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ABELLANA v MARAVE May 29, 1974 LAW: Section 1 of Rule 111, Rules of Court FACTS: A cargo truck driven by Francisco Abellana had a collision with a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. A criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed with the City Court of Ozamis City against Abellana. He was found guilty as charged with award of damages in favor of the offended parties. Abellana appealed the decision with the CFI. At this stage, the offended parties filed with another branch of CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages in connection with the accident. In such complaint for damages, the alleged employer of Abellana was included as defendant. The defendants sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court. They argued that it was not allowable at this stage where the criminal case was already on appeal at the CFI. CFI judge denied the motion to dismiss, rationalizing that: Judgment of the City Court on the criminal case was vacated on appeal. Trial de novo will be conducted. (A new trial or retrial had in which the whole case is retried as if no trial whatever had been had in the first instance). o In view of the above and since the court (CFI) has not yet begun the trial (de novo), offended parties may expressly waive in the CFI the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action and reserve their right to institute a separate action. These, they did. Hence, this petition. o

ISSUE: WON the aggrieved party may still file a separate civil action for damages considering that the judgment of conviction of lower court had been vacated on appeal and a trial de novo had been ordered HELD: Yes, the aggrieved party may file a separate civil action for damages under Section 7 Rule 123. RATIO: Petitioners contention that Section 1 of Rule 111 means that a separate civil action can be filed only at the institution of the criminal action and never on appeal to the next higher court is erroneous. Above interpretation ignores what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in the court. This rule is supported by a number of cases: People v Carreon, Andres v Wolfe, Crisostomo v Dir. Of Prisons, People v Jamisola Also, the restrictive interpretation of petitioners would give rise to a serious constitutional question as regards Article 33 of the CC: in cases of physical injuries, a civil action for

question as regards Article 33 of the CC: in cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and independent from the criminal action may be brought by injured party. That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. o The grant of power to this Court under the Constitution does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right, such as that provided for in Article 33. o Court should avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Lastly, any counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness. o

Petition is DISMISSED.

2. MANIAGO v CA February 20, 1996 LAW: Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code FACTS: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeep owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the RTC of Baguio City. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. CA dismissed his petition. There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver or against the latters employer, herein petitioner. Petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. o The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action. Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately.

conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. ISSUE: WON despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. HELD: NO, the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. RATIO: The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, Sec. 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, Sec. 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation is needed. - In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. - In Abellana v. Marave in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. - In Jarantilla v. CA the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. The rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition that, on the basis of Rule 111, Sec.1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act

instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. The new rules require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. o The question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of the Court. Thus the subject was provided for by G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of Criminal Procedure under the American rule. Sec. 107, was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 and was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. o Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code.

The decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED 3. GAN V. REYES Law in question: Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court Facts: Bernadette C. Pondevida instituted in behalf of her daughter, Francheska Joy, a complaint against herein petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. For failure to file an answer within the reglementary period, petitioner was declared in default. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex-parte. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child and to support her monthly (20,000 a month to be paid every 15 starting April 15,
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illegitimate child and to support her monthly (20,000 a month to be paid every 15 starting April 15, 2000). Likewise, petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernadette moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling. Petitioner questioned the issuance of the writ of execution by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing. Ruling of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution? Held: No. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, hence, denied the petition. Ratio: According to the Court, Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. On the validity of the writ Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ. We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy. Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice. On the issue of Paternity

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On the issue of Paternity We note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano: The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enroll in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.

