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Natural Science and Kant's Concept of Nature Introduction Among the many aspects of Kant's work his philosophy presents a critical method for natural science. The tensions inherent in Kant's critical project however, are brought into sharp focus in any attempt to make metaphysical and empirical application of the categories of the transcendental subject. In particular, the status of nature becomes uncertain under Kantian a methodology. A minimal definition of natural science would be: a systematic approach to questions regarding nature. Such a program should cultivate theoretical and empirical capacities accessible from the limits of its practitioners but also adequate to the vast diversity of nature. Kant's recommendations for the application of his critical philosophy foregoes any adequacy to nature, in surrender to a bounded transcendental subject, impoverishing the very concept of nature in the process. Specifically, Kant's too narrow cognitive concept of human reason and understanding prioritises epistemological concerns over the metaphysical and as a result abandons the possibility of a truly universal natural science. Any investigation into a philosopher's work and the possibility of natural science cannot be satisfied with mere empirical falsification. Kant was influenced by Newton, engaging with and expanding on his work from the earliest pre-critical writings. That the natural science Kant wished to find foundations for was mechanical does not allow us to refute the work with reference only to subsequent scientific theories. Thermodynamics, relativity and quantum mechanics for example would all be difficult to accommodate in a Kantian framework, if not straightforwardly contradictory. Yet the inability of Kant's philosophy to accommodate newer scientific theories provides no argument to dismiss the critical project. First, that certain scientific theories contradict Kant's work could equally be argued as dismissing the science. If, for example, quantum mechanics appears counter-intuitive to us, we might argue that this is because it oversteps the critical recommendations for the conduct of natural science.
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Second, and more importantly, Kant's critical project, while seeking to provide foundations for natural science, was not derived from natural science nor aimed at merely confirming it. There are metaphysical questions which cannot be answered by reference to empirical science, since the endeavour of science depends on these questions, and not vice versa. On this we are in agreement with Kant. A philosophy of nature is a prerequisite of any science, whether it is explicit about it or not. The starting point for this project is Kant's antinomy of judgement as it relates to the concept of nature, and the explanatory framework and methodology of natural science: [1.] [] All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws. [2.] [] Some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible in terms of merely mechanical laws (Kant 1987, 267). The antinomy of is based on three elements as Kant defines them: judgement, matter, and production. By enquiring into Kant's treatment of the first two, which are jointly defined, this project will show the problems subsequent on the third. An explication of Kant's approach to Newtonian science in particular will reveal the lacunae inherent in a strictly critical natural science. Reading Kant's own work on natural purposes in the context of Whitehead's later expansion of Kantian aesthetics will provide a counterpoint to the mechanism and dualism of critical natural science. First Description of Matter Kant distinguishes between formal nature, depending on necessary connections according to inner principles; and material nature, of apparent connections according to inner principles (1998, 466). Kant's transcendental project, which aims at an a priori demonstration of the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience, requires that our sensible intuitions are brought by our judgements
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under the categories of the understanding. Matter is the subject of outer intuition as it is synthesized from the manifold of phenomena. and material nature is the sum total of appearances (1998, 466). Any thoroughgoing description of matter is dependent from the start on the cognitive structure of the subject, since in order for it to be the object of a determinate judgement it must be in agreement with the categories. A first determination of matter by the categories is given in the the Analogies of Experience in the 1st Critique. The analogies describe three relations of phenomena in time: persistence, succession and simultaneity. From these Kant draws out the necessary form of empirical cognition. First, while all appearances change in time, objects persist. Therefore there must be a persistent substance of which all changing appearances are accidents. Substance persists as the the substratum of all other relations in time. What persists is an object to which every change belongs as accidents in the Aristotelian sense. Second, there is a temporal successions of prior and subsequent event. These alterations are connected as cause and effect. Following Hume Kant says that we have no experience of cause and effect, but the temporal succession of our perceptions and that which in general precedes an occurrence provides the conditions for a rule in accordance with which this occurrence always and necessarily follows (Kant 1998, 307). The always successive synthesis of the manifold of experience presupposes the appearances that will follow from those actually experienced. Third, the manifold of sensible intuition contains within in a plurality of substantial appearances and so far as these appear simultaneously (in one apprehension) they exist in relation to one another. This community of objects guaranties the coherence of our perception and their continuity in space and time. The analogies of the 1st Critique are highly abstract. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science however, Kant expands upon the empirical use of the categories in order to make the transition from a priori deduction to metaphysical application in natural science. Presented in explicitly Newtonian language the fullest definition of matter is given in four propositions on the foundations of mechanics:
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1. Matter is the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, has moving force (Kant 2004, 75). 2. In all changes of corporeal nature the total quantity of matter remains the same, neither increased nor diminished (ibid., 80), 3. Every change in matter has an external cause (ibid., 82), 4. In all communication of motion, action and reaction are always equal to one another (ibid., 84) It is clear that the propositions of mechanical science are further specifications of the categories of relation. Here substance, succession and simultaneity find empirical application as the necessary foundation of natural science which is specifically Newtonian1. The specification of the categories for application to in an empirical program of natural science finds a detailed determination of material bodies and a description of certain regularities in their relation. The distinction made between formal and material nature is important here. While the formal laws of experience given in the categories have a priori necessity in order that the manifold of phenomenal appearance be cognitively intuitable, the empirical laws of material nature enjoy only a posteriori necessity. In so far as they describe regularities found throughout material nature and are, in theory, universally applicable, no transcendental argument can be given a priori why the
1 Indeed, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's mechanical propositions can be mapped to the principles of Newtonian mechanics: CPR Categories (of relation) Law Inertia Inherence and Subsistence 1st Analogy: Substance Persists Causality and Dependence 2nd Analogy: Cause and Effect F=ma Community Equality 3rd Analogy: Simultaneity and Reaction MF Proposition Proposition 2: Persistence of Matter Proposition 3: External Cause Proposition 4: Equality of Action and Reaction 1st Law Law 2nd Law of Newtonian

