Ethics, Counterinsurgency, and Perceptions in the Information Era

By Steven P. Basilici, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: MAJ Basilici argues that in the current Information Era, it is very difficult for a government to win a counterinsurgent war when military members actions do not consistently support stated values. Through analysis of the relationships between values and perceptions in the information realm, he demonstrates how military and interagency members can address current perception challenges.

hroughout US battlefield experience, one can clearly see the relationship between values and actions being played out. In the case of the American Revolution, once the Declaration of Independence was signed and presented to the King of England, the first thing the US Founders did was field a regular European-style army. They understood that their actions had to match their stated values; in order for the Revolution to be seen as honorable and legitimate, they had to act according to the accepted laws of war and be prepared to meet the British in the field. Later, as commander of the Continental Army, Washingtons General Orders of Conduct stated Purity of morals being the only sure foundation of public happiness in any country, and highly conducive to order, subordination, and success in an army, it will be well worthy. As one thinks about the dominant influence the United States enjoys today as the world superpower, one might think the US is somewhat arrogant in its assertions. But, the preamble and Articles I and II of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed on 10 December 1948 and translated into over 300 languages, state much the same. From antiquity to the present there has been cultural tension over different views of what is right and what is wrong, and almost all cultures desire to apply their values universally to the rest of the world. When a nation chooses to go to war and exercises its sovereign right to use military force, it must act in a way that is ethically acceptable and morally justifiable in the eyes of its people. Especially challenged is the country that

justifies its choice to go to war based upon universally stated values and then in the conduct of that war consistently acts in ways that do not support those values. A Theory on the Dynamics of War in the 21st Century In the current Information Era, the technological advances that make up the information environment have actualized the people component of the what we know as the Clausewitzian Trinity

technological advances that have greatly increased, and are continuing to increase exponentially, the speed and diffusion of information; 2) the opening-up of freemarket enterprise to the entire world as argued by Thomas Friedman in The World Is Flat, and Martin Van Creveld in The Rise and Decline of the State; and 3) the global consensus of acceptable conduct based upon the values outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally accepted bodies of law. These three forces synergistically make up the powerful phenomenon that is actualizing the people component of warfare. Universally Acknowledged Values The effects of globalization have led to an increased awareness and consensus of universally acknowledged values that have been championed by the UN, and are now being enforced through NATOs ability to project military power. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) embodies principles that have been agreed upon by most signatory members of the United Nations and is one of the most widely used tools for applying diplomatic and moral pressure on governments. Although not a legally binding document, it is the foundation for the original two legallybinding UN human rights Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and is widely referred to by academics and constitutional courts. While in the past the UN has often been criticized as an inept, powerless body,

UN delegates discuss the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (US Dept of State) (CT). This is the theory that war is a manifestation of the relationship among the people of a nation, the military of that nation, and the government. As events unfold on the battlefield and are instantaneously reported in the information environment, perceptions are created that can affect the outcome of the war. Because of the power of perception, IO has become an overarching line of operation in the conduct of war. Three forces have converged in the information environment to greatly increase the importance of the people component of the CT. These are: 1) the

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it does represent an international be the strategic and operational level forum for debate on the conduct of planners first objectives. warfare. Furthermore, since the end Through reporting of events of the Cold War the UN has gained that create perceptions ofor influence and increased authority highlight actual disconnects through organizations that have the betweenactions and values, power to enforce their charters. we create a general consensus Perhaps the most significant that may influence strategic-level example of the necessity for decision makers. Furthermore, internationally accepted statements these perceptions are compounding of value is the Cairo Declaration of and prone to distortion. This is like Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). the childs game whisper-downThe drafting and ratification of this Perceptions shared on the world stage, via global the-lane, where children in a circle significant declaration, by the 19th secretly whisper a short phrase to media. (Defense Link) Conference of Foreign Ministers in one another, in order to laugh at playing field within the information Cairo on 5 August 1990, established how distorted that phrase becomes. Shariah law as the only source of environment is much more evenly In the same way, final understanding of reference for the protection of human matched than foes on the physical an initial action will also have become rights in Islamic countries. In the view of battlefield. The speed and diffusion of distorted by ever growing assumptions the 57 member states of the Organization information and its effect on global or and perceptions. Brigadier General of the Islamic Conference (OIC), regional perception has become a crucial Vincent Brooks, former US Army acknowledgement of this declaration line of operation for governments and Chief of Public Affairs, calls these established its supremacy over the UDHR their militaries. This is particularly true growing and changing perceptions the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the ethical conduct of warfare because ink-blot phenomenon. The initial Articles 24 and 25], based on the divine of an equalization of power between perception widens just like an ink-blot revelation of the writings of Mohammed state and non-state opponents. as it takes on more and more mutations, and the Quran. The necessity of such a First, for the insurgent the war is making it very difficult to accurately document became increasingly apparent total, while for a foreign government understand the facts of the initial action. to UN representatives of Islamic states, it is necessarily limited. Because the In all information events concerning a such as the Rajaie-Khorassani of Iran, foreign government sees the war as a counterinsurgents unethical behavior, it who stated that the UDHR could not limited and possibly protracted conflict, is difficult to combat wrong perceptions be implemented by Muslims and did fighting a total war is as politically and relate the facts of what really not accord with the system of values unfeasible as fully mobilizing all their happened. Furthermore, it is difficult for recognized by the Islamic Republic of resources. Further, the government must the counterinsurgent government to reIran. As in the Biblical justification continually justify positions and actions; enfranchise the people, despite efforts to for the destruction of the enemies of they must sell or market the war in a way counter negative events through followIsrael, the Reformers dispute against that sustains the popular will of their up reporting of corrective actions. the Catholic Church of the 14th and 15th constituentstheir people. Because of Understanding that legitimacy is of centuries, and the Founding Fathers the inherent limitations imposed upon utmost importance in counterinsurgent reasoning for carrying out the American the foreign power, the guerrilla can war is not a new concept. But with the Revolution in the 18th century, the OIC win simply by not losing, whereas the advent of the Information Era, when a today is appealing to what they believe counterinsurgent power can lose by not tactical-level action (i.e. one considered is a higher authority. The OIC upholds winning. When the influence of global an atrocity) is placed into the information the CDHRI, which is based upon the perception is added to this equation, environment, it can have an adverse writings of Mohammed and the Quran, especially when the counterinsurgent strategic effect much more quickly than over what they perceive to be a wholly is trying to mitigate global perceptions in times past. In fact, even alleged secular document. of his own unethical conduct, the true unethical behavior can have almost challenge of modern counterinsurgent instantaneous adverse effects. While the The Information Era of Warfare warfare begins to surface. Actions flow of information may be manageable, The actions of militaries are being must consistently support stated values the management of consequence is not. scrutinized by the global community in because a perception of legitimacy, and The Tipping Point such a way that how they accomplish through it popular will to support the war, their missions has become just as must be maintained. Because perception Author Malcolm Gladwells 2000 important as successfully accomplishing and popular will are the key components best seller The Tipping Point explains their missions. More importantly, the of counterinsurgent warfare, they must how a combination of key elements

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can have powerful effects. In his sharing a collective identity as a Diaspora Spectrum Information Operations. online question-and-answer website, within a globally networked Islamic MG Chiarelli and others in Iraq are Mr. Gladwell states that ideas and society. The collective conscience of relearning what the US Founding Fathers behavior and messages and products this disenfranchised community felt took for granted as common knowledge: sometimes behave just like outbreaks they were being maltreated by French when a people feel their basic rights are of infectious disease. They are social society, and in a larger sense that being violated, they rebel. Therefore, epidemics. His theory is that three they were at war with the West. Such everything the counterinsurgent does phenomena work together to cause feelings fueled, grew, and sustained must send the message that it is necessary tipping points: contagious behavior; the the riots and destruction well beyond for the protection of those inalienable fact that little causes can have big effects; the expectations of French authorities. rights. Ted Gurr explains this as value and change happens not gradually but This collective identity is enabled and expectations, where people perceive at one dramatic moment. He further fostered through globally networked relative deprivation of the conditions states there are three types of people information connectivity. When looking of life to which people believe they are responsible for much of the change for Gladwells mavens, connectors and rightfully entitled. Thus, conditions experienced in society: connectors, salespersons, we need look no further have been set for collective violence. In mavens, and salesmen. Connectors than the information environment. Military Review, MG Chiarelli and Major are those who seem to know everyone; Patrick Michaelis wrote they came to the A New Reality in the Conduct of they collect people through weak ties realization that because of the power of Warfare friendly yet casual acquaintances. the media and the speed of information Mavens are people who accumulate flow, their divisions daily tactical In Why the Strong Lose, Jeffrey operations were being played out not knowledge. They are what we in the military call subject matter experts or Record notes America has a tendency only locally on the streets of Baghdad, go to people, and are living data banks to separate war and politicsto view but both nationally and internationally. of specific or general knowledge. They observed: According to Gladwell salesmen are The actions of soldiers and persuaders, uniquely charismatic leaders and their efforts on the people who seem to have answers ground can resonate at a strategic to any objection. Tipping-point level in an instant. Shaping the salesmen are so good at defeating message and tying that message to any objections to their products, operations is as important, if not they are almost always successful at more so, to the desired individual persuading their targeted audience. effect as the previous five lines of When the tipping point theory is operations. adapted to 21st century warfare, and Figure 1. Full Spectrum Information Operations. The challenge to the American especially counterinsurgent warfare, military institution today is acting one finds all of its characteristics present military victory as an end in itself, on the sentiments and hard-learned ignoring wars function as an instrument lessons of MG Chiarelli and others. in the information environment. In the Information Era, the little of policy. In other words, American However, realizing what is necessary and causes that can have big effects are military commanders are fixated on doing what is necessary are two different the unethical actions on the battlefield the kinetic fight and have forgotten the things. The US militarys use of the reported or captured in written, audio, non-physical nature of war. This is an information environment and information or visual form. The contagious especially critical mistake to make in operations as a line of operation is sorely behavior is the ever-increasing sharing irregular, asymmetric warfare when lacking at the operational and strategic and networking of information. The the objective is building legitimacy and levels. The military seems to have a dramatic change, or tipping point, sustaining political will in order to win, serious aversion to the mediawhich comes when these things working rather than physically destroying the is not entirely unjustifiable. The media together spark action in the physical enemy. American commanders in Iraq industry has consistently shown the world, as seen all across France with over the last few years have learned this bottom line is its priority, and the the November 2005 Muslim youth riots. lesson. Major General Peter Chiarelli bottom line is based on what sells: These incidents were reportedly sparked related this truth graphically in a Power death, destruction, and the perception by the suspicious deaths of two Muslim Point briefing on how he dealt with of corruption. By and large, media youths electrocuted in a Paris electricity insurgents in Sadr City in Iraq. As reporting practices have been extremely sub-station. The suspicious perception Figure 1 shows, MG Chiarelli came to damaging to the perception of what the of this event acted as a tipping point understand that everything he did had war-fighter has been trying to accomplish within the Muslim communitya group to be nested in what he called Full on the ground, thus damaging both

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US popular will (people) and political Qaeda were able to organize through will (government). More specifically, global collaborative networks. Al Qaeda the majority of the reporting has been could raise and transfer the necessary focused on those events that actually funds to equip, train, coordinate and serve to emphasize only the negative then successfully execute 9/11: the single aspects of the counterinsurgency. Time most devastating attack ever perpetrated and again, the media has created the on US soil. perception of a disconnect between In a stunning counteroffensive, the American actions and values. If the United States successfully attacked first principle of legitimacy is as critical as the Afghanistan and then Iraq, destroying Joint Publication for Military Operations government, military, and terrorist Other Than War (MOOTW) states: entities within those countries and committed forces must sustain replacing them with indigenous, the legitimacy of the operation and of democratic forms of government. While the host government to create a strong the justification of Americas second impulse to support the action then the preemptive offensive into Iraq is a point US military planner must harness the of heated debate and controversy, both incredibly fast moving dynamics of the the US Congress and the UN Security information environment with a global Council explicitly or tacitly authorized vision. President Bush to use military force. Of Planners must do this through all of the mediums of the information environment, in a way that reflects ethical conduct that supports stated values, that is honest and transparent, and that will magnify the effects of combat actions on the ground. The people component of CT has become too powerful not to consider. Furthermore, the people component no longer simply refers to the people of the counterinsurgents nation, but to Figure 2. Perceptions created through the a globally networked series of Information Environment. nations and non-state groups such (Associated Press) as the Muslim Diaspora. Abu Ghraib The world has changed more in the last three decades than in the fifty previous years. If the 1970 My Lai incident in Vietnam marked the awakening of the people component of the CT, then the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has shown it to be fully actualized as a much more decisive influence in the conduct of war. With the overwhelming US military dominance in every aspect of conventional war fighting, adversaries had no place to go except to the unconventional realm. Enabled by connectivity to the worldwide information environment, non-state and transnational organizations such as Al key importance to this article is that UN Security Councils support was essential to such an attack. UNSCR 1441 offered Iraq a final opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations set out in ten separate resolutions since the First Gulf War in 1991, and represented part of the diplomatic reasoning used in justifying the invasion. While this study is not concerned with the geopolitical argument for or against such an attack, the fact the UN is an essential political body in the authorization of a sovereign nations use of force is a critical supportive point. The Abu Ghraib incident occurred in the context of the second military offensive in Iraq. Just 21 days after

an extremely successful offensive operation, coalition forces captured Baghdad and other key cities, toppling Saddam Husseins Baathist regime. Following the extremely successful conventional phase of the war, a complex insurgent war commenced, led by separate factions of the former Baathist party and Islamic extremists. During subsequent military operations, the tactical-level unethical actions at Abu Ghraib took place. The isolated, unethical conduct of a group of Military Police (MP), Military Intelligence (MI), and civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib prison was widely recognized by both government officials, and the media, as having a very serious adverse strategic effect on what the US Government was trying to accomplish in Iraq. The Abu Ghraib incident included various forms of torture and prisoner abuse that included beatings, indecent and sexually embarrassing posturing, threats of electrocution, and the use of police dogs to injure and terrorize prisoners. A concerned soldier turned over pictures of these acts to the military Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Concerned he might get in trouble for bringing this information to light, this same soldier gave a copies of the information to two different news agencies. The images subsequently surfaced in the information environment among many media and Internet sources. These incidents directly affected both the strategic center of gravity of the American publics will and support for the GWOTas well as the operational center of gravity of the Iraqi peoplebecause the images were repugnant to both American and Iraqi sensibilities and values. While official Pentagon and independent panel reports noted the MP and MI relationship represented an aberration when compared to situations at other detention centers, the effects caused by the release of these actions into the information environment was extremely powerful. The Abu Ghraib investigations illustrate how amplification and distortion

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of facts can create a negative perception within American mindsand worse, within Muslim mindsthat does not accurately depict reality. Use of the phrase much had gone terribly wrong in Iraq, plus Americans, connotes general and collective condemnation of Americans as a people, rather than specific condemnation of the individuals responsible for the unethical behavior. The fact only five or six persons at the tactical level were responsible for the Abu Ghraib abuses is irrelevant. The perception of disconnects between actions and values at the national level had been created with both operational and strategic level effects. Even more dramatic is use of the word atrocity in comparisons of Abu Ghraib and the 1970 My Lai incident. While one may acknowledge the relationship between prisoner abuse and the murder of 300 to 500 civilians as unethical, there is an extreme difference between the two. The word atrocity was not attributed to Abu Ghraib by either the independent or Pentagon investigators, and therefore the term is a perfect example of BG Brooks previously noted spreading ink-blot phenomenon. More importantly, USG actions to re-enfranchise people offended by these acts becomes an extremely difficult task. As an organization, the US military is not geared toward winning the battle of perceptions in the information environment. The necessary, comprehensive, generalofficer-level investigations took months to complete, but in the information environment comprehensive and responsive are competitive concepts. Neither the immediate measures taken by the military to prevent further abuse or the disciplinary action taken against the perpetrators, carry anywhere near the impact of the initial reporting of the scandal. The media industry is not in the business of US government/military public affairs. If official representatives do not immediately and transparently inform the people of such events, the suspicion always exists that the truth is not being toldor is being partially covered up.

Thus, the second and third order effects of Abu Ghraib are extremely significant. DOD reaction to the Abu Ghraib incidents caused an avalanche of cascading policies and directives in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A memorandum published by the office of the Secretary of Defense and signed by then-Secretary Donald Rumsfeld followed an over 100 page independent panel review of DOD Detention Operations, as well as multiple reports on US treatment of prisoners in Iraq by the Congressional Research Center. All of this was meant to ensure effective implementation of reforms. At the operational level, joint manuals such as Detainee Operations in the Global War on Terrorism, and Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) were printed for the area of operations. These included an implementation suspense of 30 January 2006. At the tactical level, the Multinational Corps-Iraq produced Detention Operations Dos and Donts Smart Cards. Reporting of any breech in the law of war concerning these issues, by members of the coalition or civilian contractors, became critical information to be reported to commanders immediately upon discovery. Once perceptions have been created in the information environment, they cannot easily be countered. Perception management is one of the biggest concerns for the military, as evidenced by the many institutional fixes implemented in response to these and other unethical actions reported in the information environment. The US Armys PAO Chief is acutely aware the Army doing the right thing by punishing persons found guilty of Uniform Code of Military Justice violations. He is also aware of the immense amount of work that is being done to correct unethical behavior. The investigations, research, doctrinal and policy reviews, and finally the writing and implementation of command directives enforce ethical conduct consistent with the Army values, at every level. Unfortunately, the PAO Chief is also painfully aware that the US Army is not engaging in the information environment as well as it could. One of the PAOs

main missions is to inform people of what is being done to ensure Americans, and the world, that we are acting in a way that embodies our most cherished values. We are definitely not engaging with the needed intensity to counter the negative perceptions of these unethical acts. The unfortunate fact is 90 percent of our effort is expended to ensure actions are transparently reported to the public and to the world; therefore, in a sense, the effort is wasted. Once an unethical act is reported, the damage is donemaking mitigation of perceptions very difficult to counter. The bottom line is that we are losing the war of perceptions being fought in the information environment, because we have not learned how to communicate through it as a battle-space. We have not institutionally learned how to create truth-based, timely effects that serve to inform the people and preserve our freedom of action while leaving the enemy weakened and vulnerable. The war of perceptions, fueled by the relationship between actions and stated values, directly affects both political and popular will. Arguably, the war of perceptions should inform the physical war, as MG Chiarelli argues, at every level. In February of 2006, almost three years after the prisoner abuse scandal was uncovered and released to the public, new pictures (Figure 2) surfaced. This shows how images released in the information environment can make their way back to the street

LTC Nate Sassaman. (US Army)

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in a way that will seriously damage the image of the counterinsurgent. The message sends a very clear message with Lady Liberty pulling the switch that brings torture to the Iraqi. There is perhaps no better visual depiction of Iraqi disenfranchisement, nor a more clear message of the disconnect between American actions and American values. Lieutenant Colonel Sassaman The story of Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman and his mechanized infantry battalion in Iraqs Sunni Triangle brings the juxtaposed dynamics of warfare in the Information Era into sharp focus. On a personal level, his story is one of tested values; but within the context of a counterinsurgent war, it is a story of how important it is to understand the consequences of making decisions inconsistent with national values. LTC Sassaman embodied American religious values as the son of a Methodist preacher, demonstrated American cultural values as a star on the football field in high school and college, and inculcated American military values as a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. Sassaman was a product of his environment, but had a strong sense of personal responsibility and self determination as he led his battalion in Iraq. These values were tested during a very difficult year in Iraq. Sassamans overall approach to dealing with the insurgent problem in his area of responsibility was one of heavy handedness, reflecting the US Armys Cold War mentality and culture. He was exactly what the US Army wanted, expectedand as far as institutional training allowedhad created. He was an aggressive and decisive combat leader. The problem was LTC Sassaman was not fighting a conventional war, but an insurgency. In insurgent warfare, the values one truly believes become difficult to embody; values are tested daily by the ambiguity caused by absence of a clearly identifiable enemy. As one New York Times journalist wrote: [T]he straight lines and rigid hierarchy of the Army that had created him

seemed, like so many other American ideas brought to this murky land, no longer particularly relevant. In the incredibly complex environment of counterinsurgent warfare, and because of the aggressive, heavy handed command climate LTC Sassaman had set, men under his command disregarded the clear protocol established for Iraqi citizens detained after curfew. Through the decisions of one of Sassamans Platoon Leaders, First Lieutenant Jack Saville, soldiers took matters into their own hands, deciding to teach a lesson to a pair of Iraqi men caught out after curfew. 1LT Saville made the decision to force the two men to jump into the Tigris River, instead of following procedure and escorting them to a detention center. Whether intentional or unintentional, their methods reportedly led to the death of one of the two men. Following this incident, LTC Sassaman, one of Americas most professional and outstanding combat leaders, made what is known as an irrevocable decision: [He] decided to flout his 19 years in the Army and his straight-and-narrow upbringing. He turned to one of his company commanders, Capt. Matthew Cunningham, and told him what to do. Tell them about everything, Sassaman said, except the water. His statement is a perfect example of tested values, because within Sassamans words one can see the contrast of right and wrong: tell them about everything presents complete truthfulness; except the water includes a lie of omission. Without enumerating the second and third order effects of this decision, one can guess the negative outcome. Crucial to arguments in this article is the premise that Sassamans decision not to publicize what his men had done was based upon his reasoning that such publicity would incite anti-American feelings. What he failed to grasp is that publicity at the tactical level was a moot point, because in the close knit familial and tribal culture of Iraq, news like this travels with lightening speed. At the operational level, this stellar commander was about to experience how unforgiving the US Armys environment and institution had

become. Strategically, LTC Sassamans decision represented one of thousands that will collectively make or break the war in Iraq, by creating perceptions in the minds of the Iraqis. Are Americans a just people who have the legitimate authority to wield power? Or, are we people who simply have the power to compel coercion? Because of an intense loyalty to his mena loyalty forged in the extreme situations of combatLTC Sassaman lost sight of this legitimate authority, and decided not to report the whole truth about that fateful evening. The outcome of his single decision resulted in loss of a commander of over 500 soldiers, the weakening of the Armys operational hold on Balad and surrounding areas, and a potential information event requiring immediate actionin order to keep it from becoming a strategic perception nightmare. While this case did not turn out to be another Abu Ghraib, it did result in the Courts Martial of 1LT Saville and a non-commissioned officer, both of whom were found guilty of assault and sentenced to six months and 45 days, respectively. Battalion commander LTC Sassaman, executive officer MAJ Robert Gwinner, and company commander CPT Matthew Cunningham were all given letters of reprimand including the words wrongful, criminal and will not be tolerated, that effectively end their military careers. As in the case of Abu Ghraib, the damage done within the Iraqi community was most likely irreversible, especially loss of a family member within the close-knit Iraqi tribal society. While this incident certainly helped disenfranchise the American counterinsurgent force from the population in and around Balad, it also did much harm to the US Army. A significant difference between this case and Abu Ghraib is that the Army quietly and quickly initiated the Sassaman investigation. The implications of this event were not lost on the command. They became aware of the possibility of wrongdoing, and the effect the story could have not just on the Iraqis, but on the American public.

