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IS A HOLDING' OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICLS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANS.

DOCUMENT NO. -24

CGSC Form 160 13 Mar 51

COPY

A RESEARCH REPORT Prepared at THE ARMORED SCHOOL Fort Knox, Kentucky 1952-1953
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ONTOS IN TM-f R:!,ONa\TNAISSANCE PLATOON

RESEARCH R2PORPD PR~EPARED '" OMI TTEE 19

BY

ARMOR _OFFJLO2 R ADVANCED COURSE

TIT ARMORE.D SCHOOL

1952

-1953
10 D DIB
520010O

T, AJOR ROITLT

F.

CUNN'INGHAM SLIITH JR GOSSETT

CAPTAIN ROI PT S. CAPTAINT XVA BEN

G,

CAPTAIN GEORGE F.. HOGE C APTA ITI ROY L LILES

Fort

)I~.ox,

Isentucky'

a~y 1953

TABLE OF CONTENTS hapter

age

1
2

STATE.LNT OF TIr
BACKGROUND.. .....

PRO3BLEM..I,,
*.......

,,,,,,.,,,...,
................

1
9

.....

OPTIMUM MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS FOR A JIGIT RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE..... ,.

General ............
S
mmary ........

.o 0 oa .
.
*

20
20

o...o.......*........

Optimum Characteristics ...

...........

,,..

*... ,. ......
.. ...

22
9

COMPARISON OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF TIE

CURRENT ONTOS VEHICLES, THE ,-TON
o..........Q...
8.

UTILITY
.....
8.88 8 8

TRUCK M38A1,
H21,
General. ..

AND THE 81-M1 HMORTAR CARRIER,

32
32
. . .. .0

TITH TE OPTIHIU ...

Optimrnu

Comparison of the current ONTOS Vehicles

with the Characteristics ....
...

...

33

Comparisdn of the >-ton Utility Truck, i38A1, with the Optimum Characteristics..*.. Comparison of the 81-mm Mortar Carrier, M21, with the Optimum Characteristics.............. Discussion and Summary. ... ....... o.. . co 0 o ..
5 TACTICAL COMPARISONS .... ... General . . . ........................ The Command Vehicle*..... ...... The Scout Vehicle ........................... ....
o
0.......*.. ..

41

46
51
58 58 59 64

........ o
.

The Support Vehicle.

Su mar y.. 6 . .

.......................
. 0. . .. . . . . .. o
.... .........

71
o.
o

. .. o

77 81
81

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMIiNDATIONS .*

Conclusions....0... . ...... ....

.* *.. .. . .

Recommendations ........ BIBLIOGRAP Y.. ...

APPENDICES . .. .. ,...o

..... ..
...... .....

.. 0 ... ...

... . ..

.... ......

91 83
87

........

..............

I. II, III.

Extract T/O&E 2-27, 15 September 1943 Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized-. Extract T/08 17-57N, 23 Janai ry 1948, Reconnaissance Company..... *......... 0 Chart, Comparative Record of Combat Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Groups in the European Theater of Operations,
1944-45 . ....... a
a

88 89

..................

.0 .

8 0

...o

90

ii

Chapter IV. V. VI. VII, VIII, LX. X. Extract T/O&E 17-57,

Reconnaissance

Pag 15 May 1952,

91 Company.................

Vehicle Characteristics Chart........... List of On Vehicle Material for Truck i-Ton M38......,,................. Ammunition Basic Load and Equipment of the Support Squad ................ Summary of Equipment for Reconnaissance Platoon Headquarters.....,.............., Summary of Equipment for Scout Squads.,,, Sunriary of Equipment for Support Squad...... ....... ,..... ,.............. ,

92 93 94 95 97 99

iii

TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Fifre 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Title i-Ton Utility Truck, ONTOS, ONTOS, T55, T56, M38A.1 Page 2 3 4 6 34 35 42 M21, top view, showing 47 equipped as a command 62 rear view, rear view, rear view, rear view, showing crew seated. with crew standing. showing mortar. showing mortar being 7 75 65 69 72

front view with crew standing. rear oblique view. oblique view,

81-HMI Mortar Carrier M21, ONTOS, ONTOS, T55, T56,

rear oblique view. rear view showing inside empty.

An armored jeep. 81-MM Mortar Carrier, stowage. ONTOS, T55, vehicle. ONTOS, ONTOS, ONTOS, T55, T55, T56, rear view,

ONTOS, T56, fired.

81-MM Mortar Carrier, M21, high rear oblique view, showing mortar being fired.

iv

CHAPTER 1 STATED NT OF THE PROBLEM The vehicles for reconnaissance units have given rise to much discussion since the coming of age of the gasoline engine in warfare. With the passing of the horse from the battlefield, many persons have sought for a vehicle to take its place in the reconnaissance phase of modern war. Thus far, the motorcycle, jeep, armored car, the and- light tank have all tried in some measure to fill gap, but none have been completely successful. At present in our army, the jeep is the mount for the scouts. Although it affords much the same advantage, in mobility day, it also that the horse was so famous for in its has many of the same limitations that caused the horse One is the lack of armor protection. to be discarded. There are many combat experienced officers in our army, some of quite high positions, who believe that our scout vehicles should offer some degree of armor Perhaps protection and greater cross-country mobility. such a vehicle is now in being in the Utility Vehicle, Track, Infantry T55 and T56, or ONTOS as it is more faby the The above is best illustrated miliarly called;

following quotations:
There is an urgent and inmediate need in our army'for a vehicle similar in performance to the jeep, but at the same time affording some armor protection and greater cross-country mobility, for use by reconnaissance personnel, commanders, messengers, and liaison officers who are frequently exposed to small arms fire. On 24'August 1944, Lt Fiedler, 3d Platoon, Company C, 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, with one of the armored cars and a jeep started from the troop CP to take supplies and gasoline back to the platoon. In an effort to get there sooner, the Lieutenant took a short cut which led through the town of Les Ormes, France. Before he left he was warned that there was probably a German garrison in the tcwn. As the jeep turned a corner leading into the square of Les Ormes it came under the fire of a German

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ONTOS

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machine gun. The jeep was completely destroyed; the armored car was able to make its escape due to the armor protection of the crew.' On 3 April 1945, McAllister and Chaney (messengers from the 93 Signal Battalion, XII Corps) ran into an enemy ambush, when they were on a run to the 2d Cavalry Group,' in the vicinity of Budingen, Germany. Displaying exceptionally cool heads and stout hearts they ran their jeep through about a mile of enemy crossfire before being managed to But they still force to abandon it, burn the jeep and destroy their messages before they were taken captive o Asron Perry, 35253983, Tec 5, CIIP, Headquarters XII Corps, who distinguished himself by gallantry While accompanying the 1944. *: in action * commander of the 9th Inf Div (and later the CG, XII Corps) into areas often under intense enemy artilOn * * " actions. lery and small arms fire several occasions, when a less courageous driver would have faltered he drove his jeep through areas under direct enemy observation and machine4 gun fire, In this report we will study the. possible replacement of the, jeep and half-track, currently authorized in our command, scout, and support elements of the reconnaissance platoon, with an ONTOS type vehicle, namely We will weigh the military characterthe T55 and T56. of the vehicles as well as study their adaptistics roles. to tactical ability As this report 'is being written the vehicle is At present there is being modified and improved. still at Army Field Forces Board Nr 2 in being and under test an improved version of the ONTOS, and many of the limi-' tations of previous models have been overcome: However, in order to meet the deadline for this report, it was necessary to stop research as of 1 February, 1953. The first This report is divided into two parts. is a comparison of the military characteristics of the vehicles and s is discussion of thr bility.

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oblique view.

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The term "military characteristics T apprlis to " the more technical aspects of the vehicle--the performance goals that need to be set devn on paper for engineers to produce a prototype. The military characteristics include such items as flotation, armor protection and gradability. evaluation part of the paper is a The tactical study based on the experiences of qualified personnel. It is their testimony as to operation of the present vehicles in certain tactical operations, and their recommnendations for improvements in the vehicle design and construction. It is felt by many that our present reconnaissance doctrine and organization calls for three types of First is the heavy gun vehicle (currently a vehicle. light tank) mounting a 76mm or larger high-velocity cannon. It should be capable- of great cross-country mobility, high speed on roads, wide radius of action and have limited armor protection. Second is the personnel carrier. It must be able to carry at least ten men or mount and serve as a firing platform for an 81mm mortar with crew. It should have the same mobility characteristics as the light gun tank and, if possible, offer protection from'.small arms fire and shell fragments. Third is the light reconnaissance vehicle carrying a It should have great cross-country mocrew of three. bility and high road speed,,' coupled with quiet operation, good vision, low dust level, and ease of mounting and dismounting. The -ton truck presently attempts to fill this need. To date the ONTOS vehicles have been studied from various aspects by several boards, such as Report of Project 1684, The Armored School, 18 September 1952 and Project Data File, Project 1682, AFF Board Nr 2, undated. However, none have yet covered the entire problem as we One board has concentrated its effort primarily see it. on the mechanical and technical side; another considered primarily stowage. We wanted to go still further in stowage tests and field tests, but were limited by the non-availability of troops, time, and equipment. Therefore, our main contribution has been to gather the facts from several agencies. These we evaluated in the light of the experience and background of many officers through the use of interviews and questionnaires. The result we consolidated in this report

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In the next chapter there is a brief discussion of what has led up to this particular problem. Chapter 3 is the committee s concept of what the ideal vehicle should be, short of certain "Buck Rogers" developments. More specifically, it is a discussion of the ideal military characteristics for an optimum light vehicle and mortar carrier for the reconnaissance platoon. The fourth chapter compares the ONTOS, jeep, and M21 half-track with The fifth chapter deals these optimum characteristics. with a comparison of each vehicle now used in the command, scout, and support elements with the apparently desirable ONTOS. The final chapter sunmlarizes the study and states the conclusions and recommendations of the cornmittee.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 1 1Tactics, Empl.oyment, Technique, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units, a report TGB, -APO prepared by the General Board, USFET Germany: 408, 1945),-p 12. A L Lambert and Captain G B Layton, Second United States Cavalry, A History, (Germany: APO 403, December 1945), p 112.
2 Major

TAG,

3Lt Col George Dyer, XII Corps Spearhead of Patton's Third Army, A History, (Munich, Germany: 1947),

p
4

i594.
Ibid, p 228.

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CHAPTER 2
BACKGOUND A brief survey of reconnaissance units as they existed during World War II is necessary in order to trace the development of the present day reconnaissance platoon. Mechanized cavalry recohnaissance units were employed extensively for the first time during lorld War II, mostly in the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operation. The organization and doctrine in effect today is a direct result of the lessons learned from World War II reconnaissance units The mechanized cavalry reconnaissance troops in use during World War II had basically the same organization regardless of parent unit. The troop was organic to infantry divisions, cavalry squadrons, and cavalry gr oups. A review of this organization under T/0&E 2e, dated 15 September, 1943, shows that it consisted of a headquarters and three reconnaissance platoons with an aggregate of five officers and 134 enlisted men.1 The headquarters section, maintenance section, and administrative, mess, and supply section comprised the troop headquarters. Each reconnaissance platoon was equipped with three armored cars and six c-ton trucks, The armored car then in use was the M8, It was a lightly armored, 6x6, wheeled vehicle with an open turret. It weighed approximately nine tons when combat loaded and had a cruising range varying from a minimum of 100 miles cross-country to a maximum of 400 miles over good roads. The primary weapon of the M8 was the 37-mm antitank gun. It also mounted a caliber .30 machine gun. 2 Each armored car carried two radios, one SCR 506 and one SCR 508. Three of the mton trucks of each platoon carried pedestal-mounted caliber ,30 machine guns and were equipped with 8CR 510 radios. Each of the other three *-ton trucks carried a 60-mm mortar but did not have a radio,

r ..

In reviewing this organization it is worthy to note that the largest antitank weapon was the 37-mm antitank gun, which was considered effective against lightly armored vehicles at ranges not exceeding 400 yards. T ere were no tanks or full-track vehicles authorized. The nearest thing to a tank in mobility were four halftracks which were used for administrative purposes by open The armored car with its the troop headquarters. turret gave no overhead protection to the crew and its The vehicle was vulnerarmor plate was extremely light. with the exception of hostile fire able to almost all small arms. and until the development Prior to World War II, of the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance unit, horse cavalry had provided a force available to a commander for all missions requiring a high degree of mobility and the Theoretically, mechto engage in light combat. ability the roles previously anized cavalry was to assume all These units were organized assigned to horse cavalry. and equipped with this concept of employment in mind. It was visualized that distant and close reconnaissance would be the primary missions, and security and combat would be secondary missions. 3 This concept of employment was changed to a considerable degree by experience gained in World War II. Distant reconnaissance was accomplished generally by air units which were capable of obtaining necessary information much faster and with a greater degree of safety. The light organization of the reconnaissance unit precluded this type of mission except in very fluid situations where resistance was extremely weak or practically The close reconnaissance was performed by non-existent. other elements who were actually in contact with the enemy. Pure reconnaissance missions for the mechanized cavalry unit became the exception rather than rule, Since information was' generally obtained incident to other types of action, the reconnaissance unit found itperforming security and combat missions must of the self They were frequently employed as task forces time. reinforced with tanks and infantry to perform combat missions.

o =

A compilation of after-action reports from reconnaissance units which operated in the European Theater of Operations during World War II sharply points. out this departure from the reconnaissance doctrine. Approximately threo percent of all assigned missions were of the reconnaissance type. Approximately 55 percent were security and special operations, and the remaining 42 percent were devoted to offensive and defensive combat. 5 It is quite apparent from these statistics that the concept of employment of the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units was based on a false premise. A unit that was organized and equipped for the primary purpose of performing the reconnaissance mission frequently participated in combat for which it was not adequately equipped. This resulted in a much higher casualty rate in both men and equipment. iMany boards and panels were convened near the end of and shortly after World War II to study the organization and equipment of mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units. This was brought about because of the many requests of cormmuanders who had noted the inability of reconnaissance units to perform assigned missions. In the publication Combat Operational DatalFirst Ar Europe 1944-45 it is stated that it was unsound to beITE~-'"ht cavairy could obtain required information without fighting, It is further stated that the organization and equipment of reconnaissance units, basedd solely upon requirements for reconnaissance missions, had proved to be unsoundi6 The General Board, US Forces, European Theater, met shortly after the close of World War II and reported its findings concerning mechanized cavalry units, The hearings were conducted in Europe and officers who testified before the board'had recently served in reconnaisIn the report, a requirement was sance units in combat, stated for providing the ' -ton truck of reconnaissance units with a lightly armored windshield and side wings for protection against frontal or near frontal small-arms the need for an improved armored fire. It also listed of desired improvements was car. No detailed listing made 7

II

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The Armored Equipment Board (Robinett Board) recommnended that a full-track vehicle be developed for reconThis vehicle was to be capable of operanaissance use. tion in extremely wet terrain and was to have maximum cross-country ability. With a crew of six men, it was to weigh not more than six tons and was to have a maxiArmor was to mum sustained speed of 40 miles per hour. be sufficient to protect the crew against small-arms armament was to be a caliber fire at 200 yards and its Wheeled vehicles did .30 and a caliber .50 machine gun. not fall within the scope of this study and no mention was made of the :-ton vehicle. 9 The War Dear Department Equipment Board. (Stillwell miaget tank. Board) made a specific recommendation for The vehicle was to be used for limited range battle field reconnaissance and was to weigh approximately 12 tons. The report recommended that the tan: carry a crew of three men and mount automatic weapons capable of des* troying personnel and lightly armored vehicles. This board also recommended that the M8 armored car be replaced by the M24 light tank because the armored car was seriously deficient in cross-country mobility and firepower. A need was indicated for a vehicle with partial armor to replace the i-ton truck in reconnaissance units-. The theory was advanced that reconnaissance units, if given lightly armored 4-ton trucks, would be able to increase the effectiveness of their mounted reconnaissance. 9 The studies mentioned here are only a few of the many concerning improvement of the reconnaissance organiIn general, the conclusions were zation and equipment. as follows: 1. The armored car did not have sufficient cross-country mobility or enough firepower to perform The armor was not many of the combat missions required. sufficient to give the crew needed protection from enemy The most serious deficiency fire. ground or artillery Quietness was that the- 37-mm gun was not large enough. of operation, ease of maintenance, and the long cruising range were the most desirable characteristics of the Armored car but were considered secondary in importance. The majority of the boards wanted the light tank or some vehicle as a replacement but some preother rull-track ferred an armored car with a larger gun.

s sv," p

KO

2, The -ton truck, a general purpose vehicle, was not especially suited as a combat vehicle due to its total lack of armor protection and insufficient cross-country mobility, It was agreed that the agility -ton truck should not be sacrificed at the exof the mense of adding too much armor. An armored shield and wings immediately in front of and at the sides of the driver t s compartment was in general the full extent of armor desired. A minority concluded that a full-track ton truck at reconnaissance vehicle should replace the -platoon level to provide better cross-country mobility. 3. The G0-mm mortar had proved generally ineffective due to its limited range and small bursting radius of the round. The 81-mm mortar was recommended as the best replacement. 4. A command vehicle was needed by the platoon leader for bettdr control and more efficient operation of the platoon. The 1-ton truck with medium range radio was recommended as the best vehicle for this role. l It was not until January 1948 that T/0&E 1757N This created a reconnaissance company became effective. which included many of the recommended changes that had been made several years previously by the various equipment boards. The new organization of the reconnaissance company consisted of a headquarters and three reconnaissance platoons with an aggregate of five officers, one warrant officer (unit administrator), and 157 enlisted men.1 0 The company headquarters was-made up of the headquarters section, maintenance section, and the administrative, mess, and supply section. A light truck was added to the headquarters section for use by the company commander. Each of the three reconnaissance platoons consisted of a'platoon headquarters, a tank section, a rifle squad, a support squad, and a scout section. There The was one officer and 38 enlisted men in the platoon. of the platoon leader, platoon headquarters was made up his driver, and a i-ton truck with radio set AN/VRQ-1. The tank section consisted of two light tanks, each with a five man crew, and was commanded by the platoon sergeant., Each tank was equipped with a medium range frequency modulated radio set, one having an AN/GRC-3 and the other an AN/GRC-4.

