This Is Al-Jazeera

By Steven P. Carney, Colonel, USA Editorial Abstract: COL Carney examines the history and political context of modern Arab satellite television. He describes distinctions in presentation style, delivery, and tone between Arab and Western TV news, and how these differences can affect audience perception in all parts of the world.

Reporting from Qatar, this is Al-Jazeera.

h e s t ati o n id e n ti f ic ati o n is continually heard each day in the smoky shee-shas, hookah bars, coffee houses, cafs, or Arab living rooms throughout all 22 nations in the Middle East. This distinctly Arabic 24 hour a day, seven day a week television news station also reaches most countries in Europe, plus the United States and Canada. As satellite companies throughout the world continue to expand services, many will include Al-Jazeera in their broadcast schedules. Since it began in November 1996, the former Qatari state-run turned independent pan-Arabic station has been characterized by noted political cartoonist, Ahmed Toughan, as the big voice from a tiny country.1 Al-Jazeera speaks directly to the man and woman on the Muslim and Arab street. Through the vision of the new Emir, the tiny Gulf peninsula country of Qatar subsequently defined the term Arab street through the use of satellite television, and consequently gained international recognition. Al-Jazeera appealed to the Arab and Muslim populace as it said what many were already thinking but were not allowed to hear due to the predominance of state-controlled media in the Middle East. Moreover, it turned the boring and mundane Middle Eastern state controlled media apparatus on its head, reporting on taboo subjects never before addressed in the Arab media. Indeed, Al-Jazeeras unprecedented style changed the complexion of news reporting in the Middle East, and promoted the hypothesis of a free and open press in a previously censored and controlled region of the world.

Al-Jazeera home page. (Al-Jazeera.net)

Al-Jazeera also sparked the concept of a public debate played on the Arab street via satellite airwaves, plus struck down the notion that an independent Arab news network could not survive and flourish in the Arab world. Noted New York Times columnist and bestselling author Thomas Friedman referred to Al-Jazeera as a beacon of freedom and the biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world. Almost overnight, Al-Jazeera became a lightning rod for controversy due to unfiltered editorial opinions levied against many of the policies enforced by most Middle Eastern countries. It also received admonishments from Middle Eastern countries during Operation Desert Fox and the second Palestinian intifada for openly attacking countries Al-Jazeera deemed less than committed to the Arab cause. The US and British governments outwardly rebuked Al-Jazeera for its negative style of reporting at the beginning of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. During an interview with Face the Nation after the beginning of

Operation Iraqi Freedom, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to Al-Jazeera as not a perfect instrument of communication [and] obviously is a part of Iraqi Propaganda. Despite differences in opinion by many Middle Eastern nations, and by the United States and British governments, Al-Jazeera reaches approximately 40 million viewers in the Middle East and another 15 million viewers throughout the world. In April 2003, The Wall Street Journal reported Al-Jazeera had approximately 300,000 viewers in the United States. This number is expected to increase as more satellite and cable companies continue to expand services. Al-Jazeera launched a sister channel Al-Jazeera Internationalin March 2006, and an English language service in November 2006. The international program is expected to top nearly 50 million viewers upon its inaugural debut. Al-Jazeera International recently signed award winning and veteran British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

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interviewer Sir David Frost to anchor the news programs and added internationally known Riz Khan, formerly of the BBC and Cable News Network (CNN), to their broadcast lineup. These high-profile television journalists will likely add credibility to an organization in search of a wider audience. Broadcast options in either Arabic or English will likely bring the daily viewer total to nearly 100 million people throughout the world. This article compares how AlJazeera reports news events, particularly in Iraq and in Afghanistan, to how the US news media reports the same story. How did this small station grow to such importance in the Middle-East? Selected news vignettes examine the facts of the stories and draw conclusions to Al-Jazeeras motives and the effects of its reporting on US military operations in Iraq. The intent is to use examples of reporting by both Al-Jazeera and Western media sources, compare the differences, and touch on the cultural as well as strategic influences of how messages are shaping the War of ideas. Additionally, this article offers potential ways to address this important influence issue.

Background
The birth of Al-Jazeera can be attributed to timing and a series of unfortunate events with the BBC, a French television network, and the official decree of the Emir of Qatar, Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in February 1996. In 1994, British educated Sheik Hamad, then Crown prince (progressive to the ruling Emir), proposed the idea of updating the state run Qatari television network to a satellite capable, independent, yet distinctly Arabic news outlet. His father, ruling Emir Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, did not object to nor did he support this initiative. On June 27, 1995, Sheik Hamad executed a peaceful coup and seized control of the Qatari government from his vacationing father. Both a disinterest in government affairs and acts of unaccountable corruption

directly led to Sheik Khalifas removal as Qatars Emir. Noted Middle East media academics Mohammed El-Naway and Adel Iskander stated Corruption prevailed in various government sectors, and the revenues from the countrys oil and natural gas (resources were not used to improve the countrys infrastructure. Prior to the coup, Sheik Hamad received support from other Al Thani family leaders, as well as leading tribal families in Qatar for a peaceful takeover. Sheik Hamad looked to turn his vision of an independent, yet state funded, news station into a reality by abolishing state controlled press censorship in Qatar. Although he orchestrated his new role as Qatars ruling Emir and maintained autocratic government control, the responsibilities of office placed the AlJazeera initiative on the backburner in mid-1995. The demise of the BBC sponsored Arabic News channel on the Saudi Arabian owned Orbit satellite network also played a timely and advantageous role in the birth of Al-Jazeera in January 1996. Orbit Satellite Network, a payfor-service television station established by a Saudi prince and cousin to King Fahd in 1993, operated from Rome, Italy. The purpose to base the network outside of Saudi Arabia was to have access to European based technicians and talent and avoid the kind of government interference that might arise if it were based in an Arab country. The original design of the Orbit-BBC ten year contract was to bring the BBCs World News Service programming to the Middle East, in Arabic. Before agreeing to supply Orbit with its Arabic language news channel, the BBC insisted the new channel should have the same values as the rest of the World Service. The new initiative was the first of its kind, as it would showcase Arabic journalists in a non-state controlled media environment; however, the BBC would maintain editorial control of all broadcast content. It also meant following a western style line-up of programming, which was more appealing to BBC program directors than the Arab audiences it would ultimately serve.

On March 24, 1994, the BBC began its broadcast from its West London studios. The Arab press wrote off the whole project from the start, dubbing it the BBCs Petrodollar Channel. The initial two hours of news service per day grew to eight hours by the end of 1994. The joint endeavor began to erode shortly after the service began, with disagreements on both sides over program content, plus charges of Orbit being culturally insensitive. The BBC later revealed that cultural insensitivities turned out to mean editing anything with which the Saudi royalty disagreed. Indeed, the intent to base Orbit in Rome, thus away from Saudi government oversight, was not a valid assumption or practice. A major blow to BBC-Orbit relations occurred when the BBC aired a program hosted by expelled Saudi dissident, Professor Mohammed Al-Masari. His strong opinions against the House of Saud, and desire to return the Saudi Kingdom to strict Islamic rule led to his exile in the UK. The program ended unexpectedly shortly after the broadcast began. The BBC immediately accused Orbit of censorship, and added that it breached the original agreement. The Saudi government, incensed by Al Masaris short-lived broadcast, formally requested the British government begin his immediate deportation. The Saudis also threatened to abruptly end defense contracts worth millions of pounds, which would terminate the employment of hundreds of British citizens living in Saudi Arabia. The UK sought to deport Al-Masari to Dominica; however, the British courts upheld Al-Masaris appeal to remain in England. The British press sharply denounced the British government for sacrificing Al-Masaris human rights on the altar of Saudi arms deals. In the following weeks after the mysteriously aborted Al-Masari broadcast, the issue subsided and the Saudi government did not carry out their original threats. Both the BBC and Orbit went back to their respective positions of bickering about program content.

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The final straw occurred a few months later after the BBC decided to broadcast a documentary entitled Death of a Principle which chronicled: a Saudi funeral; a Filipina who testified in an interview for having been flogged for going out with male friends; and most controversially, a man about to be decapitated by a sword-wielding executioner. Although the actual moment of beheading was not shown, filming executions is illegal under Saudi law. This focus on Saudi human rights abuses sounded the death knell of a ten year joint enterprise just 18 months into the agreement. It also marked the end of a dream for Arab journalists living in London, and for Arabic viewers who briefly received an alternative to bland and often shoddy state-run television news. On April 20, 1996, the BBCs Arabic service ended on the Orbit satellite network with no offers to reconcile or restructure the agreement. Nearly 250 Arab journalists, all of them trained by the BBC, became unemployed. The timing of the BBC-Orbit demise could not have been better for Emir Sheik Hamad and Al-Jazeera. Though still a concept in the making based on the Emirs decree, Al-Jazeera immediately hired 120 recently unemployed, BBC trained journalists to work in Qatar. This action brought structure and rigor to the reporting content of a yet to be proven concept of independent news in the Arab world. In addition to their Al-Jazeera announcement, the Qatari Council of Ministers appointed a sevenman board of directors for Al-Jazeera, each of whom would sit for three years. Sheik Hamad bin Thamir Al Thani, then a deputy minister of information, was appointed chairman. The Emir agreed with the editorial board that Al-Jazeera would be independent of his control, and that if he were ever to break this pact, the result would be their mass resignation. In order to bring his vision into reality, Emir Sheik Hamad pledged a one time 500 million Qatar Riyals ($137 million) sum to cover startup and running expenses for approximately five years. The board of directors estimated the network would become independently

Reporting from Qatar (CIA Factbook) solvent, and no longer reliant on state funds after five years, based on program advertisement and exclusive video footage sales to other networks. On November 1, 1996, Al-Jazeera began to broadcast its all news format from its studio in Doha, Qatar. The initial limited-power terrestrial broadcasts reached all of Qatar, and westward across the bay to Bahrain; however, the future explosion of viewers and near immediate popularity can be attributed to another groups bad luck. Due to a scheduling error over the Saudi-controlled Arab Satellite (Arabsat) Network, French based Canal France International aired 30 minutes of hard core pornography on a Saturday afternoon in July 1997. Contemporary CFI broadcast data suggested that a possible 33 million people across the Middle East could have been watching, including plenty of children expecting educational material. The error, which assailed Islamic cultural sensitivities, ended CFIs programming contract with Arabsat, despite apologies and protests from French diplomats. It also paved

the way for Al-Jazeera to purchase the lucrative CFI satellite slot and increase its daily programming from eight to 17 hours per day throughout the 22 Arab nationsand to the rest of the world. The independent television station from the small state of Qatar was now positioned to seriously compete with other satellite channels in a global market. Moreover, Al-Jazeeras broadcasts were (and currently remain) free to any satellite dish owner residing in the Middle East. Perhaps the biggest break, which solidified Al-Jazeeras current standing in the Arab world, was its exclusive coverage of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. During Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, both Arab and worldwide viewers depended on CNN to bring exclusive TV news images. During Operation Desert Fox, it was Al-Jazeera that scooped the West by providing on-the-spot, 24 hour real time news reporting from Baghdad and the rest of the world, via footage sold to Western media outlets. More importantly, this providential originated from an Arab news station, based in the Middle East, with Arabic reporters bringing the story to Arabic viewers as the events unfolded. Al-Jazeeras graphic footage riveted Arab viewers and contributed to the massive anti-American protests that erupted across the region. No longer was the Middle East beholden to images and reports received from a culturally tone deaf Western media, or limited to state controlled television. In a turnabout role, Al-Jazeera sold exclusive video to Western media outlets instead of having to purchase it. Indeed, the monopoly of Western media coverage in the Middle East met a seemingly worthy contender. During the second Palestinian (or al-Aqsa) intifada, which began in September 2000 in response to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharons visit to Al Haram Al Sharif, Al-Jazeera broadcast graphic images of intense ground level combat. The networks talk shows were full of appeals for Arab action against Israel. This was the coverage which consolidated Al-Jazeeras centrality in Arab political life. Noted Arab

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media scholar Mohamed Zayani stated from Osama Bin Laden. For its part, perception and contextual objectivity. that while Desert Fox was the first Al-Jazeera kept exclusive broadcast He asserts Most networks aim to cover world event to give Al-Jazeera regional rights, selling the footage to Western the news objectively, but they end up importance, the coverage of the second news outlets CNN, BBC, and a host of coloring it with a certain context or intifada has given Al-Jazeera a truly pan- others at a price of $250,000 per three perspective that suits audience concerns. Arab dimension. News hungry viewers minute tape. Al-Jazeera film technicians Arguably, Al-Jazeera understands the could personally relate to Al-Jazeeras affixed a dialogue box in the top right- cultural nature of its Arab and Muslim style of television journalism: it reported hand corner of the television screen audience, and presents newsin both on events and issues Arab people most stating in Arabic: exclusive video from content and contextwhich best appeals wanted to see, instead of what some Al-Jazeera. Further, they adorned the to the Arab street, and is not offered western broadcast programmer thought bottom right corner of the screen with by the West. US and European media was best for Arab or Muslim viewers. the stations gold cartouche monogram, outlets can also be painted with the same Al-Jazeera, as well as other new budding bringing symbolic recognition to the brush, as most corporations select and Arab satellite channels, seized the West. Although the major networks broadcast programs based on accepted moment to mobilize the Arab street added their own corporate logos to Western cultural perspectives. Mohamed through acute and graphic intifada the purchased video, it was Operation Zayani, a noted Arab media scholar, coverage in the West Bank and Gaza Enduring Freedom coverage and the observes It would be unfair to compare Strip. Mohamed Zayani added, More signature gold monogram which made Al-Jazeera to the American media than any other channel, Al-Jazeera Al-Jazeera a household word in late partly because the latter, much like has capitalized on the importance of 2001. Undeniably, all major news outlets the society they serve, have their own the Palestinian question. It specificity. Perhaps we can has not only provided instant apply Zayanis statement in an coverage of the events and inversely proportional manner, aired detailed reports on the as Al-Jazeeras popularity is latest developments, shedding largely based on a defined an unpleasant light on the specificity emanating from practices of Israel in the Middle the Arab and Muslim street. East, airing raw footage and Prominent Saudi newsman images of incursions, death Jamal Khashoggi notes Aland demolition in the West Jazeera has a big problem with Bank and the Gaza Strip rarely objectivity. They must work displayed by Western Media; this out. They know the taste it has also devoted many of its of the Arab street, and the Arab programs to supporting and street is anti-American. At the serving the intifada, including beginning of Operation Iraqi Reporting based on contextual objectivity? debates, discussions, and Freedom, while American (Aljazeera.net) documentaries such as The media has focused on soldiers, Missing Justice and Palestine under were beholdenand scoopedby one tanks, and sandstorms, Arab TV has Siege. Perhaps Al-Jazeeras deputy station with exclusive media access seized on dramatic and visceral images executive director Yosri Fouda summed inside Afghanistan. of blown up houses and mangled it up best: it makes a hell of a difference bodies. Walid Al-Omary, the Al-Jazeera Reporting Bias or when you say it in Arabic. Indeed, correspondent in the West Bank town of it made a difference when the reports Rumallah stated, To be objective in this Responsible Journalism originated from an independent and area is not easy, because we live here. Perhaps we can best view labels such We are part of the people here. And this staunchly Arab station in the Middle as bias and responsible journalism situation belongs to us also, and we have East. Prior to October 7, 2001, when by examining who sends and who our opinions. Operation Enduring Freedom began receives a given message. Some have Who is right? According to Syracuse in Afghanistan, Al-Jazeera remained a criticized Al Jazeer for biased reporting, University Professor of Media and relatively obscure news organization while others hail them as responsible Culture Robert Thompson,watch CNN in the Western world. After this date, journalism, because they show the Arab and Al-Jazeera and youll quickly Al-Jazeera became a household word in side of a news story that otherwise realize that everyone who tells a story the West, producing coverage no other would not be told through a western tells it from a different point of view. news corporation could. The outlets media outlet. Noted communications Although Al-Jazeera remains free of rise in popularity can also be attributed scholar Mohammed el-Nawawy refers to state controlled censorship of its news to the tapes received and broadcast accusations of media bias as a matter of content, it also received accusations of 2

inciting the Arab street through hatred and misunderstanding. Perhaps as a result, some label them the terrorist news network, killers with cameras, Jihad TV, Bin Ladens Private TV channel, a nasty little propaganda channel, and even All Osama, All the Time. One can likely attribute such negative labels to the networks exclusive receipt of Osama Bin Ladens tapes, and promotion of hostile antiAmerican dialogue on its talk shows. During the first month after September 11, 2001, Al-Jazeera rebroadcast multiple excerpts from a 1998 Osama Bin Laden interviewsometimes several times a dayin which Bin Laden called on Muslims to kill Americans, Christians and Jews. Abdullah Ibrahim al-Haj, AlJazeeras assistant general manager in Qatar, prided himself by touting the stations motto of presenting the opinion and the other opinion. Critics argue this other opinion is often drummed out by a majority of anti-American, anti-Jewish, or anti-Western guests scheduled to appear on Al-Jazeera talk shows. For example, coverage of the Al-aqsa intifada promoted a perspective of solidarity among the Palestinians, but stirred hostile emotions in the Arab street. Azadeh Maveni observed, Al-Jazeera neednt go out of its way to humanize Israeli suffering, when, in their view, Palestinians receive no

such treatment on American or Israeli TV. According to Amir Taheri, AlJazeera successfully characterized the Al-Aqsa intifada as an issue of land and statehood, as well as a struggle between the Islamic and the Judeo-Christian worlds where viewers could easily form the impression that the Palestinians are more truly represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad than by Yassir Arafats beleaguered authority. Realistically, it appears we can concurrently apply labels of biased reporting or responsible journalism to Al-Jazeera, based on who receives the message.

A Nature of Miscommunication
Senator Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, asks how is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has such trouble promoting a positive image of itself overseas? Dr. R.S. Zaharna, associate professor of communication at American University, calls the current situation a cultural dance of miscommunication. Dr. Zaharna cites the current paradox between Al-Jazeera and American public diplomacy officials relate to a hidden dance described by intercultural communications scholars John Condi and Fathi Yousef. The Condi-Yousef model depicts two men of different cultures: Mr.

Training to avoid miscommunication. (Defense Link)

Jones, an Englishman; and Mr. Lopez, a Mexican, who misunderstand one others cultural and physical positions. During the conversation Mr. Jones prefers to stand at arms length from his conversation partner, while Mr. Lopez prefers to stand much closer. Neither is aware of each others hidden cultural assumption about the proper distance one should observe while carrying on a conversation. As they talk, a kind of dance ensues: Mr. Lopez steps forward to decrease the distance between himself and his interlocutor; Mr. Jones steps back to increase the distance. Both feel awkward and uncomfortable, yet neither realizes why. In the end, Mr. Lopez calls Mr. Jones aloof and cold, while Mr. Jones complains that Mr. Lopez is pushy and aggressive. Such is the nature of miscommunication. Dr. Zaharna adds that Western media outlets not only dance with two left feet, but are out of tune with the Arab street. She compares differences in news delivery, word usage, and their context as applied to Western and Middle Eastern cultures. While a Western style of news reporting resonates well in the United States, it does not promote positive American sentiment in the Middle East. An accepted practice of US news reporting is to present the facts with a low, steady tone, and calm demeanor. This style is largely patterned after Walter Cronkiteknown as the most trusted man in Americafor his stoic and objective reporting during events ranging from the tragic assassination of President Kennedy, to the remarkable Apollo 11 lunar landing. Subliminally, Cronkite represented the ideal of credibility in the broadcast news content. In contrast, Al-Jazeera is more apt to use sensationalism and emotion to present a news story. Interviewers as well as interviewees are highly vocal and emotionally expressive. The Arab street appears to respond to emotion and passionate delivery: this style reverberates as more ardent and credible with Middle Eastern audiences. AlJazeera Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Helal observes emotions are part of the story;

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the soul of the news lies in emotion. Emotion is the most important fact. While emotion is certainly part of the news reporting equation, it can be argued the use of words in one culture may ring quite differently in another. Dr. Zaharna notes President Bushs pronouncement that you are either with us or against us reinforced an unstated cultural dividing line between Americans on one hand, and Arabs and Muslims, on the other hand. This line of reasoning reflected positively with most Americans after 9/11, as us meant America and the West. However, in the Arab and Muslim world us may have meant other Arabs and Muslims. Dr. Zaharna observes, These contrasting cultural assumptions of who is us are deep and enduring. When us became the good guys in the war against good and evil, them became the bad guys and even the enemy. The distinction between us and them, which appears very specific by Western standards, is an issue of conflict by Middle Eastern or Arab standards. In this war of images and words, each side accuses the other of bias, of hiding the truth and of using loaded terms. Both Al-Jazeera and Western media outlets use words with different meanings to suit their target audiences. As an example, Al-Jazeera often referred to American officials statements as claims.suggesting the response may have other meanings, or imply falsehood. In contrast, Al-Jazeera reported Iraqi officials as saying when reporting news events. Americans are more to the point as to what they will or will not do in the future. In contrast, Arabs and Muslims tend to use the future tense more sparingly in shaa Allah, an admonition that only God knows what will happen. Early US and Western news coverage of Operation Enduring Freedom largely portrayed military action in Afghanistan as strikes against terrorists and their supporters, as well as retribution for the World Trade Center attacks. Al-Jazeera showed victims bloodied by US bombs, and carried reaction from a Muslim man in Egypt who condemned the US bombing saying, America is the maker of terrorism, and now it is now tasting its own medicine.