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Even in the midst of an extremely complex war, the individuals responsible for this act were held accountable punishment for unethical conduct under the UCMJ is thorough. But, as in the Abu Ghraib case, thorough measures taken to enforce the law within our own ranks carry much less weight than the initial reporting of the wrong doing in the information environment. The Way Ahead What is the ultimate importance of the relationship between ethics and counterinsurgency? In a single word, the answer is perception. Mao Tse Tung was correct in his prophetic statement that guerrilla campaigns would be worldwide. Guerrilla campaigns in the form of global jihad, being waged by transnational organizations like Al Qaeda, represent such a threat. Todays page in history has been turned by the unprecedented communication and networking potential of the information environment. Military planners must see the news, media, and Internet conglomerates as organizations that are biased to their own bottom line (whether economic, political or ideological), and must analyze these entities in ways that maximize their use in warfighting. Planners need to study the information environments systems at the national and global levels, in order to understand each systems response and reporting cycle. The information environment is a crucial line of operations, thus incorporating it into planning and execution timetables is crucial in all levels of war. DODs objective should be to maximize use of the information environment through planned information releases of combat operations. More importantly, DOD must be the first to release the information. Jim Channon, writing about The Millennium Force after the Vietnam War, said teams would drop into conflict areas and send out direct television coverage of the situation at hand. While this author is not a proponent of Mr. Channons full concept, the method is the kind of proactive use of the information environment that is essential in the Information Era.

A Public Affairs soldier emphasizes the US message. (US Army) DOD planners must be prepared to deliver the immediate response that people demandand expectto receive through the media. Simply put, DOD must compete with the media. Operational level planners and units must understand how to respond to the media by first knowing the medias purpose and mission at all levels. Secondly, military planners must have a better understanding of their own purpose and mission, based upon laws giving them the authority to conduct war at all levels. When US troops are perceived to have acted unethically, when their actions do not seem to support their values, we should see the event as an information opportunity rather than an information disaster. Of crucial importance is our understanding that this is not a Public Affairs Office (PAO) issue: it is a command issue. The PAO cannot decide when the commander will engage through the information environment. If DOD wants to succeed, entire organizations must think, plan, and act as communicators. The nature of the information environment, as a battlespace component in the Information Era of Warfare, demands this. One entity that would help the US compete is a rival to existing media empires, in the form of a national level government-run media agency. If the key to winning counterinsurgent war is the popular will of the people, then we must engage that will through the information environment. Is this propaganda? No. The critical tenet we must adhere to: actions must support stated values. Therefore, what we place in the information environment must be brutally honest and transparent especially when reporting unethical behavior by government or military personnel. Such reports must include simultaneously details on measures taken to correct the alleged unethical action. The government must address problems immediately and with utmost transparency, because the alternative is almost always damaging. If alleged unethical conduct is not immediately reported by the government, and enters the information environment by any other agent, the government already loses the perception battleor at least starts from a much weakened position. Certainly the US Government has the tools to do this. Use of the Internet and network technologies are hardly new concepts. Dr. Dorothy Denning of the Naval Postgraduate School is a leading researcher in the social aspects of the networking phenomena which has evolved since the inception of the World Wide Web. Also, Dr. John Arquila, partnering with other academics, has adapted the concept of net-centric warfare to a warfighting approach called the swarming doctrine. Arquila has also led research and development involving world-class computer hackers, in order to uncover, track, and destroy adversarial computer networks. The United States has the tools and expertise to exploit the information environment from any technological or informational quarter. A huge reservoir of untapped talent lies in the corporate business

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worldand in Hollywood. The USG and DOD must go out and recruit those with the expertise to use the information environment better than anyone else: those within the movie and marketing industries. This kind of recruitment was commonplace during World War II; there is no reason it should not be the same for the Global War on Terrorism. Existing capabilities must be brought together in order to develop tools for affecting the information environment: there must be an Information Environment Campaign Plan (IECP). An Information Environment Campaign Plan The IECP should lay out in excruciating detail the information assets apportioned from the COCOM level on down. These plans should specifically address the action-to-value message that must be sent through the information environment, and should be intimately synchronized with all operational and tactical level actions on the ground. Optimally, maneuver and information plans would be structured in a way to maximize the speed and diffusion of information globally, in a preemptive rather than reactive way. In a sense, we should drive the information environments reporting cycle. The ability to understand global information environment systems and processes requires an in depth analysis of globally networked communications, with an emphasis on understanding and exploiting the information-flow loop. That is, planners must understand the physical action to reporting cycle, to include how and when they can most powerfully affect the target audiences perspective. In his interviews with military planners in Qatar, Thomas Friedman noted: [T]his technology has flattened the military hierarchyby giving so much information to the low-level officer, or even enlisted man, who was operating

the computer, and empowering him to make decisions about the information he was gathering the days when only senior officers had the big picture are over. The military playing field is being flattened. Mr. Friedman never made a truer statement and his comments are just as applicable to the enemy. The Germans say, Nach dem Spiel ist vor dem Spiel! After the game is before the game! One action leads to a perception created through the information environment, which influences the next action, leading to a perception created though the information environment, and so on. The US DOD must acknowledge the information environment as a battlespace, and begin to attack the enemy there with the attention to detail we give the physical environment. Only then can we decisively engage the enemy through this perpetual cycle. Understanding the relationship between ethics and counterinsurgency is critical, because perceptions created by actions that do not support stated ethical values can have strategic-level effects. Throughout history, the people component of the Clausewitzian Trinity has gradually gained influence relative

to its ability to receive information, and communicate its desires to its government. Finally, in a presentation to the 2006 class of the US Army Command and General Staff College, then Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker observed that despite the ambiguity of the counterinsurgent battlefield and the incredibly challenging transformation presently taking place in the Army, there was one thing that made the American soldier capable of moving in any direction and accomplishing any missionthe American values he carries within himself. In this way, through education followed by rigorous and realistic training, the DOD will guard against unethical behavior on the counterinsurgent battlefield. In doing so, we simultaneously win the perception war along with the hearts and mind of the people. Please see the bibliography/references for this article on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/ Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm Click on the updates link under the Summer 2007 issue



Summer 2007

Winning the Information War:

3 Principles and a Tenet
By Benjamin E. Bourcy, Captain, USAF Editorial Abstract: The author reviews the current state of US strategic communications efforts, and how older guidance and practices hamper the ongoing campaign in Southwest Asia. He recommends changes in traditional intra-departmental relationships, plus revised statutes and attitudes, to permit effective use of modern messaging technologies.

he casual historian may see little similarity between the wars of our ancestors, and todays high tech warfare we watch on the news. What could the Mongol hoards of the 1200s have in common with the air campaign of the First Gulf War? Throughout history, military leaders and historians have noted that several themes remain constant in all warfare. Known as the principles of war, these provide commanders with a necessary framework to plan concepts of operations and courses of action.1 In todays globally interconnected world, it has become important to not only to defeat an enemys military force on the battlefield, but to convince his leaders and population to stop fighting. The war of words will reach the people, if not the bullets themselves. Words and ideas will shape the battle, and ultimately determine the outcome. Having learned a lesson on vague objectives in Vietnam, US military leaders made sure the objectives of Operation Desert Storm were clearly defined and easily measured. The short war was perfectly suited for Americas overwhelming firepower, and there was no chance for a protracted war to wean away public support. The current Gulf War, however, is different. The first half of the mission, to remove Saddam Husseins illegitimate government, was accomplished quickly. This phase played to traditional American military strengths, therefore the military commanders were well prepared to execute the mission. The second half of this goal, the establishment of a functional democracy has proved far more problematic. This is not a mission that plays into American military strengths, nor can it be accomplished by the United States military alone.

Known as classical nation building, it is a mission that the United States has struggled with in the past. In order to accomplish the mission of building a functioning democracy in Iraq, the United States government will have to reorganize its Information Operations capabilities. This will have to occur in a number of areas. First, as pointed out in the DOD IO Roadmap, the United States Government (USG) must consolidate oversight and advocacy for IO with the DOD, and clarify lanes in the road for PSYOP, Public Affairs, and Public Diplomacy. 2 Currently the information effort is fragmented and disjointed, greatly limiting its effectiveness. Second, the USG message must be consistent throughout the spectrum of conflict. The message must be truthful, and despite the American publics well founded skepticism of government information campaigns, it must be the same message for domestic and foreign audiences. The Role of Strategic Communication Information operations span the spectrum of conflictas important in peacetime as they are in war. In many ways the United States has become a victim of its own success in warfare. Adversaries can no longer face the US in a pitched military battle, therefore they seek alternate routes to attempt to achieve their objectives. Strategic Communication (SC) is one area where the US is vulnerable to asymmetric threats. Enemies such as Al Qaeda have a much easier task to execute in the information realm than the USG. For example, Al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq aim to spread discontent among

the population to promote violence and prevent the US from achieving its goals. The insurgency goal of dividing the Iraqi people is far easier to achieve than the cohesive, government building efforts of the United States. There is no need to coordinate information releases, stick to an information theme, or maintain integrity through truthful press releases. All that is required is starting panic by spreading rumors, destroying things, and pitting groups against one another. Then, all the insurgents have to do is sit back and let the United States try to restore order. Insurgent efforts can come from disjointed cells with little to no central planning, making them leaner and faster. Frustration over the insurgents shortened IO kill chain led then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to observe how Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in todays media age, but our country has not adapted. For the most part, the US government still functions as a five and dime store in an eBay world. Secretary Rumsfeld also stated US military public affairs officers must learn to anticipate news and respond faster.3 The transition from dictatorship to democracy is messy and fraught with danger from those who oppose it for their own political reasons. Opposition forces do not have to win their battles, they only have to prevent the US from winning. The cards are stacked in the insurgents favor in several ways. Among the most important are the Arabs historical distrust of the West, and the relative ease of dividing people compared to bringing them together. Secretary Rumsfeld was correct that military public affairs officers must become quicker in getting out information, but that is not all that must



Figure 1. (National Archives) happen. The US can never shorten its information targeting and dissemination cycle enough to get ahead of those who simply seek to spread discontent. The nature of the two goals will never allow it. Therefore, the United States must work preemptively around the globe to spread its message of freedom and democracy. The government must seek to build a reservoir of credibility with foreign nations and people, to draw upon in times of needsuch as the one we face now in Iraq. When terrorists commit atrocities or attempt to stoke the flames of sectarian strife or anti-American sentiment, we will be able to draw upon this reservoir of credibility until we can retaliate with a cohesive message. How exactly will this work? First, we must create a centralized strategic communications office. This is nothing new; several others have proposed this in the past. Historically, the United States has enjoyed the greatest success in controlling the information environment when employing a stand alone agency created for that specific task. In both World Wars I and II, the US government created information organizations to get the governments message out and rally support at home and abroad.4 This success came at a price, and technology has rendered many historic methods obsolete. In World War I, President Woodrow Wilson authorized the creation of the Committee of Public Information, or Creel Committee after its leader George Creel. This group used all means of communication to rally support for the war. Creels blatant propagandizing

trained Americans to hate the German foe through films, speeches, and posters such as Figure 1. Further, Creels committee censored information from the American people that did not support government objectives. During World War II, President Roosevelt created the Office of War Information. This office was also hugely successful in rallying wartime support through highly effective propaganda such as Figure 2. These periods were certainly the most effective information campaigns ever carried out by the United States government. They succeeded in rallying massive support on the home front, and ultimately helped win both wars. Clearly, a USG propaganda campaign of this sort would be unwise today. If government censors keep pertinent information from the people, and disseminate highly inflammatory information, it would be impossible for the people to adequately hold the government accountable. Neither is such a campaign possible in todays Western society because of the global information environment. The preeminent rule in contemporary US psychological operations (PSYOP) is to tell the truth. This is an absolute, because of the potential harm to our nations credibility if caught in a lie. Second, the SmithMundt Act of 1948 prohibits United States government from conducting psychological operations against US citizens. Therefore, the USG separates information releases into those meant for foreign audiences, and those targeting domestic audiences. In the Internet age, this distinction is completely meaningless. Third, note that neither image in Figures 1 and 2 could really be called lies. The portrayal of Germany and Japan as a threat was certainly accurate. Today, we might blush at the language used to describe our enemies in these posters, but it was certainly not offensive at the time. The portrayal of the Japanese and Germans as bloodthirsty killers might be seen as an oversimplification of the truth. Not all Japanese and Germans wanted to kill Americans; their corrupt governments just led that way. Most of their citizens probably just wanted to

enjoy their lives free from interference of governments and wars. Therefore, lumping of all Germans or Japanese into one large category through this sort of propaganda effectively rallied support for the necessary war effort. Arguably, it also led to unsavory effects such as Japanese internment camps, or people kicking and stoning wiener dogs [dachshunds] due to their German origins. Such propaganda did not make distinction between the people and culture, versus the government and policies. This would have been a difficult poster theme, and a murky message. Whose Voice? The Internet and global telecommunications have shrunk the world so that we see events in real time. In this environment, the USG can afford to create an agency responsible for information operations and consolidation. In fact, in order to counter our adversaries advantages, we must create an office to centralize all information operations. This organization would be responsible for disseminating the Presidents strategic communication strategy, and all other departments strategies would fall under this office. Along with the National Security Strategy would be the binding document for all government information releases. The Office of Strategic Communication (OSC) would also serve as a centralized coordination committee for interagency efforts. It could be manned by planners from the

Figure 2. (National Archives)



Summer 2007

different agencies of the government. All federal government playersand there are severalwould take the OSCs general themes, and develop their own products consistent with the Presidents directives. The Department of State would use these themes to guide diplomatic efforts, and the Department of Defense would use them to explain pending or current military action. This would ensure USG actions abroad were followed a widely and consistently disseminated message. As a principle of warfare, such consolidation of effort and authority achieves the effect of objective and unity of command. The published objectives of both the National Security Strategy and the proposed Strategic Communication strategy would provide the box within which all government agencies would work to achieve a common objective. The US Government has made some recent consolidation efforts, though political problems plague their inception. In 1999, the United States Information Agency (USIA) shut down after nearly 50 years of telling Americas story during the Cold War. Its efforts in those tense times spread American ideas and values to scores of people trapped behind the Iron Curtain. The USIA operated many successful venues such as the Voice of America broadcasts, cultural exchange programs, plus research and media reaction programs.5 These informal diplomatic efforts between the United States and other nations were tremendously important throughout the Cold War era. At a time when the Soviet Union used the Vietnam protests and honest policy debates on the US home front to paint a picture of Amerika, the unredeemable land of barbarism and violence, USIA efforts helped many understand the meaning of American events and actions.6 As important as the USIA was during the Cold War, its efforts pale in comparison to the importance of having a centralized information plan today. The openness of a wired world allows the global community to instantly see everything happening anywhere. This massive data influx can be overwhelming for anyone

trying to make sense of events, thus our need for a framework to organize and process world events. Despite this growing importance of shaping world opinion via a consolidated information campaign, the United States Information Agency ceased operations. At the closure ceremony, senior USIA official John Reinhardt stated There is no one in this room who doesnt approach this merger with trepidation. We fear that public diplomacy will be swallowed and destroyed by the State Department which practices formal diplomacy. In large parts these fears have proven true, to the detriment of public diplomacy.7 This demise of a guided public diplomacy effort is especially damning. Public diplomacy is an effort to influence people of foreign nationsversus formal diplomacy, which is communication between two governments. Public diplomacy is vital in todays world because foreign citizens do not rely solely on their governments to interpret the actions of other foreign governments (except when governments censor information). Also, formal diplomacy is only effective if the foreign government is a true and faithful representative of its people. In most of the worlds problematic areas, this simply isnt the case, therefore public diplomacy becomes much more important. The Internet makes it easy for anyone to look up events and find a plethora of interpretations and meanings. Mass media is increasingly run by multinational organizations which provide some context and interpretation, though not necessarily strategically helpful to the United States. Fortunately, there is great competition to provide a framework which helps people make sense of it all. U n f o r t u n a t e l y, a l l o f t h e s e frameworks are shaped by their creators intentions, and not all are reputable or concerned about US interests. Some are shaped by dictatorial regimes or multinational terrorists groups who attempt to persuade citizens that the West is the Great Satan. Others such as major news networks are businesses, and must satisfy a global constituency to keep ratings up and business viable.

The US Government must get into this game, to get its message out in a consolidated, organized way. It is vitally important to provide some context and justification for US actionsto compete with other possible interpretationsso people around the world can carefully weigh multiple interpretations and make informed decisions. Other US information consolidation attempts include creation of the State Departments International Information Program, to act as a successor to the USIA. However, this effort has been doomed by inadequate resources, personnel, and influence within DOS. Its responsibilities have been further splintered between State and other government agencies, resulting in a loss of common focus or objective.8 The Defense Department also made an ill-fated attempt at strategic communications with the now defunct Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). Established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in late 2001, OSI was to provide specific targeted information campaigns in response to analysis of overseas opinion polls. The office was also to be responsible for countering enemy propaganda and misinformation against the US and Coalition. A series of articles on the office and its proposed charter hit the American press in early 2002.9 Amid these reports was speculation the new office would spread false news stories to foreign media, which could easily make its way back to the American people. A New York Times story stated that the office discussed planting false stories and sending pro-US emails with misleading addresses to foreign media. The story also quotes unnamed senior leaders as saying that the mission of the new office was too broad, possibly even illegal. Many were concerned that the use of the military public affairs arm to spread false stories would undermine the credibility of the Pentagon with the media and foreign governments.10 Responding to these concerns in the media, Secretary Rumsfeld announced in a news conference that the office had been closed. He further stated that the

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stories in the media were false, and the Department of Defense never planned to plant false stories in the foreign media or distort the truth in any way. When asked what the Pentagon would do now that the office had been closed, he responded, Well have to do with the offices that existed previously. There is no question but that we have an obligation, as you remind us all, to tell the world this is not an effort against the Afghan peopleWe did a whole series of things characterized as strategic influence or information operations. We have done it in the past, and we will do it in the future... We had to defend against the lies that the food packages were poisoned and tell the Afghan people they were not, in fact, they were culturally appropriate. So theres lots of things we have to do, and we will do those things. Well just do them in a different office.11 This story illustrates a few key points about our strategic communication effort. First, it is necessary and has been carried out throughout US history. Second, it can be political dynamite. The American people have a great deal of concern about government sponsored influence operationsas well they should. Any inclination that the government would actively lie to the American people, (directly or indirectly) through censorship of negative information, or planting false stories in foreign media which make their way back to US citizens, will be met with near unanimous public disapproval. The US Government and Armed Forces, as employees of the American people, therefore owe it to them to never conduct these sorts of operations. That said, there still exists a need for the United States to centrally plan and coordinate its official strategic communications. It makes the most sense to publish this central plan at the National Security Council level, though theoretically this already happened. On 10 September 2002, the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee was created in accordance with NSPD-1. The committee is designed to foster positive opinion on US Government strategic objectives and influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to those objectives. 

