Policy Proposal to Address Prison Overcrowding in California

Press, The Associated. Prison. The Trial Begins Over California Prison Crowding. KCBS, San Francisco, California, USA.

Jamie Ferris, Audrey McFarland, Cara Lauster, and Jose Gil

Group Member Report

Executive Summary: Cara worked on this. Problem Definition: Audrey and Jose worked on this. Jamie edited. Analytical Objectives: Everyone worked on this section. Evaluation Criteria: Everyone worked on this section. Alternative 1: Amend the Three-Strike Policy; Jamie worked on this. Audrey edited. Alternative 2: Institute Rehabilitative Programs; Audrey worked on this. Jamie edited. Alternative 3: Juvenile Intervention; Cara worked on this. Jamie edited. Methods of Analysis: Jamie, Cara, and Audrey worked on this. Analysis of Alternatives: Everyone worked on this section. Discussion of Results: Everyone worked on this section. Recommendations: Everyone worked on this section.

_____________ Jamie Ferris

____________ Jose Gil

_____________ Cara Lauster

________________ Audrey McFarland

Executive Summary: The purpose of our paper is to educate the National Governors Association about the problem of the California prison-overcrowding situation. Our objective is to reduce the prison population of California by 100%, or 84,000 prisoners within fifteen years. We want to inhibit crime by implementing prevention and determent policies. We also want to reduce the current state recidivism rate of 70 percent. In addition, we aim to reduce the negative safety and health effects of overcrowded facilities. Currently, California prisons are operating at 197 percent capacity. They cannot keep up with the increasing costs of corrections or provide adequate living conditions to prisoners. Some of the effects of prison overcrowding are decreased prison safety, riots in prisons, attacks on prison guards, electrical blackouts, sewage spills, and the declining mental health of prisoners. Prison overcrowding affects prisoners health, the economy, crime rates, parole and recidivism, and violence and safety. The United States currently houses five percent of the worlds prisoner population, which is five times the world average for number of prisoners held in a single country. The U.S. spends $70 billion on corrections per year, an increase of forty percent in the past twenty years. California has the largest prison population in the U.S. and it continues to increase. California also has the highest recidivism rate in the United States at 70 percent. We extensively researched the issue of overcrowding using databases, peer reviews, and editorials to grasp the full scope of the California prison-overcrowding situation. From the research that we conducted, we picked three issues to capitalize on to help reduce the prison population in California while reducing the recidivism rate simultaneously. We proposed changes to the three-strike law that would require the third offence to be more serious than the current law states in order to reduce the number of non-violent offenders for serving life
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sentences. We also proposed implementing substance abuse programs, which suggests that not treating drug and alcohol abusers costs society more than not treating them. By implementing these drug and alcohol treatments, offenders would avoid imprisonment, reducing the prison population. Finally, we propose implementing after school programs in the state of California in order to reduce the number of juveniles in the prison population. We ran cost and benefit analyses on all three alternatives that we proposed and found that all three alternatives benefits outweighed costs over a time period of fifteen years. This proves that our three alternatives are cost effective and efficient. Our recommendation is that the National Governors Association implements all three of our alternatives. By doing this, 17,029 offenders would be released or avoided annually. After fifteen years, this would significantly reduce the prison population. While the general public and policymakers desire results now, the annual number of prisoners reduced or avoided shows the annual effectiveness. This issue does not need further research unless these alternatives prove to be ineffective in fifteen years. Problem Definition: Scope: The United States contains 5 percent of the worlds prison population and nearly 25 percent of the world's prisoners (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1). Americans incarcerate 756 inmates per 100,000 residents -- nearly five times the world average. Nearly one in every 31 adults in the U.S. is in prison, in jail or on supervised release (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1). The nations corrections expenditure amounts to approximately $70 billion each year and over the past 20 years has increased 40 percent (Lithwick, 2009, pg 1). Cost/Economic: California has the largest prison population and the highest recidivism rate in the U.S. [70 percent] (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). Prison population reductions and providing adequate facilities for prisoners are especially difficult at present due to the state
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budget crisis, exaggerating the fact that the correction and rehabilitation expenditure experiences increases each year (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). Californias corrections costs increased by 50 percent in less than a decade and comprise approximately 10 percent of the state budget (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). The average annual cost of incarceration has increased by approximately $19,500 since 2000-01 currently estimated at $47,000 per prisoner (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). This includes an increase to $8,300 for prisoner health care and $7,100 for security (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). The rehabilitative programs implemented in California exhibit failure to help prisoners recover from their drug addictions (Katel, 2007, pg 17). According to California State Inspector General Matthew L. Cate, the treatment program in California was a $1 billion dollar failure (Katel, 2007, pg 17). The state spends $143 million each year for drug abuse treatment programs provided to inmates and those released from prison (Katel, 2007, pg 17). Studies suggest that participation in Californias current drug abuse treatment program has resulted in more prisoners returning to prison within a year of their release than those not involved in the program (Katel, 2007, pg 17). In 1978, California adopted capital punishment and approximately 87 percent of all firstdegree murder cases are eligible to pursue the death penalty as punishment. With a 77 percent increase in death row inmates (Tempest, 2005) and a 67 percent increase in the total California prison population in the last decade (Urbina, 2009), the costs associated with capital punishment are only going to increase. Additionally, California Governor Schwarzenegger has allocated an estimated $356 million for a new death row facility over the next 20 years; it will cost an estimated $1.2 billion to run this facility while not truly reducing the prison population (Tempest, 2009). When comparing the cost of maintaining the current system of capital punishment in

