Max Weber's Liberalism for a Nietzschean World Author(s): Mark Warren Source: The American Political Science Review,

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MAX WEBER'SLIBERALISM FOR A NIETZSCHEAN WORLD

MARK WARREN Northwestern University

V eber'scommentators accusehimof lacking coherent a often becausehispluralist-elite political philosophy theory democracy of seems to indifferent liberal-democratic values.I argue, that however, thecoreof Weber's political philosophyisa politicized neo-Kantian one an liberalism, that produces ethically significant and is positive concept politics. problem rather Weber's of The that pessimism aboutinstituin tionalizing positive politics bureaucratized societies theethical ofhispolitical left core philosophy inexplicit. introduced conflict his thought This his a into between ethical is commitments hisassessments political and The of possibilities. conflict compelling it because reflects contemporary between promise performanceliberal the the and gap of At sametime, democracies. the terms Weber's in idenformulating problems these helps democratic solutions thatremain in tify obscure his assessment conflicts of between bureaucratization democracy. and

meaningful through lives of createdurably ost students actions. knowMax Weberas a political goal-directed politics I also argue, however,that Weber but and social theorist, few sociologist problem philosopher. failedto carryhis Nietzschean of think himas a political intohis on concept politics of Afterall, he leftno treatises ideal and positive as politics, expressed nor formsof government, systematic modelof a possible theory democracy. of in of treatments theplace of politics the inhispluralist-elite consider- AlthoughWeber's model dramatically nor condition, extended human what he saw as an absolute Nonethe- illustrated principles. ationsof normative and set betweenbureaucratization less, thereis a coherent of philo- conflict it the and that democracy, also failedto express problems commitments sophical philosoand of Weber's socialscience political innercoherence his political guides I in interested thought. argue that Weber'sthought phy. I am not, however, to a includes commitment a distinctive Weber's inconsistencies theirown for political out Weber's of conception politics,one that is, in sake.Ifitturns that is and liberal- philosophy coherent, his analylsis neo-Kantian a effect, politicized human of contemporary as the ism:he seespolitics a uniquely institutions correct, bothto discontinuities his thinking sympone are activity, withthepotential in the createand to manifest responsibility toms of real challenges democratic for in and dignity individuals an increas- theory. conflicts Weber's of in thinking The conworld. This positive have not onlyobscured ethical his ingly secularized for tributions democratic is of but concept politics whataccounts to theory, also fearthatbureaucratization rein- hisrealinsights thelimits liberalof Weber's into in world-a whatI call a Nietzschean of forces ism and thedifficulties democracy Yet societies. I individuals unableto bureaucratically worldin which are organized
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 82 NO. 1 MARCH 1988

AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 82

in Most strikingly "Parliawouldhave arguments. conflicts these that also argue in and his elaborated liberal ment Government a Reconstructed beenlesshadWeber (1978a,app. 2) Weberargues democratic Germany" in commitmentssubstantially direction forwhatwe wouldtodaycall a pluralistthantheelitist rather directions both as an elitemodel of democracy,1 he in factchose. and as modelforGermany on appropriate commentary to In contrast extensive in system mass, political the thebestpossible of philosophy socialscience, Weber's 1985,2). (cf. societies Beetham, of commitments his social industrial philosophical later,Weberrehave not benefited Much like Schumpeter thought and political of to the democracy fit facts mass Thereare a few defines attention. similar from He of levels ignorance. and each exceptions, of passivity high and notable important as (1982) does so by lookingat democracy a I which relyon here.KarlLowith by leaders instifor has developedWeber'sgeneralconcern mechanism selecting elites. between competition responsibil- tutionalizing and meaning withindividual liberal(cf. societies Merleau- From an ethical perspective, ityin rationalized turnsout to be a neutral democracy Ponty 1974, chap. 1). Drawing on Wolfgang processthatleaves out classicalliberalcontext, Weber'sneo-Kantian values,values havingto do Schluchter(1979, 1981) shows how democratic and sovereignty thegoodof popular with an Weber's social sciencepresupposes modelis especially Weber's condi- participation. historical with concern underlying he for capaci- distinctive the importance placed or tionsthatproduce undermine witha pleleadership political ties for rationalaction (cf. Brubaker on strong the for basis (1984) has biscitary as a means checking Habermas 1984). And Jurgen goals for,inraisedthelevelof debateby reconstruct- power of, and providing state and powerful expansive of ing the broad conception rationality creasingly 1985;L6wenstein (Beetham of sociology cul- bureaucracies Weber's underwrites that 1974). from 1966,26-27;Mommsen Whatis missing development. tural Weber's withextracting of The problem is however, an account theliterature, thought political philosophyfrom this model of dimensions Weber's howthese promit from comparing toanother thatis, stems producea politicalphilosophy; Commentaaspectof his thinking. himto judge inent would permit that criteria account Weber's with taken of merits politicalregimes. torsareoften the relative on of provide an oftheimpact secularization society Nor does the literature 1982;Merleau-Ponty (L6with philoso- andpolitics of political account howWeber's that 1974, chap. 1; Portis1983). In Weber's theory, is, to phyrelates hispolitical to his views on whatkindsof political view, the breakdown of traditional meantthat the given nature sourcesof moral authority are institutions possible, of diversity valuesin was a greater there world. ofthecontemporary societies.For this reason, he Western that politicswould inevitably thought value role Liberal-Democracy playa greater inmediating conPluralist politflicts ithadinthepastandthat than of andthePluralism Values by marked wouldbe increasingly ical life valuecommitments of conflicts subjective are Whatwe do findin theliterature of backgrounds coercion. in against interested by attempts commentators prominence a No doubtbecauseof their to thought extrapolate Weber's political take most for inhiswritings, commentators it his from concern philosophy political thatWeber'sviews on the since is here for granted it future, political Germany's of pluralism values dovetails political increasing one findshis most committed
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Weber'sLiberalism
of dangerousdeparturefrom traditional with his pluralisticreformulation liberal-democratic and a testimony ethics liberal-democratic theory. David commitmentGerman to one Beetham, of thebestcommentators to hisoverriding For such that nationalism. socialdemocrats as writes thought, political on Weber's David Beetham (1985,2-7), Weber reprein sents hollowness democratic the of comand irreconcilable, an age of competing, finally mitments withinpluralist-elite theory. basis all valuepositions, philosophical to politimply when that one moral- Thesecommentators agreed defensible in icalorder a rationally by Its chooses to view Weber'sliberalism as had ity tobe abandoned. placewastaken a for political or justification purelyformal procedural philosophy-that as a defensiis, to to in order, itsability allowexpression liberal blesetofethical commitments a regarding society valueswithin of theplurality competing desirable political order-ratherthan and philosophical sociological at large.Weber's as in theory leadership of in one thus perspectives reinforce another a plur- simply a formal (1985, the context institutional tradition. of alistrestatement theliberal of checksand 4-5) one it flawed. balances, finds deeply misstheinner These approaches conmake points commentators similar Other of political philosophy. in sistency Weber's of function leadership aboutthemoral reason, they miss also crucial and liberalism (Eden1984;Mommsen Forthis Weber's informative ambivalenceswithin his 1950,chap.2). 1974;Strauss as as thought a whole, especially and natural rights utili- political Weber rejected relate ourownpolitical to situation the they for tarian foundations liberalism, is commentators and today.Theproblem that metaphysics as former insupportable Weberhas a with thelatter incompatible his neo- assumethatto the extent as in it reflected philosophy, is fully ofhuman Kantian dignity-apoint political image theory democracy. of never his pluralist-elite Since Weber I towhich shallreturn. is as explicitlydeveloped the neo-Kantian Theassumption wrong: I shallargue, Weber's concerns philosophical of although his bases of his liberalism, rejection to theory of has moretraditional approaches leftthe arerelevant hispluralist-elite theydo not,by themselves, con- democracy, thought that impression hispolitical for for in sistsprimarily his arguments par- account it. leaderand liamentary government strong with ship,combined an ad hocpreference For Weber's and freedom initiative. forindividual Nietzschean Problematic: of Weber's theory leadership thisreason, Bureaucratic Nihilism for as to seems emerge a replacement preand natural-right utiliviouslyaccepted When a thinker's conphilosophical His reconfor we tarian grounds liberalism. liberal- cernsare inexplicit, can often to struct seems leavemoral to questions them looking their at mostfunismthus by This conflict. iswhy damental problems. Doingso allowsus to be solved political by can wouldhavehadtoprecommentators arguethatWeberin seewhata thinker of supposeto see themas problems the in the effect replaces moralfoundations it with the value decisionsof first place. Moreover, also helpsus to liberalism wouldhave of within context competitive knowwhat,in their terms, leaders the In machinery. conserva- countedas solutions. Weber'scase, FQr parliamentary well are like (1950, these tivecommentators Leo Strauss problems already developed the (e.g., Lowith 1982; Bruchap. 2), Weberreflects intrinsically in theliterature For nihilistic 1984; Schluchter logicof liberalism. liberals baker1984; Habermas (1974,93), 1981):they Mommsen have to do withtheprogressuchas Wolfgang of sive rationalization Western Weber's emphasison leadershipis a culture,
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goalsofinstruand Theseconcerns theonehand,theexternal thought, institutions. rational institutions likely are to his on pervade writings religion, eco- mentally law, haveonlythemost to tenuous relation the nomics, politics. and in individuals In thecaseofWeber's political thought, goalsthat pursue everyday goalsintimately related motivation to we not that then, should be surprised the life, of classicalproblems liberal-democraticand meaning.On the otherhand, the of theory of less immediate are importance technicalefficiency a bureaucracy on individuals sepato as thanwhathe identified an increasing depends training individual value commitments of He ratetheir bureaucratic displacement politics. In as conceived problem oneofa conflict fromtheirworkplaceactivities. so the forcibly separate betweenthe formal(or instrumental) doing, bureaucracies and goals and rationality bureaucracy the sub- individualand institutional of a of this with characterstantive value) rationality politics. combine separation (or individuals are InWeber's modeofdomination: usage,instrumental rationality istic and for to of refers rationalities means,themost regimented, disciplined, trained to of devotion theduties their a effective of achieving goal. Value impersonal way of offices, whichare in turnhierarchically refers the rationality to rationality that is, the internal structured to rules and goals themselves, according codified of schemas that procedures coherence theinterpretive (Weber 1978a,1148-56). worthiness an of ThelogicofWeber's deal withthe intrinsic argument suggests for that the bureaucratic end.Theproblem with bureaucracies, of organization is Weber, thatthey have no way of em- everyday destroys life whathetakes be to bodyingvalue rationality. Bureaucratic thesecular basis of meaning activities in rationality means oriented,merely thatare consciously is chosenand guided. On instrumental. the otherhand, what The costofbureaucratic is efficiencylife defines responsible a is politics precisely in a worldwithreduced scope forindiactors takeintoaccount