Opposing arguments and common viewpoints. (Defense Link) Alternately, Al-Jazeeras Kabul correspondent Thsyeer Alouni was the only foreign TV correspondent the Taliban allowed to operate in Afghanistan. His wild-eyed reports alleging massive civilian casualties from US bombing fed Arab conspiracy mills, and were picked up by CNN and other news networks. The Pentagon stated most of his claims were false. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, CNN referred to troops entering Iraq as Coalition Forces, while AlJazeera described invading Americans or invading forces. MSNBCs onscreen war headline was Operation Iraqi Freedom but Al-Jazeeras headline was War on Iraq as opposed to war in Iraq. An Iraqi cab driver who blew up a checkpoint was labeled as a terrorist by US networks but a martyr or freedom fighter by Al-Jazeera. Mohammed elNawawy notes the American media point of describes a suicide bomber who killed innocent soldiers in an insidious way. From the Arab media point of view, the bomber resisted invading troops through self-sacrifice, to reduce the suffering of fellow Iraqis. On CNN, military analysts referred to Operation Iraqi Freedom as a war of liberation. On Al-Jazeera, The war was not an act of liberation, but of occupation. Media analysts pointed out CNN and other Western Media outlets provided human interest stories on soldiers or their units, while AlJazeera updated the wars death toll, and defended its right to report on the ugly face of war. In May 2003, Delinda Hanley described two wars going on in Iraq. One is a gripping made for TV show, starring brave US and British troops putting their lives on the line to bring freedom to oppressed Iraqis. Little blood is spilled on camera. Soldiers pass food out to starving Iraqi civilians and prisoners. Homesick and on the edge, these idealistic servicemen and women remain confident that they will soon win this just war and return to their families. The other war is waged by Iraqis, desperate to protect their homes and their ancient land against US and British invaders. Bombed buildings, smoke and chaos are the backdrops for this war. Its stars are wounded and screaming Iraqi women and children, captured or terrified Iraqisand yes, US and British Soldiers. Unlike the US or Western news outlets, Al-Jazeera seemingly focused on the most terrifying aspects of the war. Jihad Ali Ballout, spokesman for AlJazeera stated, Al-Jazeera is just trying to do its job, like everyone else covering the war in Iraq. We dont decide what our viewers should or should not see. War is innately ugly. While the network brought the more distressing aspects of the war to satellite television, it did not

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bring all aspectsas it claimedto the Arab street. Selected news vignettes provide insights into the contrasting patterns of news reported the same day by both Al-Jazeera and Western media. The following illustrations refer to the combat effectiveness of an Iraqi Army Division, a car bombing incident in a Baghdad market place, the initiation of a northern front by US Paratroopers, and the historic toppling of Saddam Husseins statue in Baghdad. Each highlights the different aspects of selected news stories. - On Monday, March 23, 2003, Coalition forces announced the surrender of the 51st Division and its commander. Al-Jazeeras Basra correspondent interviewed the general, who said his troops were in Basra defending the city. In reality, Coalition forces had entered Basra and rendered the 51st Division as combat ineffective. Al-Jazeera continued to broadcast the interview and officers claim throughout the day. - On Wednesday, March 26, 2003 a bomb exploded in a Baghdad market place. CNNs Nic Roberston reported chaos and anger in the district. CNN purchased video from Al-Jazeera showing a burned-out car and men carrying a body away from the scene in a blanket. In the backdrop, Nic Roberston stated, The Iraqi government is saying this is an indication that coalition forces are targeting civilians. The scene then changes to the Iraqi Minister of Information (in English for greater effect) saying, They are killing innocent people. The Al-Jazeera coverage used similar but lengthier clips of the Minister of Information briefing, plus interviews with Baghdad residents, and more footage of Baghdad streets with a closeup shot of a puddle of blood. At no time during the story did the reporter question the bombs American origin. - On Thursday, March 27, 2003, CNN reported American paratroopers conducted a combat jump near Kirkuk to open the northern front in Iraq. On Al-Jazeera, a little Iraqi girl in a pink sweater stared out a window from her Baghdad hospital bed. Later that day Al-Jazeera aired the same footage from

Strategic communicators. (Defense Link) the market bombing the day before, adding images of a hospitalized boy with bandaged feet. Reporter Diyar al-Omari added additional images of victims lying dead in the street, and warned this could be a sign of the ugliness of this war, as opposed to what Washington said was going to be a clean war that wasnt supposed to target civilians. Al-Jazeera did not report on the paradrop near Kirkuk, or discuss the importance of opening a northern front, at any time on March 27. - On Wednesday, April 9, 2003, most US networks provided live coverage of the toppling of Saddams statue in al Fardus square. Images of cheering Iraqi citizens and tired US Soldiers appeared for most of the day. In contrast, AlJazeera gave little coverage to this historic event. Instead, Al-Jazeera conveyed the chaos of the streets, broadcasting images of people both celebrating and looting. (Al-Jazeera) also showed the anguish of Iraqi civilians: images from Basra of a wounded boy, his face partially burned off. While Al-Jazeera used a specific approach to cover these events, their apparently negative perspective did not consider the broader context, nor

the reality of these situations. If a media outlet provides the viewer only a partial picture, it introduces a form of bias. Without the complete image, the audience cannot make a valid selfdetermination of what occurs in the broadcast. Instead, the viewer gets a censored, less than objective point of view. Several Middle Eastern media analysts are quick to point out the benefits, as well as the drawbacks, of the Al-Jazeera effect on the Arab street. Mohammed el-Nawawy observes, in Arab eyes, Al-Jazeera is not affiliated with any specific Arab government and has not sided with any particular Arab regime. This in and of itself makes people trust the network more. Fouad Ajami, distinguished professor of Near Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins University, luridly described the station in an influential New York Times Magazine essay as a cesspool of antiAmerican hate that deliberately fans the flames of Muslim outrage. Newsweek Internationals Farced Zakaria stated Al-Jazeera fills its airwaves with crude appeals to Arab nationalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and religious fundamentalism. Amer Taheri noted the emergence of a new middle class in the Arab world that is looking for an alternative to both the theoparanoia of the Islamists and the corrupt lethargy of the ruling cliques. Taheri goes on to say the democratic left, the democratic right and the moderate center are never represented on Al-Jazeera. Thus, the nature of miscommunication is a product of both who sends and receives the message. Paradoxes within ones own culture are often overlooked while paradoxes within other cultures are glaringly obvious and demand explanation. Without question, the US must address present and future implications of our messages, in order to win the war of ideas in the Long War Against Terrorism.

Strategic Implications
Author Max Boot recently observed, US troops in Iraq are slowly winning

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the war on the ground, even as theyre losing the public relations battle back home. Critics state we are losing the information war in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, few take the time to define what they mean. Ironically, policy makers often use the call for strategic communications improperly: the plural communications refers to hardware used to send a message. The correct term strategic communication describes a focused message or set of themes, which articulates a defined position. As a result of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed a Strategic Communication (SC) focus study. At present, the US does not possess a national strategy which outlines ends, ways, and meansusing all elements or instruments of national powerfor SC. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld says Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in todays media age, but for the most part, we--our government, the media or our society in generalhave not. Deputy Secretary of Defense Englands direction for a follow-up SC study is a step in the right direction; however, DOD should have an inclusive role within the larger context of the interagency process. The issue of Strategic Communication is not solely a DOD problem, nor should it be limited to a DOD viewpoint or solution. Part of the current problem likely stems from well intended, yet disparate efforts by many US government officials, all of whom want to properly convey national policy and interests in the Middle East. Dr. R. S. Zaharna suggests the US has not tailored its messages to address the [Arab or Muslim] audiences cultural and political sensibilities. The US Department of State (DOS) should take the lead in this important initiative, turning to respected Middle Eastern scholars and journalists for the Arab or Muslim perspective. Ultimately, such efforts should lead to development of a National Strategic Communication Strategy, under DOS sponsorship. Moreover, the US strategy must focus on reaching out to the emerging middle class

moderates in the Middle East through engagement with Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and other emerging satellite channels. Dr. Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland notes, we have to help the moderates rally behind a global vision that would give hope. There is despair in the Middle East. Without hope we are not going to be able to defeat the militants. In the war of ideas, the militants or terrorists provide no alternative to peace and democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conclusion
The proliferation of satellite television service in the Middle East continues to reach nearly every household and public meeting place. Competition, from Al-Arabiya and others, means AlJazeera no longer holds the monopoly of satellite television viewer ratings it had prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to November 2005 IpsosStat TV research poll, Al Arabiya is

the number one watched satellite news channel in Saudi Arabia and in Iraq. Despite the drop in viewer ratings, Al-Jazeera is still funded, and remains free from Emir Sheik Hamads editorial control. In over ten years of broadcast experience, the Al-Jazeeraphenomenon continues to change the complexion of the public debate in the Arab world, and successfully promotes the idea that an independent news station can endure in the Middle East.

Please see the bibliography/references for this article on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm Click on theupdates link under the Winter 2007 issue

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Tactical IO in Support of Time Sensitive Planning

By Francisco B. de Carvalho, Lieutenant Colonel, USA Editorial Abstract: The author provides a narrative account of a joint IO Cell in action, examining direct here and now application of information operations during a recent combat rescue in Afghanistan. He describes how IO core capabilities can successfully serve planners and operators throughout critical, fast-paced mission planning and execution phases.

nformation Operations (IO) planners serving at Joint Task Forces, brigades, and below are experiencing an increase in the need for tactical-level IO understanding, planning, execution, and assessing of military operations. Conversely, many Department of Defense (DOD) IO courses focus primarily on providing insight to operational and strategic level planning. Although possessing proficiency at these levels is important, they do not adequately address the growing challenges associated with todays front-line operations. Joint and Service doctrine and education are currently addressing the addition of tactical IO in order to increase the level of proficiency and effectiveness of IO planners. Many of the collective efforts achieving success in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom can be attributed to actions planned and executed at the tactical level. This is especially true when examining our maneuver forces current strategies in dealing with the present day Iraqi insurgency and the recent resurgence of Taliban activity throughout Afghanistan. Commanders have paid close attention to increasing their requisite skills in face-toface engagements and cultural awareness, as interaction with local civilians at the tactical level has become increasingly necessary and beneficial. The US Armys Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) recruitment brief articulates the need for individuals who are tactically and technically proficient at synchronizing all aspects of core, supporting, and related IO capabilities and activities. As an example, better preparing an IO planner to manage the complexities of a counter-insurgency is paramount to the long-term success of maneuver operations, and the mitigation of risk to ground forces. Additionally, possessing tactical IO knowledge serves to increase the commanders confidence in his IO Cells planning abilities while strengthening his own understanding of how IO supports his operations. Many lessons gathered from IO practitioners downrange experiences indicate there is no clear delineation between tactical and operational level IO; rather, there is considerable overlap between the two. Having fundamental knowledge of both operational and tactical IO enables the IO planner to accurately select and integrate capabilities to achieve desired effects. It is important to note that planners can often leverage tactical IO activities and efforts to support or accomplish higher level objectives. IO planners routinely use information obtained at the tactical level to gauge the

MH-47 returns from a mission. (Defense Link) effectiveness or modify current deliberate plans, strategies, and operations. This passing up of information also works well for Time Sensitive Planning (TSP). When unforeseen or unplanned events warrant, IO planners find that tactical IO provides the quickest and most effective means to achieve desired effects. The following scenario illustrates how tactical IO supported a classified Joint Task Forces June 2005 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission in Eastern Afghanistan. The IO Cell, during the TSP process, integrated various elements of Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Electronic Warfare (EW), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Civil Affairs (CA) to support the commanders main objectives. Although the scenario is based on true events, some of the content, to include individuals names and specific unit designations, has been omitted to protect classified or sensitive operational material. The Mission For the final twenty minutes of its journey, the blackedout MH-47 special operations Chinook helicopter hugged the terrain closely as it approached its objective. The men in the rear stood silently ready for what would become their final mission. Abdullah Khan, their High Value Individual or HVI, was a prominent Tribal Warlord and Anti-Coalition Member (ACM). Khan operated freely throughout the Korangal Valley near the city of Asadabad. He was adept at coordinating logistics and movements of foreign fighters eager to strike against the fledgling Afghan Army and the Coalition. Capturing Khan 7

Message delivery over the provinces. (Defense Link) would yield a significant blow to his network and strengthen the Government of Afghanistans (GOA) control and influence throughout the province. As the chopper descended onto the objective, the pilot expertly adjusted the controls, bleeding off much of the birds forward momentum and lift. The airframe shuddered as the rotor blades bit hard into the thin mountain air. In a matter of seconds the elite operators would exit into the cool summer night and begin their mission. Ahmad Rahman, a wiry Afghan man in his early thirties, had been leading his small band of jihad fighters through the mountainous terrain for most of the night. They had been patrolling the inhospitable terrain for several days, hoping to ambush coalition convoys on their way to and from Camp Blessings. As they neared the final ridge, Ahmad paused in a small clearing to check the condition of his mujahideen. Suddenly, from seemingly out of nowhere, a descending helicopter appeared overhead. The first RPG struck the aircrafts rear rotor assembly and caused the bird to thrust downward violently. Within seconds following the first impact, a second RPG streaked across the small clearing and detonated against the Chinooks starboard pontoon. The bird pitched sharply to the right and, despite the pilots valiant maneuvers, rolled onto its side and impacted into the rocky hilltop. With rotor blades splintering, the Chinook, crew, and human cargo tumbled helplessly off the hill and down the steep embankment. The disintegrating airframe ripped up trees, dirt, and rocks as it made its way into the ravine below. High above a circling AC-130 Specter Gunship captured the carnage in its entirety. Its Forward Looking Infrared Radar showed a heavy signature of heat, suggesting to any prudent observer that there were no survivors. All attempts to radio the Chinook went unanswered. Back in the command center at Bagram Air Base, the Task Force Commander and his J3 stared ominously at the video feed coming from the lone Predator, which had been monitoring the teams insertion. The commander, not directing his order to anyone in particular, said solemnly, alert the CSAR team and assemble the staff. This type of scenario is just one of many that fall under the category of TSP. Generally, IO planners have a good understanding of how IO supports long-term objectives, which concentrate on changing perceptions and influencing 8

populations to behave favorably toward US and its interests. However, when the operational tempo is high and time is limited, the IO planner must quickly shift his focus and begin to think tactically. What tactical IO capabilities or resources are readily available for an IO planner to integrate and synchronize with the maneuver plan to increase the likeliness of mission success? Some planners refer to tactical IO as being surgical in that it is applied relatively quickly to achieve a very precise effect. In this type of scenario, the IO planner must be able to effectively apply tactical IO capabilities and resources to immediately support the Task Forces combat search and rescue efforts. The Task Force IO officer sat in the Joint Operations Center (JOC) contemplating what actions were required. The commanders guidance was perfectly clear, but presented some difficult planning challenges given the fact that time was extremely limited. The commanders expectations for IO were high and indicated he placed great value on its potential contributions. First and foremost, I want you to integrate IO to support every aspect of the recovery operation. I also see IO as being an integral part in preventing further attacks against the Task Force. Lastly, tell me how IO can support the Task Force in obtaining actionable intelligence for potential follow on Direct Action missions. The main question debated during the follow-on IO coordination meeting pertained to what capabilities and resources could support and, more importantly, how to effectively integrate them with the CSAR, force protection, and intelligence gathering plans. Careful analysis, consideration, and selection of IO capabilities would either produce positive results or compound the already surmounting feelings of frustration being felt throughout the Task Force. The J3, having stood up the Crisis Action Center (CAC), had a handful of operational and intelligence planners developing potential courses of action; resources were limited and timeliness was an essential factor. The injured operator lay motionless under the clear night sky among scattered equipment and smoldering debris. Slowly, as he regained consciousness he heard the sound of unfamiliar voices approaching. He suddenly realized the gravity of the situation and the need to act quickly. After finding no other survivors, he stealthily made his way eastward, carefully

Recovery incentive leaflet. (JIOWC) Winter 2007

following the pre designated escape and evasion route. He would require substantial stand-off distance and altitude. periodically attempted to establish radio contact using his The EWO was also vigilant in deconflicting all targeted survival radio but was unsuccessful; the antenna had been frequencies with maneuver, so as not to disrupt or degrade damaged in the crash. friendly communications during execution. Elements of special The PSYOP Support Element (PSE) recommended operations task forces often operate autonomously within a using leaflet messages to target three separate and distinct conventional commanders area of operations. Indiscriminate audiences. The first message was intended for survivors and and uncoordinated jamming has often led to unintentional contained information pertaining to the impending search and but adverse affects on other operations. With this in mind, IO rescue efforts. Informing survivors that help was on its way and EW planners must coordinate and deconflict all jamming went a long way in bolstering morale and strengthening their activities with the established Joint Restricted Frequency List psychological well-being. The second message targeted local (JRFL). Afghan civilians and solicited useful information and rendering The MC-130 Combat Talon aircraft rolled off the runway of aid. Intent was to drop these messages on surrounding towns at 0315 in the morning. The sun was still below the eastern in proximity of the crash site and along the escape route. The horizon as the aircraft banked sharply north toward the distant third message would target the ACM themselves and instruct Hindu-Kush Mountains. The PSE NCOIC stood in the rear them to cease all offensive operations. Non compliance of the craft and waited anxiously for the signal to get ready. meant they would become valid Coalition targets. Once the It would take the Talon approximately 45 minutes to enter commander approved the messages, the translators began the target area. The NCO gainfully used this time to double the tedious task of translating the messages into Pashto and check static lines, ties, and boxes. Now was not the time for Dari, the two most commonly spoken languages in the valley. any malfunctions; proper leaflet dispersion depended not only Having dedicated intelligence support to the IO cell provided on correct aircraft altitude, speed, and attitude, but on how accurate data on the populations well the boxes had been packed demographics and sentiments, and assembled. The PSYOP which ensured translated officer and Talon commander messages would resonate with determined optimum flight the audiences. It is crucial for factors using several planning IO planners to understand the tools to include Falcon View PSYOP production process and, software. Having an accurate more importantly, how much depiction of terrain features time is necessary to produce and their characteristics aids the PSYOP products. With TSP, flight commander in selecting quality of the finished product the most advantageous route may be sacrificed for quicker to service all targets. The best production times. In this case, routes are those that minimize the TPT chose to produce leaflets air time, allow for maximum Recovery crewman scans the terrain. (Defense Link) in black and white and excluded leaflet dispersion over the target the use of complicated graphics. area, and reduce potential threats IO planners must be able to accurately inform the commander to the aircraft. on how long it will take to generate the required number of The Task Forces Civil Affairs officer had been trying to leaflets to accomplish stated objectives. get back to Bagram Air Base before nightfall. His driver drove Back in the Air Component cell, the Task Forces as fast as the potholed road allowed, and spent much of the two Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) recommended using hour trip switching between the break and accelerator. The elements of EW to disrupt both adversary early warning and Soviet-built road was treacherous and showed years of neglect. command and control assets. Electronic Attack (EA) would What made it worse were the slow moving and heavily laden focus on jamming selected ACM frequencies near the crash jinga trucks that hugged the center lane, and operated with no site and along the escape route. Additionally, operators would lights. Maneuvering safely around these vehicles was difficult. employ direction finding equipment to determine the location The command center radioed the CA officer and instructed him of potential survivors or coalition radios that fell into enemy to abort the meeting with the Kabul Provisional Reconstruction hands. The EWO had four years of experience aboard an EC- Team (PRT) and return to base immediately. He wasnt given 130 Compass Call and discussed potential options with the IO specifics, but knew the order was urgent and assumed he was officer. Working with the intelligence section, he identified being called back to deploy one of his tactical teams. adversary push-to-talk frequencies commonly used in that At approximately 0400 hours, the first of many 35K leaflet remote area of Afghanistan. The EWO, using Falcon View boxes opened up in the night sky over the scattered villages. software and air charts, quickly identified areas best suited Aside from an occasional light resonating from a house or to execute the EA mission. Jamming required unobstructed clay compound, there wasnt much to indicate the aircraft was line-of-sight and given the extreme terrain, the Compass Call over any of its intended targets. The PSYOP NCO worked 

flawlessly; his hands-on experiences in rigging boxes and dispensing leaflets were honed over many previous missions. Tensions among the crew were always high during leaflet drops as the low-flying aircraft occasionally attracted ill-aimed smallarms fire. Nine more villages would receive similar packages before completion of the mission. Shortly after sunrise, the weary operator reluctantly entered a small village. Badly needing medical attention, he asked the village elder for temporary safe haven. The village elder, having read the various leaflet messages dropped only hours earlier, was fully apprised of the situation. Fortunately, he was not one of the many individuals who were sympathetic to the Taliban or other ACM groups that operated throughout the valley. He instructed Mohamed, his son, to quickly get word to the Coalition that they had a wounded US service member in their custody. As Camp Blessings was nearly 15 kilometers away, Mohamed had an arduous journey ahead, but he was determined to get help. Fortunately, the leaflets had made their way to a friendly village and the Afghans were more than willing to provide assistance. Later that morning, news arrived at the Task Force that at least one service member had survived the crash and was awaiting extraction. The next phase of the operation would commence at nightfall with the launching of the rescue package. A Tactical PSYOP Team (TPT) would accompany the rescue team and assist with actions on the objective. The TPT, once on the ground, would concentrate on mitigating risks to the villagers and using dedicated interpreters, would quickly gather information on local ACM activities. Obtaining useful information or actionable intelligence would meet the commanders third objective and hopefully, aid in bringing Ahmad Rahman and his men to justice. The IO officer held another coordination meeting and determined that MILDEC could support the extraction phase of the operation. Using Task Force rotary-wing assets to simulate multiple combat insertions north of the village would reduce the likeliness of armed confrontation during execution. The intent of the deception was to draw ACM away from the actual extraction site and keep them preoccupied. An AC-130 gunship would provide cover for the false insertions and was prepared to engage any hostiles. At the sound of approaching helicopters, Abdullah Khans men furiously attempted to coordinate a hasty attack. Taking down another Coalition aircraft would strengthen resolve and increase credibility with other foreign fighter or ACM groups. The Compass Call, having identified several other adversary radio frequencies near the village, continued jamming. Unable to communicate, Khan was not in a position to mount an effective offensive against the approaching Coalition forces. His men watched helplessly on the fringes as the CSAR birds swooped in and executed the final segment of their mission. Within minutes of landing, the special operator was safely in the hands of the Coalition. Upon hearing of the villagers actions, the Civil Affairs officer began preparing humanitarian assistance bundles as immediate compensation for the village. The interpreters, in 10

their brief discussions with the villagers, captured a list of badly needed items, to include blankets, cooking oil, flour, and other various sundries. In an area predominantly anti-Coalition and anti-GOA, it was important to send the right message and to reward heroic individuals for their efforts. From a CA and IO perspective, this was an opportunity to extend special thanks and, more importantly, to establish a favorable relationship with the villagers. Additionally, the TPT identified several CA construction projects, which would go a long way in swaying local sentiments favorable to the Coalition. Having allies in this region would be extremely useful during future maneuver operations. The Task Force CA officer also coordinated with CJTF-76 Civil Affairs and the Asadabad PRT to conduct other village assessments throughout the area. The Task Force commanders intent was to strengthen Coalition presence and to develop beneficial relationships that would yield future support and actionable intelligence. Unfortunately, despite extensive and continuous search efforts over the next several days, there were no other survivors. Not only had the Task Force lost a significant combat asset, it had lost valuable members of its tight-knit family. Although much media attention revolved around maneuvers actions, tactical Information Operations contributed significantly to the overall success of the mission. Careful selection and integration of tactical IO capabilities with the CSAR plan led to the successful recovery of the lone survivor. IO actions in support of the CSAR mission also had a profound and longlasting strategic effect on the locals residing in the valley. Even months after completion of the recovery operation, locals continued to provide actionable intelligence. Much of the information supplied proved beneficial and ultimately led to the capture/kill of many ACM members who were responsible for the downing of the MH-47. Fortunately, to this day, the Task Force maintains a favorable position with many villagers throughout the province and continues to work with them in identifying potential threats to the Coalition. Tactical IO continues to support the Task Force and will, no doubt, continue to be a major asset in restoring regional stability while strengthening the government of Afghanistan.

