Abandonment of Service

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ABANDONMENT OF SERVICE
Proof of abandonment of service Abandonment of service is question of intention, Intention of abandonment has to be gathered from conduct of employee Documents produced clearly show that employee had exhibited intention not to resume duty despite sufficient opportunity given to him Employer has proved voluntary abandonment of service by referring to voluminous records No relief can be claimed by employee. Held: Under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished his services is not easily drawn unless the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon his service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention and normally such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence under law. In the present case the intention of the petitioner to abandon his services has been clearly proved by voluminous documents produced by the Spices Board. The Apex Court has held that whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case. In the present case the abandonment of service is total and complete. The employee has given up his duties and has exhibited an intention not to resume the same, in spite of sufficient opportunities given to him by the employer. Therefore, it can be easily construed that there has been voluntary abandonment of service. (Para 10) Sankaranarayanan, P.L, Ernakulain v. Spices Board, Kochi. [1999] Settlement Bi partite settlement (dated September 17, 1984) governing service conditions of Bank employees Clause XVI Absence of workman from duty for more than 90 days Duty of employer to serve notice to report for duty within 30 days On his failure to comply, he will be deemed to have abandoned service Essence of clause is absence of intention of workman to join duty. This writ petition by the management of the State Bank of India challenged an award of the Industrial Tribunal held by which the Tribunal held refusal by the Bank to give employment to the respondent workman, a clerk in the Bank at its Phulbani Branch, on account of his absence from duty beyond 90 days amounted to illegal termination of his service and therefore directed his reinstatement with full backwages. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's impugned award as regards reinstatement but allowed in part the writ petition as regards payment of backwages. Held: The High Court observed that the essence of clause XVI of the Bi partite settlement, on which the bank purported to take its impugned action, was the absence of intention of the workman to join duty. (Para 5) The High Court found that the conclusion of the Tribunal that the workman had no intention of abandoning his services was essentially factual. It could not be treated as baseless. This finding of fact was not to be interfered within a writ petition. (Para 6) As regards backwages the High Court observed the dispute was raised after substantial length of time. Hence backwages were held payable only from January 1, 1990 and not from July 27, 1985 as directed
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by the Tribunal. (Para 7) Management, State Bank of India, Phulbani Branch v. Bipin Bihari Patnaik. [1999] Voluntary abandonment of service Petitioner not shown to have tendered resignation His leave applications not considered Nor medical certificates submitted by him No decision thereon was taken by competent officer Held impugned order of termination not bona fide State Bank of India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 Rules 20 and 92. Saibabu S. v. State Bank of India. [1999] When worker resorts to strike, he does not abandon his job I.D. Act has not provided period of illegal strike would be treated as period of unauthorised absence or relationship of employer employee would cease Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Sections 22 and 26. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam Sanyukt Karmachari Sangh v. U.P. State Bridge Corporation, Lucknow. [1999]
ABSENCE FROM DUTY

Unauthorised absence Bank employee absenting Bipartite settlement Clause 17(a) is an enabling clause to send notice to employee if he remains absent beyond 90 days Not to send this notice is risky for Bank. Petitioner had joined the Syndicate Bank as attendee in 1978, and in 1984 he was promoted as clerk. He absented from November 29, 1996. Bank issued notice to him on March 13, 1997 to join duty. Further notice was sent on March 25, 1997 by Regd. Post. Notices came back with postal endorsement "addressee left, returned to sender". Then Dy. G.M. passed order on June 24, 1997 declaring that the employee is deemed to have voluntarily retired from Bank Services from May 16, 1997, and further declaring that the period of unauthorised absence of the petitioner should not count for service for purposes of gratuity and pension. Hence this Writ Petition. Held: Clause 17(a) of the Bipartite settlement mandates that before management declares that the employee has voluntarily abandoned the job by virtue of the fact that he absented himself unauthorisedly for a period more than 90 days, the management is required to give notice to the employee offering him an opportunity to explain under what circumstances he absented himself unauthorisedly. In the instant case no such notice was served. (Para 3) Ramachandra Alse S. v. Dy. G.M., Syndicate Bank, Hyderabad. [1999] Status and treatment of officer under suspension Non payment of subsistence allowance during suspension does not entitle delinquent officer to be absent from duty Punjab Police Rules, 1934 Rule 16.21. State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh. [1999]
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ABSORPTION IN SERVICE
Casual Employees Technical Mate engaged by Railways on casual basis continued in service for number of years Claim made by such Tech Mate for absorption in Group "C" rejected nical by Railways Technical Mate approaching Central Administrative Tribunal more than once Casual Employees could be given designation Distinction exists between Casual Employees engaged in dif ferent categories Railways directed to absorb Technical Mate as Skilled Artisan in Grade III in appropriate Scale inasmuch as Technical Mate has approached Tribunal on number of occasions and case is extra ordinary case. A Technical Mate was engaged on daily wages w.e.f. August 23, 1976. She was declared to have attained temporary status in 1981. She made a representation to confer the temporary status in Group "C". The Chief Engineer took the view that the appellant was not entitled to be employed in Group "C". She filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking relief of absorption in Group "C". The Tribunal set aside the action of the Chief Engineer and remitted the matter to the concerned authorities. Once again the Chief Engineer decided against her absorption in Group "C". Hence she approached the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the Chairman of the Railway Board to examine this matter and give appropriate relief. the Chairman of the Railway Board took the view that the employee is only a casual employee and a casual employee cannot be differentiated from another casual employee and the designation of post cannot be attached to such an employee. Therefore, the Tribunal, found helplessness to give relief to the appellant and dismissed the application filed by the casual employee. Hence the Civil Appeal by Special Leave. Held: The Communication of the Railway Board No. P(S)/443/I/Misc/MP/MAS/Vo. X clearly indicates the manner in which a person whose services have been engaged as a Technical Mate on casual basis has to be treated. If this is the mode of providing an employment, then it is not understandable as to how the Chairman of the Railway Board could not apply the same to the appellant and give appropriate relief. Considering the long period of service the appellant had put in and the qualification possessed by her, namely, a diploma in technical subjects, it would certainly entitle her to be absorbed as a skilled Artisan in Grade III in Scale 950 1500 against post available in respect of direct recruitment quota. If this aspect had been borne in mind by the Chairman of the Railway Board, he would not have rejected the case of the appellant. (Para 2) The view taken by the Chairman of the Railway Board that there cannot be any designation assigned to a casual employee baffles all logic because there can be engagement of a peon on casual basis and there can be engagement of a clerk on casual basis and it cannot be said that both are casual employees and, therefore, there cannot be any distinction between a peon and a clerk as they are engaged on casual basis. (Para 3) Considering the number of occasions the appellant had approached the Tribunal and the authorities for relief, it is an extraordinary case where the respondents should be directed to absorb the appellant as a skilled Artisan in Grade III in appropriate scale as indicated in the communication No. P(S)/441/I/MISC/MP/MAS/Vo. X of the Railway Board and the benefit thereof should be given to the appellant. (Para 4) Chandra V.M. v. Union of India [1999]
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Absorption of surplus staff of autonomous body by State Government Whether entities staff to demand continuity of service In absence of specific provision No. The Appellant was a Forester in the Bihar State Forest Development Corporation, which was an autonomous body. Since the BSFDC decided to close down certain projects, certain number of staff including the Appellant became surplus. The State Government decided to absorb the surplus staff in the State Trading Wing of the Forest Department with effect from March 2, 1982. The Appellant approached the High Court claiming continuity of his service from the day he had joined the BSFDC, and his petition before the High Court was dismissed. Hence the appeal in the Supreme Court contending that he was only transferred from BSFDC to STWFD and therefore entitled to continuity of his service with consequential benefits. Held: In the absence of any provision, the appointment of the Appellant in the State Cadre had to be considered as appointment from the date when it takes effect. The judgment of the High Court that the service of the Appellant will count from the date of 'his appointment in the State Trading Wing of the Forest Department of the State of Bihar and his earlier service with the Corporation will not be counted for the purposes of seniority and other benefits was confirmed by the Supreme Court. (Para 5) Yogendra Prasad Mandal v. State of Bihar. [1999] Notification by Government of India prohibiting employment of contract labour for sweeping cleaning etc. of buildings owned by establishments in respect whereof Central Government was appropriate Government Respondent Corporation held bound by notification Employees for such work through contractor directed to be absorbed by Corporation as its regular and permanent employees Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 Section 10. Mumbai Shramik Sangh v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [1999] Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 Section 10 G.O. abolishes certain categories of contract labour in APSEB Only employees working on day of abolition entitled to be absorbed Petitioners not in rolls on said date not entitled to claim regularisation. Chandra Mouli Reddy v. Member Secretary, APSEB. [1999] Notification under Section of 10(l) of Contract Labour Act No provision in the Act for absorption of employees whose contract of employment stands abolished under notification Principal employer not under obligation to absorb such employee. Madras Aluminium Co., Salem v. Regional Labour Commissioner. [1999] Casual Labour Absorption of Ex casual labourer regardless of number of working days could be absorbed if he was graduate Scheme for absorbing ex casual labourers being benevolent one has to be interpreted in manner which furthers its objects. Pippalla Surya Bhagavan v. MemberSecretary, A.P.S.EB. [1999]
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Person appointed through back door cannot claim permanency in service Absorption in permanent service on ground of social justice, not sustainable. Calcutta Tramway Co. Ltd. (1978) v. Ramesh. [1999] No claim for absorption in regular establishment can be made till Notification is published prohibiting engagement of Vulcanisers as contract labour Leave given to Vulcanisers; to move appropriate Government for prohibition of engagement of Vulcanisers as contract labour in Halide Dock Complex, Calcutta Port Trust Order of status quo issued subject to certain conditions. Sheikh Jahangir Ali v. Calcutta Port Trust. [1999] Validity of medical certificate issued by specialists in field in face of disqualification on medical ground for absorption of workmen Certificates valid. Held: Certificates issued by District Medical Officer, Skin Specialist in the Government Headquarters Hospital, District Leprosy Officer, etc. should be accepted as valid certificates. (Para 12) Workman, represented by the General Secretary, India Cements Employees Union, Sankari West v. General Manager, India Cements Ltd., Sankari West. [1999] Absorption Whether workman medically fit to do the work Workman is entitled to produce medical certificate issued by Doctors other than Company Doctor. Held: Since the settlement contemplates a right of appeal against the findings of company Doctor to the District Medical Officer, the certificate issued by the company Doctor is not final. Therefore the workman is entitled to produce the certificate issued by the District Medical Officer. (Para 12) Workman, represented by the General Secretary, India Cements Employees Union, Sankari West v. General Manager, India Cements Ltd., Sankari West. [1999] Absorption of surplus staff of autonomous body by State Government Whether entitles staff to demand continuity of service In absence of specific provision No. Yogendra Prasad Mandal v. State of Bihar. [1999]
ACCIDENT
SEE UNDER THE HEADING "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON ACT, 1923".
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Judicial Review Scope and Meaning of Judicial Review is not akin to appeal It is review of manner in which decision was arrived at Courts while exercising judicial review must remain conscious of fact that Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of administrative authority. (Para 17)
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Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra. [1999]
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985