California with the cost of merely imprisoning these inmates for life without parole, there is a difference of $126.2 million dollars per year (Tempest, 2005). Issuing life sentences without possibility for parole instead, while it does not decrease the physical population of the states prisons, would allow for the reallocation of billions of dollars in the Correction and Rehabilitation budget which could be used in efforts to decrease or accommodate the rapidly growing prison population. Health: The California Correctional Departments health service has an annual budget of $1.1 billion dollars (Udesky, 2005, pg 797). However, the system has been criticized for providing inmates with unsanitary conditions. A U.S. federal judge described the health care system as incompetence and at times outright depravity (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). This comment emerged after hearings for a class action lawsuit filed in 2001. After hearing testimonies, Judge Thelton Henderson ordered the California prison health care system to go under the control of a court appointed receiver June 30th of that year (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). Court medical investigators found several cases of cruelty and negligence among CDCR facility employees (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). In a report provided by the medical investigators to the court, it was noted that more than 64 prisoners died each year as a result of the health care system in CDCR (Udesky, 2005, pg796). Inmates have to wait months to see a doctor and sometimes their appointments are cancelled if nurses believe that the prisoner does not need to see a doctor (Udesky, 2005, pg 796). The quality of care provided by physicians in Californias prison is 20-50 percent inefficient (Udesky, 2005, Pg796). Prison overcrowding across states has raised concerns about chronic diseases that could easily spread among inmates. In 1996 a report presented to congress describes that HIV (Human Immunodeficiency virus), HBV (Hepatitis B virus) and Tuberculosis is higher among prisoners
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(Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg 264). According to the CDC, 30 percent of acute Hepatitis B cases in the U.S. occurs in people who have been incarcerated (Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg 264). The transmission of the HBV and other pathogens in prisons is known to occur due to sharing tattoo paraphernalia, razor blades, fights, sexual activity and sharing toothbrushes (Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg 268). The prevalence of HBV is higher among state prisons and efforts to reduce the virus can benefit inmates as well as the public population. Considering that the rate of recidivism is 70 percent in California, the flow of inmates leaving and entering the prisons can transfer the virus to the general public. According to an article by Shaili Gupta, providing inmates with vaccinations can be a cost effective strategy with savings of $2.3 for every $1 invested in vaccinations to prisoners (Gupta, Altice, 2009, pg273). Violence/Safety in Prisons: Overcrowding may increase riots and arguments among prisoners leading to decreased safety for both inmates and correctional facility staff. At least 16,000 prisoners sleep on bunks crammed into cells, gyms, dayrooms, and hallways due to lack of space (Worst of the Worst, 2008). In October 2006, Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency based on the numerous effects of overcrowding including: electrical blackouts, sewage spills, numerous riots, and more than 1,600 attacks on prison guards in 2005 (Worst of the Worst, 2008). In 2007, a nonpartisan state oversight agency declared the California prison system a threat to public safety and a possible contributor to the state budget crisis (Worst of the Worst, 2008). Crime Rates: Crime rates are nationwide, as well as in California are declining (Rothenberg, 2009, pg 1). Violent crime rates decreased by 46 percent and property crime rates decreased by 38 percent in California between 1995 and 2007 (Rothenberg, 2009, pg 1). However, during that time Californias prison population increased by 31 percent (Rothenberg, 2009, pg 1). This

increase suggests that Californias sentencing procedures may not reflect the states criminal justice needs. The rate of juvenile arrest is as high as that of adults. Those juveniles sentenced to adult facilities contribute to the overcrowding problem in California. As Graph 3 shows, there is a normal distribution of the different offences from 1988 to 1998. Property offences contributed to the majority of arrests among juveniles in California. In total from 1988 to 1998, there were 536,113 juvenile arrests made for property offences compared to 222,822 arrests for violent offences. Other offences for juvenile arrests totaled to 110,048, while juvenile drug offences totaled to 95,703 from 1988 to 1998. Parole/Recidivism: In 1970, citizens of California urged lawmakers to change the states criminal justice system to apply harsher sentences to prisoners with the hopes of deterring criminal activity. Since then, almost a dozen strict sentencing laws were passed including fewer opportunities for early release for good behavior and the controversial three-strikes law. It is estimated that if nothing changes, the number of prisoners will increase to over 190,000 by 2012 (Muradyan, 2008, pg 483). In January 2008, Schwarzenegger made an attempt to ease the crisis by proposing the release of 22,000 nonviolent inmates (Muradyan, 2008, pg 498). However, since recidivism rates in California are the highest in the nation, the proposal faced criticism and failed to pass in the legislature (Muradyan, 2008, pg 498). Additionally, Schwarzenegger approved $7.7 billion in new prison construction to the ease overcrowding (Source?). The project proposed adding 16,000 state inmates and 16,000 beds for soon-to-be released inmates (Muradyan, 2008, pg 490).

Many critics question the decision because they believe the money could be used to finance recidivism programs to reduce the population in the long run. In 1994, in an attempt to reduce crime and recidivism rates, California passed proposition 184, known as the Three Strikes and Youre Out sentencing law (Greenwood, 1993, pg iii, and Chen, 2008, pg 345). Under the three-strikes policy, prisoners receive longer sentences for committing serious or violent felonies (Appendix 5). Such mandatory sentencing laws require more people to serve lengthy prison sentences in an effort to maintain public safety by incapacitating criminals from offending again (The California Prison Disaster, 2008). This system has been criticized as a possible cause of prison overcrowding (Prison Nation, 2009). In California, the three-strikes policy follows a two-part process. If a defendant has a past serious or violent felony conviction (considered a strike) when convicted of any subsequent felony, the sentence for the second felony (the second strike) is double the standard sentence (Bailey and Hayes, 2006, pg 9). If a defendant has two strikes, any preceding felony conviction carries a mandatory sentence of 25 years to life in prison (Chen, 2008, pg 349). Since the time of its inception in 1994, approximately 87,500 inmates have received sentences under the threestrikes law. Of those prisoners, 7,500 received sentences of 25 years to life for committing their third offence (Chen, 2008, pg 350). The states parole system is too large and arguably the most ineffective in the country. Upon release, all offenders are placed on parole for one to three years by requiring parole, the system is unable to provide adequate services. Approximately 70 percent of California's

parolees return to prison after three years (The California Prison Disaster, 2008). 80 percent of

parolees have fewer than two 15-minute meetings with parole officers each month, leaving serious offenders with too little attention, risking public safety (Source?). A law passed in 2009 limits parole to dangerous ex-criminals and only sends them back to prison if they commit new crimes. The effects of the law are yet to be determined, but its implementation on January 25 could help reduce the states 70 percent recidivism rate. Parolees are often returning to prison for small crimes such as failure to attend meetings or failing a drug or alcohol test (Jailhouse Blues, 2010). In California, only 33 percent of admissions were new in 2004; compared to 1990 when 41 percent of admissions were new. Overcrowded prisons are adversely affected by high recidivism rates because they cause an increase in the population by criminals who could be successfully exercising their parole option. The most common offence by felon parole violators from 1994-2008 consisted of drug and property claims (Graph # ),. Property crimes increased between 2001 and 2008. Drug crimes increased from 2002 and 2007, but later decreased. Crimes against people make up the next most frequent offence committed by felon parole violators. The number of crimes against people remained fairly steady from 1994-2008. The number of other crimes committed also remained steady from 1994-2008. The mean suggests that felon parole violators commit drug crimes most frequently. This implies that drug rehabilitation programs may be the most useful deterrent for parole violation. The second highest committed offence indicated by the mean is property crimes, followed by crimes against people and other crimes. The median also suggests that property and drug crimes occur the most followed by crimes against people and other crimes. The variance in minimums and maximums of each type of crime from 1994-2008 suggests that there will be fluctuation in