Winter 2007

Editorial

IO In an Unpredictable World
By M. Craig Geron, Captain, USN

ts time for military leaders and IO producersEWs, PSYOPers, CNO experts, and MILDECersto change the way they plan and execute Information Operations efforts. In the IO field, a sizable portion of the effort is typically generated by a small number of very large IO initiatives rather than large numbers of small IO initiatives. Talented, experienced Operational military leaders along with the seasoned IO expert planners acknowledge that predicting the success of these large IO efforts is effectively a crapshoot. How else to explain why countering the adversarys use of the internet and other efforts have yet to actually deliver a single desired effect? Are they too ambitious or too large and cumbersome? What should COCOM Commanders along with their IO experts do to improve their odds of success? The key is to understand that the outsize performance of our large IO efforts is not driven solely, or perhaps even primarily, by intrinsic attributes such as scope, range, sophistication, or even the seniority of the supporters. Rather, we may be seeing that much of the success of IO products derives from social influence the effect that target individuals or groups have on one anothers decisions. So in addition to anticipating which features individual IO targets might find themselves vulnerable to, leaders and IO planners should adopt strategies that take social influence into account. A study conducted at Columbia University by Matthew Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts, and published in the February 10, 2006, issue of Science, sheds light on the role that social influence plays in driving aggregate consumer demand. More than 14,000 participants were recruited through the teen network site Bolt, and the impact of social influence on their choice of songs to download was tested. After seeing a selection of 48 digital songs by unknown bands displayed on a Web page, participants were asked to choose songs to listen to and then allowed to download the ones they liked. As they arrived at the site, they were randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions: independent, in which they saw only the names of the bands and songs; or social influence, in which they were further divided into eight distinct worlds, and could see, in addition to the bands and songs, how many times each song had been downloaded by previous participants in their respective worlds. There were three main findings. First, social influence increased the inequality of outcomes in all eight worlds, meaning that popular songs were more popular and unpopular songs were less popular than when participants made decisions independently. Second, however, which particular songs would turn out to be successful in any given world was more difficult to predict. And third, both inequality and unpredictability

Are we trapped in our old ways? (Defense Link) increased as the strength of social influence was experimentally increased. Overall, the best songs rarely did very poorly, and the worst songs rarely did very well, but any other outcome was possible. These results suggest that the success of a particular product cannot be explained by any measure of intrinsic quality or even by appealthe fit between the products attributes and consumers preferences. Rather, when people are influenced by what others think or do or buy, their individual choices interact in complicated and inherently unpredictable ways. In other words, experts fail to predict what will succeed not because they are uniformed or incompetent but because the success or failure is driven by complex networks of social influences that render accurate prediction of specific outcomes impossible. The implication for IO planners and COCOM Commanders hoping to influence individuals or groups is that they should deemphasize designing, making, and promoting the big IO efforts and programs and focus instead on creating portfolios of IO

EXPRESS YOUR OPINION ABOUT IO ISSUES

Send your editorial submission to: iosphere@jiowc.osis.gov

Do we have the proper IO focus? (Defense Link)

products that can be used based on real-time measurement of and rapid response to target group feedback. To move in this direction the following recommendations are offered: 1. Increase the number of IO bets, and decrease their size. Acknowledging the implications of this paper and our inability to predict success in a particular IO plan, we should be planning multiple IO efforts that are related and relatively modest rather than a few big IO plans. 2. Focus on detection, measurement, and feedback. We need to dramatically improve our ability to quickly measure and assess the trends of our IO efforts in order to use this important feedback to refine our IO efforts to achieve the desired effects. Without improved MOE assessment and feedback, we are operating without a feel for the road. 3. Follow through with flexible IO budgets and funding. The ability to quickly reallocating funding and resources from unsuccessful to successful IO efforts as indications of success for failure materialize is critical. Initial outlays should continue to be guided by prelaunch research, but we need to aim at broader target populations than that suggested by initial data and intuition. More important, we should direct post launch assessment resources at groups who are reacting positively to the IO effort, whether or not they correspond to our initial expectations. 4. Exploit naturally emerging social influence. Once an IO element has gained a successful reputation or good initial indications of success we need to be able to amplify the corresponding social influence signal by directing the attention of a much wider audience toward the individuals or groups who are already enthusiastic about it. This strategy differs subtly but importantly from word-of-mouth or viral strategies that seek to identify so-called influentials in order to solicit their endorsements. Instead, we suggest that IO planners can, in effect, create influentials by selectively modifying social influence patterns as they emerge.

Rapid changes in the technology of media production, distribution, and consumption are driving a proliferation of choices for potential insurgents the so-called long tail. Some believe that this trend will reduce the importance of any single group or faction as the diversity of media and Web access to ideas and information allow individuals to seek out and respond to messages that fit their preferences and predisposition to respond to or to find cause with. Many believe, however, that precisely this proliferation of choice will further challenge potential insurgents or terrorists to discover and digest content, thus strengthening their tendency to like, or at least preferentially consider, what they think other people respond to. Meanwhile, social networking sites such as MySpace.com and Facebook, tagging sites such as Flickr and Del.icio.us, and user-generated content sites such as YouTube are increasingly exposing ordinary individuals to one anothers decisions about what they watch, listen to, buy, and believe. Together, these trends point to a world in which successes will be more dramatic and also harder to predict than ever. IO planners and COCOM Commanders should therefore abandon the notion that they can either anticipate or determine specific outcomes and instead develop their ability to measure and exploit IO success identified from multiple small IO efforts rather than our current focus on big ticket mega IO efforts. -- MCG

Winter 2007

Welcome to the JIOWC

By Mark H. Johnson, Colonel, USA Editorial Abstract: COL Johnson describes the missions and organization of the newly-named Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, and how this growing organization will serve the information operations community.

JIOWC and service senior leaders reflect on the commands history. (JIOWC)

n behalf of Major General Koziol, and the hundreds of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, government, and corporate team members: welcome from everyone in our new command. The information operations community took some major evolutionary steps in the last few months, and were already pressing ahead with our expanded missions. The most visible changes began in late October 2006, when the Secretary of Defense approved a US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) recommendation to designate the former Joint Information Operations Center as the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC). Many joint warriors put in tremendous effort to reach this moment. Everything from our core task assessment to our new patch design represents tremendous effort from our entire military, government, and contract team. I hope youve taken a moment to read General Koziols comments on our new name and symbol, as they explain much about our role. The stand-up of a new command always rests on the shoulders of its predecessors. JIOWCs beginnings in 1980 as the Joint Electronic Warfare Center later evolved into the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC), and most recently the Joint Information Operations Center, as DOD needs for full-spectrum defensive and offensive IO support continued to grow. Combatant Commanders and staffs repeatedly saw just how effective small, highly-trained and experienced IO teams could beand we remain the premiere source for that expertise.

The Joint Information Operations Warfare Commands mission is to plan, integrate, and synchronize information operations (IO) in direct support of Joint Force Commanders and to serve as the USSTRATCOM lead for enhancing information operations across the Department of Defense. The new command status reflects the growing impact of such IO core capabilities as Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations or PSYOP, Operations Security (OPSEC), and Military Deception (MILDEC), and how military commanders can best employ them in the current Global War on Terrorism. Our new command bears more than a minor resemblance to the COCOMs we serve, to provide a familiar joint face. The JIOWC is organized as a J-code staff with four subordinate centers: the Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC), the Joint Operations Security Support Center (JOSC), the Joint Mission Support Center (JMSC), and the Joint Strategic Communications Support Cell (JSSC). The JEWC brings back a familiar former name, though with even more capability to serve the IO world. No matter which center you call, you can be assured of Course of Action development, IO plan preparation, targeting options, effects assessment, and top rate exercise participation. Carefully planned and executed, the right mixture of these capabilities offers tremendous utility and flexibility to accomplish our Coalition and national goals. We know were part of a huge, interrelated community of planners, operators and policy-makersall of whom have a

say in the many IO core elements. Becoming a joint command doesnt mean were after anyone elses job: it simply reflects significant growth and additional challenges in the greater IO realm. The best way to battle these changesas General Koziol has often saidis to transform IO into a core military competency. A job this big doesnt get done overnight, because the skills and knowledge which make up that core must be deeply rooted and enduring. Information operations is what we do, but most folks would say it is not yet completely intertwined within our professional military culture. Certainly it will be a while before the average Soldier, Sailor, Airman, or Marine is conversant in IO, but chances are he or she already knows just how important it is to send the right message. Again, were here to work with partners across the governmentand the worldto educate and develop the IO force. This points to areas where we are already striving to improve, and where IO investments will lead to the greatest payoff. Building mission ready IO forces means were leading a number of joint IO training and education initiatives, ranging from formal training courses to the highest executive-level guidance. We never forget this means the total force. Were working on improving Reserve component IO Integration, to better use the capabilities and talents of those units with dual Title 10/Title 50 roles and missions. While our exportable expertise remains a primary strength, our Operations Security teams are pushing to conduct an even greater array of Joint Multi-Discipline Vulnerability Assessments (JMDVA). And perhaps youve read about one of our largest initiatives: the Joint Integrative Analytic Planning Capability (JIAPC), in the Winter 2007 issue of IO Sphere. JIAPC brings together People, Processes, and Technology to provide Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) a more complete, accurate, and timely set of Information Operations (IO) planning products. This transformational partnership of existing organizations

helps integrate relevant IO community knowledge, and provides a collaborative IO planning environment to address Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) requirements. These future emphasis areas represent just a few ways the JIOWC is pushing forward to bring timely expertise to the IO community. Viewed collectively these efforts represent a full task load for anyone, but this new command is already well on the way to accomplishing the goals of our country and our Coalition partners. While we have a ton of talent here, be assured were always open to your insights, recommendations, as well as your critiques of anything were doing. Our joint team is thankful for your sustained support from across the community, and looks forward to our continued success across the information operations spectrum. Please join us in celebrating a new flag flying over a battle-tested organization with a long and proud history. We look forward to working with you.

Winter 2007

PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: Preparing for Korean Reunification

By Jeremy S. Mushtare, Captain, USA Editorial Abstract: Captain Mushtare examines the evolution of US Army Psychological Operations forces and practices since the 1950-1953 Korean War, to include changes in training, force structure, and doctrine. He advocates the need for significant revisions in each of these areas, particularly in preparation for future scenarios on the Korean Peninsula.

Breaking the PSYWAR Syndrome

The transformation of psychological operations (PSYOP) training and execution must take place in the context of ongoing PSYOP in the Middle East. At the same time, other threats outside of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) must not be overlooked. The continuously looming menace of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a case in point. More than fifty years after the partition of the Korean peninsula, the DPRK continues to threaten US interests, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and other Asian allies. North and South Koreans continue on-and-off talks that suggest a mutual goal of reunification. Whether achieved through diplomatic means or as the result of a renewal and subsequently victorious conclusion of combat operations, reunification may find PSYOP forces unprepared and incapable of providing support unless effective systemic changes to training and operations are implemented. Therefore, United States Army psychological operations must undergo an immediate and dramatic improvement in training and doctrinal development to provide effective support to regional combat operations, and to prove useful in stabilization and reconstruction operations. Despite a long history of US PSYOP efforts during the Korean War, and the more than fifty subsequent years of combined ROK-US military operations, todays PSYOP forces

The ghost of PYSOP past. (PSYWAR.org) appear ill-prepared to conduct effective operations on the Korean peninsula. Despite significant success during World War II, the then-named psychological warfare (PSYWAR) units were disbanded in the post-bellum years. The cyclic disbanding and neglect of the importance of psychological warfare the PSYWAR syndrome would be repeated following subsequent US conflicts. Following the Vietnam War and another ten year regression, psychological operations revival finally began under the Reagan administration. Shortly after the creation of the United States Special Operations Command in 1987, both Army civil affairs and psychological operations forces were organized under the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Thus, psychological operations began gaining greater DOD funding focus coincident with the decline of the Cold War. The US-led 1991 Persian Gulf War involved a large, highly publicized PSYOP effort, due

to its largely overt nature. During the war, PSYOP efforts were credited with netting a large number of the 87,000 enemy prisoners of war (EPW) counted at the close of the conflict. Thus, the end of the first Persian Gulf War did not witness the same downward spiral into PSYOP irrelevancy recurrent since World War II. On the contrary, there is a high commitment to PSYOP troops in the Global War on Terror, while progress has been made toward increasing the current active duty PSYOP force structure.

Post-Cold War Military Paradigm Shifts

The onset of the post-Cold War period also saw the rise of intrastate conflicts over the once prevalent interstate wars. With the decline in EastWest tensions, neither the Soviet Union (later Russia) nor the United States was willing to maintain Cold War levels of military and economic assistance to their respective allies, particularly in strategically inconsequential parts of the world such as sub-Saharan Africa. This allowed international organizations, including the UN, to become more directly involved in efforts to bring an end to several long-standing conflicts. Therefore, as the United Nations became increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations so did the United States. Between 1990 and 1995 the United States executed forty-seven major operational deploymentsa 50 percent increase over the Cold War years. The latter 1990s involved even more frequent and larger troop deployments



Winter 2007

to the Balkans in peacekeeping roles and a continued presence in the Persian Gulf. Thus, the United States averaged new involvement every eighteen months in states requiring post-conflict reconstruction. Further, military personnel serving in non-combat roles found themselves involved in missions they never historically trained to conduct. The post modern period in military affairs, characterized as the interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, increased interaction between deployed soldiers and a host of organizations with varying interests. These relationships show increasing usage of the military in non-traditional functions (multinational peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance), or in current post-conflict environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and inter-governmental organizations (IGO) permeate these surroundings, providing a myriad of vital services to needy populaces. The number NGOs alone rapidly increased from approximately 6,000 in 1990, to more than 26,000 by the end of the decade, and these trends continue into the new century. Following the devastating terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States is much more mindful of the fact that failed states matter. Prior to this event, President George W. Bush noted he would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win warI believe were overextended in too many places. However, it has since become clear that, In the age of global terrorism, transnational crime networks, and border-hopping disease, state weakness and failure are a real threat to Americans and their way of life. Thus, the concept of stabilizing and reconstructing such states, as a means to rehabilitate and strengthen both internal and external security, is at the forefront of US national security interests. However, doing so requires not just improved security, but comprehensively addressing of other cross-cutting issues that foster stable governments and societies. These

include participatory governance, socioeconomic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Korean Reunification While it is clear that the United States military must be prepared for conflict based on Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions, it must also be ready to support the potential destabilizing effects of Korean reunification. Due to the protracted nature of the 1950-1953 Korean Warwhich never officially endedreunification would constitute a post-conflict environment. Partition has greatly divided not only Korean territory, but the culture as well. In the event this scenario comes to pass, PSYOP forces should be fully capable of supporting stabilization and rebuilding operations. However, they are not adequately prepared to effectively conduct such supportand particularly in Korea. This is despite more than fifty years of combined operations with Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. Unless US forces reform, and improve existing PSYOP capabilities, we may again experience the painful lessons from previous Korean War psychological warfare efforts. The following paragraphs offer a prescription of ten PSYOP transformation recommendations to help meet the challenges of future US operations.

