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Rodriguez v. Rodriguez

When Domingo Rodriguez died intestate, he was survived by his widow, Concepcion Felix, his children grandchildren. The widow, children and grandchildren of the deceased entered into an extra-judicial settlement of his estate, consisting of one-half of the properties allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership. The widow later on questioned the validity of this extrajudicial partition, saying that she entered such contract under duress, violence and intimidation. The SC agreed with the trial Court that the evidence was not convincing that the contracts of transfer from the widow to her daughter, and from the latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through violence or intimidation (this was done to allegedly convert paraphernal property into conjugal). What is more decisive is that duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years after it has ceased; and the present action was instituted only after 28 years after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred, and no less than 9 years after the supposed culprit died. On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transactions with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore, this cause of action is clearly barred. NUGUID VS NUGUID GRN L-2344 17 SCRA 449 JUNE 23, 1966 SANCHEZ, J.: FACTS: Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30, 1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby, compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the institution is void. The courts order held that the will in question is a complete nullity. ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs were preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void. Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the will. RULING: The statute we are called upon to apply in article 854 of the civil code which states: The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has been duly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. Sofia Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, Rufina Gomez, Oscar Jugo Ang, Carmelita Jugo G.R. No. L-62952; October 9, 1985 Facts: Martin Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. The will clearly stated that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita. He

stated that since 1952 he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. The testator and the petitioner herein were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely his legal wife and his children (Oscar & Carmelita) his entire estate. He devised the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The pet filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased. The legal wife and her children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to cohabiting with the pet. The Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI. It declared the will to be valid except the devise in favor of the pet pursuant to Art, 739 in relation with Art. 1028. Pet filed a motion for recon - denied. Issues: 1. Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. 2. Validity of hte disposition in favor of the pet. Ruling: 1. No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. 2. Invalid. Refer to Art. 739. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents: First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee. Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings. Whether or not petitioner knew that testator Martin Jugo, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. Revilla v CA (G.R. No. 95329) Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncles estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracios 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that: - Since 1978 up to Cayetanos death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978 - The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature - Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will - That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence - That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or threats - Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will. Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating Buksan ito pagkalibing ko to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated.

Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything. *Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies. G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994 CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED, respondents. Facts:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court of appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil executed by Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976. The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated July 24, 1973 w/ thumbmarks of decedent and signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province. Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedents thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in accordance with law. RTC allowed will. Appealed. B.pen not same color. . . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When subjected to cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as follows: Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed by them in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen used by them supposedly in succession could not have produced a different color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation clause followed the same pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated when they signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no other alternative but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix used the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one color, not in various ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the signatures, in different colors as they are, appear to be of different broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was used, and, therefore, showing

that the documents were not signed by the testatrix and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another. . . " (Rollo, pp. 4446. Citations omitted.) Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion was denied by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990. ISSUE: W/N to allow will HELD:will not allowed. The petition must fail. The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedents Last Will and Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however, there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is contrary to that of the trial court, viz.: . . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of petitioners witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the latters signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular set of facts, numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which side of the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that elapsed between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they attested the documents in question . . . (Rollo, pp. 36-37.) A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in decedents will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioners witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary documents. It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence, and real evidence or autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows: If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the accuseds arm. This source differs from the other two in omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by direct self-perception, or autopsy. It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all, a third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived. The law does not need and does not attempt to consider theories of psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness of perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does exist. There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things perceived to other things unperceived as, for example, from a persons size, complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we are here concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived for example, that a person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to such matters, the perception by the tribunal that the person is small or large, or that he has a dark or light complexion, is a mode of acquiring belief which is independent of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial evidence. It is the tribunals self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself. From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it may be termed Autoptic Proference. 3 (Citations omitted.)

In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and white or more accurately, in black and blue that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve petitioners claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedents thumbmarking thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Toletes testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored signatures on the testaments. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will and Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Icasiano v. Icasiano 11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta FACTS: Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors. Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal. ISSUE: Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery of the testators signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure? (Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sirs book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity? HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all respects. On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence: The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix's signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue. Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor's expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the wills execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial. Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will. On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate: The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page. Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence. The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividads failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the wills validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege. The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.