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the numbers of each type of crime per year. Therefore, the data suggests that there ought to be a variety of rehabilitative programs for parolees. The standard deviation is high for property and drug crimes by felon parole violators indicating that the data is spread out across a large range of values and not close to the mean. The standard deviation for crimes against people and other crimes by felon parole violators is low, indicating that the values in these categories are close to the mean; there is not much variation in the values. The data suggests that if California experiments with programs that attempt to reduce recidivism rates and thus the average number of years of imprisonment, the state could reduce the number of inmates and save a considerable portion of its budget. Reducing the number of parole violators through rehabilitation and limiting the total number of prisoners on parole may be cost effective and efficient. Standing: standing. Baseline Scenario: In the 2009-2010 budget, the state of California attempted to reduce prison overcrowding by cutting $1.2 billion from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [CDCR] budget (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). Specifically, the cuts The state of California and the states that California deports prisoners to have

reduce inmate and parolee rehabilitation programs and make changes to policies for prisoners including: reducing the sentences of and deporting specific undocumented prisoners, prohibiting parolees with no serious, violent or sex offences from returning to prison for minor parole violations, increasing the credits that prisoners can earn to reduce their sentences, increasing the dollar minimum for specific property offences to be regarded as felonies, and providing monetary incentives to counties for decreasing the number of people on probation from re-

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incarceration (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). The changes were estimated to reduce the number of prisoners in California by 18,500 in 2009-10 and 25,000 in 2010-11 (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). In 2009-10 the state achieved a reduction of only 1,600 inmates and is predicting a reduction of 11,800 inmates in 2010-2011 (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). This benchmark failure is largely due to the governors budget assuming only 200 sentence changes compared to the 8,500 estimated in the budget (Legislative Analysts Office, 2010). The legislature also failed to adopt enough statutory changes to complete the reductions. Consequently, the governors budget proposal allows for only half of the estimated $1.2 billion in savings (Taylor, 2010, pg 12). On January 12, 2010, a federal three-judge panel ruled that the state must reduce its prisoner population to 137.5 percent of its intended capacity. This calls for a reduction of approximately 40,000 inmates within two years. The state has appealed the ruling to the United States Supreme Court and is awaiting their decision before implementing the plan. The intended plan includes the changes proposed last year to reduce the budget as well as the governors current proposals which the administration estimates would decrease the prison population by 15,100 inmates (Taylor, 2010, pg 2). Schwarzeneggers current proposal is to mandate a

maximum sentence of one year and a day in county jail for parolees who have not committed serious or violent crimes and are convicted of certain property and drug felony crimes, rather than serving another state prison sentence (Taylor, 2010, pg 1). These changes, if approved, are estimated to decrease state prison costs by $25.2 million in 2009-10 and $291.6 million in 201011 (Taylor, 2010, pg 1).

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If the state is not required to comply with the federal judge ruling to reduce the inmate population by 40,000 inmates within two years, Schwarzeneggers proposal passes, a significant reduction of approximately 24,500 prisoners in 2010-11 will still occur (Taylor, 2010, pg 4). This reduction amount will increase in future years as well (Taylor, 2010, pg 4). Analytical Objectives: This analysis will attempt to weigh the effectiveness and efficiency of prison reform programs, aimed to reduce Californias prison population by approximately 100 percent or 84,000 prisoners over 15 years, which will reduce the negative safety and health effects of overcrowded facilities as well as the financial strain on the state. The analysis will focus on the literature available for the past 10 years for the state in regard to the current programs and policies in place. Additionally, suggestions will address the overarching issue of the states correctional department budget. The suggestions include programs that are effective in reducing recidivism rates and the total number of years felons spend in state facilities. We will apply national data and studies to the specific problem facing California. In order to do so, we will measure the effectiveness of those programs and apply them to the social and political environment of California. The proposed alternatives include amending the three-strikes law, fostering rehabilitative programs, and reducing the number of juveniles sentenced to adult facilities. Evaluation of the alternatives includes cost effectiveness, efficiency, feasibility and whether the suggested policies will produce net more benefits than the current policies. Methods of Analysis:

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In analyzing both the tangible and intangible costs and benefits of imprisonment, release of convicted criminals and implementation of social programs to rehabilitate convicts and prevent crime, it became clear that many of the social goods would be difficult to quantify. The State of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Center for Public Policy Research at the University of California-Davis is currently working on establishing a more effective model to determine the aggregated cost of crime for use in policy formulation and costbenefit analysis (The Cost of Crime, 2009). For the purpose of this study; however, the cost of incarcerating an inmate is provided by California Legislative Analystss office. This model takes into consideration security, healthcare, operations, support, and rehabilitation services (see Appendix 5). To determine the effect of limiting third-strike eligibility to serious and violent offenders, data collected by RAND, a nonprofit research and analysis organization, is used to quantify the criminal justice costs though it fails to account for social benefits of crime reduction (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 14-15). These costs, determined in 1993, have been adjusted for inflation and brought into 2009 price equivalents using the conversion model provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Appendix 6). Though the most applicable estimate of crime costs, critics propose that high cost estimates may suggest that any policy expected to increase crime, even a little, would cost more than the status quo (The Cost of Crime, 2009). Though imperfect, the estimates provided allow for a reasonable estimation of the costs associated with the possibility of higher crime rates versus a lower prison population. Additionally, this analysis by RAND assumes that the actual implementation of the three-strike policy is as the law was written. In the study of the three-strike policy, RAND establishes violent crimes, generally any crime that causes injury to or threatens victims with a deadly weapon (see Appendix 5). Serious
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crimes include those elements as well as other crimes where potential for violence exists (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 5). To establish the number of non-violent/serious offenders that would not be required to serve the 25 to life sentence when restricting the scope of the threestrikes policy, and therefore the number by which the prison population would decrease, it was assumed that the percentage of violent/serious offenders of the total population [62%] was proportional to the percentage of violent serious offenders of the population serving third-strike sentences (California DCR, 2009). While this assumption is likely an over-generalization of crime distribution trends, for the purpose of this study, presuming that the distribution of crime type is fairly standard across criminal populations in the state allowed for a more approachable analysis. The RAND analysis looks to the effect of the three-strike policy on crime and criminal justice cost (though not evaluating the effect on prison population). The study looks at the relationship between felony crime rate and keeping felons in correctional facilities for longer time periods. In the evaluation, crime rate is modeled as dependent on the number criminals on the street and the cost of crime is dependent on the number of inmates in the system (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 10). The study projected offender populations by modeling the estimated percentage of prisoners whom would or would not commit another felony. This proportion was derived from a multivariable study that uses indictors to estimate the average length of criminals crime career and likelihood of re-offending. The study suggests that most criminals, depending on age, average frequency of crimes committed, as well as other variables, eventually stop committing crimes and therefore stop posing a threat to society (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 12). Though the research and its utilized models have limitations (chronological age of offenders,

