Jennifer Goossen On Blackburns All Souls Night; a Response to Derek Parfit

This paper will address Simon Blackburns response, All Souls Night, to Derek Parfits criticisms of Quasi-Realism in Parfits book, On What Matters. (Parfit) First, I will give some relevant information concerning Blackburns view. Then, I will address the first three sections of Blackburns response, in turn. When I discuss the third section, I will lay out four criticisms that Blackburn gives to Parfits work in OWM. Finally, I will give a brief response to Blackburns response to Parfit. I will now briefly outline the quasi-realist metaethical view. Quasi-realists, for the most part1, say that normative expressions are not truth-valued propositions. Rather, they are emotive projections regarding ones internal opinions about the rightness or wrongness of some agent or action. For Blackburn and those who share his view, normative claims are a function of judging, evaluating, blaming, etc.. However, unlike a metaethical emotivist, a quasi-realist seeks to earn the right to talk and think about normative statements as if there were a fact of the matter concerning norms. In short, they predicate their view on a subjectivist account, but proceed as if they were objectivists. Blackburn begins his response to Parfit by asserting that the quasi-realist view of what occurs when we make normative claims is analogous to what occurs when we make wagers in single-case probabilities, referencing Ramseys claims on probabilities. (Ramsey) Blackburn means to clarify the quasi-realist understanding of what normative claims amount to in order to distinguish it from objectivism and earn it rights that emotivism is accused of lacking. This is likely as a response to Parfits explanation of it in OWM, which he finds to be obfuscated. Thro

In doing research, I saw a suggestion that Quasi-Realism could possibly be used as a method of justification for an error-theorist. (Joyce)

Blackburn devotes section I explaining the mechanics of single-case probabilities. Blackburn explains the difference between a probability in the case of frequencies and a single-case probability. Frequencies, Blackburn writes, require sets of events, and putting singular events into sets does not help unless we have a principle for selecting the right sets. I think he means to say that in cases of hypothetical conjecture, such as, the probability of a child being born with blonde hair, it is possible to assert a probability ratio with a truth value. There is no actual fact of the matter which would negate the truth of the probability claim other than the compilation of hypothetical conditions based on previously observed data. Such a probability is made true or false in virtue of the accuracy of the data which produces it. Conversely, Blackburn asserts a single-case probability is dependent upon an actual fact, and is afforded no leeway if its to be considered as a truth value proposition; the only true probability claims in single-case events would be those that accurately claimed 0% or 100% probability. So, for example, a bookie determining odds for a horse race is not an action expressing a belief in a truth claim, (say, that there are 600-1 odds that a particular horse will win.) It is nonsense to say, the horse won, 60%. Rather, the bookie is expressing a measurement of his confidence that the horse will win, and a measurement of his confidence in his own ability to predict the outcome of the race. On the other hand, a less skilled bookie may want to predict the same outcome, but is only willing to offer 6:1 odds because he understands that it is very possible that his standpoint could use improvement in the form of further experience. Another way of explaining this can be found in Ramseys Truth and Probability. (Ramsey)Ramsey describes a probability of an outcome as a measurement in which we can express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it. He means that probabilities measure strength of belief, and that measurement is assessed by the agents willingness to act because of her belief. He writes that betting dispositions are the kind of measurement of belief with which probability is a measurement of belief qua basis of action. (Ramsey)