Stabilization And Reconstruction Operations

Increasing Emphasis on Stabilization and Reconstruction Post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with US National Security Strategy emphasis on threats posed by terrorist havens and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, mean we must actively seek to stabilize states in danger of failure or collapse. In a world of increasingly globalized dangers, the United States has a disproportionate interest in ensuring a functional international system. In September 2004, the US Department of State created the Office

of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and named Ambassador Carlos Pascual to the post. The mission of this new office is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy. In 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated we have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. And so we are working to strengthen international capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states. Conducting such operations may also include close liaison with Department of Defense agencies, especially in a postconflict scenario. The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization outlines these actions: Coordinate civilian stabilization and reconstruction participation in military planning and exercises. Deploy Humanitarian, Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (HSRT) to Combatant Commands to participate in post-conflict planning where US military forces will be heavily engaged. Develop mechanisms for coordinating military and civilian operational planning across the full spectrum of possible military involvement in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. Thus, implementing comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction programs, to promote democracy and security while reducing terrorist safe-havens and WMD proliferation, is at the heart of current US national security interests. With the reality of global terrorism, the United States does not have the luxury of ignoring troubled countries no matter how small, poor, or distant. The Four Pillars of Post-Conflict Reconstruction The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association

7

of the United States Army (AUSA) have jointly formulated a four-pillared approach to post-conflict reconstruction. These are means to stabilize a state through improvement of four vital areas: security; social and economic well-being; governance & participation; and justice & reconciliation. Glaringly, current US military doctrine does not articulate how to provide adequate support to bolster the cross-cutting imperatives involved in stabilizing and reconstructing a state. It is unlikely this will continue, due to the current emphasis on postconflict strategies, ongoing US Army transformation, and AUSA involvement in the four pillars program. Therefore, it is important to highlight each area which helps facilitate effective stabilization and reconstruction operations. Security is the precondition for fulfilling the other three pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. While external actors may provide the initial role, indigenous actors must ultimately provide lasting security on behalf of the country itself. Max Weber asserts a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Therefore, the states overall legitimacy is dependent, along with the deliverance of other political goods, on establishment of this monopoly of the use of force within its borders. This pillar of security includes protection from both external and internal threats. Adequate security establishment fosters an environment where citizens can conduct daily business relatively free of violence or coercion from government, organized crime, political organizations, and ethnic groups. This can be quite difficult in post-conflict societies where armed factions have disintegrated and diffused back into society, but possess no civilian skills to earn a living. The importance of effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former armed forces and armed factions is evident, given their potential destabilizing effects on a states national security. The improvement of social and economic well-being is essential to post-conflict operations. It is true 8

that in the wake of violent conflict only a small window of opportunity exists to restore economic hope and social wellbeing. With greater security, improved economies reverse the myopic behaviors induced by warfare. This further reduces the number of individuals who are likely to seek employment from insurgent groups. The short-term efforts are focused on returning basic human services and then shift into long-term social and economic development. Essential human capital depleted due to the conflict must be replenished, either by returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, or by completely re-creating these MIA remains repatriation at the DMZ. capabilities. Health care must (Defense Link) be rapidly expanded to combat free and unfettered media is also vital to the spread of diseases and to treat those already afflictedespecially those allowing for the free flow of information, with HIV/AIDS and malariawhich as well as further promoting government spread very rapidly in the wake of accountability. Establishing rule of law in postviolent conflict. Improved educational opportunities are a must, to help reduce conflict states, while also addressing past the risk of conflict and provide long- grievances, crimes, and atrocities is vital term social, political, and religious toward moving societies further away tolerances. A states inability to support from the clutches of the conflict trap. basic education also leaves room for Judicial systems must be created that are religious schools that exclude women, independent (of the executive), impartial, or indoctrinate young men to elevate and accountable. State corrections violence as a political means. Similarly, institutions must be humane, and law economic diversification efforts must enforcement agencies must be effective target primary resource/commodity and mindful of human rights. The dependencies, which have been found concept of post-conflict reconciliation is to be the single greatest predictor of both a goalsomething to achieveand conflict. Reducing primary commodity a process: a means to achieve that dependence helps to minimize natural goal. It is comprised of four major resource predation and rent-seeking components: healing, truth-telling, behaviors, which are integral to funding restorative justice, and reparations. Clearly, reconciliation is a long-term rebellions. Improving governance includes process; the damage wrought by mass creating legitimate mechanisms, atrocities and lawlessness in post-conflict processes, and institutions, to ensure societies usually takes years, if not enfranchisement of the populace, and decades, to begin to repair. But, failure to deliver necessary political goods. address justice and reconciliation needs Participation is essential, because it further on a priority basis is a recipe for failure helps to legitimize the government and in reconstruction operations. Therefore, it is important to promotes governmental accountability to the citizenry. Thus, the cardinal rule begin establishment of reconciliation of governance is to ensure indigenous mechanisms, such as truth-telling ownership of the process. Guaranteeing commissions, in the early stages of Winter 2007

post-conflict operations. However, their effects may not be evident for generations. Increased Face-to-Face Interactions

The Role of PSYOP in The concept of military forces Stabilization and Reconstruction operating in face-to-face roles among Operations the civilian populace is inherent in stabilization and reconstruction As one of the few US military arms operations. Such missions require mainly concerned with soft power, increased language, cultural, and psychological operations forces have a regional training to communicate not vested interest in promoting favorable only with the indigenous populace, but US perceptions abroadespecially the with the host of IGOs, NGOs, and other insurgency-ridden post-conflict nations transnational actors. When conducted of Afghanistan and Iraq. This is equally properly, these operations can improve true in US efforts to resuscitate failing perceptions of US involvement, and states and stabilize entire geographic may also improve critical US human regions. intelligence (HUMINT) on significant a. The Four Pillars: Simply put, threats. It is true that IGOs, IOs psychological operations themes should (international organizations), and NGOs strengthen the four pillars of post-conflict frequently possess valuable information, reconstruction. While many themes are but are reluctant to share intelligence for in line with such concepts, it is imperative fear of reducing both their we comprehensively target impartiality and rapport with these four critical areas PSYOP has perhaps suffered most the population. However, sub-tasks. from identification with the hardware and and associated operations increasing prevalence of these Psychological missions of the tactical battlefield that organizations makes contacts forces exist to influence and cooperation inevitable. is, leaflet delivery, loudspeakers, and radio the behavior of foreign Further, increased positive governments, organizations, broadcasting. military interactions with groups, and individuals the indigenous populace and to support US national NGO, IGO, and IO members can help when beginning reconciliation processes objectives. Therefore, PSYOP forces build social capital, to the great benefit of between former warring parties. transformation is imperative for Establishing trustful and respectful them to best support stabilization and both the US and the post-conflict state. Building social capital is critical relations between men and women, and reconstruction operations. to strengthening the viability of a particularly between particularly targeted Building Social Capital: Again, post-conflict state, and ultimately for groups, is essential for fashioning a this is a central concept behind making democracy work. Social capital democratic society. improving stability within failed states. As the US finds itself more and Psychological operations forces are describes organizational features such as trust, norms, and networks, that improve more entwined in attempted stabilization critical to building trust at local levels, the efficiency of society by facilitating and reconstruction efforts in failing, to improve perceptions of the US and coordinated actions. Wars destroy failed states, and post-conflict states, their military forces, and to facilitate human and social capital, and civil war in the military will continue to play a vital cooperation on the part of the indigenous particular can have the effect of switching security, training, and humanitarian population. PSYOP forces are the behavior from an equilibriumin which assistance roles. Increased face-to-face primary soft power assets the US can there is an expectation of honestyto interactions provide opportunities to utilize to catalyze other operations. Such one with an expectation of corruption. realize the shadow of the future within operations necessitate interpersonal, Once the reputation for honesty has the indigenous populaces. Through face-to-face, two-way communications. been lost, the incentive for future honest mechanisms such as grass-roots level Again, this requires specific expertise behavior becomes much weaker. networks, the United States can help in language, customs, culture, and As wars are waged and violence move a nation toward democracy and the region, as well as utilization of escalates, economies decline, large-scale stability while reducing insurgent groups networks to expand influence throughout migration of refugees and IDPs occur, labor pools. In the Age of the Network, communities.

and myopic outlooks on life take hold. Because life is so uncertain, people shorten their time horizons and are less concerned with building a reputation for honesty. From the perspective of the Prisoners Dilemma, war-torn societies do not observe the future, but merely focus on the present and the payoff for immediate defection. Thus, rebuilding trust through repeated interactions is essential to resuming normal life and catalyzing commerce in the post-war years. When success spreads through a network, it stimulates more cooperation, and provides models of what works. Innovation increases as the latest information and trends create a largescale learning system, in which many potential users share knowledge. Networks can help build the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction by addressing important grass roots level issues. This is perhaps most significant

horizontal connections explode, not vertical ones. The winners in the 21st centurycompanies, countries, and peoplewill be those with the greatest social capital.



Provide Critical HUMINT: The vital importance of reliable human intelligence has become very apparent post-9/11. The Defense Intelligence Agencys Strategic Support Branch provides enhanced human intelligence capabilities to better support combatant commanders in the war on terror. In addition, PSYOP forces could provide a great deal of useful and reliable information to the US Army and DOD, through interactions with civil society and transnational actors in a given region. While not explicitly stated as one of the five PSYOP missions, proper training, preparation, and execution would yield important HUMINT contributions to the continued Global War on Terror.

The Republic Of Korea

Lessons Learned, But Not Heeded With more than fifty years of US involvement in the Korean armistice, one would expect modern psychological operations to be quite adept. However, this is not the case. Modern PSYOP forces are ill-prepared to conduct operations in Korea, and especially in the event of reunification. Korean War era PSYWAR soldiers noted numerous shortcomings they deemed essential to effective operations in Korea. The most glaring was little, if any, training received prior to deployment. In many cases, such inadequacies exist today. While North Koreas tight control of internal information poses difficulties for effective US psychological operations, it is important to also address the difficulties of operations within South Korea. If the US takes on stabilization and reconstruction operations following Korean reunification, and Korea accepts this US role, we would be communicating with two distinct societies. Mutual Unintelligibility Current US psychological operations in the Republic of Korea involve various exercise deployments throughout the year. These are short in duration and US PSYOP forces redeploy to the United States upon their conclusion.

Although these are combined exercises within the Combined Psychological Operations Task Force (CPOTF), both sides have difficulty communicating with one another. There are insufficient numbers of translators, and few US and ROK counterparts speak one anothers language effectively, if at all. Therefore, the entire task force relies upon a minority of personnel who can communicate in both languages. This was especially evident in designing of leaflets and preparation of radio/television broadcasts. Such observations highlight how PSYOP forces remained ill-prepared for contingencies requiring face-to-face operations, as in a stabilization and reconstruction role. Further, more than a half-century of partition has exacerbated the initial bifurcation of the once homogenous Korean culture. PSYOP soldiers must not only understand ROK Korean language and culture, they must distinguish betweenand utilizeDPRK Korean language and culture, plus the regional dialects within each category. South Korean Anti-Americanism Anti-Americanism in South Korea has been on the rise, yet US PSYOP is doing little to combat this. There are no US PSYOP forces stationed on the Korean peninsula to provide active PSYOP support to the Combined Forces Command (CFC). However, South Korea still constitutes a psychological battlefield because North Korea vehemently focuses on nurturing antiAmerican sentiment in the ROK. This indicates North Korea is still engaged in a civil war against South Korea, and is currently attacking the alliances of its rival. While there are many reasons for the rise of anti-US sentiments, some of the most prominent are: US military bases on Korean soil, the Korean medias negative image of the United States, changing demographics, Korean nationalism, and skepticism toward US policies. But the demographics have shifted as Korean War generation South Koreans, who most strongly support close ties with the United States, are waning. Further, current trends

suggest it is very possible South Koreas resentment toward the United States will become more aggravated in coming years. Countering such trends requires forces that are trained and capable of influencing public opinion in favor of the United States.

Training Shortfalls
Despite the worldwide reduction in conventional interstate wars, and rise of civil wars in the 1990s, US PSYOP retains a Cold War mentality in how it trains for and executes operations. In order to keep pace with the rapid changes in mainstream media, US forces habitually place a large degree of emphasis on the technological aspects of PSYOP product production, distribution, and dissemination. However, regardless of the dissemination mode, the most important aspect of conducting psychological operations is message content. Hastily deployed Korean War psychological warfare soldiers determined their inadequate training was one of the primary disadvantages to effective operations. While such shortcomings were known early on, the cyclic PSYWAR syndrome hindered subsequent efforts to modernize and improve PSYOP forces. When the US again acknowledged the importance of psychological operations, and funding subsequently increased, we took great strides to improve technological aspects of both print and broadcast capabilities. These primarily focused on long-range dissemination methods, via broadcast or leaflet. While face-to-face operations via loudspeakers may have been adequate in the Cold War era, this is really only one-way communication. However, governments threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face communications, as a first line of internal defense. Thus, the PSYOP role in US-led stabilization and reconstruction operations provides the impetus for training soldiers to more effectively foster interpersonal, face-toface, two-way communications. However, as a result of the predominant focus on technological innovations and acquisitions, current

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Winter 2007

psychological operations forces are not equipped with the requisite training for post-conflict environments. Adequate training in culture, language, and region still falls by the wayside under the opinion that familiarity is all that is needed for effective psychological operations. A cookie-cutter approach continues to dominate the PSYOP field: leaflets or broadcasts deemed effective during prior conflicts are dusted off, translated, and disseminated to a new target audience. Therefore, only limited linguistic, cultural, or regional training appears necessary. In the 1980s, the Army separated both its psychological operations and civil affairs forces from the foreign area officer (FAO) military occupational specialty. The change is disturbing because it separated psychological operations from the specialty that had provided its intellectual lifeblood. The core of the area expertise (knowledge of foreign cultures) and the analytic capability of psychological operations originally fell within the FAO specialty. Contemporary PSYOP training is disjointed and largely ineffectual for future of US operations. We must utilize less overt methods of message dissemination than broadcasting a prerecorded compact disc over a loudspeaker. Additionally, PSYOP soldiers should not be clearly identifiable as PSYOP soldiers. Their actions at the local level should be linked to persuasion principles which induce indigenous people to act in a desirable manner. Again, this requires proper training. Therefore, by building expertise in the appropriate areas of study, and revising doctrine and techniques to support stabilization and reconstruction operations, psychological operations forces will be able to build trust in communities. In turn, they will utilize and map networks to identify appropriate target audiences and themes, and help improve human intelligence for the supported commander. Such preparatory measures are essential to preparing for the challenges posed by Korean reunification. Observers of US PSYOP generally agree that enlisted specialists conduct psychological operations. In other

words, they craft the messages for read connected prose. Current standards specified target audiences. Obviously, require one to be capable of reading training these soldiers is paramount very simple connected written material. to ensuring effective and persuasive Previous graduation evaluation criteria, communications. However, current and indeed Department of the Army training is inadequate for crafting long- language tracking, only focused on these range dissemination messages (leaflet, listening and reading skills. However, radio/television broadcast), let alone for DOD recently expanded these parameters face-to-face operations in a post-conflict to include an emphasis on speaking skills, environment. Immediately following mostly due to the widely acknowledged basic training, PSYOP soldiers attend a lack of US language capabilities in the twelve week 37F Advanced Individual post-9/11 era. We are also paying for our Training (AIT) at Fort Bragg, North decades of neglectinside and outside Carolina. The course provides doctrine, our governmentof foreign languages including concepts, tactics, techniques, and area studies. Therefore, the Army procedures organization, equipment, now requires current BMLC graduates capabilities, and employment across the to reach a level in which they are unable range of military operations. Despite the to produce continuous discourse, except doctrinal assertion that PSYOP soldiers with rehearsed material. Meanwhile, bring an in-depth knowledge of the culture, religion, values and mind set of TAs within a country or region of operations, they receive no specific training in these areas whatsoever. This is a severe shortcoming, because culture is at once the most basic, and broadest environmental ROK-US media event. (Defense Link) determinant of individual behavior. tactical PSYOP units remain doctrinally Following the 37F AIT Course, charged with conducting face-to-face soldiers attend a Basic Military Language communications, despite fact that this Course (BMLC). However, this provides is largely one-way communication little more than language familiarity. via loudspeakers, all due to a lack of While the current BMLC language language expertise. proficiency goals for its graduates While PSYOP units possess increased in 2004, the standards are other enlisted members who are more still below those needed post-conflict. proficient in language capabilities, these Under the old standards, soldiers were soldiers are largely used for translating, to achieve listening skill levels in which and are not trained in psychological they comprehended with reasonable operations. Such Human Intelligence accuracy, though only when this listening Collectors are organized under the involved short memorized utterances or Armys military intelligence branch. formulae. Under revised standards the These soldiers attend language training course requires a slightly higher level, in at the Defense Language Institute which they can understand very simple (DLI) in Monterey, California, where face-to-face conversations in a standard they are held to higher standards than dialect. Similarly, pre-2004 reading those required of the Basic Military level standards left graduates unable to Language Course. Soldiers assigned 1

to military occupational specialty 97E are considered language-dependent for mission execution, and must retain the same Defense Language Institute minimum levels in language proficiency, or be forced into an alternative military occupational specialty. Conversely, the Army currently classifies Psychological Operations Specialists (37F) as a nonlanguage-dependent MOS which is not bound by the same qualification requirements. DOD does not require soldiers to retain languages obtained at government expense, leading to a drain on both budgets and resources. Thus, the doctrinal assertion that PSYOP soldiers provide regional, cultural, and linguistic expertise is largely a misnomer. Psychological operations officers receive training at a four week Psychological Operations Officer Course (POOC), a seventeen week Regional Studies Course (RSC), and the Basic Military Language Course. Therefore they do not share the enlisted soldiers focus on message crafting. Instead, they receive formal regional training to increase their knowledge of a particular geographic area. This is the primary disconnect of the current training system: officers receive the same cursory language course as the enlisted PSYOP specialists, and are likewise not required to maintain language capabilities. Some officers may attend Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) to study at the postgraduate level. They are often sent to the US Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) program, as are civil affairs officers. However, out of the myriad of sub-component areas of PSYOP expertise, SO/LIC is one of many. Psychological operations utilize area studies, language, marketing and advertising, media operations, plus persuasion and social influence. These relevant courses, the very underpinnings of effective PSYOP, are not in the current curriculum. Postgraduate work should 2

focus on areas that further the study and improvement of PSYOP, and not simply result in a masters degree in an unrelated field of study. Further, the PSYOP community does little to provide a professional outlet for academic discourse and institutional knowledge. While some PSYOP soldiers publish articles in the quarterly periodical Special Warfare, this is predominantly a Special Forces forum and frequently little more than a newsletter for the SF, civil affairs, and PSYOP branches. The 3rd Psychological Operations Battalion previously published and circulated The Disseminator throughout the PSYOP community; however, it fell by the wayside based on the burgeoning needs of supporting Operations Enduring

Between the two Koreas. (Defense Link) Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Notably, it was not a publication for professional discourse commensurate with Special Warfare or other military journals.

Recommendations For Future PSYOP Success

Following are recommendations for psychological operations success in future global US missions. These target three major areas: PSYOP training, PSYOP doctrine development, and PSYOP in the Republic of Korea. These support preparations for a reunification of the Korean peninsula, plus other postCold War era needs such as stabilization and reconstruction, all of which require increased face-to-face operations.

- DLI level-of-proficiency language training is a must to provide greater capabilities for all PSYOP soldiers (officer and enlisted). Previous Basic Military Language Course standards are too low to produce the requisite working knowledge needed for faceto-face operations. Recent changes include more stringent requirements, but standards are still below those necessary for operating in post-conflict environmentsespecially when the rest of the military expects these soldiers to be experts in language and culture. Current standards do not facilitate critical expertise to supported units, necessitated by interactions among an indigenous populace, especially in the face of an ongoing insurgency. At the very least, we must provide psychological operations soldiers a level of language capability commensurate with DLI graduates. This will place them at the limited working proficiency level, allowing them to provide supported commanders far better insights in difficult environments. - Maintenance of DLI language standards must be a MOSQ requirement for all soldiers. Concomitant with the increased language capabilities, we need standards requiring trained soldiers to maintain their language capabilities. Current PSYOP military occupational specialty requirements do not mandate language upkeep, which should be a necessity for maintaining any PSYOP MOS. To further enhance language viability and ensure a good return on language training investments, PSYOP soldiers should maintain the minimum standards of 2/2/2 to be considered fully MOS qualified. This will also require commanders allow their soldiers appropriate time for mandatory language maintenance training, better sustaining force-wide language readiness. - Officers Army-wide possess skills vital to PSYOP, especially in critical languages; they should be actively recruited utilizing bonuses and other incentives. In 2004, the Department of the Army Officer Record Brief began Winter 2007

tracking officer language proficiency including speaking skills. The PSYOP branch should rigorously use this tool to recruit officers possessing critical language capabilities, especially more difficult ones such as Mandarin Chinese, Korean, and Arabic. Proper bonuses or incentives could bring these officers into the PSYOP field, bolstering the population of qualified personnel, while reducing language training time and cost. - Psychological operations enlisted soldiers must receive regional and cultural training. It is imperative the primary executors of psychological operations understand their target regions. The current training model actually inhibits regional expertise and cultural familiarity by excluding most of the soldiers involved in crafting psychological operations messages and conducting face-to-face operations. This facet of PSYOP remains an historically unaddressed issue, dating back to the Korean War era. Inclusion of proper regional training is crucial to ensuring PSYOP viability in forthcoming global missions. - Psychological operations officers should pursue masters degrees in PSYOPs underpinning disciplines such as regional studies, persuasion and social influence, and marketing. We cannot underestimate the US PSYOP communitys current ability to dispatch officers to various civilian institutions to receive relevant degrees. However, current officers typically attend the US Naval Postgraduate School under the auspices of the Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict program. Meanwhile, Army officers pursuing NPS regional studies degrees are typically studying to be foreign area officersthe lifeblood from which PSYOP was removed two decades ago. Regional studies degrees are far more relevant to psychological operations in general. The Naval Postgraduate School has also recently developed a degree focused on stabilization and reconstruction operations, which is becoming more and more relevant to US operations. Furthermore, degrees in marketing, persuasion and social influence will help

build PSYOP institutional knowledge. While the new Army Intermediate Level Education (ILE) program encourages PSYOP attendance at NPS, areas of academic pursuit must be PSYOPvital, and not merely completion of a degree. - To encourage discourse, the 4th POG should publish and disseminate its own professional military PSYOP journal, and invite reserve component groups and other services to contribute. During the current Global War on Terror and Army transformation processes, it is essential we engage professional minds throughout the PSYOP community. Circulated electronically at all levels, such a journal would integrate knowledge from all PSYOP forces (including joint players) and encourage professional exchange among both active and reserve components. Further, professional publishing would promote the furtherance of PSYOP studies, and initiate new and improved training, doctrine, procurement, equipment, and mission execution practices.

PSYOP Doctrine
Just as current US military doctrine does not adequately address operations in failing, failed, or post-conflict states, neither does PSYOP doctrine address comprehensive support to such operations. a. Supporting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations The military should scrutinize all principles that underpin stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, to find doctrinal advancements for PSYOP support. With our increasing focus on stabilization and reconstruction as a strategy in the Global War on Terror, it is especially important for PSYOP to devise methodical means to support these areas. b. Establishing Psychological Operations Networks Trained PSYOP personnel should establish Psychological Operations Networks (PONs) as a means of persuading target audiences at a grassroots level. Such networks utilize interpersonal interactions to build of

social capital, through two-way faceto-face communications in the target language while allowing the mapping of the varied nodes in the network. Delivered messages become more adaptive and persuasive in pursuing PSYOP objectives. This enables improved persuasiveness in supporting all US objectives, while gathering critical HUMINT, identifying insurgents or potential insurgents, facilitating stabilization and reconstruction, and ultimately winning more hearts and minds than previously possible. c. Deployment of Trained PSYOP Personnel to South Korea It is imperative we expedite training and deployment of a PSYOP detachment to the Korean peninsula. Current US geo-strategic positioning strategy is clearing withdrawing troops from bases in South Korea. Conversely, this is when we should be deploying psychological operations forces to the peninsula. This unit should be fully trained in the Korean language and culture, with special care given to determining divergent points between these two distinctly separate nations. Current PSYOP soldiers deploy to the ROK multiple times a year for exercises, then redeploy back to the United States. Thus, the focus is merely on the exercise at hand, and associated rotational training issues, not on improving combined psychological operations. Further, these multiple transitions are far from seamless and often detract from improving relations or capabilities. A continuous presence on the Korean peninsula avoids the difficulties that are always associated with short deployments to and redeployments from the region. After more than fifty years of combined operations, PSYOP forces should have more substantial ties and capabilities within the Republic of Korea than we currently possess. Active Combined Psychological Operations We must immediately begin active combined psychological operations, focused on both ROK and DPRK target audiences. Permanently deployed PSYOP soldiers should study current marketing and media operations within 

both South and North Korea. These units should focus on counterpropaganda operations to dilute anti-American sentiment, and promote the ROK-US alliance. Such operations will further hone the PSYOP capability in the Republic of Korea by ensuring language immersion for current Korean speakers (one of the most difficult languages), and maintaining up to date knowledge of regional and cultural trends.