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variations in offending patterns, etc), the conclusions drawn by the RAND researchers proved sufficient for the analysis of effectives of the three-strike policy provided in this study. Indirect benefits analysis should include reduced childcare costs for families who pay for out of school care for their children, increased school costs, improved school performance, increased compensation, reduced crime, and reduced welfare participation. Approximately 28% of parents with children between the ages of 6 and 12 pay for outside of school child care services (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 20). On average, mothers with children under the age of five pay $79 a week for child care compared to $23.70 a week for the after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 20). The average participants family would save $1,777 if they were enrolled in after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 20). Increased schooling costs are directly related to how successful the after school program is (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 21). Each year the after school program is effective; the state is required to fund the students education for an extra year (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 21). The class of 2000 had a graduation rate of 68.7% according to the Department of Education in California, but this doesnt mean that the dropout rate was 31.3% because some students may have transferred to schools outside of California (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 22). In fact, students who participated in the after school programs only dropped out at a rate of 23% compared with a 50% dropout rate of those who did not participate in the after school program (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 22). Currently the average high school dropout costs the state of California $2,247 in addition to education costs. If we assume that the probability of graduation will increase by 22% for the

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average student, then the cost of the program per participant is $742 if the student continues his/her education for another year and a half (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 23). An additional societal benefit is the improved school performance. Data shows that those students who participated in the after school program had better attendance and better test scores than those who did not participate in after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 25). Students were also more likely to succeed at their grade level if they participated in these after school programs and were less likely to be put in lower level, more expensive classes (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 25). Intangible benefits of the improved school performance include, but are not limited to higher self-esteem and more enthusiasm from students about their education (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 26). Increased compensation is also an additional benefit to society and the individual. Students who do not graduate from high school will face employment problems in the future due to the lack of a high school degree (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 28). Not only are employment options significantly decreased, but their potential earnings also decrease significantly (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 28). According to the 1999 Current Population Survey of the U.S. Consensus, 55% of the 25 years and older population who did not receive a high school diploma reported no earnings (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 28). Of the 25 years and older population who did receive their high school diploma, only 25% reported no earnings (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 28). The government may expect a return from the after school programs investment through taxes and reduced level of dependence on social government programs from those students who complete their high school education and obtain future employment (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 28).
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Reduced crime is another benefit to society due to the after school programs. On average, after school programs produce a return of $5.92 per dollar spent in after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, p. 30). Since the total cost calculated previously equals $10,038 for each student who participates in the after school programs, we must take that amount and multiply it by the return expected ($5.92*10,038) for a benefit in crime reduction of $59,425 per participant (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 30). As mentioned previously, those earning higher incomes from completion of their high school degree and potentially further schooling in college are less dependent on social programs such as welfare (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32). In a study called the Perry Preschool Program, the average participant received $3,349 less in welfare reimbursement than did a non-participant over their lifetime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32). Welfare programs are classified as administrative savings, therefore there is no tangible gain (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 32). Rehabilitative programs is an alternative that will reduce overcrowding. The treatment cost data were collected from a study that used the Drug Abuse Treatment Cost Analysis Program Instrument (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 1). 2,567 clients were involved in the study. Their information was collected from medical hospitalizations, emergency rooms visits, earnings, and transfer payments from interviews at the start of the survey and after 9 months. Substance abuse treatment costs were calculated using a combination of cost data obtained from providers and administrative data on days in treatment (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). Monetary benefits were calculated from survey and administrative data, and may include medical care, mental health services, criminal activity, earnings and government transfer payments depending on the study (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The estimated average direct cost
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of substance abuse treatment programs was compared with the average change in non treatment costs associated with treatment [monetary benefits] (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The Consumer Price Index component was used to adjust all costs and benefits to 2001 (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The analysis used was based on clients entering the substance abuse treatment program between January 4, 2000 and May 31, 2001 (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 4). The clients also completed a 9-month follow up survey. In order to perform a sensitivity analysis, a larger group of inmates was examined (N=6,545) and for a longer period of time [1 year]. (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 1). The results of sensitivity analysis found that there were no significant changes in unemployment or disability/retirement benefits. Welfare payments increased minimally possibly because of social workers aid in encouraging public aid programs (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8). Most crimes occur without arrests, therefore, the number of arrests was increased to represent the crimes that occur without arrests. Increase in arrests were determined by inflating the number of arrests among the study group by the ratio of crimes to arrests in the general population for all available crime and arrest statistics (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 9). The average benefit of substance abuse treatment resulted in decreases in the victimization and other costs of criminal activities rose to $3,986 (SE = $957; p < .0001) and $4,687 (SE = $1,061; p < .0001), compared with the original increases of $3,019 and $2,657. Therefore, estimates of the costbenefit ratios are probably conservative (Ettner et al., 2006,pg 9). We used numbers from the California Department of Corrections to determine that there were 12, 338 drug offenders in 2008. (California Department of Corrections, 2008). (see Table ???? ) This equals 25percent of the total prison population. Theoretically, we decided to enroll 75percent of the drug offender prison population (including possession) in a substance abuse