Section 3(q) Department of Social Forestry, a scheduled employment of workers in Plantations, Farms and Schemes of such department, engaged on daily wage basis Grievance of reduction in their wages Writ petition for relief, held not maintainable Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The petitioner union sought relief on behalf of daily rated workers in the Plantation Farms and Schemes of the Social Forestry Department of the Government of Maharashtra, against a reduction of their wages, claiming that social forestry was a scheduled Employment under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The High Court held the petition not tenable. Held: The High Court observed that disputes regarding daily rated casual labourers fell within the ambit of service matters as defined under Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. (Para 4) The present (writ) petition was therefore held not tenable. The High Court consequently directed transfer of the petition to the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal. (Para 6) Marathwade Sarvashramik Sangathan v State of Maharashtra [1999] Section 14(l)(a) jurisdiction of CAT Appellant selected by Posts & Telegraphs Department for post of clerk Due to want of vacancy could not be offered appointment Appellant accepted offer of appointment as clerk in Army Postal Service on deputation Also accepted that he would revert to P&T Dept. on release from Army Postal Service Facts demonstrate that appellant had been in P&T Dept. working on deputation in Indian Army Postal Service Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain original application filed by appellant CAT erroneously accepted claim of appellant that he was army personnel Case remanded to CAT to decide original application of appellant. (Para 8) Major M. R. Penghal v. Union of India. [1999] Sections 14(l) & 15(l) Relief granted by lower Court found to be illegal Yet not disturbed on facts and circumstances of case. Union of India v. Kulamoni Mohanty. [1999] Section 28 Exclusion of jurisdiction of High Court in respect of orders passed by Administrative Tribunal, unconstitutional (Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 323 A (2)(d). Edwin v. Director General, All India Radio [1999]
ADVERSE REMARKS
Procedure to be followed before communication of adverse remarks to employee Application of
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Section 114 (c) of Indian Evidence Act to service law Presumptions applicable judicial Officers are on duty all the 24 hours. The Petitioner has gone to the Court with a prayer to quash adverse entry in his service records. The adverse entry was "deliberately avoided to attend the official meeting with Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice on October 23, 1993 at the Irrigation Inspection House, during His Lordship's visit to Mirzapure. He is guilty of disobedience. He is also impertinent and arrogant in his behavior". The case of the Petitioner was that on October 23, 1993 was a holiday and he was on fast and performing Havan while celebrating Ram Navami. Therefore he could not go to meet His Lordship. The record placed before the Court contained more information about the behaviour of the Petitioner. In 1976 77 there were adverse remarks against him such as "It is distressing to note that he lacks courtesy and good manners. He is not amenable to the advice of District Judge". Again in 1977 78 "his knowledge of law is poor and appreciation of evidence unsatisfactory. His judgments are not sound and are sometimes vitiated even by misreading of documents" etc. In 1979 80 also there were adverse remarks. Held: What the Rule prescribes is that before the adverse remarks are issued, it would be placed before the Chief Justice and in this case it was done, and nowhere in the Writ Petition has the Petitioner made any statement that the adverse remarks were not placed before the Chief Justice prior to its issuance. (Para 7.2) Even though the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act are not in terms applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution yet the principles engrafted under Section 114 (c) of the said Act concerning presumptions of correctness and regularity in regard to the official and judicial acts would be applicable to the proceedings. The act in question was done by the High Court on its administrative side. Thus, this presumption will be of the highest degree and the onus will be very heavy on a person who challenges this presumption which has not been discharged by the Petitioner. Adverse remarks were communicated to the Petitioner after the endorsement by the Chief Justice. (Para 7.3) The Petitioner has taken different stands at different times, such as that he was not aware of the fact that judicial officers were required to meet the Chief Justice at the Irrigation Inspection House, he was not informed that any official meeting has been fixed, while the circular had mentioned about the visit clearly. The contentions of the Petitioner were that the visit was absolutely private and not an official one; Petitioner was not provided with the copy of the report of the District Judge on the basis of which adverse remarks were recorded; October 23, 1993 being Ram Navami day was declared a holiday and the Petitioner was on fast and performing his pooja; the Chief Justice has not concurred with the issuance of adverse remarks; the High Court while dealing with administrative side with the member of the subordinate judiciary was required to act fairly and non arbitrarily and thus the adverse remarks recorded against him and the resolution of the administrative department are liable to be quashed. If he was really fasting, that fact should have been brought to the notice of the District Judge. The D.B. refused to believe this defence. (Para 8. 1)
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On the plea that it was a holiday the Court said that the Petitioner being judicial officer will be deemed to be on duty 24 hours. (Para 8.3) The D.B. could not find any ground to entertain his alternative plea of mercy and it was rejected. (Para 11) Singh, N.B., Additional District & Sessions Judge, Budaun v. Laksluni Bihari, District Judge. [1999]
AGREEMENT
Trade Unions cannot dictate employer whom they should employ If there was any agreement giving them right so to dictate, it was for them to raise industrial dispute. Peethainbaran v. Ramachandran. [1999]
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT RULES

Chapter VIII Rule 5 Right of appeal, a creature of statute No inherent right to prefer appeal, unless it is conferred on litigant by law If appeal sought relief of implementation of award coming within prohibition of Rule 5 of High Court Rules, appeal is not maintainable U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Sections 14 A and 16. Rain Kripal Singhv. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. [1999]
ALLOWANCES
House Rent Allowance Entitlement of employee living in his own house Admissible only if gross rental value assessed by Municipal Authorities for municipal purposes exceeds 10% of employee's pay Rental value for H.R.A. cannot be different from rental value of house as assessed for municipal purposes Employee cannot draw H.R.A. based on certificates obtained from municipal officials showing different rental value. Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research v. Dr. Anil Kumar Ghosh. [1999] House Rent Allowance Entitlement of employee living in his own house Admissible only if gross rental value assessed by Municipal authorities for municipal purposes exceeds 10% of employee's pay Rental value for HRA cannot be different from rental value of house as assessed for municipal purposes Employee cannot draw HRA based on certificates obtained from municipal officials showing different rental value. (Para 16) Director General, Indian Council of Medical Research v. Dr. Anil Kumar Ghosh. [1999] Subsistence Allowance Interim relief Nonpayment of subsistence allowance Not a ground that will vitiate award.
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See also under the heading 'SUSPENSION'. Venugopal V. v. Management of Reed Relays & Electronics Ltd., Madras. [1999] Dismissal of employee without enquiry Subsistence allowance during pendency proceeding in Labour Court Should be paid Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 Section 119 D. Bharat Co operative Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Baria, Judge, Labour Court. [1999]
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
SEE UNDER THE HEADING "CONSTITUTION OF INDIA" ARTICLE 226.
AMENITY
Supply of uniforms and shoes It is an amenity Employer may provide it, discontinue it or not provide at all Application under Section 15(2) to be filed within 12 months Payment of Wages Act, 1936 Sections 15(2) and 15(3). Gurbux Singh v. Executive Engineer, Ropar Division, Sirhind Canal, Ropar. [1999]
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR (PWD) GROUP A AND GROUP B POSTS RECRUITMENT RULES, 1980
Determination of seniority of employees whether service rendered on ad hoc basis prior to regularisation can be taken into account for determination of seniority in a particular rank Ad hoc appointee's service prior to regularisation is not counted for the purpose of seniority. Singh P.K. v. Bool Chand Chablani. [1999]
ANDHRA BANK (OFFICERS) SERVICE REGULATIONS

Regulation 8 Notional pay has to be fixed and P.F. and gratuity to be calculated on that basis Arrears can be claimed, under Regulation 8 as of right and it is not paid ex gratia. Veerabhadra Rao K. Ch. v. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi. [1999]
ANDHRA PRADESH COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1964

SEE UNDER THE HEADING "COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES".
ANDHRA PRADESH EDUCATION ACT, 1982

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Section 79 Appointment in leave vacancy is not regular appointment under No enquiry for removal of teacher appointed in leave vacancy necessary. Kanthi Kumari P. (Smt.) v. State of A.P. [1999]
ANDHRA PRADESH (REGULATION OF APPOINTMENTS TO PUBLIC SERVICES AND RATIONALISATION OF STAFF PATTERN AND PAY STRUCTURE) ACT, 1994
Regularisation of service of temporary employees on daily wage basis Those who completed rive years of service, although not on date of petition, held entitled to be considered for regularisation, subject to their fulfilling other conditions including those regarding appointment at inception. The present petitioners were N.M.R. Section writers on temporary daily wage basis and they sought a writ of mandamus for regularisation of their services. The High Court disposed of the petitions with directions. Held: The High Court observed that the petitioners had completed five years of (temporary) service as on the date of this judgment. Therefore the respondents could not refuse regularisation of their services, as per G.O. Ms. No. 212 of April 22, 1994. (Para 6) However the respondents were entitled to consider whether the petitioners satisfied the other conditions as to age, vacancies etc. and follow the rule of reservations. (Para 7) The respondents could also consider whether the petitioners would satisfy conditions as to their appointment at inception. (Para 9) Nagaraju T. v. District Collector& Chairman, Rural Development Agency, West Godhavari Dist. [1999]
APPEAL
Right of appeal, a creative of statute No inherent right to prefer appeal, unless it is conferred on litigant by law If appeal sought relief of implementation of award coming within prohibition of Rule 5 of High Court Rules, appeal is not maintainable U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Sections 14 A & 16 Allahabad High Court Rules Chapter VIII Rule 5. Rain Kripal Singli v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation. [1999]
APPOINTMENT
SYNOPSIS
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1. 2. 3.
Ad hoc appointment Vacancies Miscellaneous 1. ADHOC APPOINTMENT
Ad hoc Class IV employee appointed ad hoc clerk against leave vacancy Respondent not possessing requisite qualification High Court setting aside order of non regularisation Also ordering employee to be continued as clerk Held, it cannot be upheld Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226. Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Kuldip Singh. [1999]
Appointment on ad hoc basis Right of such appointees to claim for regularisation or reinstatement Persons appointed on ad hoc basis who were continued for 4 to 5 years cannot claim reinstatement as of right They are entitled to sympathetic consideration State directed to grant them relaxation to age and give them first preference in the event of appointment being made to posts. Appellants worked as Home Guards from 1985 to 1990. They were appointed on ad hoc basis and worked upto July 1994. Contention of the State was that they were appointed only on fixed term basis and were not given fresh appointment on the expiry of last term in 1994. Therefore, they were not entitled for the relief of either reinstatement or regularisation. High Court issued direction for taking action against the Officers who have granted extension to the appellants from time to time. Held: The fact that all the 8 appellants had worked as Home Guards for the period from 1985 to 1990 and the further fact that they were appointed on ad hoc basis and had worked on the aforesaid posts upto July 1994 is not disputed. Although the appellants, having been appointed on ad hoc basis cannot claim reinstatement as a matter of right. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the appellants were appointed by the respondent on ad hoc basis and the appointments have continued from time to time with the result they continued in service for 4 to 5 years. Therefore, they are entitled for sympathetic consideration. Hence the appellants are entitled to the benefit of relaxation in age for the period for which they are already in service as Corporal Instructors/Dispatch Riders. If the respondents at all intend or proceed to make appointments on these posts, the appellants shall be given first preference. The direction of the High Court to take action against the Officers who have granted extension to the appellants from time to time is allowed to stand. (Paras 3 & 6) Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab. [1999] Appointment on ad hoc basis of Law Assistants in North Frontier Railway Appointees having made representations to regularise their appointments cannot make grievance as though they were not aware of appointment on ad hoc basis. Appellants have sought regularisation of their service as Law Assistants who had been informed after two years that their promotions as such Assistants had been on ad hoc basis. The Administrative Tribunal held that the appellants were not entitled to promotion as Law Assistants on regular basis. The
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Supreme Court in this appeal against the Tribunal's order only confirmed it and dismissed the appeal. Held: The Supreme Court observed that it was not as though the appellants would not be aware of the ad hoc basis of their appointment (on promotion) as Law Assistants and that was why they made representations to regularise their promotions on ad hoc basis. Thus the appellants could not make a grievance now. (Para 7) Sarma A.K. v. Union of India. [1999] Appointment on ad hoc basis Right of such appointees to claim for regularisation or reinstatement Persons appointed on ad hoc basis who were continued for 4 to 5 years claim reinstatement as of right They are entitled to sympathetic consideration State directed to grant them relaxation to age and give them first preference in the event of appointment being made to posts. Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab. [1999] 2. VACANCIES Appointment Vacancy arising on one selected candidate not joining It is not fresh vacancy Restrictions imposed by Reserve Bank of India on fresh recruitment do not apply to such non joining duty vacancy. This writ appeal by the Indian Bank challenged an order of a single Judge directing the Banking Service Recruitment Board to sponsor one candidate from the waiting list, in which the first respondent was included, to the Indian Bank for filling up a non joining duty vacancy which arose in the Bank. The High Court dismissed the appeal. Held: The High Court observed that the restrictions imposed by the Reserve Bank of India did not apply to the case on hand, which was one non joining duty vacancy and not of fresh vacancy. Therefore the direction of the Single Judge to the Banking Service Recruitment Board to notify the next immediate available vacancy to the appellant was perfectly in order. (Para 7) Indian Bank v. R. Jayasree. [1999] 3. MISCELLANEOUS Appointment offered to persons whose land was acquired, under policy originally declared Change brought about in policy could not affect person's vested right Nor take away such right by such change giving it retrospective effect. In allowing this petition against discriminatory action of the respondent Board, which lured, as it were, land owners to part with their land for its power project with offers of appointment, the High Court spoke the voice of justice rendering relief to a disappointed land owner by the said action of the Board, resulting in his losing both the land and the job. The reply of the Board that there was a change in its policy since the time that such offer was made to the petitioner, which resulted in the denial of the job to the petitioner, or that the petitioner was overage, did not succeed before the High Court. Held: The High Court observed that the alleged change in the policy of the Board could not affect the
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vested right of the petitioner under the policy originally declared. Such a right could not be taken away by a subsequent change in the policy, with retrospective effect. (Para 8) Finding that others who were over age were given relaxation in age, the effort of the respondent Board to deny petitioner the job on ground of his being over age could not but be termed as discriminatory, the High Court concluded. (Para 8) Malkiat Singh v. Punjab State Electricity Board. [1999] Appointment Constitution of India, 1950Article 226 Appellant appointed Lambardar Order challenged by respondent's father Commissioner remanded matter to Collector for fresh consideration on merits and demerits Order of removal challenged by appellant before Financial Commissioner who declared that order of Collector had become final and proceedings had become infructuous as a result of death of respondent's father Aggrieved by that order, Respondent filed writ petition in High Court which remanded case to Collector directing him to permit respondent to continue as Labrador till fresh decision was made as to who should be appointed to post by inviting fresh applications from all interested persons Aggrieved by High Court's order respondent riled this appeal High Court's order not sustainable So long as appointment of appellant is not cancelled, it is not permissible to invite fresh applications Matter remanded to Financial Commissioner as question of survival of cause of action was to be decided Heir of Respondent Allowed to become party Appellant allowed to raise all contentions permissible in law. (Para 5) Khazan Singh v. Shamsher Singh. [1999] Appointment to Civil Service (Executive Branch) Appointment to civil service challenged by unsuccessful candidates Matter carried to Supreme Court Candidates were appointed as Excise and Taxation Officers and also getting themselves impleaded before Supreme Court Supreme Court directing candidates to file proper writ petition before High Court Writ Petition riled cannot be dismissed on ground of delay and laches Circular issued by Government can be enforced Under circulars issued by Government, Appellants are entitled to be considered as vacancies arise by reason of non appointment of some of the candidates especially when vacancies arise within period of six months from date of previous selection. Virender S. Hooda v. State of Haryana. [1999]
APPRENTICES ACT, 1961