4. QUISUMBING V. MERALCO Law in question: RA 7832, the "Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994." This is a petition for review, assailing the decision and Resolution of the Court of appeals which set aside the decision of the trial court, dismissed the case against respondent MERALCO and ordered petitioner to pay MERALCO the differential amount of P193, 332. Facts: Defendant-appellant: MERALCO Plaintiff-appellees: Quisumbings (owner of a house in Green meadows, which they bought from Ms. Carmina Santos) March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant's inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Green meadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of asking permission from plaintiffsappellees, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was misaligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-appellant's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The laboratory testing conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit: 1. Terminal seal was missing. 2. Lead cover seals ('90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by forcibly pulling out from the sealing wire. 3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register were found out of alignment and with circular scratches at the face of the register which indicates that the meter had been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the meter terminal blades were found full of scratches. After an hour, E. Orlina returned to the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they pay the amount ofP178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be

representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon defendant-appellant's officer through a two-way radio instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees' electric service which the latter faithfully complied.

Trial court ruling: The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given the Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering. It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural due process in immediately disconnecting the electric service of petitioners. Respondent's action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi delict Ruling of CA: It held that respondent's representatives had acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners' electric service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential in the amount of P193,3325 representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical consumption, which had been established without being controverted. Issues: (1) Whether respondent observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners? (2) Whether such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages? (3) Whether petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent? Held: (1) No, they did not. No government officer was present during the time of the inspection. (2) They are not entitled to actual damages but they are entitled to exemplary and moral damages. (3) Yes, they are still liable to pay for the billing differential of P193,000. Ratio: First issue: Compliance with Requisites of Law Section 4 of RA 7832 states: (a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x xxx xxx xxx (viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)." Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was made. In this case, it was proven that only MERALCO personnel had been present during the inspection. Statcon lesson for issue (1): Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners' secretary was present at the time the inspection was made. Had the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. During the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H. Osmea, its author, stressed the need for the presence of government officers during inspections of electric meters The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of electricity must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralco's employees.

the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed only by Meralco's employees. That the ERB representative was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not cure the defect. Second issue: Damages As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows: Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable As to moral damages, Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be recovered. One such case34 is when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated. To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners' electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering Third issue: billing differential Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages -- the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting petitioners' electrical supply -- respondent's counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage52 does not necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted53 that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises. 5. MELENDRES V COMELEC FACTS: Melendres (who lost the Brgy. Chairman position to Concepcion in the May 1997 elections) filed an election protest at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig contesting results of the elections. After preliminary hearing, it was found that no filing of docket fee was paid by Melendres (which was required in Sec.6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure) so Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on grounds of failure to comply with it. Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss and said that the case should be continued on the ground that the filing of docket fee is merely an admin. procedural matter and not jurisdictional. Concepcion elevated the case for COMELEC to decide on and ruling was that the Trial Court should cease and desist form further acting on the Election case. ISSUES: 1. W/N the payment of the filing fee in an election protest is a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance can be a valid basis for the dismissal of the protest; 2. W/N subsequent full payment of the filing fee after the lapse of the reglementary period will cure the jurisdictional defect; and, 3.] W/N public respondent observed due process prior to the promulgation of the questioned resolution in SPR No. 16-97 HELD: 1. No. The payment of filing fee is an admin. procedural matter, proceeding as it does from an admin. body. Sec 6, Rule 37 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure is explicit and does not speak of conferment of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing

of jurisdiction upon the Trial Court or acquisition by the Court of jurisdiction upon payment of filing fee. Contemporaneous construction is resorted for certainty and predictability in laws especially those involving specific terms having technical agencies 2. No. The Rules of Procedure of the Commission, in Sec. 6 of Rule 37 requires the payment of the filing fee of one hundred pesos for the proper court to acquire jurisdiction. However, this has to be read in conjunction with Sec. 4 of the same rule: Sec. 4. Period within which to file petition. The petition shall be filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation. The rule prescribing the ten-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional and the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should not be taken lightly nor should it be brushed asideas a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality But an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case. 3. Yes. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its ruling. The interpretation of an admin. govt agency is accorded with great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. When it renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Courts give weight to govt agency or officials charged with the implementation of law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment. 6. MILLER VS MARDO LAW IN QUESTION: Reorganization Plan No. 20-A These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical question of law, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. FACTS: G.R. No. L-15138 Manuel Gonzales, a driver of Bill Miller filed with the Regional Office of Dept of Labor Manila, a complaint for being allegedly arbitrarily dismissed without being paid a separation pay. Miller filed a petition praying for prohibition from proceeding with the case for the reason that Hearing Office Mardo had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of Gonzales. Chief Hearing Officer Mardo and Gonzales filed their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. The Court held that RA Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as EO No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards. G.R. No. L-16781 Cresencio Estano filed a complaint with the Regional Office Dept of Labor against Chin Hua Trading Co. claiming to have been their driver for which service he was not paid overtime pay and vacation leave pay. Chin Hua Trading Co. then filed a petition for prohibition to proceed with the case on the ground of having no jurisdiction to entertain the same as Reorganization

