Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Pro se
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Plaintiff Pro Se Dr. Orly Taitz (hereinafter "'faitz") hereby moves this Court
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to enter a stay/preliminary injunction to assessment of the penalty tax under PPACA against her. Plaintiffs asserts that such penalty tax violates Plaintiff
Tait.z v Sebelius et al. Motlon for Stay/ Preliminary Injunction
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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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DEMANDED
No.: 3:12-cv-03251-P
VIOLATION OF 14TH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTIONI RIGHTS, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ARTICLE 2 SEC 1 OF COSTITUTIO INJTINCTIVE RE,LIE,F, STAY DECLARATORY RELIEF
RICO, PREDECATE CRIMES : FRAUD, AIDING AND ABETTING FORGERY AND UTTERING OF FORGED DOCUMENTS TO COMMIT ELECTIONS FRAI'D 7TH AMENDMENT JURY
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Dr. Orly Taitz, ESQ 29839 Santa Margarita, ste 100 Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688 Ph. 949-683-5411 fax 949-766-76A3
constitutional and statutory rights for Free Exercise of Religion, Free Speech, Due
submits an accompanying brief and a proposed order.
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Respectfully submitted,
August 28,2A12
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process rights, and rights provided by RFRA. In support of this motion Plaintiff
Pro se plaintiff
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IN THE US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHBRN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
DR. ORLY TAITZ, ESQ
Case
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Plaintiff,
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DEMANDED
No.: 3:12-cv-03251-P
VIOLATION OF 14TH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ARTICLE 2 SEC 1 OF COSTITUTI INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, STAY DE,CLARATORY RELIEF
RICO, PREDECATE CRIMES : FRAUD, AIDING AND ABETTING FORGERY AND UTTERING OF FORGED DOCUMENTS TO COMMIT ELECTIONS FRAIJD 7TH AMENDMENT JIJRY
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fnjunction
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Dr. Orly Taitz, ESQ 29839 Santa Margarita, ste 100 Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92GBB Ph. 949-683-54 1 1 fax 949-7 66-7 603
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Table of
Authorities.
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A) Violation of RJRA..
2. Irreparable J.
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Harm
Interest.
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INTRODTiCTION
The case Taitz v Sebelius et al u'as filed in The United States District Court
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ruling in
Human Servi
Healtlr and Human Services. et al. 567 U.S. 2012 (docket 1l-393,11-j98.
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Federation
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Commerce clause, it is valid under taxing powers of Congress. The cornplaint is incorporated herein by reference. The complaint
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2)
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1. H. R. 3590 "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act" (PPACA) Section l4l I (5XA) Exemptions from individual requirements state.
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REQTJIREMENTS
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In the case of an individual w,ho is seeking an exemption certificate under section 1311(dX4XH) from an-y requirement or penalty imposed by section
5000A, the following infbrmation:
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RESPONSIBILITY
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As such according to PPACA 26U.S.C. $$ 5000A{dXi) and (ii) members of a religious sect or division who object to insurance or acceptance of insurance are
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Party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: 1) a likelihood of success on the rnerits, 2\ a thread of irreparable harm, 3) rvhich outweighs any
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protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain in the law at issue discriminates
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undertaken tbr religious reasons." (Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 53?}. The court continues stating that when the "object of a larv is to infringe upon or restrict practices
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Hialeah, 508 U.S. 52A,547 (1993) the court established that "at minimum, the
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harm to the non-moving party, 4) and that the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest (See Awad v Ziriax, o7A F.3d 1111, 1125 110ft Cir.
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exetnpt from the individual mandate to purchase such insurance or pay a he{ty penalty tax.
it is invalid unless
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sect of
of an exempt religious
Plaintiffs sought an injunction tiom providing coverage under PPACP and tiorn
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against PPACA on the grounds that it violates her First Amendment right of free exercise of religion, violates First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth
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religions by exempting them from payment of the Healthcare tax. "The Free
Exercise of Religion Clause protects religious observers against unequal
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treatment, and inequality results rvhen a legislature decides that the governmental
interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct
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additional tax due to the fact that they are members of a certain religion. In Addition to violation of the Free Exercise of Religion clause, PPACA violates the Establishment clause, as it encourages individuals to adhere to certain
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In addition to violation of First, Fifth and Fourteens Amendments, PPACA violates RFRA which prohibits government from creating larvs that will place
substantial burdens a person's free exercise of their religion. RFRA provides:
Ta:tz r-r Sebeiius e: ar. MoEicn fox SLay/ P::eiirninary Tnj-':incLlon
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discrimination between citizens is akin to an establishment of religion. Additionally it shows clear discrimination and lack of equal protection in
b)Violation of RFRA
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penalized she would have to convert to another religion, such as Islam. Such
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any penalt.v tax under PPACP due to the Plaintiffs aversion against abortifacient
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(a) In general
religion even if the burden results from the rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
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Espiria 546 US at 424 n.1., Employment Division v Smith, 494 U.s. 872 (1990).