Sections 2(aa), 18 and 22 Apprentices Training Rules, 1961 Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 Clause 12 Meaning of apprentice Person undergoing training in pursuance of contract of apprenticeship Apprentice being only trainee and not worker, cannot claim relief to absorb him in employment. Petitioners herein were trainees under apprenticeship programmed of the respondent Transport Corporation, and they challenged in this petition denial of appointments in the Corporation. The High Court dismissed the petition.
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Held: The High Court observed after referring to Clause 12 of the Standing Orders and the statutory provisions, that letters of selection of petitioners as trainees contained a condition that there was no job guarantee. Further the contract form signed by the petitioners did not contain any clause providing for employment. Hence petitioners could not claim any relief to absorb them in the employment of the respondents. As per Section 18 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, the petitioners being apprentices were only trainees and not workers. (Para 15) Babulal Slo Heera Lal v. Rajas than State Road Transport Corporation, Parivahan Marg. [1999] Section 6 Period of apprenticeship Extended beyond one year by appraisal committee Whether such extended period can be counted for seniority of employee Seniority is a question of comparison between incumbents in same cadre If performance of apprentice trainee is not satisfactory requiring extension of training period, trainee not entitled to presumption of completion of training period in one year Discrimination cannot arise on basis of illegal order in another case. The present L.P. Appeal by employer Electricity Board called in question an order of single Judge, who, while a] lowing a writ petition of the respondent employee, directed the Board to reconsider the question of seniority of the respondent, on the footing that his apprenticeship could not be for more than one year period, though, as a matter of fact, it had been extended in his case for more than a year on account of an appraisal committee finding his performance not satisfactory. The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order of the single Judge. Held: The High Court observed that the period of apprenticeship training had to be taken as anterior to the entry into a service or cadre. (Para 18) The respondent was not entitled to a presumption of completion of his apprenticeship on the expiry of one year, bearing in mind the appraisal committee's unfavorable finding on his performance and consequent extension of period of apprenticeship beyond one year. (Para 20) The respondent's complaint of discrimination compared with others could not succeed as the legality and validity in their case had first to be investigated before it could be directed to be followed in the case of the respondent. (Para 22) Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Dal Chand Rathore. [1999] Section 13 If employer pays stipend at rate less than prescribed minimum, it cannot contend compensation should be only at rate actually paid Such argument, if permitted, would allow employer to take advantage of its own wrong. Held: The High Court rejected another contention of the appellant that compensation should be calculated only on the basis of wages (stipend) which the appellant was paying to the claimant and not on the basis of minimum wages prescribed on the relevant date for the designated trade. The High Court observed that this contention would permit the appellant to take the benefit of its own wrong and besides defeat the benevolent provisions of the statutes. (Para 14) Divisional Controller, G.S.R.T.C. v. Ashok Kumar Keshavlal Parekh. [1999] Section 16 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 Schedule If apprentice in establishment
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suffers personal injury caused to him by accident arising out of and in course of employment, his employer, liable to pay compensation. Held: Refuting the contention of the appellant employer, the High Court observed that from a conjoint reading of the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961 and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, an apprentice in an establishment in case suffered personal injury in the course of his employment, his employer was liable to pay compensation under Chapter II of the aforesaid Act. (Para 13) Divisional Controller, G.S.R. T. C. v. Ashok Kumar Keshavlal Parekh. [1999] Section 21 KSRTC (Cadre and Recruitment) Regulations, 1982 Claim for post of Helper based on National Apprenticeship Training Scheme Claimant can be said to have completed apprentice training only if he has passed test held under Section 21. An unsuccessful claimant for the post of Helper (B) in the respondent Corporation filed this writ petition seeking direction for his appointment. The High Court dismissed the petition. Held: The High Court observed that the petitioner's challenge to the denial of the post was based on the plea that the petitioner had undergone training under National Apprenticeship Training Scheme. But a person could be said to have completed his apprentice training within the meaning of the Apprentices Act, 1961, only if he was found to have passed the test held under Section 21 of the Act. Taking any other view would defeat the very object and purpose of the Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in [1995] (Para 9) Nagaraja A. v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore. [1999] Section 22 Trade apprentices selected for training in Carriage and Wagon department of N.F.Railway No guarantee of employment given while sending them for apprenticeship course Let of appointment in Group 'C' on temporary basis, ter stating their services could be terminated on 11days' notice or pay in lieu thereof Cancellation of their appointment and alternative appointment in Group D (lower post) held, not arbitrary or discriminatory and not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of Constitution. The present appellants who were selected as trade apprentices under Apprentice Act, 1961 for apprenticeship course in the Carriage and Wagon Department of N.F. Railway were aggrieved that the cup of Group 'C' Fitter post had slipped their lips and they had to be satisfied with the Lower Group 'D' Carriage Khalasi post. They were first selected for Group 'C' (Class III) post on May 28, 1990 and in less than one month, that is, on June 7, 1990, their appointment was cancelled and they were given fresh appointment in Group 'D' (Class IV) post. They agitated their grievance before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati and having failed there, they came up in the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Held: The Supreme Court observed, after referring to Section 22 of the Apprentice Act, 1961, that the appellants did not, after undergoing the apprenticeship course, have the right to be appointed. (Para 9) Further the original appointment letter of May 28, 1990 (in Clause 2) informed the appellants that it was purely on temporary basis, terminable on 11 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof. Its subsequent
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cancellation could not therefore be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 12) The decision not to allow direct entry into Group 'C' a rule, namely Rule 159 of the Railways' Rules of Recruitment and Training providing for 25% posts in Group 'C' to be filled by selection from apprentices notwithstanding, was reportedly taken upon discussions between the Administration and the Unions in view of stagnation of existing employers in Group 'D' waiting for promotion. This decision was therefore held to be reasonable and taken to keep industrial peace. (Para 14) Mitrangshu Roy Choudhary v. Union of India. [1999]
APPRENTICES TRAINING RULES, 1961

Meaning of apprentice Person undergoing training in pursuance of contract of apprenticeship Apprentice being only trainee and not worker, cannot claim relief to absorb him in employment. Babulal S/o Heera Lal v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Parivahan Marg. [1999]
ARMY RULES, 1954