the vidual autonomy, that responsibility, sponpolitical rationality ends(Weber of 1946,chap.4). and initiative. Weberin effect taneity, to Politics kinds Nietzsche's ought makedifferent of borrows viewson how nihilvalue rationalities objectsof discus- ism can affect into individuals, he interbut sion,choice,and at somepoint,power. prets problem the politically. Nihilism a is Butwhere bureaucratic power dominates, resultof institutions systematically that responsible politics becomes increasingly separate meansand ends,at leastwhere impossible (Weber 1978a,app. 2, sec. 2). individual actions are concerned. This Weber's rather Nietzschean ofcon- suggests-atleast in principle-a close way the be structing issue might put as fol- relation between structure instituthe of lows: in a secular a with- tionsand the abilities individuals society, society of to out values accepted the authority on of inhabit meaningful universes. forms As of is faith, bureaucracy an institutionalizedsocial organization that systematically form nihilism. Weber, of For however, it sever rationality means the of from of that is not-as forNietzsche-the demiseof ends,bureaucracies displacethekindof theological culture theriseofscience sovereign, and responsible individuality apin itselfthat producesa disenchanted, propriate secular,liberal-democratic to nihilistic universe (Warren 1988,chaps.1, societies. In this sense, bureaucracies 7). The disenchantment identifies he in destroy social and psychological the soil "Science a Vocation" As (1946,chap.5) is of classical liberal-democratic values, a constant cultural potential, it is not explaining part why Weber wrote but in just this: it is also reproduced en- despairingly bureaucracy an iron and of as forced bureaucratic by domination. On cage.
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Weber'sLiberalism
presupproblems As Nietzschean Weber's Politics Value Choice commitment significant pose a politically As and Politics Conflict capable agents, as to persons responsible problematic in then, Weber's Implicit, This actions. goal-directed ofmeaningful, bureaucratic especially with ofrationalization, Weber provides commitment ethical to is political rationalization,a deepcommitment liberal and a defensible coherent of a sense, notion in What keeps thesecommit- politics somepositive philosophy. to to ought relate peraction ments from appearing in Weber's howpolitical a is of theory democracy that sons. It is herethatone finds coherent pluralist-elite one in commitmentsWeber, powerwas in- setofliberal bureaucratic he thought failedto finda societies, forwhichhe ultimately in evitable mass,industrialized Viewednegatively, and for this reason classical liberal- politicalexpression. (Weber "struggle" exist, politicsis essentially valuescouldno longer democratic power to be. 1978a,1414),the"striving share theymight how desirable no matter of the to of Weber'stheory political or striving influence distribution The reason is institutions such a poor guideto the power, eitheramong statesor among 1946,78). (Weber a within state" phi- groups of commitments his political ethical inpolitics however, that losophyis thathe thought contem- Viewedpositively, valuerationaliindividual to volvesrelating made it impossible conditions porary that implying recogchoices, tiestogroup politically. these commitments address with together processes of could be ad- nition persons What Weber thought and argumentation, conhowever,was the of discussion, dressedpolitically, Politof exercises power. lie of organizational sensus behind problem related closely kind human are of icalactions a distinctively means are Bureaucracies superior drift. instrumencombine they a achieving givengoal but incapableof ofsocialaction: and thus of the determining rationality goalsthem- tal and value rationality, and expresswhat Weberconare develop bureaucrats terms, selves.In Weber's for responsibleonly for the ceivesas thehumanpotential teleotechnicians, For goals that are logicalactionand self-determination. means of implementing are All givenand takenforgranted. other this reason,politicalactivities valapartfrom and uable in and of themselves, experiences beingequal, their things the outcomes. to train responsibilities them disregard for As In "Politics a Vocation," examgoals of rationality theorganization's and is politics a it makes clearthat goals. ple,Weber of consequences these theultimate only activity whenitinvolves polit- meaningful bureaucratic powerdisplaces When to onlywhen, transof they had in post- a control destiny; ical institutions-as is politics a histerms, makewhatare lateintoMarxian Bismarck Germany-they actorsmaynot Political activity. politicaldecisions torical in fact irresponsible but on under the guise of technicalexpertise agree valuecommitments, positive do view, politicalactivities requirethat one 1978a,990-94).In Weber's (Weber Weber ir- have value commitments-what such bureaucratic it was precisely to that responsibility had allowedGermany refers as a cause or calling(Weber onlynegapolitics 1978a, 1946,117). To define into to drift WorldWar I (Weber would of only in terms conflict, 1385-92,1407-16).This is why he ad- tively, qualitiesand potenof his theory democ- miss its distinctive dressed leadership may politician' get 'power leadership tials:the"mere of racyto theproblem political his but effects, actually workleads while bracket- strong society ina bureaucratized of of ing the deeperproblem bureaucratic nowhere.... It is a product a shoddy the toward blase andsuperficially attitude as nihilism unsolvable.
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meaningof human conduct" (Weber suggesinteresting 1946,116-17).Weber's of tionin thisessayis thatthearchetype conductis politicalactivity meaningful of out carried in behalf a cause. out he spells itsethical Although never for politthat Weber it dimensions,seems to relation have a distinctive ical actions is politics thesocialmedium personality: can develop whichindividuals through as autonothemselves free, and manifest agents(cf. Portis mous,and responsible mayalso be a deeper 1983,33). Butthere to reasonforWeber'sattentiveness the He of actors. situation political existential that maybe suggesting it is onlypersons can that sense in political acting a broadly in value and consider implement choices a society,at least in any post-Christian and way desirable socially significant (cf. Weber 1946, 115-28, 148-56). Value in are society inevitably choices a secular are beings and political, onlyas political and for responsible valuechoices humans in Weber's theirconsequences practice. nihilism thus of problematic bureaucratic as activity suchis a that implies political as human activity, wellas a distinctively desirable replacementfor culturally value consensus.Thus it authoritative was partlybecause Webersaw technoovervalue choicesas value cratstaking down that he was breaking consensus of questions tooksuchcareto distinguish of fact from questions value.The kindof is for appropriate valuequestions activity but (cf. expertise, politics nottechnocratic politics Weber1949,34-38). ForWeber, human activity is notonlya distinctively (cf. but also a fate and responsibility Portis 1986,chap.3). thisundercombine Weber'swritings in about politics lyingsenseof urgency a sensewith deeppessimism thispositive This aboutitsinstitutional possibilities. is of do dimensions politics whythepositive not findtheir way intohis sociological of (cf. definitions political organizations of that Scaff argues because 1973).Weber
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by of theplurality endspursued political to it organizations, is notpossible define values,goals,or in of them terms shared (Weber 1978a, 54-55; commitments organpolitical 1946,121).Rather, Weber means, share onlya characteristic izations deWeber Andfamously, theuseofforce. that as community a fined state a "human of claims monopoly the the (successfully) a within use force legitimate of physical to (1946,78). According giventerritory" then, definitions, it wouldseem Weber's express cannot organizations that political of as theintrinsic good ofpolitics a form means are they simply since socialaction, to are of to a plurality goodsthat extrinsic Webereven the politicalprocessitself. the that that "precisely writes itis ourfate values have and mostsublime ultimate from life"(1946,155; cf. retreated public for Weber 1949,55). Thisis why, Weber, be inevitably a power todaymust politics of over a multitude ends; why struggle societyas a value questionsaffecting against be ultimately decided wholemust Thustheposiof a background coercion. of dimensions politics tiveand negative remain polarized in Weber's political philosophy:positive politics, broadly as conceived all social actionsoriented one's together toward determining future human is good with others, a distinctively Yet in society. it that necessary a secular is politicsin this sense that is precisely meansof lacks institutional increasingly is then, WhatI am arguing, expression. problemof that the most compelling is Weber's philosophy thisconpolitical sense an significant between ethically flict and institutions. ofpolitics contemporary clear it this From perspective,becomes who argue about that commentators mostobviouspolitthe reconciling three his ical valuesin Weber-hisliberalism, and his elitism-missthe nationalism, Thesevaluesare notof similar problem. statusor originin Weber's conceptual and thought, to missthisis also to miss withinhis the way the inconsistencies