with the case on the ground of having no jurisdiction to entertain the same as Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional. Court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void and therefore, granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued.

G.R. No. L-15377 Numeriana Raganas filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company claiming that as a seamstress she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. Sen Bee Trading Company filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor; and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a claim for separation, vacation, sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court dismissed the case. G.R. No. L-16660 Vicente Romero filed with Regional Officer of Dept. of Labor against Sia Seng for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng did not appear for hearing. Decision was rendered in favor of Romero, however, Regional Administrator Angel Hernando believed that Sia Seng should be given a chance to present his evidence and refused Romeros writ of execution and re-ordered a hearing. Sia Seng filed an answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A. He also urged in his appeal that decision sought to be enforced by Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional. G.R. No. L-17056 Mariano Pabillare filed against Fred Wilson and Co. alleging that as a Chief Mechanic he was summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay. Fred Wilson and Co. moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional office "being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying, among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, be declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. After hearing, the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241, Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956. It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid." The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted: 25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help.

services of domestic help. Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law; (b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and . (c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of domestic help. Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing. In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court. It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. 2. Whether or not Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress. HELD: 1. No, Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is invalid and of no effect. 2. No, Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed by Congress.

RATIO: 1. RA 1241 which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC) empowers the latter to: (2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.) The functions mentioned refer merely to administrative and not judicial function because the GSRC was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive branch which did not include the creation of courts. Also, the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. Corominas et. al vs. Labor Standards Commision held: . . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the

appointed or offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government. 2. The Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is argued as an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the enabling act. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this argument reads as follows: SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any, modification thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was submitted to the President who transmitted it to the Congress. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision. Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenance in this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution). Section 6(a) of the Reorganization Act violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each house of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other."

separate determination of the other." Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme for democracy.

7. ASTORGA V VILLEGAS FACTS: In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to ViceMayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3 reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted. HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
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and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. 8. ARROYO V. DE VENECIA 227 SCRA 268 FACTS petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of RA 8240, an act that amended provisions of National Internal Revenue Code by imposing sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes petitioners: members of the House of Representatives respondents: Jose De Venecia, Speaker of the House Deputy Speaker, Majority Leader, Executive Secretary, Sec. Of Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Passing of the bill originated at the House, approved at 3 reading transmitted to Senate, approved with amendments bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile during interpellations: Rep. Arroyo claimed absence of quorum after roll call: Chair declared there was a quorum before committee adjourned: disagreement on objection of Arroyo on the same day: bill was signed by House Speaker and Senate President, certified by respective Secretaries next day: signed into law by President Ramos Petitioners' argument 1. RA 8240 is unconstitutional because it was passed in violation of House rules violated house rules: - no call for yeas or nays - deliberately ignored Arroyo's question - suspended session without answering Arroyo's question Respondents' defense 1. Principle of separation of powers: Court cannot decide on enforcement of House rules Art. VI, Sec. 16 - House adopts its own rules on proceedings - Courts can only rule on the requirement of 3 readings 2. Enrolled bill doctrine should apply 3. Journal entry rule: De Venecia's certification of the Bill is valid since the journal provides that it has been approved
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ISSUE W/N RA 8240 is unconstitutional