Rule 22 Dismissal of domestic orderly by court martial Nothing on record to show that Rule 22 was followed It showed total non application of mind nor was there any admission of guilt by domestic orderly. Held: This writ petition by a dismissed domestic orderly in the Army challenging his dismissal, was allowed. The High Court found that no such statement as alleged by the respondents to have been given by the petitioner at the time of hearing under Rule 22 of Army Rules, 1954, of the charge of stealing of a steel almirah, was given by the petitioner or recorded. (Para 3) There had been total non application of mind by the respondents. It was inherently impossible to allege that the petitioner had stolen the steel almirah. (Para 3) Harnarayan Singh v. Union of India. [1999] Rule 37 Form IAFD 916 Commanding Officer Court Martialled Necessity for written order by Commanding Officer nominating personnel for Court Martial No record to show that personnel for Court Martial were appointed or nominated by Lt. General Order for assembly of General Court Martial did not contain signature or initial of Lt. General Such Order was signed only by Colonel No order evidencing appointment of Court Martial by Lt. General who has to satisfy himself that charges to be tried by Court Martial are for offences within meaning of Army Act Not relevant to decide whether Rule 37 is only procedural in view of categorical stand taken by appellant that there was an order by Commanding Officer appointing or detailing Officers to form Court Martial Form for assembly of Court Martial does not contain signature or initial of Lt. General No record to show that oral order was passed by Lt. General Rule 37 was violated Court Martial has no jurisdiction to proceed with trial and entire proceedings are vitiated. The Commanding Officer was issued a Charge Sheet containing 8 charges alleging certain irregularities in regard to local purchase of material for repair. A General Court Martial was convened and after trial, the
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Commanding Officer was found guilty of 4 out of 8 charges. He was awarded the sentence "to be cashiered" and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. The said sentence was confirmed by the concerned authority. A writ petition was filed challenging the Court Martial proceedings as well as punishment. The High Court accepted the contention that the constitution of Court Martial was not done by the Commanding Officer as required under Rule 37(3) of the Army Rules. Hence the High Court took the view that the Court Martial has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and therefore, the entire proceedings as well as order of punishment vitiated. Hence civil appeal by special leave. Held: Admittedly there is no record whatsoever in the file to show that the personnel of the Court Martial were appointed by or nominated by the Lt. General. The Order for the assembly of a General Court Martial did not contain either the signature or the initial of the Lt. General. It was signed only by the Colonel and none else. In the circumstances the said order cannot be considered to be an order evidencing the appointment of personnel of the Court Martial by the Lt. General. There is no dispute that under Rule 37, the Commanding Officer has to apply his mind to satisfy himself that the charge to be tried by the Court are for offences within the meaning of the Act and that evidence justifies the trial of those charges. The Commanding Officer has also to satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of Court Martial which he proposes to convene. The form for assembly of Court Martial does not contain either the signature or initial of the Lt. General. Even assuming that the Lt. General passed an oral order, there is no record of any kind whatsoever to prove it. The form for assembly of Court Martial was not contemporaneous to such oral order, if any. In the absence of any record whatever to show that the appointment of the personnel of the Court Martial was by the Lt. General the contention of the appellants that the requirements of Rule 37 were fully satisfied cannot be accepted. (Para 7) Union of India v. Harish Chandra Goswami. [1999]
AWARD
Ex prate Award Employer not riling applica before Labour Court for setting aside award tion due to Supreme Court decision in [1981] Petition in High Court Delay in approaching Court Vague averments on same Petition dismissed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Delhi Development Authority v. Pradeep Kumar. [1999] Ex prate award Employer not riling application before Labour Court for setting aside award due to Supreme Court decision in [1981] Petition in High Court Delay in approaching Court Vague averments on same Petition dismissed. Held: Even in this petition except making vague averments, the petitioner has failed to give facts which may amount to sufficient cause for its non appearance before the Labour Court. Except for a vague averment that the petitioner's panel of lawyers had been changed and that the concerned file was misplaced, no details of files with which this file may have been tagged on or misplaced have been mentioned. It has also not been stated when it was traced. The petitioner has been utterly negligent in not appearing before the Labour Court for nearly four years since the last appearance. Even this petition has been filed six months after the award. (Para 1) Delhi Development Authority v. Pradeep Kumar. [1999] Award of Industrial Tribunal inconsistent with statutory rules Writ petition filed for
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implementing Award Arbitrator enhancing age of superannuation to 58 years contrary to Statutory Rules which determined age of superannuation as 55 years Award under Industrial Disputes Act cannot be inconsistent with Law laid down by Legislature or by Service conditions Such Award is illegal and cannot be enforced Decision by Constitution Bench cannot be overlooked Decision by Bench of lesser strength is not binding authority, if it is inconsistent with decision of Constitution Bench especially when attention of Judges deciding latter case was not invited to earlier decision. Giri N. S. v. Corporation of City of Mangalore. [1999] Award of Labour Court Labour Court upholding order of dismissal issued to workman High Court upheld award of Labour Court but directed employer to provide appointment in lower category as new entrant High Court has jurisdiction to issue such direction after upholding order of dismissal High Court can reduce severity of punishment on finding that punishment was disproportionate No jurisdiction is vested in High Court to direct employer to reemploy delinquent employee after upholding punishment. (Constitution of India, 1950 Article 226 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 11 A). A.P.S.R.T C. v. K. Pochiah. [1999] Dismissal order passed in violation of Section 12(3) of I.D. Act That vitiates domestic enquiry However award is not vitiated as enquiry was conducted before Labour Court itself. Venugopal V. v. Management of Reed Relays & Electronics Ltd., Madras. [1999]
BACK WAGES
SYNOPSIS 1. 2. 3. 4. General rules Grant of back wages (a) On reinstatement Denial of back wages Quantum of back wages (a) Fullback wages (b) Reduction in back wages 1. GENERAL RULES Backwages Normal rule is, workman, whose termination of service is held illegal, is entitled to backwages except to extent he is shown to have been gainfully employed during enforced idleness. In this writ petition the State Bank of India questioned the legality of an order passed upon applications made by respondent workmen under Section 33 C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947, for back wages, pursuant
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to their reinstatement in service under an award of the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Held: The High Court observed that the award directing reinstatement of respondent workmen was totally silent as regards backwages. The normal rule of payment of backwages had to be applied in such a situation, unless it was proved by the Bank, which it had not done, that the workmen had engaged in some gainful employment during the relevant period. (Para 11) State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey. [1999] Backwages can be computed in application by workmen ordered to be reinstated Such computation cannot be treated as conferring any new right upon workmen Industrial Disputes Act, 1947Section 33 C(2). State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey. [1999] 2. GRANT OF BACK WAGES (a) On reinstatement Untrained teachers in Notified Area Schools in Orissa Sent for training On completion of training not allowed to join duty Joined duty at intervention of Administrative Tribunal Entitled to back wages for period between completion of training and taken back on duty. Appellants, untrained teachers, were taken over in the Notified Area schools and sent for training. On completion of training they were not allowed to join duty. On the intervention of the Administrative Tribunal, they were taken on duty, they claimed wages for the period they were not allowed to join duty. Held: The appellants were not taken back. It cannot be said it was due to their fault. The Tribunal was not right in denying their salary for the period from the date when they reported for duty on completion of training till they were taken back on duty pursuant to the order of the Tribunal. (Para 5) Rabindra Kumar Battick v. State of Orissa. [1999] 3. DENTAL OF BACK WAGES Denial of back wages not proper when there is no material to connect employee with alleged charges. Held: The High Court further observed that except in exceptional cases denial of back wages was not proper and permissible. The present was not one such case. When there was no material to connect the appellant with the alleged charges, there was no justification to deny the back wages. (Para 7) Velappan M.M. v. Commissioner, Madurai Municipal Corporation, Madurai. [1999] Non payment of back wages justified in some circumstances But they cannot be denied for reason that charges could have been established with better proof.
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Held: The Supreme Court expressed its disapproval of the single Judge's view that non payment of back wages could be justified, as in this case, for the reason that charges (against the appellant workman) could have been established by better evidence. It was a view, the Supreme Court said, falling within the realm of speculation. It expressed its surprise, that this view had been upheld by Division Bench (in the writ appeal). (Para 9) Chandra Shekara Chari H.S. v. Divisional Controller, KSRTC. [1999] Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 226, 227 Workman directly approached Writ Court against termination No enquiry can be held about gainful employment during period of forced unemployment which is matter of enquiry Hence backwages consequent on reinstatement not granted Workman left to claim from appropriate forum relief of backwages. (Para 22) Pawan Kumar Shrivastava v. Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur. [1999] Tribunal could not have directed payment of back wages, when it has upheld order of dismissal. The Supreme Court set aside in this appeal that portion of the Tribunal's order as affirmed by the High Court, which directed the Management appellant to grant back wages. Held: The Supreme Court observed that it was difficult to appreciate how the Tribunal could have directed payment of back wages, even after upholding the order of dismissal of the respondent employee from service. (Para 2) Lucas India Service Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras. [1999] Employee who had not put in 240 days service in a year cannot be regarded as temporary employee Such employee cannot claim benefit of back wages in terms of settlement for period when he was unemployed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Sections 25 B and 25 F. State Bank of India v. Presiding Officer. [1999] Refusal to grant backwages on ground that workman had not shown that he had not been able to secure any employment It is not incumbent upon workman to make out a case for award of 'back wages by producing sufficient material Workman cannot be asked to prove the negative. The petitioner was removed from service. The Labour Court after adjudication, modified the punishment from removal to stoppage of two increments, declining to grant relief of back wages, on the ground that the workman has not made out a case for back wages. Therefore the petitioner approached the High Court. After quoting various judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Held: The workman is not expected to prove the negative. (Para 10) The view of the Labour Court that the worker has not made out a case for back wages cannot be sustained. (Para 13) Ishwar Singh v. Delhi Transport Corporation. [1999] Finding of Labour Court that termination of service was illegal could not be accepted Service
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of workman came to end on account of his failure to exercise option of accepting work at another place within given time Award of back wages by Labour Court held unwarranted. This petition by employer company challenged an award of the Labour Court, so far as it directed payment of back wages to first respondent workman, he having already been reinstated in service as per the said award. The High Court allowed the writ petition. Held: The High Court observed that it was difficult to accept the Labour Court's finding that there was illegal termination of the first respondent service. His services, in the High Court's view, came to an end on account of his failure to exercise his option (to take up work at another place offered by the employer) within the given time. The award with regard to back wages was wholly unwarranted. (Para 5) Gansons Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Shriram Y. Chhatre. [1999] Suit for reinstatement and backwages Court decreeing reinstatement and ordering wages for 3 years and 2 months Respondent, instead of claiming decrial amount, making departmental representation on reinstatement Later, on refusal of representation, filing writ petition claiming backwages Held, it was not permissible to claim back wages in a belated writ petition. State of Punjab v. Sukhdev Singh. [1999] Back wages pursuant to award determined payable Employer taking technical stand and indulging in vexatious litigation Appeal dismissed with costs. The appellant, a Tamil Nadu Government undertaking filed this writ appeal against an order of a single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. The writ petition challenged a Labour Court's award of a sum of Rs. 37,000 as back wages payable to the first respondent workman. The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs. Held: The appellant was indulging in vexatious litigation all along in fighting a poor worker (first respondent) by initiating and opposing proceedings, wasting public money. (Para 4) Arasu Rubber Corporation Ltd. v. Thangamuthu. [1999] 4. QUANTUM OF BACK WAGES (a) Full Back Wages Termination found to be illegal Reinstatement ordered with 50% backwages Full backwages are normally to be ordered once order of termination is found to be illegal and set aside Backwages can be reduced only in exceptional circumstances. Held: It is well settled law that normally when termination order is set aside full backwages has to be awarded. But it is only in exceptional cases that it is not. No such exceptional circumstance has been pointed by Labour Court for award of 50% of backwages after directing reinstatement of the employee. (Para 5) Durga Singh v. Labour Court, Dehradun. [1999]
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Termination found illegal by Labour Court Ordering reinstatement with 50 per cent backwages Management not having proved that workman was gainfully employed, full backwages should be paid to workman Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 11 A Schedule 2, Item 3. Jagmal Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haryana, Rohtak. [1999] If termination of service is held neither proper nor justified and if workmen were ready to work but kept away there from, not awarding them full backwages will not be justified. The present writ petitioner, a Traffic Controller in the respondent Transport Corporation had to fight this long legal battle extending over nearly two decades, to establish his innocence against a charge of having obtained his appointment illegally on false representations. This writ petition was necessitated, as he failed to get backwages and continuity of service, although his removal from service was set aside and reinstatement was ordered under the impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal. The High Court granted continuity of service and 50% backwages, while allowing the writ petition. Held: The High Court observed that there could be no dispute in this case that the petitioner was a workman within the meaning of I.D. Act. (Para 4) Taking all the facts and circumstances of the case, there could be no dispute that the petitioner would be entitled to continuity of service and substantial portion of backwages. (Para 7) Ratnakar Arnrith Karnath S. v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. [1999] Whether workman, on reinstatement, should be paid full back wages A question of fact Whether workman was gainfully employed elsewhere an important factor to be considered Public interest also to be considered in awarding back wages. Held: In this appeal, the U.P. Financial Corporation challenged the judgment of a single Judge who directed payment of full back wages to the first respondent employee of the Corporation, while allowing his writ petition and quashing the order of dismissal passed by the Corporation's Board of Directors against the first respondent. The only question raised in the appeal was whether the first respondent was entitled to full back wages on his reinstatement. The High Court, while confirming the single Judge's Judgment, and disposing of this appeal directed the appellant Corporation to hold an enquiry on the question whether the first respondent should be given full back wages and decide the same upon such enquiry. (Para 13) U.P. Financial Corporation v. V.P. Sharma. [1999] (b) Reduction in back wages Employer was found to be indulging In unfair labour practice Industrial Court coming to conclusion that termination of services of employee would amount to unfair labour practice Employee reaching age of superannuation during pendency of proceedings of High Court High Court directed employer to pay wages and other benefits from date of retrenchment till date of retirement Considering all aspects, employer directed to pay to workman one third of back wages with all other consequential benefits from date of retrenchment till date of superannuation within three months Failure on part of employer to pay suit amount would
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result in employer paying interest @12% on the expiry of three months till date of actual payment. Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. V. Shankarprasad [1999] Employee not joining duty on award of Labour Court directing reinstatement Labour Court's award of full back wages reduced to 50% and payment thereof made conditional on employee reporting for duty within four weeks. A dismissed Conductor of appellant Transport Corporation did not rejoin duty pursuant to an award of the Labour Court holding his dismissal to be not sustainable and directing his reinstatement with full back wages. The appellant Corporation having failed in its writ petition challenging the Labour Court's award, came up in the present appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal with directions. Held: Finding that the respondent workmen had no justification not to have reported for duty after the Labour Court's order or at any rate after the dismissal of the writ petition or the limited stay by the Supreme Court which was only in regard to payment of back wages, the Supreme Court limited the payment of back wages to 50% and that, too, conditional upon the respondent reporting for duty within 4 weeks. (Paras 6 & 7) Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. Kameshwar Prasad Thakur. [1999]
BANK OF COCHIN SERVICES CODE