Weber'sLiberalism
The resulting elitism was, I predicament- autonomy. a mirror political thought libof turns modifications, outto willargue,an outgrowth Weber's one thatwith unleavened demoby is eral commitments in be oursas well.Whatwe find Weber on by ones,andnarrowed hisviews commit- cratic his to an attempt reconcile liberal capitalism of and freedom, the theinevitability monopoly ments-topersonhood, It government. is in and government competi- and bureaucratized parliamentary that concern with make thiscontext hisgeneral that presumably tive capitalism concern with becomes specific a persons 1985,chap.2)(Beetham possible these of and with an illiberalpolitical realityand theautonomy responsibilityelites to organizations respect bureaucratic thatwas no longercompeti- with capitalism 1985,57-58). For thisreason, his he tive.In theprocess, modifies liberal (Beetham for shouldbe accounted elitism to commitments thepointthattheyare Weber's of by his analysisof politicalpossibilities in expressed his theories minimally kindof political and not as a separate institutions. political are commitment. and statism Weber'snationalism The tensions betweenWeber'svalue with inconsistent hislibernotnecessarily mostthen, commitments, are interesting (1985,chap.5) alism.As David Beetham of and EdwardPortis(1986, 121-24)have ly as symptoms the deeperconflict an senseof significant of between ethically argued,thenationalism convincingly I and contemporary institutions. stemmed politics his middleand late writings of his view thatpeople can develop now deal withthe implications this from by in personalities onlycom- conflict lookingat two questions. intodistinctive Is to commitmenta positive cul- First, Weber's defined distinctive by contexts munal ex- conceptof politicsa plausibleethical tures.Nor was Weber'snationalism his to as although, Beetham response whatI am calling politiGerman, clusively of the problem, collusion orientation cizedNietzsche also pointsout, his cultural how- secularization and bureaucratization In Eurocentric. principle, remained a meaningful that evolved domination undermines all ever,he regarded historically The reconstruction for His senseof politics? of as nationalities worthy protection. I wouldhaveled Weber a in was an out- which argue state for concern theGerman had democratic direction, he growthof his beliefthat under con- substantially his the survivalof fullyconceptualized commitments. conditions, temporary elaboration on depended their Second,Was Weber'selitist communities national the political poshaving ofhiscommitments only or states, atleast into organization of giventhenature mass,indusstates.Germany's sibility, powerwithin political I that clarifying societies?shallargue in view, trial "worldresponsibility,"Weber's commitments clarifies also some communities Weber's the was to protect national that he did not Anglo-American politicalpossibilities Europefrom of central nation- entertain. Weber's domination. and Russian alism and statism,then, are not sui with interdependent his but generis rather Weber Kant: and to commitmentpersons. liberal and was an elitist nota Weber Finally, ThePolitical Ethics senseof in democrat except theminimal ofPersonality a modelof democracy, his pluralist-elite He With to issue,commenregard thefirst pointto whichI return. heldthatin often liberalthat suggest Weber's societies only a few are tators bureaucratized relativism furthat an capable of livingup to his idealsof in- ismincludes ethical and thersthe modemreduction right of to dividual freedom,responsibility,
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1985).At (cf. ethical philosophy Williams doesnot Weber however, thesametime, of supposethatthesespheres value will One is coexistin harmony. necessarily between choices absolute faced with often and value rationalities, thisis why one of conscious his or herfate who is fully are willknowthatthere no compromises 1949, God and theDevil (Weber between 18). Yet Weber'spositionis not a simple because isbasedona viewof it relativism, lives 101). what humansare, such thattheir rootedin difIf by relativism, thesecom- could be simultaneously however, of and seesno ways ferentiated autonomous spheres mentators meanthat Weber one where finds of distinguishing better and worse value.Thisis presumably metaphysics his havemisinterpreted the specialkindof organic actions, then they position. Indeed, he proteststhat to thathe alludesto but does not develop. concepto in commitmenta specific his understand comments this way Weber's becomes clearin a activity would be the "crudestmisunderstand- tionofhuman lead instead a to ing,"arguing thatthey secondclaim,and thisis whatultimately content hisnotion politto of ethical "veryspecial type of ('organic')meta- gives in he ical action. In the same paragraphs physics"(1949, 18). Unfortunately, he of plurality aboutwhatthisspecialtypeof which writes theinevitable sayslittle of values, he also arguesthathumans be. metaphysics might to seems to have an imperative "choose"between Weber's position Nonetheless, rather than live conflict claims.Haber- valueswhenthey includetwo interrelated and muddle through. in the mas (1984)has elaborated first his semiconsciously he "The fruit thetreeof knowledge," of Action. On Theoryof Communicative to "which distasteful thecomis Habermas's Weber doesnotseek writes, account, inone set of value criteria groundall placentbut which is, nonetheless, to that he in escapable, consistsin the insight others because seescultural progress activity ultiand important thedifferentiation ofvaluespheres, none everysingle if life are and of which primary each of which mately as a whole, itis nottobe perin but kind to has itsowndistinctive ofrationality mitted runon as an event nature is guided, a to and criteria propriety. is truefor is instead be consciously of This which of decisions through erotic life, lan- series ultimate economics,aesthetics, the soul-as in Plato-chooses its own and so life, guage,intellectual sociallife, of is for on. Each sphere necessary a fully fate,thatis, themeaning its activity 1949,18). At one (Weber human anditwouldbe inappropriate and existence" life, the standardsof one level, of course,Weber'semphasison to universalize the One does notjudge decisions to seemsto support idea that sphere all others. of are subjeclove artbylogical consistency, byutility, standards conduct merely To or righteousness efficiency. de- tive. At a deeperlevel, however,his by a conreflectsKantian to clearly reduce one imperative mandthatall valuespheres a to ceptionof persons, view thathuman wouldbe to empty ofitssubstance, life residesin the abilityto choose and dignity life fleefrom intoa worldof formal which manifests one through consciously, lifelessstandards(Weber 1949, 17), a as agent(cf. in oneself a freeand rational pointthathas been revivedrecently 1950,chap.2). power(Eden1984;Strauss comes Support thiskindof position for that choices fromWeber'sobservation valuesare inevitably individual between can clarify Rationality and subjective. in valuechoices, argues "TheMeaning he but proof 'Ethical Neutrality,'" cannot for them vide universal grounds making (Weber1949, 17-19). Each mustchoose his or herown god or devil,and thisis world whatit meansto live in a secular 1984,98(Weber 1946,151-53;Brubaker
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Weber's Liberalism
1984,95-101).This is not sur- (Weber1949, 15-18; Lowith1982, 43; Brubaker of Schluchter atmosphere 1979). the since academic prising, that by stillargue,however, was Germany permeated neoWeber's One might relativa Kantianethicsand epistemology, fact Weber'spositionis implausibly Kantoften overlooked in Anglo-American isticbecausehe believes-unlike teleology to of a It is commentary.2 in terms thisback- that commitmenta rational of of is, thattheethicalcommitments ofpersonhood in theend,a matter ground begin to faith (Weber 1949, 16-17). But what Weber's politicalphilosophy that is in context simply means this "faith" emerge. premises was dis- all arguments axiomatic involve Kant'sapproachto freedom demof be themselves rationally cannot becauseofhisequation reason, that tinctive is onstrated. freedom What separatesKant from moralchoice,and freedom: his Kantheldthat premises is to our capacity use our reasonto guide Weber that all this and exhaustive, that commits As our behavior. CharlesTaylor(1985, were are as insofar they potento 318-21) has pointedout, what proved humans them of aboutKant'sunderstanding tially rational beings. Weber simply attractive he because liberal avoidsuniversalizing claim his to whencompared earlier freedom rationargue that self- understands onecannot affirmed is thought thathe radically rational capacities either but privat- allyfortheaxiomthat determination, without life. freedom as a human To do so would define fully izingtheself,or interpreting to Kant's be to presuppose what one is trying overreason. of thevictory impulse liberal thinking demonstrate. thus shifted schema moral makethecase (I will Still,one might approaches, away from natural-rights are axioms a Weber's while on a and toward focus howvaluechoices nothere)that in of humans as rational agents, "matter faith" thattheyare (forconstitute of have thequality they to withregard theway moral mally)a priori, especially in choicesare manifested actions.Kant all good axiomsin thattheyare maniargumenin of opposed moral schemasthat prescribe fested theactivity rational would or tationitself.Such an argument of values-whether means religious by and various followHabermas's development crior dogmas through metaphysical that kinds of social utilitarianism ulti- tique of Weber in The Theory of Comto matelyrequireinstitutions distribute municativeAction (1984) fromthe perethics."On violate spectiveof his "discourse prescriptions values.Suchexternal binding In Habermas's the account, formally to freely. theindividual's ability choose cannot quality of the premiseresidesin the thecase of moralvalues,actions commitaboutmoral unless of they process argument be said to have moralworth about agreement and free from choice.BecauseforKant ments notina prior result Thus,speakfor their and meaning content. is by humanity defined thecapacity to a and dogmasthat ingimplies commitmentthepersonalmoralchoice,schemas Without agents. qua equate moral action with prescribed ityofothers rational moreto be is there nothing of violatethepersonhood indi- thispremise, behavior fact to con- said,except notetheempirical of viduals(Kant1970,73-86).Weber's This value these broadly different rationalities. maybe follows ceptof personality problike Kant, (and almostalwaysis) a political Kantianlines of reasoning: with not valueinfreedom lem,butthisshould be confused finds ultimate an Weber commitof structure Weber's as construed rationalagency(or personal- theformal nor AndlikeKant,he ment personality withtheimplied to terms). ity,in Weber's Itis commitments. in of reason(moralchoice) universality these construes practical underthat should one then, context, of as a condition thiskind of freedom this
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stand Weber's argumentthat value logicallyrationalaction"(Weber1975, choicesas such and the "beliefin the 192; cf. L6with1982, 45-46; Portis1978, of for 113-20; Schluchter1979, 73-74; Weber validity values"remain necessary thepossibility personality something 1946, 151-53). In thisway Weberequates of as in Thisis meaningful actions. developed and through action withwhat is potenso evenif,for the of Weber, validity value tially in one that whois rational, thesense choices remains "subjective." life a living meaningful can, in principle, Whatis important notice,then,is provide consistent to a account hisor her of that what notsubjective Weber, is for and actions relation bothvaluesand cirin to hencenotrelativistic, thepossibility- cumstances(Schluchter1979, 76-92), in is the and indeed, existential moral necessity this way combining instrumental and ofsubjectivity "Certainly dig- valuerationality practices. concept itself. the in His "liesin of rational nityof 'personality,'"he writes, not agency requires onlythat thefact that itthere for exist valuesabout individuals make consciouschoicesbewhich organizes life;-evenifthose tweenthe demands conflicting it its value of values are in certain cases concentrated spheres also havea clearunderstandbut within sphere theper- *ingof the means and contingencies the of exclusively of son's'individuality,' 'self-realization' action.3 political then The of significance these inthose interests which claims for it valid- pointsis thattheyimplythatpersons' ityas values,is theidea withrespect to capacities rational for are agency intrinwhich its whole existence oriented. sicallyvaluable and therefore is oughtto of in guideand limit Only on theassumption thebelief political judgments. the validity values is the attempt of to Although Weber'sethicsdevelopsin espouse value-judgments meaningful. the spirit Kant in theserespects, he of of However,to judge the validity such departs from While Kant Kantinanother. valuesremains matter faith" a of (Weber holdsthat freedom the implies universali1949,55). WhatWeberis saying hereis zability maxims conduct, of of Weber's that the content value universalcommitment although specific of attachesto the is judgments "a matterof faith,"as inner consistency valuesandtheir of intehumans share interest a meaning- gration with empiricalconditionsof we an in ful existence(cf. Weber, 1946, 275). action.His departure from Kantin part Realizinga "meaningful" existence de- stems from viewthatthere many his are actionsin terms pends on orienting of possiblevalue rationalities, closely each value judgments, that is, "organizing related itscultural to context. Thispoint in one'slife" relation values."Personal- reminds of Hegel'scritique Kant's to us of of ity"is the result a lifeso organized. categorical as forimperative implausibly Thisclaim,with implicit its moralteleol- mal. But equallyimportantly, repreit ogy,is partofWeber's of ontology social sentsWeber'semphasison the conseaction(or,as he putsit,his"special kind quencesof action.Thereare a multitude of['organic'] and metaphysics") part his of worldly of in situations, especially poliof are. understandingwhathumans in there no unambiguously are tics, which It is this broadclaimabouttheimpera- right courses action.As Weber's conof tives valuechoice of that Weber construes trast of between "ethics responsibility" an in terms an axiomatic of commitment and an "ethics ultimate to of ends"in "PoliThus rationality. hisnormative definition ticsAs a Vocation" Kant'sunisuggests, ofpersonality focuses the"consistency versality possible on is in not only intentions, ofitsinner to relationship certain ultimate outcomes (Weber1946, 118-27). Those values and meanings life,whichare who wouldact according an ethics of to of into turned purposes thusintoteleo- ultimate and ends(Kantis onlyone example)
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Weber'sLiberalism
act only on the basis of the inner con- willinevitably themselves find confronted of sistency value systems. Theyconsider with conflicts ethical between meansand anyaction "good"onlyto thedegree that ends.Thattheworld amoral has qualities itreflects value-rational maxims behav- meansthatpoliticswill usuallyhave a of ior. Butvalue-rational intentions not tragic are dimension. Weber's idealpersonalsufficient rational to actionbecauseone itywouldbe conscious thiselement of of can holdthem without regard thecon- thehumancondition acceptit withto and tingencies and consequences action. outparalysis cynicism: is immenseof or "It When one fails to link intentions to ly moving whena mature man-no matworldly in consequences an instrumental-ter whether youngor old in years-is ly rational way,good intentions and aware of a responsibility the consecan for do results. quencesof his conductand reallyfeels often producequitecontrary ends"-thatis, ethics suchresponsibility heartand soul. of "Ethics ultimate with and value He thenacts by following ethicof intentional that are strictly an to rational-arenot sufficient theteleo- responsibility somewhere and reachesa actionthatdefines rational logically per- pointwhere says: 'HereI stand;I can he An of on sonality. "ethic responsibility," do no other.' Thatis something genuinely the otherhand, requiresthat persons human and moving" (1946,127). between strive long-term for consistency It is in remarks suchas these thatone a and valuecommitments outcomes, con- finds Weber's radicalreappraisal poliof sistencythat develops and manifests tics: no longeris it simply necessary a personality. evil,butrather is a positive definiit and I has Karl Jaspers suggested, correctly tively humanactivity Lowith1982, (cf. of thattheeffect Weber's believe, appro- 47). Politics themost is demanding of test for- an ethicsof responsibility, at the of priation Kantwas to deemphasize and and draw out the sametime is thekind activity mal rulesof conduct it of through in which for responsibility consequences implicit is personality cultivated maniand formulation themoral of Kant's question. fested theexpression responsibility. as of He comments the that Insofar politics this as has potential within thehuman it condition, is valuablein itopposition between principleand results as a self.It is thismorally sense significant of basis of ethicsis not tenable.The ethicsof printhat and politics guides structures of much ciple itself demands that in concrete action Weber's and thinking no doubtaccounts guidedby thecategorical imperative, should one bear theconsequencesin mind.The truebasis of formuch hisconcern of with bureauthe ethicsis a thirdfactor,which Kant, who obvicratic of displacement politics.
ously has it in view, does not expressly mention but which Max Weber bringsout clearlyin his 'ethicsof responsibility.' Ethicsof responsibility is the true ethics of principle.It does not take mereresults rationalprinciples itsguidebut or as seeks its way in the open arena of possibility, pursuing an absolute that is not manifested through any materialcontent, but only through in thought actions. (Jaspers 1962, 72-73)