The rifle squad consisted of ten men mounted in an armored personnel carrier. Crew-served weapons organic to the squad were the 5.5 inch rocket launcher, one Browning automatic rifle, and one caliber .30 heavy A radio set AN/VRC-13 was used when mounted mar chine gun. AN/PRC-8 was used for communication when the squad and the operated dismounted. The support squad, consisted of in two i - ton trucks trucks was equipped squad, generally called the mortar five men and an 81-mm mortar mounted One of the i-ton with trailers. with a radio set AN/VRC-8.

The scout section of the reconnaissance platoon was made up of two identicalsc-out squads. Each squad had One of the -ton trucks six men and two I-ton trucks. was equipped with a radio set AN/VRC-8 and the other had a, pedestal-mounted caliber .30 machine gun. The new organization made the reconnaissance, platoon a combined arms team containing armor, infantry, With support elements, reconnaissance, and indirect fire greater firepower, increased mobility, and more armor predprotection it became a better fighting unit than its ecessor of World War II. Accompanying the change in organization and equipment was a change in technique of employment for the reconnaissance unit. The theory of obtaining information by stealth and infiltrati6n which had prevailed before and during World War II was discarded. 'Reconnaissance technique was enunciated in FMI 100-5, January, 1949, and is quoted as follows: are balanced Armored redonnaissance forces, capable of executing distant combat reconnaissance missions, operating beyond the supporting range of other ground combat units and, in general, of executing any mission within the limitations of their organization and equipment. "Frequently, essential It is further stated that: information can be obtained only through attack, Recon"l l naissance units attack when their mission requires it.
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The reconnaissance platoon was organic to several different types of combat units. It was found in the following organizations: 1. 2. Reconnaissance Company, Infantry Division.

Tank Battalion, 90-mm gun, Infantry Division. Reconnaissance Company, Airborne Division. Airborne

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Tank Battalion, 90--mm gun, Div is ion.,

Reconnaissance Company, Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Cavalry Regiment. Reconnaissance Company, Reconnaissance Battalion, Armored Division. Tank Battalion, Tank Battalion, Group. 90-mm gun, 120-mm gun, Armored Division. Armored Cavalry

Armored Infantry Battalion, Armored Division. Tank Battalion, Div ision. 120-mm gun, Armored

10.

The organization of the platoon was identical in of these units with the exception of that found in all the reconnaissance company of the-airborne division. Because of the airlift requirements, '-ton trucks mounted with 75-mn recoilless rifles were substituted for the light tanks of the tank section. The armored personnel carrier of the rifle squad was replaced with three -ton trucks. The reorganization of the reconnaissance platoon into a combined arms team came at a time when the army was facing many postwar problems. Funds were not available to equip reconnaissance units with the new armored Half-tracks personnel carriers authorized by the T/O08. in lieu of the and lI--ton trucks were issued to be used personnel carriers.

'I

The personnel and training problems were by far the most serious. Training was especially difficult due to the rapid turnover of personnel. The demand for reconnaissance crewmen was so great that unit training was practically eliminated, -Many repla cements, after receiving only basic training, were sent overseas without any maintenance, communication, or necessary reconnaissance

specialization.
The reduction of training areas and a lack of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers to train the men was sorely felt by reconnaissance units in the United States. Maneuvers were held to a minimum due to the shortage of training funds. As a result of all these conditions there was very little opportunity to employ the newly organized reconnaissance to test its effectiveness. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, then stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland, was one of the very few units able to conduct effective unit training and to participate in field exercises and maneuvers. The 82d Reconnaissance Battalion of the 2d Armored Division received extensive training and also participated in field exercises and maneuvers. The reconnaissance units in the European Theater fared much better than other units. Their personnel situation was more" stable and maneuvers were conducted frequently The 2d, 6th, and. 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments in Germany and the 4th Armored Cavalry Battalion (SEP) in Austria probably received more training under the new reconnaissance organization than other units,. Maneuvers have reconnaissance unit to ment has been found to deficiencies, however, worthy of discussion. proven the new organization of the be sound. The doctrine of employbe fairly sound. There are several that have come to light and seem

The platoon had a tendency to be road-bound because of the limited cross-country mobility of the -ton truck. The remainder of the platoon all too often could not follow the tank section over rough terrain. This limited the capabilities of the platoon in that it had to operate piecemeal over rough terrain and thus lost much of its effectiveness as a team.

As in World War II, the scout section was most vulnerable to hostile small-arms fire. Almost every time the platoon came into contact with enemy forces the umpires first action was to inform the platoon I ader that his leading -ton truck and scouts had bee~n knocked out by small-arms or automatic fire. The scouts, protected only by "God and an OD shirt" were "killed"' with regularity during every maneuver. This left a bad impression' on many of the young trainees and a frequent remark was, "When real bullets start to fly I tm getting into the tank section," Occasionally, the support squad had to leave their vehicles and hand-carry the 81-nmP mortar and ammunition to the desired firing position because of the inability of the &-ton truck to negotiate rough terrain. This caused considerable delay in getting the mortar in action and reduced the speed of movement of the platoon when withdrawing from action. recent change to' the organization under T/0& 17-57, dated 15 May 1952, re= placed the -ton trucks with the 81-mm Mortar Carrier, 1121. The M21 half-track is currently being issued as an interim vehicle pending development of an armored personnel carrier suitable for use as a mortar vehicle.
-A

The present reconnaissance unit was first used in combat in the Korean War, It must be remembered that the terrain of Korea is not especially suited for maximumt effective use of a reconnaissance unit due to the poor road net and the preponderence of untrafficable areas. The reconnaissance platoon organic to the tank battalion and the reconnaissance company of the infantry division are the only United States reconnaissance units presently being used in Korea, the employment of a larger unit not being feasible. Though the technique of employment has been modified considerably, many lessons have been learned regarding this organization and its equipment. The use of the reconnaissance platoon of the tank battalions varied directly with the type of action, During the perimeter defense phase of the war in the summer of 1950; the platoon was generally used for route reconnaissance, with the -- on trucks operating often t without support of tanks or mortars. A few of the vehicles were lost because of mines and small arms fire but they were considered generally adequate for the mission. During the United Nations, offensive in the fall

17

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and winter of 1950, the - *ton truck was used mostly as a guide vehicle and was seldom without tank protection. 2d Lt John W Rose, former platoon sergeant in the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron during World War II, in addition to saying that the jeep was an unsatisfactory vehicle in the reconnaissance platoon, said "It doesn't have enough power to pull itself across country when

loaded.12
Major Robet K taChins, who was S4, 70th i;edium Tank Battalion, said, "Too many jeeps had to be abandoned under fire due to lack of armor protection." Brigadier General Venard Wilson, former assistant Division Commander, 25th Infantry Division, and World War II Commander of the 106th Cavalry Group, is very definitely in favor of the jeep. He is quoted as saying, "We are fixing up 100% of our vehicles to meet the need of 2% of our operations" 1 3 The above represents the views of only a few soldiers with Korean combat experience in reconnaissance, However the story has been told andthere is a very decided difference of opinion. This chapter has traced the reconnaissance platoon from its conception,"through its evolution of both organization and doctrine, to its present form. Now, the question is, what do we need in the way of a light reconnaissance vehicle to be able to accomplish the missions that can be assigned the platoon? There are seve eral contenders for the title of "the desirable light reconnaissance vehicle," but at the present time, no champion.

NOTES FOR

CHAPTER 2

IT0&E 2-27, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop iechanized, (Washington: Government *Printing Office, 1943). 2FpI 2-20, The Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanized, (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1944),

p 4.
b hof '

'

'

t'

31bid,
4 Report

p 9.

of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to the Chief of Staff United States Army, (Fort I o.nroe : AFF. 18 Feb 1949), Tab V, p 4. Erployment. Technique, Organization, and Equipment of the- Mechanized Cavalry Units, report TGB, APO 408, of the General Board, USFETTGermany: 1945), app 4, p 3. Operations Data, 1st Army, Euroe 194445, (Governor s Islandt iq 1st Army, Nov 1946), p 58,
7

5 Tactics,

60 Combat

0p cit,

anization, p 18.

Tactics, Employment Techniquel Or.* and Equipment of the Mechanized Cavalry Units,

of the Armored Equipment Board, a report prepared under chairmanship of Brigadier General PM Robinett, (Ft Knox, 3 December 1944), annex 1, p 1. Department Equipment Board Report, a report prepared under chairmanship of General Joseph W' Stilwell War Department, 29 May 1946, pp 5,6, (Washington: T/0&E 17-57N, Reconnaissance Company, Goverunent Printing Officer, 1947,.
1 1 FM 10 9 War

8 Report

(Washings

ton:

100-5, Field Service Re;ulations-Operations, (Washington: Government Print ig Officer, l1949) p '39

, 1 2 2d
leader,
1

Lt John W Rose, Interview, former platoon 4th Armored Cavalry Bn (Separate). Vehicle in US prepared by 1951-52 (The 82.

Armored The Need for a Li gtly Reconnaissnce Units, a research report Comittee #38,' Officers Advanced Class, Armored School, Fort Khmo, Kentucky), p

*t +hV

J HS

CHAPTER 3 OPTI.lTh'I MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS FOR A LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE Probably no subject has received more attention with less unanimity of opinion than the need for lightly armored vehicles in reconnaissance units. The subject is confused by the lack of.a clear concept as to what is expected of the personnel who are to ride in such vehicles.. they to fight or observe from the vehicle, or are they to ride to the vicinity and observe on foot? If we armor the vehicle at all, men will tend to use it as an armored fighting vehicle and will not ordinarily dismount for reconnoitering. If we do not armor it some, the crews are vulnerable to any weapons or shell fragments, Perhaps the answer is to team light tanks, with their fighting ability, with light armored full-track: personnel carriers for more mobility, such as the Bren Gun Carriers.1

'Are

An attempt to set forth the optimum qualities of anything is a very difficult undertaking. Education and experience produce very definite ideas and concepts along This any line, especially among professional people. committee, being five such individuals preparing the optimum military characteristics for a light reconnaissance vehicle, has had to unify considerable difference of opinion. However, through extensive reading of AfterAction Reports from World War II and Korea, AFF Board Project Reports, and interviews with reconnaissance experienced officers; it is felt that the majority opinion is represented, It was found that ,aconsiderable number of armor personnel feel that the :-ton truck and half-track I21 mortar carrier are not completelydesir able. A relatively small, light, economical, quiet, mobile, wheeled vehicle with light frontal and side armor for reconnaissance, patrol, and liaison work should replace- the present 1-ton truck. This vehicle, I believe, would be adaptable as support weapon carrier (mortar) and as a command vehicle. If possible within mobility limitations, .2 armor against mines should also be

20

The above quote is from an officer with conIt is not particularly hard siderable armor experience. On the ranks. to find a volume of agreement from all verhas proven its other hand certainly the =-ton truck It situations. types of and usefulness in all satility General readers has become indispensable to our army. will certainly remember the jeep as the workhorse of the Army. Now, you have a very fine vehicle in the jeep and everybody is trying to ruin it by loading it up so it wontt be worth a damn. You put a big plate of armor on it and try to fix it up so it will- protect you against :ines and you have nothing, absolutely nothing. In evolving these desirable characteristics, the committee did not attempt to conjure up a certain vehicle. The aim was the optimum of each of the many military charIt desirable for a reconnaissance vehicle. acteristics assumed by the committee that these reconnaissance was vehicle optimums existed as requirements for such a vehicle set forth by the many Army Policy and Equipment Boards that convened during the poet war period. #AGF 1947, was Board Nr 2 Project Er 1169, dated 22 August solution when it' formulated the military close to the -ton type, lightly archaracteristics for the truck, other boards mentioned the fact Though several mored. that there should be such a standard for comparison - of existing and contemplated vehicles, no amount of re d The following, thae, search could turn them to light. Do not lose sight are the products of this committee. by creating a vehicle of the purpose of this chapter Each individual optimum is to in your mind's eye. be used as a yardstick to measure against like charac of the jeep, ONTOS, and M21 Mortar Carrier. teristics It is interesting to note the result of a poll Of 312 experienced officers quesconducted in 1952. 4 -ton truck of the scout that if the tioned, 208 felt section were replaced by an ONTOS type vehicle the same type vehicle should also be used in the command and support sections.

21
S' t
.

;" ,

Optimum Characteristics

(See App-ndix V)
Crew: Current T/O&E 17-57 dated April 1952 sets forth the organization of the Reconnaissance Platoon. It is beyond the purview of this study to recommend changes of personnel or number of vehicles in each seotion, therefore the vehicle must be capable of carrying a minimum of two men in the command section, three in the scout section, and five in the support squad. Stowage space: The vehicle must be capable of "in" vehicle stowage of all T/0&E weapons and equipment as outlined in summary of equipment T/0E 17-57, Space should be provided for ,on"' vehicle stowage of personal equipment necessary to sustain the individual in maneuvers or combat, Communications carrying capacity; The vehicle must operate rrom a v-vITf~ET-EI l-ys tem,. suitably waterproofed. It must provide sufficient space to install' the AN/VRQ-1 with components, for- the command vehicle, and the AN/VRC-8 with components, for the scout section and support' squad. Due to extensive use of radios in this unit, all must be mounted in a comfortable position for the operator. Mobility: Up to this point we have considered the fairly obvious requirements of any vehicle--can it carry what it is supposed to carry. 'Now let us consider one of the more controversial issues, that of mobility. According to Project Report Nr 1169, AFF Board Nr 2, 22

August:
Mobility is the prime consideration, with emphasis on cross-country operation, stream crossings, and other difficult terrain. Unless the development of multiple-wheel suspension with self-locking differentials can provide equal flotation and traction, the vehicle must be tracked. 5 If we consider the missions peculiar to reconnaissance units, namely security and reconnaissance, we may conclude that the unit must be able to observe, communicate, and fight. To quote tje I D 7hit e;

22
t. t

Speed and mobility are essential characteristics in this consideration; speed because reconnaissance must be performed rapidly and the unit's fighlting strength must rely on surprise; mobility because reconnaissance and combat missions are not confined to'road nets. Under optimum conditions, therefore, the reconnaissance platoon should be capable of mounted operations in all types of terrain and

weather.6
Based on the recommendation of iMaj Gen (then Col) George W Read as head of AGF Board Nr 2, we have set a requirement of a maximu;mu sustained speed of 60 MPH and It should be capable a minimum sustained speed of 2 1MIPH, of stable operation on side slopes up to 40% and longitudinal slopes up to 60% under ideal conditions of surface material and weather. 7 Considering mobility,'much praise must be given to the capability of the jeep, which enabled it to traverse narrow mountain trails and fairly heavily wooded Therenarrow tread. areas. The characteristic was its fore, we have set a maximum of 50 inches as that optimum. ground The jeep was limited at times by its These clearance and lack of self-locking differentials. shortcomings frequently caused the vehicle to become To offset this, we recommend a "hung up" or stuck. minimum ground clearance of 12 inches and self-locking differentials as found on the M34 and 1135 2k-ton trucks. Reconnaissance elements in the past have been able to operate in areas inaccessible to heavier armored formations because the light weight of the equipment enabled it to cross small, relatively weak bridges.
h of this .h re the desirability To * illstrate 1944, cooks of Headquarters on 14 September ateristic, threw a light bridge across Company, 2d Cavalry Group the Leuthre River, capable of carrying only light reconThis enabled line elements to cross naissance vehicles. and establish a screen north of Luneville, France. 9 This characteristic of light weight we do not want to For this reason we have sacrifice in any future vehicle, set a maximum gross weight for the command and scout vehicles of 5,000 pounds, and the support vehicle of 10,000 pounds. The payload of the scout vehicle s be at least 800

23
____________________'k'~

pounds In order to carry four men wi.th equipment or three men and a radio, The support vehicle payload must be 1500 pounds to carry five men, a radio, mortar, and part of the basic load of ammnunition. The towed load capacity of the support vehicle is set as 2,000 pounds. This is based on the load carried by the squad when it was equipped with two 4-ton trucks and -ton trailers, giving a combined payload of 2,000 pounds. Inasmuch as it'was necessary to exceed this figure to carry the crew, radio, mortar with equipment, and basic load of manunition, we feel that a combination payload of the vehicle and trailer should be 3,500 pounds. The scout vehicle should be capable of pivot turns or have a maximum turning radius of nine feet to permit rapid turning around in the normal 18 foot roadway in the face of sudden, unexpected enemy fire or observation. Because of the common use of reconnaissance units over great distances all reconnaissance vehicles should be capable of wide radius of action. This is best measured by the cruising range, which we have set at 300 miles. The average distance that corps reconnaissance units operated from their parent unit in World War II was 45 miles. At ties they were required to operate 125 miles away.1 0 It is conceivable that future operations in uninhabited wasteland areas of Eastern Europe and Asia may require more extended operations. Partially fulfilling the suggestion of the Robinette Board that these vehicles be capable of operation in extremely wet terrain,1 1 we have set the maximum ground pressure as 3.5 pounds per square inch. The platoon is the smallest tactical unit normally charged with reconnaissance missions. It should maintain its tactical integrity under all conditions. The current organization which provides for a combination of wheel and track vehicles does not allow for this. Jeeps readily afford good road movement for the scout, support, and command sections, but do not provide a means whereby these sections can accompany the tanks and rifle s r s-country operations 12

Inasmuch as the light tank has cross-country mobility superior to any other vehicle in certain respects, we shall set these capabilities as our minimum desired in an optimum vehicle. It should then be capable of fording in four feet of water, spanning a six F ot ditch, and climbing a vertical step 2.3 feet high.