Chapter VII Para 22(iv)(e) Major Misconduct Minor Misconduct Likelihood of serious loss coupled with negligence would amount to Gross Misconduct Proof of serious loss is not necessary and likelihood of loss is sufficient to prove charge of Gross Misconduct Simple negligence also will come under Gross Misconduct if on account of such negligence, Bank is likely to get involved in serious financial loss. Bank of Cochin got amalgamated with State Bank of India w.e.f. April 27, 1985. The Manager of the Madras Branch of Bank of Cochin was issued a Charge Memo in respect of misconduct committed said to have been committed by him during 1977 1981. On August 25,1981, he was transferred to Calcutta and he received Letters of Commendation during March 1983 and April 1984 as the Branch in which he was Manager Stood at No. 1 in the matter of mobilisation of Advances. Some advances given by him, while working as Manager at Madras during 1977 1981 could not be recovered and hence, on February 4, 1984 he was reposted at Madras for the purpose of recovering the advances. He made substantial recoveries but he was suspended on July 13, 1984 and was served with a Charge Sheet on September 18, 1984 for giving advances unauthorisedly and without observing the lending norms. He denied the charges. A domestic enquiry was held by the Advocate who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer found that there was no proper sanction/ratification from Head Office with regard to certain sanctions and certain other charges he found not proved. The Disciplinary Authority issued a second Show Cause Notice on January 22, 1986 proposing dismissal without notice accepting the findings of the Enquiry Officer that he was found guilty of 'Gross Negligence' and also for violation of Head Office instructions. The Disciplinary Authority passed orders dismissing the Manager from the
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services without notice on March 20, 1986. On Appeal, the Appellate Authority modified the said order to one of removal in terms of Rule 49(g) of State Bank of India (Supervisory Staff) Rules. A writ petition was filed questioning the said order. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and held that the findings of the Enquiry Officer on Item 23 was that no financial loss was proved and it was a case of not taking adequate 'security' from the loaners and not obtaining ratification as per Head Office instructions. These charges were not sufficient for imposing the penalty of dismissal or removal and only a Minor Penalty could be imposed. The High Court also took the view that the S.B.I. Rules would not be applicable since the misconduct alleged related to the period of the service in the Bank of Cochin. It was also found by the learned single Judge that the punishment of removal could not have been imposed as it was not one of the enumerated punishments under the Bank of Cochin Rules. The learned Single Judge, while setting aside the Order of removal, observed that the Bank could impose any punishment for Minor Misconduct as per Rules of Bank of Cochin. The writ appeal preferred in the said Judgment was also dismissed. Hence the Civil Appeal by Special Leave. Held: The definition of "Gross Misconduct" in Para 22 (iv) of Bank of Cochin Code, inter alia provides that doing of any act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the Bank in serious loss is Gross Misconduct. In other words, likelihood of serious loss coupled with negligence is sufficient to bring the case within gross misconduct. The Enquiry Officer's finding of 'gross misconduct' on the ground of not obtaining adequate security is, therefore, correct and it cannot be said to be based on no evidence. This can be contrasted with Para 22(vi)(c) under minor misconduct which deals with "neglect of work and negligence in performing of duties". Therefore, serious loss is not necessary but likelihood of loss is sufficient to bring home Gross Misconduct. (Para 15) Gross negligence or negligence likely to involve the Bank in serious loss would come under major misconduct within Para 22 (iv)(1). Even assuming that there is no gross negligence, simple negligence will come under major misconduct if accompanied by 'likelihood' of serious loss and this is clear from Para 22 (iv)(1). Therefore, the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding gross misconduct is correct and could not have been set aside by the High Court. The findings of the Enquiry Officer clearly bring the case under 'major misconduct'. (Para 16) State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul. [1999]
BANK OF INDIA GRATUITY RULES

Rule 8 Employee getting benefit of higher post Under scheme requiring resignation from post previously held by employee, Employee cannot approbate and reprobate Having received benefit of higher post, he cannot say resignation was obtained by coercion. Bank of India v. Kalyan Kumar Sarkar. [1999]
BANK OF INDIA OFFICER EMPLOYEE9S (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS, 1976

Regulation 7(l) Restriction imposed on officer employee to own, conduct or participate in editing or management of any Newspaper or Periodical publication where such newspaper or periodical publication does not publish matters which are purely literary, artistic, scientific,
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professional, cultural, educational or social character Restriction imposed by Clause (1) of Regulation 7 cannot be validly challenged Clause (1) of Regulation 7 is valid and reasonable Proviso to Regulation 7 applies to all 3 Clauses. The Bank of India Officers' Association filed a Writ petition challenging, inter alia, Regulation 7 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, on the ground that it encroached upon the fundamental rights of the Officer Employees. The High Court struck down Regulation 7 even though the challenge restricted to Clause (1), of Regulation 7. Bank of India and others filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court. Held: Clause (1) of Regulation 7 cannot be validly challenged. It is eminently reasonable that an officer employee of the Bank should not own, conduct, edit or manage a newspaper or other periodical publication that does not deal with literary, artistic, scientific, professional, cultural, educational, religious and social matters. The Proviso to Regulation 7 applies to all the three clauses of the said Regulation. Clauses (2) and (3) of the Regulation were not challenged. The appeal is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court set aside in so far as it strikes down Regulation 7 of the Bank of India Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. (Paras 3 & 4) Bank of India v. Bank of India Officer 'Association. [1999]
BANK OF INDIA OFFICER EMPLOYEES' (DISCIPLINE & APPEAL) REGULATIONS, 1976

Regulation 12(l)(a) Objection that authority passing order of suspension or of removal had no competence to do so Not countenanced Removal could not be held as one based on no evidence. Satish Mehra v. Bank of India. [1999]
BANKING COMPANIES (ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS) ACT, 1970

Indian Overseas Bank Officers Employees Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976 Regulation 6(6) Appointment of Presenting Officer It is directory, and not mandatory Inquiry Officer acting both as prosecutor and judge in the domestic enquiry renders enquiry unfair. Radhakrishna Setty v. Deputy General Manager, (Disciplinary Authority), Indian Overseas Bank. [1999] Section 19 United Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 Regulation 17 Opportunity of being heard or assistance of lawyer Not provided for in Regulations Order cannot be assailed on this ground Non supply of inquiry report Does not ipso facto vitiate enquiry Bias objection Raised after an order is made Not maintainable Appeal New plea, Plea not maintainable.
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Held: There is no provision in the Regulations while considering an appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority to give an opportunity of personal hearing by the employee appellant or to grant assistance of a lawyer. The order of the appellate authority, therefore, cannot be assailed on the ground of non opportunity for hearing. However, where the appellate authority decides to enhance the penalty imposed, it is the duty of the appellate authority to afford show cause notice to the employee. (Para 6) Non supply of preliminary enquiry report does not ipso facto vitiate the enquiry held. (Para 18) Any objection regarding any bias against the enquiry officer cannot be raised after the enquiry was completed and order of appointment was passed. (Para 21) A new plea cannot be raised for the first time during the appeal. (Para 2 1) Dilip K. Shah v. United Bank of India. [1999] Section 19 Canara Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 Regulation 8(2) Delinquent seeking disciplinary authority to hold impartial enquiry Minor penalty imposed without an enquiry Held, it is not proper. Held: Delinquent officer, in his reply to the charge memo, requests the disciplinary authority to hold an impartial enquiry, if he is not satisfied with the explanation. The disciplinary authority has imposed a minor penalty. There is nothing in record to show that the authority had given a finding on the question. There is no express provision in the regulation for the disciplinary authority to consider the same or pass an appropriate order. But when such a request is made by the delinquent officer, it is for disciplinary authority to consider it and pass appropriate orders. This unwritten duty is fundamental to a just decision by any authority which decides a controversial issue affecting the rights of the parties. (Para 9) Sundaram G. v. General Manager, (Disciplinary Authority) Canara Bank, Bangalore. [1999] Section 52 New Bank of India (Officers) Service Regulations, 1982 Regulation 7 Finding of fact by single Judge Not challenged in appeal cannot be re opened in appeal in Supreme Court Promotion policy in New Bank of India Policy held not discriminatory. Shanna K. B. v. Union of India. [1999]
BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949

Section 10(l)(B)(i) Conviction for offence involving moral turpitude Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 Section 4(l) Indian Penal Code Section 498 A Husband of woman subjecting her to cruelty Employee of Bank convicted by Criminal Court for offence u/S 498 A and sentenced for imprisonment as well as fine High Court on revision giving benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to such employee Subsequently disciplinary action initiated by Bank resulting in disciplinary action imposing punishment of discharge from service Husband subjecting his wife to cruelty within meaning of Section 498 A Is offence involving moral turpitude Release under Probation of Offenders Act will not wipe away guilt and conviction Mere release under Probation of Offenders Act is not ground to escape from provision of Section 10(l)(B)(i) of Banking Regulation Act No lesser punishment can be imposed than Discharge from Service
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Employee convicted by Criminal Court for offence under Section 498 A and released under Probation of Offenders Act cannot claim reinstatement and Order of Discharge cannot be set aside. A Bank Employee was discharged from service for the reason that he committed an offence involving moral turpitude. He was prosecuted for commission of an offence u/S 498 A of the Indian Penal Code and he was convicted for imprisonment as well as punishment of fine. The conviction and sentence were upheld by the Appellate Court. On revision, the High Court upheld the conviction but the employee was given the benefit of Section 4-1 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Though convicted, the employee did not undergo imprisonment. Departmental proceedings were initiated against the employee on the ground that he was found guilty by the Criminal Court of an offence involving moral turpitude as a result of which he was as already stated, discharged from service. The employee unsuccessfully filed an Appeal before the Appellate Authority. Held: A reading of Section 19(l)(B)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, makes it clear that the offence under the said Section involves moral turpitude. An offence under Section 498 A of the I.P.C. Provides, inter alia, that the husband or the relative of the husband of woman, subjecting her to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend upto 3 years and shall also be liable to be punished with fine; if established can be regarded as one involving moral turpitude and in such cases Section 19(l)(B)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act is attracted to send away the offender from service. (Paras 4 & 5) Benefit under Section 4(l) of the Probation of Offenders Act, if extended to an accused to escape from the sentence of imprisonment, will not wipe away the guilt established on him. The Supreme Court in Harichand v. Director of School Education reported in [1998] has held that a Government servant cannot escape from dismissal from service on the basis of the conviction on the reason that he had been released on the basis of Section 4(l) of the Probation of Offenders Act. Naturally, the revisional order enabling the release of the petitioner on such basis cannot be said to be a ground to impose any lesser penalty than that of sending him away. Out of the several modes of such sending away, the simplest form of discharge is imposed upon the petitioner by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority. (Para 6) Vincent Varghese v. State Bank of India. [1999] Section 23 Appellant bank could not have opened, new branch without permission of Reserve Bank of India Though opening a branch without such permission was illegal, appointments of employees were not shown to be for purpose of working at said branch Directives of Reserve Bank of India under Banking Regulation Act could not adversely affect such employees. Held: On the substantial question whether the impugned action of the Administrator in stopping payment of salary to the writ petitioners, the High Court held the directives of the Reserve Bank of India in terms of Section 23 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1948 could not adversely affect the petitioners who were not shown to have been appointed solely for the purpose of working at the branch opened without permission of the Reserve Bank of India. (Para 19) Further the Administrator in directing such stoppage of salary payment was taking a major policy decision which he could not take without leave of the Court, as per its directions in the matter. (Para 21)
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SBISA Co operative Bank Ltd. v. Tarun Kumar Saha. [1999] Section 45(7) Scheme of amalgamation Notification for, declaring all liabilities, duties and obligations of Hindustan Commercial Bank taken over by Punjab National Bank Appeal by dismissed employee pending with Hindustan Commercial Bank, at time of amalgamation Punjab National Bank not taking steps for disposing of appeal Writ petition against it maintainable. In this writ petition, an employee of the Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. challenged his dismissal for which he had preferred an appeal to the appellate authority of the Bank. While the appeal was pending the Bank was amalgamated with the Punjab National Bank through a scheme notified by the Government of India under Section 47(7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The High Court allowed the writ petition. Held: The High Court observed that at the time of amalgamation the appeal preferred by the petitioner was pending with the Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. The Punjab National Bank on taking over all liabilities and obligations of the Hindustan Commercial Bank should have also undertaken the task of disposing of the appeal. Admittedly that had not been done. The stand taken by the Punjab National Bank that the writ petition was not maintainable inasmuch as the Hindustan Bank was not a nationalised Bank ran counter to the scheme of amalgamation. (Para 13) Even on merits the impugned order of dismissal was held to be contrary to well established principle. No inquiry was held, no finding given and no material on record to sustain the dismissal. (Para 14) Poddar S.K. v. Chairman, Punjab National Bank. [1999]
BEEDI AND CIGAR WORKERS (CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT) ACT, 1966