HELD RA 8240 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RA 8240 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RATIO 1. HOUSE RULES OF PROCEDURE WERE VIOLATED, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 2. PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: SUPREME COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION 3. NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION 4. ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE 5. JOURNALS ARE CONCLUSIVE TO THE COURTS

HOUSE RULES OF PROCEDURE WERE VIOLATED, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS The Constitution provides that the House has the power to promulgate its own rules. This means that the legislative is autonomous and is free to perform its duties without interference from the courts. House Rules are subject to change at the pleasure of the legislative. Mere failure to conform to the procedural rules does not have the effect of nullifying the act since the members themselves provide the House Rules. They may agree to change the rules. (Note: Procedural rules are directory. Not said in case itself but is applicable here.)

PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS In observance of the principle of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has no power to look at the internal proceedings of the Legislative. The Court has no power since there are no rights of private individuals violated, nor is there a violation of the Constitution. NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION The Supreme Court cannot exercise its power since there is no grave abuse of discretion. There is no showing that the legislature acted beyond what is constitutionally mandated to them. What the Constitution requires is the voting after the third and last reading of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members, and in repassing a bill after a Presidential veto. Grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction refers to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. The Court itself will be committing grave abuse of discretion by dictating upon Congress to follow its internal rules of procedure. Court's suggestion: repeal or amend ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE The signing by the House Speaker, the Senate President, and the certification of the respective Secretaries are conclusive of the bill's due enactment. The dissent of Justice Puno urged the Court to overrule the doctrine. The SC did not overrule it because this is a well established rule of evidence, accepted here and abroad. (How I paraphrased the case says: The doctrine applies the principle of separation of powers since it accepts that the Executive cannot execute laws not duly passed by Congress. The Court may only determine if it was passed in conformity to the Constitution. It respects that the 3 branches of government are coequal and independent.) LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS ARE CONCLUSIVE TO THE COURTS Legislative journals are conclusive to the Courts regarding what was required by the Constitution. In the absence of evidence contrary to what is provided in the journals, the journals are conclusive.

PETITIONS WERE DISMISSED.

PUNO (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion) CONCUR: Rules are procedural. DISSENT: Application of enrolled bill doctrine, case presents a justiciable issue Puno argued that the Court has the power decide on the case since there has been a grave abuse of discretion. By not deciding on the matter, the Court would be refusing to exercise its power and wield such power with timidity. Puno calls to re-examine the application of the enrolled bill doctrine. Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of the constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or mistakes. It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. The enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. Many of the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth. 9. MORALES VS. SUBIDO LAW IN QUESTION: Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) FACTS: The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Petitioner contended that his service alone as captain for more than three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment. Respondent refused to reconsider his stand, hence, this petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons." The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows:

follows: NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless HE (1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning AND has served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR (2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record, OR (3) has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; OR (4) any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department. In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act "to place the local police service on a professional level," and contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of professionalism." ISSUE: Whether, within the meaning and intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have educational qualification as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree. HELD: YES, the law intended to have an educational qualification in addition to service qualification. RATIO: Morales contends that if a person who has rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree. The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment of members of a police agency only. The appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph of which states that: Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee possesses the above educational qualification: Provided, further, That in no case shall such appointment extend beyond six months, except for a valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service Commission. Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be provisionally appointed chief of police " [ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.
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Section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear: That the purpose is to require both educational and service qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966) read: Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. No chief of a police agency of a province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the police agency. No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or Criminology. Where no civil service eligible is available provisional appointment may be made in accordance with Civil Service Law and rules, provided the appointee possesses the above educational qualification but in no case shall such appointment exceed beyond six months. Exchange of views were made on the floor of the HoR citing objections to the educational requirement. While it was agreed that this requirement will be deleted during the period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect the change.

