Commendador et.al vs. De VillaG.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991 CRUZ, J.

:p Topic: Fundamental PrinciplesFACTS: The private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippinesfacing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny),A W 9 6 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised P e n a l C o d e (Murder).Ltc Jacinto Ligot (private respondent) applied for bail, but the application wasdenied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Q u e z o n C i t y a p e t i t i o n f o r certiorari and mandamus w i t h p r a y e r f o r provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction which consequently issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot. The trial court rendered judgment inter alia :Xxx Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution grantingthe right to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicableand covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. xxxH o w e v e r , S o l i c i t o r g e n e r a l c o n t e n d s t h a t m i l i t a r y m e n a r e e x e m p t f r o m constitutional coverage on the right to bail. ISSUE: Do private respondents have the right to bail? RULING: None. Supreme Court find that the right to bail i n v o k e d b y t h e p r i v a t e respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in themilitary, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to aspeedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violatethe equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarlys i t u a t e d a n d d o e s n o t a p p l y where the subject of the treatment i s substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if theyare denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannotsay they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed thesame right that is extended to civilians

annulled the decisionof the trial court in granting bail to petitioner on the ground that they weretainted with grave abuse of discretion. Responednt court observed that at the time of petitioners application for bail, he was not yet in the custody of the law, apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail beforehe was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. Respondent court also noted that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusionperpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that nobail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons held that thegrant of bail was doubly improvident. Issue:A. W hether or not petitioner was in the custody of the law when itapplied for bail before the arrest warrant was served on him. B . W hether or not bail was granted with grave abuse of discretionc o n s i d e r i n g t h a t p e t i t i o n e r w a s c h a r g e d w i t h a c r i m e p u n i s h a b l e b y reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt was strong. Ruling:A. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security givenf o r t h e r e l e a s e o f a p e r s o n i n c u s t o d y o f t h e l a w , f u r n i s h e d b y h i m o r a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as requi redu n d e r the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main p u r p o s e , t h e n , i s t o relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction andy e t s e c u r e h i s appearance at the trial. 10 A s b a i l i s i n t e n d e d t o o b t a i n o r secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custodyover him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a case "it would beincongruous to grant bail to one who is free."As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have eitherbeen arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will everhave occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him asit is available to "all persons" where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the applicant is i n t h e custody of the law . On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of thelaw (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issuedpursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on CriminalP r o c e d u r e , o r ( b ) w h e n h e h a s voluntarily submitted himself to t h e jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeedfiled his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that p o i n t a n d i n t h e f a c t u a l ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally undercustody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filingof his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof h e s h o u l d b e d e e m e d t o h a v e voluntarily submitted his person to t h e custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court whichthereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by theso-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confinedto quarters" or restricted to the military camp area B.

Section 1. Bail DefinedCASES: Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals247 SCRA 741Facts: Petitioner Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged as co-conspirator inthe crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag familyin Gingoog City of which, petitioner was the mayor at the time. The trial of the case was all set to start with the issuance of an arrestwarrant for petitioners apprehension, but before it could be served on him,petitioner, through his counsel filed a motion for admission to bail with thet r i a l c o u r t . P e t i t i o n e r furnished copies of the motion to State P r o s e c u t o r Gingoyon , to the Regional State prosecutor and the private prosecutor. Thetrial proceeded to hear the application for bail, but only assistant prosecutorappeared for the prosecution and four of petitioners counsel.Petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College GeneralHospital due to acute costochondritis, his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapterof the IBP and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he isconsidered being in custody of the law. The prosecution neither supported nor opposed the said application for bail. The trial court admitted petitionerto bail. The following day, petitioner managed to personally appear beforethe clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount fixed. Hew a s t h e r e a f t e r a r r a i g n e d a n d i n t h e t r i a l t h a t e n s u e d , h e a l s o a p p e a r e d personally and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case.20 days after the resolution of the trial court, Prosecutor Gingoyon fileda motion for reconsideration alleging that he received a copy of the petitionfor admission to bail only a day after the hearing. The trial court denied themotion for reconsideration, and so Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matterthe respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that beforeconviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged withoffenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt isstrong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as a m e n d e d , n o w provides that all per sons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat,arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from thepresumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not beinflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled toacquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as amatter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances wherethe accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong.Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, thecourt having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant thesame after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On theother hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion onthe part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatoryin nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of thecourt, is required with the participation of both the d e f e n s e a n d a d u l y notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether ornot the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.O f course, the burden of proof is on the p r o s e c u t i o n t o s h o w t h a t t h e evidence meets the required quantum. The Court ruled that Prosecutor Abejo was authorized and could validlyr e p r e s e n t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n in the hearing for bail. He was also e x p l i c i t l y instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutors Office, to