Cost:
Weapons and equipment for the ground forces must be the best in the world. Only if this is so, will we be able to keep down our casualties and to prevent useless loss of life. A weapon or a piece of equipment should be developed for a specific purpose and must represent the best possible solution to the needs of the user. Partial solutions and sub-standard materiel can only result in unnecessary loss of life and materiel in combat. 1 4 At the present time, it is hard to compare costs of vehicles with that of similar vehicles prior to or during World War II. The ,Mlrifle which during the last ) , war cost the government ; 31.00 now costs )65.54 The caliber .45 pistol which was valued at $38.00 now is 1 5 These articles have not been modified or improved but cost of production has increased. Therefore, in view of the ever-changing economy, we do not feel it desirable to set a dollar value on the cost of the vehicles. It is realized that the cost must be as low as consistent with the value received in line with defense budget limitations. We do feel that, while new vehicles under test to fulfill this requirement are considerably more expensive than vehicles now in use, their cost is not out of line. Other items being purchased by the army are of questionable relative need compared to the need for a good reconnaissance vehicle..

1'65.54.

Availability of Materials: Any vehicle adopted for this purpose must not consume materials which are apt to be in short supply in our national economy during time of general mobilization or war. Vision: A vehicle which is to be used for reconnaissance purposes should provide for easy 3600 vision for at least one crew member and more if feasible.The jeep provides unrestricted vision.. This characteristic payed off for a platoon of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop on Los Negros Island. While moving

M1Pa I

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yn7 yy

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down a road in column the scouts detected a Japanese ambush, Seconds later the enemy opened fire. But the warning had been given and the platoon barrelled ahead with all guns blazing. Not a single American soldier ar vehicle was lost, while Japanese casualties were approxima;tely 50 dead and wounded. 1 6 Armament: The vehicle adopted for the scout section must be capable of mounting a light caliber .30 machine gun on a flexible mount capable of 3600 traverse. Because of the varied security missions performed by this section and their usual habit of encountering the enemy suddenly and from any direction this is believed necessary. Although there are many arguments in favor of using multiple guns of .30 caliber or larger, it is .felt that a discussion of this would be outside the realxm of our paper. Therefore, we are considering only the capability of successfully mounting weapons .currently authorized by T/0&' 17-57, dated April 1952. As for the support squad, they must be able to fire their weapon both from a mounted position in the carrier or dismounted. Since the platoon often must engage unexpected resistance without delay and without the benefit of time to select covered firing positions, the mount offering cover and at the same time carrying the weapon already mounted for action is desirable. The platoon may be required to conduct extensive dismounted action., In this case the mortar must be capable of dismounted employment. An example of this was the operation of the 4th Cavalry Group in the Normandy Campaign when ty were employed dismlounted to relieve infantry units. Accessibility: Vehicles used by these sections should be constructed so as to provide easy and rapid egress and ingress for the crew. In addition, planned stowage space should be provided to allow easy loading and unloading-of all T/0 and OVM equipment and a~umunitioh. The engine must be readily accessible for ease of maintenance, Armor: In order to accomplish the mission of combat, even "light" combat as it has been called, a majority of officers feel that armor protection against small arms is essential. This recommendation is a resuit of experience gained in World War II and Korea.

hT!

Tjj2

A typical incident which established this need occurred on 18 January 1951; the 3d Reconnaissance Company on division order, reconnoitered north in South Korea to include the town of Kunjangjang-Ni. The unit engaged in a fight with elements of a relief battalion of Chinese which infiltrated into the town from the high hills around it. The' enemy destroyed seven 5-ton trucks, three .-ton trailers, and two 81-mm mortars. The 3d Reconnaissance Company inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. However, the example illustrates the major difficulty encountered with the "thin skinners" of tie present organization of armored reconnaissance. Major General Hobart R Gay, Commanding- General, 1st Cavalry Division for eight months in Korea, says of the jeep, "A very mobile and dependable vehicle--but affords no protection and in no way can be considered a suitable vehicle from which to fight," He believes that the scout section and support squad should be given a new lightly-armored vehicle. AGF Board Nr 2 in studying a similar problem, that of placing armor on a -ton truck, considered the following: "The missions on which this vehicle will be used normally require it to be light, small' in size, and highly mobile both for cross-country operation and for road operation." It will perform the same missions as our *-ton trucks now in the command and scout sections but will decrease "The occasions on which the probability of casualties. will be few." 1 9 it will be exposed to a heavy volume of fire Therefore, it is felt that armor to stop penetration by caliber .30 AP at 250 yards is necessary. No overhead cover design which will make entry or exit by the crew difficult is acceptable. The design should afford protection from air bursts if possible consistent with accessibility.
orgaizaton o armred econais"4-c

'Armor protection for not considered essential, sent development trend is which are less vulnerable

the engine compartment is especially since the pretoward air-cooled engines than the water-cooled type. 20

The floor should be of sufficient strength to prevent crew casualties from a four pound AT mine. This must include protection against parts of the vehicle which might be jarred loose or shattered from mine action and in turn produce casualties. 1 27
.... _ln

Size: The vehicle shall present a silhouette no larger tFan 52 inches in height, excluding machine gun and mount. The overall length shall be the minimum consistent with other characteristics. The ability of the vehicle to negotiate narrow roads and mountain trails will be one of its most desirable traits. If this ability is to ' retained, a maximum width of 62 inches is specified, Ease of Maintenance: The vehicle shall be designed to permit ease of servicing, adjustment, and replacement of parts under field conditions in a minimum of time. This should include such facilities as complete change of power plants within ll hours. The production model of the vehicle should provide a final capacity of 48 hours of operation for every one hour of corrective maintenance. Noise and dust level: While stealth is not essential to effective reconnaissance, it is believed that the vehicle should be reasonably quiet in operation. Ability to operate within close proximity of enemy lines must be a capability. Major General E N Harmon (Ret) recalled.: jeeps I well remember the work of our little that went down the road at night in the Battle of the Bulge and made no noise and discovered a big, heavy, clanking German armored colun coming up through the night and these jeeps got away and came back up and we set a trap and practically We never annihilated one big German column. could have done that if our jeeps had been noisy, track-laying vehicles, 2 3 Ability to operOperational temperature ranges: ate efficiently in temperature ranges of from / 120 F to -400F were selected, as these are the ranges required in Equipment that proprobable future areas of operation. vides for heat during cold weather and ventilation during hot weather should be provided. The vehicle shall have Air transportabilit:4 provisions for the attachment of lashing for built-in in this Other characteristics listed transport by air, loading size and weight, will permit its chapter, ie, and air discharge from a C-119 tra cr ft
28

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Pt

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F1

Protection aainst gas and radioactivityj Characteristics of all-around armor protection will provide the best protection against gas and radioactivity. This is an important consideration in view of current studies on the tactical uses of an atomic bomb. Summary: It must again be pointed out that these characteristics as described in this chapter will They are the optimums of milinot evolve a vehicle. tary characteristics necessary in a vehicle to meet the requirements of the c omnuand, scout, and support sections of the reconnaissance platoon. WJhat we must do now is to determine whether or not the ONTOS can, with its present models, actually replace the jeep and 121 Iortar Carrier. Can one vehicle do the work that both now perform? The very light jeep is the best scouting and light transport vehicle we have as T/0&E equipment. The MI21 has been selected as the best interim mortar Now their present carrier and included in the T/0&E, positions are being challenged by a relative newcomer. In the This cormmittee has established the standards. following chapters we will compare the vehicles with these standards and select the most qualified.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3 need for a Li htl. Armored Vehicle in US Reconnaissance Units, a research report' prepared' by Committee' Nr 38, Officers Advance Class, 1951-52, TAS, Fort jInox, Kentucky, p ii, Letter, ber, 1952,
2 1 The

Colonel Paul A Disney,

GSDA,

26 Novem-

3Letter, Major General E N HIarmon, November 1952.

4

(Ret), 20

in

The Heed for a Lightly Armored Vehicle 0p cit, UT Reconnaissance UTnits

5 Project

Report Nr 1169, (Ft Knox, Kentucky: Army Ground Forces Board Nr a, 22 August 1947), Appe nd ix D, p 4. A

<&f'i
UT1I~h-rm~---- ~- -- ~ZL\nL I

6Letter,- Lt General I D White, X US Corp, Korea, 9 December 1952.

7 0p

Commanding General,

cit,

Project Report Nr 1169, Letter,

Appendix C, p 2.

8Op cit
9 Major

Lt Gen I D White.

A L Lambert and Captain G B Layton, Second United States Cavalr , A History, (December 1945), p 140 on Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor To Chief of Staff United States Army. a report preEairmansp of Taj Gen EN Harmon, (Ft Monpared under roe, Va: AFF, 18 Feb 49), Tab 2, Annex B, p 2.
1 1 Report 1 0Report

of the Armored Equipment Board, (Ft Jnox, Annex 1, p 1.

AGF Bd Nr 2, 8 December 1944), 12p cit , Letter,

Lt Gen I D White, 76-nm Gun, (Washington:

13T 9-730 Tank T41E. June 1951Tp 13, par 5._ DA

14

Report of the Armored Conference, 7 June 1946) , Part D, Sectio III, p 1. 50rd 5-3-1, Pricing Guide, August 1945 and 7 March 1952),
1 6 1st 1

(Ft Knox,

Ky:

(Washington:

DA,

Lt Harold R Vaughn, personal interview, lecz Cav Ron Trp, Pusan, Korea, December 1945.

40th

lEugene J Field, Major; Cavalry, USA, The Role TAS, 25 of the Cavalry Group in Combat. (Ft Knox, Cy:

Feb 194)7 ,

... ...

Combat Lesson Bu lletin l_ Ambush of a 1951, Hq I US Corps, Reconnaissance Coman 18 Januar

8 Feb 1951. ,A

1 8 Armor

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Ralo

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Col
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A Disney. Ape ndix C,

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Project

1169,

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CHAPTER 4 i UrISTICS OF TEi CURRENT COMPARISON OF THE CHARACT ONTOS VEHICLES, TIE I-TON UTILITY TRUCK, M38A1,

:I..R, 121, A^D TIE 81N i ORTAR C ...

General

UITH T

QPTIUM

One of the best methods of comparative evaluation is the comparison of items under consideration with a known, sound standard. This is particularly necessary when no item has proven itself the best or optimnu in its field, Such is the case with the three types of vehicles under consideration in this study. None of these vehicles have been proven the-best or optimum in the reconnaissance role. Therefore, in this chapter the three types of vehicles will be compared with the optimum characteristics established in the preceding chapter. Using these characteristics as a measure, it is felt that the vehicle can be selected which- will best meet the requirements of the command, scout, and support elements of the reconnaissance platoon0 The ONTOS type vehicles under consideration are actually two vehicles with the same basic characteristics. The ONTOS T55 being considered for the command and scout sections and the ONTOS T56 being considered for the support squad. Since these two vehicles do have the same basic characteristics, they meet the recuirement of having the maximum standardization of types of vehicles in the platoon. This is possible by the use of kits to adapt the vehicles to the role to which they are assigned. The current model of the 1-ton truck, M38A1, as described in TH 9-80-A, is now beink tested by AFF Board Although these tests Nr 2 and other interested agencies. have not been completed, the vehicle has been accepted end is now in production. No major deficiencies have been discovered as a result of the tests already completed, and where there was a change from the previous model, it was an improvement. 11hile armor modification kits have not been provided for thisvehicle, it is possible to employ them with some loss of performance. This has been recoummended as a result of experiences of reconnaissance units during World War II, and is now under consideration. 2 This capability of providing armor protection for the l- ton trA'ck has-. boon taken into consideration Toe -ton truck is in the comparisons in this chapt
,I WJ4

-; L

being considered for the command and scout sections for which it is currently prescribed by T/O&E.. The 81-mm Mortar Carrier M21, as described in TM 9710, is the basic half-track modified to carry an 81-imm mortar. The vehicle provides a stable platform for on-vehicle firing and sufficient stowage and crew space. The vehicle was developed and tested in 1943 and was employed in the ETO during World War II. At the end of the war it was decl'ed obsolete. However, in 1952 a change to the T/0&E of the reconnaissance platoon replaced the two -ton trucks and The large numtrailers in the support squad with the MI21. ber of these vehicles in storage, and the desirability of providing facilities for on-vehicle firing were the main reasons for this change. The M21 is therefore being considered for the support squad, Comparison of the Current ONTOS Vehicles with the Opt imum Characteristics Crew, Crew space requirements in the reconnaissance command section of be considered are as follows: platoon to two men, scout squad of six men in two vehicles, support The OTTOS T55, being considered for both the squad of five men. conmmand .and scout elements, can carry a crew of five including the driver. 3 With crews reduced to two or three, more than ample space is available for efficient operation even Therefore, the T55 can be considered when combat loaded. excellent in crew carrying ability and space for operations. The ONTOS T56, being considered for the support squad vehicle, was designed to carry nine men and a driver with The vehicle is excellent for carequipment. their field rying five men if only their field equipment must be carried. The ONTOS T55 provides sufficient Stowage Space, T/0&E and personal space within the vehicle to stow all Crew operequipment of the command and scout sections. ating space and efficiency would be increased if field packs were strapped on the outside; however, it is not necessary. 5 The ONTOS T58 provides excellent stowage The OTOS T55 does not provide sufficient space space. for ~on" and "in" vehicle stowage of the required equipment, porsonnel, and ammunition of the mortar squad. The vehicle can carry only 50% of the 81-nm ammunition basic load when the crew and required equipment are mounted. 6 That would leave the vehicl with only sixty 33

55 W .4. ________

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ONTOS,

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rounds of mortar ammunition. The T56 is in the provision of stowage space,

unsatisfactory

Communications Carrying Capacity. Neither ONTOS has been tested carrying a medium range radio but both poss-es -such a capability. A modification to carry a medium power radio in place of the low power radio provided in the test vehicles is possible. The radio would be in the right rear sponson easily accessible to the crew but not to the driver. An "off-on" switch would be provided the driver in addition to a control box for transmitting and receiving. The driver would have to leave his seat to change channels. Both vehicles provide the 24-volt system necessary for the standard family of radios. 8 The communications carrying capacity of both ONTOS is very satisfactory. Mobility. Being full-tracked vehicles, both ONTOSmeet the. optimum in the majority of requirements. However, the vehicles have some weaknesses that are far below optimum which detract from the outstanding strongpoints, The first glaring weakness of the ONTOS T55 and T56 is the ability to attain a maximum sustained speed of only 30 miles per hour. 9 This is one half the maximum sustained speed considered optimum. This lack of speed is not from a lack of power but because of the track suspension. 1 0 Both ONTOS vehicles have been tested traveling 2 miles per hour for one hour without engine temperature rise or vehicular failure. The vehicles are satisfactory at the minimum sustained speed optimum. 1 1 Lateral stability of both ONTOS has been tested at 52% on a zig-zag cours.e. This is 12% moe than the required minimum and is considered excellent. t The ONTOS T55 and T56 have been tested and found satisfactory on slopes up to 60o. The vehicles, especially the T55, are nose heavy and sudden stops on steep slopes might flip the vehicles. This has not been tesm~nirum ustaned peedop~iISMl ted however.13 The cruising range of the ONTOS ehicles is as follows: T55150 miles, T56ll5 miles 1 With the vehicles stowed, additional gas canbe arried in the brackets provided and inside the vehicle, bua waul not increase

I~e

~3

their range to the o timunm 300 miles, The vehicles raan only approximately 2- miles per gallon of fuel and ther e fore have unsatisfactory cruising ranges. The ONTOS T55 and T56 have ground pressures less than the required 3.5 pounds per square inch. The'smaller T55 has 3.2 pounds per square inch ground pressure. The T56 with more track on theoground has only 2.9 pounds per

square inch.1 5

suspension gives the ONTOS vehicles The full-track excellent cross-country capabilities. The low ground pressures enable the vohicles to operate on wet and marshy terrain, The vehicles can span ditches and climb steps as well as a light gun tank and lack but two inches of being able to ford the same depth as that tank., The ONTOS can climb slopes as well as the light gun tank and over. maneuver on side slopes where the tank would tip ae of the strongest capabili Cross country operation is ties of the ONTOS vehicles. forded at a depth of ONTOS vehicles have been test water enters the transmission and At that depth 46 inches. Proper waterproofing would enable the vehicles batteries. to ford 46 inches and possibly the 2 inches more required Increased spring tension on the floor drain as optimum. all water from entering the v e plugs would prevent almjt hicle below door level. the gross weight requirement. Neither ONTOS fulfill The T55 has a gross weight of 11,942 pounds with a five man With This we ight is more than double the optimum, crew. a ten man crew the T56 has a gagss weight of 14,682 pounds, almost half again the optimum. Payload requirements are far surpassed by the ONTOS The T55 has a payload capacity of 1500 pounds and vehicles. The optimum required is only can carry a 100% overload, The T56 can carry up to 800 pounds with 1001 overload. 2000 pounds as compared to 800 pounds with 100% overload required for a support squad vehicle, 1 9 The ONTOS vehicles have" not been tested for towed However, one T55 towed another T55 load capacity as such. several miles and it is believed that the vehicles would O .. tow a 1500 pound 1 satisfactorily

'C-.