Weber'sCommitment Persons: to Elitist Democratic? or

Yet what is problematic Weberis in his whether politicized, neo-Kantian ethic in be could,in principle, expressed political institutions. thisrespect In Weber's departure from Kantremains significant. Kant'sposition thisissue was clear: on thereis no necessary conflict between individual freedom agreement uniand on

Weber fact in makesessentially same the with point respect Kantin "TheMeanto " ingof'Ethical Neutrality'(1949,16-17). Weberemphasizes, thatan however, ethics responsibility a recipe of is not for in right action, especially politics. Actors
41

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his commitments, elitism ethical versal standardsof conduct,that is, Weber's of elaboration hiscommitbetweenpracticalreason and political is onepossible This would meanthat of requires individu- mentto persons. Whatmorality right. it Instead, is goodsand theelitism notfundamental. on als isnotagreement external with ethics, of that the is all thatis left hisliberal values but ratheragreement sigand for treating itsrespect persons itsethically peoplemakenotinvolve choices whenhe comsenseof politics, othersonly as means. Kant's rule for nificant of of an it this accomplishing was, of course,the bines with analysis therealities in domination mass,industhat the imperative: notion the bureaucratic categorical libIf society. so, an originally to of maxim an act ought be put trialized guiding political democratic In to the testof universality. principle, eralandsubstantially by the ethos would have been overtaken Kant(1964;1970,132-33)considered of of for respect personsas freeand rational Weber'sassessment the realities a producing imper- power in modem society, by expressed thecategorical agents elitism. liberal and marginally ative to be a possible,sufficient, is The pointof my argument not, of worthygoal for a liberal intrinsically course,somehowto save Weberfrom society. Rather,it is that looking at polit- himself. a one that finds genuine It is here himinterestmakes manner in posi- Weber this ethical inWeber's icalindeterminacy to tion.In contrast Kant,Webersimply ingin a way thathe wouldnotbe ifhis of a weresimply matter tasteand to his avoids universalizing commitment 'elitism fear for-and perhaps antipathy even within personal personsas rationalagents, for as his reason, commitment of-the masses, Beetham, example, For societies. this than suggests (1985, 111-12). This approach rather an produces elitism topersons of positionthatfol- shows how Weber'snarrowing his the liberal-democratic to in Kant.Whatonefinds Weber ethicalcommitments personsreprelowsfrom a reality whatwas certainlypolitical of is a heroicinterpretationpersonality: sents so intelli- in his day and remains in our own, requiresa strength, personality liberalbetween contrast a thathe namely, stark and gence,commitment, realism and to commitmentspersons, couldever democratic onlya fewin society believed liberal-demowithin this achieve.Combining heroicinterpre- thepowerrelations the thatundermine social societies of cratic thathierarchies withthenotion tation Readof in are domination inevitable anysociety, conditions thesecommitments. in (1984, ingWeber thisway allowsus to learn at Weberarrives what Brubaker about ethical dilemmasof as describes an aristo- something 97-98) correctly in one that is only very liberal-democraciesmass-administered craticmorality, liberaland not at all demo- societies. marginally whatis moreclearly In order define to cratic. In "The Meaning of 'Ethical exthe Weberwrites at stake,let us perform thought for Neutrality,'" example, Weber's ethics of every periment separating is one that "only thing indisputable: of possibility. his exception, from analysis political without typeof social order, must,if one wishesto evaluateit, be What would a good societylook like wouldtreat politics A to with examined reference theopportuni- then? good society to essential thepersonhood typesof as something to tieswhichit affords certain we assuming understand of to persons riseto positions superiority of itsmembers, to all relating to of the through operation thevariousob- politics include activities If, rationalagencyin social situations. 27). factors" (1949, and subjective jective a we are How fundamental Weber'sclaims therefore, wereto define good socicomethical of in of etysolely terms Weber's aboutthestructure If here? I am right
42

Weber'sLiberalism
by and theplebiscite limited parliament. that formula Weber expected this Second, an wouldproduce equilibforleadership forcesbetween rium of countervailing political leadership and bureaucratic that power,an equilibrium wouldensure society open and dynamic a relatively 1985, (Weber1978a, 1414-17;Beetham chap.4). that then, commenItis tobe expected, tatorson Weber'sviews of democracy on entirely thequeswouldfocusalmost and tionof leadership elitecompetition. writes the that for KarlJaspers, example, thinking of concern hispolitical "primary was how to createan activeharmony was inevitbetween democracy-which leadableanyway-andtheauthoritative statesof able ership truly andresponsible Mommsen men" (1964, 201). Wolfgang of is Jaspers, critical Weber, who,unlike of that "wasan advocate demoche notes the under social that, racyon thegrounds of and politicalconditions a modern a it society, offered maxibureaucratic The and mumof dynamism leadership. meantlittle however, classicaldoctrine, in of tohim.He didnotbelieve thetheory of thesovereignty thepeople"(1974,87; cf. Kilker1984). Webersaw the demoas struggle cratic process a "competitive leaders the for support ofvarious political of thepeople."In thissense,Mommsen of theory democracy out,Weber's points Democracy Pluralist-Elite is clearly "liberal the modelof competiand DemocraticValues "from to tion" transplanted economics the mass When Bismarck's cametoan endin fieldof parliamentary democracy" rule 1977,chap.4). in a words, nation (1974,88; cf.Macpherson 1890,he left, Weber's David Beethamnotes that "withoutany political sophistication" Similarly, of the originated "theory competi1407-16). Weber (1978a,1392;cf.also 1385-91, thatgainedsuch democracy It was in thecontext a post-Bismarck tive elitist of acceptancewithinpolitical war widespread that into Germany had drifted world in thatWeberdevelopedhis pluralist-elite science the1950sand 1960s"(1985,2). politof His outstanding Fromtheperspective Weber's model of democracy. as his dis- ical ethics, view of.democracy a concern was withthe bureaucratic selection would for of mechanism leadership of and domination placement politics with features of seemto be quiteconsistent hisneotechnocrats. outstanding The shouldbe view even aristocratic thatsocieties the model were, first, strong, a in of they based on judged terms theopportunities Caesaristic leadership political
43