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to make the provision read: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
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It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained. Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made by mistake, the enrolled bill was read and examined and found that the text of Section 10 of the act is as it is set forth at the beginning. The text of the act also bears the signatures of the Senate President, House Speaker, the Secretaries and the President. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito this text of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on the courts. The significance now of this is that a high school graduate, no matter how long he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for appointment as chief of police. Even if Morales holds an AA degree, completed two years in law school and served as Chief
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Even if Morales holds an AA degree, completed two years in law school and served as Chief of Detective Bureau for 14 years and held successive ranks and given prestigious awards, still he cannot be qualified for appointment because these qualifications are not included in the law. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make them. Mr. Justice Frankfurter: An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Separate Opinions DIZON, J., concurring: Judge Dizon opines that a man bearing such credentials is expected to be a good Chief of Police. However, the issue is not whether or not his training and experience justifies the expectation but whether or not he is qualified for appointment. Section 10 of the Act may be construed as providing for two different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning, and (2) a high school degree, each of which is coupled with separate and distinct service qualifications. Any one of the latter, joined with either of the aforesaid academic requirements, would qualify a person for appointment as Chief of a city police agency. In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation would make the grade, in the same manner as would another applicant with a similar bachelor's degree who has served as chief of police with exemplary record, etc. In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, the service qualification is not only different but is higher and more exacting for obvious reasons. While in Judge Dizons opinion, petitioner's interpretation of the provision (in facts) is not unreasonable, it falls short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning and intent of the law aforesaid. This leads to the conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the purpose stated in his petition because to be entitled thereto he must show that, in relation to the matter at issue, he has a clear enforceable right, on the one hand, and that the respondent has an imperative legal duty to perform, on the other.

10. MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO Law: This case is about a Congressional Resolution designated as resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto Facts: Petitioners: 8 senators 17 representatives form the House Presidents of parties (Democratic Alliance, Popular Front, Philippine Youth Today) Respondents:

Respondents: COMELEC Treasurer of the Philippines Auditor General Director of Bureau of Printing 3 Senators and 8 Representatives had been proclaimed by the COMELEC but are suspended by the Senate and the House due to election irregularities. They argue that they were not considered in determining the required vote in order to pass the Resolution in question (Resolution to amend the Constitution) But if these members of the Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes would still have been be short of the necessary vote of each house. Thus the petition for prohibition in preventing the passage of the Resolution since it allegedly went against the Constitution.

Issue #1 Whether or not the Court can inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. o Respondents: The court has no jurisdiction because enrolled bills and resolutions are conclusive to the courts. o Petitioners: The court has jurisdiction, and there is merely confusion between jurisdiction (matter of substantive law) and conclusiveness (matter of practice and evidence). Held:

The court has no jurisdiction.

Doctrine: 1. The petitioners objection is purely academic, because whatever the difference between jurisdiction and conclusiveness, they boil down to the same thing both are founded on the fact that the judiciary accords a coequal department. b. Political questions are not in within the power of the judiciary c. Respect for the principle of separation of powers. Problem: How does one determine what falls under political questions? Coleman v Miller case Clarifies what political questions are This case is an authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by a state legislature of a proposed amendment is a political question and hence not justiciable. Important: If an amendment is a political question, then a proposal which leads to ratification has to be political also o Why? Because the 2 steps complement each other to achieve one objective Mississippi Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Black The Congress has the exclusive power to control submission of Constitutional amendments Decision of a political question by a political department conclusively binds judges. Proclamation of Congress that an amendment has been ratifies carries with it a solemn assurance that ratification is according to the Constitution leaving the judiciary to its traditional duty of interpretion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter Commented on Justice Holmes statement (Even if the petition concerns political question, courts can hear of it if it seeks to recover private right ) Frankfurter: Those are not private rights. They pertain to legislators

Frankfurter: Those are not private rights. They pertain to legislators not as individuals but as political representatives executing legislative process.