.il

The T55 has a satisfactory turning radius. The T56 does not. The T55 can turn in seven feet as compared to a required nine feet. The T56 requires twenty-two feet which means the vehicle must back in order to turn around on an eighteen foot roadway. 2 1 The ninety-three inch tread of both ONTOS vehicles inches and therefore both is almost double the optimum fifty vehicles are unsatisfactory as regards to tread, 2 2 inch ground clearance The ONTOS vehicles fifteen satisfactory when compared to the minimum twelve inches required. 2 3 is

Both the T55 and T56 have better angles of approach and departure than the required 45 . Both have approach angles of 480 and departure angles of 80 .24 A self-locking differential does not apply to the YIowever, both vehicles are equipped with vehicles, ONTOS a transmission which enablos the driver to lock either power to the unlocked track. track thereby transmitting full This capability fulfills the self-locking differential requirement as applied to these vehicles. 2 of the ONTOS T55 equals the The spanning ability required forty-eight inches. The T56 oxcooeeds the reof fifty-seven inches. quirement with the spanning ability of the ONTOS vehicles is very imporThe spanning ability tant to their cross-country mobility. Both ONTOS vehicles can vertical step climb the required twenty-two inches27 The ONTOS vehicles climb mobility. ability is excellent and adds much to its Cost. The cost of ONTOS vehicles .is one of the most serious stumbling blocks in the way of its adoption. 28 The vehicles would cost approximately $20,000 each in mass If the vehicles save lives and help win production, 2 9 battles then they are worth that price. Availability of liaterials., The ONTOS are fulltrack, fully armored v'ehicles and therefore draw on steel However, 80% of and rubber supplies just as a tank does. its parts are standard, which would save on retooling
equipme nt.30

2 6

38 S7KI

"

;' ; a

Steel, rubber, and machine tools were critical during World War II and will be again in case of all out war. However, the vehicles do not affect critical materials nearly as much as does a tank. Vision. Both ONTOS vehicles provide 360 vision from the top door. Drivers have 1800 vision from their hatches. The T55 has ong top door which can be positioned three ways: closed, 135 open, and open flat on the top deck. The T56 has two such top doors. With the top doors in a closed position, the crew had 3600 vision through the driver's pe iscope in front and vision slits in the sides and rear. With the doors at 1350 open, vision front and rear is unrestricted but Vision to the sides is made more difficult by the doors. With the doors latched down to the top deck, vision is unrestricted in all directions. The ONTOS, then, offers satisfactory 3600 vision at all times. Armament. The ONTOS vehicles can be modified to mount the required armament. To fulfill the requirement of an LiG with 3 6 0 0 traverse on two of the scout vehicles a pedestal mount could be welded in front of the top door of the T55, The gun would have only 1800 traverse with the crewman inside the vehicle but could fire 3600 if the crewman got out onto the vehicle's front slope. 'A ring mount and hatch modification can be manufactured This arrangement would allow more rapid and easy 3600 traverse for the gunner without his having to climb out of the vehicle. 2 The 81-mm mortar required by the support squad can be mounted in the T56. This modification would allow 3 3 rapid, accurate "on vehicle" firing. Such a modification would increase weight and cost considerably. The weight increase would seriously affect the vehiclets mobility. Although the modification is possible at present it is not considered satisfactory. 4 Accessibility. Easy- accessibility for mounting and dismounting of personnel, stowage of equipment, and maintenance is satisfactory in the ONTOS vehicles. Some care must be exercised if crewmen are carrying a field pack. 3 5 The large rear door will accomodate all oquipment to be stowed. Armor plates over the transmission and engine can easily be removed for maintenance of those items,36

39 I I ;~-~c~er~ 1 ,,

ia

-.

Armor. Both ONTOS vehicles have the armor to turn a caliber .30 AP round at 250 yards as is required. This is made pos6ible by the slope angles in conjunction Although the floor has never been with the armor, tested against mine explosion, it is felt that the ONTOS floor will not withstand the explosion of a four pound AT mine. 3 8 Size, The ONTOS vehicles do not satisfy the optimum size equirements. The vehicles are sixty-eight inches high as compared to a required fifty-two. IIowever, considering that a six foot man can look over the vehicle, its silhouette is relatively low. The vehicles exceed the required sixty-two inch width by thirty-four inches, 'This excessive width might restrict the vehicle in woods. The lngth is the minimum possible to still retain balance. Ease of M:aintenance, No test has been conducted on the ONTOS vehicles to determine ease of maintenance since access plates to the engine have been put in the hull. Tests on the old vehicle were unsatisfactory. However, the modification mentioned has remedied the major deficiency and ease of maintenance is under study to ease tragk adjustment and checking of transmission oil level.1 O Noise and Dust Level. Being full-tracked vehicles, both ONTOS have a high noise and dust level when compared to wheeled vehicles. However, when compared to other trac lvehicles the noise and dust level is somewhat better. The T55, moving cross-country at 10 miles per hour at night can be heard for 300 yards or heard idling for 250 yards. 4 2 The ONTOS vehicles can be considered satisfactory for track vehicles in noise and dust level. Operational Temperature Ranges. The ONTOS vehicles have boon tested in the temperature range from 107 to -20 and found satisfactory. 4 3 Considerable discomfort was experienced by the crew because of heat and dust. However, modifications are being worked on to imIt is felt that the vehicles will prove this condition. operate officiently at higher and lower tom praturos if proper maintenance procedures are followed. Both ONTOS vehicles have Air Transportalbility. been stowed and transported by a 0119 cargo aircraft. The T55 has been successfully paradropped, 4 5

40

x'
IIIII I

f 9

Protection Against Gas and Radioactivit . The ONTOS vehicles possess the same p rotective qua itios against gas and radioactivity as do other armored vehicles. If at a reasonable distance from an atomic blast, the vehicle and c :' cT be C- cctcd to operate almost immediately after theI. b.ast is over , Comparison of the --Ton Utility Truck, MA with the Optimum Characteristics. ' Crow, The crew of the &-ton truck in the cormmand section consists of two men under the current T/O&E. The vehicle provides adequate room for efficient operation with two men w-hen combat loaded. The crew of each vehicle in the scout section consists of three men under the current T/O6E. The vehicle provides adequate room for seating, but when the vehicle is combat loaded the crow is somewhat restrictod for operations. However, since the -ton truck can carry the prescribed personnel it is considered satisfactory for crew requirements of the command and scout sections. Stowago Space, The g ton truck is capable of "in" vehicle stowago of all T/O, weapons and equipment and of "on" vehicle stowage of personal clothing, equipment, and rations necessary to sustain the crew members in combat. This stowage is with the minimum amount of ammunition con-sidered necessary and without the side curtains, plexiglas doors, and deep fording kit. This is the maximum stowage leaving room for crew operation.. Any adpossible, still ditional requirement for personnel, clothing and equipment, or amm ition would seriously affect crew and vehicle operSide curtains and doors, when not mounted in oation, sition, will have to be stowed by rear supply echelons. will not normally be carried on the The deep fording kit -ton truck The fording position. 4 8 vehicle except in its is considered satisfactory for stowage requirements of the command and scout sections. Communication Carrying Capacity.. The radios assigned to the command and scout sections can be installed in the -ton truck in the proper position for efficient crew operThe vehicle provides the required 24-volt system. ation, The position of the radios provides for the necessary ease of maintenance. The -ton truck is considered excellent for the communication carrying capacity requirements of the commnnand and scout sections, 41
i" ~ -- VS). T.i--

~-'

13- V7Tx7ZZVZ.L VIN

Fig

7.a

An arrnored jeep, 42
e-t

'.

1' .I -. )Cir

-ton truck does not meet the optimum requirements in that it is not a full-trackd vehicle, it has many outstanding features which may be considered to make up for this weakness. The maximum sustained speed is listed in TM 9-804A as 55 MPH. This is considered conservative based on actual tests of the vehicle. These tests showed the vehicle to have a maximum speed of 61.4 MPH with an 800 lb load, which is more than satisfactory. The minimum sustained speed is 2- MPH and the vehicle is considered satisfactory, although continuous operation at this speed would result in excessive stfrain on the engine and could result in mechanical failure. The -ton truck with cross-countryr load will operate on side slopes and embankments up to an approximate 52.7% slope. 5 0 This meets the requirement of lateral stability for 40% slopes. The 2-ton truck with cross-country load will opcrate with satisfactory longitudinal stability on slopes up to 69%. The cruising range of the vehicle, with the additional five gallons of gasoline in the container on" the rear of the vehicle, is between 220 and 310 miles. This will depend directly on the amount of cross-country travel. It has a cruising range of 304,5 miles at 35 MPH over rolling terrain which is satisfactory, 5 1 The -ton truck with dross-country load does not moot the requirement of 3.5 PSI for flotation. The cross-country operational capabilities are considered unsatisfactory because the vehicle is not full-tracked. The degree of difference in cross-country operation is dependent on the typ typof terrain over which the vehicles are operating. This difference is a scrious deficiency in comparison with the optimum requirements. The fording depth is 37- inches without fording equipment and 75 inches with fording equipment, Therefore the vehicle meets the requirement of 48 inches only when the deep fording kit is mounted.

Mobility.

Thile the

LL

Jt.J

4 L)3iX X4

iJ51.L

fL

The vehicle is within the requirement of 5000 gross weight with a full crew and 100% overload,

Ibs

The payload of the vehicle is 800 lbs for crosscountry operation and is therefore satisfactory. The towed load capacity of the vehicle for crosscountry operation is 1500 lbs and is, therefore, satisfactory. The tvrning radius is definitely unsatisfactory, as the minimum turning radius to the right is 19 feet 4 inches and to the left is 19 feet. This does not approach the optimum requirement of a 9 foot turning radius or a pivot turn. However, due to the vehiclets short wheel base and body length and the inherent agility of the vehicle, this is not considered a serious deficiency. The vehicle t s tread of 49 3/13 inches in rear and 49 1/8 inches in front meets the 50 inches requirement. The rinimnum ground clearance of 9 5/16 inches does not meet the requirement of 12 inches ground clearance. Any increase in ground clearance for this vehicle would result in increased height. This is not considered desirable for tactical reasons, although the vehicle t s cross-country mobility is affected. The angle of approach of 460 meets the requirement of 450 . The angle of'departure of 340 does not meet the requirement. However, due to the vehicle t s short wheel base, and small amount of overhang in the rear, this is not considered a serious deficiency, The vehicle does not have a self-locking differential as required and this is definitely considered a deficiency. and vertical step do not The spanning ability even approach the requirements because, the vehicle is not full-tracked, As previously mentioned, this is it most serious deficiency as far as mobility is concerned. Cost While the cost of the 4-ton truck (:2013) has increased with each model, due to improvements being added and due to the rising cost of production; it is still considered an inexpensive vehicle. Its versatility in the performance of various missions makes it difficult
to replace as far as cost is co

"Ll

- _.

" _

Availability of Materials. VWile almost any type of military vehicle requires certain critical materials, the 2 -ton truck requires the minimum due to its size and Even the addition -of an arsimplicity of construction. mor kit would not raise the requirements too high in comparison with other vehicles. Vision., The vehicle provides for easy 3600 vision The maximum vision provided exceeds for all crew members. the optimum requirements and exceeds the majority of all military vehicle s in unrestricted vision. Armament. There is'no requirement for armamhent, Two other than personal weapons, in the command section. of the four vehicles in the scout section are reqcnired to mount caliber .30 machine guns with 3600 traverse, All vehicles of the command and scout sections are capable of providing mounts for a caliber .30 or.-caliber .50 machine gun with a 360 traverse. The crew member firing this weapon is completely exposed and his movements are reHowparticularly when the vehicle is moving. stricted, ever, this is considered adequate to meet the requirements. Accessibility. The accessibility of stowage and of items requiring periodic maintenance is superior, The ease of mounting and dismounting of personnel is one of the outstanding features of this vehicle. Armor. The vehicle is not provided with armor as issued and therefore must be ,considered unsatisfactory in this respect at the present time However, an armor kit is under study and development. 8 This should be conis If the kit sidered in-the evaluation of the vehicle. successful, the optimum requirements will be approached if not met, Size. The vehicle satisfies the requirements for lengt and width. The requirement of 52 inches in height is exceeded slightly, 56) inches, but this is the steering wheel only. The bulk of the vehicle is 52 inches For this reason the size of the veor less in height, hicle is considered satisfactory. The ease of maintenance is Ease of Maintenance. another outstanding qualication of the vehicle. It will normally exceed the optimum re uiroments and the standards of most military vehicles. y
M

~ ~

~ ~

."

lot

Noise and Dust Level. The vehicle provides the minimum in noise and dust. It is considered the lowest of all military vehicles and can be considered the optimum at the present time. The vehicle is Operational TempTerature Ranes capable of starting and operating under the optimum required conditions but provides no protection for the crew. This is considered satisfactory for extreme hot weather but unsatisfactory for extreme cold weather. Again'the vehicle meets the Air Transportability. optimum requirements and is, in fact, the optimum at the present time. Protection Against Gas and Radioactivity. vehicle is unsaatisfac-ory in that no protection is for the crew, Comparison of the 81mm Mortar Carrier, M21lwith the 0ptimum iharacteristics. Crew. The 81-nm mortar carrier, ,121, was desined to carry a crew of six with their personal equipment. The optimum requirement is five which is the crew authorCarrying a crew of five, the vehicle offers ized by T/0&EO adequate seating space and room for "on vehicle" operation of the mortar. The vehicle has excellent crew carrying ability. The 1r21 provides sufficient space for "on" Stowage. T/O&E equipment, basic load or "in" vehicle stowage 5 Rf all of ammunition, and OVM. With.stowage complete space remains for efficient crew operation. The vehicle carries an ammunition basic load of 97 rounds of 81-mm mortar ammunition, 400 rounds of caliber .50 machin gun ammunition, Brackets, 12 grenades, 6 AT rockets and 12 AT mines. straps, and racks are provided to secure the equipment. The M21 is considered satisfactory for stowage.
-

The provided

Communications Carrying Capacity. 'The M21 halftrack mounts a medium range radio; however, it is not one of the standard family. The vehicle has a 12-volt system SCR 509 of the old radio group; 5 6 This and mounts an However, it does not radio will net with the new radios, have as great a range as the new standard replacement. The vehicle possesses the carrying capacity, but it is unsatisfactory because it supports only the old set and not the standard set as required | .l . A A 46

n IBi
: I i-sn

I8
~eoa

a ms

-.0

BE

Sm

Fig 8.,

81-mm Mortar stowage,

Carrier,
47

M21,

top view showing

rm

m.

S..

0 v

obility. The 1h21 half-track does not meet the optimum requirements-for mobility in almost all categories.- The vehicle, being half-tracked and halfwheeled; possesses qualities of both tanks and trucks. However, the T121 favors the wheeled vehicles for mobility. Maximum sustained speed for the M21 is 45 miles per hour according to TM 9-710. This is unsatisfactory when compared to the required 60 miles per hour. The minimun sustained speed is also unsatisfac ry. The vehicle can maintain a speed of 3- miles per hour. The required optimum is 2a miles per hour. Continuous operation at these reduced speeds result in engine overheating. The M21 half-track will operate on side slopes up to 40% as is required. Care must be exercised in, stowage to prevent load shifting and to insure proper load balance. The mortar carrier will negotiate longitudinal slopes up to 60% as is required, 5 9 The M21 has a normal cruising range of 200 miles. By using the 10 gallons of gas carried in cans on the side of the vehicle, this range can be extended to 235 miles. The vehicle cannot be considered, satisfactory in view of the 300 miles required. However, under emergency conditions, the vehicle could range 300 miles by carrying 20 gallons of gasoline in cans stowed insi4e. 5 9 Flotation is a major weakness in the M21, Its ground pressure of 33.5 pounds per square inch is veryunsatisfactory when compared to the 3.5 pounds per inch optimum. 6 0 The wheel suspension in front on the M21 gives the vehicle wheeled vehicle characteristics when operating cross-country. The vehicle is therefore considered unsatisfactory. A trench or high vertical step will stop the vehicle completely. Poor flotation prevents the vehicle's use on marshy and wet terrain. The 1M21 is equipped with a winch which can be used to great advantage when the vein cro -country operations. hicle encounters difficulty

48

The fording of the required depth of 48 inches cannot be accomplished by the I21, It can ford only 32 inches. The additional maintenance required after fording also adds to the already unsatisfactory fording problem. 6 1 The 1121 mortar carrier weighs double the optimum weight of 10,000 pounds and is therefore unsatisfactory. 6 2 The payload of the M21 half-track is 4400 pounds. The weight carrying capacity is excf6lent and exceeds the optimum requirement by 3400 pounds. The M21 has a towed load capacity in excess of the optimum requirement. The vehicle can tow a.fully loaded one-ton trailer. The towed load capacity required is 1500 pounds. The vehicle tturning radius is 60 feet and thereThe inability to turn on a normal fore unsatisfactory. roadway is a serious mobility deficiency and definitely restricts the vehicle when road bound. The tread measurement of 87 inches does not meet the 50 inches required. The Mi21 has a ground clearance of 17 1/8 inches. 6 6 The optimum clearance is 12 inches, therefore the vehicle is satisfactory. The mortar .carrier is unsatisfactory in both angle of approach and departure. A minimum of 45 is considered optimum. The M21 has an angle of approach of 37 and an angle of departure of 320 67 The vehicle has no self-locking differential this is considered a deficiency. and

its The i21lts half-wheel suspension restricts This despanning ability to that of a wheeled vehicle. ficiency seriously affects the vehicle t s cross-country to climb a mobility. The same is true in the ability vertical step. The winch on the half-track helps solve the problem but does not make the vehicle satisfactory.