mitments persons,we would have to in of its defined desirability terms itssub aspects.Only this democratic stantially in kindof society would be desirable a world wherethereare no Nietzschean of sources value,because transcendental wouldallowindividuonlysucha society to durability the als to givea meaningful Sucha activities. worldoftheir everyday be wouldnot,ofcourse, devoid of society Nonethetragedy, violence. and conflict, pointsout (1949, less, as Weberhimself is socialconflict inevit26-27),although are able, there manyways forit to be for The expressed. problem a peacefully value that Weber's society wouldexpress to commitments, would be, first, then, the institutionalize respectfor persons without withinlarge-scaleinstitutions Secondwouldbe to agreement. imposing of maximize dialogical possibilities agent ones (cf. withinsmall-scale formation 1977, chap. 5; Mansbridge Macpherson 1979, chap. 3). In this 1981; Habermas of problematic bureaucratic way,Weber's nihilism his political and ethics produce democracy an imperative substantive for model the at quite oddswith pluralist-elite he advocated. ofdemocracy actually

AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 82

to legitimacy of affordfor superiorleadership(Weber description democratic does not even elaborate a sociologicalcategory,his 1949,27). Weberhimself between on turns a distinction in his to attempt justify model democratic definition charisma and in of He terms. does so instead terms lib- authoritarian democratic Accordhas importance. eral, elitist, and nationalist values that a normative one checks ing to Weber'sdefinition, should 1985,chap.4). Through (Beetham only the it and balances, wouldlimit powerof speak of democraticlegitimacy the precedes of recognition a leader with to government interfere individual where The demoof an By liberties. providing arenaof polit- relationship legitimacy. of it ical competition, would selectforthe craticcontent Weber'spluralist-elite is then, in thefact it mostable leaders.Finally, wouldpro- modelof democracy, a presupposes legitimacy to thatdemocratic with capacity the state videtheGerman decision-making allowing moreor less considered a politics, assume placeinworld on culture as process thepartofthegoverned. its it to protect own national In the contextof Weber's broader of nations cenof wellas those theweaker one thateven however, finds sociology, tralEurope. substancedemocratic havebeenmuch more this minimally It would,infact, this consentto being ruled by anotherfor difficult Weberto have justified cirunder very special of wouldhavetoexist ethics of modelin terms his political if a demo- cumstances it werenot to be merely withits substantially personhood Volunof appearance democracy. That implications. thisis so can be formal cratic and autonomy, even will, of Weber's ownassessment the taryconsent, seenfrom choice. considered He basis plebiscitary ofleadership. insists implya consciously in is thatif leadership to have any demo- But the statusof "choosing" Weber's of From perspective the it cratic meaningwhatsoever, would modelis tenuous. of societies, is hissociology mass,industrial followfromthe factthatlegitimacy of the derivedfromthe will of the it is precisely existence individuals "formally governed"(Weber 1978a, 268). Even as rationalagents capable of making Weberdid rests democracy on thevol- choicesthatis problematic. pluralist-elite believethatinto and autonomous consent the not, like manyliberals, untary rationalutility That dividualsare necessarily individuals. of leadership particular he As to this is important Weber's model maximizers. a sociologist, observed of democratic that most mass followings leaders he when defines clear becomes and emotional irrational" "purely in part of Economy involve legitimacy the first Weber (1978a,1459). Moreover, and Society as an antiauthoritarianfactors are writing notedthatsuchfollowings especially of legitimacy, species charismatic mass democraof authoritarian principle characteristic modern that "basically the may ofcharismatic legitimation be subject cies. It was forthisreasonthathe fully leaders usedemato plebiscitary interpretation,expected to an anti-authoritarian to their followauthority gogictechniques solidify forthevalidity charismatic of such leadership evokes by on rests entirely recognition theruled, ings.Veryoften Weber dethe mass behavior-something before their on 'proof' eyes.... When pro- clines to describe as "social action" undergoes charismatic organization character of it pos- because itslackofintentional rationalization,is readily gressive that being (1978a,23).' Thisis whyhe thought sible that,insteadof recognition of it as treated a consequence legitimacy, the consentelicitedby a plebiscitary be and as demo- leaderwouldin fact "onlyformal is treated thebasisoflegitimacy: (1978a,267). fictitious" cratic (1978a,266-67).4 legitimacy" My aim is not, of course,to fault AlthoughWeber only intendedhis
44