Blackburn attempts to present an analytic defense, as well. To demonstrate that the judgment of a probability is a measurement of a degree of confidence rather than a truth claim, Blackburn points out that there is no semantic link between the evidence (ex: young horse, good jockey) used to determine the chances of some event and the meaning of the claim likely to win. He insists that the true meaning of the term Ill give you 6:1 odds is I have about 60% confidence in my ability to predict this event. In section II, using the Ramsey-probability parallel, Blackburn points out some of what he supposes are the flaws in Parfits arguments against Quasi-Realism. He firsts replies to Parfits contention that Blackburn cant give an account of what it means to be able to be mistaken about a claim that doesnt have a truth value. Blackburn uses the parallel of the more experienced bookie and the less experienced bookie. He means that, while neither bookie is making an actual truth claim when he sets his odds, the inferior bookie might feel that his odds might be mistaken in the sense that, if he had (an improved) standpoint, his betting disposition would be less likely to be mistaken. He admits that there is a clearer upshot in the betting case; to win. He accounts for what the upshot of a normative claim might be by saying, In ethics we have our standards, and scramble about for grounds as best we can. He then addresses Parfits contention Blackburn is not entitled to use the term mistaken concerning normative views that are on the quasi-realist account non-truth valued, because what it would be for our present beliefs to be mistaken is if they were false. First, Blackburn says that there is nothing wrong with the homophonic answer, it is true that the horses chance of winning is high if and only if his chances are high, aside from its being unhelpful. Then he attempts to clarify his position by saying that one might be mistaken in the sense that he was falling short of his own

standards, or even by standards of which he is as yet unaware but which he should be grateful to learn. 2 He also answers Parfits claim that Blackburns view is insufficient to answer metaethical questions. Rather than asking if it is really true that certain acts are right or wrong, Parfit wants Blackburn to tell him what it would mean for an act to be right or wrong. To respond, first Blackburn denies that he has ever said that desires or other conative states are true or false, Rather, Blackburn says that moral commitments are practical commitments that are voiced in sentences that take on the clothing of expressions of belief. I think that Blackburn most cogently states his position when he draws a parallel between his view of moral judgments as a quasi-realist and Kants view on aesthetics on The Critique of Judgment. (Kant) Distinguishing himself from expressivists who say that beliefs are also desires, Blackburn writes, (desires) are practical commitments that naturally take on the clothing of expressions of belief. He says that, Perhaps the combination of seeing a commitment in terms of mental states with a practical direction of fit, and seeing it in terms of a propositional reflection or expression of such a state, is a problem that is parallel to Kants antinomy of taste. So, in the same way that an appraisal of beauty is subjective and emotive in Kants estimation, so is a moral appraisal for Blackburn. We feel moved and inspired by some work of art, and we tend to say, that is beautiful. Yet, it seems true that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Our experiences, psychology, emotions and rational faculties gift us with our aesthetic appraisal. At the same time, Kant believes that there are such things as bad tastes and good tastes which are wrought through an interplay of the totality of human faculties, and such tastes can be improved via improved perspective, as in the case of an amateur and an art critic. So, a normative judgment is an expression of ones subjective desires; a person desires justice, and therefore believes that justice should be carried out. This belief is not a

(Blackburn)Page 6

proposition about an objective fact per se, but it is still appropriate within common uses of language to talk about it as if it were one. To further answer the charge that Quasi-Realism lacks a metaethical theory for answering questions about what would it be for a moral judgment to be correct or mistaken, Blackburn flips the script. He says that, in attempting to answer the same question, Parfits descriptions are no richer or more robust than mine. He says that Parfits answers are in synonymous terms and are therefore trivial. He specifically refers to Parfits definition that what it would be for something to be wrong is that there are decisive reasons against doing it, and so forth. In section III, Blackburn launches into four specific criticisms against Parfits work in general. Namely, he criticizes Parfits division of reasons into the subgroups of object-given and subject-given or state-given. His second objection is that Parfit is unduly restrictive when addressing Humean ethics. He points out in his third objection that Parfit should allow him (Blackburn) and Hume to draw a distinction between normative and descriptive issues. His last objection is more systemic and all encompassing than the first three; Blackburn points out that many views necessarily disallow analysis of any ethical issues whatsoever. I will now lay out Blackburns first objection. Blackburn describes Parfits division of the realm of reasons as bizarre and bipolar. As Parfit tells it, there are two types of reason, object-given, which would function as reasons independent of any subjective desire, and subject-given or stategiven reasons, which are rendered from a persons subjective desires and opinions. Blackburn says that doing this immediately disallows Parfits understanding the structure of Humean theories. Humes theories all rest on his assertion that there is a necessary division between matters of fact (contingent facts) and relations of ideas (necessary truths.) Necessarily, no valid inference exists among matters of fact; that we infer from them is a habit (in the case of predicting future matters of fact), or