Conclusion
Given the relatively short history of US psychological operations forces as a continuous unit, and the cyclic post-war neglect that has hindered developmental progress, todays PSYOP forces may have finally broken with the PSYWAR syndrome. In light of effective changes, especially in the realm of individual training issues, contemporary PSYOP forces have a precise moment in history to affect such reforms. While technological advancements have increased global communication capabilities and simultaneously reduced cost, true PSYOP transformation emphasis needs to shift toward providing soldiers more comprehensive training. Technology merely serves as a means of dissemination, not as the origination of the message itself. The modern parallel to the Korean War era PSYWAR emphasis on quantity over quality is the current emphasis on technology over training. This is further underscored by the predominant tactical PSYOP role as loudspeaker operators, instead of face-to-face communicators with verbal abilities. The emphasis on disseminating previously recorded messages continues to perpetuate an ethos of limited warrior deejays instead of capable warrior diplomats. As the US Army Special Operations Command SOF Truths state: Humans are more important than hardware; Quality is better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; and competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Hence, the PSYOP community needs to analyze its current human capital investments and determine how to maximize their efficacy. Consequently, such increased 

investment also requires careful scrutiny of those areas of the world most critical for developing linguistic, cultural, and regional capabilities. The rising importance of stabilization and reconstruction operations also necessitates careful contemplation on the part of psychological operations planners. We must develop specific doctrinal support to the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction and their respective sub-tasks, to best enhance PSYOP capabilities and efficacy under such scenarios. Due to the growing importance of such operations, such research should not merely be placed on hold until we complete doctrinal revisions. The lens of Korean reunification illuminates the relevance of initiating substantive changes in the aforementioned critical areas. The prospect of conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations on the Korean peninsula represents a multitude of difficulties for US forces, especially interactions with both the North Koreans and South Koreans. While we must ready PSYOP forces for general stabilization missions, the severity of the protracted Cold War partition makes the Korean case a unique challenge. Generations of North Koreans have now been raised completely from birth in the ubiquity of Kimism. Further, prolonged partition of the Korean peninsula has fostered two separate and distinguishable cultures, with notable linguistic differences. PSYOP forces must understand and effectively utilize such peculiarities if we want to be truly persuasive.

While the people of South Korea have not been inculcated with antiAmerican ideology commensurate with North Korea, external DPRK propaganda is at least partially accountable for rising anti-US sentiments. Such opposition further heightens the difficulties the US would face during Korean reunification. In light of such trends, current US PSYOP forces are doing little to counter such anti-American perceptions. Continued inaction further reduces future PSYOP prospects for success under a stabilization and reconstruction role, and threatens to undermine the ROK-US alliance. It is imperative for the US to forward position forces, properly trained in Korean language and culture, to conduct active perception operations. In transforming to best support US national interests, the PSYOP community should carefully research all vital areas, to avoid cookie-cutter approaches and provide continuous improvements to the psychological operations profession. As the United States becomes more proactive in preserving its national security through stabilizing other statessometimes through the active use of our military forcesour PSYOP community must always stand ready. Please see the bibliography/references for this article on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/ Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm Click on theupdates link under the Winter 2007 issue

Winter 2007

Teenagers as a Model for Terrorist Development of Situational Awareness

By Matthew J. Sheffer Editorial Abstract: Mr. Sheffer observes how Allied commanders decision making is slowed by application of strategic situational awareness concepts in tactical environments. He argues that modern teenagers present an agile, useful model of how insurgents communicate on the battlefield, and recommends military commanders adopt a similar situational awareness approach. What do terrorists, teenagers, and the individual soldier have in common? The need for agile communications in their tactical operations.

Awareness Through Agility:

1.0 Introduction
Effective situational awareness is essential to battlefield management. Terrorists, teenagers, and the individual soldier all require effective situational awareness to conduct operations. Terrorist situational awareness evolves through the use of covert communications. Given a finite amount of existing communications methodologies, it should be possible to discover how terrorists communicate without knowing much about the content or the sender-recipient pair. Using the teenage communications paradigm as a model, it is possible to discover the communications methodologies being employed by terrorists. Understanding how terrorists exchange information will offer coalition forces the ability to respond more effectively, by developing strategic objectives that improve the likelihood that tactical situational awareness results in improved anti-terrorism defences. Effective actions demand coalition forces gain situational awareness faster than terrorist elements.

he agility exercised by teenagers in gathering situational awareness is a model for how insurgent terrorists communicate on the battlefield. Tactical decision making by coalition commanders is slowed because they apply strategic situational awareness concepts within tactical environments. Currently, the military develops tactical situational awareness, then transfers this to the strategic common operational picture. Alternatively, the teenage communications model provides an evolutionary concept of operations, where allied forces can develop a highly flexible tactical situational awareness in urban environments by leveraging commercial technologies and infrastructure. The forced technical interoperability between tactical and strategic operations centers hinders agility at the tactical level. We must change the strategic/tactical model in our defense against terrorism, to keep pace with the enemys rapid planning-andattack cycle. By leveraging the teenage modelto improve the flexibility and speed at which we provide information to the urban warfare environmentwe must change the Cold War communication paradigm. This shift will allow for more rapid development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which are critical in the urban warfare environment. Teenagers use situational awareness to make decisions regarding their interpersonal relationships in much

Technology-enabled teen. (Montclair State University) the same way military and civilian leader make decisions. By using commercially available, collaborated, and highly resilient communications capabilities, both teenagers and terrorist insurgents develop situational awareness in an unconstrained manner. This article presents possible solutions to merging agility with necessary strategic/tactical secure infrastructure, to gain urban warfighting superiority. Defeating terrorist insurgents requires allied commanders to develop situational awareness with the same efficiency and agility as teenagersand the terrorists themselves.

2.0 The Teenage Communications Paradigm

Teenagers are defined as youth between the ages of 13 and 19 (inclusive). However, in American culture we can place this label on people as old as 21 or 22. Teenagers form unique social groupings that are often held together by both paranoia and friendship. Paranoia causes a teenager to gather a consistent stream of situational awareness regarding members of their clique, so that they may discern these members motives, and react accordingly. Such

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intelligence, often both actual associations are made based and imagined, causes teenagers on school affiliation; allowing to constantly readjust their for only cursory information TTP. For teenagers, situational such as name, school awareness shapes the day-toaffiliation, and a small userday structure of their social posted pictureto be collected. group. Facebooks tiered security While they may be limits covert collection, unaware, teenagers perform however once a relationship every action in the intelligence has been defined, users can cycle1 in order to produce their see all posted information required picture. The teenage regarding one another. With communications paradigm a sense that their content is is primarily concerned with more protected, Facebook the collection aspect of the users often post more detailed A teenaged intelligence network. (Defense Link) intelligence cycle. In order to information and more unedited collect situational awareness, pictures than what might be teenagers use two technological tools seen on MySpace. computers and cell phonesas well as (AOL Instant Messenger), Microsoft 2.1.2 Blogging human intelligence gathered through (MSN Messenger), and Yahoo! (Yahoo! daily interactions with those around Messenger)allows for real-time Blogging has revolutionized the way them. communications in either a one-to-one or we disseminate information. Teenagers, It is also important to realize one-to-many mode over the Internet.2 once seemingly averse to writing, have that teenagers primarily distribute begun to author online journals in the 2.1.1 Web-Based Social information horizontally. By horizontally form of blogs. Such authoring allows Networking disseminating situational awareness, teenagers to express themselves and, a teenager is able to have a greater Web-based social networking in some cases, gain limited notoriety. perception of their surroundings without allows for definition of groups online, Blogs differ from Web-based social having to request information from by connecting people using a defined networking sites as the information is higher headquarters. Unlike the relationship. Two of the most popular more personal, and the publications military, there is very little resistance social networking sites are Myspace. author may be anonymous to all but a to the flow of information between com and Facebook.com. MySpace small social group. independent elements, as vertical is currently the worlds fifth most In both Web-based social networking information distribution is essentially popular English language Internet site.3 and blogging, situational awareness is non-existent. MySpace allows teenagers, and anyone obtained from user-posted information else with Internet connectivity, to post and visitor comments. In Web-based 2.1 Computer Based pictures and textual information for social networking increased intelligence Situational Awareness free. By adding other MySpace users can be collected by following a trail of C o m p u t e r s h a v e b e c o m e a n to ones list of friends, one can define comments between users; much like important resource in teenaged situational relationships, collect information and an e-mail trail results from multiple awareness development. So called Social disseminate it appropriately. With messages sent back-and-forth among a Networking sites such as MySpace and MySpace it is possible to conduct group. Facebook have permanently changed the covert collection activities on any 2.1. Instant Messaging way teenage cliques are organized and member, without needing an account managed. Social networking over the or validating an existing relationship. Instant messaging allows for short, Internet allows for effective information This allows teenagers to gain situational real-time messages to be sent between gathering and denial-and-deception awareness without disclosing sources users over the Internet. Numerous operations. Web logs, or blogs, have also and methods. applications exist to exploit this become an integral part of information A more structured Web-based capability; some of which include AOL dissemination and collection. Internet social network is Facebook. Only Instant Messenger (AOL IM), MSN sites such as Blogger, LiveJournal, and teenagers with validated credentials Messenger, and Yahoo! Messenger. Blogspot leverage advertising revenue (a college e-mail address or invitation The intelligence benefits of instant to provide free Internet accessible from a previously authenticated high messaging are twofold. First, instant space. Instant messagingprovided school student) can access Facebook messaging allows for rapid, informal by companies such as America Online content. Within Facebook, preliminary communications in order to disseminate

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or collect targeted information. Secondly, instant messaging services often allow users to post information in a profile that any user can read. Profiles are frequently updated and will often include information regarding the users location. Intelligence collection against a number of targets makes it possible to build relationship structures, and develop situational awareness based on critical information requirements. 2.2 Cell Phone Based SA Teenagers use three applications of cell phone technology to collect intelligence: text messaging, picture messaging, and voice communications. Text messaging allows teenagers the same rapid, informal communications as instant messaging, but without the ability to post static profiles that are common in instant messaging. This means cell phones are used to gather targeted intelligence by asking carefully crafted questions, or collecting intelligence via information disseminated by reliable sources. Picture messaging allows users to send an image taken from a normally low resolution camera located on the phone, to anyone with a cell phone or email address capable of receiving them. Traditional voice communications are a primary collaboration means between teenagers, however this method is less agile and more time consuming than the previous two. 2.2.1 Text and Picture Messaging Teenage use of text messaging is increasing on a daily basis. Text messaging provides them an informal way to send information such that no direct interaction with the recipient is required. Coordination of event information, brief single-topic discussions, and information verification are just some of the potential uses of text messaging among teenagers. This method changes the way that information is disseminated by reducing the energy and time expended in the exchange. As the telephone revolutionized information exchanges that once took days or weeks via the postal mail, text messaging is

now poised to further reduce timeto-delivery. Texting is also a discreet form of communications, allowing for conversations in constrained environments where cell phone-based voice communications are prohibited. Teenagers use picture messaging in the same way military organizations use imagery intelligence. Through photo interpretation, teenagers can gain situational awareness as well as provide details about the subjects location and acquaintances. Alternatively, one can also glean information about the person taking the photo. In this way a picture can often simultaneously tell a teenager who is participating in an activity, where and when that activity is taking place, and what ancillary activities are occurring. 2.2.2 Voice Communications Teenagers love to talk on the phone. This traditional method of communications is still a primary means of information gathering. In a recent Pew Internet and American Life Project survey, 63% of teenagers surveyed reported phone-based voice communication as their primary means of collaboration with friends.4 Voice communications over cell phones allows situational awareness gains based on more perceptual signals, such as voice inflection. Voice communications also allow dialogue to direct situational awareness. With the understanding that you dont know what you dont know, it is often impossible to ask every question which might provide situational awareness. Dialogue between teenagers allows situational awareness development without being constrained by limited prior knowledge. 2. Information Dissemination In order to be collected, information must first be disseminated. Dissemination between teenagers can be either unintended or offensive in nature. Both types of propagation can be accomplished using any of the means mentioned. This is an example of unintended intelligence dissemination among teenagers:

John, Walt, Roger, and Paige are friends and members of a social group. John wants to invite his friends to attend a concert that evening. John decides to send each friend an instant message via AOL Instant Messenger (AOL IM) in lieu of a formal invitation or phone call. An AOL IM user can exist in three states: active, inactive, and away. If a user is away he must leave a message that will display when another user sends a message. Away messages often describe where and with whom the user currently is (although this is not a formal requirement), and the length of time the user has been away. When John sends a message to Walt, Roger, and Paige he finds all three are away. The away messages returned to John read: Walt: Im at the Bright Star Bowling Alley. [34 minutes] Roger: Out of the house [34 minutes] Paige: Spending time with Roger and Walt [34 minutes] Through these away messages John is able to deduce that his friends decided to go bowling without him. This intelligence increases Johns situational awareness and aids in his future decision making. The use of offensive information is normally in the form of rumors and speculation. Such information can be posted to Web-based social networking sites, blogs, or instant messaging profiles; pictures that are taken out of context can be sent via cell phone picture messaging. Denial and deception campaigns should also be considered offensive information dissemination.

.0 The Teenage-Terrorist Model

Describing the terrorist communications paradigm would be to repeat the teenage communications paradigm described above, with only minor changes. Terrorists have a somewhat greater need to exercise operational security (OPSEC), as coalition forces

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actively target their communications. This OPSEC requirement forces terrorists to employ TTPs which hide both actual communications, and individual components of their collaborative environment. Through open source analysis of these discovered communications, we can infer an analogous relationship between communications paradigms exercised by both teenagers and terrorists. While terrorists may not use Facebook or MySpace, they have demonstrated use of the Internet for mission planning and information dissemination in the past.5 Terrorists have also demonstrated a keen understanding of cell phone technology, making mobiles useful in both mission planning and weapons triggering.6 Terrorists use technology in ways quite similar to teenagers. While their collaborate environments may look different from those used by teenagers, terrorists underlying capabilities are nearly identical. .1 Internet Based Communications Te r r o r i s t s n e e d c o v e r t communications between geographically disparate cells to carry out situational awareness and mission planning. The anonymity of the Internet seems to offer the widest range of services while providing the greatest OPSEC opportunities. Each Internet-based communications technology used by teenagers has been employed by terrorist elements. Continued reliance on technology as a force multiplier and agility enabler will decrease the length of the terrorist planning-andattack cycle, and increase the ability for geographically disparate participants to engage in terrorist activities. While not as openly commercial as those services used by teenagers, terrorist Internet usage is just as sophisticated. The Internet has improved terrorist groups ability to gather and distribute critical information for the production of situational awareness.

.1.1 Web-Based Social Networking Younis Tsouli, also known as Irhabi 007, was skilled in the art of Internet use to further the goals of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Using a myriad of underground websites and password protected chat rooms, Irhabi 007 linked numerous geographically disparate terrorist entitiesand their potential recruitsvia the World Wide Web. Though captured in November 2005, he had already provided all of the necessary recruiting and social networking resources required for continued terrorist use of Internet.7 According to TrackingTheThreat. com, which provides link analysis between suspected terrorists, many extremists can be linked even though they are located in geographically separate areas.8 From these links, we can infer that Web-based social networking plays a part in the organization of terrorist structures. For example, Orkut, a Web-based social networking site affiliated with Google, is gaining popularity in the Middle East. Orkuts popularity is most evident when searching through its social communities based on support for specific terrorists or terrorist networks.9 These communities are formed much like communities on Facebook or MySpace except that rather than support for a university or sports team, the relationships are built on support for terrorism. If this trend continues to grow, extremist communities could easily create substantial recruiting and sympathizer lists. .1.2 Blogging While terrorists have not demonstrated pervasive use of blog technology, a similar capability exists in message forums which are a well documented form of terrorist collaboration. Message forums allow users to post messages and have other users respond. These messages boards are often displayed in a hierarchy based on threads. A new thread is similar to a post on a blog, while the replies to a

thread are almost identical to comments left on blogs. Terrorist message forums, many started by Irhabi 007, provide a continuing collaborative capability, where situational awareness can be disseminated rapidly between geographically disparate users. Extremists have been known to use message forums to collaborate on tactics and weapons; including weapons of mass destruction.10 .1. Instant Messaging Instant messaging allows terrorists to rapidly initiate collaborative sessions from almost any connected device. Instant messaging services offer a flexible framework for communications in a oneto-one or one-to-many collaborative environment. Due to the myriad of instant messaging service providers, it is conceivable that anonymity would be increased by service hopping, or rapidly developing new aliases (screen names). Encryption technology also offers a measure of privacy that would be required for terrorist communications.11 Given the technologys widespread availability, one should always expect terrorists have the potential to use instant messaging in planning and attack coordination. .2 Cell Phone Based Communications Cell (or mobile) phones provide an invaluable communications tool for terrorist organizations. The prevalent use of cell phones is indicated by their discovery as both a situational awareness tool and a weapons trigger. The use of communications equipment in effects based operations has highlighted the insecurity of cell phone communications among Coalition enemies. We must also understood that terrorists have received warnings regarding cell phone usage for critical operations. However this technology is so pervasive throughout society, it would be hard to operate completely without one. Terrorists must be considered a subset of any population in which they reside. As cell phones are a common means of communication in much of the world, we must infer the

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of 25, compared with just 15% of the US civilian labor force.16 Exploiting our military youths pre-existing knowledge would be extremely valuable in tactical anti-terrorism environments. .1 Coalition Strategic Objective: Mitigate Mitigating the speed at which terrorists gain situational awareness requires the coalition collect and disseminate situational awareness at similar speeds. Current military strategy is to coalesce situational awareness at the strategic level, requiring vertical information dissemination. The need to protect sources and methods requires some of the most important information to remain bogged down in a bureaucracy of classification. Coalition forces conduct tactical level counter-terrorist operations on a daily basis. Due to the vertical distribution of information, tactical users often have far less situational awareness on their target than their strategic commanders. Only when we distribute information both horizontally and vertically will the tactical soldier be able to operate with critical situational awareness in-hand. .2 Coalition Strategic Objective: Respond Rather than always developing technology for soldiers, the coalition should use tools that soldiers already know. Responding to the terrorists technology requires similarly userintuitive tools be employed at the tactical level. Coalition soldiers use, or have used, situational awareness tools throughout their young adult lives. Current military strategy is to develop technological tools because young soldiers understand technology. However, using technological tools that young soldiers already understand could be of staggering consequence. For instance, in conjunction with CSO Mitigate, what if coalition forces developed a Terrorist Facebook that looks and feels like todays Facebook tool used by teenagers? Armed with the same currently available toolssuch as social network linking,

The long reach of the mobile phone. (Defense Link) percentage of terrorists using them is roughly equivalent to the cell phoneusing population of a given region. .2.1 Text and Picture Messaging Text messaging is prevalent in areas where terrorists operate, however information on the use of picture messaging is generally unavailable. Terrorist use of text messaging generally seems to occur on throw away cell phonescell phones either purchased using false names or used for only a short period of time.12 Just as teenagers use text messaging to organize events, terrorists in Australia are charged with planning meetings using cell phone text messaging.13 The ability to rapidly disseminate information in a one-to-many manner is valuable to both terrorists and teenagers. In Iraq, the local population actively uses text messaging to report crimes to the Iraqi Police Service.14 Given this technology is being actively used to expose terrorism, it is also likely being used to carry out terrorist acts. .2.2 Voice Communications Terrorist use of wireless voice communications technology in support of situational awareness is well documented. The US National Security Agency (NSA) had Osama Bin Ladens satellite phone under surveillance, prior to the exposure of that fact. As early as 2003, security services were unraveling terrorist networks based on the phone numbers of associates stored in captured terrorist cell phones.15 The prevalence of cell phones and their network infrastructure has only increased. While this network is under continued surveillance, it remains of importance in situational awareness gathering and dissemination.

.0 Coalition Strategic Objectives

Correlation of the teenage communications paradigm with that of terrorists allows for development of two coalition strategic objectives (CSOs). First, mitigate the speed at which terrorists gain situational awareness by developing the same agility within coalition forces. Second, respond to the terrorist use of efficient, cost effective technology by fielding similar systems within the coalition structure. Effective CSO management will certainly result in more effective operations. Current statistics show our tactical forces are young. Youth allows a coalition military to leverage their knowledge of situational awareness toolssuch as Facebook, MySpace, blogs, and instant messagingto mitigate agile terrorist communications methodologies. According to the Population Reference Bureau, approximately 42% of Army and Navy personnel are below the age

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biographical display, multiple image storagethis Terrorist Facebook would give soldiers the situational awareness needed to find terrorists in a given area of operation.