Further, they possessed the necessary interagency information and analytical tasking authority to anticipate future needs.12 This committee never issued an official strategy, and was disbanded in 2003. In the same year, an Office of Global Communications was created to facilitate White House and interagency communication with foreign audiences. As of early 2007, this office has not released an official communications strategy. A 2005 Government Accounting Office report on Public Diplomacy in recommended that the Office of Global Communication fully implement the role mandated for the office in the Presidents executive order, including facilitating the creation of a national communications strategy.13 No matter the name or the location of the office, one requirement is clear and absolute: the US must create an office to centrally coordinate strategic communication. This organization must publish a plan for all official communications, including those by the DOD, Department of State, CIA, the Broadcasting Board of Directors (runs Voice of America and foreign radio broadcasts formerly under USIA), and any other federal government agencies that communicate directly with the public (domestic or foreign). Political Considerations and the Smith-Mundt Act This brings to light another important Strategic Communication issue: the need to consolidate both domestic and foreign speaking functions. As noted earlier, this is illegal under the 1948 SmithMundt Act, and is certainly political dynamite. One only has to look at the public outcry following stories on the Office of Strategic Influence, or efforts to plant news stories in Iraqi newspapers, to understand how uncomfortable the American public is with the whole concept of influence operations. Though these efforts only involved foreign media, the potential of a planted story reaching the American media was one of the most contentious issues. Even within the military, there is great distrust between traditional Public Affairs personnel and Information Operations planners. Many

in the PA field attempt to keep a strict wall of separation between these groups. This is a microcosm of the larger wall of separation the US attempts to maintain between information distribution intended for domestic audiences, and that intended for foreign audiences. Such a barrier served a purpose when the Smith-Mundt Act was passed, but today it is a potentially harmful illusion. One would only have to know about the Internet to render the SmithMundt Act ban useless. For example, Voice of America programming is openly available on the Internet at www. voanews.com. There is a disclaimer on the website that states it is not for domestic audiences, however, anyone is free to read or listen to any article on the webpage. This caused some concern when the United States Information Agency first launched its Internet service in 1994. In response, USIA moved its servers from domestic to foreign servers and forbid its employees from giving out the Web address to US citizens. Of course, Internet search engines made that strategy useless.14 Smith-Mundt was passed in 1948, when memory of Hitlers propaganda was fresh in the American conscience. The artful way in which the Nazi regime used vicious propaganda campaigns to shape a ruthless war machine ultimately led to the deaths of roughly 42 million people worldwide.15 Understandably, American citizens became and remain highly suspicious of government information campaigns. Seeking to avoid the sort of government brainwashing that led the German people to war, Congress allowed dissemination of information about the United States and its policies abroad, but not at home. As distasteful and immoral as the German propaganda campaign was, the real problem in Nazi Germanythe enabler that allowed Hitler to shape the sentiment of the German people in such a devastating fashionwas not propaganda, it was censorship. The absence of opposition to outrageous and inflammatory Nazi claims allowed Hitler to shape the information environment completely unchecked by any balancing force. Under Joseph Goebbels Ministry Summer 2007

of Propaganda, the Nazi party hours. The power of the 24 hour systematically censored all forms news media instantly spread the of media, including movies and false information around the globe. music. These rules were enforced Tuned in to the emotional appeal of by the secret police and punishable families in distress and tense rescue by death. 16 Under this broad operations, many Americans went blanket censorship the government to bed rejoicing that the miners was free to make ridiculous and had been rescued. They awoke inflammatory assertions about the next morning to the absolutely anything they pleased. stunning news that it was all false. Fortunately, a convergence of The mistake here is the failure to several factors have combined in maintain the information offensive. such a way that censorship on the In the absence company progress scale of the Nazi program would be updates, a rumor took hold and Official spokesman and foreign journalists talk impossible to carry out today. First, quickly gained credibility through one on one. (US Navy) the free press guaranteed under the repetition. The result was stunning quest to maintain its credibility, serve US Constitution serves as a necessary and terribly damaging to the companys a global constituency, and put out check on federal power. Any claim made credibility. Viewers watched live as the important stories before its competitors by an official government spokesperson is families went through the emotional often ends up putting out stories that serve immediately and thoroughly scrutinized roller coaster. When news first broke the strategic aim of Americas enemies. by the press. No matter ones opinion on that all the miners had been rescued, The American independent media, while press coverage of government actions, joyous celebrations erupted complete a noble institution, is first and foremost it can be reasonably stated that the with ringing church bells and carnival independent press serves as an effective a business, and as such it must concern style celebration. This went on for some check. Second, the growth of information itself with turning a profit. Obviously this time before the company came out and technology has made the world smaller, does not always harmonize with USG announced it had all been a mistake. with fewer information-isolated areas. aims. Not to complain about bias and The world watched live as shock and One can rest assured that if the American unfair reporting of the current war in Iraq, disbelieve soon turned to outrage. This military is sent to intervene anywhere in but the United States government cannot terrible story illustrates the importance the world, the full focus of the American rely on CBS, CNN, or even Fox News to of maintaining the initiative in any type media corps will document the action.17 explain US foreign policy to the people of influence operations. What does this mean for American or to foreigners. The government will be The Role of Public Affairs & the foreign policy, the use of the US military, best served explaining its own policies. Common Military Member and the strategic communications effort? The independent media can then react The traditional principles of warfare First and foremost, there is absolutely and fact check those explanations for no danger of a government sponsored accuracy, which will serve the principle are general guidelines for all military forces, while additional tenets provide information campaign brainwashing of offensive. A p e r t i n e n t e x a m p l e o f t h e more specific considerations. For American citizens. The free press and global interconnectivity will prevent importance of taking the offensive in example, Centralized Control and such an action. Therefore, it makes information operations is the 2006 coal Decentralized Execution are primary sense to consolidate the functions of mine tragedy in West Virginia. Thirteen considerations in effective warfighting. government information agencies into coal miners were trapped under ground These concepts are also extremely one voice, and remove the distinction of in a mine explosion. International Coal important in the field of information information for foreign or domestic Group was left with the unenviable task o p e r a t i o n s . We m u s t p u s h t h e dissemination. Technology has rendered of simultaneously running a rescue responsibility of spreading the US the distinction useless anyway. 18 and a public affairs operation, as the message down to the lowest level Agencies will keep their independent American media brought full focus on operators throughout all government press arms, but they will all work from the small town. Mine rescue operations agencies. Within DOD there are two the same central communication plan are agonizingly slow, and in this case the important ways to accomplish further published at the National Security sole survivor was trapped for about 42 decentralization of the information effort. Council level. This consolidation hours. The company gave limited news First, we must remove the artificial wall will serve several important purposes: updates on the progress of the rescue of separation between Public Affairs and fulfilling the principle of objective; and operation, but they failed to appreciate Information Operations. Second, we providing a much needed government or head off groundswell rumors that must change the policy that directs all voice to compete independent media led the miners families to mistakenly military members to refer all questions voices. The independent media in its believe the miners were alive for over 3 to Public Affairs, while refusing to make



any comments. with an amphibious assault starting in and PA. The New York Times warns of As stated earlier, there is a deep one month, and all the reporters printed blurring the line between the two lest seated distrust between Public Affairs the story. This would have been an overt we return to the Vietnam era, when the and Information Operations planners. lie, assuming the Coalition did not intend American public and the world were When IO theory started becoming to attack the beach when the statement skeptical of anything DOD had to say. popular in the mid 1990s, Public Affairs was released. What if the commanders The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of immediately took a hands-off approach, had fully intended to attack the beach Staff issued a warning about the risks to maintain their credibility and keep their when the statement was released, but of mixing the two functions, and the hands clean. At first this was relatively then changed their minds? Should they Public Relations Society of America has easy, as the doctrine on information have called the media and updated them advocated a strict firewall separation warfare was still being worked out. In with the new attack plans? Would it have between IO and PA.20 No matter what February 1996, 20 year PA professional been believable to Saddam? Generally, it we name it, the wall between these Karen Piper of the Office of the Joint is a bad idea to release statements which two information functions will be a Chiefs of Staff, stated IW has no place describe the exact intent of military pretend one. Both fields haveand will in PA. In our democracy, the military forces before they engage the enemy. continueto serve the same purpose: to organization exists only by the consent First, it is bad OPSEC. Second, as a put out the militarys message. We may of the governed. If the institution lies or Military Deception campaign it is not continue to pretend they are separate misleads the people, they cannot make believable. MILDEC is most effective by doing what we have been doing. informed decisions regarding the issues when it involves letting the enemy see Public Affairs works in one room and we cease to be a democracy.19 selected truths that will cause him to covering stories they are given by the This single quote sums up the traditional reach his own incorrect conclusions. commander, stories of their own interest distrust between these two fields. approved by the commander, or Popular misunderstanding of responding to outside media with American PSYOPand by command-approved answers. In extension information warfareis the next room, IO planners go the core problem. Ms Pipers through their targeting cycle, since quote immediately equates IW they are using the information with lies and misinformation. In spectrum as a weapon system. this sense information warfare In any conflict, they are going would be an ethical nightmare, and to try to convince the enemy an impediment to our democracy. and our allies that we are right, However, DOD information the enemy is wrong, and the operations are closer to corporate conflict is just. They will follow advertising than government the commander s objectives Are PA and IO really on opposite sides of the same misinformation campaigns and aim at defined centers of road? (Defense Link) practiced by oppressive regimes. gravity. Like the PA efforts, the IO campaign will also received DOD does not disseminate lies for several reasons. First, they are General Schwarzkopf maintains that the the commander s approval. The not the most effective way to accomplish press was not intentionally manipulated, commander must now deconflict two objectives. Second, anything they and amphibious operations remained a plans, put together separately, to ensure would achieve will be short lived or viable alternative until the last day. One they mesh appropriately. This gives too risky, because of the cost of lost could even suggest the press blew the Public Affairs personnel a feeling of credibility. Take the classic amphibious invasion by writing detailed stories, so plausible deniability, but tends to keep assault scenario from the First Gulf that military commanders were forced them out of the loop for parts of the War that caused so much controversy. to go with an alternate plan. Certainly campaign plan. The lack of unity of American news outlets were flooded military leaders usually leave themselves effort is an expensive price to pay for with articles and stories about where a more than one option, and none would the illusion of separation. Major Tadd Sholtis outlines several likely amphibious assault on Kuwait. argue that it is incumbent upon them When the Left Hook took the place to share those options with the media, myths which have further hampered of the amphibious assault, the news the American public, or the enemy. military information efforts. Among media cried foul. This scenario is an The bottom line is that overt lies are the most important are: Credibility is example of a classic military deception dangerous and minimally effective, Absolute, and Advocacy is Politics.21 campaign, but could it be called a lie? and PA does play a role in information The credibility argument states any perception of a link between IO and Was it intentional use of the media to operations. Influential sources are on the record PA is enough to destroy all credibility mislead the enemy? Imagine PA telling reporters the Coalition planned to attack advocating strict separation between IO for military Public Affairs. However, 0 Summer 2007

Major Sholtis points out credibility is a moving target. An infantryman talking to Fox News has different credibility than a senior Pentagon official talking to Al Jazeera. Further, no one expects military PA to be entirely objective in news releases to the general media. It stands to reason that Public Affair personnel will be military advocates. Of course, PA also covers negative stories, and it is absolutely essential they do so first, in order to maintain the information initiative. The independent media and the public expect PA to be truthfuland they are. However, like all other uniformed military members, PA professionals are driven by a single goal of accomplishing the missions given to them by civilian leadership. Conclusions The US finds itself in a new role following 9/11. In large part, Americans have historically favored staying out of the affairs of others unless conditions dictated otherwise. In World War I, the sinking of the Lusitania broke the back of isolationists; Pearl Harbor began the US WWII campaign; and a communist threat prompted involvement in Vietnam. On 10 Sep 2001, the story was no different. Few viewed instability around the world as a direct threat, yet one fateful day again awoke a sleeping giant. Instability anywhere can easily become a threat to the homeland. A more active US role involves all instruments of national power, including an increased US military role in foreign affairs. As evident in the current war in Iraq, the military role will not be the decisive and swift combat operation followed by a quick exit that military commanders favor. Instead, it will be protracted war fought over many decades to convince the rest of the world that democracy and the rule of law are the only legitimate ways to maintain a stable country. The war will not be won by the high tech platforms and weapons systems that the United States prefers to use. Instead, as Special Operations Forces have

known for some time, it will be won by human-to-human interactions which change the minds of people. There are those who say the US military should not act at the worlds policeman, and yet we will be thrust into that role as far flung problems become the immediate US national security concerns. We will be forced to not only remove the enemys ability to fight, but remove his will and desire to fight. The most effective way to do that will be to offer an alternative method to air grievances, and a functional democracy is the way to do that. The war of ideas is the war of the future, and Information Operations are our battlefield. Notes AFDD 1-1 Information Operations Roadmap, DOD, 30 Oct 2003. 3 Miklaszewski, Jim, Rumsfeld: US lags on information battle, MSNBC News, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/11408619 4 Ecklund, Marshall V., Strategic Communications: How to Make it Work? IO Sphere (Fall 2005), 5-10. 5 USIA Factsheet, http://dosfan.lib.uic. edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm. 6 The United States Information Agency, A Commemoration, http://dosfan.lib.uic. edu/usia/abtusia/commins.pdf 7 Ward, Brad W. Strategic Influence Operations-The Information Connection, US Army War College, 2003, 1-33. 8 Ibid, 18. 9 Ecklund, 8.
1 2

Dao, James and Schmitt, Eric. Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad, The New York Times, February 19, 2002, www. commondreams.org/headlines02/021901.htm 11 Defense Department News Briefing, February 26, 2002, www.fas.org/sgp/ news/2002/02/DOD022602.html 12 Ward, 16. 13 Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, Apr 2005, h t t p : / / w w w. g a o . g o v / h i g h l i g h t s / d05323high.pdf 14 Smith Mundt Act, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, http://wiki. uscpublicdiplomacy.com/mediawiki/ index.php/Smith_Mundt_Act 15 Hitler, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, http://users.erols. com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm 16 Welch, David, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda (London: Routledge, 1993). 17 For more on this see Thomas Friedmans The World is Flat. 18 Is the Domestic Dissemination Media Ban Obsolete? http//www.annenberg. northwestern.edu/pubs/usfa/usfa4.htm 19 Crumm, Robert K. Information Warfare: An Air Force Policy for the role of Public Affairs. Air University Press. June 1996, 11. 20 Sholtis, Tadd. Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success. Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2005. 21 Sholtis.
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Some Thoughts on Networked Radicalization: Interview with Frank J. Cilluffo

Interviewed by John Whisenhunt, Editor Editorial Abstract: Frank Cilluffo was a featured speaker at a US Northern Command sponsored Homeland Defense seminar, hosted by the JIOWC in June 2007. A noted strategist and US national policy advisor, Mr. Cilluffo shares his views on contemporary Islamic extremists, and their effective use of social networking. He further examines the current state of Western efforts to counter extremist messages, and a strategy for enhancing our actions in the cyber domain. consider to be a transnational insurgency underpinned by a global Salafi jihad. Here you have Al Qaeda Classic, but youve also got the franchising of Al Qaeda, with their own indigenous objectives, but they tap into the larger movement. Perhaps its best to think of it as groups that by and large think globally, but act locally. Then youve got the third tier, where I think our homeland in particular needs to be concerned, and thats the leaderless movement: those inspired by, but not directly part of any Al Qaeda organization. We need to understand that narrative weve got to unpack it, and come up with a compelling counternarrative, that can get those on the brinkthose potentially seduced by the jihadi Salafiststo actually counter that. This means our response cannot be government alone, you need someone who has credibility with the communities were trying to influence. This has to some extent come from within. We need former jihadis coming out and denouncing terrorism, like Hassan Butt in the UK did in a 60 Minutes interview, explaining how he felt duped by Al Qaeda. We need more of these sorts of messages, that are most effective. We need to remind people that the victims of terrorism are largely Muslim. Were not reminding them of Casablanca or Bali, or of Beslan, which killed how many children? We hear terrorists talk about their martyrswell, weve had our martyrs, and its time we actually recognize them, and not be afraid to show the world that bombing weddings in Jordan has consequences for the Jordanians, and for Muslims killing children in schools, has consequences. The question needs to be asked: if, from their perspective, theyre waging a war against the West, why have they killed so many Muslims? The Spanish government did this. They actually packaged a VHS tape showing another face of ETA [Basque separatist group]. We need to recognize that no single agency owns this missionin fact its beyond the federal government alonewe cant look at it from a centralized perspective. You cant defeat a networked adversary with a supercomputer, you have to defeat networks with other networks. We have to use all the elements of statecraft, and frankly we havent done a good job marshaling all of those instruments. We have to win hearts and minds, remove terrorist masterminds, and offer opportunity for those who could be seduced by the terrorist message.

Frank J. Cilluffo (George Washington University) IO Sphere: We really appreciate the chance to talk with you today. Setting the stage, as we do with many of our guests, we note how the business of influence operations is too big and too complicated. Is there anyone you see that is doing that job well? Or that we could use as a model? Mr. Cilluffo: To be absolutely honest, I think the adversary is doing this job exceedingly well. They recognize the war is a war of ideas, and the battlefield is no longer the traditional one alone, but now in cyberspace. Their intent and objective is to influence, and get a message out that resonates, expands their ranks, energizes those who are already part of their organizations, and tries to justify and reaffirmin my view their aberrant attitudes. Theyve woven a very successful imaginary clash of civilizations by exploiting local political and economic grievances, some of which are very real, but then also peppering it with pieces and components that are absolutely false and manipulative. We need to be in the business of understanding that narrative, why is it resonating? Why is it sticking? Why is the brand successful? We also need to recognize from a social networking standpoint why brands in general flourish and grow, and what makes them atrophy and die. We need to start looking at the second stage of issues. I think some of that is a shift in mindset, particularly in our own planning efforts, recognizing the need to move beyond tactics aimed at simply attacking their structures and toward those that are also attacking their strategyaimed at what I

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IO Sphere: That leads us into the next question. Careful use of language is something that comes up all the time in government forums like this. We tend to find that our expertise in cultural subtleties is scarce, and Western misuse of terms in the media works against us. Can you elaborate on that? Mr. Cilluffo: Sure. Words do matter, and they do have consequences. In many cases were using the words theyd like us to use, because it further empowers and legitimizes their activities and their movement. Even the term jihad, which refers either to inner struggle for righteous deeds or to external struggle against aggression and injustice in which strict rules of engagement concerning the protection of innocents apply, has been hijacked, because its largely a defense measure that every Muslim engages in. Part of it is understanding the culture. We dont have nearly the same capacity in the military war colleges and in universities throughout the country as we had for the Soviet Union. Russian speakers were everywhere. Understanding the mind set was part and parcel in most national security and foreign affairs education activities. Were very slow to recognize and pick that up in the US. And part of that is we have to recognize some of the grievances are legitimate and recognize those, so we can unpack those that are absolutely off the charts. So, our words do matter. I personally dont even use the term GWOT, as it lets them feel that they are warriors and that what they are prosecuting is a legitimate and just war. I think theyre really more like a bunch of thugs, and what theyre doing is un-Islamictheyve actually corrupted and hijacked certain tenets of Islam, as corroborated by recent public opinion polls in several Muslim-majority countries by the Program on International Policy Attitudes. In Egypt, 77 percent of respondents believe that attacks on civilians are never justified; in Pakistan, its 81 percent and in Indonesia, its 84 percent of respondents. These are big numbersmost Muslims do not see this as legitimate. First and foremost we need the Islamic scholarsthose that can use the Quran as an instrumentto demonstrate how its being misused by those attempting to interpret it as a religious struggle. IO Sphere: Lets go back to your comment on the network of networks. Youve written and spoken at length about cyber protection, and in your most recent US Senate testimony [May 2007] you talked about how our adversaries are effectively using the cyber domain for social networking. How well are our adversaries doing online? Mr. Cilluffo: I think you hit the right concept on the head: its the social networking, the interaction between the physical and the cyber. Its the chat rooms, the dark corners where we need to be paying the most attention, not just the static Web pages. Those are important, but thats just propaganda. What we need is to get those people into the chat rooms that are well versed in the religion, and in some of the regional studies, to provide a counter narrative that will make sure were not allowing the adversary to bring more into the extremist ranks, and energizing those ranks.