ln United States v Hardeman. 297 F.3d 1127 (10u' Cir. 2A02) the court
established that to
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justify
a substantial burden on
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religion, the government must show that its application of the act furthers "interests of the highest order." While the government may have interest of promoting the public health, it damages the vital interests of the significant amount of the US citizens. "Law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of
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Additionally, the whole PPACA r,vas turned into a sham w'hen 190 million people were exempt. With so rnaly exemptions predicted cost of Health insurance the is expected to rise and not to go down, u'hich defeats the whole purpose of
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The new tax exempts over 190 million from paying the tax rvithout to penalizing them. lt means that only one third of the population will be subject
when larv penalty tax, which represents a substantial burden. A burden is created
Ta.itz v Sebel:us ec ai. i'loticn icr S-tay/ Preij-r*j-nary ililuictioi:
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the highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Jnc v Citlr of Hialeah,
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Sherbert r,. Vemer,374 U.S. 404 (1963), PPACA imposes a clear burden as in
order to receive governmental benefits (exemption from paying a tax) Plaintiff must change the religion.
The Supreme Court has found "a fme imposed against appellant" is a quintessential burdeil. Shebert,374 U.S. 403-04. Such burden is envisioned in
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PPACA.
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ln addition, Defendants fail to use the least restrictive means because the
could allou, for free portability of insurance across the state lines or health care tort reform, r,vhich would make Health Insurance more affordable without discrimination based on religion. Instead, by creating PPACA, Defendants used their ovrn liberate discretion to promote a particular religion such as Muslim religion on all Americans by exempting them from penalty tax.
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compelling goveflrmental interest." RFRA, with "the strict scrutiny test it known to constitutional larv." City af Boerne v. Flores,521 U.S. 5A7,534 {1997). A compelling interest is an interest of "the highest order," Lukttrni,508 U.S. at
546, andis implicated only by "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests," Thomas v. Collins,323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). Defendants cannot
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"in propose such an interest "in the abstract," but must show a compelling interest the circumstances of this case" by looking at the particular "aspect" of the interest
as "addressed by the larv at issue." Cql. Democratic Party v-Jones,530
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adopted," OCentro Espirita,546 U.S. at 430, imposes "the ntost demanding test
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Additionally PPACA cannot lvithstand the strict scrutin,v test and cannot show a compelling governmental interest in dividing citizens based on religion. Defendants cannot establish that their coercion of Plaintiffs is "in furtherance of a
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government could create exemptions on other basis then religion. The govemment
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U.S' 567,
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one precepts of
particular claintant"); see also Lukurml, 508 U.S. at 546 (rejecting the assertion
that protecting public health was a compelling interest "in the context of these
solution." Brotyn v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,2738 (June 27, 2011). If Defendants' "evidence is not compelling," they fail their burden. Id.
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hefty tax on Christians and Jer,vs, while exempting Muslirns, would serve a
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a correlation but a "caus[al]" nexus between their Mandate and the grave interest it supposedly serves. Id. The governmeut "bears the risk of uncertainty . . . ambiguous proof u,ill not suffice." Id.
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anything, it u,ould make it more expensive tbr ones who pay fbr it, as it would
create an excuse for others not to pay for the health care, but use the benefits. The
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only interest that would be served, would be tuming citizens towards conversion
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463, it noted:
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"Courts have routinely rejected religious exemptions from laws regulating controlled substances employing tests similar to that required by RFRA. See
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United States v. Greene, 8gZF.2d 453, 456-57 (6th Cir.l989); Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 , 146l-62 (D.C.Cir.1989); Olsen v. Iowa,808 F.2d 652, 653 (8th
Tail-z .,. Sebeiius et- ai. i{atj-cn for Siayl Prelininar}' ln-uxc-L:cn
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If
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497
v. smith,494 U.S. 872.905, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d876 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Even after enactment of R-FRA, religious exemptions tiom or
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defenses to the CSA have not fared r,vell. See [Jnited States v. Brown, 72Y.3d 134, 1gg5
175 F.Supp.2d,1123,
sacramental use of peyote was granted by Congress afte, enactment of RFRA, suggesting Congressional doubts that RFRA was sufficient (alone) to grant an
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In O Centro Espirita 546 tl.S. 423 425the Supreme Court found no compelling goveffrmental interest even rvhen regulation of potent hallucinogenic drugs w'as
concerned.