sentiment (in the case of moral positions.) Hume said that if reasons were to engage the will, they must have the motivation of sentiment. Therefore, the way we react to matters of fact is also a function of our concerns (passions, desires, inclinations). Those concerns are the structure by which we organize our priorities or reasons. Blackburn then rejects Kantian ethics, which are opposed to Humean ethics, stating that Kant was in error to try to separate desire from reason. Specifically, he objects to the idea of object-given reasons. He argues for this position by giving an example of two people (himself and a matador) with differing feelings due to differing capacities who respond in very different ways to the same external object; a bull. His prominent point is that Parfits assertion that there are such things as objective reasons, which would apply across the board to beings who can perceive, infer, and calculate, is useful only as a tool of persuasion in moral discussions. He says that the assertion is false when used to argue that we all share some objective reasons. His third objection seems to be a specified example of his second objection. Specifically, Blackburn argues that Parfit shouldnt disallow Hume or himself from distinguishing normative and descriptive issues. He says that Parfit completely misunderstands Hume, and offers as evidence Parfits continual assertion that Hume is not entitled to talk about policies, precautions, demands, rules and other elements of practical life as being reasonable or not. In OWM, Parfit takes issue with Blackburns claim that there are object-given reasons. There are some reasons that everyone must acknowledge, whatever their sympathies and inclinations. Blackburn, of course, denies that such reasons are objective realities somewhere out in existence. Instead, he draws attention to the ambiguous nature of his statement about everyones reasons. For example, he wants to say, there is decisive reason to stop beating your wife to a wife beater. The first sense of that claim about reasons it is a moral remark, purveyed in the service of the practice he refers to as moralizing.3 The second sense of the claim about

I assume he means moralizing in the common sense; preaching, trying to convince/convict, appealing to morality in an argument for or against something, etc.

reasons is to view it as a descriptive remark, entailing that people must of physical or metaphysical necessity acknowledge some particular behaviors or concerns. He then says there would be an entailment that those people do acknowledge them, independent of their sympathies and inclination. He points out that, clearly, people sometimes act against moral reason in favor of their inclinations, and therefore it cannot be true that the statement about reasons is a truth-valued, descriptive claim. I will now address the last of Blackburns four objecting points. Parfit criticized Blackburns epistemic view, saying his theory was too weak, and that it allowed for conflicting beliefs to both be sound, as well as spurious claims to have knowledge due merely to internal confidence. Blackburn says that Parfit has misrepresented his view. I will begin by giving a quote from Blackburn, and then Ill flesh out that aforementioned view. Blackburn writes, But of course I never dreamed of saying that when we talk of knowledge it follows that we are right to do so. For pragmatists and expressivists, it is the human practice that is the explanandum, and our practice with epistemic vocabulary is, I hold, insightfully described by seeing a claim to knowledge or the allowing of such a claim, as an evaluation of the remoteness of the possibility that improved positions should undermine confidence - with the consequent removal of motivation to further investigation and inquiry. So, Blackburn first tells us that, on his account, a person does not have an automatic claim to knowledge based on his confidence; he must be correct when he claims to know things. I think what he is saying is that we can say we know some moral truth when were pretty sure we know it, and we dont feel motivated to continue deliberating about it. Actually, he stretches the scope of his theory to include all epistemological pursuit. He explains that when someones claim to know is false, namely, in the case that the matter is still an open question, we refuse to allow their claim. He asserts that this theory is preferable to the analytic