Historically theyve used the Internet across the board, in support of tradecraft, for communications, fund raising, planning and coordination, training, operations security [OPSEC], information gathering and data mining, propaganda and misinformation dissemination, and radicalization and recruitment. But they really are networked, and we need to start doing some of the same. The killer application of the Internet is people, and that it enables us to connect us globallyand reaffirm our views. You already have people who are predisposed to a particular set of views and issuesthe Internet is great at that-in effect it Balkanizes us. You and I can get all our news through an RSS [Really Simple Syndication] filter to justify our own thoughtsyou name it. We are starting to lose context. You can drill deeper and deeper, continue to lose context, and people are going to actually think what theyre doing is correct. Plus, there are two levels: those using it operationally, and those who could potentially become part of a movement. I think our emphasis needs to be on the second level. IO Sphere: Recruitment versus command and control? Mr. Cilluffo: Recruitment and enlistment selfenlistment those that are inspired and seeking mutual support. But what is the life cycle? We recently brought together in a task force a group of multidenominational religious scholars, including Muslim religious scholars, behavioral scientists, as well as the national security community, to look at Internetfacilitated radicalization. We also did a study on prisoner radicalization, and what we were trying to get our arms around is the life cycle: what does it take to go from sympathizer, to activist, to indiscriminate violence? What are the points where we can intervene to peel that off? Sadly, I dont think there is a single profileand I dont use that in the legal profiling sense, but in the behavioral sense. But you look at home grown cases in the UK, and the Internet has always played a significant role. For instance, in Casablanca, Morocco at an Internet caf, an individual was told he could no longer monitor certain extremist Web sites, so he actually detonated himself at the caf simply because he couldnt have access. So here you have someone who had no interaction with people; it was purely from the Internet. That certainly has implications. How often do we write in email things we would never say face to face? I try not to, being from a generation that still likes to speak to people! Too often people will blog things they wouldnt say to your face, and at this point in time, theres not much accountability. Thats the biggest challenge: whos behind the clickity-clacks on the keyboard? Though in the long run, I firmly believe that more information and greater transparency is the answer. IO Sphere: Weve already touched on what the West is doing about this. Would you like to expand on that? Mr. Cilluffo: Two points on that. People ask where are the moderate Muslims in countering extremism? I dont like the term I mean, whats a moderate Catholic? I prefer

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simply Muslimthose that are actually Islamic scholars. One thing many Americans dont fully appreciate is that Islam, or at least Sunni Islam, has no hierarchical clergy; there is no central leader such as the Pope in Catholicism. Its important to recognize that Muslim groups in America have stepped up, theyve issued fatwas [official religious opinions] denouncing terrorism. A fatwa need not only be an edict justifying attacks. So they have been active, but no oneincluding the mediapays this any attention. Looking overseas, the Saudis are doing some innovative workthats not to say all theyre doing is on the positive side of the ledger. But they have whats called the Tranquility Program, where they go into the prisons and get jihadi senior leaders to denounce terrorism publicly on television. These sorts of people have credibility with those who can be seduced by the extremists. We have to find ways to facilitate exit so that sympathizers dont move to become activists. IO Sphere: Where the spiritual component will validate that its OK to get away from all that? Mr. Cilluffo: Absolutely. Also, the Moroccans are very active at using Muslim scholars for this sort of exit facilitation. In Britain, there is a community-based program called the Radical Middle Way, which is the project of a group of Islamic scholars who seek to discredit extremism through religion and promote a peaceful interpretation of Islam. While the UK government may not be completely happy with what they discuss, the group is vehemently opposed to terrorism as a tactic. Ultimately what were talking about is providing a dream for the future and realistic opportunities. If you look in Europe, its very different from the US, and youre largely seeing a generation that doesnt relate to their parents generation, nor to their host country I think almost every religion has this contemporary challenge. And theres a youth component despite the clich theyre not all disenfranchised, unemployed youth. They feel theyre underemployed. According to UK Home Office statistics, over 60 percent of those that have engaged in home grown terrorism have had graduate degrees. IO Sphere: Lets shift a bit from the human wetware aspect to the physical networking issue. A few years ago you warned the US leadership that were too focused on lower level cyber protection I believe you said beeps and squeaks level. How would you say were doing nowadays? Mr. Cilluffo: Clearly there have been some across the board improvements. But I still feel the cyber domain is not treated at the same level as the kinetic and physical. In part its because of the complexity, in part its a generational issue. Many decision makers havent grown up in that space, but many know how to exploit it even if they dont understand the nuts and bolts. While there have been many strategies, including a national strategy on protecting cyberspace, I still feel its been a footnote in our overall planning efforts. That

Seeking true Muslim voices. (Defense Link) said, weve made some major improvements in protecting our physical infrastructure. I mean, a well placed bomb could be as debilitating, if not more so, than a cyber attack. To me, cyber is still to a great extent in the perception side, but its also a force multiplier to enhance the lethality of physical attacks. I cant see a strict cyber attackthat doesnt mean someone wont do itbut many of Usama Bin Ladins generation have their hands on AK-47s. But his next generation of children and nephews have their fingers on a computer mouse were seeing that. But I dont think theyll go entirely to cyber, rather theyll still see it as an enabler, to shape the battlefield for their physical actions. IO Sphere: So the hateful traditions endure, just with more high tech tools? Mr. Cilluffo: Most people feel theyre motivated by hatred for the US, but thats an oversimplification. The far enemy, the US, is actually a convenient target to energize opposition to the near enemy. If they demonstrate they can attack the United States, they can get people energized to overturn thefrom their perspectiveapostate states in the Middle East. They need to have the bang from their perspective, that they can actually do this. I feel the symbolic value of physical attacks is still so great at energizing their indigenous ranks to take on thefrom their viewapostate states. Thats a different perspective from many thoughtful analysts. While they exploit the activities in Iraq, I dont think thats their ultimate target: they still want to build, first and foremost, a Caliphate state spanning the Middle East. What I find somewhat surprising and disappointing is the unintended net effect of some of our policies has been to unite our adversaries, when I believe its really time to divide and conquer. We have not tapped the disagreements to drive wedges between and among terrorist organizations. My strategy would be something along the following: 1) isolate the military and operational planners from terrorist organizations; 2) isolate terrorist organizations from one another; 3) from that, isolate them from the larger movement;

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and from that 4) isolate them from society writ large. Now, we cant take a one-size-fits-all approach, because it has different domestic dimensions depending on the host country. But we need to look at all the different dimensions that allow us to do that. Weve barely tapped the cyber dimension of the battlefield, and [our adversaries] have been very good at that. IO Sphere: So when it comes to growing cyber expertise, who can we get to be technically and culturally astute? How do we recruit and entice people to come to work in this new battlefield of ideas? Mr. Cilluffo: Those are great questions. Not only do we have to find ways to recruit some of the best and brightest, Im very concerned on the retention side. How do we keep people when they can be easily lured away at greater salaries in the private sectorthey have less bureaucracy there, and theyre empowered to do things. We have to find better people investments, and this is a leadership issue: how do we keep the best? How do we reward them, even if they make mistakes? How do we empower them, and get them to take calculated risks? Otherwise this has a chilling effect. So we have to work with academia and the universities to build the skill sets, that quite honestly may be better built outside of government. Recruiting has been on the uptick in places like the intelligence community, and thats a lot of young talent. The challenge now is that it generally takes five to seven years to go from entry level to be really effective as an analyst. And everyone is in the intelligence business now! It used to be the domain of a few entities, but now everyone is in the business and everyone is a customer. So you have a limited pool, and everyone is fishing, but it will still take us about five years to grow seasoned analysts. Then we have to retain them. In the

CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear] and cyber environments Im not sure were going to be able to stay cutting edge. And its more than just the labs, its in our day-to-day operations. Its not so much the recruiting as the retaining. This goes far beyond the traditional human resources functions: we also need to let them know theyre making a difference. People on my staff at GW [George Washington University] could be making a lot more money, but they want to contributethis is our generations war. If you cant pay them a lot, youd better be providing the psychic income that acknowledges theyre contributing and making a difference on important issues. While I cant think of a more noble cause than public service, Im not sure our government structures have enabled and empowered that. We need to get beyond tinkering with boxes and org-charts and invest in the people charged with the most awesome responsibilities our country faces. But if you look back, any successful leader has had to adapt. Ill leave you with a favorite quote I use with my students, from General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower: In preparation for battle, Ive often found plans to be useless, but planning to be indispensable. IO Sphere: You could almost say were on a voyage of discovery versus following a plan? Mr. Cilluffo: Right, I think were almost always on a voyage of discovery in this campaign. This part of the effort has us really going off road. IO Sphere: Thank you again for taking the time from a very busy conference to speak with us. Mr. Cilluffo: It was great to be here John, thank you.

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The IO Range: Tackling Electronic Warfare

By Thomas W. Curby-Lucier Editorial Abstract: The author examines the complex architecture and methodologies required to provide distributed DOD Electronic Warfare testing, training, and exercise environments. He outlines planning and coordination actions necessary for successful IO Range operations, using a notional joint scenario. Finally, Mr. Curby-Lucier recommends enhancements to best implement future DOD IO Roadmap guidance. full-spectrum IO. Further, these efforts will allow US forces to assess advanced EW capabilities, train with combinations of new EW and CNA technologies, and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for employment against sophisticated and emerging threats. This quick look effort also provided a recommended list of sites for Introduction EW integration, based on criteria which match COCOM and Service collected he IO Range, as discussed in the Fall requirements (see Figure 2). 2006 issue of IO Sphere, completed Background For the purposes of this effort, its first round of demonstration EW integration will add traditional events, and is on the way in radio frequency (RF)-spectrum bringing a realistic IO test, operations, non-traditional (i.e., training, and exercise environment Wireless Telephony Networks), to the warfighter. The IO Range and the ability to explore the use of provides representative combat Directed Energy (DE), including targets, systems, and situations High Power Microwave (HPM) to develop IO capabilities. programs. The goal is to focus on Figure 1. Service Delivery Point for the IO Range. This environment supports the most promising technologies realistic Service, component, and associated efforts that can meet US Joint Forces Command and combatant commander-sponsored the pressing needs of commanders training and exercises. At full operational (USJFCOM) recently completed a and forces engaged in operational capability (FOC), the IO Range will also 6-month quick look across major environments. EW integration will center provide a flexible, seamless environment EW ranges to determine how best to on several key areas: use of multiple that enables commanders to achieve the integrate existing electronic warfare independent levels of security (MILS) same level of confidence and expertise in range capabilities into the larger IO will allow multiple sites concurrent employing IO capabilities that they have Range. This effort sought to build on and/or phased execution of range events; with kinetic weapons. It is intended to existing capabilitiescurrently limited visualization of combined EW/CNA facilitate integration of kinetic and non- to CNAthrough the addition of full events to demonstrate effectiveness of kinetic capability to demonstrate effects spectrum EW. The current IO Range architecture, ideal for CNA applications, operational and tactical processes; and a based capabilities and operations. Presently, the IO Range is a is under thorough closed-loop network that connects review to ensure that geographically separated sites to support the aperture is open a distributed testing, training, and for other IO elements. exercise environment for Computer A c h i e v i n g E W Network Attack (CNA) capabilities. integration will create The current architecture allows it to a test environment support multiple simultaneous events for pre-deployment and, within each event, networks of spin-up of EW/CNA different classification levels. As of capabilities, and move Initial Capability (IC) in July 2006, the IO Range closer to the sites require either a permanent or achieving the support Figure 2. Requirements Based Criteria for site assessment. deployable service delivery point to infrastructures for DOD requires an integrated test range to increase confidence and better assure predictable outcomes. The test range should support exercises, testing, and development of CNA, EW, and other IO capabilities. -- Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap, 30 Oct 2003 access the IO Range. Figure 1 illustrates a site-end Service Delivery Point, and how its traffic is encrypted prior to entering the Defense Research and Engineering Network (DREN) to reach other IO Range sites. This architecture is very well suited for the current CNA capabilities, and is constantly reviewed for evolutionary changes, in order to fully integrate other IO capabilities, including Electronic Warfare.

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more robust EW environment through an The ability to integrate interconnected network of emitters and fixed sites, mobile platforms, instrumentation from multiple ranges, and transient targets platforms (e.g., airborne, mobile) not Execution of combinedassociated with ranges, and associated effects operations, using visualization tools. full spectrum EW against As a mature warfighting discipline, targets. Impacted targets EW has well-developed communities would include traditional of interest ranging from weapons (i.e., RF), irregular (i.e., development to electronic combat ranges. wireless), catastrophic EW has been a central element of tactical (i.e., electromagnetic pulse and operational level exercises, and has [EMP]), and disruptive (i.e., Figure 3. Notional Joint Network Warfare Scenario. been used extensively in a live-virtual- directed energy [DE]) constructive (LVC) environment. The Visualization of those phased in over time, with additional EW implementation quick-look study effects in a MILS environment which classification levels, to more accurately sought to expand on this capability by allows interaction of EW Range events reflect an electronic environment as part moving closer to the vision outlined in simultaneously at the proper levels of of a larger campaign plan or tactical the October 2003 DOD IO Roadmap security level engagement. Finally, the EW which directs a combined integration concept provides IO effects capability. This opportunities for improved will begin incrementally with visualization of both EW and the addition of EW, and the combined EW/CNA events resultant changes will provide for event controllers and test opportunities for EW/CNA managers. This visualization integrated events. To leverage improves operational execution, this knowledge and expertise, enhances situational awareness EW integration efforts seek to as events transpire, and provides identify centers of excellence ground truth for key individuals throughout the DOD and match or organizations such as the those capabilities to the most exercise/event White Cell. pressing war fighters needs. Integrating EW into the This process of aligning critical existing CNA environment of the EW requirements with range IO Range will enablethrough Electronics Technicians help prepare EW systems capabilities will result in a list virtual simulations, high fidelity for a day on the Range. (US Navy) of candidate sites to serve as a emulations, and actual threat baseline in forming the initial cadre of Cross-linking and sharing of systemsthe following activities: EW-capable sites, comprising the next EW capabilities are highly desirable 1. Examination of the potential IO Range integration phase. Since many attributes that maximize use of limited/ synergies of EW-enabled wireless CNA EW-capable sites are the same ones high demand assets. This allows the and CNE. The growing trend towards providing CNA capability from Phase future Range architecture to link sites, wireless networks, in both civil and 1, integrators are placing maximum providing the right EW capabilities and military applications, increases the effort on leveraging existing Service targets necessary to prosecute combined importance of leveraging existing or Delivery Points (SDPs). These provide EW/CNA operations and effects. This developing new EW capabilities to connectivity to the IO Range backbone, gives IO Range users access to a one-of-a exploit these networks. as the command and control structure kind capability, and/or with difficult to 2. Testing and training with systemfor combined EW/CNA capability obtain perishable targets. of-systems EW capabilities for US expansion. In addition to a secure and networked forces. For example, to attack an architecture, the EW integration process Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), EW Integration: What Does It is the first step in achieving and providing US Forces could employ a mix of Mean? combined-effects IO events. By linking low-observable, stand-off jamming, Integration of EW capability into multiple ranges, platforms and targets escort jamming, stand-in jamming, and the IO Range is based on several key with different EW and CNA capabilities, self-protection capabilities against the IO Range users can test, train, and tracking, targeting, and engagement concepts: A c o m m o n f e d e r a t i o n o f develop technology and operational art radar systems, as well as either EWindependent ranges that cross-leverage capabilities for the warfighter. Secondly, enabled or traditional CNA against the combined EW/CNA effects can be radars command and control network. each others EW capabilities 11

An integrated EW and CNA range TSMO provides an actual threat Test community requirements may could fully test and train with these radar dictate parametric data capture/storage capabilities. UTTR provides range and air space for post-event analysis, while training 3. Testing and training against an for TSMO asset audiences will need to review training adversarys system-of-systems EW Air Force B-52 provides Electronic events. In this scenario, each site capabilities. For example, a modern Attack against TSMO asset captures EW effects and transmits these IADS consists of a mix of tracking and SCORE provides IADS threat back to the IOROC for synchronization targeting radar systems plus a layered emulations and a training venue for and consolidation. These effects could system of man-portable and vehicle Third Fleet be displayed on a variety of visualization mounted surface-to-air missile (SAM) F U R Y p r o v i d e s R e d tools, such as Google Earth, Starship, systems. A few of the more capable communications for countering by and/or Falcon View. ranges might be able to support a subset Third Fleet Brief/Coordinate of these systems, but by pooling the Point Mugu provides EA-6B resources and capabilities of multiple Prowler capability via one of their labs Once the sites have been identified, ranges, it is possible to create a more NSWC, Crane provides EA-6B Range members and customers will realistic representation of system-of- Prowler fidelity against IADS threats brief the event plan, and ensure schedule system threats. JRAAC-MSIC provides IADS coordination. For this scenario, a. In addition to the systems, there modeling for all players availability of EW ranges and platforms will be opportunities for US Forces Y P G p r o v i d e s a w i r e l e s s possessing the appropriate capabilities to train against opposing Red forces communications network would be verified in order to support (OPFOR), which will improve the specific needs of this event. our ability to hone Blue Tactics, Additionally, the players would Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) review security considerations against Red forces. such as Special Access Required/ We can best illustrate the EW Special Access Program (SAR/SAP) integration concept through use requirements. The Ranges MILS of a notional scenario (Figure 3), structure could be used to organize which employs combined EW/ and compartment all training and/or CNA capabilities provided by test events required to successfully the IO Range. Here the Range replicate the appropriate C4I, approaches the ability to permit IADSand the capabilities required full spectrum Network Warfare. In to counter them. This is a unique, this scenario, mission requirements Figure 4. Notional Joint Network Warfare Scenario highly desirable IO Range attribute, superimposed on the IO Range. dictate the defeat of an enemy IADS as it brings together different sites, as well as Command, Control, platforms, and targets at varying Communications, Computers, and Marine Corps tactical units conduct levels of security. This combination Intelligence (C4I), all as part of a exploitation of wireless network at has traditionally been very difficult to conventional operation. The following YPG accomplish, thus even early integration sections describe the logical steps used Information Operations Range efforts provide a long sought after to conduct a combined-effects event Operations Center (IOROC) ensures solution. on the IO Range, using a Plan, Brief/ event synchronization, distribution of Execute Coordinate, Execute, and Debrief/ information, and a common operating Assessment (PBED) process. Execution of this scenario involves picture (COP). The next step in the planning numerous IO Range nodes, as depicted in Plan process is to identify visualization and Figure 4. The Army or ground component The first step is to identify existing instrumentation requirements. Range would provide live and/or virtual forces capabilities necessary to achieve desired events require both, to capture the right to attack the IADS command and effects. IO Range event planners work information in the right format, to ensure control structure, and provide sites and with the customer to identify the proper relevance to the event requirements. In assets for proper scenario execution. capabilities which exist at various sites this scenario, the mission may require The Navy or maritime component which are part of the IO Range. In a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander would counter communications data this hypothetical scenario, the team to visualize the combined EW/CNA links at SCORE and FURY, and would identifies sites that can support the effects on a battlefield, in order to assess also provide electronic attack assets mission objectives, and are available for operational effectiveness and identify in a lab environment. The Air Force such an event, as follows: and address shortfalls that may arise. or air component would provide an

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the synergistic effects of using jamming platforms against emitters with CNA effects. As a result, warfighters may attempt new tactics, techniques, and proceduressuch as a point defense against terminal SAMs and against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or Figure 5. IO Range facilitating the merge of various operational-level effects such as disruption and/ capabilities from EW communities of interest, or denial of IADS C2 or including combat developers, Joint Testing and other C4I. Notably, this Experimentation, and Warfighters. hypothetical scenario brings together various EW communities electronic attack asset and an open air of interest, including combat developers, range to conduct strikes. The Marine joint testing and experimentation, and Corps would infiltrate the wireless warfighters, as depicted in Figure 5. network at YPG while countering IEDs Additionally, every scenario includes in the process of getting to their target. post mission and/or test analysis. This The execution phase also highlights provides the training audience and/or potential modifications to the IO Range test managers a clear picture of what architecture, which could further enhance transpired and why. More importantly, EW integration. This potential new it provides the venue for follow-on architecture builds on the IO Range IC corrective actions as well as validation architecture of SDPs and adds secure of the EW/CNA capabilities employed. tactical data links (TDL) such as Link Bringing this Electronic Warfare 16, secure wireless, and other secure capability to the IO Rangeand utilizing links to fully integrate fixed sites, mobile this event processoffer traditional platforms, and transient targets. Range kinetic range benefits for the non-kinetic participants would monitor execution IO arena. phase results via a common operating picture, offering players a coordinated, real time collaborative environment. Debrief/Assess In conducting combined-effects EW/CNA operations, it is imperative we properly assess capabilities employed against the threat network. By having proper visualization and instrumentation, Range participants can properly assess the results of a range event to determine the effectiveness of combined IO capabilities. This is critically important to identify the effectiveness of EW and CNA, and to demonstrate the synergy of employing combined effects in an IO Range environment. Such visualization needs to be shared among all players in the collaborative environment, in order to increase confidence in non-kinetic effects as well as aid decision makers. For this scenario, we could demonstrate

Way Ahead Although this article used a single notional scenario to articulate EW integration on the IO Range, customers can define numerous other requirements driven scenarios. Events that include the Air Force Distributed Mission Operations Center (DMOC), and other intelligence production organizations such as the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) and National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), can truly enhance the ability to bring realistic EW events into a live, virtual, and constructive environment. Given the appropriate amount of resources, the IO Range can move one step closer to its vision: Create an integrated infrastructure environment which enables Combatant Commanders and Component Commanders to achieve the same level of confidence and expertise in employing information operations capabilities as they have with kinetic weapons. In a sense, the IO Range ability to facilitate EW events in support of tests, training, exercise, and experimentation is limited only by imagination. As the IO Range tackles EW for future operations, it takes one more step towards fullspectrum IO support to the warfighter.

