed hitherto.' hi
the words of one authority, any river C1'OSS- '
ing really a mattel' of drill in the correct
handling of a vast mass of magnificent
equipment-a statement that says nothing
of the colossal task of assembly, 01' of the
many thow;an<ls of tons of stone put down
to prevent the roads from collapsing,.
But it i;; a combincd operation, a superbly
timed example of the three dimensions of
modern war, that the Rhine assault stands
out ,with the landinJrs in Normandy. Leaving
aside the vital role of ail' powel', it used
to be said that a crossing of the Rhine would
be almoot a naval o}ll'ration, and true enough
del: . III < Its of both the Royal Navy and
the Vnite( Statcs Navy are there. It was
allpr some months ago that the armies
would nl'ed a fast fel'l'Y service capable of
curl'j'ing- tanks. bulldozcrs, and lllobile guns
before even temporary _ bridges could be
thrown aCI'oss the river.
After eareful expel'iments in British rivers
most resembling the Rhine in banks
and cunent, it was decided that the most
suitable vessels--and had to be carried
lIlany miles overland on existirig tl'ailers
were the LC\l (landing craft mechanized)
and the Ley (P). deRig-nea to carry vehicles
01' pelsonnel. They form part of the large
Bl'itish contl'ibution to the evolution of
,pecial ships and craft for amphibious oper
ations which have since become standard
equipment in the American Navy, Both
these craft, as used on the Rhine, have bows
which may be lowered to for111 ramps for
loaning and unloading, and their "turn
around" is thus extremely fast, This river
assignment, however, called for an entirely
new amphibious technique. Naval crews, in
stead of operating their craft through waves
and surf, had to leal'n how to maneuver
them to and from pinpoint landing places
in strong currents runninJr across their
course, and, moreover, how to launch them
from muddy ba'nks, And the Rhine Navy
has come into existence to give its aid to
this, the greatest of all river crossings,
,-.'
:126
. The Defeat of the U-Boats
Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article in Tlw
Aeroplane (Great Britain) 16 February 1945.
NOT many months ago the ::-';azi U-boat
was onp of the main w(,(lpons of warfare upon
which Hitler counting' in onler to achieve
wOI'ld domination. \Vith elwmy
inflictillg"stagg'el'ing upon Allied ship
ping. this U-hoat nH.'lH\Cl' was tIll' tirst thing
whil'h ha,1 to h<> ovel'l'omc if tlw Unite,l l\a
\\'Pl'll to avoid dt.,fl'HI.
:-\0 A'l'l'att.'!' l'an CVt'l' Cn})ll\ out of this
wal' than the ';\"1',' of' hoI\' nA F Coastal Com
l11al1<l and neAF (',lIlatlian Ail' Forcel
Eastl'I'n Ail' C,J11111HllHI airel'aft, wol'ldng in
compll'!l' COol'l'l'alinn with the Allied nllvil's,
tackh>d the job of anti-l'-boat wada!'e. Day
alld night in all kitlfb of \\'('ath"I'. for more
than livl' ail'lTaft and \\'lll'"hips havl'
\\'ol'l("d tOg'dhl'!' and rvI,'ntll'"I,' ('al'l'il,d on
the fight to k",p the ,\tlantie ,hil'pint!;
(,pen. lIad it nol hl'l'n ["I' til<' HI!''''''',', tlwy
H('hil'Vt'd :lJ_!':llll:--t tntlll'ndou:-:
Alli<.}d HI'lUi<.\"; \\'ollid !lot today ill' in (;t'l nl:tny,
CnlIlw tIll' llll-l-lHI." ('<lnfii!'t, th(' :\'azi"
nnil,,'l"/ 11!ll'estrict('d P-hna! warfare .to he
come l'll'ertivl' fl'oll1 tIll' v"I'y outi>n'ak of tIll'
Pl'PSt'nt war, TIll' IL\' F CO<lstal Coll1mand, to
offset V-boat mcnal'l'. had only fourteen
and a half whl1n \\'(tl' lItlgan. and
most of thes" Wl<j'e pquipl'L'd with 10w-pcl'
formanc!? aircraft. The comlllon uircraft
that the l{AF had availahle for l1'" against
the V -boats was the' Avro Anson, which not
only hau an inaul'quatc range hut was capable
of cal'l'yinr: only two IOO-pound antisubmarine
hombs. With such pOOl' aircraft, and such in
adequate weapons for anti-L"-boat warfare,
Coastal Command at the heginning of the
war had little po\\'el'. Its aircraft
were forced to go on tho dl'fen;;ive. acting as
convoy escort only when Allied shipping had
come within close range of the British Isles.