49

Cost. The current cost of the 81-mm mortar cartier, M21, is $13, 11.69 However, the carrier is not being produced but is being issued to units from stocks left over from World War II, Therefore, the cost to our present economy is very little in comparison to the production of a new vehicle. Availabilit of Materials, Because the vehicles were produced several years ago, there is no drain on critical material, Vision. The i21 is open topped and therefore offers 360'1 -ision. The canvas top is equipped with zippered apertures for use then the top is employed. Armament. The 1121 is a modified version of the standard half-track designed especially to mount an 81-mm mortar. The vehicle provides a stable platform for on vehicle firing. In addition, the M21 moun a caliber The ve-. .50 machine gun for AA and local security. hice satisfactorily mounts the required armament. Accessibility. Accessibility for rapid loading and unloading and periodic maintenance is satisfactory. The crew can mount and dismount readily through the two Taken as a whole, accessibilside doors and rear door. ity can be considered very satisfactory for this vehicle. around arThe M121 mortar carrier has all Armor. The vehicle is therefore mor protecton except overhead. unsatisfactory for this requirement. The side arm6r will protect the vehicle against fragments and caliber ,30 bullets. However, caliber .30 AP bullets will penetrate at close ranges striking at 900. The bottom will not prevent casualties from a four pound AT mine, Size. The mortar carrier, M21, is oversized in every di1ension. The vehicle is 87 inches high as compared to a required 52 inch and is 87- inches wide comThe size of the vehicle, pared to a required 62 inches. 7 1 however, enables the crew to stow all equipment and ammunition and operate efficiently. Ease of aintenance. The M121 presents no particular mainrtenance problem. Ha intenance time is more than required for wheeled vehicles but less than required for full-track vehicles. The vehicle is satisfactory for ease of maintenance, 5
50
A'
T ^ "'.

U
SA

Noise and Dust Level. Here again the characteristic half-wvl'e', 1alf-track suspension controls the vehicle's characteristics. Noise and dust is more than a wheeled vehicle but considerably less than a tank. The rubber tracks and tires make the noise level almost the same as a truck, but the track throws more dust than a truck. The vehicle can be considered to have a satisfactory noise and dust level. Operational Temperature Ra nes. Maintenance procedures have been established so t the tat vehicle can be operated in temperatures ranging from /1200 to -400,73 Particular care of the cooling system is necessary in extreme heat. Crew protection is offered against extreme cold and the vehicle has openings in the fire wall thereby heating the crew compartment. The M21 can be transported Air Transportabilit. out cannot be air dropped. by the CT09 aircrat The Protecton Against Gas and Radioactivity. vehicle offers no protection against gas and only lrimited The side armor gives protection against radioactivity. '-- . TT "t o:i 'ifi some prot ct ion

Discussion and Summary The ONTOS T55 and T56. The outstanding qualities of the 1TOS veTinclos are cross-country mobility and allaround armor protection. The T55, in addition, has outstanding crow and stowage space qualities, to include communication carrying capacity. The T56 does not have adequate space and is'definitely unsatisfactory in this important requirement. The vehiclets main mobility weaknesses aro lack of speed (30 MPH), short cruising range, and weight. Both vehicles are readily accessible and times, The vehicles can be modioffer 360 vision at all fied to mount the required armament ..Hoowvor, modification of the T56 to carry an 81--mm mortar may soriously impair its mobility.. Both vehicles are oversize whon compared to optimum, The T55 and T56 aro satisfactory in ease of maintenance, operational temperatures, and air transportability. Both vehicles offer protection against atomic bombing or shelling. The cost of the vehicles is high and may be considered by some as excessive and "not worth it." Cost, considered with the vehicles' strong and weak points, will determine whether or not the vehicles, either the T55 or T56 or both, should be adopted for the reconnaissance platoon .

51,

1M

The -ton Utilit Truck, The i-ton truck has t e obvious advantage of being assigned to the roles by T/O(E, in production, and tested in combat. These are all elements in its favor as its record is outstanding. However, the comparisons with the optimum are more specific and present a slightly different picture. The requirements for crow, stowage, and communication carrying capacity are definite and all vehicles considered must, and in this case do, meet them. The *-ton is satisfactory for crow and stowage but not ideal, It is excellent for cormmunication carrying in that it not only provides the space and voltage but it provides for easy operations and maintenance. Cost is a relative matter and depends on the operational necessity for the vehicle. If it takes a million dollar vehicle to do the job and win the battle then it is cheap at any price, The kton may not be the best but certainly it is the cheapest vehicle available at the present time that can do the job. The same is true for availability of materials. The remainder of the characteristics are operational requirements and must be considered in the order of their importance. Mobility is certainly the most important and the -ton truck fails to emot the-requirement of keeping up with meet the requiroemnts and the vision and accessibility are outstanding. It fails to meet thq armor requirement but a satisfactory kit would improve this deficiencr. Its size, ease of maintenance, noise and dust level, and air transportability are practically the optimum,' The operational temperature ranges present a problem for the creow and this probably cannot be improved. The same applies for protection against gas and radio activity. Threofore the -ton trucks main weaknesses are in mobility, armor protection; and- protection of the crow against oxtrones of cold, gas, and radioactivity. The degree of those deficiencies must be carefully considered as opposed to the advantages of the other characteristics in reaching a conclusion. The $1- mm Mortar Carrier, M21.. The fact that the M21 carrier is already in stock and requires no critical materials is the biggest advantage in its favor. The vehicle is unsatisfactory in size, weight and mobility.. chaacorstcs n ~ochng cncu52n It offers limited "U~-~~~ protection. Because 84-Aits basic ;--. armor ~~t CI~_~~N w~ 'I TGi. 2zt of t~z design, it can carry the crew, equipment, and ammunition required.. The vehicle is readily accessible and offers 3600 visi6n at all times, Th t

no longer standard. The vehicle possesses the qualities of a wheeled vehicle in most aspects of mobility and possesses the qualities of a track vehicle in weight and size,

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

*' DC:

TM 9-804A -- ton Utility Truck, M38A1 (Washington, US Government Printing Office, July 1952) p 3.

Ta ct is Empl oyme nt Te ch ue Organizat ion and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units, a report prepared by thGeneral Board, 5T (Germlanyt TGB, APO 408, 1945), p 18. ^3Notes on Development Type Materiel, Utility Vehicle, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, Allis Chalmer Ianufactur ing Coipany (Flint, Michiganh Allis Chalmer Manufacturing Company, 1 August 1952), p 21. 4Ibid. Captain G 7 Flint, personal interview, ONTOS Test Officer, AFF Bd Nr 2, Ft Knox, Ky, 6 January 1953. Armored Infanrtr Vehicle s T59 T59El T73, T56 ; The Armored School (Ft' Knox, KyThe Armored-School, 18 September 1952), Appendix N, p 2.
7 5

6Renort of Project 1684 Tact ical Evaluation of

p cit,

Captain G W Flint, ,personal interview. Notes on Development Type Materiel; Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 15.

cit; Utility Vehicle,

9

8 0p

Ibid,

p 14. Captain G W Flint, personal inverview.

00p cit,

ity

t I ox, Ky:

llProject Data File, Pr1ect 1682, Test of UtilInfantr T55, AFF Board Nr 2 Vehicle, Tracked

AFF Board

undated),

p A14.

:'J

nsi:

PhiEE
d
--I

Utili ty
Ftt Knox,

2roect ehicl e
Ky:

Data File, Project 1684-4, Test of ac ke d Infantr 0Tr 2d x56, AF Boar Nr 2 AFF Board Nr 2, undateT, p A1 .4,
p Ale. on Development Type ateriel, Infantry T55 and T56, p 16. p A14
Y

13

d, p A12,

Utility

Notes i ecit, Venicle, Track,

1 5

0p cit, Project Data File, Project 1682, Project Data File , Project 1684-4, p A3.
16

0p cit, Notes on Development Type Materiel, Utility Vefic~e, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 14.

17
18

OP cit,

Captain G 'J Fline,

personal -interview.

0p cit, Project Data File, Project Project Data File, Project 1684-4, p A18. Op cit, Vehicle,
2 0 0p
21

1682,

p A418,

Utility

Notes on Development Type Materiel, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 14. GW Flint, personal interview.

cit, Capt

Ibid

Op cit, Project Data Report, Project Project Data Report, Project 1684-4, p C3.
0p cit, Utility Vehicle,
24
2 5 23

1682,

p C3,

Notes Track,

on Development of Type Materiel, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 14.

!bid,

p C3,

0p cit, Project Data Reports, Project 1682, Project Data Report, Project 1684-4, p 03.
26

cip,

Capt G W Flint, personal interview.

2 7 Ibid.

fl'
54
-II-w

280p cit, Utility Vehicle,

Notes on Development of Type Materiel, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 16.

29ajor A N Whitley, personal interview, Combat Vehicle Test Group, AFF Bd Nr 2, Ft Knox, Ky, 15 Feb 1952,
3

29

0fp cit,

Capt G W Flint,

personal interview. Bd Nr 2, (Ft

31Record of ONTOS Conference, AFF Knox, ISy: A .Bd Nr 2, 2 Jan 1952), p 4. 320p cit, Utility Vehicle, 33 34 4 p33 cit, Ibid. t, IMajor A N Whitley,

otes on Development Type Materiel, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 18. Capt G W Flint, personal interview.

3 5 0p

personal

interview. p A9,

360p cit, Project Data Report, Project 1682, Project Data Report, Project 1684-4, p A9.
37 3
38

p cit, Ibid.

Capt G W Flint,

personal interview.

39!bid. cit, Utility Vehicle, Oplcit

4 0

Notes on Development Type Materiel, Track, Infantry, T55 and T56, p 14. Capt G t Flint, personal interview.

42 Ibid.
430p ct, Project Data Report, Project 1682, p A2.

44IJ

, p A24.
Capt G 71 lii osona . interview.

Op ci5i

lI
I-~1---r---i -i

Mo

AE I

I'

6Ibid. 88th Reconnais'sanee Co. .(TRUJST :

'17 Loadn _Tests Capt R S Smith, 1952 ) 48 M38,

Auitomotitve
p 18.
1

Project 1466,
4 9 Ibid

Mar 1951,

a report prepared bar A iBd Nr2,8

Test of' Trucok,

=--t

18

sts January 19527.

50

41--ton Utility

Truck,

M38131,

APP Bd N r 2,

5 Z Ibid. 52 53

Ibid. Wheoled Vehicle

Sc_ o APP

Board 21.

Nr 2,

Fob 52,

54TpN 9-.71Q

Basic Half-Track

Vehicles
D
p

Autocar,
Printing

and Diamond T)

Off ice,

(Washington,

C:

(X'Jhite, US3 Gaverment

23 February 1943 ),

of' 81' mm Mortar Carrier, 9 The Aimored Ky: The Armorod Force Board, 22 Force Boar d7T't Iro, Junio 1 943) p 2., 11 1O1-1O, Oirganizat nical Data (Washington, D 0: Office, august 1949), p 276.
57 6 5

55

Test

iona1,

L~ogistical,

and Te ch-.

1US Goverment Printing

Op cit, Test of' 81-mn Mortar Carrier, T19, p 4. 0 0 tT T 9-x710,

p:

2L.

59

Iboid,
id

6 0 Ib

passoiin.

61

Ibid.

56.
13;i

if

lid,

62I, 631 d

p 41, p 21.

64ibidpassim.
65

Ibid, Ibid passitn.

66

67 1bid.. 68

1b id.

6 9

Ibid

passim,

%0rd 5- 3,., Pricing Guide, (Washington, IDO us Govornnnent Printing of'f ices 1 Januiary 1951 corrected to 11 Feobruiary 1952 ), p 7f2.

71 0 '

ct,

Test of' Sxnm Mortar Crarr ior,

T19,

p. 1.

7 2 0pct
7 3

TI!

9-'710,

p 21,,

b id

passim~,

'e~ddp 39.41.

57 r
rr J-.

02

.2

.1

'K K
*,,,,ijii

CQ APTER 5 TACTICAL COMPARISONS In the preceding chapters this committee assembled and compared statistically the optimum characteristics for a lightly armored full-tracked vehicle against those presently possessed by the OTTOS, jeep,, and M21 lMortar Carrier. These were merely facts and figures, to be classified andanalyzed. Now we will dig into the "meat" of the problem, that is, how well can each of the vehicles perfxm its tactical roles. Although the assembled characteristics in Chapter 3 were considered optima~, it is not absolutely necessary of them to carry out for a single vehicle to possess all Some optimums are simtactical mission, effectively its For example, a command vehicle need ply "nice to have". platform for an 81-mm mortar; not provide a staole firing however, the cormmand, scout and support sections must mount a medium range radio. Inasmuch as the ONTOS vehicle has never been tactested, it is necessary for this committee to test tically will be based upon This theoretical test it in theory. previous reconnaissance experience of members of this committee, reports of personnel familiar with the ONTOS (AFF Test Board members) and opinions of various officers and enlisted men with reconnaissance background. Our second contestant, the _l-ton truck, M138A1 also conditions, but it is has never been tested under tactical World War II prototype is valid. that the record of its felt The reader has only to call upon his own experience to qualify the WW II jeep, then realize that certain improvements have been made in the new model. The'third vehicle in our study, the half-track morThis moris a very old combat veteran. tar carrier, tar carrier is merely a modification of the basic halfage and service the M21 track vehicle. Regardless of its has only recently been added to the reconnaissance platoon All combat examples and personal experiences used T/Ol. in this chapter to support the retention of the 121 in the support squad will come from personnel who were familiar role of mortar squad carrier in the with the vehicle in its . . ... armored infantry company.

1M21,

-4

L!-

Fi -~

58
a ~~-~ ~ '--'
---bh~a~mzmE

--

1.

The remainder of this chapter is broken down into three phases, and a discussion and summary. The first phase deals with the specific requirements a reconnaissance platoon command vehicle must meet in order to successfully perform its functions. The present jeep and the ONTOS, T55 will then be compared tactically to determine which can better be utilized in this capacity. Phase two will bring the jeep and the ONTOS,T55 together to settle the question as to which is the most desirable in the scout section. The final phase will discuss and compare the tactical merits of the M21 half-track and the ONTOS,T56. The chapter will close with a discussion and summary of each of the three sections. The limitations of this study are pointed out in Chapter one. The principal problem dealt with in the writing of this chapter was the lack of reports dealing with the tactical testing of the ONTOS. ith that in mind some conjecture was used by the committee in regards to the ONTOS to establish a basis for tactical comparisons. Those conjectures, however, wore first weighed against the actual military characteristics of the vehide to test their feasibility, We shall assume the engineering tests are behind; all vehicles have shown what they can do, Now in theory, and through the wa'nts and experiences of the reconnaissance aoldicr, lot.s sec if tho ONTOS vehicle can bottea assist him in the p. rot anea of his mi ssions. The Command Vehicle

The patoon loado t of the recoannaiosan-c platoon exercises commiand and control of the platoon by means of' close personal contact and the use of organic radio communication, In order to accomplish this close personal contact his command vehicle must possess sufficient mobility and speed to allow him to move rapidly to any portion of his unit wherever it may be employed. The jeop is better suited to this role as far as speed is concerned, insomuch as it is capable of considerably more speed than the ONTOS, T55. This groator speed of the jeep is also important to the platoon loader in that he has to double his platoon column frequently for control during a movement of the platoon. The mobility of the tvo vehicles is nearly equal on hard surfaces and level terrain but the ONTOS posses4es better mobility over extremely rough terrain.