Sections 2(f)(i), 2(h) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 Section 1(3)(b) and 2(e) 'Home worker' although working away from factory would still be considered working in establishment and covered by Gratuity Act. The petitioner Beedi Factory denied payment of gratuity to the widow of one of its 'home workers' on the ground such 'home worker' was not an ,employee' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act. Having failed in such denial before the authorities under the said Act, the petitioner came forward with the present writ petition challenging the order of the said authorities. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Held: The High Court observed 'home worker' like the husband of the third respondent was very much a person working in the establishment within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Gratuity Act, since the place where he rolled the beedies, though situated away from the Beedi Factory was nevertheless a part of the establishment within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Beedi Act. (Para 9) Bagi Beedi Factory v. Appellate Authority. [1999]
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BEEDI WORKERS WELFARE FUND ACT, 1976

Section 4 Merely because certain benefits are given to workmen under another Act, they could not be deprived benefits under E.S.I. Act. Seyadu Beedi Company, Tirunelveli v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation. [1999]
BENEFITS
Emergency Commissioned Officers and Short Service Commissioned Officers (Reservation of Vacancies) Rules, 1971 Rule 6 Benefit conferred for limited purpose of seniority, pay and pension By a deeming fiction of commencement of service from earlier date Such fiction cannot be extended in respect of other service conditions As, for example for claiming benefit of service beyond 58 years, under First proviso to Rule 19(l) of State. Bank of India Service Rules. State Bank of India v. Hanumantha Rao D. [1999] Government has to examine whether benefits provided by employer are similar or superior to benefits under Act Hearing employer/union must be afforded. Lohiya Machines Karmachari Sangh, Kanpur v. State of U.P. [1999]
BENGAL PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT, 1913

Request of E.S.I. Corporation to initiate recovery proceedings under State Act Corporation having the option to recover under either Central or State Act Refusal to grant Corporation's request held, not proper Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 Section 45 13 Revenue Recovery Act, 1890. Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Overseas Metal Industries. [1999]
BIAS
Opportunity of being heard or assistance of lawyer Not provided for in regulations Order cannot be assailed on this ground Non supply of inquiry report Does not ipso facto vitiate enquiry Bias objection Raised after an order is made Not maintainable Appeal New plea, Plea not maintainable. Dilip K. Shah v. United Bank of India. [1999]
BIHAR PENSION RULES

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Rule 43(b) Retiral benefits Mere pendency of criminal proceedings is not ground for withholding pension in absence of disciplinary proceedings and order for withholding pension. Held: A Section Officer in the Home Department of Bihar filed this petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay his retiral benefits. They were withheld on the ground that a F.I.R. had been lodged and criminal proceedings against him for embezzlement were pending. The High Court allowed the petition. It observed that mere pendency of the criminal proceeding was not a ground for withholding pension of an employee; No disciplinary proceedings had at all been initiated against the petitioner and no order for withholding the retiral benefits of the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension. (Para 5) Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar. [1999]
BIHAR SERVICE CODE

Compulsory retirement Not a punishment Order is passed on subjective satisfaction of Government Principles of natural justice have no place in context of such retirement Order would however be subject to judicial scrutiny if it is mala fide, or based on no evidence or is arbitrary. . Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar. [1999]
BIPARTITE SETTLEMENT
Clauses 19.2, 19.3(a) and 19.12(b) FIR filed against Clerk cum Cashier of Nationalised Bank in connection with alleged criminal offence under Section 304 of Indian Penal Code Employee detained in connection with said offence Nationalised Bank suspending employee from service in view of detention for offence under Section 304 of Indian Penal Code Clause 19.3(a) empowers Bank to suspend Employee when Bank is of opinion that employee has committed offence and is being prosecuted Order of Suspension issued by Bank is valid and cannot be interfered. A Clerk cum Cashier in Punjab National Bank was suspended from services on June 4, 1998 in view of his detention under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code consequent upon filing of FIR on April 27, 1998. The employee filed a writ petition challenging the Order of Suspension before the High Court. The High Court quashed the Order of Suspension on the ground that there was no provision in the Bipartite Settlement empowering the Bank to suspend the employee. Hence the Civil Appeal by Special Leave. Held: The High Court only refer Ted to Clause 19.12(b) of the Bipartite Settlement which gives power to the Bank to suspend an employee pending departmental enquiry against him. In addition, there is also Clause 19.3(a) in which when in the opinion of the Management an employee has committed an offence and he is being prosecuted, the Bank has power to suspend the employee. Clause 19.3(a) also further provides that if the employee is not otherwise prosecuted, the Bank may take steps to prosecute him or get him prosecuted also. In all these circumstances, the Bank has the power to suspend an employee. The High Court is wrong in coming to the conclusion that the Bank did not have any power to suspend the employee when criminal prosecution is pending against him. (Para 4) Punjab National Bank v. Jagdish Singh. [1999]
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BOMBAY CIVIL SERVICE RULES, 1959

Rule 152 Order under this Rule not passed Before passing such order opportunity of being heard should be given. Ramsunder Shamlal v. J.B. Jhala or his successor, Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad. [1999] Rule 161(l)(i)(aa) Compulsory retirement Whether order casts stigma Court can lift veil to find out if it is based on misconduct or with oblique motive Adverse remarks not communicated Can be considered for compulsory retirement. Held: Even if an order of compulsory retirement is couched in innocuous language and without making imputations, in appropriate cases the Court can lift the veil to find out whether the order of compulsory retirement is based on misconduct or passed with an oblique motive. Where the order itself mentions that an enquiry into charges was pending, the order certainly casts a stigma and it can be presumed that it is passed to short circuit the enquiry. Uncommunicated adverse remarks can certainly be considered in the exercise of powers of compulsory retirement. (Vide 1992 2 SCC 317 and 1992 2 SCC 299). Narendrakumar V Parikh v. State of Gujarat. [1999] Rule 161(l)(aa) Appointing authority can retire Government servant in public interest Meaning of "Public interest" is that only honest and efficient persons are to be retained in service and inefficient, corrupt, dishonest employees are to be weeded out. "Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959" Rule 161(l) (aa). [1999]
BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946