Weber's Liberalism

Limits Democracy: to of leaddescriptions plebiscitary Weber's ershipfroma sociologicalperspective. of "The Principle The pointhereis thatif Weber'ssocioSmallNumbers" are then logical considerations correct, As J.J.R. Thomas(1984)has recently sense in whichit theyblur the limited lackofconsidering it sense to describesuch political argued, was notfor makes of SurelyWeber possibilities direct democracythat processesas democratic. he tooktheposition did. The fact credence to Weber was aware of this,lending at and that for Weber thathe considered rejected least Mommsen's suggestion alternademocratic are institutions a merely some substantially "democratic chalall makes position themore his functional in machinery" the hands of tives His theory. argufor him charismatic leaders, pushing danger- lenging democratic was democracy substantive against prin- ment leadership ouslycloseto the"fascist and based on two claims:thefirst most Mommsen ciple" (1974, 93). Although is that obvious problem the size of modem the may overstate case, he is right compelling and the from the perspectiveof substantial societies; second more democracy opposedto Weber'sown problemhas to do with bureaucratic (as "impossibility" Weber's of power.Butwhile mechanisms on emphasis the formal to it is very difficult dis- arguments are crucially insightful, democracy) are in case, they not and especially thelatter consent between voluntary tinguish mass behavior.This is why Mommsen decisive. to Withrespect the questionof size, can plausibly arguethatWeberfailsto leader- Weber held that directdemocracyis betweencharismatic distinguish undifferrelatively onlyinsmall, on possible domination, ship and charismatic The proband betweenliberal- entiated simplesocieties. which the difference decisions political democratizing dic- lemwith and democratic leadership demagogic is making decision is thatactualpolitical depends. Similar tatorship presumably of Habermas always governedby the "principle have considerations led JUrgen of to characterize Weber's concept leader- small numbers,"which expressesthe of as desperate "superiorpolitical maneuverability shipdemocracy a somewhat (1978a,1414).The groups" smallleading to of attempt breakthepowers bureaucin exclusiveness polittoward self- tendencies ratization means a "decisionist of by in assertion the midstof a rationalized ical decisionmakinggrow as societies sugin lead- becomelargerand morecomplex, world" embodied a strong-willed modemcircumstances that gesting under for er'sinstinct power(1971,65-66). is democracy impossible. is conflict between direct Clearlythere little in terms, meanthat, Weber's Does this this institutional model Weber's and elitist values can have democratic substantive But and nationalist sentiments. it is also Although no place in modemsocieties? clear that the model gives littleor no democto limitation relate direct may to theethical commitments this of expression applyto less his politicalphilosophy, those I have racy,it does notso clearly democof forms participatory characterized based on a commitment demanding as of racy. Weber's positive political ethos and a positive to persons conception thateveryindividual politics, orientedtoward bureaucratic would not require in and demo- participate every politicaldecision. nihilism havingsubstantially is Whatit wouldrequire thatindividuals cratic Thus to implications. it remains be that decisions in directly those asked whetherWeber's pluralist-elite participate theireveryday affect most immediately modelwas the onlyway he could have The activities. reasonis that,in Weber's institutionalized political his ethics.
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qualities can politics havepositive terms, to it onlywhere relates the"local"develof senses and of opment persons, to their (cf. freedom and self-determination pardirect 1946,155).Thus,while Weber may decisions in ticipation foreign-policy of for not be feasible largenumbers inmajorconcerns (oneofWeber's dividuals in and in "Parliament Government a Reit Germany"), also has less constructed polifor importance a positive immediate ticsthan,say, powerin the workplace, cooperatives, consumer neighborhoods, hand,repreand thelike. On theother wouldbe bothfeasmechanisms sentative in ible and sufficient thoselarger-scale the determine thatveryoften decisions life, of contingencies everyday including and investment decisions, foreign-policy indusin decisions large-scale production policy, on decisions macroeconomic tries, ethics political and so on. WhatWeber's is words, participation in demands, other at to appropriate theleveloforganization whichdecisionsare taken. This is the he that does notconsider. option consider ThatWeberdid notseriously options these kinds of participatory showsup in thefactthatwhenhe conof siders socialistprinciples economic of he organization, looksonlyat "cartels of and producers," "cartels consumers," centralized bothof whichwouldrequire chap. (1978b, to control be effective state 1978a,1454).WhatWeber 12, cf.Weber is in failsto consider thiscontext democspheres and of ratization production other of societyin ways that would extend beyond for opportunities participation as of the spheres government theyare He in societies. doesnotdo defined liberal he because seestheincreasing itseems, so, of of bureaucratizationall spheres society as inevitable. powerin mass, industrialbureaucratic "As soon as mass adminized societies: is istration involved,the meaningof that so changes radically itno democracy to makessenseforthesociologist longer the democracy meanto ascribe theterm" democracy of ingithasinsituations direct (Weber1978a, 951). Weber'sargument includesthree kinds of reasons why democracy. limits bureaucracy behas The first to do withconflict by government law anddemocratic tween there an intrinis heldthat Weber control. toward bureaucratization sic tendency for demands withtheriseof democratic by treatment govand rational consistent ernment(Thomas 1984). Democratic involvesequality minimally legitimacy the before law and hencea legal-rational these of structure rules. Administering that rules requires somebodyofindividuand als have powers of interpretation leadsto legalwhich enforcement, inturn as Yet domination. " 'democracy' rational suchis opposedto the'rule'of bureaucof because its of in racy, spite andperhaps of promotion unavoidable unintended yet (Weber1978a, 991). bureaucratization" of intothedevelopment Weber's insight as is democratizationthatinsofar formal in of a it involves "leveling thegoverned and the face of the governing bureauthe group," bureaucarticulated cratically posiautocratic a may"occupy quite racy (1978a, tion,bothin factand in form" 985;cf.Cohen1972,72-77).Itisprecisely that democratization leads this"passive" and democracy between to the tension believed the Weber At bureaucracy. best, effectsof rationalizedadministration could be stemmedthrough"political by democratization," which he meant designed mechanisms constitutional those of "thedevelopment a closed to prevent in of status groupof officials theinterest and of accessibility office," to universal Limitsto Democracy: in of minimize authority officialdom "the Bureaucracy the of the interest expanding sphereof argument, 'public opinion'as far as practicable" Weber'smore compelling of has then, to do withtheinevitability (1978a,985).
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Weber'sLiberalism
administra- thirdfactor:power. Bureaucracies of The problem rule-based proproblem, vide technically by tionis compounded a second superior meansof conof trol.Thisquality bureaucratic character namely, nondemocratic the of organiHere,theissueis not,as in the zations-forWeberas muchas forFouexpertise. contradiction cault-is thedeepest most first case,oneofan internal and intractable but within democracy, themorefamiliar problem substantive for Acdemocracy. the between advantages cording Weber'sanalysis,both ecooneofa trade-off to and ofa technological society thegoodof nomic and political processes cause Where "a group of bureaucratizationmodemsocieties. self-government. in In Weber "no capitalist writes, is specialists present," economies, bureaucracy spreads is how strongly attempt made simply the matter becauseprofit closely is related to in the its technical position, to keepthem a dependent in superiority production. are seeds of bureaucratization present. Where government is concerned, bureaucbe ratization encouraged demands can neither Above all, such persons is for by nor according the equal treatment uniform to appointed dismissed and services. proceduresappropriateto immediate The forms administration result of that democracy" (1978a,290). produce a "passive democratization," ways combining formal Yetinbothcasesonecanimagine a in equality thedelivso societies that eryofservices higher ofarranging complicated with degrees conof and powersof administration expertise trol by organizations over both their and dividedso as to make employees are checked and clientele (Weber1978a, The 949,985-86). to them threatening democracy. less authorities should is The superior question notwhether technical of capabilities the bureaucracy, they transgress not exist,but whether however, onlyprovide to boundaries meansofpower,butalso result appropriate the kind of superior principle, frompreexisting relations power. In they authority possess.On this of of to I maybe subject theauthority some- such cases, the splitbetween individual of (for and institutional one else in one sphere existence goals does not simply to legalauthority reflect example, a policeman's imperatives efficiency; also of it whenI am driving, a doctor's expert reflects-indeed, to presupposes-the power I when am sick,andso on). But ofsomeindividuals enlist authority to others the in in I might an authority other be spheres, service their of goals (cf. Weber1978a, andan equalinspheres permit that equal- 289-92). Weberis quiteclearabout the the of ity.Indeed, publicspheres liberal- fact that bureaucratic dominationis democracies already embodysome of fueled bothcapitalist (state) in and socialwouldbe to ist societiesby the mannerin which these distinctions. point The to extend them bureaucratic organizations groupsof individuals monopolize social assuming wayscould resources society, throughout (1978a,1394).Thisis whythey effective. be foundto makethem Thus, have the ability use others instruto as couldbe a society is ments rationalized that theoverall effect in schemes adminof and istration production. language and differentiated pluralistic, and In highly that equal withregardto the evokesMarx,Weber yet relatively writes that valuesof personhood Walzer1983). (cf. thehierarchical of dependence thewageworker, Weber'spessimistic image of Certainly theadministrative technical and the employee, be as bureaucracy an "ironcage"cannot in assistant theacademic institute wellas that as of thecivilservant thesoldier due to the and is of based on theintrinsic properties rules fact intheir the that case means for indispensable alone. and expertise theenterprise for and making living in the a are for whatis decisive theconflict Rather, or handsof theentrepreneurthepolitical ruler. is and between bureaucracy democracy a ... The "separation" of the worker from the
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AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 82

nature pointis thatit showsthepolitical thatthediscontinuproblem; of Weber's his ity between politicalethicsand his reflects model pluralist-elite ofdemocracy and reality, not of hisassessment political that It of justproblems principle. suggests if solutionsexist to the problemsof they bureaucratization, wouldhaveto be politicalin natureand addressthe disoversocialresources of tribution control In of the throughout institutions society. logic,onlythiskindof of terms Weber's the wouldremove sustainredistribution here are important, ing cause of bureaucratization. Weber'scomments This that forthey suggest he was quiteaware would, of course,involvea substantial such as Marcuse(1968, democratization society, consistent of what critics of chap. 6) accuse him of overlooking, with This ethic. political Weber's positive rationalization wouldbe theclearest that namely, instrumental solution imaginable or -whetherin capitalist state-socialist to his politicized "Nietzsche problem," relations bureaucratic by supported power societies-is Yet nihilism. any workable fromcontrolover social re- solution stemming Weber agent. a requires political is sources.Bureaucratization not, then, saw onlya fewcourageous individuals, of simplyan effect the technological butno political to likely chalmovements nor lenge bureaucratic of requirements a complexsociety, This is domination. of presumably he optedfora position socialexpression evenlessan inevitable why is that WhatWeberis claiming "rationality." if intact politically, not couldremain that bureaucracies both presuppose as a liberal-democratic politicalphilosbased on controlover ophy. power relations and superior meansofexistence, provide control.His pesmeans of increasing of the simism regarding march bureaucConclusion bureaucratic that from fact the racystems political Weberdoes have a coherent are superiormeans of organizations with then,one concerned that philosophy, power,and thismakesit less likely meanto capacities construct can control be successfully individual concentrated secularized livesin an increasingly Weber ingful The challenged. keyto criticizing world.Yet he is inhas on thispoint,as Habermas pointed and bureaucratized about thevalues of his political out (1984,220-22,241-42),is to notice explicit in of Weber that equatedtherationalization philosophy, largepartbecausehe sees for and societywith bureaucratization did littleor no possibility theirinstituThisleavestheunderof notentertain possibility anyother tionalexpression. the of philosophy forms of rationalization. lying problems hispolitical institutional for This made it difficult himto locate unsolved, as we see in the conflict and whathe ethics his of between political This rational alternatives. is so in spite pluralpolitics-his of conception ration- tookto be a possible thefact Weber's that This conof theory democracy. alityin social lifeis verymuchbroader ist-elite sigan in of flict Weberbetween ethically rationality than the instrumental and its institusenseof politics nificant bureaucracy. it because is the of possibilitiescompelling Nonetheless, importance this tional
addestruction, meansof production, material in and research, finance academic ministration, basisofthemodem state, is general thecommon and sphere, and cultural, military initspolitical, In economy. bothcases capitalist of theprivate is means in thehandsof of thedisposition these (of apparatus whom bureaucratic the that power clerks, supervisors, officers, judges,officials, or obeys officers) directly andnoncommissioned to whomit is availablein case of need. This is apparatus nowadaysequallytypicalof all and its thoseorganizations; existence function concenof causeand effect this are inseparably of 1978a, (Weber of means operation. tration the 253) 1978b, 1394;cf.Weber