59

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Theso nocossary capabilities of speed and Mobility for the commiand vohicle may be supplomontod by the desirable charactoristics of cuietness of onoestiorn ~ r ood visibility from the vchicle. The quietness of operation facilitates secrecy of movement of the platoon leader between elements of the platoon when in the proximity of hostile forces. Ease of observation from the vehicle, of course, greatly assists the platoon leader in his mission of controlling the movement of the platoon. The jeep is excellent in both of these respects.- The ONTOS, T55 is not nearly so quiet during movement, and observation is restricted to vision slits in the sides and rear of the hull unless the hatch is open on top of the hull and the platoon leader is in a standing position. 1st Lt Robert C Gunsel served in the European Command as platoon leader and company commander of "B" Company, 2d Armcred Cavalry Regiment. He is quoted as follows concerning the command vehicle of the reconnaissance platoon: I consider the jeep an excellent command vehicle. It is very fast and maneuverable, operates quietly, and offers the platoon leader all around observation while operating from the vehicle, Its mobility is sufficient to operate over nearly all types of terrain and I do not agree with the theory that a full-track vehicle is needed to give more cross-country mobility to the command vehicle. The ONTOS, T55 probably has a little better cross-country mobility than the jeep but I don't think it compensates for the accompanying loss of speed and maneuverability. It would certainly not be as quiet in operation as the jeep, and the visibility of the platoon leader, which I consider very important, would be extremely limited when he was buttoned up in the ONTOS. 1 Radio is the principal and most often used means of conmunication in the reconnaissance platoon. The voice radio is indispensable to the platoon leader for command' and control of his unit. The command vehicle, therefore, must be a suitable carrier for radio set AN/VRQ-1. There is no problem of having sufficient space in which to mount the radio set in either the jeep or the ONTO, T55, (See Appendix IX.) The radio set can easily be mounted and the extra weight carried without difficulty by either of the two vehicles. There are several points, however, to be

60

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brought out pertaining to ease of operation c6r-the radio They are of secondary imset after it has been mounted. committee to be worthy of portance but are deemed by the consideration. The driver of a command vehicle is often required to operate the radio set when the platoon leader is not in the vehicle or is temporarily engaged with other duties. The driver of a jeep can easily monitor and operate the If necessary, he can radio set from the drivor t s seat. while the vehicle accomplish this without undue difficulty Due to the greater distance between driver is in motion. and radio set in the ONTOS, it appears that the driver could not as officiently perform this function. The second point for consideration concerns the quietness of operation of the command vehicle relating to Due to the great amount of operation of the radio set. noise, created by the ONTO L while moving over hard surfaced roads, it is believed that it would be extremely difficult for the platoon leader to receive incoming messages over the loudspeakoer of the radio set. This problem, of courso, does not exist with the jeep as the command vehicle. The command vehicle of the reconnaissance platoon :lost must be capable of sustained periods of operation. situations require the platoon leader's radio to tactical Therefore, discounting be in operation 24 hours a day. short refueling periods, his vehicle must be capable of running constantly for indefinite periods of time and quite The capability of the often without proper maintenance. long years of use Its is comlmon knowledge. to do this jeep proven it to be rugged and dependable have in the field Although enough to function continuously for long periods. has not been troop tested, engineering tests the ONTOS,T55 the requirement of sushave shown that it can fulfill should be pointed out, however, that It tained operation. this is going to require greater amounts of gasoline and oil for the ONTOS than for the jeep, Field ianual 17-22, Miay' 1950, Reconnaissance Pla-The platoon toon and Reconnaissance Company states that He must place himleader is well forward in the column. self where he can observe and direct the forward elements ahysically lead his main combat eleof the platoon and . 2 This statement brings up the controversial subrment. In the ject of armor protection for the conmmand vehicle. nnnttee, armor protection must be classified opinion of the c

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as a desirable characteristic rather than a mandatory one. It is impossible for the platoon leader to physically lead his main combat element in a combat situation without occasionallybehqn subjected to hostile small arms and artillery fire. The all around armor protection offered by the ONTOS against these fires would-be invaluable to the platoon leader, The jeep, of course, offers no armor protection whatsoever,

Lt Col Curry N Vaughan served in combat during World in Europe as executive officer of the 3d Cavalry Squadron, 3d Cavalry Group. At various times since World War II, he has cornnanded the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 70th Tank'Battalion, and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. When interviewed by the committee he made the following statement concerning the command vehicle of the reconnaissance platoon;
WVar II

It is my opinion that the most important requirements of the reconnaissance platoon leader t s vehicle are speed and mobility, unobstructed visi6n, excellent conununications, and ease of maintenance during sustained operations. It has been m.y experience, both in and out of combat, that the jeep can capably fulfill these requirements, I consider it an excellent conmmand vehicle for the reconnaissance platoon. "Based on what I have seen and read of the ONTOS, T55, it does not meet these requirements that I deem necessary. It does not have the speed and agility of the jeep, It is important that the driver monitor and operate the radio of the command vehicle in order to have radio contact at all times with the company commander, and I do not believe this can be done 1hen the platoon leader is buttoned up in the ONTOS. or operating the radio in the ONTOS he does not have the proper vision to control his platoon or to observe what the enemy might be doing. The ONTOS, being a full-track vehicle, is going to require more maintenance than the driver alone is capab o of giving it, and the extra amount of fuel required is going to create a supply problem for the platoon. Nor do I believe that armor is a requirement of the command vehicle. In the rare instances where armor protection is absolutely necessary, the platoon leader caneuse In my opinion, the one of the tanks in his platoon. reconnaissQnce platoon leader can perform his missions much more efficiently with the presently authorized joop than he could with the ONTOS, T55,

63

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The capability of being utilized in the role of an evacuation vehicle for casualties is another desirable Since no medical characteristic of the command vehicle, vehicle is organic to the reconnaissance platoon, an emergency could arise necessitating such a use in order to get The quickly. the wounded to the nearest medical facility jeep has long been .used by medical personnel as a frontline medical evacuation vehicle, It will accomodate two at least three or, if not fitted with litters, litters walking wounded, The ONTOS, T55 does not have sufficient space to accomodate a medical litter but could carry at least four walking wounded at one time. Certain other minor points might be considered when Ease of comparing these two vehicles for the command role, mounting and dismounting is clearly a point in favor of the The platoon leader would have to move in and out of jeep. the ONTOS by climbing over the top or by using the rear door, either of which would be time consuming and unhandy. On the other hand the ONTOS would make an excellent command post for the platoon during blackout operations, It could offer protection from the weather when map work or These written reports and messages had to be prepared. The ONTOS, being facilities are not offered by the jeep. vehicle, would require a great deal more maina full-track Secrecy of movement would be tenance than would the jeep. hampered in certain instances because of the large amount of dust created in movement by the ONTOS. And lastly, vehicle, it cannot compare since the ONTOS is a full-track with the jeep for ease and comfort of riding and driving. we must load our vestep' in our test As the first T/O&E, OVM, and individual equipment and hicle with all Let us suppose that ammunition before moving to the field. squads, one in ONTOS, and one in we shall have two scout jeeps. As our squad leaders report that they are re ady to See move out, we check their vehicles for stowage (Note: of T/&E and OVM). Generally Appendix VI, VII and X for list we see that both squads are able to mount their radios in The- ONTOS a convenient place and are able to operate them. machine gun, but squad is at present unable to mount their this should be taken care of when they receive the new ring inside the comThis mount will fit mount now under study. around operation easier than mander's hatch and make all with the pedestal mount now employed on our machine gun The Also our guess is that it will be more stable. jeeps. OVM, ad T/O&E and basic load of ammunition can be easily The packs are stowed inside on our jeeps in order stowed, 64
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ONTOS T55,

rear view showing crew seated.

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to keep froe increasing the overall dimension of the vehicle and to keep the equipment clean. Our ONTOS crews,on the other hand.tie theirs to the outside of the vehicle without increasing the overall width. This arrangement gives our OTTOS squad much more room in the vehicle than the jeep squad members who are required to sit on top of their equipment, In considering the weight that our machine gun vehicle is carrying, we allow 200 pounds per man, This includes his individual weapon and equipment. Then we find that ;he 2000 rounds of machine gun ammunition'Weighs 154 pounds and the gun itself (complete)57,10 pounds. Adding these figures together we find our jeep is now carThis does not include the rest of our rying 804.10 pounds. OVi!I and T/0&E which will increase the weight.to 1600 pounds.

Next we shall evaluate our contestants in a tactical situation. As we move-out of the motor pool where we conducted our stowage test, and our platoon deploys for either a reconnaissance, combat'oor .security mission we notice that our scouts operate well to the front or flanks of the bulk of the platoon. In this way they act as the feelers or eyes and ears of the platoon leader. 7 Operating on back roads and cross-country requires a high degree of mobility to keep up with the fast moving situation. As we plot their route on the map we see it takes our scouts over soft ground and steep hills. In winter the area might be blanketed in deep snow. Now observing their operation, we see our jeeps move faster on roads, but the ONTOS covers the difficult terrain much easier. It crosses soft ground, ditches, logs and muddy hillside that the jeeps must.detour. In winter our ONTOS, with its tracks, low ground pressure and greater ground clearance, could traverse deep snow that' would stop our jeeps. To. illustrate this, on maneuvers in February 1952 in Germany, the 2d Battalion,14th Armored Cavalry frequently. crossed areas with tanks which were impassable to wheeled vehicles because of deep snow. These areas were usually open ground that was normally traversed by all vehicles, Even back roads that had not*been cleared were inaccessible to the scout jeeps. However, Aggressor tank columns could come down these same roads and surprise our forces. This caused the battalion serious setbacks. 8

Our ONTOS squad has now beer, But back to our test, stopped by a narrow trail up a hillside, t cr jeep squad with their narrower vehicles is able to go up the hill and secure observation. We have observed the primary considerations for the more basic task. There are still scout vehicle to do its They points to examine, but these we feel are secondary. These are; adaptability are desirable,-but not necessary. to observation, ease of mounting and dismounting, quietness of operation, armor protection, use as a casualty evacuacontrol work. tion and resupply vehicle, and use in traffic During the advance to Manila the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, used the'regimental reconnaissance platoon, mounted only in jeeps, to lead the advance. In most cases when resistance was met, the lead scout'vehicles were destroyed and the crew killed. Of course, the main body subsequently would clean out the resistance and move on. Similar exporiences from European combat are Of course, before long the remaining scouts lost available. If agressiveness and moved too slow to be effective. their only these light reconnaissance vehicles had offered more protection against small arms than "God and an OD shirt" the loss of many men and much equipment might have been The ONTOS offers this protection. avoided. In both our OiTTOS and jeep squads we see that the vehicle commnander and scout observer can both observe In the ONTOS both stand in the open hatch, simultaneously. Of course this one facing the front and one to the rear. standing position may be somewhat fatiguing over a period of time. Now and then our scouts must dismount to observe The men in the jeep squad bound in and or for security. out of their vehicles time after time with no more effort than if they were getting out of a chair and almost as Our ONTOS squad must either climb out over the quic kly. This top or go through the vehicle and out the rear doors. Although, we find is more time consuming and fatiguing. with the armor protection of the ONTOS we may find that dismounting is not necessary as often as with the jeep. During the advance on Manila, a platoon of medium tanks was attached to the advance guard troop of the 8th During a night advance the' commander had t he tanks Cavalry. iowever, he soon found it following close behind him.

A ii "'

necessary to place them well back in the coluumn because they created so much noise that the lead scouts could not hear anything else and would have no sonic warning of the enemy. By the same token we find,during mounted erations with our platoon,that the jeep squad is detect the sound of enemy tanks and trucks. The might as well be deaf. The track noise of their blots out all other sound. night opable to ONTOS squad vehicles

This noise level, we find,has another effect. The jeep comnianders can talk easily to other members of the vehicle and even use hand signals for the driver to turn, speed up,or slow down. The ONTOS conmlander would have to shout above the vehicle noise and so instead uses an intercom, which is more difficult. Because of the location of the driver, hand signals are of no use. Therefore control in the OITTOS is not as good as in the jeep. Our ONTOS squad has the same problems in operating their radio as were discussed previously. These are,the necessity for using headsets rather than the loudspeaker and the ability of the driver to operate the radio on more than one channel from his position. As a casualty evacuation vehicle, the jeep can carry two litter patients but does not give them any proto ction. The ONTOS cannot carry a litter,ll but does offer protection for four sitting wounded whon transporting them across bullet swept areas. Such a use can be illustrated in the ambush of the 3d Reconnaissance Company in Korea on 18 January 1951. All jeeps were knocked out at once and the crews driven from them. Throughout the engagement these men were unable to even get close to their vehicles. Casualties had to be evacuated in tanks and fully armored M39 armored personnel carriers, 1 2 During the conduct of our test, we find that the platoon leader may have occasion to'send a vehicle back to the company for ammunition, rations, or special equipment that might be needed. The company will, whenever possible, send supplies forward to the platooh, but sometimes urgency of the situation will make it advisable that the platoon send a vehicle back. ilore times than not we believe this will be a scout jeep under the present platoon organization.

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Several factors favor this. One is the ease of handling" of the jeep which was mentioned in the preceding section,. When another is that it is most numerous in the platoon. the ONT 'S is used for this purpose, we find it can carry greater load capacity more than the jeep because of its and larger inside dimensions. This is also a favorable characteristic when we send a scout squad out on a mission For inwhich will require it to carry special equipment. stance, if we send our squad out to set up a road block, squad with, let' they may borrow the bazooka from the rifle say, six rounds of ammunition weighing 9,38 pounds each.1 3 . a dozen M15 antitank Also they will want to carry, say and perhaps fifty pounds mines weighing 31.5 pounds each, of TNT with other detonating equipment for construction of abba.ttis, This all adds up to over 466 pnmds, no addifor the ONTOS but a backbreaker for our tional load at all already overburdened jeep. Lt Col Jewett A Dix, presently CO, 30th Tank Battalion, Ft Knox, and CO,Troop B,81lst Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (L ecz ), 1st Armored Division during World War II states that there were many instances both in North Africa and Italy where, because of the wide frontage assigned, a As the platoon was required to secure two or more routes. 1st Armored Division was pushing out on the north side of Rome, the sector assigned his troop to secure against a Pla possible German counterattack was abnormally large, toons had to establish road blocks on two or more routes, In which meant that squads or sections operated singly. such instances as this they employed whatever antitank measures were available4 These usually consisted of bazookas and captured German MBark IV Teller mines. From an observation point letts watch our two' squads move over dusty terrain. Both kick up a cloud, but the ONTOS stirs up dust almost like a tank., It is a large heavy cloud which would iimnediately attract the attention of enemy artillery observers. Furthermoreour 0 TOS squad reports that the dust has been sucked in around the rear doors and everything in the vehicle is covered with it. We may be able to overc6me this by placing a rubber gasket around the entrance.15 The reconnaissance platoon, because of its excellent radio facilities may be called upon to perform traffic control during marches, or troop movement control work in river crossings, 1 6 This often rem d oad speed and

maneuverable. vehicles for doubling a column. better suited for this than the ONTOS.

The jeep is

In our tests today we will consider only those "must" -capabilities in a support squad vehicle. Our vehicles are stowed but there seems to be some trouble over in, Sergeant?" by the 0NTO0 ._'You say you can t t get it all Even rearrangement and strapping equipment on the outside doesnlt offer enough space, "Inventory what cannot be stowed and don't forget to leave space to operate,.' In Appendix VII is the equipment which our contesting vehicles must be able to carry. The ONTOS has proven unsatisfactory on our first test--stowage. With other equipment stowed, only 60 Letts check rounds of 81-im ammunition can be carried. 1 7 on the 81-nm mortar carrier, M21. All in and in place and well it should be, the vehicle ~ as designed to carry a mortar squad and its equipment. We move out of the motor pool and down the road That ONTOS is certainly noisy on toward the mortar range. the hard surface road, "Turn your ONTOS loose, Sergeant, Let the halfand see what speed you can get on the road. track go now. Transmission from the vehicles medium power That radios report the half-track overtaking the ONTOS. The ONTOS was previously tested t 30 MPH checks oo. be Ittl The M21 made 45 MPH on its tests. maximuml We a different story when ve put them out cross-country. radio our two vehicles to return to the starting point via a cross-country route allowing the half-track to start It s not too long before our ONTOS,T56 comes into. first. view in a cloud of dust. Here comes the half-track more Our vehicle commanders state they took the same slowly. However, the halfdifficulty. route and experienced little and ditches slowed track commandeT says the erosion cuts him down. The combination of wheels and tracks just doesn t vehicle, do as well cross-country as a full-track The radio reports along our mobility routes came in loud and clear. We check off our vehicles as being This is a very capable of mounting medium range radios. important requirement both for control and fire adjustment The only difficulty is that the half-track has reasons. a 12-volt system and mounts a radio from the old family. The ONTOS mounts a set from the new standard family.