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Law: Action

Though the mapping of Kantian propositions to Newtonian laws is not exact the correlation of basic metaphysical principles is instructive. 4 of 17

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laws of material nature should be so and not otherwise. Kant's critical work aims to provide a structured philosophical approach to first, the possibility of experience which is grounded in the necessary formal nature of the transcendental subject; second, the metaphysical application of the categories which determines what matter as the object of our outer intuitions can be; and finally, the description of empirical laws of the regularities apparent in material nature as the sum total of appearances. The propositions of mechanics describe this material nature. Propositions two and four introduce the conservation of matter from a substantial basis, and the community of mobile substantial bodies. Proposition one gives the description of matter as movable and having force. The nature of the relation of force to matter, whether external or inherent, becomes a tension in Kant's work which is central to the problem of Kant's recommendations for natural science. Directly related to this, proposition three introduces the concept of a necessarily external cause. The necessity of extra-material origin of efficacious change, which follows from the categories of relation, profoundly impacts on the concept of nature. Kant's work from transcendental deduction through metaphysical determination to empirical application gives a concept of nature is divided between a material nature, which is the subject of natural science, and formal nature which grounds the possibility of the material. Kant's foundations for natural science therefore determine that it deals with substantial bodies, dependent on external forces for all change, and existing in a community of relations with all other bodies. Imposed Law The system of natural bodies described by Kant and Newton depend according to Whitehead on a doctrine of Imposed Law (Whitehead 1967, 113). Every element of the system can be described sufficiently as it appears without reference to any other element. Yet in a system of multiple elements external relations impress upon each element certain changes. A mechanical material body is described as substantial, extended, and persisting. These properties together with any motion are the limit of a complete description and the body
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depends on no other properties for its existence, it is sufficient to itself. Such a body will persist without change however, unless subsequent bodies come into communication with it. Here then external relations compel bodies to certain changes. Here we encounter the first problem with the system of natural science explicated by Kant: what is the force which acts between bodies in a system of external relations? Persistent substantial bodies are objects properly understood in the Kantian sense. Yet while the relation of appearances under the categories give certain concepts of cause, effect, and relation, there is no object of our perception which corresponds to these concepts. The experience of succession gives no direct cognitive intuition of cause and effect, just as simultaneity is not directly a cognitive intuition of relation. Empirical laws describe the regularities of phenomenal nature, but experience gives no reason for these regularities. This was a problem frankly admitted by Newton: I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for the properties of gravity, and I do not feign a hypotheses (Newton 2004, 92). A related problem is the potential dualism of such a system. The definition of matter determined in the understanding gives us a inert substance dependent on external principle for its changes: The inertia of matter is, and means, nothing else than its lifelessness (Kant 2004, 83). The lifelessness of matter imposes upon it the necessity of an additional principle to effect any change. Newton admits as much himself It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate on and affect other matter (Newton, 2004, 102). If the forces of change under imposed laws are different in kind from the bodies on which they act how is effective communication to be explained between metaphysically distinct things? This again is a problem experienced by Newton whose detractors targeted the action at a distance of the force of gravity and instead posited some medium of communication. How is the force of gravity transmitted instantly through the void without a substantial carrier? However, the interaction problem recurs even