Workman cannot be prevented from filing complaint, in exercise of right created by statute and for which statutory remedy is provided. Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. N.L. Mansukhai. [1999] Sections 3(25), 15(b)(ii) Proviso and Explanation Meaning of "Member" Cancellation of Registration of Union Meaning of "More than 3 calendar months" Person can be member of Union if he is ordinary member and pay subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month Ordinary member of Trade Union means "Employee Workman engaged in concerned industry and who is other than an ex officio member of Union" Such ordinary member can be treated to be member of Union if he is shown to have paid subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month Member would be treated to be in arrears for calendar month if he has actually not paid subscription by end of concerned calendar month for which it was due Explanation to Section 3(25) refers to proviso which precedes it and qualifies term "Arrears of Subscription" but it does not travel backward so as to qualify entirely a different phraseology found in main part of Section 3(25) about payment of subscription of not less than 25 paise per
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calendar month Words "arrears for period of more than 3 calendar months cannot be equated with "3 calendar months" Continuous period of three calendar months is not found in proviso to Section 3(25) Proviso requires defaulting members to pay subscription for requisite calendar months subsequently to satisfy authorities that during period of six months immediately preceding month in question which is on anvil of scrutiny he had so behaved that subscription was not in arrears for period of more than three calendar months failing within relevant period of six months Period of more than three months deals with time span during relevant period of six months and not continuous period of three months Provision in BIR Act is based on principle of Industrial Democracy Proviso has to be construed to subserve legislative intent of industrial democracy and collective bargaining Interpretation which fructifies benevolent scheme guaranteeing continuance of membership has to be preferred. An application was moved by the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union before the Registrar functioning under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act for cancellation of Registration of Respondent No. 4 Union as a representative union of workmen in the textile industry for the local area of Bombay. The Additional Registrar, after finding that the Membership of Respondent No. 4 had gone below the minimum requirement for registration i.e. 25% for the period of continuous three calendar months, declined to cancel the registration on the ground that during the relevant three months there was strike in the textile industry in Bombay and, therefore, the workers could not pay their subscriptions. The said Order of the Additional Registrar of Trade Unions resulted in two cross Appeals before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra. The Industrial Court, Maharashtra, dismissed the appeal filed by the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union under Section 15 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Writ petition was filed challenging the Order of the Industrial Court and the same was dismissed by the Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. On a certificate of fitness granted by the Bombay High Court, this civil appeal. Held: A mere look at Section 3(25) shows that the definition of a "Member" which applied in the relevant time and which is in the same form on the statute book till date clearly indicates that a person can be a member of a Union if he satisfies the following two requirements: i) that he is an ordinary member of a Union and (ii) he has paid the subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month. The "Ordinary Member of a Trade Union" connotes a member employee workman engaged in the concerned industry and who is other than an ex officio member of the Union. Thus, an ordinary member of a Trade Union would be an employee in that industry with which the trade union is concerned and would not include honorary or temporary members, like office bearers. Further, Section 3(25) requires that for such an ordinary member to be treated as member of the Union it has to be shown that he has paid the subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month. A small amount of minimum 25 paise is required to be shown to have been paid by such an ordinary member for the given calendar month. It is not as if the subscription must be shown to have been paid by such ordinary member on or before the end of the concerned calendar month. The legislature has advisedly used the terminology "has paid a subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month". It has obviously not used the phraseology "has paid a subscription of not less than 25 paise before the end of a calendar month." The phrase "has paid" is very significant. Payment of subscription of such a meager amount of 25 paise per calendar month at any point of time for any of the past calendar months would entitle such member to continue on the roll of membership of a Union. If he pays at a time, say Re.1/ covering the subscription for each of the calendar months i.e. December 1981, January 1982, February 1982 and March 1982, itself, he can
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legitimately say that he has paid subscription of not less than 25 paise per each of the aforesaid calendar months. It is not the requirement of the main part of Section 3(25) that such subscription should have been paid on or before the expiry of the concerned calendar month. The explanation of the aforesaid Section discl6ses a different legislative intention. While considering the question of arrears of subscription per calendar month, the requirement of the provision is entirely different. A member would be treated to be in arrears for that calendar month if he has actually not paid such subscription by the end of the concerned calendar month for which it was due. The explanation naturally is a reference to the proviso which precedes it and qualifies the term "arrears of subscription" but it does not travel backward any further so as to qualify entirely a different phraseology found in the main part of Section 3(25) of the BIR Act about the payment of subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month. Therefore, if on facts it is found that subscription for the relevant 3 calendar months has already been paid up by the concerned member even in lumpsum at a later point of time after the expiry of the calendar month concerned such payment in lumpsum may ensure for his continuance as a member if he so behaved and paid up subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month concerned. The legislature has enacted a safety valve and a road block against such activities of the Union to sustain application under Section 3(25) of the BIR Act whose registration was sought to be cancelled on the relevant date. (Para 8) On a conjoint reading of the proviso to Section 3(25) and the explanation attached thereto, it becomes clear that even if a person may have paid the subscription of not less than 25 paise per calendar month for the relevant three calendar months at a time subsequently and, therefore, may have remained out of the sweep of the main part of Section 3(25), his membership is liable to be displaced if he is hit by the proviso and the explanation. Meaning thereby, if a member is shown to have paid subscription for December 1981, January and February 1982 in March or April 1982, and who can legitimately contend that he had paid subscription of not less than 25 paise per each of these calendar months his membership for each of these calendar months which would remain guaranteed under the first part under Section 3(25) would be deemed to be non existent once the provisions of the proviso and the explanation hit such membership. The proviso requires such a defaulting member who seeks to pay up subscription of requisite calendar months at a time subsequently to satisfy the authorities that during the period of 6 months immediately preceding the month in question which is on the anvil of the scrutiny, he had so behaved that his subscription was not in arrears for a period of more than 3 calendar months falling within the aforesaid six months. In other words, for deciding whether a person was an ordinary member of respondent No. 4 union in the month of December 1981, which is the first month on the anvil of scrutiny for the purpose of consideration of appellant's application under Section 15(b)(ii) of the Act, the period of six months immediately preceding such time, namely December 1981, will consist of the block from June 1981 to November 1981. It has to be shown by the respondent No. 4 Union that its members concerned had not been in arrears of subscription for more than 3 calendar months during the period beginning from June 1981 and ending by November 1981. If it is shown that such a person had so behaved and had not attracted the adverse effect laid down in the proviso, then only such member will be treated to have continued as per the main part of Section 3(25) but if it is shown that during the block June 1981 to November 1981, for a period of more than 3 calendar months he was in arrears, meaning thereby, as seen from the explanation to the proviso, the subscription of such a member for a particular calendar month during this period was not paid up by the end of the calendar month concerned. Such a member would be treated to be in arrears for that calendar month and even if he had paid such arrears by next month, his subscription for the calendar month would be treated to have remained in arrears. If such arrears cover more than 3 calendar months then his payment of subscription for December 1981
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will be of no avail. This safety valve has been enacted by the legislature to provide for a contingency in which such chronic defaulters in clearing the arrears of subscription may not get a locus paenitentiae and may not also afford an equal locus paenitentiae for their union to get subscription paid up in lumpsum. subsequently for each of the three calendar months on the anvil of scrutiny in proceedings for cancellation of representative character of such unions. (Para 9) The BIR Act is based on the principle of Industrial Democracy. Any provision of the Act which tries to cater to the needs of these illiterate masses of workmen has to be so interpreted as to subserve the legislative intent underlying the principles of industrial democracy and collective bargaining guaranteed by the Act. Any interpretation which fructifies such benevolent scheme and which guarantees continuance of membership of such illiterate masses of workmen has to be preferred to the interpretation which frustrates the scheme underlying such a benevolent enactment. The deeming fiction contained in the proviso to Section 3(25) for dis membering a person, has therefore, to be raised only on a strict construction of the proviso and not on a liberal construction of such a disabling provision. (Para 10) The application of Maharashtra Gimi Karngar Union for cancellation of registration of Respondent No. 4 under Section 15 of the BIR Act would fail as the requirements of the said provisions to the effect that for each of the three relevant months preceding March 1982, February 1982 and also for June 1982, the respondent No. 4's Membership must be said to have fallen below 25% would not remain established. Even if for one month of December 1981 the membership is above the requisite 25 % the application has to fail. (Para 11) The phrase "period of more than three calendar months" necessarily takes in its fold the conduct of the defaulting member with reference to not only three calendar months but more than three calendar months meaning at least 4 months if not more than four calendar months within the block period of six calendar months immediately preceding the month in question. (Para 12) Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union v. S. Bhattacharji. [1999] Sections 42(4) and 85 Workman's refusal to accept lower type of work Unless Industrial Court in revision could hold that work offered was equal to work he was doing earlier, it could not revise Labour Court's order. This writ petition was filed by a workman of the respondent company challenging an order of the Industrial Court passed in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. By its impugned order the Industrial Court dismissed the claim of the petitioner that the respondent's action in not assigning him work as Helper but offering in another Department work as "Begari" which was of a lower type of work, was illegal and his prayer for a direction to the respondent to assign him the usual work of a Helper was disallowed. The High Court quashed the impugned order. Held: The High Court observed that it was not possible for the Industrial Court to interfere with the Labour Court's finding unless the Industrial Court itself came to the conclusion on appreciation of evidence that the work of "Begari" was equivalent to the work of 'helper'. In the absence of such finding, the Industrial Court had no ground for interfering with the Labour Court's order. (Para 8) Singraj
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Sewaswaini v. Kanzala Mills Ltd. [1999] Section 97(l)(b) Dismissal of employee after illegal strike followed by compromise before Industrial Court Categorical admission by employee of having accepted fresh employment in pursuance of compromise Employee's claim of gratuity on ground of continuous service rejected Interest at 12% for delayed payment, however allowed Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 Sections 2 A and 4. Ramappa Bhimappa v. Phoenix Mills Ltd. [1999] Section 119 D Dismissal of employee without enquiry Subsistence allowance during pendency of proceeding in Labour Court Should be paid. These Writ Petitions challenge the orders passed by the Industrial Court, Vadodara. The question that came up for consideration is : When the employer, without any enquiry, dismisses or discharges his worker and if the worker approaches the Labour Court, is the employer to pay an amount to the worker equal to subsistence allowance during the pendency of the proceedings in the Labour Court. The Petitioner in both the Writ Petitions is a Co operative Bank. The relationship between the petitioner Bank and its workmen is governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The workers involved are a clearing clerk and a peon. The allegation was that a cheque dated January 23, 1996 for Rs. 41,360 which was meant for a third party was got credited by the peon in the Current Account of his father with the active connivance of the clearing clerk. Therefore both these workers were discharged straightaway as the Bank Management thought it unnecessary to have a departmental enquiry since the Bank had lost its confidence in the workmen. Held: If the employer dispenses with the enquiry which is mandatory the employee cannot be made to suffer. It is open to the employer to suspend the employee during the period of enquiry on payment of subsistence allowance. However, if the employer chooses not to hold the enquiry and straightaway dismisses the employee this protection to receive the subsistence allowance until the charge is proved has got to be extended to the employee. In such a situation the Labour Court should grant an amount equal to subsistence allowance during the pendency of the proceeding in the Labour Court. Otherwise the provision for subsistence allowance will be made nugatory and the employee will be made to starve though the charge is yet to be proved. Section 119 D of B.I.R. Act empowers the Labour Court to pass such interim orders in appropriate cases. (Para 16) The plea of termination simpliciter even if permitted under the Standing Order is also not tenable for the reason that the present case is obviously one involving specific allegation of misconduct and therefore a departmental enquiry is necessary to prove the allegation and the employee cannot be terminated by simple one month's notice. The power to simply terminate is held to be bad in law, Even if such power is there, it cannot be invoked where it is a case of specific allegation of misconduct. (Para 19) Holding of a departmental enquiry particularly where it is so provided in the service regulations or
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Standing Orders is a rule and dispensing with the same is an exception. If the employer does not want an employee to be in actual service during the pendency of an enquiry, he may suspend him but during that period he has to pay him subsistence allowance as provided in the Standing Orders. In the absence of any such Standing Orders, the ad judicatory authority can grant such allowance. Where there are insurmountable difficulties in holding Enquiry and where such difficulty is created by the employees, the employer cannot be blamed if he straightaway proceeds to discharge or dismiss the employee. (Para 30) What applies to subsistence allowance at departmental level will also apply equally to such an allowance or amount equivalent to such an allowance paid in Labour Court, since the enquiry in the Labour Court is held at the instance of the employer, something which the employer ought to have done at departmental level. Hence, the doctrine of relation back will not affect the grant of subsistence allowance in any way. (Para 39) Subsistence allowance is to be paid to tide over the immediate difficulties and, by the very nature of it the same is non refundable. (Para 39) Bharat Co operative Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Baria, Judge, Labour Court. [1999]
BOMBAY PORT TRUST RULES OF PROVIDENT FUND

Rule 16 Enquiry as contemplated in said Rule, pending which payment of Board's contribution to provident fund was not to be made, was domestic enquiry Withholding such payment on ground of pending criminal case is held not justified. Vasant Ramkrishna Bhide v. Board of Trustees of Port. [1999]
BONDED LABOUR
Directions of Supreme Court for rehabilitation of 445 families in State of Bihar Contempt petition for not complying directions Supreme Court calling for report from District Judge On examining report, held, no case made out for contempt proceedings. This was a contempt petition by a person who formed the Society to which the State Government gave construction work for rehabilitating 445 families of bonded labourers in Banda village of the State of Bihar. The rehabilitation was on the directions of the Supreme Court issued in a writ petition, The contempt petition alleged that the State Government had not complied with directions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court called for a report from the District Judge. Upon receipt of the report, the Supreme Court found there was no case for initiating contempt proceedings against the State of Bihar. It therefore dismissed the contempt petition. Held: The Supreme Court observed that it had been monitoring this case over a decade by issuing interim orders from time to time. It was satisfied, the Supreme Court said, that the State Government had substantially complied with its directions. The Supreme Court, however issued certain directions in the nature of suggestions for the consideration and compliance of the State Government. (Para 5) Kameshwar Prasad Shanna v. State of Bihar. [1999]
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BONDED LABOUR SYSTEM (ABOLITION) ACT, 1976

Complaint of bonded labourers ; suffering and of inadequate measures by State authorities for their rehabilitation Directions given. The petitioner, who was chairperson of a Bonded Labour Liberation Front, alleged existence of bonded labourers in certain villages in the Mirzapur District and the failure of the State Government to take adequate measures for their rehabilitation. The High Court disposed of the petition by giving, directions. Held: The High Court was not satisfied with the averments made in the counter affidavit and therefore directed that an enquiry be conducted by the District or Additional District Magistrate and speaking order passed relating to the rehabilitation (of the bonded labourers), with opportunity given to the petitioner and information furnished as to where and how those bonded labourers were settled. (Paras 6 & 7) Champa Srivastava v. State Of U.P. [1999] Section 13 Committee with Director General, Labour Welfare of Union Government or very senior officer as convener be set up to check particulars furnished by petitioner and identify bonded labour, to collect all relevant material and assist Supreme Court to make further directions in terms of requirement of scheme to rehabilitate them. The Supreme Court had not concluded the matter after giving certain directions regarding bonded Labour and the present petition was there heard which alleged that certain persons who were said to be freed bonded Labour had to be rehabilitated in terms of a scheme framed for the purpose. Held: The Supreme Court directed the immediate setting up of a Committee with Director General, Labour Welfare or a very senior officer from his establishment as its convener to check up within 6 weeks the particulars provided in the list by the petitioner and collect all relevant material as to assist the Supreme Court to make further directions for the rehabilitation of bonded Labour. (Paras 4 & 5) Bandhua Mukhti Morcha v. Union of India. [1999] Section 6 Every obligation of bonded labour to repay any bonded debt remaining unsatisfied on commencement of Act gets extinguished Appointment of officer to ensure implementation of Court's order, made. The Supreme Court's concern for exploring ways and means to rehabilitate bonded Labour is writ large in this judgment. Held: As both sides agreed that further action was necessary for implementing the Supreme Court's orders and indicated that the then Additional Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar might be appointed to carry out the further work to ensure complete implementation of Court's orders, the Supreme Court directed the appointment and issued the necessary directions in this behalf. (Para 3) Chakkalackal T. v. State of Bihar. [1999]
BORDER SECURITY FORCE RULES, 1969

