CROSSLAYER APPROACH FOR IDENTITY AND LOCATION PRIVACY IN WSN ABSTRACT Though an increasing number of wireless hotspots and

mesh networks are being deployed, the problem of location privacy has been ignored. When a user's location privacy is compromised, an attacker can determine where the user is, and uses this information. It is difcult to be addressed by traditional security mechanisms, because an external attacker may perform simple trafc analysis to trace back to the event source. Solutions such as ooding or using dummy messages have the drawback of introducing a large amount of message overhead. The proposed scheme names Cross later approach for identity and location privacy in wsn provides secure communication among wireless device. The Simulation results shows that the proposed scheme outperforms best results compare to other location privacy schemes. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Wireless Sensor Network Advances in wireless communication made it possible to develop Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consisting of small devices, which collect information by cooperating with each other. WSN comes in the category of Low Range Wireless Personal Area Network (LRWPAN). These small sensing devices are called nodes and consist of CPU (for data processing), memory (for data storage), battery (for energy) and transceiver (for receiving and sending signals or data from one node to another).The size of each sensor nodes varies with applications. Sensor network can be defined as a collection of sensor nodes, where all the sensor nodes work together to perform a specific task .In general, similar type of data will form one cluster, for each cluster there will be a cluster head .This cluster head will gather the data and after the collection of data, it will route them to the base station. A sensor node consumes its energy in monitoring its environment and receiving and sending radio signals. Sensor nodes can determine their absolute or relative geometrical positions by using Global Positioning System (GPS) or a position detection system. Since sensor nodes are severely constrained by the amount of battery power available, innovate techniques that improve energy efficiency to prolong the network lifetime are highly required. Data aggregation and hierarchical mechanism are commonly used techniques. Data aggregation can eliminate the data redundancy and reduce the communication load. In order to design good protocols for wireless sensor networks, it is important to understand the parameters that are relevant to the sensor applications. In general sensor nodes are application specific one. 1.2 Location-Based Service With the advance of location technologies, various positioning systems can deter-mine peoples locations with high accuracy, such as GPS, nearby cellphone towers, and wireless access points. The receiver of all these positioning systems can be integrated into a small mobile device with limited computing power and storage, which can report location information to people almost anywhere anytime. These technologies have led to the introduction of location-based services (LBS), which provide people information relevant to their current locations. There are various types of existing LBS, such as: Navigation service. This service provides directions to a user- dened target location. Location-based trac and weather alert. This service provides trac and weather information to users in real time. It could be combined with the navigation service to avoid trac congestion or road hazards in bad weather.

Providing location privacy in a sensor network is very challenging. First, the adversary can easily intercept network traffic due to the use of a broadcast medium for routing packets. He can use information like packet generation time and packet generation frequency to perform traffic analysis and infer the locations of monitored objects and data sinks. Second, sensors are usually resource constrained. It is not feasible to apply traditional anonymous communication techniques for hiding the communication between sensor nodes and destinations. This need to find alternative means to provide location privacy considering resource limitations of sensor nodes. Recently, privacy-preserving routing techniques have been developed for sensor networks. However, the performance and efficiency of most of these existing solutions are measured against an adversary capable of eavesdropping on limited portion of the network at a time. A highly motivated adversary can easily eavesdrop on the entire network and defeat all these solutions. For example, the adversary may decide to deploy his own set of sensor nodes to monitor the communication in the target network. This is especially true in a military or industrial spying context where the adversary has strong, potentially life-or-death, incentives to gain as much information as possible from observing the traffic in the target network. Given a global view of the network traffic, the adversary can easily infer the locations of monitored objects and destinations. For example, a region in the network with high activity should be close to a destination and a region where the packets originate should be close to a monitored object. Here, we focus on privacy-preserving communication methods in the presence of a global eavesdropper who has a complete view of the network traffic.

2. RELATED WORK The location privacy schemes provides two kind of approaches named, source location privacy and sink location privacy 2.1 Source Location Privacy Prior work in protecting location privacy to monitored objects sought to increase safety period, which is defined as the number of messages initiated by the current source sensor before a monitored object is traced. The flooding technique requires a source node to send out each packet through numerous paths to a destination to make it difficult for an adversary to trace the source. However, the problem is that the destination will still receive packets from the shortest path first. The adversary can thus quickly trace the source node using backtracking. This method consumes a significant amount of energy without providing much privacy in return. Two techniques for location privacy: Fake Packet Generation Technique: In which a destination creates fake sources whenever a sender notifies the destination that it has real data to send. These fake senders are away from the real source and approximately at the same distance from the destination as the real sender. Both real and fake senders start generating packets at the same time. This scheme provides decent privacy against a local eavesdropper. Phantom Single-Path Routing: Achieving location privacy by making every packet generated by a source walk a random path before being delivered to the destination.