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with the addition of a medium of gravity. The force acting between bodies is a function of their extensive, massive and motive properties. Even assuming that a substantial medium in common with that which forms the substrate of material properties permeates every point in space we must find some way of explaining how the the properties of bodies may be communicated in a non-extended, zeromass and immobile way. A medium for force would share only the substantial substratum of bodies2 and could not share any other property of matter without become another material body. A material medium of force, however finely distributed, would effect material systems as another body leading once again to the problem of the communication of force. A third problem is the atemporal nature described by imposed law. The persistence of substantial bodies, their relations of cause and effect and their community all describe transcendentally necessary relations which are the same everywhere at every time. The empirical laws given by mechanical materialism as they are based on metaphysical determinations are in no way probabilistic, indeterminate or capable of self-determination. They are precise functions of material systems describable in exact mathematical terms. This is the problem of Laplace's demon. Given a complete description of the cosmos at any time the positions, extensions and motions of every cosmic body a complete description of the cosmos at all times is possible. Such a demonic vision may be unavailable to humans, yet philosophically this raises serious questions, including the reason for the appearance of temporal nature. Atemporal mechanics contradicts metaphysically what is transcendentally necessary; i.e. succession. The problem of time is also connected to questions of the origin and development of material nature. This is a problem present in Kant's antinomy of judgement which enquires about the production of material things. Yet is production possible at all in mechanical terms? This is a problem recognised by Kant in his discussion of a watchmaker. Clocks and orraries, exemplary as mechanical systems, function according to precise laws, but they do not build themselves. Although the production of complex systems from determinate mechanical laws has been
2 And as we shall see the substantial substratum is without force. 7 of 17

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argued for3 it is something which Kant explicitly rejects. The problem of the origin and production of mechanical systems cuts to the heart of Kant's antinomy of judgement, especially regarding the possibility of natural science. The determinate relations described by mechanics are brute facts. Observations are described properly according to the empirical application of the categories. Unifiable observations are understood as common exemplifications of certain determinate relations and laws governing these phenomena are described. Yet there remain questions of reason for which no transcendental argument can be given. Why do we experience these laws and not others? What is the origin of these laws? It is here that transcendental philosophy draws a line. No true object of cognitive intuition can come from the ideas of reason and these questions regarding the form of the appearance of material nature is beyond either empirical or transcendental investigation. It is here that we must remember the restraint placed on our investigation into material nature: the persistence, causes and relations of which we speak are appearances only and objects as they are in-themselves are beyond our capacity to know. We may suppose Kant's answer to our questions, drawn from his claimed solution to the antinomy of judgement: there is an indeterminate concept, an idea of reason, a supersensible substrate of appearances in which these questions are resolved but to which we can have no access. Kant's suggestion that we judge purposive form on the assumption of a will that would have so arranged them in accordance with the presentation of a certain rule (1987, 65) refers to the supersensible ideas of God and freedom as the substrate for natural purposiveness. Although this maxim is given in the context of purposive forms for which we can see no mechanical origin it is equally applicable to mechanical systems since any sufficiently complex mechanical arrangement is by Kant's admission inexplicable on mechanical grounds. The purposiveness of nature is not only a question of beautiful and complex living beings, but also of the organised form of mechanical nature. Newton makes this point explicit: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from
3 Most often by compatabilists arguing for free will within a mechanical material concept of nature. Conway's Game of Life is the favoured demonstration of this. 8 of 17

