CONTROL POWER FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS.

OPLE On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor (Ople) for unfair labor practices and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Subsequently, respondent, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondents establishment. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory arbitration pursuant to the provisions on strikes of the Labor Code this is to avoid adverse effects to the national interest. ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power. HELD: FTWU failed to make out a case of undue delegation. The President shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: The President shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. However, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of workers to self-organization,collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. At this stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application.

APPOINTING POWER SARMIENTO VS. MISON Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performingthe functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission onAppointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers whom the president shall appoint. (1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution, (2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, (3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and (4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups are the present bone of contention. Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should beappointed by the president with or without the consent/confirmation of the CA Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of appointmentwith hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation the appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required. The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the constitutional authority of the President.

Bautista vs. Salonga On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December of the same year, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring the decision in the Mison case, averred that Bautista cannot take her seatw/o their confirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec, filed with the CoA communications about Bautistas appointment on 14 Jan 1989. Bautista refused to be placed under the CoAs review hence she filed a petition before the SC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO 163-A stating that since CoA refused Bautistas appointment, Bautista should be removed. EO 163-A provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Bautistas appointment is subject to CoAs confirmation. HELD: Since the position of Chairman of the CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the CoA it follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or participation of the CoA. To be more precise, theappointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in thePresident with the consent of the CoA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of governmentwhom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint. And Sec 2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the CHR. Because of the fact that the president submitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 the appointment of Bautista, the CoA argued that thepresident though she has the sole prerogative to make CHR appointments may from time to time ask confirmation with the CoA. This is untenable according to the SC. The Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution cannot be sustained. Further, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. There can be no ad interim appointments in the CHR for the appointment thereto is not subject to CoAs confirmation. Appointments to the CHr is always permanent in nature. The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

AYTONA VS. CASTILLO