As a result, packets will reach the destination following different paths. This algorithm is quite effective in dealing with a local eavesdropper. Cyclic Entrapment : Create looping paths at various places in the sensor network. This will cause a local adversary to follow these loops repeatedly and thereby increase the safety period. Energy consumption and privacy provided by this method will increase as the length of the loops increase. 2.2 Destination Location Privacy Techniques that provide fault tolerance against failure or compromise of individual destination or sensor nodes. They also introduced a technique to protect the locations of destinations from a local eavesdropper by hashing the identification fields in packet headers. Deng et al. also presented four techniques to protect the location privacy of destination from a local eavesdropper who is capable of carrying out time correlation and rate monitoring. Multiple Parents Routing: Scheme in which for each packet a sensor node selects one of its parents randomly and forwards the packet to that parent. This makes the traffic pattern between the source and the destination more dispersed than the schemes where all the packets travel through same sequence of nodes. 3. PROBLEM DEFINITION In this section we begin by introducing the network and attacker model, and then discuss the simulation framework. 3.1 Network Model

As in other sensor networks [9], we assume that a sensor network is divided into cells (or grids) where each pair of nodes in neighboring cells can communicate directly with each other. A cell is the minimum unit for detecting events; for example, a cell header coordinates all the actions inside a cell. For the network to be connected, we assume the nodes in a cell rotate their roles as cell leader and at least one node in the cell is awake. Each cell has a unique id and every sensor node knows in which cell it is located through its GPS or an attack-resilient localization scheme [10], [11]. We assume that a base station (BS) works as the network controller to collect the event data. The BS is interested in the source of an event. Every event has an event id; for example, we may assign a unique id to each type of animal. When a cell detects an event, it will send a triplet (cell id, event id, timestamp), which provides the BS with the source location of the event as well as the time it was detected. 3.2 Attacker Model According to the classication in [2], we assume that the attacker is external, local and passive. By external, we assume that the attacker does not compromise or control any sensors. The attacker may launch active attacks by channel jamming or other denialof-service attacks. However, since these attacks are not related to source anonymity, we do not address them in this paper. A local attacker can only observe and launch attacks in a limited range. Suppose a sensor network is used to monitor the appearance of pandas. Once a panda appears in some place, the sensors in that place will send a message to the BS. A hunter will be the attacker, and it tries to trace back to the event source to locate the panda. Similar to

[1], we assume that the attacker starts from the BS, where it is guaranteed that all packets will arrive eventually. The hunter (attacker) is constantly listening/receiving. Once the attacker hears the rst message, he knows which node among the neighborhood sent that message, and will move to the transmitting node. If the attacker does not hear any message for a certain time, he goes back one step and keeps listening. The attacker repeats this process until he reaches the source. 4. CROSSLAYER APPROACH Beacons perform as a heart-beat in a beacon-supported network even when there are no events detected. Therefore, if we add event information to the MAC layer beacons, the event information can be spread to the BS without incurring extra routing layer trafc. 4.1. PRIVACY PROTECTION Based on the above observation, we propose a naive privacy protection scheme. After a source node detects a certain event, instead of passing the event information to the routing layer, the node encodes its node id, event id and timestamp in a beacon frame constructing a modied beacon frame. The source node sends out the modied beacon frame to its neighbors in MAC layer encryption mode. After a neighbor node receives the modied beacon frame, it decrypts it to extract the event information and adds the event information into its own beacon frame, which will be sent out at the next beacon interval. Every node in the sensor network repeats this process and the event information will eventually arrive at the BS.

This process repeats and it eventually reaches the BS. In this small network, 3 hops are needed for the event to reach the BS. Beacon frames are ooded to all the neighbor nodes. There-fore, in order to stop the event information from circulating in the network, every node maintains a record of the event information they receive from the beacon frame. Each time a node receives a beacon frame, it checks if it already has the event information. If so it rells the beacon frame with dummy information. If not, it saves the event information and sends it out through its own beacon. Old event information entries are removed after a certain number of beacon intervals to save memory. For example, if the maximum hop from any node to BS is 10, the old entries can be safely removed after 10 beacon intervals. 4.2. PRIVACY The naive solution is simple and achieves perfect privacy, because all the modied beacon frames perform exactly the same as the regular beacons. From the attacker point of view, every node sends beacons as dened in the protocol. Therefore, the probability to identify the source node is 1/N, where N is the total number of sensor nodes in the network. The cross-layer solution has two phases: MAC-layer broad-cast and routing. In the rst phase (MAC-layer broadcast), nodes perform in the same way as the naive solution. After a sensor node detects some event, it broadcasts the event information within MAC layer beacon frames for several hops (a system parameter H). Then, it switches to the second phase (routing). One node, referred to as the pivot node, passes the event information to the routing layer and

sends it to the BS via routing if the same pivot node is used for routing. All event information, the attacker will be able to easily trace back to the pivot node by observing routing layer trafc. Therefore, different pivot nodes are used to send different event information. This forms different trafc ows to the BS. The source node is responsible for selecting the pivot node. The source node knows which nodes are H hops away based on the cell information. It randomly picks one of these nodes as the pivot node for each event occurrence and adds that node id to the beacon frame

Latency VS No of pandas Protocol is implemented and performance is evaluated in terms of latency and throughput. Design is compared with existing LRP protocol

5. SIMULATION & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Experiments are based on simulations using the NS2 network simulator. A heterogeneous sensor network is considered with 100 numbers of sensor nodes that are randomly distributed in the 200 * 200 m2 area, UDP connection with CBR data traffic used in simulation with the transmission interval 0.01sec. The data connections are established randomly. The performance is evaluated in terms of throughput, latency and power consumption. Simulation is conducted for 1000 seconds with 4 source nodes..

Throughput VS No of pandas Simulation is conducted with the variation of no of pandas such that no of source nodes. The performance is evaluated in terms of throughput. The protocol shows better results in terms of throughput.

6. CONCLUSION

Prior work that studied location privacy in sensor networks had assumed that the attacker has only a local eavesdropping capability. This assumption is unrealistic given a well-funded, highly-motivated attacker. We formalized the location privacy issues under the model of a global eavesdropper, and show the minimum average communication overhead needed for achieving certain privacy. The proposed solutions offer different levels of location privacy, network trafc and latency by exploring the cross-layer features. Simulation results veried that the double cross-layer solution can reduce the trafc overhead with a reasonable latency. More importantly, it can achieve these benets without losing source location privacy.

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