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Weber's Liberalism
of precondition interpretive a it is also ourconflict: reflectscontinuing kindof transcendental (1979,73). and the between promise per- sociology" divergence leaderis the Weber's schema, plebiscitary 4. At of formance liberaldemocracies. the "theIn important transitional type"between most in authoritarian Weber's problems framing sametime, and domination governcharismatic in solutions mentwherechoicehas becomerationalized an allowsus to identify terms these 1978a,266-67).Thus, (Weber officialdom" in becausehe "elected obscure Weber thatremain a plebiscitary wouldnot Weber between although tobe a mature considertherationalidoes not always distinguish democracy, democracy of and of problems principle those power zation this to adds modeoflegitimacy nothing its of Identifying consensual andcanbe treated thesameway of inhisanalysis bureaucracy. in basis, to bureau- in regard thisissue. thatsustain thepowerrelations Weber pluralists, 5. Much like contemporary thatWeber's suggests craticdomination and the that concluded to counter "direct irrational in politics a sec- mobruletypical purely of problem a meaningful it peoples," is of plebiscitary ularizedworld,could, at least in prin- desirable individuals represented means by be that as suchas clubsand unions substantive of secondary groups, through ciple,be addressed (1978a,1460). parties formsof democracynow lacking in wellas political societies. liberal-democratic

References

Notes
I and criticisms, am comments For theirinsightful indebted to William Connolly, Thomas Dumm, StuartGilman,AsherHorowitz,Alkis Kontos,Jane Mansbridge,Edward Portis,and J.J. R. Thomas. 1. I intend the term pluralist-elitetheory of democracy to refer to the model explained and developed by C. B. Macpherson (1977, chap. 4). Macpherson refersto this model as "equilibrium democracy"because of its emphasis on marketlike outcomesof elite competition. equilibrium 2. Some aspectsofWeber'sKantianlegacyare, of course,betterknown than others.He subscribesto between moral choice and the Kantian distinction empiricalexistence,for example, when he insists that thatvalues are subjectivecommitments cannot validated.Like(thatis, empirically) be scientifically wise, Weber follows Kant in pointingto the nonwhilealsoof character value judgments, scientific like Kant and against the positivists-holdingthat values have a rational meaning. Much of Weber's writingon the philosophy of social science was aimed at savingvalue choices frompseudoscientific claims, a centralpoint of "The Meaning of 'Ethical " Neutrality' (1949, chap. 1). of 3. Indeed, for Weber, the ethical significance conditionsof in social scienceis its utility clarifying rationalagency.His choice of objects (social action) reconas well as his choice of methods(interpretive structionof subjective orientations)both follow in from interest personhood.His social scienceis his appropriateto the studyof humans insofaras they than,say, organisms are conceivedas agents,rather alludes behavior. WolfgangSchluchter manifesting to thispointwhenhe notesthatforWeber"theconis of ceptuallypresumedconsistency personality a 49

Beetham,David. 1985. Max Weberand the Theory of Modem Politics. 2d ed. Cambridge:Polity. Brubaker,Roger. 1984. The Limitsof Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thoughtof Max Weber. London: George Allen & Unwin. Cohen, Jean. 1972. Max Weber and the Dynamics of RationalizedDomination. Telos 14:63-86. Eden, Robert. 1984. Political Leadership and Nihilism. Gainesville: University of Florida Press. 1971. Discussion. In Max Weber Habermas,Jurgen. and Sociology Today, ed. Otto Stammer.New York: Harper & Row. 1979. Communicationand the Habermas, JUrgen. Evolutionof Society.Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon. Habermas, Jurgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon. Karl. 1962. Kant. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Jaspers, San Diego: Harcourt,Brace & World. Jaspers,Karl. 1964. Three Essays. Trans. Ralph Manheim.New York: Harcourt,Brace & World. Kant, Immanuel. 1964. Groundworkof the Metaphysicsof Morals. Trans. by HerbertJ. Paton. New York: Harper & Row. Kant, Immanuel. 1970. Kant's Political Writings. Ed. Hans Reiss and trans. H. B. Nisbet. CamPress. bridge: CambridgeUniversity Kilker,Ernest.1984. Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy. In Max Weber's Political Sociology, ed. Ronald M. Glassman and Vatro CT: Greenwood. Murvar. Westport, L6wenstein, Karl. 1966. Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspectiveof Our Time. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. Amherst:Universityof MassachusettsPress.

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Lowith, Karl. 1982. Max Weber and Karl Marx. Trans. Hans Fantel. London: George Allen & Unwin. Macpherson, Crawford B. 1977. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mansbridge, Jane.1981. BeyondAdversaryDemocof racy. Chicago: University Chicago Press. Marcuse, Herbert.1968. Negations. Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1974. Adventuresof the Dialectic. Trans. JosephBien. London: Heinemann. Mommsen, Wolfgang.1974. The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives the Political Sociology of on Max Weber. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Portis,Edward. 1978. Max Weber'sTheoryof Personality.Sociological Inquiry48:113-20. Portis,Edward. 1983. The Unityof Normativeand EmpiricalTheory. Political Studies 31:25-42. Portis, Edward. 1986. Max Weber and Political Commitment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Scaff, Lawrence. 1973. Max Weber's Politics and Political Education. American Political Science Review 67:128-41. and Schluchter, Wolfgang.1979. Value-Neutrality the Ethic of Responsibility.In Max Weber's Vision of History, by Guenther Roth and Schluchter.Berkeley: Universityof California Press. Schluchter, Wolfgang. 1981. The Rise of Western Rationalism:Max Weber's DevelopmentalHistory. Trans. GuentherRoth. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress. Strauss, Leo. 1950. Natural Right and History. of Chicago: University Chicago Press. Taylor, Charles. 1985. PhilosophicalPapers. Vol. 2. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Thomas, J. J. R. 1984. Weber and Direct Democracy. British Journal Sociology 35:216-40. of Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralismand Equality. New York: Basic Books. Warren, Mark. 1988. Nietzsche and Political Thought.Cambridge:MIT Press. Weber, Max. 1946. From Max Weber. Trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Charles WrightMills. New York: OxfordUniversity Press. Weber, Max. 1949. The Methodologyof the Social Sciences.Trans. and ed. EdwardShilsand Henry Finch. New York: Free Press. Weber,Max. 1975. Roscherand Knies: The Logical Problems of HistoricalEconomics. Trans. Guy Oakes. New York: Free Press. Weber, Max. 1978a. Economy and Society. Trans. and ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley:University CaliforniaPress. of Weber, Max. 1978b. Socialism. In Selections in Translation, ed. Walter G. Runciman. CamPress. bridge:CambridgeUniversity Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limitsof Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Mark Warrenis Visiting AssistantProfessor Political Science,Northwestern of University, Evanston,IL 60608.

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