.0 Conclusion
The teenage communications paradigm provides a model for understanding how terrorists gain situational awareness. To defeat a terrorist communications infrastructure based on tools used by teenagers, coalition military forces must use similarly agile technologies. One way to improve tactical situational awareness is to use technologies that soldiersmostly teenagers themselvesalready use and understand. Improving the agility and efficiency of coalition military situational awareness development, especially in tactical environments, will create a situation in which soldiers can respond as quickly as terrorists. It is nearly impossible to defeat an enemy who is already effectively using commercial, publicly available, Internetbased technology to gain situational awareness. However, by using similar technologies to improve horizontal information flow, it is possible for tactical forces to mitigate terrorists operating speeds. Notes Central Intelligence Agency, The Intelligence Cycle, [http://www.cia. gov/cia/ciakids/who_we_are/cycle. shtml], April 2006. 2 Duffy, Michael, A Dads Encounter w i t h t h e Vo r t e x o f F a c e b o o k , [http://www.time.com/time/archive/ preview/0,10987,1174704,00.html], March 27, 2006. 3 Alexa Internet, Top English Language Sites, [http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/ top_sites?ts_mode=lang&lang=en], April 2006. 4 Lenhart, Amanda et. al., Teens a n d Te c h n o l o g y, [ h t t p : / / w w w. pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Teens_Tech_ July2005web.pdf], 27 July 2005 5 Terrorists Web Chatter Shows Concern About Internet Privacy, The Washington Post, 13 April 2006, A14.
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Appelbaum, Jacob, IED in Iraq, [http://ioerror.livejournal.com/177534. html], April 2006. 7 Terrorist 007, Exposed, The Washington Post, 26 March 2006, B01. 8 Tracking The Threat, [trackingthethreat. com], April 2006. 9 Hunt, Kasie, Osama Bin Laden Fan Clubs Build Online Communities, [ h t t p : / / w w w. u s a t o d a y. c o m / t e c h / news/2006-03-08-orkut-al-qaeda_ x.htm], 08 March 2006. 10 SITE Institute, Message Posted To Jihadist Message Board provides Instruction Booklet for Home-Made Chemical Weapon, [http://siteinstitute. org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications122 04&Category=publications&Subcategor y=0], March 2004. 11 JonyTech, Encrypted Messenger, [http://www.johnytech.com/home.asp], April 2006. 12 Harnden, Toby et. al., UK Terrorists Got Cash From Saudi Arabia Before 7/7, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/07/nsaud07.
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xml], 08 July 2005. 13 The Sydney Morning Herald, The Case Against the Sydney Accused, [ h t t p : / / w w w. s m h . c o m . a u / n e w s / national/case-against-the-sydneyaccused/2005/11/14/1131951103465. html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1], 15 November 2005. 14 Knickmeyer, Ellen, Text Messaging Lets Iraqis Tip Authorities to Attacks From a Safe Distance, [http:// www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article. cgi?f=/news/archive/2005/01/21/ international1353EST0546.DTL], 21 January 2005. 15 Isikoff, Michael et. al., Like Clockwork, [http://www.msnbc.msn. com/id/5821599/site/newsweek/ ], 25 August 2004. 16 Segal, David et. al., Americas Military Population, [http://www.prb. org/Template.cfm?Section=Population_ Bulletin1&template=/ ContentManagement/ContentDisplay. cfm&ContentID=12460], December 2004.

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Information Operations: The Challenges of Second Generation Insurgencies

By Dr. David Sloggett Editorial Abstract: In this first in a series, the author explores the role of IO when faced by second generation insurgencies capable of mounting their own sophisticated information operations. Such groups target specific audiences with articulate, simple and ideologically grounded messages aimed at specific vulnerable groups, against a backdrop of a pervasive global media. He concludes we have to develop a strategic-through-tactical IO approach that seeks to complement and reinforce tactical arena operations, highlighting inconsistencies in insurgent leaders messages.

Backdrop

ecent media coverage suggests there is a growing body of analysis and commentary indicating the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fuelled the Global War of Terror (GWOT). They have, it is suggested, provided a magnet for disenchanted people from the Muslim world, drawing them into these theatres to undertake Jihad 1 in the cause of building a reinvigorated [and hence more collective] world-wide Muslim community or Umma. These perspectives need to been seen against the backdrop of a globalized world, where traditional state boundaries and allegiances have broken down where the 1.2 billion Muslims are increasingly viewed as a trans-national communityfrom a media perspective if nothing else. It is possible to argue to some extent the Umma has been re-created, if we view it as an audience which might be receptive to certain messages. Albeit, it does not represent a single governed state with adherence to Sharia Law. In addressing ourselves to the challenges of conducting information operations against this backdrop, we must take into account both this audience and our approach to message delivery, with greater care than has hitherto been the case. The West must orchestrate tactical level measures from an overall strategically derived and maintained campaign. In contrast to the initial proposition in this article, it is also true to say there are those whose assessment differs they argue that the levels of violence we see in these theatres would be happening

Greater challenges lie just ahead. (Defense Link) anyway, but its nexus (if indeed one were to exist) would be elsewhere. After all, they point out, a number of those leading the Jihadist movement (the Global Salafist Jihad GSJ) have been waging varying forms of warfare and terrorism well before September 11th, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a view merits further analysis. To determine what strategy the West should adopt to defeat Al-Qaeda, we must first look at Al-Qaedas strategy against the US and its Allies. It is possible do this by listening to what they say, viewing the US through their eyes, and by watching what they do. Listening to what Al-Qaeda say draws three lessons from Osama bin Ladens supposed declaration, captured in the World Islamic Front Statement of February 1998.2

The first concerns the Arab/Israeli problem: Al-Qaeda (AQ) is gaining leverage for the extremists from the perception that the US is failing to resolve the dispute. AQ claims the influence of the American Jewish people prevents a fog-free and unbiased view of the situation. Resolving this issue is a work of significance in its own right. Bin Ladens declaration reads that the aim is also to serve the Jews petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. Secondly, Al-Qaeda want US influence out of Iraq and they pronounce that, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 million despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific massacres. Thirdly and in more general terms, Al-Qaeda desires the removal of US influence (value projection 2) from Islam. Their assertion refers to the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam. Al-Qaeda would wish for a resolution of the Arab/Israeli dispute, US influence out of Iraq and, in general, out of Islam. It is also worth remembering the media capital made by GSJ and their colleagues in various related movements, with the withdrawal of US and French troops from the Lebanon after the car

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bomb attacks as being a major victory. This also has to be set against the backdrop of their victory over the Soviet Union, and the subsequent collapse of the USSR and its hegemony over its satellite states. GSJ desires a similar effect for NATO forces in Afghanistan. Recent Hezballah operations in Lebanon have similarly created a feeling that a major (if not the) military power in the region has been defeated by clever use of asymmetric approaches to warfare. In these positions we find the classic polarized elements that often provide the backdrop to an information operations campaign. Two juxtapositions at what are clearly very different ends of a spectrum of viewsoften quite distinct in messages they are passing to audiences and easily reinforced through unintended outcomes, such as the use of the media to portray the persecution of prisoners. But set against a world where the 24 by 7 global media is capable of reaching specific communities or groups and quickly unleashing violent responsesthe response to the recent speech in Germany by the Pope being one case in point and the other being the impact of the Danish [Prophet Mohammed] Cartoons. Moreover, we also have to recognize that media coverage, with its challenges of filling 24 by 7 airtime, is often repetitive and shallow in its analysis [often basing key points on sound bites]. Mass media are attempting to get often complex messages across to audiences that sometimes have lower levels of literacy, and who readily see certain events or actions as an attack upon their established way of life. The issue therefore is how do we position an information operations campaign, set against an increasingly globalized media and a sophisticated, technically aware, ideologically motivated and articulate adversary? How do we counter his clearly defined simple messages [able to be readily delivered as sound bites] that are aimed at a specific and vulnerable community?

A Question of an Information Operations Strategy

Today we are faced bywhat in this article we shall refer to as a secondgeneration asymmetric insurgencythat is backed up by a sophisticated GSJ and related group media operation, that reinforces a number of simple, and yet key messages. These include the need to do duty through Jihad5 to fight the aggression from the Zionists and Christians that are targeting Islam and setting this in the context of some periods of world historysuch as the time when the Mongols sacked Baghdad in the 13th century and ended the Abbasid [7471258] Caliphate. This world-wide enemy with no respect for international boundaries and

Sharing many messages. (Defense Link) norms, coupled with a highly developed and developing well articulated message sets, delivers to a sympathetic audience. The messages, being broadcast through the Internet and across traditional media outlets such as Al-Jazeera, reach empathetic eyes and ears. Indeed, what might be seen as an asymmetric fight in terms of military levels of capabilitywhere the West has more resourcesis reversed when it comes to media aspects. It is clearly the case that the GSJ movement and its various associated organizations are presently far more capable when it comes to media operations than we in the West.6 Their ability to conduct influence operations is far more agile and flexible than we have at the momenta

capability that we certainly had in the Cold War and during the Vietnam War.7 So is it right to suggest that terrorist activities would be in any way different had we not deployed forces into Iraq and Afghanistan? Some would argue that had we not removed the Taliban regime from Kabul, the GWOT might be a lot worse than it is todayas the training camps in Afghanistan would have continued to turn out recruits for the GSJ movement. This cadre of willing volunteers would have been motivated enoughthrough their training in the campsto have wished to carry out operations in support the drive towards creation of the new Caliphate. One of the key issues at the heart of this is where they might do that? Some would focus on the so-called near-enemystates in the Middle East that have been seen to be too close to the WestJordan and Egypt, for example. Others would advocate operations in the Westthe US and Europeplus world-wide attacks such as those carried out in Bali, and planned attacks in Singapore. The fact is that those who desire to recreate the global Muslim community are engaged in what can only be called the long-gamea desire to carry out terrorist operations on an on-going basis until they achieve the goal of a trans-national statefrom Spain to the Philippinesthat is governed on the basis of Sharia law. This is something they regard as being non-negotiable, placing us in the West in a difficult position of how to cope with their aims and long-term strategy, and the messages they deliver to their target audience. To provide a concerted response to this new environment, we simply have to try and understand the way in which our adversaries conduct their approach to information operations and their objectives. At the heart of GSJs strategy is the desire to mobilise the world-wide Muslim population to overthrow secular governments. Their objective is to build upon feelings of resentment that exist

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over issues such as Palestine, as well as (EBO)in other words not only using that warfare is all about influencing an what they perceivethanks to excellent kinetic effects to achieve orchestrated adversaries will to continue fighting. information operations orchestrated by military aimscoordinated across the They want to prolong their activities Al-Qaeda amongst othersto be the spectrum of instruments available to in the hope they can achieve their end Wests global crusade against Islam. Western governments. game and objectives. This ability to Our challenge is not to pour further It is clear that over recent operations influence their will is where psychology fuel upon this fire by carrying out actions a paradigm shift is occurring in the may offer some insights into coordinated that would ultimately be used against us way in which we develop our planning IO strategy development. This will be in the court of world opinion, and more of military operations. This article the subject of a follow-on companion specifically that part of it to which the 1.2 maintains that whilst there is a major article that will look at ways in which billion Muslims world-wide belong. The shift in our approach to military information operations can benefit from question is how do we create an clear, operations, there has not yet been an studies such as Carl Jungs work on orchestrated view of our objectives in associated development of the way in Psychological Types.9 the world that are compatible with the which we conduct IO alongside the Information Operations vast majority of the Muslim population. military activities. This is an area we We must reduce the numbers of people urgently need to address. One aspect and Second Generation who feel their only course of action is to of this may be to undertake activities Insurgency join the ranks of the Jihad, and undertake in the information operations space that worldwide terror attacks. Moreover, in carefully highlights inconsistencies in History shows that insurgencies are developing our approach we also need GSJ messageignoring as they do the classically fought using what are often to ask to what extent we are providing 14 centuries of Islamic Jurisprudence. called hearts and minds approaches. escape routes from this trajectory, We should also be agile enough to The United Kingdom military had from passive acknowledgement of exploit, perhaps at the tactical level, a number of successful campaigns, grievances, through radicalization carried out in Malaya and Oman, into violent responses, such as At this moment our adversaries are whereby delivering water supplies, suicide bombings. medicine, fuel and other materials Further articles in this series very good at operating in cognitive to communities supporting the will consider such issues, and maneuver space. insurgency helped our forces obtain highlight the inherent problems that intelligence and gain leverage. exist in a free society when getting the opportunities that arise to highlight Such efforts enabled careful operational messages across to those who may be divisions and schisms that appear in our planning, to have maximum effect upon prepared to hearbut not listen tothe adversaries views. adversaries supply lines and means of arguments. This article suggests that we On a recent visit to Iraq, I was support in the local area. This targets in the West are currently poor at getting struck by the emphasis being placed on the adversaries will by showing him our messages across, not only to our the successful harvesting of the winter that you have excellent knowledge of his own populationsa point that seems to tomato crop. This delivery was one of activities, and can chose to act at places of be backed up in opinion pollsas well a number of things that were uppermost your choosing. Further, this undermines as to populations overseas.8 It suggests in the local commanders mind. Clearly, support and ultimately reduces his will that we need to have greater connectivity successful delivery of the tomato crop was to prosecute the campaign. between the strategic messages we are vitally important to the local population. There is no doubt that local efforts to delivering, and the tactical operations Equally, maintaining southern Iraqs oil ensure a steady supply of basic utilities on the ground. Given the level of export supply, something to which a and food are essential elements of an Western military efforts directed at the great deal of military effort is dedicated overall tactical level campaign plan to Balkans, humanitarian operations like on land, air and sea, is a key element of win hearts and minds. Whether these the Tsunami relief work, and efforts developing the local economy. Such lower level successes are fully exploited after the earthquake in Pakistan, it successes rarely get media coverage. at the operational level is a question we is surprising we have apparently not Their voracious appetite for bad news, could usefully debate. Clear examples received acknowledgement for assisting already highlighted in this thesis as a of such linkage are not immediately primarily Muslim populations when they matter of minutes at very shallow depth, and readily apparentwhich from an have been vulnerable. far outweigh the air time allocated to information operations perspective is How can we address this? Today success stories. troubling. However it is also clear that there is a wide ranging debate within In understanding there are indeed at the strategic level we are failing to get military and political circles about the paradigm shifts in the way we conduct campaign aims and objectives of across move towards conducting what might warfare, such as the evolution of the to our intended audiences. But in an be referred to as effects based operations three-block war, we have to remember age of globalization, where access to the

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Internet and media is straightforward, a whole new challenge arises. This is what we shall refer to as second generation asymmetric warfare the first generation being conducted by UK forces in Malaya, Oman and, to some extent, Northern Ireland, from the 1950s through the 1980s.10 This first generation of asymmetric warfare was conducted far away from the media spotlight; little was known of the campaigns or their successes or failures. The role of UK Special Forces in places like Oman was not acknowledged publicly. Operations were conducted on the ground with specific local aims and objectives, in effect pushing back the boundaries of where the adversary felt able to operate. Coupled with excellent use of physical maneuver space, UK forces conducted these local effects in territory where the adversary would have felt relatively safeand thus sought to undermine the will to fight. The adversary could not predict where UK forces would operate next. A key aspect of the first generation asymmetric conflicts was the use of locally derived, often human intelligence (HUMINT)-based, information on the adversaries supply routes and organization. Intelligence collected on the ground, coupled with careful military planning and harnessing of limited forces, allowed forces to deliver the maximum effect against the will of the adversary. In this era, an enemy denied the oxygen of publicity that is available today, would lose ground in the maneuver spacethrough lack of supportand ultimately be defeated.

Fighting next generation insurgencies. (Defense Link) where a civil war was unleashed in Iraq as over zealous. It is fair to say that many people thought he had lost the plot, and was prepared to go for ever more desperate measures to try and incite violence in Iraq. It is also true that whilst at his peak of his activities he was by far the main attraction for those prepared to fund his organizations operationsdrawing funds away from Al-Qaedas main leadership. Some of his actions also produced a backlash. The bombing of the hotels in Jordan served to disassociate his activities from a large number of supportive people; he was seen to be going too far. This led to him lose the hearts and mindsthe cognitive maneuver spaceof many of his erstwhile supporterswhich led to his reported betrayal. It was his actions, and dedication to fostering a civil war by any means possible, that led to his demise. Successful military campaigns cannot rely on the other guy losing the plot and effectively shooting himself in the footalthough when it happens (possibly as an unintended consequence of his actions) it is nevertheless welcome. Further, we should recognize this as a decisive pointa point at which the adversaries center of gravity [in this regard in this article, his ideology] can be threatened. Ifand only ifwe have the agility within our force structures and approaches, can we take advantage of such an event. In the absence of such pieces of luck, it is important we bring a more effective approach to information operations, designed to help us achieve overall military effects, and resorting to kinetic measures when this is seen as the right and proportionate response. At the heart of this is the issue of addressing the need to provide a seamless view of our messages and to ensure they have the right impact, plus build a willingness to listen to our points of view. Above all, in creating this seamless view we need to build empathy for the messages we wish to be heard. This is extremely difficult when set against a backdrop of on-going military operations, with all their potential for casualties and associated media coverage at both the operational and tactical levels [noting impact in a region or country] and the strategic levelacross the global media. The speed with which public antipathy can be further enhanced, given the media coverage, has been illustrated several times in the last few years, such as the reactions to the Danish [Prophet Mohammed] cartoons which had been published earlier with little or no media coverage. It was only through the direct actions of those seeking to dominate the media agenda that the coverage became global, with its consequent loss of life. This failure of connectivity between the successes at the tactical level, and the ability to exploit those at the operational

Information Operations in the Cognitive Space

It is also true that people can lose the war in the cognitive spacesomething for which we aim in information operations. Let us take the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006. Evidence in the open media suggests that Zarqawi had lost his constituency, and was increasingly coming into conflict with the Al-Qaeda leadership. Many saw his efforts to create the circumstances

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and strategic levels, is ultimately one of the reasons why commentaries suggest the GWOT has worsened the overall security situation in the world, not acted to stabilize it. Until we resolve the need to establish a coordinated information operations campaign across all instruments of power (political, economic and military), and ensure this works top-to-bottom across the entire spectrum of our activities, we will not secure the progress we need in building a consensus to secure the end of terrorism. In attempting to develop a coordinated strategic-to-tactical approach to information operations, it is clear we must understand the way our adversaries are delivering their messages to what they have decided is their target audience. At this moment our adversaries are very good at operating in cognitive maneuver spacein contrast to physical maneuver space. This is not to suggest that those involved in the insurgency are not good at that physical dimensionfar from it. They are experts and using the ground around them to fight. It is just that what we are dealing with here is a second generation of insurgency. Recognizing the ground on which we have to fight this war for the hearts and minds of the world-wide Muslim population is vital. Developing sound and robust approaches to how we fight in the cognitive space is as important to us today as it was fifty years ago in Malaya. The issue is how do we do that against a second generation insurgency with all the implications of 24 by 7 media coverage? It is to this question, and the related topic of how we need to direct intelligence collection to take that fight to our adversaries, that we shall return in the second part of this article.

Martin and Bob Sharp, both of whom added much value to my thinking. Notes (2005) Cook, David Understanding Jihad, University of California Press 2 Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement, 23 February 1998 at http://ndunet. ndu.edu/nduspeeches/OsamahBinMuhammadBin-Ladin.htm accessed on 1 Dec 03. 3 US National Interests are freedom, democracy, and free enterprise according to the Bush September 2002 National Security Strategy. National Interests, within this article, are expressed in terms of the four categories of security, prosperity, value projection, and value preservation as within the Deibel Model accessed, with notes, from http://ndunet. ndu.edu/nwc/FASmodel/fas.htm on 10 Oct 03. 4 This is a task for a separate article. This article posits that a balanced solution to the Arab/Israeli problem would be enough to satisfy Al-Qaeda. Alternatively, it could also be argued that Al-Qaeda wish the Israeli Jews to be pushed into the sea and care not for any form of negotiated settlement. I believe
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the issue for Al-Qaeda is the perception of how the US has been approaching a solution to the problem. 5 It is interesting to note that the word Jihad appears once in the Koran. The most frequently used word is ilm or knowledge. 6 I am grateful for the conversations with Wing Commander Neil Martin in respect of this remark. 7 I am grateful to Brian Jenkins of RAND Corporation for making this remark in response to a recent International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) presentation Where we are with the GWOT. 8 This is based upon recent UK press coverage suggesting that nearly 100,000 people in the UK have some affinity with Suicide Terrorism, noting the attacks in London of July 2007. 9 (1999) Hall, C.S, Nordby V.J. A Primer of Jungian Psychology, Meridian Publications. 10 It is fair to say that operations in Northern Ireland took place against an ever increasingly capable global media footprint and development of the Internet. So it can be argued that this was the first Insurgency of the secondgeneration.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to a number of friends and colleagues who have commented upon the initial draft of this article. I would like to specifically thank my colleague Roger Mendham, without whose guidance and excellent common sense I would be much the poorer and also the helpful comments from Neil 21

Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber PSYOP

By Timothy L. Thomas Editorial Abstract: The author analyzes the evolving phenomenon of cyber psychological operations, examining their application in the recent Israeli campaign against Hezballah. He describes CYOP forms and contents, and how these capabilities enhance both insurgent and friendly influence operations.