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program. This equals 9,524 prisoners. Then we found a study by the Prison Journal that looked at Drug Treatment Alternative-to-Program (DTAP) (Sung, 2001, Pg 281). The program educated non-violent drug offenders for 15-24 months of residential training and life skills. Participants received educational and vocational training, job skills, connections to social networks and job market information (Sung, 2001, pg 281). The participants also received 30-36 months of vocational training to obtain job skills, job readiness counseling, resume writing, and interviewing (Sung, 2001, pg 282). The study found a severe link between drug abuse and economic status (Sung, 2001, pg 282 ). In this study 92percent (8,514) of prisoners were employed after release and 8percent (741) were unemployed. Using these numbers we

determined that after 3 years recidivism rates for those that were enrolled in the program and employed were 13percent or 1,107 prisoner reoffences. Recidivism rates for those that were enrolled in the program and unemployed were 33percent or 245 prisoner reoffences (Sung, 2001, pg 282). This resulted in an estimated reduction of 7,905 prisoners per year. Our numbers are estimated and since the study by the Prison Journal was only of 281 prisoners there is a high margin of error. Evaluation Criteria: For the evaluation criteria, alternatives will be considered in such a way as to determine their cost effectiveness and whether the social benefits will equal or outweigh both the economic and social costs. The number of prisoners reduced from the institutional population determines the effectiveness of the proposed policy alternatives. In regard to Alternative 1, if, when applied retroactively, as well as into the future, the restriction on the three-strike policy reduces the total prison population substantially [benchmark of at least 5000 prisoner of 15 years], then the proposed policy is considered successful. It must be considered, however, that the policy change

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cannot lead to the release of a large enough number of prisoners that the crime rate increases and, consequently, public safety diminishes. SPECIFICS ON ALT 2/3? Alternatives: Based on the federal mandate to reduce Californias prison population as well as concerns for safety, health and the state budget, prison over-crowding must be approached with multiple methods for decreasing the population. Suggestions from the state include: amending mandatory sentencing laws, rehabilitating nonviolent drug offenders, and reducing the number of juveniles sentenced to adult prison sentences. Combinations and variations of these alternatives should be implemented on a trial basis in California in conjunction with methods previously proposed by the state in attempt to determine which reduce overcrowding in the most effective manner. Alternative 1- Amend the Three-Strikes Policy: Due to the provision in the three-strikes sentencing policy that the third felony does not have to be a serious or violent offence, many inmates are incarcerated for 25 years to life on comparatively minor felony charges such as theft or drug and alcohol related crimes. This stringent directive leads to high numbers of long-term inmates. According to the California Legislative Analysts Office, the estimated cost of Californias three-strikes policy is $500 million per year (Chen, 2008). By amending the policy to mandate that only a third strike consisting of a serious or violent offence must carry the 25 years to life sentence, a decrease in the number of long-term inmates would result (Chen, 2008). Revising the three-strikes law could

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lessen the cost of extended incarciration, a burden to the states budget as well as the physical capacity of the correctional facilities (Chen, 2008). According to data provided by RAND, implementing an alternative version of the current three-strikes policy where the third offence must be a serious or violent offence (see Appendix 3) to warrant a 25 years to life sentence would maintain 66 percent of the current crime reduction while incurring lesser costs relative to the current three-strikes policy (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 27). Although it achieves only an estimated 18 percent reduction in crime versus an estimated 28 percent from the existing three-strikes implementation, achieving two-thirds of the benefits while saving approximately $668 per crime prevented (see Appendix 8) suggests that the program operates cost effectively (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 26-27). The financial burden of the 3,230 inmates [2008] that would be ineligible for the 25 years to life sentence under the revised policy is, at present, a considerable drain on the departments budget (California DCR, 2009). This financial burden, under current policy, would not begin to be relieved until at least 2014 when the first group of prisoners sentenced under the three-strikes provision will reach eligibility for parole (Greenwood et, al., 1994, pg 27). Retroactively implementing the revised criteria suggests a of 3,230 inmates immediately and improvement of the overcrowded conditions by approximately 8,000 over the next 15 years. This results in a decrease of nearly 42 percent of the total projected prison population (California DCR, 2009). Necessary for public support of this measure as well as the social responsibility of policymakers, is that the program still incapacitates the most threatening, dangerous criminals while allowing for alternative options (rehabilitative treatment, job training, etc) for less highrisk criminals. In addition, the possibility of a 25 years to life sentence could still deter criminals

22

from serious and violent offences, possibly positively affecting the crime rate while reducing the population of the already over-burdened state facilities. Alternative 2- Institute Rehabilitative Programs: A study by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy found that intensive drug treatment programs reduce prisoners chances of re-offending by an average of 17 percent (Worst of the Worst, 2008). The study finds that for every dollar spent on substantive

vocational, therapy, or substance abuse programs for inmates and parolees, between $2 and $98 can be saved by decreasing expenses (Worst of the Worst, 2008). Programs such as addiction treatment programs should be created to help addicts recover before reentering society (Prison Nation, 2009). The study conducted by substance abuse and me uses data obtained from the California Treatment Outcome Project (CalTOP). This is a large demonstration study that obtained outcomes data on people admitted to 43 substance abuse treatment providers in 13 counties in California (Ettner et al., 2006, 3). The direct costs of drug treatment programs includes the monetary benefits compared with the monetary costs. Costs include prisoners medical care, mental health services, criminal activity, income, and transfer program payments (Ettner et al., 2006, 1). Costs of the clients substance abuse rehabilitation was estimated by multiplying the number of days that the client spent in each treatment program by the estimated cost per day of that program. Monetary benefits were defined by each inmate (Ettner et al., 2006, 1).---ADD #s The comparison of costs to benefits suggests that not treating those criminals with alcohol or substance abuse problems costs society substantially more than the cost of instituting rehabilitative programs (Ettner et al., 2006, 2). Costs are also incurred through decreased work

23

productivity-especially by those struggling with addiction (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 2). Studies in this area consistently prove that substance abuse treatment programs produce net social benefits (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 2). After the study, decreases in hospital inpatient, ER and mental health service costs occured. Victimization and incarceration costs decreased and earnings increased (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8). This results in a total reduction of $5, 676 in crime costs over nine months (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8). A linear regression of net benefits was examined as a function of the client's age; sex; marital, employment, and homelessness status; education; treatment modality; primary substance abused; and ASI subscale scores. Alcohol abusers should obtain $8,185 more in net benefits than those who abused methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin, or marijuana (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 8). The analysis includes a nine-month follow-up program with clients as well as follow-up survey data (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 10). Reductions in crime costs, including incarceration,, compose composed 65 percent of the total benefits. 29 percent is attributed to increased wages, and six percent to decreased medical and mental health care costs (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 10). An analysis of eleven studies determined that the benefitcost ratios determined from substance abuse treatment ranged from 1.33 to 23.33 and that benefits depict a significant relationship to decreased criminal activity, smaller contributions of earnings, and decreased healthcare expenses (Ettner et al., 2006, 10). The benefits of investing tax revenue in substance abuse treatment are obvious even without accounting for health and quality-of-life benefits to citizens (Ettner et al., 2006, 12). In order to establish a link between the monetary benefits of treatment and the duration and intensity of treatment, further research is required (Ettner et al., 2006, pg 12).