.'At minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the larv
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prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons." Iuk lrn l- 508 ll.S. at 532. When the "object of a larn, is to infiinge upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation, the larv is not neutral, and
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unless
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"A law
examining its text and operation. Id. at 534-35' ..The Free Exercise Clause protects religious observers aBainst uneQual
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it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrorn'ly tailored to by advance that interest.,, Id. at 533. The object of a law can be determined
facialneutr@
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it is invalid
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between religions Since the individual mandate flagrantly discriminates and it violates the allowing exemptions to some religions, it is unconstitutional
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Frerrr'i:a:y
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States v. A,liddleton, 690 F.2d 82A, 824 ( I lth Cir. 1 982), see also Employment Div.
Free Exercise of Religion, due Process and Establishment clause based on Lukumi
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As the individual mandate is not generally applied and is not lleutral in relation
to religion, it is vierved under the strict scrutiny test and
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preference."' Colo. Christisn U. v. llteuu-er, 534 F.3d 1245, 1257 (1Oth Cir. 2008);
(6th Cir. 1990) (holding that section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act,
w'hich exempts from mandatory union membership any employee u,'ho "is a
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fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections
to joining or financially supporting labor organizations," is unconstitutional
because
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govefirment inquiry into religious tenets\. cert. denied,505 U.S. 1218 (1992).
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tinder Wilsbn v NLRB the individual mandate is unconstitutional under the l, 5th, l4th Amendments.
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"indoctrinate": the governance was tied to particular church atfiliation; and similar
Individual mandate under PPACA is unconstitutional under Weaver, as it violates lst, 5th and 14th Amendments, specifically freedom of religion clause,
Establishment Clause, due Process Clause and Equal protection Clause.
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religions policy that is very similar to the Mandate. The discrimination among
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analysis.
The First Amendment protects the right to "decide rvhat not to say." Hurley v.
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(internal quotation marks omiued). Thus, "[l]aws that compel speakers to utter or
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PPACA tax. This represents a violation of both the First Amendment Freedom of
speech clause as well as the First Amendment Freedom of Religion clause.
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Irreparable Harm
In Kikumura v Hurley,242 F.3d 950, 963
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decided that the potential violation of Plaintiff s constitutional and RFRA rights threatens irreparable harm. In the case at hand PPACA provision violates both
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of exercising the religion protected by the First Amendment and places enormous Plaintiff would suffer imminent irreparable harm.
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The First Amendment in its pertinent part states that"Congress shall mcke
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United States, Congress passed the law 25 USC $50004 "Patient Protection and Affordable Act" (PPACA) that directly interferes with the freedom of religion. Exemption for religious purpose under PPACA segregates citizens just at it previously segregated them by race and gender which was found unconstitutional by earlier decisions by US Supreme Court (see Brown v. Boald of Edacation
Taiiz v Sebel:-us et aI . l:Io--io;: f;: Stay/ Prelimina::y In;uncr!':n
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(101r'
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the
Irish-Am. Gay,Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,573 (1995)
law which shall abridge the privileges or irnmunities of citizens of the United States. " By providing religion exernption under PPACA, the State enforces the
the Plaintiff, rvhile providing privileges others.
law that leads to segregation, rvill infringe on the rights of the US citizens, such
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"enforcing regulations that Congress found it in the public interest to direct that
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2008). Such potential interest cannot be compared with greatharm that Plaintiffs
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RFRA and therefore cannot serve public interest. Thus, there can be no harm to
non-moving party.
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w,il| interfere rvith free of exercise of religion since PPACA will place enorrnous
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burden on members of some religions like Christians and Jews r,vhile relieve the burden from members of other regions like Muslims by exempting them from
Ta::z v Sel:el-ius et
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Equal Protection Claus it is directly stated:"lt{o State shatt make or enforce ony
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paying additional tax and providing free coverage for their medical expenses. This
interest. Therefore, absence of preliminary injunction will not only not serve the
public interest but indeed will damage rights of US citizens and provide great opportunity for discrimination.
WHEREFORE,
Respectfully submitted,
August 28,2A12
Plaintiff Pro
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application
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for stayl