The Royal Canadian Ail' Force. operating
from bases established in Canada and New
r'oundland. was also at the same time provid
'ing similar short-range escort for the Allied
convoys during the, first part of their trip
across the Atlantic. But during these early
years of the war and, in fact, as' late as the
>CPl:ing of 1943, there was a gap in the middle
of the Atlantic which had no aerial protcc
tion. And the enemy scored many successes
by assembling their U-boats into packs and
by waiting to attack Allied convoys only
when the ships had reached this mid-Atlantic
dang'pr zone. Experience later proved to the
(;ermans that most of the ship-sinkings could
he ]>1'l'vente<1lll1d the U.boat packs themselves
hroken up when convoys were sailing within
rangp of the RAF Coastal Command and
HCAF Eastl'rn Air Command aircraft. The
V-hoats, therl'fore, continued to operate in
mid-Atlantic and Coastal Command aircraft
had lit til' success against them.
\\' i t h t he fall of France, and the subsequent
X azi occupation of the ports of Brest,. St,
Xazail'l\ Lorient, La Pallice, and Bordeaux,
the V-boat menace became even more acute,
Thl' use of theso ports enabled (he German
Xavy to move its V-boats farther away from
th" coasts of Great Britain, Allied shipping
soal'f'd to a new height, and that long
rang'c ail'craft would be needed to meet this
new enemy threat immediately hecame
obvious.
The full effect of the British Commonwealth
Ail' Training Plan [BCATP}, which had been
established in Canada soon after the outbreak
of war, then began to be noticed. The RCAF
not only increased its strength on all of its
Eastern Air Command stations, but it sent
six fully' equipped Canadian squadrons to
with RAF Coastal Command in Iceland
and Great Britain. Four of these Canadian
squaul'ons were detailed for anti-U-hoat war
fare while the remaining two had been es
pecially trained to combat enemy shipping,
Thousands of other Canadian airmen,
uatl'S of the BCATP, also crossed the Atlantic
to serve voluntarily with RAF squadrons
scattered throughout the length and breadth
of the vast area covered by Coastal Com
mand. With them werit model'll long-range
aircraft, especially designed for antisub
127 FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS
marine warfare and equipped with many
devices which later proved to be decisive.
Command aircraft were at la,st able
to go olf the defensive. No longer they
. have to pl'ovide short-range convoy CSCOIts,
but now they started the offf'nsivt; job of
attual sub-hunting patrols. This ncw polie.y
brought immcdiate results with a corresJlond
ing' incrcase in the number of V-boats ,.jg+tptl
and attacked. The most illlPortant elfect t,:
thl'se sub-hunting patrols, howevcr, was to
force thc V-boats to remain submerged in
daylight and only by night could they risk
surracing to recharge batteries under thc
covel' of darkness.
Ideal weather conditions and brilliant
moonlight had to be encountered before
Coastal Command crews had any hope of
making a successful night attack against. a
surfaced U-boat. In 1942 the RAF produced
a weapon which has since revolutionized anti
submarine warfare. It was a powerful Search
light, called the Leigh Light, which was fitted
into the aircraft and which made it possible
for the Allied sub-huntcrs to illuminate any
U-boat that was caught on the ocean surface
recharging its batteries at night. V-boats
were now being attacked at night without
wal'l1ing and this caused a marked impression
on the U-boat crews which spread quickly
throughout the entire Nazi fleet. More aml
more coast aircraft were then fitted out
with the eigh Light and their crews put
throug intensive training in the use of the
searchlight weapon. The U-boats, however,
devised new tactics to meet this Leigh Light
threat, and enemy submarine crews were soon
ordered to surface and recharge batteries in
daylight. This meant they were to use
their ack-ack guns and attempt to fight it out
I with attacking aircraft. SU,ch tactics we!'c
followed for a long time and many bitter
battles were fought over the waters by
Coastal Command aircraft operating hun
dred,<;; of miles away from their nearest base.
Victory over the U-boats that remained
surfaced to fight it out was not achieved by
Coastal Command without loss, and many of
its attacking aircraft were hit by enemy fiak.
Casualties were also infiict,ed by the
Ail' Force which, using French bases, sent
long-range fighters to intercept Coastal anti
;,llb nircl'llft, operating over the Bay of
Biscny. But by November 1942 Coastal Com
lIIand hml really begun to sink U-boats.
In however, the U-boats were
,till ,inki 19 staggering amount of Allied
,hipping, un effective measures to prevent
>tleh los'C's hac! to be devised at' once. The
prohlC'1Il was finully solved in the spring of
UI.j;l, whcn the RCA F and RAF very long
1ange Consolidated closed the mid
Atlantic gap. from bases in
foundland, Icdand, arjd Great Britain, these
Libcrator;; flew such I great distances that
Allied convoys were I at last assured of
constant air protection
l
all the way across the
ocean. The closing of this mid-ocean gap,
coupl(>d with the invC'ntion of the Leigh Light
searchlight and othC'r weapons, marked the
end of the first phase in the Battle of the
Atlantic. Cboat losses during 1943 rose to
decisive figures and a la;'gc nUlnber of them
were by aircraft.
An important developlIH!nt contributing to
thebe Allie,] victories was the granting by
Portugal of the right to establish Allied air
haAes in the Azores., Canadian airmen, work
ing in dose partnership as members of RAF
crews, wel'e quickly sent out to carryon the
for more U-boats from the Azores bases.