24

Alternative #3- Reduce Number of Juveniles Sentenced to Adult Prison Sentences: As Figure 2 depicts, there is a normal distribution of the different offences from 1988 to 1998. Property offences contribute to the majority of arrests among juveniles in the state of California. In total, from 1988 to 1998, there were 536,113 juvenile arrests for property offences compared to 222,822 for violent offences. Other offences for juvenile arrests totaled to 110,048, while juvenile drug offences totaled to 95,703 from 1988 to 1998. The number of arrests for property offences peaked in 1991 and then decreased (Advisor C. N.). By 1998, juvenile arrests for property offences decreased by 16,644. A similar trend is found for juvenile violent offence arrests (Advisor C. N.). The number of arrests for violent offences peaked in 1994 and then decreased (Advisor C. N.). By 1998, violent arrests decreased by 2,783. Drug offences were highest in 1988, but then decreased and remained consistent through the 1990s (Advisor C. N.). Juvenile arrests for other offences nearly doubled from 1988 to 1993 (Advisor C. N.). These offences remained fairly consistent from 1994 to 1998 (Advisor C. N.). According to the Legislative Analysts Office, while the population of juveniles in California has increased 22 percent, the number of juvenile arrests has decreased by 14 percent (Advisor C. N.). Similarly, juveniles arrested on felony charges declined by 20 percent between 1997 and 2007 (Advisor C. N.). Reason for this may include increased enforcement, more effective prevention and intervention programs, and other economic factors (Advisor C. N.). The majority of juvenile offenders commits one or two offences and never offends again (Advisor C. N., 1995). There are a small number of juvenile offenders who commit the bulk of the crimes (Center, 2000). These offenders typically begin committing crimes at an early age

25

though most juveniles are not incarcerated until they have a well-established record of criminal activity (Advisor C. N., 1995). Juvenile arrest rates are high, consistent with adult arrest rates, however there are benefits to providing services to those juvenile offenders (Advisor C. N., 1995). By implementing cost effective programs to keep juveniles from participating in criminal activity, the incarceration rate among juveniles would most likely decrease (Advisor C. N., 1995). These programs keep juveniles in school, prevent gang related activity, and provide help for substance abuse, which could help reduce juvenile crime (Advisor C. N., 1995). The derived social benefit of implementing after school programs is substantial as shown in Appendix 10. As a result, after school programs have been established all over the country to deter juveniles from criminal activity (Advisor C. N., 1995). Vice-President of Research-Resources for the Future at Vanderbilt Owen Graduate School of Management Mark Cohen conducted a comprehensive study on after school programs in 1998. He estimated the future benefits and costs of preventing high-risk youth from participating in criminal activity through after school programs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). Cohen uses data including dropout rates, drug abuse, and the direct and indirect impacts of crime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). Cohen also calculates the present values of the costs of an average career criminal, average heavy drug abuser, and average high school dropout (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). The data shows that the cost to society is high, but society is willing to pay to evade these costs (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 6). It is concluded that continuing after school programs is beneficial as long as the benefits of the programs outweigh the costs of implementation. Cohen claims that by preventing 50 percent of the after school participants from becoming career criminals each year,
26

the benefits would range from $3.5 to $4 billion each year (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 7). According to The After School and Education Safety Act of 2002, the direct costs include $50,000 for elementary schools and $75,000 for middle schools (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). Each school would qualify for a $5 grant for each child per school day (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). In addition, each school educating lowincome students would be eligible for $200,000 in funding (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). Schools must provide a 50 percent cash subsidy to insure one and a half times the funding that is provided in grants by the state (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). Therefore, the total cost per student will be $7.50 per school day. Annually, each student will cost $1,350 [7.50*180] (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 18). If we assume a discount rate of four percent, in fifteen years the cost per child would equal $15,010. Statistics prove that career criminals cost society anywhere from $1.4 to $1.7 million over his or her lifetime (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1). On average, students who drop out of high school end up costing society between $268,133 and $428,130 compared to a student who stays in school and graduates (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1). Finally, the average drug abuser costs society anywhere from $408,268 to $1,070,324 (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 1). With these staggering societal costs, one must conclude that after school programs should be implemented in order to keep students and children out of criminal and gang activity. To derive the social benefits of after school programs, one must consider indirect outcomes of school programs.

27

It is difficult to measure whether the benefits outweigh the costs because the benefits occur over an individuals lifetime, not just in their adolescent and early adult years (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 2). A common way of deriving these benefits is by conducting a study of individuals who participate in the after school program compared to a control group of those who do not participate. However, since the programs have recently been implemented, there is little data to base these findings on, making it difficult to quantify (Brown, Frates, Rudge, & Tradewell, 2002, pg 2-3). Analysis of Alternatives and Discussion: To evaluate the costs and benefits of the proposed alternatives, we considered the current institutional and social needs budget, and resources in California and used existing evaluative methods to determine the outcomes. We completed a literature review and solidified the alternatives. We considered the effectiveness of our proposed alternatives and evaluated them with consideration to the difference in demographics in the California legal system Providing convicts with rehabilitative programs is beneficial to prisoners and public safety. The short term benefits of releasing prisoners to save money fails to outweigh the long term costs of sending untreated criminals back into society (Rothenberg, 2009). If California provides services to help prisoners succeed independently then the number of prisoners would likely decrease significantly. The California employment program for prisoners has been cut due to the California budget cuts; this is significant because those that are unemployed are at a greater risk to return to prison (Rothenberg, 2009). Recommendations: After analyzing all three proposed alternatives, it is concluded that all three alternatives are cost effective. Therefore, it is recommended that the National Governors Association implement all three programs. The three proposed solutions would annually avoid incarceration of or reduce 17,029 prisoners from Californias existing state prison population. The total present value for all three alternatives at a discount rate of 4.33 percent over fifteen years would amount to state prisons relieved of 370,672 inmates. The total present value for all three of our alternatives at a discount rate of 4.52 percent over fifteen years results in a reduction or
28

avoidance of 377,242 prisoners from the state prisons. Finally, the total present value of all three alternatives at a discount rate of 4.71 percent over fifteen years yields a reduction or avoidance of 383,971 prisoners in the state prison system. With the implementation of all three programs, the California prison system population will significantly decrease. While policymakers and the general public demand results now, the effectiveness of these programs will be seen on a per annum basis in the reduction or avoidance of 17,029 individuals in the California state prisons. This social issue does not require further research unless three proposed programs prove ineffective after fifteen years. Though the costs of this policy appear to be high given the current budget for the California state prisons, the benefits outweigh the costs in fifteen years of our policys implementation.