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any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent (2004, 95). The thesis of Kant's antinomy of judgement is fraught with contradictions even before the antithesis. Despite the predictive and engineering successes of mechanical science, and despite the work that Kant has done to ground natural science, we are ultimately left with a philosophically troubling situation. The assumption that the world purposively formed is the way it would appear if an intelligent will had so formed it applies not only to teleological nature but also to mechanical nature. Mechanical material has been defined in a project running from transcendental deduction to metaphysical and empirical application. Yet questions of reason come back unsettle our empirical investigations. Nature is divided, first formally and materially, and subsequently material nature is divided in a dualism of bodies and forces the problems of which cannot be resolved, except by appeal to a supersensible substrate beyond nature and well beyond the capacity of either philosophy or science to know. There is however, within Kant's work an alternative concept of nature which suggests a different kind of science. Immanent Law While Kant's antinomy of judgement divides mechanical nature from apparently purposive products of nature he does also recognise the problem of the production of mechanical systems. Machines for Kant have only motive force (1987, 253) and thus he should be in agreement with Newton regarding the impossibility of the origin of our organised solar system on mechanical grounds. Yet, the difficulty of the antinomy, and perhaps also the feeling that its solution is unsatisfactory, comes from the work that Kant has done in attempting to form a concept of nature containing more than mere mechanism. In his discussion of natural purposes and organised beings Kant contrasts the motive force of mechanical systems to a formative force of organized systems. A formative force propagates itself and is capable of forming organised wholes. Kant makes two requirements of an organised systems: first, the possibility of
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its parts (as it concerns both their existence and their form) must depend on their relation to the whole (1987, 252); and second, the parts of a thing combine into the unity of the whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of their form (1987, 252). Whitehead names this alternative system of reciprocally produced entities as a doctrine of Law as immanent (1967, 111). In contrast to the bodies under systems of imposed law, no element of a system of immanent law is self-sufficient. No simple description of any entity in abstract isolation is possible since entities in a such a system are products of the interrelations among every element in the system. The order of a system expresses the character of existent elements which are jointly composed by their mutual communication. Among the influences on Whitehead's formulation of this doctrine is Kant's work on natural purposes and teleology. While Kant rejects the possibility of any true knowledge from judgements of teleology in nature Whitehead embraces the possibility of a nature in which [t]he teleology of the universe is directed to the production of beauty (1967, 265) the enquiry into which aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling (1985, 113), that is a program of aesthetics as first philosophy. There is not space here to fully explicate Whitehead's philosophy of organism as an inversion of the order of the Kantian critique's, nor the problems with chaos and disorder which both Kant and Whitehead share. Yet Whitehead provides a productive twist on Kantian aesthetics and matter. There is in Kant's work the basis for a doctrine of immanent law that runs counter to his own final pronouncements on the impossibility of a physical purposes. Most interestingly there is an argument from physical necessity for forces as immanent. Newton sided with his critics when questioned as to whether a body described by it's extension, mass and motion is exhaustively defined and in need of an imposed force to account for any change. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter [] is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it (Newton, 2004, 102). Yet, as
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the criteria by which we may assess Kant's own work on the