The Germans then attempted new tactics,
and Allied convoys found themselves being
attacked by Heinkel aircraft equipped with
glider bombs. But these ('nC'my airplanes
proved to be no match for the escorting
Coastal Command aircraft. One RAF
Liberator, for example, found six Heinkels
attacking a convoy. Despite tha numerical
odds the Liberator crew, single-handed, shot,
down two of the enemy aircraft and chased
the other four away. Saving its remaining
strength for the AJlied D-day, tfe German
Navy then decided" to concentrate its U-boats
in southern Norway and western France.
Enemy submal:ine crews were put through
intensive, antiaircraft training in the Baltic
while German scientists devised new methods
of U-boat warfare.
One of the most important developments of ,
128
MILITARY REVIEW
1944 for the enemy ,vas tIl(> equipping of its
U-boats with a device called the SchnorkPl,
which made it possible for a Rubmal'ine to
l;emain submerged whil>.;t l'I1arging its bat
teries. The Schnol'kel b a retractable
air-intake tuhe that can he mise,l and lowered
from inside the underwatl'r craft. It ('nahles
a U-boat to draw in air for its when
the boat is Whl'n ill the
Schnorkcl pipe pro,i<'cts above the watet' and
is a little 10\\'l'r than till' pcrbl'ope. SevcI:aJ
V-hoats had bl'en cqul)lpl'd with tIll' Sehnol'
kcl when Ddar l'Hllle hut, dl'spite this fitting.
V(.\l'y fl'\V enclny ,vel'C ab\t\ tu l\ntCl'
the English Channel. ttll,l tlwy wel'l' una!>ll' to
interfl'!'e with the Allied invasion.
Capture of till' elll'lllY snbllwrine base at
Bre>,l, and tIll' L'neil'{'lt'llIl'nt of tIlt' ,)ther Bay
of Biscay jHll'ts hy tIll' AlIil'd ttn,l thl'
F'FI [F!'('neh Forec, of thl' IlItl'riol']. latl'\'
brought ahout a Illajor and decbivl' defL'al
fol' till' (;el'lllan :\,wy. Dl'privL'd of' the' USc
of these Freneh ports, C-ho:lt had no
altl'l'ltativl' hut to try ant! ,'seape.
Coastal Command aircraft, continuing' to:
work in the closest cooperation with the AIJied'
navies. immediately placed a day-and-night
aeriall blockade over the Bay of Biscay and
the western French coast, And in
during August 1944. many more bitter 'battles
Wl're staged between aircraft and submarine.
:-.'0 longer did Coastal Command airmen have
to fly ebsolete aircraft with inadequate equip
ment. Now there was a surplus of highly
trained air crews and to counteract the U-'
boat menace they had numerous squadrons of
Liberators. Short Sundel'lands. Consolidated
Catalinas, Handley Page Halifaxes, Vicker8
Armstrongs Welling-tons. Cansos. rocket
lil'ing Bristol Beaufightel'R, and even six
pounder cannoll-firing DH :\!osquitoes. Allied
(,mvoys Wl'r,' being cscorted all the way
the Atlantic by very long-range air
(,,,,1ft. Dl'pth charges. bombs. rockets. anu
cannons could all be effectively used ag'riinst
'llhnHll'ines sighted in daylight and V-boats
wcre eonstantly being hunted down and at
tacke'd at night with the usc' of Leigh LiJorht
"'a,'chliJorhts and flares.
Confidence Bl'eeds Initiative
}[ajor H. ;\1. Tod,l in (Great Britain).
Rt'printed from All COSlIlIl"il' (Ein).
THE :=:PIl'It of is a SI It'
'j/{(t 1/<11/ to th,' alld holding'
initiative ill' battle. "YlIll 11111,,1 w n that
fire-fight." But to win that tight. tn to
win. and hold. and al\\'a," to he seeki ",
the "first movc"-tht' power to "call the
tune"-and the feelin!!; of OVt'!'
one's en"llIy-all of whith are integTal parb
of what we eall initiative-the .ti,.", requisite
is consciou,; skill with the personal weapon,
The maehinc-gu1l11l'r who has fired his
gun so much that he <Ioes it "with his eyes
shut" acquires a feeling' of invincibility
which ,he expresses by seeking' The
initiative, in other words.
The bombel' who can thro IilIs bomb
on to a spot one yard squ re eve,'y time
is proud of it and looks for something more
difficult to hit. The initiati e.
_",i_,____
nd the sniper who can, and knows he
can (and I have seen it kill an
enemy sniper at 800 if he (the enelllY)
moves hiB head, looks for other heads to
shoot at. The initiative. once more.
To talk of initiative to troops who know
they are not trained is, at best, a waste of
time and, at worst, "propaganda" which
deceives nobody. In war, the initiative will
always lie (a) with the side whose men
think they are better trained and better
armed; (b) with the side whosc men are
expert with their individual weapons and
know it; and (c) with the side whose officers.
knowing (a) and (h). are continually seeking
it and who, by their own attitude, -commu
nicate to their men a restlessness which
will not let them "take. root" with any mental,
" emnf"'_ _.
c
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