Introduction

arties on both sides of the recent fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon have used cyber technologies to their advantage. Of course, this is nothing new. Tanks, planes, and soldiers have been uploaded with a host of cyber/ information technologies for the past two decades at least. These technologies have increased the precision and lethality of weaponry, the situational awareness of the soldier, and the overall efficiency of operations. However, an evolving cyber phenomenon is underway: the concept of cyber psychological operations (CYOP, pronounced PSYOP)which are cyber operations (those that use the computer chip) that aim to directly attack and influence the attitudes and behaviors of soldiers and the general population. While armies continue to compete in digital battlespace, local populations are now caught up in digital influence space battles. As a result armies can no longer stand between an enemy and the public as they once did. CYOP is also awash with unintended consequences, since we are only now starting to understand what degree of influence, persuasion, deception, and mobilization the cyber environment offers. For example, mobile (cell) phones became tools for citizen journalism in Lebanon since they provided people the capability to transmit audio, video and photographs by short message service. Such contributions from the street carry their own form of psychological persuasion. CYOP is characterized by speed, precision, and creativity. Speed is recognized due to the quickness of the message-response mechanism. An incident happens and is reported on the

The physical battlespace. (Univ. of Texas/BBC) Internet, or via cell phone or video messaging, before legitimate news services can adjudicate its authenticity. Notably, these message have infinite yet precisereach (some call CYOP precision guided messages PGMs). We can target friendly or enemy soldiers and populations with equal ease. Plus, creativity is an emerging issue. Technologies offer the ability to update time tested PSYOP techniques with new applications not tried or tested. The cyber element enables traditional psychological operations (PSYOP) such as loudspeakers and leaflets to penetrate not just a few miles into enemy territory, but to intrude directly and pervasively into the local populations homes or across continents. The cyber element does so privately and quietly, invading not only computers and cell phones but the psychological well-being of the population as well. Local citizens on both sides of the Lebanese-Israeli conflict are victims of an intense propaganda and counterpropaganda campaign, for the maintenance of public and international support. This article will investigate the emerging CYOP phenomena and its impact on the shape and outcome of future conflict. Please keep in mind this is an emerging and sensitive issue that is only beginning to be understood. Therefore, the issues presented represent only some initial thoughts and examples. Only further research will indicate how far this phenomenon has progressed and what eventual utility and capability it will offer future combatants.

Developments
For many years, at least until the late 1980s, PSYOP was usually associated with leaflets, rumors, loudspeakers, fake or gray news reporting, and deception. While the form of these old methods has

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lived on into the cyber age, the methods frequency. The consequences are and range of distributionas well as difficult to imagine. Are we to be the intended targetshave changed segregated into technological groups dramatically. New technologies have based on age if the report is correct? Will had totally unexpected consequences. some soldiers be able to hear a message With regard to general cyber and others wont? Will this impact how technologies, one can recall the recent we construct forces? Further, can the August 2006 drinking incident involving sound be incorporated as a ring tone actor Mel Gibson. The drunken Gibson audible only to young people? uttered some ethnic slurs that a New York Similar developments are affecting media firm gave away as a cell phone the traditional PSYOP field dedicated ring tone, the latter a popular cyber to the use of leaflets and loudspeakers. technology. An even more infamous During the recent fighting in Lebanon, ring tone incident in 2004 involved the the site http://beirutspring.blogspot.com President of the Philippines. Again, reported that, in addition to the normal the incident speaks volumes about leaflet delivery propaganda bombs, unintended consequences of the cyber the Israelis were using E-flets. What Hizballah symbol. age. is an E-flet? It is a leaflet type message (Terrorist Knowledge Base.org) P h i l i p p i n e P r e s i d e n t G l o r i a that appears on the Internet, usually Macapagal Arroyo, running for reelection, through URL links to a website. In one was talking with Commissioner of case, a website gave the appearance fight. This means silent loudspeakers Elections Virgilio Garcillano in May of being Lebanese in content (a red, can potentially impact a campaign and be 2004, before the election results were green, and white Lebanese flag). It was delivered at continental distances from announced. Unaware the conversation accompanied by bombastic patriotic the fight. Further, specific cell phone was being tape recorded, she said Hello statements to rise against Hezballah. towers can become pieces of key mental Garciwill I win by one million votes? But the site had a +881 satellite number terrain, since some need to be left up When she found out that someone had to call instead of a Lebanese number, and operating to text key population recorded the phone call, Arroyo elements, while others can be shut declined to allow local media News doesnt always have to be fake down or destroyed. to play the tape. In turn the According to another report, to influence attitudes and behavior. tape quickly made its way onto the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in activist websites and found use as a and the server name was reportedly Gaza are using similar phone messages. ring tone on cell phones, simply stating NS.BARAK.NET.IL. That is, this was The Jerusalem Post reported on 27 July Hello Garci? Thus, while shopping probably an Israeli site to which one that nearly 1,000 residents of Gaza had in Manila or sitting on a plane, people could call and report information. The listened to a recorded IDF message were soon bombarded with the Hello site further guaranteed anonymity plus warning them not to harbor operatives Garci ring tone. a cash deal. or hide weapons. An Hamas government Government authorities said the The loudspeaker has also been spokesman stated the Israeli intent was to recording was made with an illegal wire technologically updated in ways never drive people from their homes, paralyze tap, and was doctored. Other authorities imagined. The days of shouting at the government, and demoralize the said it was part of a plot against the one another over cease fire lines or to population. president. On 28 June Arroyo admitted encourage one side to surrender still Rumors, another traditional PSYOP she had talked with Garcillano in a lapse exist, but these have been supplemented technique, are difficult to spread unless of judgment. Thus ring tones, now used by the silent loudspeakerthe text you understand how to get into a groups to embarrass people or to become a message. Text and voice mail messages mental circle of influence. In Lebanon medium for political message delivery, on mobile phones warned residents of much of the information digested by the may have unimaginable future uses as an Tyre in southern Lebanon to leave or risk general population comes from radio, TV attitude and behavior modifier. being killed. This means the message and newspaper reports. Taking a radio Another unintended use of a cell is precision guided, just like high-tech stations electronic broadcasts hostage phone may soon be tied to developments weaponry. Coalition forces reportedly and inserting ones own messages is not with specific audible tones or frequencies. used the same method before their Match a difficult proposition in this day and age, Some websites advertise that a certain 2003 advance into Iraq. Their aim was and such activities occurred in Lebanon. frequency is usually not detectable to change the attitudes and behavior of One report in The Guardian noted that a to people over the age of 30, while Iraqi commanders by enticing them to local radio station suddenly had reports those younger than 30 can hear the defect or simply to go home and not broadcast from the Israeli governments

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point of view. Cell phone images from for a global audience to share firsthand goal by attacking Lebanon is pulling the the street also circulated and impacted reports, military strategies, propaganda trigger for another world war? By not on the circle of influence. videos, and personal commentary about offering the same question with regard Gray or fake news can be inserted a violent conflict as it unfoldsIt is to Hezballah, he clearly influenced quite easily in the cyber age. For a disorganized bazaar of images that attitudes and perhaps behavior in the example, mobile phones can be the requires visitors to search for a specific Arab world. medium through which to send regular topic; searches for both Hezballah and Terrorist Groups And messagesin the form of news updates Israel yield hundreds of videos, some to discredit leaders or offer a different of them violently graphic, others not so Technology point of view on the fighting. Some serious. Groups like Al-Qaeda and Hezballah mobile phone messages in Lebanon Naturally these videos could have were headlined with the title news. been produced with deception in mind. have developed CYOP of their own sort. But recipients did not find customary One is reminded of the Iraqi Armys These groups try to change attitudes and news: instead they found news from 1991 Gulf War video, which showed a behaviors through intimidation, cyber the Israeli viewpoint. In addition, the sign posted outside a destroyed military fear, or outright racial or religious hatred. Israelis resurrected a Voice of Lebanon facility stating it was a baby milk Of course their CYOP is not just aimed radio station on frequency 103.7 Mhz. factory. Or, more likely, YouTube videos outward, but is internal as well. It often While not mentioned in the article, Voice can offer personal comments on the war targets the disaffected in the Middle of Lebanons reporting could easily be and an outpouring of the emotional rage East, attempting to recruitment those inserted into mobile phone messages, if people feel over what happens to them or who feel disenfranchised. Coalition the former is ever blocked. their families. Emotional videos with no forces have not done as well in efforts News doesnt always have to be fake deception intended can also have strong to neutralize these terrorist/insurgent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan as one to influence attitudes and behavior, of psychological overtones. course. The Daily Star, a digital version According to Yonit Farago of www. would expect. US IO doctrine is weak of a Lebanese paper, had a few sentences timesonline.co.uk, there is also an intense (in fact, almost nonexistent) on the issue of counterpropaganda, and at the start of its paper that this is reflected in coalition Hezbollah has demonstrated in its said Help Lebanon. Send a letter to your government war with Israel that it can take technology operations. One journalist writes, The Professors of representative. Download a sample letter. The last from other countries, and quickly adapt it the University of Hezballah have just rocketed past all the sentence linked to the letter to the battlefield. theoretical thinkers at cushy and offered any Lebanese or foreign reader to download, fill in monitoring and counterpropaganda US war colleges. Cyber operations have provided the blanks, and send the message to a campaign underway by Israeli supporters. congressman or parliamentarian. Special software termed megaphone is Al-Qaeda and Hezballah with their own While all the above elements used to alert Jewish students to anti- newspapers and distribution means involve some sort of deception, this Israeli chat rooms or Internet polls. These and these means are becoming quite category merits further discussion. It students then attempt to influence the professional in appearance. A July 2006 is never clear at the start who is calling course of a debate or an opinion survey tape from Al-Qaeda leader Ayman alor who is posting a news bulletin. Only by marshalling friends and supporters Zawahiri had a semi-professional look after the fact is it possible to sit back to take part. This allows a place where as if it was produced by a CNN affiliate. and consider what just occurred. Then networks of US and European groups In the background are huge photos and ones own sense of realitybased on with hundreds of thousands of Jewish stage lights, and it appears that Zawahiri experience and common sensemust activists can place supportive messages. is reading from signs or perhaps even a prevail and offer a best guess of what The Israeli government is supportive Teleprompter. Al-Qaedas personal news the recipient believes. Furthering this of this effort. According to Farago, studio, As-Sahab, produced the video. movement into the unknown are websites diplomat trainees have been ordered to The result is that Zawahiri appears to be speaking from a position of authority like YouTube, where people can post track websites and chat rooms. their own videos. People are often I r a n i a n P r e s i d e n t M a h m o u d simply based on the environment created swayed by visuals: they can seem more Ahmadinejad developed his own strategic for his talk. The context is a far cry from real than mere words. Many individuals counterpropaganda campaign. He being filmed in a cave with a rifle at the have posted their personal videos of the opened a blog site when the Hezbollah- ready, as he was in the early days of fighting in Lebanon and other areas. As Israeli fighting ended, asking readers his retreat into geographical obscurity. one source noted: In a matter of weeks, (they could vote yes or no) do you However, the cyber age ensures no one YouTube has become a video trash bin think the US and Israeli intention and is ever really obscure if they dont want

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to be. A video camera and outlet for the recording is all that is required. Terrorists have as much access to Internet voice technology as anyone else in the world. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) allows you to make telephone calls using a broadband Internet connection instead of a regular (or analog) phone line. Some services let you call anyone with a phone number, whether local or long distance. This makes it much harder to find and track terrorist cells. In the war with Israel, Hezballah demonstrated they can take technology from other countries and quickly adapt it to the battlefield. On 7 August 2006, the Israelis shot down a terrorist operated reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Utilization of these technological advances makes Hezballah appear stronger than it actually might be, which is another psychological aspect of technology. Cyber mobilization and attacks on attitudes dont stop at the US border, either. According to the website of Laura Mansfield, who has appeared on CNN with Anderson Cooper, several sites on MySpace advocate jihadist activities. This enables terrorist groups to write their own E-flets against US targets. More dramatic was the discovery made by the private Illinois group called the Society for Internet Research in August. The group noted Web site Al-Manar (outlawed in the US) made a stopover in Austin, Texas during the Hezbollah-Israeli conflict. When Israeli warplanes bombed its facilities in Lebanon, Al-Manar set up shop on Austins Broadwing Communications servers. Finally, on 11 August a jihadist website posted the following message: The Global Media: A Work Paper for Invading the US Media, Prepared by Najd al-Rawi. The message explains how to do this work and what tools to use. Analyst Ben Venske notes jihadi videos are another terrorist favorite. They are used for several specific purposes instead of the organized bazaar represented by YouTube. These are: as instructional material, to make

Traditional media delivery. (Defense Link) statements, to produce tributes to suicide bombers, to highlight operations, and to produce internal training videos among other uses. As a result such videos, especially those produced on hostage situations or operational successes, produce a type of followon psychological attack. Again, in the cyber age, the unintended mental (stress, fear, etc.) consequences of videos and technologies (text messaging) could also be termed follow-on CYOP attacks. The Hezballah Central Internet Bureau has reportedly taken the video issue a step further. It has developed the video game Special Forces that places contestants in operations against Israel. The game praises martyrs, and credits those who shoot Israeli politicians and others. However, there are also reports, of Christian digital games in which soldiers either save or kill an opponent. Two points are awarded for a save and one point for a kill. It seems such games will have an impact on young peoples attitudes and behavior on both sides, as they become morally disengaged from their physical versus their virtual realities. or some other method, especially those of the non-lethal variety. The Russians have been leaders in this category. Analyst S. P. Rastorguyev, for example, began writing openly about this subject in the 1990s at the behest of the Russian Security Council. His task was to develop algorithms that would put suggestive influences into human heads via words or sound. These influences were known as psycho viruses. Other writers, both in China and Russia, have discussed putting frequencies into computer programs or conducting other activities that would affect the headware (neurons) of a user. In the journal Contemporary Navy, the Chinese described efforts at conducting mind control, using telepathy, and using secondary sound waves in the 3-17 Hz range, that allegedly shut down a humans ability to function. This article also described use of blinding lasers, weapons of sound, holograms, and camouflage by transfiguration. Elements of this type of CYOP (especially the use of a sound wave weapon) would be instantly debilitating. They would challenge your ability to continue functioning as a human.

Hard Versus Soft CYOP

The use of CYOP may soon enter the phase of hard CYOP. Hard CYOP refers to the development and implementation of ways to not just affect attitudes and behaviors, but to shut down the brain via some meansfrequencies, chemicals,

Conclusions
The age of CYOP is upon us. Now silent loudspeakers disguised as cell phones, PDAs, and mp3 players reside in our pockets. A recorded call on Lebanese telephones these days is Hasan, have



you realized yet that the Israeli army is Teenagers, those most intimate with spam type messages reach us quite not as delicate as a spiders web? Its a cyber technology, will be as affectedif easily from home and abroad, and web of steel that will strangle you! The not more sothan their elders in a cyber luckily these are only soft ad attack intended recipient is not just the Lebanese environment. Middle aged and senior CYOP. Will hard CYOP be able one people but the leader of Hezballah, Sheik citizens, more skeptical and analytical day to reach us as easily? Terrorist Hasan Nasrallah. CYOP has also shown based on a lifetime of exposure and groups have no moral dilemma using up on Lebanese TVs where purportedly familiarity with deceptive techniques, hard (frequency generated) messages. Israeli hackers are putting out warnings will still require the more immature but The Russian fear that researchers are reading Hezballah members beware! technologically advanced teenager to intent on finding ways to control human The CYOP impact on future war is interpret meanings and impactsmuch consciousness may be just around the clearer now, since we are able to watch like a translator. Cyber language and corner, if the terrorists have a say in the and evaluate it as it unfolds in all shapes techniques are confusing and a difficult matter. Technological developments are and sizes in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and medium in which to stay current. For moving that fast, and may contain several Iraq. If these wars are any indicator, example, teenagers cruise through blogs unintended consequences, beyond those future wars will be personal, deceptive, and sites like Zone-H, Digg This (or just that have already surprised us. civil-military, and involve worldwide Digg), Little Green Footballs, MySpace, The general population is not only a recruitment. All of these items will FaceBook, and technorati with abandon. favorite target of CYOP, but has become be managed and performed by cyber Such sites provide a very different a self-generator or CYOP participant e l e m e n t s . Ye l l o w as well. For example, journalism may also a subscriber recently become a real threat. used Google Earth to The website Little document military Green Footballs recently actions on both sides demonstrated how a of the Israeli-Lebanese Reuters reporter had border. The subscribers manipulated images of maps provided an his photo reports from instantaneous photo the field. Photographer montage of potential Adnan Hajj had virtually military strategies, enhanced and pasted acting as an intelligence (using Photoshop) a source for groups without plume of smoke with satellite capabilities. As concentric circles, making one description of the it appear to come from a site noted, it contained building destroyed by an details on the action Israeli airstrike. Hajj was which occurred at the dismissed by Reuters and location and the casualties all of his 920 photos were Young and blog-savvy: the face of the CYOP generation. (Defense Link) or damage resulting, and removed from Reuters allows you to view the database. insight into a conflict than newspapers aerial photos and see what it looked We are also able to do something or TV. Online populations can actually like before the conflict. No current else in the cyber environmentevaluate interact with the populace of the other newspaper or TV report can currently the consequences. This is because side in a conflict. There are also growing replicate this type of updated, constantly recipients of the CYOP messages often instances of media and Internet stardom reviewable data, conducted at ones own provide their reactions either in online that we must monitor for deception. pacealthough news outlets are moving blogs or in personal Internet interviews. These are situations where it appears the in this direction. One thing is very clear: CYOP is not reporters name and the virtual images CYOP can produce other only personalbut persuasive in new he/she is reporting are the center of psychological impacts as well. Not all wayssome more powerful than any attention, at the expense of the tragedy of them are as neutral as Google Earth. earlier PSYOP attempts. CYOP strikes and its victims. Of greatest concern are hate propaganda, raw nerves in a different way than a We must develop ways to recognize calls to arms and cyber mobilization. leaflet, due to its targeting precision with new CYOP techniques as they arise, Of lesser but still notable concern all forms of communicationsauditory, and monitor the consequences they is the impact of Internet-generated visual, and print. CYOP appears to be a bring with them. We must remain cyber fear. Gabriel Weimann, one very invasive form of PSYOP that allows vigilant in particular for hard CYOP of the most prolific and well-known no mental sanctuary. developments. Today Viagra and other authors on the terrorist use of the  Winter 2007

Internet, has noted with regard to the cyber age that From a psychological perspective, two of the greatest fears of modern times are combined in the term cyberterrorism. The fear of random, violent victimization blends well with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology. An unknown threat is perceived as more threatening than a known threat. Although cyberterrorism does not entail a direct threat of violence, its psychological impact on anxious societies can be as powerful as the threat of terrorist bombs. We m u s t f o l l o w t h e C Y O P phenomenon as it picks up momentum. Groups will initiate new and varied techniques, and everyone must be on guard to counter the unexpected. E-flets, silent loudspeakers, Google Earth, ring tones, and YouTube represent only the start of this phenomenon. Traditional PSYOP personnel will play a key role in uncovering the advantages offered by these technological advances, and then must creatively apply counters to them in warfare. CYOP can be private, silent, deceptive, intercontinental, and as full of hatred and prejudice as the initiator wants it to beand all are issues that should concern us. Notes Lysandra Ohrstrom, Mobile Phones Play Key Role in Lebanon War, Daily Star, 16 August 2006, from The Information Operations Newsletter, Jeff Harley editor, Vol 6, No 18 (11-21 August 2006) 2 Sign of the Times, Kansas City Star, 4 August 2006, p. C1 (located in the header on the page). 3 Dave Pugh, Ring-Tone Revolution in the Philippines, http://mrzine. monthlyreview.org/pugh230705.html, downloaded on 31 July 2006. 4 Sarah Toms, Philippine Tape in Ringtone Craze, BBC News, downloaded from news.bbc.co.uk on 31 July 2006. 5 Pugh. 6 Google search Mosquito, adult-proof, and silent ringtones to read the positive and negative potential of this idea.
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Israeli E-leaflets, downloaded from http://beirutspring.blogspot.com, 24 July 2006. 8 Clancy Chassay, Info War Goes Personal with Voicemail and Text Message, The Guardian, 24 July 2006. 9 Associated Press, New IDF Tactic: the Phone Call, The Jerusalem Post, 27 July 2006. 10 Chassay. 11 Ibid. 12 The Daily Star, 1 August 2006, downloaded from www.daily star.com.lb. 13 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Videos about Mideast conflict now appearing on Internet site, The Kansas City Star, 26 July 2006, p. A12. 14 Jonit Farago, Israel Backed by Army of Cybersoldiers, www.timesonline. co.uk, downloaded on 31 July 2006. 15 Ibid. 16 Doing His Blog: Populist President Goes Online, The Guardian, 15 Aug 06, downloaded from www.smh.com.au. 17 John E. Carey, Hezballah is Way Ahead. Again, Peace Journalism, 17 Aug 06, downloaded from peacejournalism. com. 18 Information accessed at http://www. fcc.gov/voip and downloaded on 9 August 2006. 19 CNN TV, 8 August 2006. 20 See http://blog.lauramansfield. com/2006/05/18/teen-terror-on-theweb-jihadi-and-islamist-activi...
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Todd Bensman, Hezballah Web Site Booted in Austin, Express-News Staff Writer, downloaded from www. freerepublic.com 22 Global Islamic Media Front Discusses Plan for Penetrating US Media, OSC Report in Arabic, 23 August 2006, contained in an e-mail to the author from FMSO analyst Kevin Freese. 23 Ben Venske, Evolution of Jihadi Video (EJV) V1.0, Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 50-51. 24 The game is offered at its own website, at http://www.specialforce.net/english/ indexeng.htm. 25 Authors meeting with S. P. Rastorguyev at a conference in Moscow, 1997. 26 Associated Press, This is the beginning of the cellular phone war, Haaretz, 8 August 2006. 27 Ibid. 28 Website for Little Green Footballs, www.littlegreenfootballs.com, accessed on 7 August 2006. 29 Reuters Says Mideast Photographer Doctored Shots, www.cnn.com, accessed on 8 August 2006. 30 http://www.gearthblog.com/blog/ archives/2006/07/israellebanon_c.html, Google Earth, posted by Frank Taylor 21 July 2006. 31 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet, US Institute of Peace, 2006, p. 150.
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The War of Ideas in Southeast Asia