29

References Advisor, C. N. (n.d.). How Many Juveniles are Arrested Each Year? Legislative Analysts Office. California. Web 25 April 2010. Advisor, C. N. (1995, May). Juvenile Crime--Outlook for California Part VI. Legislative Analysts Office. California. Web 25 April 2010. Bailey, Amanda, and Joseph M. Hayes. 2006. Who's in Prison? The Changing Demographics of Incarceration. California Counts, v. 8, no. 1. San Francisco, Calif: Public Policy Institute of California. Bernstein, Kyle T., Joan Chow, Juan M. Ruiz, Julius Schachter, Evalyn Horowitz, Rebecca Bunnell, and Gail Bolan. 2006. Chlamydia Trachomatis and Neisseria Gonorrhoeae Infections Among Men and Women Entering California Prisons. American Journal of Public Health. Vol 96 No. 10. Brown, W. O., S.B. Frates, I.S. Rudge, R.L. Tradewell. 2002. The Costs and Benefits of After School Programs: The Estimated Effects of the After School Education and Safety Program Act of 2002. Legislative Analysts Office. Claremont, California. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Data Analysis Unit. 1998-2009. Chen, Elsa. 2008. Impacts of Three Strikes and You're Out on Crime Trends in California and Throughout the United States. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. Volume 24. Num. 4 (pg 345-422). Ettner, Susan L, David Huang, Elizabeth Evans, Danielle Rose Ash, Mary Hardy, Mickel Jourabchi, Yih-Ing, Hser. 2006. BenefitCost in the California Treatment Outcome Project: Does Substance Abuse Treatment Pay for Itself? Health Services Research Journal. Blackwell Science Inc. Web. 15 Apr2010. Greenblatt, Alan. 2007. Felon Fallout. Governing. 20.6: 36-8, 40, 42, 44. OmniFile Full Text. Select. Web. 22 Apr 2010. Greenwood, Peter W, Peter Rydell. Allan F. Abrahamse, Jonathan P. Caulkins, James Chinesa, Karyn E. Model, Stephen P. Klein. 1994. Three Strikes and Youre Out. RAND. Santa Monica, California. Web. 11 Apr 2010. Gupta, Shaili. Altice, Frederick L. Hepatitis B Virus infection in US correctional Facilities: A review of Diagnosis, Management, and public health implications. Journal of Urban Health. 2009 Vol. 86. No. 2 pg263-279. Jailhouse Blues. 13 Feb. 2010. Economist. London, England. Vol. 394, No. 8669: 37. SIRS Researcher. Web. 06 March 2010.
30

Katel, Peter. 2007. Prison Reform. CQ Researcher. 17.13: 289-312. Web. 1 May 2010. ...2009. Prisoner Reentry. CQ Researcher. 19.42: 1005-1028. Web. 1 May 2010. Lithwick, Dahlia. 15 Jun 2009. Our Real Prison Problem:Why are we so worried about Gitmo? Newsweek. Vol. 153, Iss. 24. 15 Jun 2009: ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 3 Apr. 2010. Office of the Attorney General. March 2000. Report on Juvenile Arrests in California, 1998. California. Web 28 April 2010. Rothenberg, Jackie. 12 Dec 2009. For State Prisons, West Isnt Best: California Clogs its Jails While New Yorks Court Reform Frees Funds. ABA Journal. 95.:15(2). Academic OneFile. Gale. University of Kansas. 6 Mar. 2010. Spiegel, Sarah. 2007. Prison Race Riots: An Easy Case for Segregation. California Law Review. Vol. 95 pgs 2261-2293. Summary Statistics on Adult Felon Prisoners and Parolees, Civil Narcotic Addicts, Outpatients and Other Popualations. State of California. Web 5 April 2010. Sung, H.-E. 2001. Rehabilitating Felony Drug Offenders Through Job Development: A Look Into a Prosecutor-Led Diversion Program. Prison Journal. 81: 271-286. Taylor, Mac. 25 Jan 2010. Legislative Analysts Office. Web. 12 Apr 2010. Tempest. 6 Mar. 2005. Death Row Often Means a Long Life. Los Angeles Times. Report and Recommendations of the Administration of the Death Penalty in California. California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice. The Cost of Crime: Issues for California-Specific Estimation. Oct. 2009. State of California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Center for Public Policy Research University of California-Davis. The California Prison Disaster. 25 Oct. 2008. New York Times, Late Edition - Final, Editorial Desk: 22. NewsBank. Web. 7 Mar. 2010. Udesky, Laurie Court takes over Californias prison health system. The world. September 3, 2005. Vol. 366 pg796-797. Urbina, I. 25 Feb. 2009. In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting. New York Times, p. 1. Academic Search Premier. U.S. Department of Justice. January 2007. Medical Causes of Death in State Prisons, 2001-2004. Washington DC.

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Worst of the Worst. July/Aug 2008. Mother Jones. 33 No4. Young, Kathryne Tafolla. 2007. The Privatization of California Correctional Facilities: A Population-Based Approach. Stanford Law and Policy Review. Vol. 18 pgs 439-470.