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Our two vehicles with their trained mortar crews have arrived on the mortar firing range, We give the order to the squad leader in the M21 half-track to go into action, In less than a minute the vehicle is aligned and the aiming stakes positioned., Our test was the same as those conducted previously. The mortar mount is very stable in all positions. A trained crew can obtain fire for effect' in two or three rounds, and with Miortar Sight, M2A3 or MS, shift to another target within the limnits of the traverse provided and obtain fire for effect with three rounds. 2 2 The ONTOS,T56 is now ordered into action. With a modification kit making the mounted firing of the 83-mm mortar possible, the ONTOS rolls on to the firing line and does as well as its competitor.23 'The creo of both vehicles were able to operate; however, the ONTOS had -to cut down stowage to attain that ability. The M21 has room for one more man than is authorized for the squad. That completes our "must" capability tests, but letts chock the concurront tests of "nice to have" qualities of the vehicles. When we loaded we found both vehicles readi y accessible for mounting, dismounting, and stowing -enembors of the crews of both vehicles can stand and obtain 3600 vision at any time. Both vehicles are armored against small arms fire and shell fragments. The ONTOS tp door can be closed to give overhead protection. The half-track does not offer this protection.
We now leave the range and proceed to a training area where we can run tactical tests on our two vehicles. We will have three situations--reconnaissance, security, and combat,

The reconnaissanoe platoon is moving down the road reconnoitering for an enemy believed to be in the area, The noise and dust level of our two vehicles is not as bad as the light tank~ 7--T . scouts are well out in front and the mobilit of our vehicles makes- :t very easy to keep up with tie main body. The enemy force is located and our platoon is ordered to delay them to give our parent unit time to deploy. Our test vehicles pull off the road into a defilade position and prepare to give support fires. Our lead scout sduad calls for fire well out in front of our strong point. Our mortars go into action and fire is

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adjusted by radio. As the enemy o6mes closer we sngage himn with more and more mortar fire. This fire is adjusted from any vehicle in the platoon mounting a radio. The platoon leader orders the mortar squad to the next delaying position. Our mortar crews cease fire and wesee the vehicles move immediately to the next position. The half-track has rougher going until it is guided back onto the road. In the net position the vehicles are off the road again and firing, It was just a matter of minutes since they stopped firing in the previous position. Firing continues but we see trouble developing. The ONTOS is running low on aimmunition because it could not carry its complete basic load. The platoon leader cannot spare a vehicle to get more and our parent units report it will take 30 minutes to get some up. "Too little and too late, ' The platoon leader soon loses the benefit of his mortar support fire. But the .M21half-track is still firing and will be when a munition arrives from the parent unit. The platoon withdraws to a previously prepared position with its parent unit. Here the mortar is dismounted and the vehicle used for resupply. Both vehicles can accomplish this role because of their carrying capacity. What can we draw from this short exercise? The ONTOS is more mobile when working cross country but the half-track is nofar behind. Working on roads the M21 would get from position to position more quickly. Both vehicles can deliver adjusted fire from the vehicles very rapidly. The M21 is capable of more sustained fire because it can carry its entire basic load. Both vehicles can work resupply missions when the'mortars are firing from ground or dismounted positions, then firing the ONTOS What of the armor protection? must have its top door open so offers little advantage over the M21 open top. However, when out of action the armor offers protection to the crew. The M21 mounts a caliber .50 machine gun for antiaircraft and local ground protection. 'The ONTOS does not. The ONTOS could with a modification, But the T56 is already loaded. "$ue e are we going to put the machine gun ammunition? We cannot afford to eliminate any more of the already too few mortar rounds. In tactical operation the ONTOS,T56 has better cross-country mobility than the halftrack but inferior road speed, The ONTOS t most serious In exdeficiency was the lack of stowage and crew space. tended combat or the platoon operating alone on other

ABi~ L'

missions, the ONTOS could not effectively support the plae toon with mortar fires. Ammunition supply would not be sufficient. The 121 half-track is capable of carrying sufficient ammunition in addition to its T/0&E equipment. A modification of the ONTOS will provide it with a stable firing platform comparable to the Mi21. The 3600 vision is equal in the two vehicles. The overhead armor of the ONTOS is an advantage except when firing. The half-track mounts a machine gun for AA and local security which canThe two vehicles not be feasibly mounted on the ONTOS. mount medium range radios necessary for communications. However, the radio in the half-track is a 12-volt,obsolete set while the ONTOS mounts a 24-volt set belonging to the new family of radios. As a command section vehicle speed, maneuverability, crew vision, quietness of operation, economy of fuel and maintenance, and overall agility are the strong points of the jeep. The T55 offers armor protection and greater cross country mobility. Certain officers interviewed liked the general utility value of the jeep over the specIt must be remembered ial purpose design of the ONTOS. that the jeep has been around for quite some time and has gained many friends while the ONTOS is a comparative youngster,. A strong point in favor of the ONTOS, and one considered quite important by many officers 'interviewed, of the vehicle to serve as a mobile comwas the ability Several recalled trying to- brief section mand post. leaders in a rain and wind-lashed jeep, or hunting for a Being a closed-in vehicle, suitable blacked out vehicle. ONTOS would make an ideal CP. Those points listed as favorable for the jeep in its command vehicle role, apply equally as well in its capacity as a scout vehicle. The same is true for the quest for recognition as a logical scout ONTOS,T55 in its Stowage is no particular problem for either vehicle, vehicle although there is more room for operation inside the ONTOS, after complete stowage. The reconnaissance soldier has long bemooned the fact that the jeep does not afford armor priotection and that what should be aggressive reconnaissance turns out to be an overcautious ap-The ONTOS seems to satisfy this particular reproach. The jeep quirement so far as the scouts are concerned. is superior to the ONTOS insofar as accessability7 crew visability,and noise and dust level are concerned. -ton truck has won many nature of the Again the utility They just friends among the scouts of the recon platoon. V SIc

--

couldn't see a tracked vehicle being used for liaison purposes, carrying messages, serving as guide vehicle or markers on a road march,or doing the many jobs that one has observed the jeep doing as a member of the scout section. Maybe that in.itself is a problem. Maybe we are too used to seeing the jeep do everything.
SOur theoretical test between the 81-mm mortar carrier, M21 and the 01TOST56 has produced almost the identical strengths and weaknessos between the vehicles as those evol ved b twoon the jeep and ONTOS,T55. Due to the increased size of the T56 and the half-track design of the M21 a few of those strong points are worthy of repetition. Stowage is of particular importance in a support squad vehicle. Arimunition, OVM, and T/O&E must fit. One of the main reasons for discarding the jeep and trailer in the support squad was in not ;being able to pull and haul the load required over cross country terrain. The M21 can stow everything and still leave room for crew operation. The T50 is just too small, the load will not fit. Both vehicles do provide a stable firing platform for the 81-mmn mortar. But the crew of the OTOS, working from a crouched position will become fatigued more quickly. ONTOS again surges forward in this race due to its. overhead armor) M21 has sufficient side armor but is an open topped vehicle. The ONTOS is slightly faster than the M21 in movement across country. The I21 is 15 MPH faster on hard surfaced roads, and is slightly easier for the crew to mount and dismount. Both mount the medium ranged radio but the i21. will have to be modified to mount- a radio from the new series. In each section,comiand, scout and support, the factor of noise and dust level was decidedly in favor of the wheeled vehicle.

Command, scout, and support vehicles of the reconnaissance platoon, a much discussedhighly controversial subject,has been approached in the preceding chapters from two angles; first from the established optimums a statistical comparison was made between ONTOS, jeep and M21. Next the vehicles were all tested tactically, the ONTOS being tested completely in theory, Now the tests are over and the notes being tabulated. From a very difficult subject certain conclusions and recommendations must be made. These will be discussed in the following chapter.

'1111

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"'

NOTES FOR CHAPTER

1

lst Lt Robert C Gunsel, personal interview, former platoon leader and company commander, Company "B", 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. FM 17-22, Reconnaissance May 1950, p 83. sance Compan,
3 2

Platoon and Reconnais-

Lt Col Curry N Vaughn, personal interview, former commanding officer, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 70th Tank Battalion, 3d Battalion of 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.
4FM 100-10O Staff Officers Field Manual OrganizaDepartWashington: Data' tion .Technical and Lo istical p 259. ment of the Army, 1949),

T"

S5FM 23-55 Brownng Machine Guns, Caliber ;.30 War Department, April Washington and M1919A6 SM1(919A4W

4
6 Loading

'

"p

Test, 88th Reconnaissance Company (TRUST: Capt R S Smith, March 1952). 0p cit,
8

FM 17-22,

passim. interview, 15 Feb 1952. Fort

Capt G F Haze,

personal

Knox,

Col Walter J Landry, Kentucly 14 Feb 1953. 10Ibid.

1 Capt

9 Lt

personal interview,

G W Flint,

personal interview,

ONTOS Test

Officer,
12

AFF Bd Nr 2,

6 January 1953,

Armor Combat Lesson BulletinNir 1 Ambush of Reconnaissance Company 18 January 1951, Hq, I US Corps 13 Feb 1951. 15p cit, FM 101-10, p 259.

14b id.
i79 i
;

AA
L "
S '

Opcit, Capt G W Flint, personal interview.

FM 17-22, p 172.

Report of Project 1684, TacticalEvaluation of Armored Infantry Vehicles T59 T59E_1 T75 T56, The Armored School TFt Enox,- Ky: The Armored School, 18 September 1952) Appendix N, p 2.
1 8 Technical

17 1

25,

D C

Manual 9-710 War Department (Washington, US Govt Printing Off ice,23 February 1944), p 6. AFF Bd Nr 2

19Draft .R e ort of Tests Pr oject 1682 (Fort Knox, iKy: AFF Bd Nr 2, undated), p 8.
2 0 0p

cit,

TM 9-710,

p 10.

21Test of 81-nm' Mortar Carrier, T19, The Armored Force' Board (ort K'nhx, Kentucky: The Armored Force Board, 22 June 1943), p 1.
22

Ibid Capt G W Flint, personal interv iew.

I iI
s0

it

~'1-

;gp3

E moo"
C'LA.PTE'R 6 REC01ENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS Considering the ONTOS T55 in its present form, Cormiittee 19 concludes that although the vehicle possesses many desirable characteristics it should not replace the jeep in the command and scout sections of the reconnaissance platoon. The desirable characteristics of the ONTOS are excellent cross-country mobility, armor protection, and stowage space; these are outweighed by cost of the vehicle, mechanical difficulties not yet corrected, limited cruising range, and excessive noise and dust level. The -ton truck,'*138A1, has as its deficiencies: lack of armor protection, restricted cross-country moThese are compensated, bility, and limited stowage space. for by its low cost of production, mechanical reliability, vision and accessability, size, low noise and dust level, more than optimuml cruising range, and its proven general utility to the Army. It is further concluded that the ONTOS T56 in its present form should not replace the 81-nm mortar carrier, 1121, in the support squad of the reconnaissance platoon. The excellent cross-country mobility and armor protection of the ONTOS- T56 are far overshadowed by its high production cost, lack of sufficient stowage space, questionand limited speed and cruising able mechanized reliability,

range.
Although the L121 is an interim vehicle and far from optimum, it has proven itself mechanically reliable, offers sufficient stowage space, and provides an excellent platform for "on-vehicle" firing. The vehicle is a modification of the basic half-track vehicle being'used extensively throughout the army today; therefore, cost is low and sufficient quantities are on hand for troop use. Re commend that:
rton truck, M38A1, and the 31-mm mor1. The tar carrier, M21, be retained in the reconnaissance platoon at the present time.

j%3&-r

The development of the ONTOS be continued 2. A need for possible use in the reconnaissance platoon. for a vehicle of this type is forseen for use in certain underdeveloped-areas such as Eastern Europe, Asia, and Arctic regions, and in the event of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare.

82
-.i.i. .?~
.

.z UT\I~~II.I

--'"".v-i-"~'

BIBLIOGRAPHY Tactics, Employment, Technique. Organization and Equipment of Mechanized- Cavalry Units, a report prepared by the General Board, USET (Germany: TGB, APO 408, 1945). A L Lambert, Major, Cavalry, USA and G B Layton, Captain, Cavalry, USA, Second United States Cavalry, A Histor (Germany: December 1945T. George Dyer, Lt Col; AGD, USA, XII Corps, Spearhead of Patton's Third Army, A Hi story, -(Germany: TAG, APO 403,

1947).
T/OE 2-27,
Washington

Cavalry Roconnaissance Troop Mechanized,

, 15
0ptembe

1945T

FM 2-20 The Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop Mechanizod TWashington: Govoernment Printing Office, 1944), Combat Oporations Data, 1st Army; Europe 1944-45, (Governorts Island: T-Iq 1st Army, Nov 1946) War Department Equipment Board Report, Gon Joseph W Stillwell, WTashington: War Department 29 May 1946). T/O& 17-57L N Roconnaissance Company, (Washington: (Washington: D A,

15 January 194.8.
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations Government Printing Office, 1950). 2d Lt John W Rose, Bn (Sep), APO 174,

personal interview, 4th Armored Cavalry United States Army,

Research Report, Committee Number 38, Armored Officer Advance Class, 1951-1952 oort Knox, Kentucky, Letter, Colonel Paul A Disney, GSDA, 26 November 1952. Letter, Maj Gen E N Karmon, (Ret), 20 Nov 1952. Army Ground

Project Report #1169, (Ft Knox, Kentucky, Forces Board Nr 2, 22 August 1947), Letter, Lt Gen I D White, Korea, 9 December 1952.

Commanding General,

X US Corps,

_..e..

ar

rirll

rYY rNVY

rrw

::rlriio9\

la~kl~r~a~

All

ReportL o Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor to the Chief of Staff United States I a-report prepared under chairmanship of I'.aj Gen E N Harmon, (Ft Monroe: AFF, 18 Feb 1949).Report of The ArmrOred Equipment Board, Bd Nr 2, 8D"ec "1944 (Ft Knox,
Kyr T

AGF

TM 9-7T30 Tank T41E1 76-rmim Gun,

(Washington:
(Ft

DA, Ky:

June 1951). 7 June 46), 1945).

Report of The Armored Conference

Qrd 5-'3-11 Pricing Guide,

Knox,
DA,

(Washington:

9 August 40th Mecz

1st Lt Harold R Vaughn, personal interview, Cav Rcn Trp, Pusan, Korea, December 1945. Eugene J Field,'M ajor, Cavalry, U5A, Group in Combat, (Ft Knox, Ky: TAS,
2 5 Feb

The Role of the Cavalry

1947).

Armor Combat Lesson Bulletin Nr 1 Ambush of a Reconnaissance Company, 18 Jan 1951, Hq I US Corps, 28 Feb 1951.., TM 9-804A. The Ton Truclk M38A1, ment Printing Office, July 1952),

(Washington:

Notes on' Development Type Materiel Utilit y Vehcle, Track, anufacturing ComCalm s , illis 5 and Infantrj 1 Aug 1952). pany, (Genter Line, Iicht Capt G W Flint,
AFF Bd Nr 2,

personal interview,
y.

ONTOSSTest

Officer,

Ft Knox,

Report of Project"I r 1684

Infantry Vehicl es~_9 T 5

Tactical Eval
T73, T56,

T59El

at ion of Armored The Armor ed

School

Ft Knox,

Ky:

TAS,

18 Sep 1952),

Project' Data File, Project Nr 1682, Test Tracked; Infantr T55oAFF Bd lr 2, (Ft Bd Nr 2, undated. )

of Utility
Enox, Ky: Utility

Vehicle, AFF

Te st of Project Data File, Project Nry 1684.4 Vehicle, Tracked Infantry T56, AFF Bd Nr 2,

(Ft Khox,

Ky-

AFF Bd Nr 2,

undated,)

Maj G'- W hitley., personal interview, Combat Vehicle Test Group, AFF Bd N3 2, Ft Knox, Ky, 15 Feb 1952
.a

S3

t~
-~

/{
~ ~

~A2

Record of ONTOS Conference Bd Nr 2, 2 Jan 1953)7.

AFF Bd Nr 2

(Ft Knox, Capt R S

AFF

Loading Tests 88th Re con Company, Smith, March 1952) -

(TRUST:

Automotive Test of Truc, Ton4x Utility, ject N 146&, a report prepared by AFF Bd Nr 2, Tests ofj-Ton Truckl MI38A1, AFF Bd Nr 2,

8 Pro 8 Mar 1951.

Jan 1952. (Ft Knox, US

Data from Wheeled

IKy AFP Bd Nr 2,

Vehicle Section,
Feb 1952.)

AFF Bd Nr 2,

TM 9-710, The 81-rm M.ortar Carrier M21, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 23 Feb 1952).

Test of 81-mm Mortar Carr ier T19 The Armored Force Board, (Ft Knox, Ky: The Armored Force Board, 22 June 43). FiM 101-10, Staff Officers Field Manual, Organizational, (fWas hington: US Governand To st ical Data Technical nent Printing Office, Aug 19495. US Government Ord 5=3--j Pricign Guide, (Washington : Printing Office, 7 June 1946 corrected to 9 Aug 1952)., M 23-.55, Browning. iachine Guns. Caliber .309 M1919A4 and 1919A6. (Washington: War Department, April 1945), 1st Lt Robert C Gunsel, 16 Feb 1953. personal interview, Ft Knox, Iy, Company, Iy,

FM 17-22, Reconnaissance Platoon and Reconnaissance (Washington: US Govt Printing Office, May 1950). Lt Col Curry N Vaughn, 17 Feb 1953. Capt G F Hoge, personal interview, Ft Knox, interview, Ft Knox,
Iy,

personal interview, personal

15 Feb 1953,

Lt Col Walter J Landry, 14 Feb 19535

Ft Knox, Ky,

Report of Project Nr 1684 Tactical Evaluation of Armored he Armored School TFt Infantry Vehices T59 T5931T3, Kinox, Ky: The Armored School, 18 Sep 1952, Draft Report of Tests Proj'ect Nr 1682, AFF Bd Nr 2, (Ft

Knox, Kyt

AFF Bd tr 2, undate).
.8
([

...-

_6

y':C5

F,-t

vl-

Y9

il- ap.

M .~~ ii M.: 4 *t:& a

Test of 81-rmn Mortar Carrier,

Ft

nox, Ky:

The Armored Force Board, 22 June 19--43T

M9, The-Armored Force Board,

Unit History,

I(ieadquarters 38th Mecz Rcn Sqdn:

Reconnaissance Operations Report, 10 Aug' 1944).

38th Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron, June-September 1944).