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Rules 16(5), 45 B and 46 Object of Rule 46 Once Commandant of accused person is likely to be a witness, independent authority not under control of Commandant has to take action Punishment held not justified as it was a case of no evidence. Jha B.N. v. Union of India. [1999]
CADRE
Constitution of local fund service, with equality in time scales and same duties and degree of responsibilities for posts Persons working in Octroi sections do not constitute separate cadre Grouping them with others in general section held therefore cannot be impugned Orissa Municipal Act Section 81. State of Orissa v. Kishore Chandra Samal. [1999]
CALCUTTAPORT COMMISSIONER'S EMPLOYEES (DISCIPLINE & APPEAL) RULES

Rules 9 & 10 Compulsory retirement Penalty of Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 Section 25Chairman of Port Trust Whether competent to impose compulsory retirement without sanction of Central Government Held: In view of provisions of Calcutta Port Commissioners' Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, Chairman competent to impose penalty without approval of Central Government. Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Ghosh. [1999]
CANARA BANK OFFICER EMPLOYEES (DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL) REGULATIONS 1976

Regulation 8(2) Banking Companies (Ac question and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 Section 19 Delinquent seeking disciplinary authority to hold impartial enquiry Minor. penalty imposed without an enquiry Held, it is not proper. Sundaram G. v. General Manager, (Disciplinary Authority) Canara Bank, Bangalore. [1999]
CANARA BANK SERVICE CODE

Chapter 11 Regulation 21(3)(b) On reinstatement, employee entitled to full pay and allowance during period of suspension. Ramaswamy P. v. General Manager, Canara Bank. [1999]
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Chapter XI Regulations 4(d) and 20Suspension Merges with dismissal Upon dismissal being set aside by appellate authority, suspension order will not survive Hence period between date of suspension and date of dismissal has to be treated as on duty for purpose of service benefits. Canara Bank v. Ramachandrappa. [1999]
CANTEENS
Canteen functioning as facility to provide refreshments to employees With object of improving their efficiency Unity of Management and functional integrality between canteen and establishment, present Maya of legal appearances ought to be avoided Canteen workers, held, engaged in work incidentally connected with main activities of State Electricity Board. Present writ petitioners were workers in the canteen attached to the office of the first respondent Electricity Board. They were aggrieved that they did not get pay on par with the regular employees of the Board. Hence their present writ petitions seeking relief of such parity in pay. The High Court upheld the claim of the petitioners and issued consequential directions. Held: The High Court observed that there was unity of management and functional integrally between the workers in the canteen and those in other wings of the Board. (Para 7) The High Court further observed that it discerned the plain truth camouflaged in artistic umbrella of legal terminology. The petitioners were held to be engaged in work which was incidentally connected with the main activities of the Electricity Board. (Para 9) The petitioners could therefore certainly claim, said the High Court, that they were entitled to be treated alike and paid equal pay for equal work. (Para 10) Ananda v. Karnataka Electricity Board, Bangalore. [1999] Demand of employees in non statutory canteen for parity of emoluments with regular employees of Electricity Board Not sustainable in absence of any legal obligation on part of Board. Karnataka Electricity Board, Bangalore v. Ananda. [1999] Difference between ordinary and statutory canteen (i.e. within meaning of Section 46 of Factories Act, 1948) Principles governing canteen employees' relationship with principal employer If obligation to provide canteen is explicit or implicit in service conditions, workers employed in such canteen become employees of management (principal employer). Workmen in the Indian Overseas Bank Staff canteens represented by their union agitated their claim to be treated as workmen of the Bank, (the canteens having been run by local implementation committees), first before the Industrial Tribunal and later before a single Judge in writ petitions filed by the Bank against a decision of the Tribunal in favour of the Union. Hence the present writ appeals by the union,
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which were allowed. Held: The High Court discussed the principles governing canteen employees' relationship with the principal employer. The normal rule was that workers employed in canteens governed by the Factories Act were employees of the management. The obligation to provide might be explicit or implicit under an agreement or award etc. (Para 3) On the facts of the case and applying the aforesaid principles, the High Court found that the Bank had an obligation to run the canteens and had in fact been running them by one or other kind of agency. Hence the award of the Tribunal was restored and the judgment of the single Judge was set aside. (Paras 6 and 8) Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union v. Indian Overseas Bank. [1999]
CASUAL WORKERS
Casual Labour Absorption of Ex casual labourer regardless of number of working days, could be absorbed if he was graduate Scheme for absorbing ex casual labourers being benevolent one has to be interpreted in manner which furthers its object. This reference to a Full Bench arose as a result of a view taken by a single Judge and Division Bench different from the one taken by an earlier Division Bench. The said earlier Division Bench took the view that under a Memo of the respondent Board evolving a scheme for absorption of its ex casual labourers, not educational qualification, but number of working days was the criterion. The Full Bench held the Division Bench could not be taken as laying down the law correctly. Held: The Full Bench observed that setting priority to educational qualification in the context of the post held was easily discernible from the scheme. Having regard to the benevolent purpose of the scheme in accommodating ex casual labour, it became necessary, the High Court said, for it to interpret the scheme in a manner which furthered its object. (Para 7) In the circumstances it was held that the petitioner, seeking absorption in the post of Lower Division Clerk, was eligible to be considered for the post of LDC/Revenue Cashier. (Para 8) Pippalla Surya Bhagavan v. Member Secretary, APSEB, Hyderabad. [1999]
CATEGORISATION
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Sections 3(l)(b), 4(l)(iii) and 5(2) Notification under Categorisation of employees working in open cast mines with employees in underground mines Effect of notification was to make unequal as equal Such categorisation unknown to statutory guidelines Held, not permissible in law. Essel Mining & Industries Limited v. Union of India. [1999]
CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) RULES, 1965

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Rule 24 Service rules do not expressly or by implication take away jurisdiction of Civil Courts Civil suit challenging dismissal from service held maintainable. Appellant was dismissed from service pursuant to departmental proceedings against him and he filed a civil suit for declaration that the dismissal was void and illegal and for reinstatement. The suit had a chequered career; it met with dismissal in the Trial Court, success in the first appeal before the District Judge, but again dismissal in the second appeal before a Single Judge of the High Court. Hence the present appeal to the Supreme Court by the dismissed servant. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, and remitted matter for fresh decision. Held: The Supreme Court minced no words to express its disapproval of the Single Judge's impugned order. The opinion on which it was based, was that in view of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted from dealing with an order passed by the disciplinary authority and hence the suit of the appellant was according to the Single Judge not maintainable. This opinion, the Supreme Court said, was palpably erroneous. (Para 5) Service Rules neither expressly nor by implication have taken away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to deal with service matters. According to the Supreme Court the opinion of the Single Judge did violence both to the Code of Civil Procedure, the Specific Relief Act and the Service Rules. (Para 6) Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura. [1999]
CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CONDUCT) RULES, 1964

Rule 3(l)(i) and (iii) Order holding petitioner Teacher guilty of claiming house rent allowance on false documents, found not based on relevant evidence Impugned order set aside. Held: A teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya filed this petition impugning an order against him passed by the disciplinary authority for recovery of sum paid as house rent and imposing a penalty of reduction of pay by one stage. The High Court allowed the petition as it found the impugned order suffering from the infirmity of ignoring the relevant evidence on record. (Para 5) Pramod Kumar T. v. Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, New Delhi. [1999]
CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (EXTRA ORDINARY PENSION) RULES

Schedule I A Pension Disability pension Disease contracted after entering service and not appearing to have been caused by irregular or intemperate habits Burden of proving that disease is not attributable to, or aggravated by Government Service, lay on Government Burden not discharged Government servant held entitled to disability pension, although 10 years of required service had not been completed.
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The respondent in this appeal, in a little over 7 years of service in the CRPF obtained directions in a writ petition filed by him for getting disability pension. The present writ appeal was field by the Government challenging the said directions. The High Court dismissed the writ appeal. Held: The High Court observed that the respondent had contracted the illness leading to his disability after many years of service and the disability did not appear to have been caused by irregular or intemperate habits. The appellant Government on whom the burden of proof lay, had not established that the disease (disability) was not attributable to, or aggravated by, service in Government. (Para 8) Union of India v. Alex Varghese. [1999]
CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICE (PENSION) RULES, 1972

l
Withholding of or withdrawing of pension That Rule can be invoked only in cases where pecuniary loss is caused to Government not sus tainable Pension can be withheld or withdrawn in all cases of grave misconduct or negligence of duty during service. Union of India v. B. Dev. [1999]
Rule 8, Explanation (b) Grave misconduct Definition not exhaustive Expression 'grave misconduct' includes communication or disclosure of any official secret Not correct to conclude that, that only kind of misconduct which should be held to be grave is communication of official secret. (Para 9) Union of India v. B. Dev. [1999]
Rule 9 Grave misconduct Withholding of pension Government Officer posted abroad charged of un authorised absence and disobedience of Govt. order to join duty in India Also charged with lack of devotion to duty and conduct unbecoming of Govt. servant Excuses given for not joining duty in India untenable Disobedience of orders to join duty found willful Conduct of officer premeditated as he has purchased house at London indicating he had no intention to return to India No legitimate reason found for absenting from duty or refusing to join at Delhi Finding that he is guilty of grave misconduct proper Order withholding of pension also proper. Union of India v. B. Dev. [1999]
Rule 54(14)(b)(i) Father will not be entitled to get family pension, as he will not be considered a member of employee's family However, ex gratia payment was directed to be made in circumstances of case. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kedar Nath Sood. [1999]
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ABSENCE FROM DUTY

Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra. [1999]

ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT RULES

ANDHRA BANK (OFFICERS) SERVICE REGULATIONS

ANDHRA PRADESH COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT, 1964

ANDHRA PRADESH EDUCATION ACT, 1982

Ad hoc appointment Vacancies Miscellaneous 1. ADHOC APPOINTMENT

APPRENTICES ACT, 1961

APPRENTICES TRAINING RULES, 1961

ARMY RULES, 1954

BANK OF COCHIN SERVICES CODE

BANK OF INDIA GRATUITY RULES

BANK OF INDIA OFFICER EMPLOYEE9S (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS, 1976

BANK OF INDIA OFFICER EMPLOYEES' (DISCIPLINE & APPEAL) REGULATIONS, 1976

BANKING COMPANIES (ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS) ACT, 1970

BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949

BEEDI AND CIGAR WORKERS (CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT) ACT, 1966

BEEDI WORKERS WELFARE FUND ACT, 1976

BENGAL PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT, 1913

BIHAR PENSION RULES

BIHAR SERVICE CODE

BOMBAY CIVIL SERVICE RULES, 1959

BOMBAY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT, 1946

BOMBAY PORT TRUST RULES OF PROVIDENT FUND

BONDED LABOUR SYSTEM (ABOLITION) ACT, 1976

BORDER SECURITY FORCE RULES, 1969

CALCUTTAPORT COMMISSIONER'S EMPLOYEES (DISCIPLINE & APPEAL) RULES

CANARA BANK OFFICER EMPLOYEES (DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL) REGULATIONS 1976

CANARA BANK SERVICE CODE

CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CLASSIFICATION, CONTROL AND APPEAL) RULES, 1965

CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (CONDUCT) RULES, 1964

CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (EXTRA ORDINARY PENSION) RULES

CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICE (PENSION) RULES, 1972

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