Interview with Kenneth Ward
Interviewed by John Whisenhunt, Editor Abstract: Mr. Ward, a former Australian Foreign Affairs officer and intelligence analyst, shares his views on his nations role in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. He describes Australian difficulties and successes in dealing with Islamic communities, Islamic extremism, and the need for greater cross-cultural awareness. popular as anti-Islam. One of our major newspapers has been running headlines such as The Unacceptable Face of Islam, about Muslim attitudes towards women, and some days this newspaper can run up to six articles that Muslims would perceive as anti-Islam. There is a kind of disconnect with successful operations towards Muslims in SEA. Our leaders always have dialogs with Muslims when they travel to SEA countries with Muslim populations, particularly Indonesia. It is widely accepted we need dialog. Many people understand were pressuring our Muslim community in Australia, and the danger is that now and again frustrated Muslims may turn to terrorism to express that frustration. So I think thats how I view Australias current cultural awareness. Southeast Asia in context. (Dept of Defense) IO Sphere: Some observers criticize the West for a lack of in-depth understanding of our adversaries. How do you think were doing in terms of developing and practicing true cultural awareness, especially in Southeast Asia (SEA)? Mr. Ward: I think weve progressed a long way in the past few years, but we recognize we started from a low base of understanding the religion of Islam, and how to talk to Muslims. But since 9-11, and particularly since the (2002 & 2005) Bali bombings, the Australian government has become aware of Muslim sensitivities in SEA. On the other hand, we tend to forget that Muslims in SEA tend to be very concerned over what happens to Muslims in Australia. I think over the past 12 months we have shown, both in the government and elsewhere, much less sensitivity to the feelings of our own Muslim community. There are several hundred thousand: its not a large community compared to other immigrant communities in Australiathe majority is Lebanese. But I think were throwing too much at them at the same time. Were relating the Global War on Terror to the successful integration of Muslims in Australiathe successful adaptation of Muslims to modernity. We urge them to adopt different attitudes towards women, we question their wearing of the veil, and so forth. So I think it would be quite normal for some Muslims in Australia to feel what Indonesians describes as being cornered. Thats a word that is used a lot by Indonesian Muslims; that the world has them corneredin other words putting a great deal of pressure on them. I think there is a danger that criticizing Muslims in western countries could become electorially IO Sphere: Youve spent a considerable portion of your professional life living and working in Indonesia. This states traits of a large, young, culturally diverse Islamic population all seem similar to parts of Southwest Asia. Do you find any parallels relevant to the current struggle against Islamic extremism, which seems focused on the Middle East? Mr. Ward: There are. For a start, the Middle East has exerted more influence over Indonesia in the last 20 years. There are a lot more pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia; Arabic is studied more now; Islamic modes of dress are becoming more widespread. These things did not use to characterize the communities in Indonesia and Malaysia. And unfortunately, through terrorism too. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a major Indonesian extremist group heavily influenced by Al-Qaeda (AQ), though I dont think JI has made any independent contribution to Islamic terrorist ideology. I think all of JIs ideology is derived from AQeven the idea of a caliphate. JI is a descendant of the Dal Al Islam or DAI movement, which did not advocate a caliphate. Its goal was simply establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, period. From AQ or somewhere in the Middle East, JI has taken on the idea of the caliphate. So in many ways there are similarities. Id say there has been a slow process of Arabization of Islam in Indonesia, particularly in the last 20 years. IO Sphere: Some observers feel the whole idea of influence operations is too complex, and has too many players or stakeholders. Do you find any group or state that is doing this sort of thing well? Is anyone a good model?

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Mr. Ward: For SEA, the Singaporeans are developing a very good model for influence operations. They have been the object of a certain amount of bias and prejudice from their Muslim neighbors, but they are developing ways of eliminating that sort of prejudice. They have worked toward a much better relationship with Indonesia over the past three or four years, particularly with the successful handling of the (2005) Tsunami situation. Thats something one can talk about in considerable detail. The US had the best opportunity to positively influence Indonesia as it had for a very long time. The technical parts went extremely well, and the end result should have been a reduction in anti-Americanism. To what extent that happened is hard to say. The Tsunami had a devastating impact, but it took place in a remote area of the country. So even though Indonesians living in Jakarta and other parts of Java knew the Americans were helping out, I think the impact on the whole of Indonesia was much less because of the remoteness of the disaster area itself. I think America only received the gratitude of only one area of the country, and didnt receive the same outcome in terms of a reduction in anti-Americanism as if the disaster took place on Java itself. But this is the sort of intervention we are seeking. Though we certainly dont want to arrange for any disasters [laughs]. But, I think the Tsunami coordination seemed to have no flaws at all, and provides a very good example of coordination with a wonderful impact. I know the response from the disaster site was great, and though I wont say Indonesians living on Java and near the capital are indifferent to the outlying regions, the impact would have been far greater had it happened closer to Jakarta. As far as models go, Singapore is really worth studying. They were conscious for half-a-dozen years that they had a poor reputation in Malaysia and Indonesia, and they handled that Tsunami with a great deal of diplomacy and without arrogance. On the other front, the Singaporeans have developed a very effective de-indoctrination program for terrorists in prison. They are also successful in sending Muslim spokesmen around the rest of SEA and the outside world. So they really understand the need to show sympathy towards Islam, while trying to deindoctrinate extremists in their communities. IO Sphere: In the past 25 years, Australia seems to have really evolved its regional role as a Pacific power. Based on your time in the Foreign Service, and as an experienced observer, how do you view Australias current and future roles in the fight against extremism? Mr. Ward: I think theres a danger were going to be overstretched. We are clearly the most powerful country in the south Pacific, and the burdens we are assumingincluding Timorare very demanding and very heavy. There has been violence in East Timor which has prompted us to send troops, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea (PNG) is not entirely stabilized. We are essentially the main guarantor of stability for the entire south Pacific. But we are also assuming burdens far away from there, such as in the anti-proliferation exercises/

maritime exercises being carried out against North Korea. We have troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and many who follow defense issues think our forces are now heavily over-extended. I would see it in a slightly different manner: that the educational base in Australia has not been expanded adequately to give us expertise in all the countries in which or towards which weve decided to play a role. For example we have very few Middle Australian soldier patrols the Eastern institutes in Indonesia/East Timor border. Australia, and Arabic is (MOD Australia) not widely spoken at all among Australians who are not of Arab origin themselves. Not every state or city has a Middle Eastern institute in any of its universities. The government itself has few Arabic speakers. We haveas a sign of being overextended for examplenever had an embassy in Afghanistan, and we still dont. And yet weve troops there since 2001-2002. Weve had an embassy in Iraq, but only since the heavier combat phase of the war ended. And yet weve been fighting in a war in a country weve not seen as important enough to post an ambassador there. Now that, and the fact we have limited knowledge of either countryplus the lack of an embassyshows the lack of depth in our relationship with those two countries before we entered conflict. So we dont have a strong knowledge base of either Iraq or Afghanistan. Its true were working within an alliance with the US, more so than making an independent assessment of our own national interest. So were really not very knowledgeable. But theres a gap between some of the commitments were making, and some of the knowledge base that should exist to allow Australia to operate effectively. As far as Im aware, no university in Australia teaches Afghan languagesand thats dangerous, to have no basis for a war weve been participating in for some time. In the war with Japan (WWII)this was a war of necessity, not choicewe had a knowledge base before the war began. But 60 years later, an industrialized country must have a proper knowledge base that it can reply upon when it does become engaged in a conflict. Australia is without question the most important guarantor of stability & security in the south Pacific, and we must be more careful measuring our priorities in the Asia-Pacific as a whole, or outside the region. I see this hiatus between making a commitment, and having the knowledge base with which we can help the people understand why weve made these choices. So, were really not strongly knowledgeable in the Middle East.



And though our troop commitment is not really that large, the concern is what happens when it is a south Pacific contingency and no other power will be available? We may not have the troops to send. Certainly we have our commitments to East Timor, which we undertook in 1999 under UN auspices, and PNG as a former Australian mandateso those are major priorities. But I think we need to be cautious about making commitments further afield. I cant recall another time when Australian forces were so heavily engaged in different places around the world. IO Sphere: Its been a tough start to this century. Mr. Ward: Yes, very much so. I think we have a three part problem: how to deal with terrorists; how to deal with extremists; and how to deal with the Muslim community as a wholeespecially those at home. I think we have to see how interrelated these are. If we are seen as arrogant and suspicious of Muslim constituencies within our own borders, that will give extremistswhose main argument is the west is fighting a war against Islamwell, that will give them more ammunition. I dont think were being nearly as careful as we can on that front. For example, former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made a rather strange statement (in Oct 2006) after a Muslim woman wearing a face veil came to see him, stating that made him very uncomfortable. It is hard to conceive of a woman having the courage to visit a member of parliament unaccompanied. Muslim women who wear face veils are more likely to be Salafi (traditionalist) Muslims, than otherwise. And they are typically not going to be calling on members of parliament (MP) alone, or even with their husbandsthey simply do not do that. So any Muslim man in Straws constituency who has a grievanceand I say man because that too is a traditional male rolehe has something to resolve. Well, it will be the husband who normally does that. So I find that statement gratuitous, and extremely insensitive: it should not be made when a nation like Britain faces a terrorist threat. That kind of statement gives one the impression that the British political elite is opposed to all sorts of Muslim practices, which are really none of our business. Other countries have to put up with young people wearing the strangest sorts of clothinghardware on their noses [laughs], and no politician is going to admit hes uncomfortable if a young man with green hair and multiple eyebrow rings comes to call at his parliament office. If we are able to cope with our young generations bizarre practices, why is it difficult to accept a Muslim face veil? If such social tolerance exists toward unconventional clothing and personal adornments, we can certainly show tolerance to much more conservative practices. Were dealing with a continuum of attitudes here, terrorism at one endclose to that is extremismand then the Muslim community as a whole. We should not give any ammunition to terrorists by indicating that there is a great deal about Islamic practices we disapprove of. The situation could be deteriorating in that respect. We may be making headway against terrorism, we may have some impact on the popularity of extremist

ideology itself, but I think this year (2006) our relationship with Muslim communities has deteriorated. There was the issue like the (Prophet) Mohammed cartoons (originating in Denmark); it may be difficult for us to understand why that can provoke violence response. When something like that happens, we should condemn the cartoonists, though without suggesting any punishment, because its simply not illegal in the West. But we should do something. Similarly the Popes (Sep 2006) comments (perceived as anti-Islamic) were unfortunate, though it didnt lead to any lethal violence anywhere as far as I know. These things are happening at the wrong time. We must do everything we can to establish we are not at war with Islam, and to separate terrorism from the Muslim community as a whole. This has been a bad year in terms of improving our relationship with the Muslim world. IO Sphere: Folks of all walks of life say be respectful, have some understanding, yet both the proper message and the damage can spread so rapidly! Mr. Ward: Yes. I dont think our leaders understand well enough that Muslims have a much stronger sense of community than other religious groups. Educated Muslims rally round fellow Muslims who they think are being badly treated. For example, a Muslim newspaper in Indonesia will mention that Muslims in Britain are the subject of discrimination, and theyll be a much stronger sense of solidaritymuch more so than say the global Christian community. And I think we lose sight of that, thinking we can compartmentalize Muslims from the rest of the world. Statements made in Australia that are perceived as anti-Muslim can be reproduced in SEA in a matter of hours. Misstatements and slips of the tongue will be often be seen as deliberate, and showing malice toward Muslims.. IO Sphere: Well, wed better get you to the seminar. Thank you for your time this morning, sir. Mr. Ward: Youre quite welcome.

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Winter 2007

Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Seminar

By Mary E. Whisenhunt Abstract: The Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Seminar (SEAVIS), a multi-agency political-military exchange forum, brought together 150 representatives from the Asia-Pacific region and North America. Attendees examined regional threats, and outlined both unconventional and conventional influence approaches to countering extremist activities.

he Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) hosted the Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Strategy Seminar (SEAVIS) from 31 October 3 November 2006, in San Antonio, Texas. US Pacific Command (PACOM), Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC) and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) jointly sponsored the event. The Rendon Group (TRG) served as primary facilitators and strategic communications consultants. The goal of this gathering was to generate potential information operation activities to support US Pacific Command (PACOM) efforts in their area of responsibility (AOR). The seminar brought together more than 130 members of academic and research institutions, defense laboratories, the Department of State, and the information operations (IO) and intelligence communities. The desired outcome included both a shared understanding of violent ideology in the PACOM AORspecifically Southeast Asia (SEA)and the outline of a shared strategy for affecting future extremism in the region. Experts from academia, the US government (USG), and industry identified new approaches to countering this threat, leveraging a variety of social, cultural and psychological data. The forum demonstrated an organizational and concept framework which other IO organizations may find useful in building similar regional initiatives.

Cross-cultural communications: relief worker provides language tips to Indonesian students. (Defense Link) briefings from country experts, topic experts, and experienced information operators outlining the current violent ideology situation: Radical group trends in SEA Policy objectives of the USG in SEA The SEA information environment Curbing militant recruitment in SEA Islamic extremism in SEA Identification of audiences Identification of messages and messengers ID innovative message delivery systems Identification of wild card events Identification of threats and opportunities

Background
Presently, the US and its Coalition partners are engaged in a global conflict, with real terrorists seeking to attack our interests. Secondly, we are engaged in a Long War originally comprised of potential terrorists, some of whom are aliveand some of whom are not yet born. Over the past five years, this war has shifted from potential terrorists to potential allies. These entities exist at an individual level, and not just at the level of the nation state. Success is dependent upon building support one by one, individual by individual, turning the Street against the terrorists. The conference was designed to enable attendees to understand the evolving threats generated by violent ideologies. Afterward, participants generated engagement recommendations that leveraged existing and potential support, to mitigate negative forces at play in the region.

Seminar Process
Organizers drew participants from several communities: active and retired government service; personnel with experience designing and implementing strategic communications or public diplomacy operations during their service; private sector experts in fields with similar experience in corporate and political endeavors; personnel with regional subject matter expertise, and foreign military and diplomats. JIOWC and TRG chose this mix of experience levels and viewpoints to encourage non-traditional and unconventional discussions. Such a cross section of individuals helped generate approaches to audiences and activities that traditional IO planning groups may not otherwise identify.

Methodology
The forum began by establishing a common baseline understanding of some of the major regional players, attitudes, and issues. The group heard subject matter expert (SME)



Facilitators led an interactive knowledge-based exercise to identify direct and indirect messengers (3PVs). In this session, each participant presented both productive and counterproductive messengers, and when appropriate, linked the messengers to the messages identified during the earlier breakout sessions. While the US government has a legitimate right and responsibility to message, we must recognize that the USfor many of our audiencesis our own worst messenger. Accordingly, most messaging activities should focus on the identification, recruiting and placement of proper validation.

PVs
Forum members also identified some of the most significant elements for success: 3rd party validators (3PV). Organizations seeking to earn the publics trust need to do more than engage in trustworthy behavior; they must have their actions verified by third-party sources that are themselves credible. These are individuals, governments or organizations that can effectively deliver a message to a specific audience. Often, 3PVs can be used to reach audiences with whom the USG has limited access or limited credibility. Validators may deliver messages either with or without knowledge that they are assisting the US of Coalition partners. Of course, this makes 3PV selection a politically and culturally sensitive process.

US Navy personnel evacuate a patient during an Indonesian medical exercise. (US Navy)

Strategic Considerations
This phase included a series of interactive knowledge harvesting exercises in order to identify strategic considerations for information activity development. These exercises identified potential audiences, messages, messengers (including possible third-party validators), message delivery systems, and wild card issues. Forum participants discussed Coalition and partner nation strengths and weaknesses through round-table discussions and an interactive exercise. In the Long War, coalitions remain a primary center of gravity for the US.

Wild Cards
In turn, the group identified possible future events, both likely and unlikelyso-called wild cardsthat would affect SEA and US policy towards the region. Many events can be defined as worst case scenarios for the US in the region, but others introduce an element of instability in which the outcome, positive or negative, is simply unknown. For this segment, participants offered scenarios that would positively or negatively affect the situation, from both a threat and opportunity perspective. Most scenarios looked at the next 1224 months, with particular emphasis on the changing political situation in the region, and possible external key events that could affect internal information operations activities.

US Policy
A frequent observation among interagency planners is gaining access to the big picturethose highest-level objectives necessary for common understanding. In this forum a DoS official outlined broad policy goals and public diplomacy objectives for the US in SEA. Regional policy is based on long-term US strategic objective: a world which is democratic, prosperous, stable, secure, and at peace. The three primary US public diplomacy strategic imperatives in SEA are: Offer people a positive vision of hope rooted in common beliefs about freedom, justice, opportunity and respect for all Isolate and marginalize violent extremists and amplify moderation Foster a sense of common values and interests among various countries in the region US transformational diplomacy efforts support regional reforms to promote democracy and good governance, foster broad-based and sustainable economic development, strengthen their societies, and make them stronger partners.

Messaging
In this segment, participants identified and discussed messages Coalition members should be develop and test for use. Each participant was given time to develop possible general messages/actions, then discuss more specific intent for follow-on development. The first principle of messaging directed US and Coalition/partner nation governments must provide timely, truthful and accurate information. 

Malaysian/US sports exchange. (Defense Link)

Winter 2007

Audiences
Target audience discussions examined both external and internal groups. The lists below come from the round-table exercises, as well as breakout working groups and sidebar discussions. Not all audiences are accessible by all USG agencies or partner countries, so addressing certain audiences requires interagency coordination. The breakout groups identified these internal audiences, describing principle groups the USG hopes to positively influence: Political Leaders Military and Security Leaders The Street: common or average persons Elites: persons/entities of power Opinion Leaders Non-traditional media Commercial Industry Terrorist and Other Violent Groups Academia External (international) audiences consist of these entities: Audiences in the US International governments and organizations Regional political/social groups International opinion-makers Business Military Academia Religious groups Terrorist groups and supporters Again, the inherent legal, political, and relational issues of these choices require third party validation.

- Online databases, discussion groups - Video teleconferencing - CD-ROM/DVD - Personal digital assistant (PDA) - Mass e-mail - Web sites & blogs: including closed (password) - Short messaging service: mobile phone texting - Cyber cafs - Massive multi-player online role-playing games News, information and entertainment - AM/FM/Short wave legacy radio, satellite radio - Commercial newspapers - Television - Mainstream magazines/interviews - Traveling street theater - Songs/contests for young musicians Advertising and visibility - Collateral materials: free giveaways - Promotional products for computers - Printed receipts or invoices - Phone cards - Transit advertising: Airport, bus, taxi and subway - Packaging materials: throwaway wrappers - Public sculptures: honor a specific event - Hollywood product placement

Conclusions
The overwhelming majority of attendees found this a useful and productive experience. Regardless of region, the SEAVIS methodology offers a useful construct for identifying and discussing the range of external and internal audience issues needed to craft a coherent shared strategy. While highlighting numerous US/coalition opportunities, the group clearly recognized significant threats involved in countering violent ideology. Finally, careful identification of messages, messengers and delivery systems, as well as potential wild card events, help illustrate just how significantly actions may alter the information operations playing field.

Message Delivery
The group examined the five types of message delivery systems: personal contact initiatives; mail delivery systems; information technology and telecommunications; news, information and entertainment (earned media); and lastly, advertising and visibility (paid media). The following provides a few representative examples, traditional and non-traditional, which IO planners may want to examine: Personal contacts - Education alumni groups - SEA Diaspora: communities/extended families - Cleric exchanges: Moderate Imams - Youth exchange programs Mail delivery systems - Personal correspondence: letters home - Professional correspondence - Educational: schoolbooks/associated materials - Invitations: weddings and birthday day parties - Gift mail - E-mail intercepts or alterations Information, technology/telecommunications - Telemarketing, telephone banks, surveys - Telex & fax transmissions

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