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Uncertainty in Estimating Human Behavior

By Sameul R. Dick Editorial Abstract: The author explores the challenges of analyzing complex systems, contrasting human behavior models with those of hurricane predictions. He describes how better understanding of predictive tools may enhance DOD leaders relative confidence levels.

fter more than a decade of public discussion about Information Warfare, Information Operations, NetCentric Warfare and the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs, a widespread belief has developed within the Department of Defense regarding the changing environment our military experiences, and the USs ability to engage adversaries within this new environment. The Oct 2003 DOD Information Operations Roadmap, with its 57 recommendations and the subsequent programming of resources to act on those recommendations, showed a clear recognition of a DOD need. The formidable military capabilities deployed at the end of the last century must adapt to the burgeoning information age that marks the beginning of this new century. As we reached the end of the first fiscal budget (FY 06) year directly influenced by the watershed IO Roadmap, another widespread belief emerged. A growing understanding of the importance of influencing human audiences has led to some frustration concerning our inability to anticipate human audience behaviors. This frustration manifests itself in the belief it is not possible to predict human behaviors. The frustration felt by DOD decision makers is well founded, and reflects a private sector concern for marketing and public relations of products. In part, this frustration is due to different expectations of what a prediction really provides a decision maker. Reviewing another area of science where predictions are important may point to potential tools to aid those employing military capabilities to influence human audiences and their behaviors. When DOD members express their frustration over prediction capabilities for human behaviors, they are not alone. Within the marketing and public relations industries, there is an underlying concern over the ability to anticipate the targeted human audience (market, in their viewpoint) and the markets changing behaviors. Some of this concern is expressed in the dramatic drop in estimated spending on advertising during 2006 (approx $615B, down from nearly $1T in 2005 ). Changes in how those market audiences engage their information environment combine with the industrys basic concern over how much impact their advertising dollars will generateand results in a much lower estimated investment for 2007. Some of the cause for frustration among decision makers comes from their expectation of what predicting means when applied to human behaviors. Exact behaviors are difficult to elicit from people for many reasons. But experience with the application of military capabilities has left many DOD decision makers with the impression that predictions come true, mostly. Thanks to decades of developing Joint Munitions Effects Manuals, force-on-force Lancesterian conflict models, and the standardization of planning processes around the JOPES (to

Figure 1. 28 Aug 06 track predictions. (National Hurricane Center) mention just a few innovations), DOD decision makers have come to expect highly developed, well supported estimates of outcomes. Confidence levels for these estimates have become fairly robust. When a DOD leader hears a speaker say predict human behavior, the comparison of those robust confidence levels versus less robust efforts to estimate human elements, immediately leads the DOD leader to conclude its not possible to predict human behavior. Despite this tendency in some areas of prediction, DOD decision makers have become comfortable with relatively lower levels of confidence. One of the most historically important areas is the impact of weather on combat operations. Weather prediction is notoriously inaccurate, yet the DOD spends significant effort to determine the current state, and estimate the future weather. Decision makers have come to understand that in weather prediction, confidence in estimated outcome is high for only a short timeor over a large areaand quickly becomes out-of-date. Hurricane modeling and track prediction may provide a useful analogy of a potential technique for estimating similarly complex and chaotic human audience behavior. Both of these systems are highly dynamic, and individual models rarely accurately predict future behavior. However, the aggregation of several well-correlated estimates provides actionable information to guide decision makers in making evacuation choices, and positioning emergency response forces. Similarly, analysts could aggregate estimates of human audience behavior, improving confidence to a level valuable to military decision makers planning to influence those behaviors. To provide better understanding of the potential application of an analogous human audience behavior estimate, it is useful to look at the details of the hurricane track estimating process. Forecasters update the models every 6 hours (during an active storm) with the best measurements available, and make projections as far into the future as their confidence levels

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Figure 4. Actual track. (NOAA/NWS) overall track was within the predicted fan of the expected track and therefore provided useful evacuation warning and recovery forces staging (Figure 4). The correlation of any individual hurricane track models to the actual track may be relatively high for one storm, but the same model may show comparatively low correlation for the next storm. These differences reflect the state of the art in forecasting storm tracks. Despite the lack of consistency of the individual predictive models, the NOAA approach to storm track estimating provides a valuable illustration of how mathematically complex and chaotic system behaviors can be portrayed in ways that are valuable to decision makers. While the difficulties in providing individual track predictions for a targeted human audience may still be difficult, using an aggregated estimate can optimize the confidence level for DOD decision makers. Navigating the landscape of human behaviors may be fraught with error, but navigating them without a map showing the likely outcomes may be the largest error. Owing to their complex nature, exact prediction may never be possible for human behaviors. Adjusting to an estimate of behavior tracks may provide the best available tool.

Figure 2. Detailed model estimates. (NOAA/National Weather Service) allow. Figure 1 shows the several models of the spaghetti plot that is produced by hurricane forecasters (Hurricane Ernesto, Aug-Sep 06). This portrayal of the hurricane track prediction system is rarely noted in public. The actual NOAA predictions for this date in Aug 06 (Figure 2) show detail for each of the several predictive models used in preparing the track forecast. Both the public and decision makers primarily use a generalized hurricane track estimate derived from contributions of various models (Figure 3, same date). This aggregation of the individual models recognizes the inaccuracy of the individual predictions, but increases the confidence level of the overall track estimate, rather than rely on any single prediction. It shows likely left and right bounds and traces a most likely future track, based on the aggregation of the individual model predictions. The actual track three days later shows that although the estimates were largely wrong (some of the individual models came close), the

Sameul R. Dick, Col, US Air Force, Retired, is a program manager for Northrup Grummans Joint Information Operations Division, supporting the IO Range, IO Joint Munitions Effects Manual and Joint Integrative Analysis and Planning Capability. He served as Chief of Staff, Joint Forces HQ-Information Operations, USSTRATCOM, and was USSOCOMs first Chief of Information Warfare. Col Dick received his BS in Engineering Sciences from the US Air Force Academy, an MS in System Management from the University of Southern California, and an MA in National Security Affairs and International Studies from Naval War College. Readers can contact him at sameul.dick@ngc.com Figure 3. Track prediction with fan and centerline. (NOAA/NWS)

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Marketing As An Element Of Strategic Communication

By Daniel R. Matchette, Lieutenant Colonel, USA Editorial Abstract: LTC Machette examines how selling a variety of commercial messages can apply to US Government strategic communication campaigns. He provides a detailed model analysis of Middle Eastern audiences, potential US marketing strategies, product delivery ideas, and how the US Government might compete in the world ideas market.

n 2005, US companies spent roughly $1 trillion on marketing and reaped $12 trillion in revenue. They knew a credible and repeated message earns customers. Positive customer experience with product or service, along with truth in the message brings customers back. Relationships are built; loyalties are developed. They will want your product, not your competitors. The United States Government markets Freedom, Democracy, Security, and Stability. We desire other countries of the world to buy these products for if they dowe believewe will reap the benefits of a safer world, greater political freedoms and economic growth for all peoples, and a strengthened ability to defeat global terrorism. However, the United States is losing credibility world wide to the point that we have significant problems influencing actions of other peoples and governments. The American public doubts the message of the US Government. Poor coordination between US agencies exacerbates the problems. Customers do not want our product. The United States Government and Department of Defense could reap the same benefits by applying industry accepted practices to our diplomatic, military diplomacy, and strategic communication activities. A corporate marketing approach to our military strategic communications can be effective and bring desired results. (Terrorists) get up in the morning, have committee meetings and think about how theyre going to manipulate the worlds press to their advantage. They have repeatedly proven to be highly successful at manipulating the worlds media here in this country as well as elsewhere Marketing campaigns are effective in business. We could use the same

approach to build relationships and loyalties between the United States Government, the American people, and the peoples of the world. If the Department of Defense and the United States Government were to adopt a marketing based strategy for strategic communication and public diplomacy, we would see a great payoff in terms of promoting the countrys foreign policy objectivesmostly clearly laid out in the National Security Strategy. A good marketing strategy is more than just having a catchy message, sound bites, and some themes. An effective marketing strategy

is organized around the marketing campaign. Like all campaigns, marketing campaigns are planned in detail. They are based on a solid intelligence estimate, seamlessly integrated with the operational plans, and tightly coordinated during execution. Most importantly, campaigns require unity of operations and a clear understanding of the commanders intent. If not, the attempt will fail. The question remains whether the United States Government sells products we would want to market? I believe we do. Selling is the exchange of goods or services in exchange for some type of remuneration. This may be monetary or take the form of some other good or service. What product does the government sell, and what do we expect

in return for that product? I believe we sell Freedom, Democracy, Security, and Stability. These basic tenets are laid out by the President of the United States, and reiterated by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The US desires other countries throughout the world to adopt democracy, to enjoy freedom, and to know security and stability in their areas of the world. If we can successfully sell these products to other non-democratic nations, the remunerationthe payment will be greater security for the United States, a safer world with greater political freedoms and economic growth for all peoples, increased human dignity worldwide, and a strengthened ability to defeat global terrorism. Is this selling aspect of strategic communications a Department of Defense (DOD) mission? The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states it succinctly: The US military, in coordination with interagency and Coalition partners, will support a US Government strategic communication strategy for the Global War on Terrorism. This goal is echoed in the National Defense Strategy and the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review. Marketing techniques adapted from the commercial sector would provide unique tools and methodologies to satisfy this requirement and address some of the greater strategic problems the US faces. The goal of the National Security Strategy is to influence actions of target groups and countries around the world in order to increase our own security. In the Department of Defense we can use marketing as a means to this end. Strategic Communication is not sufficient; it is just the message. Marketing makes the message actionable and brings results.

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The Problems We Face The United States has lost worldwide credibility to the point where we have significant problems influencing actions of other peoples and governments. Consider these highlights from a few news stories and other public information sources: Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the US is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of threats to Americas national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic opportunities. Critics (of US Middle East policy) claim that the US neither listens to nor understands what is being said about America in the Middle east region. This is called Voice of the Customer. In Iraq, the US fights an enemy it hardly knows. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories (Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality. Today, there is a realization that strong negative public opinion about the United States could affect how helpful countries will be in the war of terrorism. Moreover, negative sentiment might assist terrorist groups in recruiting new members. the US governments voice is sometimes missing from local and international media. Military, embassy and other US government personnel in the field face cross-cultural communication challenges everyday. It takes only one misplaced image, word or phrase to confuse or cause offense, and many more to repair the damage. At a time when terrorism is a worldwide threat, addressing anti-American sentiment abroad and engaging in the war of

ideas are necessary supplements to traditional security measures. Disparate missions and strategies among government agencies engaged in public diplomacy have resulted in inefficiencies in public diplomacy efforts. Coordination of public diplomacy activities is hampered by the lack of a national communication strategy. Certainly the worsening state of partisan politics in the United States fuels this problem. Professor James Wilson, Pepperdine University, cites numbers such as 81% of Democrats but only 20% of Republicans thought the Iraq War was a mistake. 94% of Republicans approve of the presidents overall performance while only 18% of Democrats do. He cites similar deep divides over many other political and social issues: religion, abortion, schooling, firearms, and so on. His summary is right on the mark: Sharpened debate (caused by political polarization) is arguably helpful with respect to domestic issues, but not for the management of important foreign and military matters A divided America encourages our enemies, disheartens our allies, and saps our resolvepotentially to fatal effect. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) cites 29 separate reports, studies, and documents published between 1999 and 2005 that examine the structure, goals, and methods of US public diplomacy. New articles appear monthly covering similar topics. The problems are well documented. Simply put, much of the world does not believe the US message. Our actions do not support our words. Poor coordination between US agencies only exacerbates the problems. Worse, the American public doubts the message of the US Government. You must have support from your followers to influence others. What is Public Diplomacy? If we are to understand how marketing applies to the discipline and how we might use it with to military operations, we need to know what public diplomacy involves. State Department

believes the goal of public diplomacy is to increase understanding of American values, policies, and initiatives and to counter anti-American sentiment and misinformation about the United States around the world. A slightly different definition appears in a congressional study, defining public diplomacy as: the promotion of Americas interests, culture and policies by informing and influencing foreign populations. Both of these definitions lack somewhat in substance. Where is the action? We want to do more than increase understanding, we want to affect behavior. As early as 1998 at least one military author, Air Force Lt Col Jim Riggins, argued for a more active approach to public diplomacy. He offered a definition of public diplomacy as a governments attempt to shape foreign public opinion through overt, structured dissemination of truthful information in such a way so as to support ones own national objectives, interests, and goals. This more encompassing definition appears to be reflected now in the DODs official definition: Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. But times and conditions have changed and we, as a nation and a military, have more to do. We want peoples of the world to buy into and embrace the concept of democracy. We want them to believe democracy and freedom will give them greater stability and security. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Strategic Communication is a separate discipline which describes a variety of instruments used by governments to understand global attitudes and cultures, engages in a dialog of ideas between people and institutions, advise policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion

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implications of policy choice, and influence attitudes and behavior through communication strategies. As such, it informs public diplomacy. If public diplomacy seeks to promote foreign policy objectives, it must understand global attitudes and cultures, thus giving policy makers means to communicate their ideas and concepts. Clearly, there is a two way link between the activities. The ability of SC to influence attitudes and behavior is best accomplished through public diplomacy activities. With its emphasis on personal connections, the more people-oriented public diplomacy is often better for communicating our strategic message. These two intra-related activities can be improved and made more effective with a comprehensive marketing strategy. Why apply corporate marketing to strategic communications and public diplomacy? Marketing is active. It is meant to accurately portray your company, your mission, and products. If done well, marketing achieves several goals: Proclaims your values to the customers Standardizes your message Links products, actions, and words Creates desire; customers want your product and will line up to buy it Creates loyalty Demand will out-run supply Marketing is also proactive. It builds demand where none exists. Campaigns are designed to build public understanding of who you are, what you are doing, why you are doing it, your future plans, and why the customer must have your product or service. You are making a promise to the customer. DOD and the US Government can use this approach to build a global marketing campaign to create demand for democracy, freedom, security, and stability. We can build a demand through accurate and truthful message linked to

our actions and operations. By faithfully delivering on our promise we can earn repeat customers. Not all commercial marketing campaigns are successful; the same factors that make those efforts fail will also break a US Government or DOD marking campaign. Critical parts are: The linkage of the message to your actions The coordination of the message, actions, and operations between all governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and partners Truthfulness The internal stakeholderthe American publicmust believe the message

is sellingand people are buying. Al Qaeda has a message and a product that people are buying. Some are even continue buying the Marxist/Leninist product. We need customers to prefer our message and product. How the Marketing Approach Compares to Traditional DOD Endeavors DOD has three functional areas that utilize tenants of a marketing campaign, but do not fill the same need. These are Public Affairs (PA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Information Operations (IO). Public Affairs manage public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. They generally use a reactive method of communication designed to explain events after they occur, but not necessarily designed to influence behavior. They tend to focus on the media as its distribution channel, and are generally geared for the American audience, though with a sub-set audience of US allies. Public affairs do not necessarily direct their message toward neutral or hostile audiences. PSYOP is a proactive event. It is defined as planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately influence the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originators objectives. Generally, PSYOP is used in tactical or operational level operations to sway the actions of enemy combatants and potential combatants and not directed to the general populace. Depending on the immediate need PSYOP may or may not be truthful. As a result, using PSYOP anywhere other than the tactical battlefield could hurt us more than help.

Defense and State teaming in action. (Defense Link) A disconnect between our actions and our message has caused a loss of confidence. If we institute a marketing plan and one element of the government performs different actions than another, or we offer conflicting messages, then credibility is lost and believers lose faith. If the message is false or contains discrepancies then a shadow is cast upon us making our actions suspect. If the inside employeesDOD employees, federal workers, our contractors, the American peopleare not sold completely on the message and product then we cannot hope to have world buyin. If we are going to make a promise, we had better fulfill it, because the customer has options. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has a message and product he

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If the message is perceived as (or is) a lie, then we lose credibility. Even when it is the truth, it may not help our longer term objectives. For example, promising to drop a 10,000 pound bunker buster on an enemy formation in 24 hours unless they desert their unit may be true, but does not win friends. Information Operations are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending ones own information and information systems. This is primarily a technical field that protects information stored on communication networks. IO may also have an offensive component to attack an enemys information systems. IO does not look to influence decisions or buying habits. A marketing campaign is not propaganda. The Department of Defense received bad media coverage in recent years for issues like the Secretary of Defenses Office of Strategic Influence and stories of the military paying to have positive articles written about operations and placed in Iraqi newspapers. Both of these events spun up reactive public affairs campaigns to counter the negative affects of the media coverage. A marketing campaign is completely open and acknowledged. It is not pushing doctrine, policy, or agendas. Rather, it is a straightforward attempt to build desire for a product and create a market for that product. In our case the products are a more esoteric than a loaf of bread. Nonetheless, they are products we want peoples of the world to taste and experience. Corporate Methodology and Model Marketing is the set of activities used to influence the thoughts and choice decisions of your target audience. A marketing plan is designed to capture the potential customers attention, motivate them to want your product, move them to actually buy your product, convince them to buy again, and use their experience with your product or experience to influence other customers. Figure 1 presents the Corporate Marketing Model to help envision development of a marketing plan and

how to apply that plan to operations. It is important to note that this is not a serial process, but an iterative onerefinement continues even after we launch a marketing campaign. The Message This is the brand theme, the essence of the message you wish to convey. This may be developed iteratively Figure 1. Corporate Marketing Model. and in fact benefits from refinement as the marketing campaign The idea is to segment customers, usually develops. The rest of the messaging by behavior, with the idea to first target will be based on this theme. It should be the people whose behavior is already short and snappy; you want immediate amenable to your productthose people recallsomething memorable. It may who already want it. Then, after we establish a base, we begin to work on also include a logo. For the US and its efforts to converting other buyers. There will sell democracy, freedom, security, always be people who do not want the and stability, one idea for a simple, product and no amount of marketing will unifying message is: Expect the rights of persuade them to buy. It is important to liberty. This would become the theme identify this group than spending any around which we would build all other amount of money trying to sell to them. Geoffrey Moore defines five general messages. Further, the message must be groups of people that help categorize integrated. DOD cannot create its own target customers: The Enthusiast: already on your separate messageit must be the US message. Ideally this would flow down side and wants your next release The Visionary: sees the value of from the President with assistance and guidance from Department of State your product and with little prompting (DOS). They would be the owner of the will use it messageperhaps our Central Marketing The Pragmatist: approaches with Office. DOS would then develop and some caution, wants to see if someone refine the messaging for many different else uses it first contexts and applications. Other Federal The Conservative: could live agencies such as DOD, Department of without your product and will only use Homeland Security (DHS), Department it when it is clear there is no other real of Justice (DOJ), etc, would develop their choice own messaging based on central themes The Skeptic: will never voluntarily developed and handed down from DOS. use your product The US Government currently lacks a After identifying people in these complete, comprehensive, and integrated groups, target them in this order with communications strategy; we will be unified messaging. Other demographics successful only when we get the message typically used to further segment right. customers include age, location, income, job, education, buying habits, Target Market Analysis and methods used to gather information, and Opportunity Analysis entertainment preferences. No money In this step you are working to is spent on people and groups who will identify your target market demographics. never be sympathetic to your product

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or service. The next step is to identify the markets where your product can be used. Where are the people you want to target? With an idea of who the target customers and their markets, you must define their values. What is important to them? What drives them? What makes them select one product over another? Do not take your best guess about what they value, you must ask them. This is known as Voice of Customer. The only way you can be sure your product satisfies the customers needs is to ask. There are many ways to do this such as interviews, surveys, polls, customer feedback, and performance monitoring, i.e. buying habits. Companies are now spending considerable resources performing in-depth research of customers and markets. Market intelligence is a component of this research, and follows the same pattern as military intelligence and analysis. In fact, there are now companies that specialize in performing detailed market research, selling this as a service to other companies. Finally, with a completed analysis, rank order the target customers and markets by revenue. In instances where revenue is not the driving factor, you can rank order by the payoff or expected impact, such as how much one customer will influence others. While this technique clearly works in corporate America, how would this method apply this to DOD? Clearly, a broad, world-wide messaging campaign would be needed. A global message is beyond the scope of this article, however we can look briefly at two regional markets: the United States and the Middle East. The US audience probably
Customers Requirements Honor and Islamic morality must be preserved Economic improvement and ability to earn a decent living Secular government if there is cleric oversight (juridical validation)

does not need a targeted message, so we will use a broad, horizontal campaign. A horizontal campaign generally restates your theme with more detail, but does not go into specific details about how a particular product will help a particular customer. The Middle East group needs more analysis. How should they be segmented within the region? There are many ways to do this: tribe, clan, religion, age. Defense Science Board reports suggest there are two broad groups, those more inclined to support the US and those less inclined. The Supporters can be divided into the Regime Elites, the Establishment Ulama (middle class), and the Technocratic Class (professionals). The Non-Supporters are divided into the Regimes, the Uncommitted (who prefer status-quo), the Sympathizers (to the Jihadis), the Islamists (indirect supporters of the Jihadis), and the Jihadis (radical change makers for a Salifist society). However, on one point I take issue with the Defense Science Board. By referring to the last group as Jihadis we may inadvertently give them legitimacy. Jihad is a holy war and Jihadis are holy warriors. In marketing words are important, so we must get our words right. Rather, let us refer to the last group as Mufsidoonevildoers who are engaged in Hirabahunholy war. In a small way this will help us undermine the insurgents legitimacy. Recognizing not everyone fits into those categories, former comptroller of the Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim argues most democratic change movements in the Middle East have come from the Regimes and Regime Elites. We should therefore start with
Competing Message

four groups: the Regime Elites, the Regime Leaders, the Establishment Ulama, and the Technocratic Class. These should be further segmented, targeting specifically Dubai, Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Using Moores definition above, most of our targets fall into the category of Pragmatists or Conservatives. There are few Enthusiasts or Visionaries to readily buy our products in the Middle East. Do not segment the customers by religion, but keep religion in mind, for it may affect the tailored message. As for the other groupsignore them in terms of marketing. Neither our words nor actions will sway them. But we will keep their message in mind, for we need to counter their message to our target customers. What do these customers want? What is the voice of the customer in the Middle East? And what is the competitors message you may have to counter? No doubt these are complex questions, but there are some basic answers. Figure 1 provides some details. Customers Requirements Competing Message O u r c o m p e t i t i o n s m e s s a g e is becoming more standardized and credible; it is beginning to ring true with their customers. Our messaging must therefore de-stress the competitors message by better arguing the benefits of our product. Our message must emphasize democracy tailored to their unique Islamic heritage and desires (see Zakheim), honor through freedom, and economic improvements derived from stability and security of a well-governed society. We must place our emphasis on the benefits of our product and not on attacking the competitors product (i.e. Islam or Islamic law)though it will be necessary to undermine the competitors credibility. The International Crisis Group suggests our adversaries actions be cast as dishonorable and Anti-Islamic, and that they perform monetarily motivated, criminally reprehensible acts (i.e. beheading captives). This is why it is useful to refer to them as Mufsidoon.