which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10512.After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondentJudge Bellosillo ordered the immediate issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted incash. He further directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan,to immediately impound the bus involved in the accident, whichcould be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in theamount of P50,000.On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion 7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court under protest a cashbond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. The bus was released.On 4 April 2000, VLI 8 todeclare null and void the order directing it to post bond for therelease of its bus. This petition was, however, dismissed forimproper venue and lack of jurisdiction.In his comment, 11 respondent Judge Bellosillo explains that in theexercise of his sound discretion and in the greater interest of justiceand fair play, he required a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of the police-impounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of a bond for the release of impounded vehicles involved in recklessimprudence cases is practicedAs for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory Liner bus,respondent Judge claims that it was just under the circumstancesconsidering that its prior release was illegal.In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice Narciso T.Atienza, the OCA Consultant to resignation, which wasaccepted by the Court En B anc effective 27 March 2002, does notrender moot and academic the instant administrative complaint. Hefinds that the respondent Judge erred in ordering the impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for itsrelease. Issue: Whether or not the court lost jurisdiction by the mere fact that therespondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of thecase. Ruling: Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo does notrender moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of theadministrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that therespondent judge ceased to be in office during the pendency of thiscase. The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the respondentofficial innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rulewould be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful anddangerous implications.We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the respondent fromthe charges of inaction on a pending motion and of compelling thepolice authorities to file a criminal case against De la Cruz. We,however, hesitate to hold the respondent administrativelyaccountable for gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1) theimpounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular accident and (2)the posting of a P50,000 bond for the release of the vehicle, both of which were found by OCA Consultant Atienza to be erroneous

VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. B ELLOSILLOFacts: On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along the National Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan,it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales.Marciana died the following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral andburial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000, VLIand the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement/Undertaking. 1 On 14 March 2000, after payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M.Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of the heirsof the victim, executed a R elease of Claim 2 and an Affidavit of Desistance 3 in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la Cruz.However, earlier or on 3 March Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who were also signatoriesto the Agreement/Undertaking , executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay 4 against Reino de la Cruz. On the strength of that document, acriminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, 5

SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.

Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested

without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes

medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio. Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution. Yap vs. CA

MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's First Division denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment. The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel? Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

People vs. Reyes GR 101127-31, 18 November 1993 FACTS Lorie Garcia delivered rice to Cresencia Reyes, as accommodation to her friend Manny Cabrera who had no more stock to sell. Reyes issued 6 checks for 6 orders delivered in different dates. Only 3 of the 6 checks were made good, the other 3 were returned by the bank due to insufficient funds. Garcia

Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and

notified Reyes of the dishonor and the latter promised to pay her their total value. Despite demands, Reyes failed to make good the checks or replace them with cash. 3 criminal cases for violation of BP 22 and 2 criminal cases for estafa were filed against Reyes. ISSUE Whether a single act of issuing a check may entail criminal liability of both violation of BP 22 and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa). HELD A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is a variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment; and act deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. BP 22 applies even where the dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual payment, as the law does not make any distinction. On the other hand, the checks were not payment for a pre-existing obligation nut as consideration for each shipment of rice. The checks were issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of her property. Reyes made good 3 of the checks, giving assurance to Garcia that the remaining checks were fully funded. Her failure to make good the checks raised the prima facie inference of deceit.