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we have seen, to reject the force of gravity as inherent to matter is only possible in a dualist system whose problems competent philosophers have struggled with for millennia. Perhaps aware of this Kant criticised Newton for not being Newtonian enough (Friedman 1992, 139), arguing that by denying gravity as essential to matter he is at variance with himself (Kant 2004, 54). Kant attempted a description of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations, in the chapter prior to the mechanics, which is dynamic. Here matter is considered as the product of two opposing forces in tension. The first force is repulsive, which accounts for a bodies resistance to the imposition or penetration of other bodies. The second, less easy to account for by appeal to our outward senses, is attractive. Kant derives this force from a physical necessity in relation to the first attractive force. Any force exerted outward would continue to expand unopposed, filling space until it encountered a force in the opposite direction. In such a system of forces there would be no void, only matter filling every part of space, and if the forces were in equilibrium there would be no change. Instead Kant's posits a second attractive force of matter which holds the first in check and maintaining the stable and extended character of bodies in a tension of inherent forces. What is most interesting about the dynamic description of matter is the way in which Kant arrives at it. The first repulsive force is posited in order to avoid the problems of atomic matter4 and to include elasticity in the description of matter. The repulsive force is relatively easy to understand phenomenologically and is therefore permissible as a metaphysical principal. The attractive force on the other hand does not present itself so immediately to the senses as impenetrability, so as to furnish us with concepts of determinate objects in space (2004, 50-1). Nevertheless, based on the physical consequences of an unbalanced force of repulsion Kant introduces the attractive to hold the first in check. The exciting possibility of matter as a product of forces is given away however, when in the mechanics the categories come back to impose upon matter the necessity of external force for change, denying once again any inherent power to matter.
4 Kant criticised the Atomists for describing a matter which cannot be compressed or divided, and for claiming that atoms had geometrical shapes to which no sensible intuition was possible. 11 of 17