Defeat the occupier whose invasion is simply a continuation of the crusade to dominate Islam Remain pure from the corrupting influences of the world Sharia rule; longer term to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate. (While the Caliphate may be a romantic ideal, it is also unifying vision.) Democracy is a threat to Islamic values. Highlighting coalition missteps and resulting turmoil

Security

Figure 1. What do customers want?

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How are customers integrated to products in order to focus the With the customer now marketing efforts? For the US somewhat defined, it is time to horizontal marketing campaign the analyze our products. Typical goal is to unify as much as possible analysis criteria are: the American populace behind the Product Description, in one benefits of spreading democracy. clear sentence why your product Therefore the horizontal message is perfect for a specific buyer and will stress the benefits of democracy, what it does best the role that political systems play Product Differentiation, in providing stability and security. why your product stands out in a How might it look for the Middle credible and relevant way to the East target customers? Figure 3 customers you are targeting US spokesman addresses Middle Eastern customers. provides suggestions. Product Name, it is more Frankly, positioning will be a (Defense Link) important to be descriptive than challenge. Given the widespread but good for others. And for our Middle creative dislike of the United States and its Functionality, Features and East customers, Figure 2 shows what an policies, it will be difficult to convince Benefits, to understand the product analysis might look like. even the (hopefully) open-minded target from a customers point of view, list Middle East customer we have defined. Integrate Target to Product the functionality, the features, and the The external market environment ranges With the customer by and large from ambivalent to outright hostile. benefits that product has; prioritize each defined and the products understood with Our internal competitive advantage is for the target market Product Adaptability, to understand regard to the target customer, it is time fractured and strident. However, we how adaptable your product is to your to match the rank ordered customer with have one powerful advantage over our the products that fit their needs. Another competitors who argue for other forms of markets Price, the amount of money integration concern is product positioning governance: advantage is the product. charged for a product or service or the how the target market defines you in Having some voice and value exchanged for the benefits of the relation to your competitors. If the representation before your leaders is product or service. A price too low will target market views your product as desirable. Many hope for a stable, secure not be taken seriously, too high and the unique, you are in a good position. life for themselves and their children. potential customer will not take the risk. Being one-of-a-kind means customers For this market however, words and have a compelling reason to buy your noble ideas are insufficient; actions must Price is not always monetary. How would an analysis look for our product. Positioning also considers two demonstrate the concepts. To create a customer sets? A horizontal campaign aspects of the environment: the external yearning for freedom we need functioning for US customers will primarily sell marketing environment and the internal democratic institutions to characterize the benefits of democracy. Remember, competitive advantage. What challenges the principles. Representation must we want the greater US populace to does the DOD face in its markets? What be fair and equitable, applying civil believe democracy, freedom, security, unique advantage does the DOD have in liberties to all. Representative bodies and stability are not only good for us, advancing their product? must function with a degree of efficiency Product Analysis
Product Characteristic Description Democracy To be represented by and to represent yourself to your rulers and be fairly judged by them Your voice counts Representation, Fairness Highly tailorable to your needs and yet maintains your Islamic identity Freedom To make an honorable earning and a decent living for you and your family and to pray to the God of your choice You keep all that is good and holy Openness, Education You may grow it as much as you are comfortable with Security To work, worship, and live without fear. To have a reliable infrastructure for your homes, towns, and schools All are welcome, none need fear Degrees of Freedom, Schools Improves every environment Stability To enjoy the benefits for your lifetime and your childrens lifetime and their childrens lifetime. It will last beyond your time as a legacy Prosperity, Capital markets Once stable you will never want chaos again

Differentiation Functionality, Features, Benefits Adaptability

Price

Courage, Time; steadfastness; Giving up historical hatred & tribal feuds

Figure 2. Product analysis.

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Customer Regime Leaders Regime Elites Establishment Ulama Technocratic Class

Product Democracy, Stability Democracy, Stability Representation, Security, Freedom Freedom, Opportunity

Figure 3. Customer versus product. to accomplish the tasks of governance. We can build the desire for the product with our words, but only by following through with meaningful, functional mechanisms. These desires among peoples of the world, if they can be built and sustained, are our position and our relative competitive advantage. It is also our differentiated brand promise for the customers. However, it will most likely help our cause of distancing the product from the United States Government lest we taint the product. With the customer environment and product differentiation now fairly well defined, we turn our attention to various marketing methods we will use to create brand awareness, and ultimately sales. Develop Marketing Strategy Marketing strategy is primarily focused on the various components included in the message and a plan to get the message out. The usual objective is to move your target customer through the following phases: Unawareness > Awareness > Beliefs/Knowledge > Attitude > Purchase Intention > Purchase. To clarify, unawareness does not necessarily mean a lack of product knowledge, it can also mean the customer is unaware of your company, why your product is preferred over another, or unaware of why your company is preferred over another. What components go into the message? Usually these are the promotion, the offer, the call for action, and the promise. The promotion is the specific mix of advertising, personal selling, sales promotion, and public relations campaign used to pursue advertising and marketing objectives. The offer is a statement to the customer 2

that tells the customer what is being offered: the value proposition, the problem the product of service solves, how the problem is solved, and product features. The call for action must challenge the target to do something based on the offer. Ask customers to take an action so they will learn more, test your product, or even buy the product. Challenge them to act and tell them what action you want them to perform. However, the promise is more than simply telling the customer about the benefits of your product; it is your guarantee of satisfaction. It is your personal vow the product will meet, even exceed, the customers expectation. It is linked to your credibility, perhaps even your honor. When crafting the message it is important we analyze the culture where that message will be delivered. Cultural knowledge is important to ensure we use the right words, meanings, inflections, and the right delivery method. Metrics must then measure the messages success. These are especially important for measuring the response to the message as different offers are tested, and for tracking the results of the offer. Metrics take two forms: leading indicators; and lagging indicators. Leading indicators are those factors we can control before making an offer, including employee satisfaction, company performance indices, product differentiation, process efficiency, customer satisfaction, and

customer advocacy. Lagging indicators are those showing results for actions that have already occurred. These include things such as revenue growth, market share, profitability, referrals, repeat purchases, sales, brand awareness, and return on investment. Figure 4 shows all these elements included in a simple Web advertisement for a Samsung LCD monitor. What resources are available to get out the message? There are many methods, from classic advertising to using the latest Internet media techniques. The challenge is to select those most appropriate to your customer and those that the customer will encounter. A partial list includes: World Wide Web: advertising, Web media, blogs, pop-ups, e-mail, chat, pod-casting, and webinars (Webbased seminars) Direct Mail Classified Advertisements Press Releases Product Reviews, both in-house and second party Print media Broadcasting (radio, TV) White papers Event (trade show, conference, lunche, party) Collateral advertising Public relations Lobbying Direct calls Conference calls

Figure 4. Example Web ad analysis. Summer 2007

These are not all one-way communication tools. Two-way dialog is vital to companies and is used frequently. Interactive webinars, conferencing, public relations, and lobbying are critical techniques to inform customers and receive feedback. For our two previously defined customer setsthe American public and the four Middle East targetsthere should be different promotion strategies that offer tailored message variations. Before considering what these might look like, we need to consider other resources available to the US Government and DOD for distributing the message that are not available to commercial firms. For the military these resources include: Recruiting Public interaction Troops on the ground who engage in face-to-face contact Department of State has used a variety of methods, which include:

partnerships. Direct distribution is when a company offers its products directly to the customer. This could be via on-line ordering, mail-order, or company store. Apple Computer, for example, runs a number of stores to sell its products directly to the consumer. Starbucks coffee shops are direct distribution channels. Retail is the distribution of product through other companies whose mission is to sell a variety of products. Gillette, for example, sells its razors through retailers, such as Wal-Mart and K-Mart. Partnerships are agreements between companies to sell the others products in part or in whole. Symbol Technologies may sell equipment directly to the customer, but prefers to sell through partners such as Dexterra and Adesso. As a means of incentivizing the partnership, Symbol Technologies offers better prices to customers who buy from partners. But delivery of the product is not sufficient. The companys other elements must be aligned one to the American Corners other, and to distribution. Virtual Presence Centers Such elements include Sales, Information Presence Human Resources (HR), Market Centers Intelligence, Operations, Supply American Presence Posts Chain, Information Technology American Libraries (IT), Finance, and others. It Broadcasting, i.e. Voice of DOD advertiser drops in on a commercial venue. is reasonable to say there is a America, Radio Sawa, and (Defense Link) many-to-many linkage between Al Hurra television East targets, the goal is to also drive the these elements; each one must be in The DOD can use all the resources available to commercial companies, benefits of democracy, but in this case perfect alignment. Marketing may as well as tailor them for our use. de-coupled from the provider. We do generate demand, but HR needs to Collateral advertising, in particular, not want poor perception of the US to staff a sales force for the customer provides a unique opportunity. DOD distract from the good that can come interface. Demand must drive the supply can partner with other agencies, Non- from representative governance. Figure chain to ensure product is available. Finance must provide funding for all Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 5 provides some marketing strategy. With our marketing strategy operations and HR. Market Intelligence other governments, and private businesses to do joint advertising. For example, developed, we must then consider actual informs marketing and operations about establish a partnership with Mdecins product delivery. Alignment between expected market conditions and the Sans Frontires (MSF) [Doctors Without the products message and the products competition. Operations integrates the actions. Supply Chain gathers new Borders] where DOD will actively delivery is crucial. material and provides product to the advertise MSF as the humanitarian Product Delivery Method distribution channel. Figure 6 represents medical organization of choiceand Product delivery includes the method the alignment notion. It is bad business they will actively promote democracy as a means of establishing stability, thus or distribution channels used to make for a company to successfully market the product or service available to the a product and then fail to deliver that leading to better medical conditions. One last thought about the message consumer. There are three general types product. For example, Sony Corporation really gets to the heart of influencing of distribution channels: direct, retail, and built a great deal of interest for its Play

behavior: we want to establish an emotional connection with the customer. This happens when a customer uses a product because it fulfills a deeper desire than just a need. This is a challenging goal that quickly delves into behavioral psychology and is highly dependant on culture. However, once a customer is emotionally attached to a product it is virtually certain they will use it for life. The first goal is to move the target customers from unawareness to awareness and then beyond. For the American target customer the goal is to make them aware of the benefits of the productsimply that democracy is good, not only for us but for others, and that for greater worldwide stability the US Government wants democracy in as many places as possible. For the Middle

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Marketing Element Promotion Offer

US Customer Primarily advertising Expect the rights of liberty - Your childrens future depends on world stability

Mid East Customer Advertising - Indirect Sales - Public Relations - Expect the rights of liberty - To be fairly represented by and to represent yourself to your rulers - To make an honorable earning and make a decent living - To live without fear - Opportunity - Get more information to make informed decisions - Establish local democratic organizations - Call on your tribal leaders to demand representative government - Heavy focus on tradition - Tribal orientation and attendant authority and social status - Time as a non-linear concept - Long memory that does not encourage forgiveness - Face-to-Face communication and two-way relationships preferred and trusted - Important values: family, religious faith (and freedom to practice as you choose), social safety net, volunteerism, freedom of expression, universal reach of education, and economic prosperity - Rule of law - Personal and family honor Leading - Marketing budget Global economic performance - Attitude towards democracy as an institution - US Intra-agency coordination - Percentage of customers who prefer democracy to other forms of government Lagging - Relative economic improvement - Attitude towards the U.S. Government - Attitude towards Americans - Number of message hits - Increase in democratic institutions - Sectarian strife Continued traditional Department of State activities - Advertising in local print media - Advertising on local broadcast sources, especially Al Jazeera - White papers on the benefits of democracy, freedom, stability, and security - In depth face-to-face encounters and private debate at the diplomatic level down to the individual level - Partner-based messaging with NGOs and private business - Heavy Web-based presence using all means

Call to Action

Become more informed - Become more active in American democratic processes Beer drinking, NASCAR watching, red-state right wingers - Wine sipping, Volvo driving, blue-state left wingers - TV-watching, worried about the job and rising medical costs, just-want-to-get-on-with-life mid-packers

Culture

Metrics

Leading - Economic measures that affect quality of life (i.e. mortgage rates, costs of goods, medical costs, gas prices, tax rates, job rates, education rates, inflation) Lagging - Unit cohesion at DOD and Joint levels - Partisan political strife/division

Marketing Resources

Television advertising - Recruiting messaging - Web based media, pop-ups, blogs, pod-casts, targeted emails - Coordinated intra-agency messaging (i.e. democratic messaging at national parks) - Event based presence (i.e. at annual Hollywood Oscar presentations)

Figure 5. Marketing Strategy. Station Three, but failed to get it to the market; in the meantime they lost huge amounts of market share to Microsoft who successfully delivered its X-Box 360 to the market in time for Christmas 2005. It is a complex challenge to link all the elements of a company, but it must be done. The marketerss challenge is to link the message to the rest of the operations; to build the demand just in time to deliver the product. How could this be applied to US Government and DOD strategic communications and public diplomacy activities? It means that if we are going to sell democracy, we had better be prepared to deliverand have the mechanism to deliver. It also means the entire operation must be fully financed, all positions fully staffed, that competition is clearly understood, and the partnerships for delivery of democracy are solidly in place. Regarding finance, how much should be spent on marketing efforts? An industry rule of thumb suggests that 3.5% of revenue is required to maintain a market, and 5% of revenue is required to penetrate a new market. Clearly market penetration is what we are after. The Fiscal Year 2007 US Presidential budget request is $13 trillion, which means $650 billion should be dedicated across the federal government to the marketing effort. DODs budget request is $504 billion, which means $25 billion for dedicated marketingthe big numbers necessary for a winning investment. Military operations are one type of product delivery channel used in the DOD. The US Military participates in numerous operations using a wide variety of operational types. The list of operations consists of the following: Offensive Operations (which now include Defeat Terrorist Networks) Defensive Operations (which now include Defend the Homeland in Depth) Stability Operations (which include Shaping Choices for Countries at Strategic Crossroads, Preventing Hostile States and Non-State Actors from Acquiring or using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Peace Operations Support Operations (which include Domestic Support Operations, Nation Assistance/Building, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Relief Operations, Disaster Relief) Many of these operations are ideally suited for a marketing campaign. For the internal campaign directed towards the US public, we need an aggressive marketing campaign integrated into operations associated with Defending the Homeland, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Domestic Support Operations, Relief Operations, Disaster Relief, Support to Civil Law Enforcement, and Community Assistance. Likewise, for the Middle East marketing campaign, maximizing the integration of the message into Shaping Choices for Countries at Strategic Crossroads, Peace Operations, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Nation Assistance/Building, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Relief Operations, and Disaster Relief is necessary.

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Figure 6. Alignment notation. Linking the message with operations provides the greatest opportunity to say and do the same thingto keep the message linked to our actions. Finally, all the analysis and planning should be linked together into the campaign plan. Marketing Campaign Planning and Sub-Launch Planning The campaign plan is delivering the tailored message to the target customer using the chosen methods over a period of time, with the goal of generating demand and ultimately selling product. In corporate America, marketing campaigns typically span an 18 month time frame. This is the amount of time needed to build visibility and create demand. It assumes a buying environment, one where the buyer is friendly to the company offering the product. In 18 months, the Apple Corporation could generate much demand and revenue on its next release of the iPod. Alternately, W.R. Grace and Company would need much longer to convince the public to buy asbestos based ceiling tiles. In fact, the market would be so hostile to such a product that no marketing campaign could ever be successful at selling asbestos. What is a reasonable estimate of time needed to change a markets perception of a company or a product in a hostile environment? CEO of Johnson & Johnson Bill Weldon stated anecdotally that it has taken five years worth of effort to turn public opinion about pharmaceutical manufacturers,

and that several more years of work is of products and a limited customer set needed. The direct implication is that in to reach. And, most of the world isnt the current hostile environment, it will hostile toward them. take years of messaging and action to The challenge for the Federal begin changing global attitudes. government and the Department of As discussed earlier, there are Defense is much larger. For this reason two types of marketing campaigns: we must have partners who will help sell horizontal and vertical. Horizontal our message, we must have an appropriate campaigns are broad and designed budget, and we must integrate messaging to generate general recognition of a and advertising into all operations. It product. Vertical campaigns are directed is a challenge we must successfully towards very specific markets. While take on, if we truly desire to spread everyone is likely to see a horizontal democracyand the resulting security campaign, a vertical campaign is only and stability. for targeted at customers. In 2005, The Surrounders IBM ran a broad horizontal campaign for their professional services that featured The Surrounders are the four points a help desk worker sitting at a desk in a around the exterior of the marketing number of unlikely settings. One such model. All these points have been spot showed the worker solving traffic covered above, but they are so critical congestion on a freeway for a police to overall success, they must be at the officer. Millions of Americans saw these forefront of thinking and planning. advertisements, which created broad - People: It is becoming understood recognition for IBMs technical services. that brands that earn their customerss At the same time, IBM was advertising its Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) software in RFID Journal, specifically targeting retail companies to help solve their backend warehousing problems. There is a very good chance most Americans did not see this vertical advertising campaign. What might a DOD campaign plan look like? It could take any number of forms, but figures 7 through Figure 7. DOD Campaign Plan (1). 10 offer one example tailored to the Establishment Ulama customer target. While recognizing this plan is incomplete, it offers the scope of planning required to reach just one market segment. Businesses expend much effort to put together comprehensive plans in an attempt to persuade customers to buy. Businesses have it easier than DOD because they usually have a limited set Figure 8. DOD Campaign Plan (2).

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they have problems. Follow the process and projects work well. Process is very important; always looking to improve process, consistency, and speed. - Promise: our promise is linked to our idea of honor. The Middle East customers will understand this concept, but if we fail to deliver, we lose face and honor. What could be a better promise Figure 9. DOD Campaign Plan (3). than to stake honor on the satisfaction your product will deliver? - Partners: we can not go this long war by ourselves, we need other organizations that will support and help codeliver the message. These partners should be tightly bound to our processes and our promise. These partners include: Other agencies, starting with Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and Figure 10. DOD Campaign Plan (4). Department of Justice loyalty are characterized by employees Non-Governmental Organizations who understand and identify with the Private business, particularly those brand. If the insiders do not believe then that work abroad they will not sell the product or service. Other governments DOD employees, military and civilian, must believe the message. Likewise so must employees of Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Justice, and all the Federal agencies. They hurt the mission if they dont support the message. The American public is also considered an insider, which is why we must expand marketing dollars to win them over. - Processes: our internal processes must be aligned. The marketing strategy aligns to product, aligns to sales, aligns to distribution, aligns to supply, chain aligns to operations and on it goes. As one successful CEO noted, Processes must be common across the company. Anytime a process is tailored or shortcuts are taken is generally when Call to Action Marketing is effectiveand with a serious investmentoffers serious returns. What then should we do? Declare that America is right and go it alone? Become even more so the worlds police force, setting up armed camps in every disruptive state? Or launch a campaign aligned with our people, processes, partners, and operations to build US public support and confidence? Then slowly begin to build world-wide demand for greater security, stability, and democratic institutions? I believe the latter is the preferred choice. There are several concrete steps to start this process:

The US Government develops a national communications strategy to start linking intra-agency processes with Department of State taking the lead The President and Congress increase funding for marketing to 5% of budget across the federal budget DOD applies 5% of its budget to marketing Create within the Department of State a Central Marketing Office that creates the US marketing strategy and unified messaging, and which coordinates the marketing efforts of subordinate agencies such as the Department of Defense DOS, DOD, and other federal agencies hire an international marketing company to bring professional expertise to the marketing problem DOS, DOD, and other federal agencies hire a news wire service to distribute US messaging DOD plans operations as part of our marketing campaign DOD plans marketing campaigns as part of our operations DOD incorporates marketing into our training DOS, DOD, and other Federal agencies partner with business for more than just messaging. The government and DOD could encourage and incentivize US and foreign companies to build and operate in the Middle East, and other areas around the world. These companies would use local employees, verses imported foreign employees. The company would support both local markets and the broader global market. Local employees would become invested in jobs, and their success will help build the local infrastructure, grow markets, and build stability and security. The incentives for the companies must give them a legitimate business rationale to be in the country; we can not subsidize their operations. Subsidizing provides no incentive to perform, and worse, makes them American lackeys. Conclusion Does a marketing plan solve all our problems? No, only half our problems the other half are solved by our actions.