77th Infantry Division,

Washington Historical Section, Department of the Army,

Notes on Reconnaissance Operations in Historical Section: 26 Tuly 1944), Italy. (British

Action against Enei mReporte 82d Armored Reconnaissance Squadron* TWashington Historical Section, Department of

the Army, 1945),

Testimon of US Army Reconnaissance Policy Witnesses, e (OCAFF: Army Field Forces, February 1940),

Air and Ground- Reconnaissance in Korea,

OCAFF, undatedT)

(Ft Monroe,

Va:

Ground Reconnaissance Against Japanese, (Washington: Personnel Division, War Dept, General Staff, 29 June 1945). Reconnaissance Operations of Ground Troops, (Headquarters United States Arm Far East, 31 arch 1943),

(Washington: Reconnaissance Patrols in the Pacific Historical Section, De'p- of the Army, 31 March 1943).
Donald P Boyer, IKy, 12 May 1942 Lt Col, Armor USA, Miitary Monograph, 38th

Armored Infantry Battalion

7th Armored Divisioi

(Ft Knox

Henry S Hasting, Major Armor USAF Military Monorah Employment of Armored Infant, (Ft Knox, Ky, 25 Feb 1947). Special Test Nr 39 Engines and Accessories, The Armred School, Sep 1952T7 (Ft Knox,

Ky:

Special Text Nr 41 Miortar Vehicle -Wvheel and Full-Track, o Ft nox, Ky: The fMaiintenance, Control and Insec
Armored School, Sep T952T. 86

I777T 7
-- I' -~~--

'"
rC, ~;T~

~bi

h WS

~i

WIX iiE

c Pllcr

TATT.1/\DRAnT nnt.

rvi

APPENDICES

Appendix I

Extract T/O&E 2-27, September 1943, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized.

Extract T/0&E 17-57N, 23 January 1948,

Appendix II

Reconnaissance Company.
Appendix III Chart, Comparative Record of Combat Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Groups in the European Theater of Operations, 1944-1945.
I 1

Appendix IV

Extract T/O&E 17-57, 15 May 1952, Reconnaissance Compony. Vehicle Characteristics Chart. List of On Vehicle Materiel for Truck -Ton M38. Ammunition Basic Load and Equipment of the Support Squad.

Appendix V. Appendix VI

Appendix VII

Appendix VIII

Summary of Equipment for Re c onnais s ance Platoon Headquarters.

Summary of Equipment for Scout Squad.

Appendix IX Appendix X

Summary of Equipment for Support Squad

87

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT,

T/O&E 2-.27, CAVALRY RECO1NAISSANCE TROOP, HECHANII D, 15 EPTEMBSR 1943

s."

4.'

^DHTJIARY OF M4AJ OR ITEMS OF EOUIPWNT ar ; Gar, armored light, IM8, w armament----12 4 half track, 143A2, w o armamont-^
y-lton-----------------------23

SUIMARY OF PERSONiTiWL:

Captain-.
Lieutenant-

..---

1
4 5

ar-Truc;

Total cornissioned--

'ruxck, 2: -ton, 'cargo---------------3, 5 1-ton-----------------------('ailer, 85 -------------------arbine flex----13 Gun; machine; cal .30, light, 3 Gun; machine, cal .50, 13, flex----pun, submachine,-------------28 TLauncher, rocket.-------_-_-. "-.---4 9' Jtortar, 60"rim----<------^-----.rifle, M-l---------------------------26 Xadio sets: SCR 506-----..----------- "--12
SCR

Sergeant-.--.---- = 1 First Technical Sergeant----- 1 7 -----Staff Sergeant Q ----Corporal-'------

Technician,

Grade 4^-~--44:

-'"-".w* T, Grade 5 ---- $ Private, First Class- -42 . Private---*--------Total enlisted-----134 Aggregate----------i59
~ ' "t.

---510--------r----------10 SCR 528--------------------

SCR

508--

1- 1

IH"

MMH Mc lf

ff-9'

APPENDIX II EXTRACT, T/O&E' 17-57N, RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY, 23 JANUARY 1948

-i

..

,... . ._..

SUMARY- OF MAJOR EQUIPMINT: Carrier, personnel, armored----.-Tank,' light-----------------ton-----------ruck,; Truck, 3/4-ton, wpns carrier----Truck, 2 -ton, cargo, ..---------.-------.---. Carbine, cal ,.30-Gun; machine; cal .30; heavy----light---*.Sun; machine; cal .350 -------. Gun; machine, cal ,50, IB dun, submiachine," cal , 45-- -----Launcher, rocket, 3,5- inch------"-------------.--Mortar; 81-mm cal ,45------isbol, automat i, Rifle; automatic, cal .30..----------------Rifle, cal .30-----

5 7 ?5 1 3 58 3 6 3 1L7 6 3 55 3

SUTHMARY OF PERSONNEL Captain-------------.-Lieutenant--------------Total commissioned----Warrant Officer-----------

1 4 5 1

1 Sergeant----------First Master Sergeant---------Class----.-l Sergeant First Sergeant--------------33 Corporal- ---------------Corporal or PFC----------41 Private First Class------2. ---------64 Private 2)

Private 2-.------------- 3
Total enlisted--------157 Aggregate----------163

89

ct 0

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I 1 it1 Il I t1 tl { t 1 I )I I

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t.1

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0 Cii tC)

CnA r

o)

VUtt

N Hh N

91

AIb

Angle

of~

Self

Locking

Differential
or Cross

Approach &

Drive

Departtire, 450

Tranmniss ion ges

Spanning Ability 72"

Vertical Cost 2'7.641

App 460 D~ep -340

no

u~ns at

$2, 013

App 320 D~p 350

no

unsat

uinsat

Built during

11W! II
4811

3 0 11

~20' 900-.

92s000

5'1f

30t1

625, 000

Towed AvailabilLoad ity of Payload -- ~Capacity ICC- - Materials -1 -.- ----. 800 lbs

Accessi: Vision _____ Armament _~C--C - --II- C3600 LMIG 8mo1ta readily' accessible&

1500 Ibs

no

/ 100o
overload

critical items

I_
800 lbs
cross

_ __~__i~r
sat

3600

---

mortar - --LMG

-.--

-r

1500 lbs coun- cross count

try 1200 2000 lbs Ibs highway highway

4400 lbs 2000 lbs

_ --i_-UIYr- ,Lsat

I3600 81-mm

-mort .50
cal mg

-- -Lsat

I ---

--- - --I-sat

~----I---sat

LII~IC 1-- -~- - ;-r-3600

LMG

LI-~-LD--)~-Lsat

i~~

/ 100%

1500 lbs overload

---

LI

___

-- t*

4500 lbs

sat

sat

3600

81-mm mortar

sat

---

~I

--

c~-i--~--

.I_;~

--

- rrr~l ir;r~ll -LII -~-LI *

~*

Payload 800 lbs

Towed Load Capacity ------------1500 Ibs

Availability of. Materials -Y-r- r~ -~4 ll--c--no critical items

-----

Vision ~-C~ 360

Armament~-----LC-r-Cllr LIMG 81-mm mortar

bilit

Accessi.
readilk acce s .sible:

/ 10oo
--

overload
----

---

800 lbs cross country 1200 lbs highway 4400 lbs

1500 lbs
cross count

sat

360

LMG

2000 lbs
highway
-i...-...------- '

2000 lbs

sat

3600

81-mmmort .50 cal mg

1~ --i-

sat

--

,-----

~-~

1__-

-_ll--

---

--

~IUI

jl

1500 Ibs

sat

/ 100%

sat

3600

LMG

sat

overload
+i ~---rrr -----r I _ -----:1 -

4500 lbs

sat

sat

360

81-mm mortar

sat

-----

---

--------

i'-

t j'"DIX

,
Stability Longitudinal Slopes -,, ---t------~Cruising Range -*----r~--rrr~300 mi

C.: T.... . RISTICS CHART

Cross Country Fording Gross

Flotation Operation rr~u ilr r*---~-~-~r~r~

3.5 psi

Deth 48"

leight

same as
light
tank

5000 lhb
500
10000

.
-. ---- -I --------~~CI~llll - QC- -~ -~--~~-c~--~- -~ -~-CClrr~-~rYI.I ~-~

304 mi

unsat

unsat

w/atchmt 75,5" w/o atchamt 37.5" 32"

3865

1s

20) mi

33,5 psi

unsat

20000 l'a

----

. ----

; -----------------

;c--ulr~~

~'T1"-

'-1-

--

-----l~-- -CIZ

-- *)-

-~-

---

121 mi

3.2 psi

sat

11942 Ibs

iUL~--N_

.u

~IICi

-- rr--;r----------

--

------

~-----

LL~

120 'mi

2,9 psi

sat

30"

14682 Ibs

92

Stowage

Comm Noise Carrying and dust Max Sust Capacity Level-~" --- -~ Speed -~~-~-~~---~~-'-

Min Sust Stability Slopes Speed 1- Side --- 1

22 MPH

--

B/L/
100 overIpad or 2 litters B/L

med rn
radio on 24v

no more
than --

60 MPH

40%

ton

sat

sat

100% overload or 2 litters

---- -1WI--LLLI-

official 55 M]PH test 61,4 MPH

---L r~-~C.

2-

MPH

52.7%

----

I--

sat

med rn radio on 12v

/,, __,

sat

45 MPH

3-2 MPH

___ ___ ____ _._.___________--_____________ _.__-_-- _.__-_.-__._ _

.-.

B/L/
100;

sat

unsat

32 MPH

2-

MTPH

40%

overload no litters

B/L /
1.00 o overload

sat

unsat

32 MPH

2.2 MPH

40%

2.no l tters NOTE Certain spaces are ba nk because tests have not been made to determine the values for the vehi cle concerned,

Armor Side and Too

rcrr~~~CB

Armor

Bottom ttom
prevent casualties fr 4 lb AT mine
unsat

Silhouette r*C

Lengtht~

____

__?

turn 530 cal at 250 yds

52

minimum possible

--

---

unsat

56 "t

138 5/8"

unsat

unsat

87"

244 7/8w

sat

unsat

66

149"

sat

unsat

68"

184 -

--

_ - .. -

-.

Ir

.__. -

-.

,-

... r,

......... .. i . r

. . .

. .

UvLa
Effects ".idt3 IEase off Ma intenance
off

Ar

Transport-.
carr~ed

Turn

read
9!

Ground Clrne 12"

or

in Ci1 9

pivot

a at 7/8 U

sat

sat

19'4"

49 &

5/6?

87 &
! ti

~at

sat

sat

60

17.& 1/8',

95!?

sat

~at at 1200 ]F cola.

uink

aat

15"

11,

15"1

~aI

APPENDIX VI LIST OF ON VEHICLE MATERIAL FOR TRUCK

1. bag, tool, empty -- - -

-TON
-

M381
1

2.

gage, tire pressure, general service type, calibrated 10 to 60 lb in 1 lb units, and 60 to -1 - - - - - - 160 lb in 5 lb units - - - - handle, jack, folding type, Igh overall 22

3, 4. 5. 6,

7/8 in jack,

- - -

- - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - 1
-- - 1

screw type,

1j ton cap, assy

w/cutter,
-

pliers,
8-in -

comb,
-

slip jt,
- - -

nominal size
-

a- - -1

screwdriver, common, h-duty, integral hdl, lgh of blade 6-in, width of blade 3/8-in, Igh overall -- - - - -- - - -- - - -11-in wrench, 1gh 8in adj, sgl open end, - --- - - - jawopng 15/16-in, -- - -

1 1 1 - 1

7. 8. 9.

wrench, plug, gh 2--in -

stght bar, sq, site of plug i-in, - - - - - - - offset socket, - - - -.-

wrench, wheel stud nu ,. sgle-hd, hex, size of opng 3/4-in, lgh 9-in

740;
4x4

of the Army Supply Catalog Ord 7 SNLG-Or anizational Iaintenance Allowances for Truck -Ton,
1

1 Department

WashInton,

Department

of the Army,

26

Fe ruary 1951.

S93

--

rt-

--

1_1
-

.-.

..

-'

.APPENDIX

VII

AMLIUNITION BASIC LOAD AND EQUIPMENT OF TIH SUPPORT SQUADD AI .IUNI TI ON, BASIC LOAD 81-mrirOn vehicle train .50 cal mg 2 hand grenades 2 mines, AT rockets, AT 2

120 rds
97 rds

23 rds 400 rds 12 12

EQUIPMENT 3 81-mm mortar complete SMG cal .45 Rifle M-1 Camouflage net Canvas cover, vehicle (compl) OVM tools Pioneer tools MG cal .50 complete Personal equipment for
--------- 1-- lu*

1Recommended Ch: Inge to Change I,

FM 101-10,

The

Armored School (Ft

nox

Ky

TAS Dec 51)

D CO

p 2,
US Govt Printing

S 2 FII 101-10, DA (Washington, Office, August 1949), p 256. Off ice,

3 TM

US Govt Printing 9-710, V7D (Washington, D 0C 25 Feb 1943), p 340-34lI 81-82, 73.

94

APPIENDIX VIII SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT FOR RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON -IEADQUARTIER&I

mask protective field M9A1 -- -

compass lensatic luminous - - - - grad w/case 3.

4..
5.

damped 5 deg 20 mil -

glass magnifying self-illuninated S2-inch diamet - 5 power - sniperscope Bob Jones -- - --- - -.
rr r _ .

bayonet knife M4 w/scabbard M8A1 binocular M17A1 - -. - -.. - -. --

rr

6. 7. 8. 9, 10. 11. 12.

carbine cal .30 M2 telescope truck utility axe chop,

-r

observation M48 &-ton, 4x4, single bit

M38A1-

-,

wgt 4 lb w/handle --

can gasoline

5 gal cap -

-, -

carrier wire

cutter M1938

13.. case canvas 14, 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

carbine cal .30 Ml - -- -

case canvas map roll-type cutter wire 111938 goggle M1944 - outfit - - - - -

- -- - - -- --. -

cooking one-burner M1950

- - -

shovel gen pur D handle strap back round . - - - - - -Nr Spoint 2 - tube flexible nozzle - - - -

95

xL

20.

belt LC23
climbers LG5

. ~

.
-

..
-~

21.
22. 23. 24.

-:1
-

flashlight~ TL122

_-

- --

----

lantern

E~D

2 9OIV

radio

set ANc/V

1 ratd in. trk &.-ton

1s/O&2

17-57

96

)V

A:PJ2DTX IX S TI RY OF 2QTICP 11NT

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6.

FOR

SCOUT SQUAD1 - .. - -- ----I-. .I - w- 2

mask protective field M9A1 - - compass wrist induction mine probe Ml bayonet Ml . -. -.. damped . - -

w/scabbard M7

bayonet knife M4
binocular M17A1

w/scabbard M8A1
-

7. 8. 9. 10, 11. 12. 13, 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

carbine

cal .30 M2

- - -

-.

gun machine cal .30 brg M1919A4 launcher grenade U7A2 - -

4
! -M FBI # I -

mount tripod machine gun cal ,30 mount truck pedestal M13C rifle US cal .30 Ml telescope observation Hi4 truck utility -ton 4x4 M38A jewel
-

M2 --

- --

watch wrist 7 or more axe chop single bit can gasoline

- - - - -

-1 2

wgt 4-lb w/handle - -

5-gal cap
-

- . _

can water 5-gal -

_ _ _

- * - 1
-

19,

carrier grenade 3 pocket -

97

8~6B ~4

1CIED

'

eJ

JAI- 10

i, al

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

carrier wire cutter M1938 - - - case canvas carbine cal .30 Ml

cutter wire 11938 - -- -

<

- 2 - 2 -12

goggle M1944

--

- -

...
Sw ,

-2

outfit cooking one burner M1950 --

shovel gen pur D handle strap back r 'O ' - - - - -. point Nr 2 - - - tube flexible nozzle -

flashlight TL122 radio set AN/VROC

--

mtd in trk i-ton

N- --------i--u -^-r -i~--

1T,/0&&E , 71-- 57 9

A8

Aim

APPENDIX X SUMMARY OF EQUIP'ENT FOR SUPPORT SQUAD 1 1. mask protective field M9A - w w r t

compass lensatic luminous damped 5 deg -20

grad w/case 35.

4. 5. 6.
7,

- . -

..

mil

1 - - w .r -

bayonet M1 w/scabbard 1M7

2
2 1

bayonet knife M4 w/scabbard M8A1 binocular M17A1 carbine cal .30 MI2 - - . - --

2 -- --

carrier mortar 81-mm half-track M 21 gun, rifle submachine, cal .45 M3A1 -. - - - - - -

, , ,
, ,

1.
-

8. 9. 10, li, 11. 12, 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

1
2
4r <

1 US cal .30 Ml

- , --

watch wrist 7 or more jewel attachment packbd plywood cargo bag carrying ammunition can water 5-gallon carrier wire cutter - - --

1 4 1 1 1 2 1 1

- - - - - -

1938

-,

case canvas carbine cal .30 Ml cutter wire M1938 flag set M238 goggle M1944 .--. -. --

- -

- -

, 4

-.
-

5 - 1

machete 18-inch blade M1942

99

oe

n"Now

20. 21, 22, 25, 24. 25. 26. 27.

outfit cooking one burner M1950.

packboard plywood -.-.-

pad shoulder panel set AP50 sheath machete

- -

18-in blade M1942 plastic - .. - -

strap quick release packbd flashlight TL122 radio set AT/VRC8 --

mtd in

carr half-track

1 T/O&E

17-57.

100

-'

E''

j~3i

;j8~jtj~ii