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Immanent Power Immanent power is given by Whitehead as the essential meaning of the doctrine of immanent law, quoting Plato's definition of being from the Sophist: My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power. (247E) Considering Kant's philosophy of nature as a whole, what elements can be said to have power? Our first definition of matter in a mechanical system was composed of extensive bodies of no immanent power with only relations between these bodies imposing changes of an external force. The bodies of such a system have no power to effect anything, although systems of multiple bodies are subject to a motive force. As we have discussed however, the force of gravity is not a power of bodies and the determination of that force is merely a function, and not an effect, of the mass and spatial relations of bodies. In addition to this, forces have a questionable metaphysical status in Kant's formulation as we have seen. A force is not a substantial object which might come into cognition through sense and the understanding. Strictly speaking the motive force hypothesised as causing the motions of substantial bodies is nothing to us. We never experience a cause, only the succession of phenomenal events, and what properly constitutes objects synthesized from the manifold of sensible intuitions are substantial bodies. The changing relation of such objects or bodies suggest to us the law-like arrangement of their interactions but to know any active motive force would be to know a cause and this is impossible for Kant. What of our second, dynamic definition of matter? On Kant's dynamic definition material bodies have at least two forces - of repulsion and attraction and every body is subject to the mutually interacting power of these forces. That the power of matter might include productive as well as motive force is a possibility never
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examined by Kant. Instead, the tension of forces productive of matter are forgotten in favour of the necessity of substantial substratum and external cause. The properties or accidents of any object are predicated of a persisting substance. The deduction of a persistent substance from the categories of relation is based on the argument that changing phenomenal properties must belong to some substratum. Yet this requirement is neither a physical or logical necessity and the substantial substratum is an object which has no effective power. The accidents of substantial objects whether dynamic or inert extension are phenomenal appearances which are equally powerless. Just as with the mechanical definition of matter, when dynamic matter is determinatively judged it is brought under categories of the understanding in the synthesis of experience for which causal power cannot be an object. Conclusion No system of immanent nature is possible for Kant. If we ask again the question: What in Kant's philosophy has power? the reply must be Only the categories of the transcendental subject. The division of nature into formal and material is the segregation of causal efficacy to the side of the subject and away from matter. In every judgement on nature as the sum total of appearances it is the categories of the understanding which form and determine nature as that which we experience. Determinative judgements are determinative only in so far as they can bring the manifold of intuition under specific categories of the understanding. Material nature is almost nothing in such judgements, the contingent succession of phenomena prior to our synthesis. The synthesis of phenomena in experience is the production of a world according not to laws of nature but laws of the transcendental subject. Reflective judgements as they are presented by Kant, which is with subjective validity only, impoverish nature in the same way. The feeling of free-play is an affect whose impetus we make our own in imagining the arrangement of nature in analogy with our own will. In discussing the apparent purposiveness of the biological forms of plants and animals Kant suggests a maxim that nothing happens by chance (1987, 256,
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italics removed). Such a maxim could be considered a formulation of a principle of sufficient reason. Two pages later Kant explicitly formulates his own principle of reason: Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in it is gratuitous; and the example that nature offers us in its organic products justifies us, indeed calls upon us, to expect nothing from it and its laws except what is purposive in [relation to] the whole. (1987, 259) Kant's formulation is distinguished by the fact that it is valid only subjectively (1987, 259). As such it is only a maxim for how we ought to judge nature, that is normatively, and not how nature is, i.e. ontologically. As a normative maxim it is also distinguished for it's subtle substitution of 'reason' for 'utility'; that is, the gratuitousness against which the principle is supposed to guard is not a causal gratuitousness of indeterminacy or chaos, but a gratuitousness of use, that there should be nothing in nature which is useless in the sense of providing some good. Such a principle is categorically not a metaphysical one, and it is a testament to the restricted role Kant allows for causative powers in his philosophy. In judging teleologically as Kant here recommends we say nothing objective about nature and everything about our own faculty of reason. This reflective introversion is linked to a movement in Kant whereby he abandons nature 'out there' in favour of a second nature in the subject. Physics, says Kant, must be kept strictly within its bounds (1987, 263) even when the inadequacy of mechanical explanations prompt us to ask questions of reason. We are, in effect, stuck with the inadequacy of mechanics since it is the only science suitable for subjects such as we are. Our consolation is that imagination creates for us a second nature, both beautiful and moral. Imagination ([in its role] as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it. [] [W]e can process that material into something [] that
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surpasses nature (Kant 1987, 182). Kant's famous conclusion to the Critique of Practical Reason can be understood from this perspective rather bitterly as one and the same reflection. The starry heavens as objects of material nature must be lifeless as Kant has said of all matter. It is only in reflecting upon them in analogy with our own will that the form of their arrangement signifies any purpose to us. The restriction of efficacious power to the transcendental subject is the institution of a radical division in the concept of nature between mind and world. Natural science under such a methodology is trapped in a dead end program of empirical cataloguing, held on a transcendental leash away from metaphysical questions. The possibility of future sciences depends on a return to the concept of nature.

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Bibliography Friedman, Michael (1992) Kant and the Exact Sciences. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Grant, Iain H. (2008) Philosophies of Nature After Schelling. London, Continuum International Publishing Group. Kant, Immanuel (1987) Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company. Kant, Immanuel (1994) History and Natural Description of the Most
Remarkable Occurrences associated with the Earthquake which at the End of the Year 1755 Shook a Great Part of the Earth, trans. Stephen Richard Palmquist (Revising Richardson, 1799). Online: http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/fne/essay1.html [Accessed 04/01/12].

Kant, Immanuel (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (2002) Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. Online: http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5683/pg5683.txt [accessed 21/01/12] Kant, Immanuel (2004) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. Michael Friedman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel (2008) Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, trans. Ian Johnston. Arlington, Richer Resources Publications. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2007) Monadology, trans. Jonathan Bennett. Online: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibmona.pdf [accessed

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19/01/12]. Newton, Isaac (2004) Philosophical Writings, ed. Andrew Janiak. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Shaviro, Steven (2009) Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics. London, The MIT Press. Plato (1999) Sophist, trans. Benjamin Jowett. Online: http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1735/pg1735.txt [accessed 21/01/12]. Whitehead, Alfred North (1967) Adventures of Ideas. New York, The Free Press. Whitehead, Alfred North (1985) Process and Reality, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York, The Free Press.

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