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Words build the expectation and the deeds deliver the goods. The challenge is that despite any number of words, one misstep with our actions will end any credibility we may have created. The US already has major credibility problems in areas of the world where we desire influence. It is time to start stepping carefully. In the business world, all employees are involved in marketingpart of their job is to sell the company. Likewise, everyone in the military has some responsibility for strategic communication and diplomacypart of our job is to sell the US. A corporate marketing approach to our military diplomacy, strategic communications, public diplomacy, and military operations along with new ways of thinking about our problems, will bring results. We must plan for and look towards the long term. We need to orient our people, align our processes, gather our partners, and deliver on our promises. Our own democracy, freedom, stability, and security require us to do so. Bibliography Charkowske, Sergeant Kevin M., Practical Impacts and Effectiveness of Cultural Intelligence, Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 2005 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006 Department of State Publication 11201, Jun 2005 Epstein, Susan B. and Lisa Mages. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations. Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2 Sep 2005 -- Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, US Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations. Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 5 Oct 2004

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Apr 2005 International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report No. 50, 15 Feb 2006 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001 Laird, Melvin R, Setting the Record Straight, Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2005 Moore, Geoffrey A. Inside the Tornado. New York: HarperBusiness Books, 1995 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, Mar 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 Feb 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Sep 2002 and Mar 2006 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Sep 2004

Rice, Secretary of State Condoleezza, remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 18 Jan 2006 Riggins, Lt Col Jim, A Strategic Assessment of Public Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 14 Sep 1998 Rumsfeld, Donald. Remarks at the National Press Club, 2 Feb 2006 Van Otten, Dr. George A., Culture Matters, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Jan-Mar 2005 Smith, Shaun and Joe Wheeler. Managing the Customer Experience. London: Prentice Hall, 2002 Swanson, Bill. CEO of Raytheon, Inc, stated in conversation 10 Mar 2006 US House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Hearing Memorandum, 4 Feb 2004 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Report for 2004 Wilson, James Q, Divided We Stand, Can a polarized nation win a protracted war? Commentary, Feb 2006 Zakheim, Dov S, Blending Democracy, The Generational Project in the Middle East, The National Interest, Fall 2005

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A Framework for Analyzing & Developing Theater-Specific Information Operations

By Dr. David Sloggett Editorial Abstract: This is the third part of the series studying the ways in which information and associated intelligence can play a role in helping formulate coherent IO that operates seamlessly from the strategic to the tactical levels. Part I explored the overall backdrop against which information operations make contributions to the ways in which we operate in complex theatres. Part II introduced a framework whereby intelligence analysts could develop jigsaw puzzles that would enable improved levels of situational awareness to be developed in these complex theatres. This part of the series takes the Jigsaw Puzzle Paradigm one step further, introducing a framework through which commanders can form situational awareness when operating against a backdrop such as a Three-Bloc War.

ny analysis of contemporary military theatres, such as Iraq and Afghanistan [and results emerging from the 2006 conflict in Lebanon] will highlight the very dynamic and adaptable nature of the adversaries we face today. If Colonel John Boyds Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop paradigm [Hammond, 2001] still applies to todays warfare, then the age old axiom that one needs to stay inside the adversarys OODA loop still guides our thinking. This is complicated today by the pace at which military operations can be concluded in their high intensity phase, and situations where you may find yourself engaged in what is referred to as the Three Bloc War. This is where you might still be fighting at one end of the operations spectrum in a very small geographic area, but also in parallel delivering humanitarian relief supplies to a nearby part of a community. This is also increasingly difficult when one is faced by an enemy who has so clearly shown adaptability, flexibility and ability to use the cognitive spacesuch as the use of so-called night letters in theatre to intimidate key members of the populationa form of tactical information operation. Thus, it is relatively straightforward to say our need to dictate military operations tempo when fighting a conventional high intensity operation such as the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom or on-going large-scale operations in Afghanistanby staying inside the adversaries decision cycle, is vital. It throws the adversary onto the back foot, and allows you to dominate 32

the tempo at which operations are carried outin effect you and not the adversary have the initiative. A question is: does this concept still apply when one is dealing not with the 20 days war, but the 20 year waraddressing counterterrorism and counter-insurgency? The first point is that we might think there is a huge difference in the tempo of operations conducted in the 20 day war as opposed to the 20 year war. As a statement this is not necessarily true. Some aspects of information operations have to be thought of as very long-term, almost generational in scope. These are not all strategic information operations, as there will be a need for on-going and adaptable IO at the operational and tactical levels. We must be responsive to local initiatives taken by the enemy to reduce the impact of our on-going activities. Other strategic level activities may only last for short periods of time, requiring adjustment in response to an adversarys actions. This all points to the need to develop much greater agility in the planning and conduct of information operationsdriving a clear need for information and associated intelligence to be synchronised with the same. The question becomes how do we move towards this situation, creating the circumstances where such responsive and agile capabilities are available? Information and Intelligence Perspectives In the second part of this series (IO Sphere, Spring 2007: 19) we discussed

the idea of information landscapes that allowed us to collect material across the whole spectrum of the information spacefrom economic and political to classic military and physical aspects of warfare. These landscapes provide a framework in which an intelligence analyst supporting IO development could piece together jigsaw puzzle pictures, that commanders could use to make decisions. The jigsaw puzzles provide the coherent images from which commanders can evaluate different courses of action (COA), and try to look into the future to predict likely outcomes associated with each COA. The issue is the degree to which we can put together such pictures with the right levels of certainty, recognizing what has been called the four dimensions of ignorance [Zack, 1999]: uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity and equivocality. All of these pervade the intelligence analysis process and hence effect the assessment that arises. Clearly, in todays theaters of operation the pictures formed from doing these puzzles are highly dynamic and subject to rapid and sometimes unpredictable change. After all, we face an agile adversary who can change his tactics at will, as he feels far less constrained by the approach to warfare he conducts. Our adversaries feel all options are on the tableincluding Weapons of Mass Destructionand can be justified. One of the advantages of asymmetrical approaches to warfare is to hit hard at what you perceive to be your enemies center of gravity [Thome, Summer 2007

2006], such as his economy. Or, you keeping and peace enforcement. Any enhanced SA variant, we have to be might reach out through the media to framework must be agile enough to capable of mapping his evolving mental populations who might influence and recognize the form of the mission images to what we are developing from weaken a politicians resolve. The assigned to the military, and the likely intelligence and other information adversaries objectives and approach ranges of options they will use in sources. He will represent things in can vary quickly, making excellent use undertaking this task. This acknowledges his mind as pieces of puzzles built of maneuver warfare in the cognitive that while the world is complicated, and from things that are easily memorized, domain as part of their own conduct of IO not helped by the ubiquitous nature of sometimes using pictorial metaphors to [Thomas, 2006]. We have seen examples the media, not all military operations represent images that can be recalled in Iraq where the emphasis on attacks will be carried out in complex theaters. when required. This is the point where by suicide bombers has changed several So how do we recognise different types a commander moves from awareness times, from coalition forces through to of theaters and adjust our approaches to understanding [Ntuen, 2005], in the internal security organizations, and accordingly? effect applying his own internal models even to government officials. to represent the situation. In creating A Framework for Developing It is clear to most commentators understanding a commander has to Situational Awareness that in these theaters our adversary seeks consider if he has seen this sort of to create a high degree of disorder or One of todays maxims is that by situation before, what was previously entropyin effect denying a civilian developing and deploying Network relevant, and what has application here population what they seek most: security Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities we and now? against which to plan their futures. Our will create the circumstances in which we In his seminal work Sources of adversaries aim to promote situations that can use our Intelligence, Surveillance, Power, Klein has analyzed a wide range encourage civil war and the break down Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance of decision making environments, such of society. While this may be their short- (ISTAR) assets to gain an almost perfect as those undertaken by fire fighters term aim, it is difficult to imagine [Klein, 1999]. He developed the their long-term aimthough Recognition Primed Decision clearly not the form of stable model [RPD], which shows society we would understand. A how quickly commanders in crucial point from the situational some situations can develop awareness perspective is that a COA from relatively our adversaries may not have a uncertain information. In specific outcome in mind, other military situations such as high than removal of foreign forces intensity, rapid tempo conflicts, from their land what comes the application of this model after that is left alone. In this may well reflect the levels of situation some actions are not training and experience that easy to predict, as they do not give commanders the ability form part of what we might to use their tacit knowledge to consider a coherent campaign to immediate effect. However, Developing situational awareness. (Defense Link) achieve specific objectives. in counterinsurgency and While these contemporary situations picture of the enemys deployments counterterrorism operations this reliance are complex and difficult to predict, it is and intensions. This, the idea goes, upon the intuitive aspects of decision also clear that in trying to develop new creates the situation whereby we create making might be too simplistic. It is approaches to information operations, any what we shall refer to as enhanced vital that the commander appreciates framework must also cater for situations situational awarenessby definition the nature of the backdrop against which not based upon, for example, detailed that we have better means of collecting he is tasked, setting the context for any ethno-religious situations. It is important materialand then can act having operational planning carried out as part to highlight that more straightforward gained information superiority and hence of on-going stabilization efforts. application of military power, such decision supremacy. While this sounds In looking across a large number as destroying an enemys military great in theory, in practice things are of military operations carried out in the capability, still requires supportive IO a little more complicated, especially 20th century and those that are currently across the spectrum of operations. when trying to develop a coherent view on-going in the 21st, we can characterise Military operations since the Second of an information campaign across the the backdrop against which they were World War that have embraced a wide strategic to the tactical levels. conducted into one of four definitions: Recognized: where knowledge of range of activities, from humanitarian For a commander to develop relief through varying forms of peace situational awareness, let alone an the enemies ORBAT, and associated

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behavior, but it is difficult to predict how various communities within a population may react to specific military undertakings. In this situation, cause and effect relationships at the heart of command decision making are very difficult A US soldier reflects on a sometimes anarchic campaign. to predict. One (Defense Link) moves to a world where we must intelligence on his tactical deployments manage unexpected and approach to warfare was so well outcomes flexibly. Examples of this exist understood that the campaign plan today in areas of Iraq such as Basra, and could be created with a reasonable in some areas of Afghanistan. degree of certainty. While still needing Anarchic: where there are next to be adaptable to the fog of war, the to no discernible patterns of behavior ability to reason the likely outcomes on which a commander can gain any of specific actionsthe cause and decision-making traction, in terms of effect relationshipswere quite well creating effects. This lack of patterns of understood. Examples of this include: behavior being indicative of the lack of the Battle of Alamein; the Falklands War cohesion of enemy elementstoo many [Woodward, 2003]; Gulf War I; initial different factions each pulling their own operations in Iraq in 2003 [Clark, 2003]; way and not having any common view or and Afghanistan in 2001. Complex: where it is possible to goal. Without that common goal, each develop an understanding of the enemys faction is essentially fighting their own activities, but requiring additional battleseven though they may have a intelligence collection effort, such very limited understanding of any endas collecting HUMINT. With little state they are trying to achieve. Hence, understanding and predictability of we lack discernible patterns in factional the adversarys behavioral reaction behavior. In this situation it is vital to because the underlying cause and effect try and narrow, or shape, some of the relationships are not immediately clear freedom given to the various factions it is difficult for a commander to consider and get their behavior onto a more the ramifications of his actions [Smith, predictable footing. Examples of this 2005]. A specific example is the Kosovo state exist today in areas of Iraq such as War, and the way in which Slobodan the Sunni Triangle. The aim of creating these four states Milosevics behavior and actions were difficult to predict, requiring some of understanding is to show the ways intensive socio-cultural understanding commanders form situational awareness about the history of Kosovo and its has to be set against the varying levels significant place in Serbian politics. This of entropy (disorder). It also shows characterization also applies in some commanders what they need to reflect areas of Afghanistan today. upon when setting their local operational Chaotic: where outcomes of a focus, as they move toward overall commanders specific actions can be campaign goals such as stabilizing a realistically seen only in retrospect, and country. Responses developed against are difficult to see being repeated. There an anarchic backdrop will be very are discernible aggregated patterns of different from those taken in a more

mature theater, such as in Bosnia today. There the cause and effect relationships are easier to predict, as the behaviors of key players and stakeholders is more certain. A Framework of Analysis To create military effects it is important for commanders to appreciate that entropy exists not only in a theater, but at the regional and local levels. In Afghanistan for example, one valley might be quite separate from another due to the geography of the Hindu Kush, requiring quite different levels of activity from a security standpoint. Today it is fair to say the in-theater entropy across Iraq and Afghanistanin terms of socio-cultural relationships, ethno-religious factors, economic and political issuesvaries greatly from region to region. We must create information operations to address these wide variances, hence the desirability of what we shall refer to as a Framework of Analysis. This provides a structured way of looking at first, second and third order effects we must consider when developing information operations and related military activitiessuch as mounting arrests of key people, disrupting illegal activities, shutting down local law enforcement agenciesagainst which they have to sit. The issue with many of these groups is what we shall refer to as tightly coupled communities where activities undertaken against one person or group can have far reaching consequences across a community. This Framework of Analysis has several dimensions, which need to be handled with care, for it is possible to create additional complexity. We must strike a balance between having the right dimensions, with appropriate representation of effects, where interactions are at play between those dimensions. In other words, the framework needs to provide a campaign assessment capability where we can represent cause and effect relationships and study their impact. Further, this requires development of models able to show those interactions, in order to study variations on approaches.

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The dimensions will include, but not necessarily need to represent the total of: Political analysis and historical perspectives, where these are relevant Demographics and geographic allegiances Socio-cultural relationships, including long-term antipathies where these exist between families and tribal groups Economic analysis, and associated overturns, such as the development of natural resources Criminal identities and group links Moral values & Legitimacy The Framework of Analysis allows users, e.g. intelligence analysts, to determine what kinds of information they need to collect, from a first and second order perspective. This will allow them to build the pictures required to play into the analysis processes, where what if activities and cause and effect relationships are studied. We need to develop this framework from a number of viewpoints, including family, tribal, local and regional communities perspectives, plus the population at large. From this, operations and planning staff can start to build options for short and longer-term operations against varying levels of entropy or disorder within a given community or local area. The aim is to create or shape the circumstances through various tactical operations, and set against an operational backdrop, to move an area or community from higher levels of entropy (such as those deemed to be anarchic) to a lower level of disorder. In effect, we are trying to move a community from the anarchic end of the scale, through a series of activities in a campaign, to lower levels where we more readily understand the cause and effect relationshipsand the behavior is more predictable. Equally vital, planners must consider the situation where one wishes to avoid carrying out operations that result in a situation worsening. Certainly we do not want to move from a relatively controlled and yet complex situation into a chaotic one, through our military actions.

Core to this is getting sufficient when developing the representation of the key players in-theater, to enable some form of predictive analysis upon their behaviorif necessary with support from people with specific skills such as social psychology. Collecting enough information and associated intelligence material allows some degree of predictive behavioral modelling, playing out scenarios to see what might happen if we adopt a specific COA. Clearly, given our definition above, the analysis framework will vary from the recognized backdrop to the anarchic context. In the first case the emphasis will be upon collecting

Coalition officer calls attention to the operations plan. (Defense Link) information and intelligence material at sufficient levels of granularity to allow predictive modelling. In this case we must develop very detailed models of the social ties of individuals and groups from whatever sources can provide them, including demographic data. Using predictive models of interactions between groups with clearly stated goals and intensions will allow commanders to select appropriate COAs. Some of these actions may well be targeted against individuals, or small groups of people, whose arrest would create our desired

levels of disruption. In the latter case (anarchic) it might be the levels of granularity of intelligence vary and are targeted at different aspects of behavior, such as leaders who cannot be arrested. This option simply does not exist if the ramifications would be too large. For example, what a commander might attempt in an anarchic situation where there has been significant societal breakdown, and different but mostly equal factions have emerged with their own apparent agendaswould necessarily require a different response. This is about giving a commander the freedom to limit the options of significant and politically influential groups, perhaps through disrupting their supply chains of people, materials and financing. This also has to be set alongside specific political reconciliation attempts, such as overtures towards certain less-than-hardline members of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In this regard the commander has to understand the extra landscapewhere initiatives may be triedlies outside a sphere of military control. The difficulty in this latter case is many groups may have no idea what their campaign plan is, nor their medium to long term agenda: they simply have not figured that out yet. Psychologically, they can still operate across a broad spectrum of actions (such as large scale suicide attacks) without the constraints that might exist if their overall goalssuch as becoming part of the political mainstreammight impose. A question is: in an anarchic situation is there any form of regulation that can help a military commander make some decisions as to how to proceed? It is interesting to reflect that after the 2005 attacks in Jordan, Abu Mussab Al Zarqawi lost some of his constituency. So it is possible to suggest even people involved in extreme forms of terrorism eventually go too far, and can lose their key supporters. Perhaps some selfregulating mechanism comes into play? However, until his death Al Zarqawi was still attracting large sources of finances some of that being drawn away from sources that had traditionally supported

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the broader Al Qaeda organization. This must have been because, at least in the eyes of his supporters, some degree of supportalbeit extremeexisted outside his immediate group. Summary and Conclusions This analysis shows that information operations design has to be capable of taking many factors into account. These include a wide range of landscapes in which political, military, socio-cultural, ethno-religious and economic factors. Such factors play a key role if one is to understand the context against which we create an information operation. Message components need to apply at the strategic, operational and tactical levelsand very importantlymerge as one flows from one level to another. Any obvious fault lines or inconsistencies across those levels will be open to enemy exploitation and will form part of their response. Again, we are dealing with a media savvy adversary who is very capable of putting across his own interpretations of our messages. This does all sound very difficult. It is hard for us to imagine orchestrating a campaign across all those levels with proper consistency and fluidness. After all, this is the very heart of the pragmatism behind politics. The hard problem is that our adversaries have set the benchmark, and at the moment we are not competing with thembecause we fear the consequences. Looking at the Islamic communitys worldwide reaction to the so-called Danish cartoons shows our effort is fraught with dangers. Sending out the wrong messages could result in all sorts of unforeseen consequences, such those surrounding the execution of Saddam Hussein. Clearly, it is vital we develop a professional cadre of information operations specialists, with the right social and psychological skills, particularly awareness of the history of some of our more complex theatres. Otherwise, how can we give our commanders options when dealing with the chaotic

and anarchic ends across our spectrum of backdrops? It is also vital that we develop approaches with simple and consistent messagesthings are already complex enough, and there may be little gain in trying to make them more complicated. How we carry this out shall be the fourth part of this series. References Clark, W. K. Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire, Public Affairs, 2003. Hammond, G. T. The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Books, 2001. Klein, G. Sources of Power: How people Make Decisions, MIT Press, 1999. Ntuen, C. A Model of Sensemaking in Dynamic Organizations: A Review and Implications for Military Decision

Making Processes, Report Number 7N746 for the USArmy Research Office, 2005. Smith, R. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Books, 2005. Thomas, T. Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency Campaign. IO Sphere, Summer 2006, Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), 2006. Thome, P. The Role of Information Operations in Strategy, Conventional War and Low Intensity Conflict, IO Sphere, Summer 2006, JIOC, 2006. Woodward, S. One Hundred Days: the Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, Harper Collins, 2003. Zack, M.H. Managing Organizational Ignorance. Knowledge Directions, 1, Summer, pp 36-49, 1999.

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The Role of Information Operations Campaigns in Shaping a Political Reality: The American Experience as an Example
By Thomas F. Talley, Major, USA Editorial Abstract: This article won a US Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) annual writing contest award in 2006. Major Talley examines the nature of contemporary information operations campaigns in Southwest Asia through the lens of the American Revolution. He describes how iconic works such as Thomas Paines Common Sense display modern IO elements which helped successfully shape the eighteenth century influence battlespace.