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Appendix 1: California Felon Parole Violators Returned with a New Term by Offence Category Calendar Year Person 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2503 2415 2640 2578 2547 2546 2319 2375 2463 2449 2841 3107 3153 3222 Property 7281 7165 6766 6338 5751 5386 5046 5096 5580 6131 6988 7527 7730 7596 Drug 5618 6275 6484 7239 7632 7804 7309 5706 4824 5505 6106 7134 7555 7565 Other 1623 1599 1634 1490 1470 1343 1338 1355 1485 1609 1907 2019 2331 2427 Total 17025 17454 17524 17645 17400 17079 16012 14532 14352 15694 17842 19787 20769 20810

33

2008 Minimum Maximum Average

3358 2319 3358

7623 5046 7730

6537 4824 7804

2434 1338 2434

19952

2717.2352941 6516.4705882 6583.5882352 1755.0588235 17591.8 1765 3529 9412 2941

Standard Deviation Median

343.48725629 973.58907436 927.06032063 390.81961494 6497 2547 0577 6766 466 6537 8599 1609 17454

Figure 1

34

9000 8000
Number of Felon Parole Violators

California Felon Parole Violators Returned with a New Term by Offense Category

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Person

Property

Drug

Other

Drug + Drug Offenders total 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 42,998 45,328 43,998 38,271 36,711 33,252 32,520 CS Possession total 19,073 19,753 19,864 15,781 14,877 13,061 12,651 Possession Total 63,862 54,052 51,588 46,313 45,171 49,726 50,273 Violent crime total 48633 51175 52532 55730 58204 46961 60625

CA Prison Pop

159563 159563 160687 160655 157142 161785 163939

35

2005 2006 2007 2008

35,437 35711 33738 31565

14,325 14,562 13,456 11,981

47194 43546 47194 43546

63051 65215 66307 45796

168035 172528 171444 171085

Average

15,399

55839

18% of total % prison pop

7% of total prison pop

32% of total prison pop

Drug Offender Population in California Prisons

70,000

60,000

50,000 Drug Offenders

Population

40,000

Controlled Substance Possession Charge Violent Offenses Total Drug Related

30,000

20,000

10,000

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Years since 1997

36

200000

180000

160000

140000

120000 Prison Population Violent Crimes Substance Possession Offenders Drug Offenses

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

37

Death Row Cost of Trials Cost of Appeals Additional cost of Confinement Total $ in millions 20 54.5 63.3 137.7

Life Sentence 5 3 3.5 11.5

38

Cost of Death Row vs. Life in Prison

140

120

100

80 Financial costs in millions 60 Death Row Life Sentence

40

20

0 Cost of Trials Cost of Appeals Additional cost of Confinement Total

39

Appendix 2: Juvenile Offences Categories from 1988-1998 Violent Offences Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 13,886 17,325 20,453 21,016 21,367 21,402 22,429 22,334 21,962 21,002 19,646 49,061 53,116 53,762 54,952 53,768 51,058 48,720 46,135 44,946 42,287 38,308 11,646 11,037 8,158 7,396 7,636 7,861 9,375 8,797 7,921 8,484 7,392 6,165 7,548 9,000 10,301 10,713 11,652 11,475 10,650 10,811 10,975 10,758 Property Offences Drug Offences Other Offences

Average Median

19,646 21,016

38,308 49,061

7,392 8,158

10,758 10,713

40

Sum

222,822

536,113

95,703

110,048

Figure 2
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!"#$%&'$()**$+,+(&%(-.'&/0*%&.
(*#+(' ("#!!% ("#&%' ("#&%$ (!#)($ *+#)%! *$#&') *%#!"( **#+*% *'#'$&

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*))))

"$#")$

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''#*'+ ')#*(" ')))) !&#"'( '!#)!% '!#"%& '!#*)'

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!"#$$% !!#%*% !)))) &#(*$ %#!%( !!#)"& +#))) $#!($ !!#%(' !!#*&( +#"&( &#%"% &#$%! !)#$!! &#+'! !)#+&( $#*$* &#"+'

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41

Appendix 3: Cost of Crime Estimates Crime Fatal crime Child Abuse Rape/Sexual Assault Assault/Attempted Assault Robbery/Attempted Robbery Drunk Driving Arson Burglary/Attempted Burglary Auto Theft/Attempted Auto Theft Average (non-violent/serious) 1993 $2,953,333.00 $60,000.00 $9,400.00 $87,000.00 $8,000.00 $18,000.00 $37,500.00 $1,400.00 $3,700.00 2009 $4,448,006.00 $90,366.00 $131,031.00 $14,158.00 $12,049.00 $27,110.00 $56,479.00 $2,109.00 $5,573.00 $16,342.00

42

Appendix 4: Californias Annual Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison

43

Appendix 5: Violent/Serious Offences

2009 value $ cost (millions) Number of crimes prevented (000) Cost/crime prevented calculated at 4% discount rate

Current 3-strike $14,907.00 881 $24,200.00

Violent/Serious Only $10,542.00 999 $17,520.00

44

45

46

Appendix 6: Criminal Justice Costs 1993 and adjusted to 2009 equivalents

Cost Item Police cost per arrest

2009 $ 926

Adjudication cost per arrest 1930

Cost per trial Jail operating cost per prisoner-year Prison operating cost per prisoner-year

5939 14847

47000

47

Prison capital cost per prisoner

144,015

48

Appendix 7:

Appendix 8: Cost Benefit Analysis of 3-strike policy vs. Revision, RAND

49

Calculation of the cost of the after school program Cost/child per day # of School Days State $5 Local School $2.50 Total $7.50 180 Annual Cost per child $1,350.00

p. 20 Cohen Estimates After School Doc. Summary of Cost and Benefits of After School Programs: Cost per participant: $10,038 Effect of Act: Range of Benefits Reduced Child Care Costs $889 to $1,777 Increased Schooling Costs ($989) to ($742) Improved School Performance $447 to $809 Increased Compensation $29,415 to $38,284 Reduced Crime Costs $59,425 to $88,835 Reduced Welfare Costs $335 to $502 Total $89,522 to $129,465 Net Benefit $79,484 to $119,427

Cohen 1998 Page 6 of After-School Doc. estimates Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk Youth Classification Low Estimate High Estimate Career Criminal $1,434,455 $1,655,140 Career Drug Abuser $408,268 $1,070,324 High School Dropout $268,133 $428,130

Number of Juveniles reduced due to Intervention programs Discount Rate Number of Years Annual Number of Juveniles reduced 4.33% 15 8,768 4.52% 15 8,768 4.71% 15 8,768
50

Present Value 190,853 194,236 197,701

Discount rate 4.33% 4.52% 4.71%

Number of Prisoners reduced by revocation of Three-strike Law Number of Years Annual number or prisoners reduced Present Value 15 356 7,750 15 356 7,887 15 356 8,028

Number of Prisoners reduced by Substance Abuse Treatments Discount Rate Number of Years Annual Number of Prisoners reduced Present Value 4.33% 15 7,905 172,069 4.52% 15 7,905 175,119 4.71% 15 7,905 178,242

51