pursuit of a solution to the Gettier problems, which he summarily dismisses as a wasted trip down a hallway to nowhere4. I will now give a response to Blackburns points that have been covered in this paper. I found Blackburns All Souls Night to be nearly incomprehensible until I did some background research and read the paper several times. In doing this, I really stretched my assumptions and understanding concerning expressivism and subjectivism in general. Before my inquiry, the idea of relative morality, even more, epistemological relativity, seemed absurd to the point of ridiculousness. When Id hear from relativists, Id think, Of course theres a fact of the matter, and its not because I want there to be one! All Souls Night has altered my view. I think that Blackburn does an excellent job shifting the paradigm of thought away from a strictly analytical and objective account of reasons. Overall, has succeeded in providing me an intuitively satisfying account of Quasi-Realism. Blackburn drew on commonly used yet less lauded senses of what we mean when we say weve done a thing such as make a moral claim. Through his analogy of Quasi-Realism to Ramseys view on probabilities, Blackburn showed that there are cases in which people give accounts of their internal states (namely, their confidence in their ability to predict some outcome) using language that sounds as if they are making a truth-valued claim. Having established that precedent, Blackburn goes on to explicate the parallel by responding directly to some of Parfits criticisms. Presenting quotes from OWM, Blackburn demonstrates that the quasi-realist view can be substituted with the probabilities view in the very same wording, and have the quotes remain coherent, thereby strengthening his theory that the two are analogous. More, once the substitution is made, Blackburns view is clarified because it allows us to examine his standpoints from precisely the standpoint he desires. Having thouroughly argued for his view, Blackburn goes on to explain the error in Parfits criticism of his view. Citing Humean and Kantian

Oop, sorry Bruce. Guess your jobs dumb.

ethics, he argues that Parfit is wrong to assert that expressivists arent entitled to normative language talking about reasons, and points out that Parfits own account of reasons is trivial and uninformative. Wielding these tools, Parfit convinces me that there is a very strong case affirming the expressivist, Quasi-Realist view. However, even if he has made a good case for himself, he hasnt done much to show that his view should be accepted exclusively. Even if it is true that our normative statements are efficacies for expression of our internal states, it could still be the case that those expressive normative statements are, in fact, consistent with some objective normative truth. Unless I am completely misunderstanding him, Blackburn actually offers us the following absurd claim as an argument against moral objectivism: that if there are objective reasons for some act or belief, and we recognize those reasons, we must necessarily act on them. He substantiates this argument by highlighting the Kantian belief that acknowledgement of a reason will always include motivation. And, he asserts, any demonstrable, objective moral truth would need to be either metaphysically or physically necessary, and would therefore be immediately evident once it was discovered. Therefore, it would be necessary to act morally, and, he adds, we all know that doesnt always happen. I dont see how hes justified asserting that. It seems to me that, even if the Kantians were correct about motivation, it isnt necessary that a person act on that motivation. I want to say that in the same way a person who is not very invested or interested rational pursuit might fail to recognize a necessary truth upon first inspection, so could it be the case the objective moral truths are sometimes concealed to those who dont really care about love (i.e., moral behavior that is beneficial.) Further, although his analogy to probabilities did much to clarify and bolster his position, Im not so sure it excluded the possibility that normative statements are subjective expressions which in accordance with objective moral truths. I wonder why he thinks that probability estimates cant be both

a measurement of confidence and a truth-valued statement. I think this is metaphysically misleading. Say there is some single-case event; whether I will make it to class on time. Someone might give 5:1 odds that I wont, and that person could be saying, It is true that, were Jennifer abstracted to a woman in very similar circumstances and with a similar track record of promptness, there is a 5:1 chance shell be late. These are the odds that shell be late. I understand that Blackburn worries about how we would abstract that general case from the real one; where would the line be drawn on comparative categories, etc. But, its still true that we really want to say that we can say that were talking about a fact of the matter when we give odds, even if that isnt all were talking about. So, to summarize, Blackburn gives a response that should cause us all to pause and reconsider his position. While it seemed that Parfit had demonstrated that the Quasi-Realist position was absurd, Blackburn shows us that Parfit either didnt fully grasp the Quasi-Realist view, or he is guilty of formulating a straw man argument against it. By using allegory, parallel, and analytical treatment, Blackburn vindicates the emotivist. However, I believe that while he has shown that his view is necessary for any metaethical theory, he has not proven that it is sufficient.