In 1815 John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson that, in his opinion, the Revolution had occurred not in the halls of Congress or on the battlefield, but rather in the minds of the people. 1

n both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States finds itself fighting tenacious insurgencies. More precisely, the United States military, assisted by the forces from a multinational coalition, has found itself juggling many tasks, not least of which has been to shoulder the brunt of the fighting. While these herculean efforts have met with considerable success, the reality remains that these are only secondary efforts in both countries. The militarys main effort, and the only means by which success will derive, lies in the performance of the Afghan and Iraqi forces, as well as in the demonstrated ability of either government to effectively govern. To that end, the United States military has sought to recruit, equip, train, and support tactical and operational employment of Afghan and Iraqi sovereign forces. All that being said, it must be stressed that fighting the insurgency whether by the United States military, multinational allies, or even Afghan or Iraqi national forcesis NOT the core challenge. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the core challenge is similarto create both the institutions and political culture for a functioning and sustainable liberal democracy.2 In both instances, the insurgencies exist because they hold to a competing

vision of the post-war political reality. I define a political reality as the combination of ideals, values, and institutions that comprise and define a political system. To use the US as an example, its political realityits ideals, values, and institutionsare defined by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. More so than anything else, this is a war of ideasabout which political, social, and economic systems are legitimate. The United States of America finds itself at war with an enemy that is better defined and understood by studying the ideology that motivates and inspires it than by any traditional analysis of the physical form that the enemy assumes. In such a war of ideas, the United States cannot afford to take a passive posture; we must deny ourselves any comfort we draw from our conviction that the combination of our political, social, and economic systems result in a greater opportunity for advancement, accumulation of wealth, and a higher quality of life for each individual. It bears repeating: this war is a struggle over legitimacy, not which combination of political, social, and economic systems offers the best cost-benefit ratio. If we are to win this war of ideas, we must commit to fighting it, and we must fight it aggressively. Three Challenges Facing The US Military The challenge for the US military is threefold. First, we must understand and accept the nature of the fight, and derive missions and roles accordingly. More preciselyaccepting the premise that the core challenge is to create the

political culture and institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq that support liberal democracythe military must define its role as fighting against one political vision and for another. Regardless of the nature of the conflict, the US military would be most hesitant to undertake any role if it did not already possess a weapon system, or systems, suitable for the task. Indeed, the US military defines its roles less by the desired outcome than by what weapon systems it brings to bear, or by what forces it employs. The second challenge then is to determine what weapon systems the US military can field for such a role. Fortunately, it is within the discipline known as Information Operations that the US military possesses the ideal weapon system for such a role. In our joint lexicon, we define IO as composed of five distinct disciplines,3 the purpose of whose events and actions is to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Regardless of where these events and actions occur, we define their effect as occurring in an information environment, defined as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. 4 These definitions are almost mindnumbing in their complexity and lack of clarity. By default, any definition must be both inclusive and exclusive. Yet, whoor whatdo either of these definitions exclude? The honest answer

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isnobody, and nothing! The problem this creates is that everything can be defined as an IO operation. Even worse, IO does not seem to have its own unique logic, or purpose. Why then do I argue that IO is the ideal weapon system for the current war? Let us accept that our current definitions only serve to confuse us. We must redefine IO in order to gain a better appreciation of what it is and what it can do for us. Strip away everything that IO says that it is, and ask one simple question: what is it about? Information Operations is about IDEAS! Consider again the definition of the information environment: people dont act on informationthey act on how they interpret information. And interpretation is based upon ideas. Likewise, we would be better served by redefining IO to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial ideas, and ideologies, while protecting our own. Once we begin to realize that it is the realm of ideas that we are fightingand not the technology, the systems, nor even the individual messages that flash through the Internet in so many 0s and 1sonly then will we understand the unifying logic of IO. This new appreciation of IOas the militarys weapon system for the realm of ideasprepares us to accept the third challenge: the US military must design an appropriate strategy or campaign plan, for employing its weapons systems in support of its role. Such a plan allows for synchronization and prioritization of efforts, all aimed at achieving quantifiable outcomes. Traditionally, the US military draws upon its historical experience for a comparable precedent, and builds its strategy from that template. But where does the military draw its precedents when the prevailing view of IO is that it is something new? I contend we can answer these questions through examination of the American experience from 1775-1788, when thirteen colonies found common cause in a set of shared ideals and values, and built a political culture and institutions around them. That American experience is comparable to the present challenge, and illustrative of how we may achieve a comparable result.

How an IO Campaign Can Serve as the Main Effort in Shaping Political Reality The Declaration of Independence (1776) and Constitution of the United States (ratified in 1788) serve as the twin pillars of Americas political reality. Within both of these documents we find the clearest expression of the ideals and values of the American people, and the clearest expression of American political culture. The Constitution goes one step further, laying out in clear detail the nature of the various political institutions and their proper relationship to one another. Looking back across the intervening centuries, it is easy to believe that such documents were inevitable. In fact, such a position could not be farther from the truth.

The Common Sense template, 1776. (US Library of Congress) In December of 1775, notwithstanding the fact that the Continental Congress had levied forces and revenue for a Continental Army, and that army had taken the field in a siege of British forces in Boston, the chances of the colonies waging a war for independence were practically nil. Indeed, just the month before, In November 1775 the Congress voted in favor of a resolution to formally reaffirm the colonists loyalty to the British crown. (Liell, 99) Yet within six months, the thirteen colonies would unanimously consent to a declaration of independence and commit unreservedly and wholeheartedly to a war that would

not be resolved for eight long years. What happened? The answer is that within a span of less than five months, an information operations campaign had been successfully waged and decisively won. The American people forced their leaders to declare for independence because the people were convinced this was the only means by which they could establish the political culture and institutions that would guarantee their ideals and values. To a large degree, the story of this information operations campaign is the story of the pamphlet Common Sense, and to a lesser degree that of its author, Thomas Paine. In a fascinating parallel, the Constitution of the United States likewise owes its birthright to the efforts of an information operations campaign: The Federalist Papers. Actually a series of eighty-five essays, published at short intervals over 1787-1788, The Federalist Papers encouraged support for ratification of the new Constitution. Though signed on September 17, 1787, it still required ratification by nine of the thirteen states to bring it into effect. This super-majority was viewed at the time as a near-insurmountable obstacle. The state most likely to be lost to the cause, and yet had to be won, was New Yorkwhose Governor George Clinton was adamantly opposed ratification. Yet thanks in no small measure to the efforts of authors Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, New York did indeed ratify the Constitution, albeit by a very narrow margin. An IO Campaign to Express Ideals and Values: Common Sense as a Template Released on Tuesday, January 10, 1776, Common Sense was an immediate runaway hit, going on to sell 120,000 copies in its first three months. (Liell, 16) Indeed, by the end of the year there had been over 25 editions and over 500,000 copiesauthorized and bootlegin circulation; roughly one copy per every five inhabitants of America, or nearly one copy per household! Add to this astonishing

figure the fact that most copies were read to or by more than one personin some cases many moreand the audience for Common Sense far surpasses any other printed work, apart from the Bible. (Liell, 95) Clearly, Common Sense was very uncommon. It falls to us to understand why. If we examine Common Sense as simply a best seller, we miss the point entirely. In his book, 46 Pages, author Scott Liell comments The single most important factor in that success was the unique genius of the pamphlet itself. (Liell, 91) The genius of Common Sense is that it was something entirely newit was an information operations campaign. This work spoke to the people, in the voice of the people, expressing both their mundane and the aspirational sentiments. That is, Paine didnt just speak about what the people wanted their lives to be like, but also about what they wanted their lives to mean. Common Sense laid out the debate in stark terms. Paine redefined the debate, and in so doing he ruthlessly destroyed the ideological foundation of the opposing arguments. He made it personalhe named the king as enemy and he made the people feel personally affronted and involved. He made clear to all what was at stakeand why delay was worse than action. Most of all, he gave the people something to fight FOR that was greater than themselves and their current strugglesand he showed it could all be achieved. In the end, Common Sense did not lead the waythe people did; the book merely pointed the way. Common Sense came Into an atmosphere of uncertainty and doubt like the revelation of an absolute truth. As Samuel Adams would say, the people acted as if they had been awakened by Common Sensethey now felt that they knew what must be done in the face of the gathering crisis. Patience was not a quality much in favor. And it was only a matter of time before they began to turn their frustration with what they saw as a lack of progress toward independence onto their leaders in Congress. (Liell, 107)

As one citizen wrote to his delegate, The People are now ahead of youThe Peoples blood is too Hot to admit of delaysAll will be in confusion if independence is not declared immediately. In the words of one constituent, the people were beginning to grumble: What in the name of Common Sense are you gentlemen of the Continental Congress about? (Liell, 107) The work serves as an ideal template for an IO campaign, not only for the structure of its arguments, but also in relation to its audience. Well examine both of these aspects in turn.

18th century Information Operator Thomas Paine. (Wikipedia) The Structure Of An IO Campaign: Six Critical Elements Common Sense provides us with six elements that must be incorporated into any IO campaign. First, you must define the debate; you can allow neither the enemy, nor even any interested third party, to define the terms of the struggle. Paine began by redefining the debate from one of civil rights to natural rights: those bestowed by the Creator. This destroyed the ideological foundation of those who opposed independence on the grounds of established government as the ultimate source of all rights, law, and justice. (Liell, 63) This new perspective meant that instead of the colonists having to defend their rights, it

was Britain who had to defend its record of protecting and preserving those rights on behalf of its subjects. (Liell, 74) Not only had Paine changed the relationship between government and the governed, from this point on, those who opposed independence were on the defensive. In the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson follows Paine in appealing to the timeless, universal authority of the laws of Nature and of Natures God. In doing so, he too superseded virtually every legal argument that had been made against independence. (Liell, 137) Previous efforts at gaining a consensus among the colonies failed because they sought to reckon with the political, economic, and cultural fragmentation that was the nature of colonial life; Paine simply ignored them. Recognizing the colonies would have to be united first, Paine largely ignored these regional divisions and distinctions and By combining the colonists diverse grievances into a single grievance and all potential policies into a single policy, he convinced his geographically dispersed readers that their interests were one and the same. (Liell, 17) Second, you must utterly destroy the enemys arguments, starting with his strongest positions. Even more importantly, you cannot simply attack the individual thoughts; you must attack the infrastructure shoring up those positions. Paine attacked the most deeply embedded, yet subtly powerful of assumptionsthe idea of George III as the father and the colonists as children within his extended family. Paine knew instinctively that this family romance had to be utterly exploded before the colonists could embrace the possibility of severing ties with the empire. (Liell, 19) Indeed, before Common Sense, All our politics had been founded on the hope or expectation of making the matter up (Liell, 70). Once the deepest assumptions had been shattered, Paine ruthlessly attacked each argument against independence. Arguing against Britains strength, he noted It is not in the power of Britain or of Europe to

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conquer America, if she do not conquer herself by delay and timidity. (Liell, 176) Against repeated efforts to petition the King, Paine commented nothing flatters vanity, or confirms obstinacy in Kings more than repeated petitioning. (Liell, 177) Third, you must identify what you are fighting against. You must name your enemy; make it personal, thereby giving your people a physical enemy. Paine ridiculed the concept of hereditary rule, then the history of the British monarchy, and finally the person of King George III. Such an approach was unheard of; even Samuel Adams had not gone so far. The effect was sudden and startling. After the publication of Common Sense, talk of the Ministerial Army was replaced overnight with talk of the Kings Troops. The kings arms were removed from their place of honor and publicly burnt by patriotic mobs. Outside Boston, George Washington ceased his habit of toasting the king at supper. (Liell, 77) Indeed, the effect of naming the king as the enemy was so successful in galvanizing support that, when writing the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson again followed the same tack. He too ...had shifted the burden of blame onto George III. He charged that the history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, and proceeded to recite a litany of those injuries, 27 of them, all beginning with the same word: He. This shift of public odium to the person of the king had the effect of obliterating the strongest remaining bond between America and Great Britain. (Liell, 77) In addition to identifying your opponent, you must also redefine those who, while not standing in active opposition, still work to oppose your interests. Paine categorized those who stood against independence into four categories, each worse than the preceding: Interested men, who are not to be trusted; weak men who cannot see; prejudiced men who will not see; and a certain set of moderate men, who think better

of the European world than it deserves; and this last class by an ill-judged deliberation, will be the cause of more calamities to this continent than the other three. (Liell, 175) Fourth, you must make it clear what you are fighting FOR. Paine argued that an independent country would enjoy greater security and economic opportunity. But these arguments were almost secondary. He made it clear that independence was being waged in order to establish a republic of, by, and for the people. The call for independence was not simply to replace British parliamentary rule with a homegrown facsimileit was a call for a new political reality. Even more profound than the effect on the people was the arguments effect on the Continental Army. Washington ordered the pamphlet read to his troops. Common Sense offered him and his army two things they most desperately needed. By calling for them to oppose not tyranny but the tyrant, Paine gave them an actual enemy. By stating with fanatic certainty that the only acceptable outcome of the war was independence, he gave them a cause. (Liell, 125) Common Sense was a huge hit among the officers; even more so than among the men and civiliansthey knew they needed a declaration to get external assistance; and they knew that reconciliation offered them nothing. Fifth, you must create a sense of urgency. It is not enough to gain your audiences agreement; they must feel compelled to act! Indeed, the cost of not acting must be made worse than any possible cost incurred in the present. Paine spoke to his audiences responsibility to later generations when he wrote: To those who granted all these points and yet counseled patience and restraint, Paine warned that they were shirking their duty and leaving the burden to their children. He

said that if it must come to war for Gods sake, let us come to a final separation, and not leave the next generation to be cutting throats, under the violated unmeaning names of parent and child. (Liell, 79) Sixth, you must create a bigger sense of purpose. Paine argued for independence in order to achieve a republic; and he argued for a republic in order to save civilization. He wrote we have it in our power to begin the world over again. (Liell, 117) In words that rival an evangelists imagery and sense of mission, Paine wrote: Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom has been hunted round the globe. Asia and Africa have long expelled her. Europe regards her like a stranger, and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time an asylum for mankind. (Liell, 81) Relationship Between An IO Campaign and the Audience: Five Critical Elements The second aspect of any IO campaign is relation to its audience. Our examination of Common Sense provides us with five elements that must be incorporated into any IO campaign. These ensure the message is received, takes root, and ultimately achieves the desired outcome. The first element is to properly identify the target audience. The they must be selected for the effect you intend to achievenot just who you think will initially receive the message. Paine wrote a work of political philosophy written for those who didnt read works of political philosophy. He wrote to the American people. (Liell, 115) And accordingly, The profound and widespread popular impact of Common Sense was pronounced and unprecedented, but it should not be viewed, at the end of the day, as a complete surprise. Thomas Paine

reached the largest audience ever by a political writer because he aimed at the largest audience ever. (Liell, 114) The second element is to pick the right medium for the message. This is a greater challenge today in the age of instant newsa headline today is forgotten tomorrowthan it was to Paine. The biggest consideration is that the medium must reflect the message. If you are trying to effect substantial, permanent, and important changes, it stands to reason that you need something that lends the air of substance, of permanence, of importance. Common Sense was published as a pamphlet; essentially several pages of newsprint bound together. It was more than a newspaper, less than a book. In that manner, it had the best of bothlike a newspaper it was short and inexpensive, but like a book it was bound and more durable. The third element is well known to every realtor: location, location, location! Common Sense was published in Philadelphia, at that time the largest, most cosmopolitan city in Americaand the seat of the Continental Congress. Because of the unique geographical, social, and political importance of Philadelphia, what might have remained merely a local phenomenon in any other American city was able to engage a truly national audience. (Liell, 91) The fourth element is voice. The message must ring out with a powerful, emotional appeal. This is no time for legalism and cold logic. Thomas Paine wrote with a suppressed rage. (Liell, 20) If your objective is for the target audience to take ownership of the message, then they must recognize the voice of the message as their own. The message speaks to and for them, because it says what they would say, given the opportunity. Paine was successful because he wrote in the language of the public house, (his contemporaries) wrote in the language of the courthouse. (Liell, 20)

You will know if you are successful when the target audience defends your message. Common Sense was also met by a frantic volley of respondents, some attempting to support, but most to attack Paine and rebut his arguments. (Liell, 84) The profound difference in this instance was that people did not simply sit back and observe the debatethey took ownership of the message and began to defend it from attack. A New Yorker wrote proudly:There has been a pamphlet written and publishd here against our natural rights and Common Sense. It has met with its Demise. Some of our sturdy Sons seizd between 1500 and 2000 of them at Sam Loudons, and consigned them to the flames. (Liell, 106) In another instance, a pamphlet named Plain Truth was published. Although it was quickly dismissed by independents and Tories alike as vastly inadequate to the task of toppling Common Sense, (Liell, 85) this assessment did not serve to prevent patriotic mobs from publicly burning it and even destroying the print shops that dared print it. In fact, so dangerous was the outcry that the author never revealed himself. The fifth element is empowerment. You must express confidence in people if you want them to do something. Paine demonstrated a fundamental confidence in the American people. (Liell, 119) This was a far cry from the position of many of his supporters. Even John Adams had some reservations even then about some of Paines notions of the kind of government that would replace imperial rule, notions he felt were too democratical. (Liell, 103) An IO Campaign to Establish Political Culture and Institutions: The Federalist Papers as a Template The Federalist Papers are often considered a debaters handbook because they were thought to reflect the very best political thought on debates of

One of the first US IO strategists: General Washington. (US Library of Congress) ratification, and copies of each essay were very much in demand throughout the states. They can also be understood as four books in one: 1) an explanation of federal governmentstill a new concept; 2) an indictment of the Articles of Confederationwhich provided little to no government; 3) a more precise analysis and defense of the new Constitutionwhich the authors desperately wanted to gain the peoples allegiance to; and finally, 4) as an exposition of certain enduring truths that provide an understanding of both the dangers and the delights of free government. (Rossiter, xii) By design, all of the essays were published under the pseudonym of Publius, a near-legendary figure drawn from the very historical beginnings of the Roman Republic. His name was chosen for its affiliation with a republican form of government. Notably, the actual authors were left unnamed, and two went to their deaths without receiving full credit for their contributions. In any event, it was the message, not the author, which was of greatest importancea point we would do well to note today. The Federalist Papers fought for, and achieved, primacy of three notions of government that we today hold as unquestioned values: federalism, social pluralism, and constitutionalism

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(that is, divided, balanced, and limited government). (Rossiter, xiv) The question is how did they do it? In simplest terms, the authors tackled each item, point by point. Their tone varied from that of the layman, colorfully expressing frustration and openly ridiculing those who dissent, to that of the lawyer, mercilessly dissecting even the finest point. And, they continued until the authors felt sure they had driven the point home. The Constitution of the United States was ratified because of the will of the people, not the elites. The people were no more certain of their ability to effectively govern themselves than were many of the elite, but they demanded the opportunity to try. Ratification reflected the peoples belief that institutions established by the Constitution would in fact represent their ideals and values, and serve to protect and defend their interests. And the American people came to this conclusion in no small part due to the arguments laid out in The Federalist Papers. Conclusion The United States is waging a war against one political realityof ideas and ideology. Such a war is about the legitimacy of political, social, and economic systems. Legitimacy is conferred, first and foremost, in the minds of the people. If so, where is the corresponding effort? In all our efforts to build the capacity and capability of the Afghan and Iraqi governments, are we also fighting equally hard to convince the people of the legitimacy of our efforts? Could it be that we are defaulting this fight to the Afghan and Iraqi governments, on the pretext that it is their people, their government, their culture? If so, have we acknowledged, even to ourselves, that we have ceded responsibility for the main effort to someone else? Could it be that, confused by the ambiguity and complexity of our own definitions, we fail to see that Information Operations is the right weapon system for this fight? As I have sought to demonstrate in this essay, IO is all about ideas. But the

US military, focused as it is on weapon systems, sees Information Operations primarily as a means of protecting its investments. In effect, when it comes to IO, the US military is not playing to win; it is playing to NOT lose. This is most unfortunate, because we have in effect ignored the role information operations campaigns had in shaping our own political realityespecially in the critical years between 1775-1788. I believe Information Operations, as currently understood, are about many little ideas. But success will only come when we prioritize our efforts and focus on ONE BIG IDEA. And the one big idea the US military must contend with is how to respond to the core challenge facing the US: how to create both the institutions and political culture for a functioning and sustainable liberal democracy. Information Operations, properly targeted and resourced, is the weapon system of choice for this challenge. Bibliography Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay. The Federalist Papers: with an Introduction by Clinton

Rossiter, New American Library, A Mentor Book, New York, NY, 1961 Liell, Scott. 46 Pages, Thomas Paine, Common Sense, and the Turning Point to Independence, MJF Books, New York, 2003 US Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Washington, DC: GPO, 13 February 2006 Notes 1 Quote taken from 46 Pages, Thomas Paine, Common Sense, and the Turning Point to Independence, by Scott Liell, MJF Books, New York, NY, 2003, page 119 2 The term liberal democracy is traditionally defined as a government that enshrines the rule of law (liberal), and whose decision-makers are truly representative of the people (democracy) 3 The five disciplines that form the core of Information Operations are electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC) 4 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, dated 13 February 2006