*The said views are shared by the present court since they are all considered persuasive authorities. Coleman v Miller case - According the court, there is a necessary discussion of the case to make their points clear - Similar case as the present one o In 1924, there was a proposal of Child Labor Amendment o In 1925, it was denied o In 1927, the proposed amendment was ratified. o There was a 20-20 vote (40 senators), so the Lieutenant Governor casted his vote in favor of the resolution to break the tie o Issues: Legal standing of petitioners The right of the Lieutenant Governor (LG) to vote. The effect of the previous rejection and the lapse of time after the submission of the amendment o Held: Legal standing = there was. Right of the LG = avoided. Previous rejection and lapse of time: The efficacy of the ratification is a political question Not subject to the review by the court Issue #2 Whether or not the duly authenticated resolution or bill imports absolute verity and is binding to the courts. Held Yes, they are conclusive. The Supreme Court is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of the enrolled bill shall prevail over the journals Thus, the court cannot accept the argument of the petitioners citing the case of US v Pons where the same court looked into the journal o According to the Civil Code Procedure, there are 2 ways of proving legislative proceedings: 1. By the journals. Published statutes or resolutions or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; 2. In case of acts of Legislature by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts The Court looked into the journals in Pons because they were the offered evidence PRESENT CASE: The court found no signs of irregularities in the passage of the law. o It did not look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the bill because there appears no discrepancy between the two Final: Petition is dismissed. Bengzon (and Padilla), concurring: Petition is dismissed. But:

But: o o

I maintain that we have jurisdiction over the case Our constitutional system is more analogous to state systems that to the Federal theory of grant of powers (which the majority followed in this case), hence his conclusion that the courts may and should take cognizance of the present controversy It is clear that the measure was upheld by the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution. o None of the Senators and Congressmen asserted that there were absent senators and congressmen who had been taken into account o Still, the court would be no better qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of actual membership at any given moment

Hilado, concurring and dissenting: Concur on the result. Dissent: o If the suspended members were counted, the votes in favor of the amendment would have been short of the necessary Ground: Suspension of said members is political question Judiciary does not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the determination thereof I would answer that we do not know whether they would have voted against it or they would have abstained. Conclusion: They cannot be counted due to the very impossibility of knowing which way they would have voted.

Paras, fully concurred with Hilado Perfecto, dissenting: Petitioners Personality They have the personality Respondents failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that petitioners have the necessary legal personality Senators and Congressmen = direct interest 24 Senators NO amount of argument may delude anyone into believing that senators excluded in the voting are not senators o Proclaimed o Took part in the election in senate o Took oaths Same conclusion for the Representatives Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Agrees with the petitioners that the court has no jurisdiction He cannot accept what he knows is a falsehood o The certification presented is a falsehood Political Questions The doctrine of political questions should not be accepted at face value We do not accept it even as a good doctrine It is not a doctrine at all Doctrine o What is taught o What is held o Principle

o Principle o Position o Applies to any speculative truth o To be true, it should be expressed in simple and self evident terms Political question doctrine o Made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy, or uncourageous tribunals I agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the constitution is a political question, but it is NOT beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary o Because the constitution itself is political

Coleman v Miller There is no similarity , therefore this should not be invoked There was no constitutional provisions that was said to be violated in this case It has no bearing Green v Weller Inapplicable also. Mr. Justice Black This authority seems equally reluctant to offer its helping hand Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked omnipotent power is granted to the Congress by the fundamental law Mr. Justice Frankfurter Opinion does not offer much help His arguments does not have weight at all. Enrolled Bill Theory The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory The certification is false The Constitutional Numerical Rules Rule guarantee against the adoption of amendments to the fundamental law by mere majorities Exactly is needed. No one should be left uncounted The rule must not be left to the caprice of the arbitrary majorities Jalandoni case No reason for the court to refuse its duty in giving redress in clear case of violation of the fundamental law The petition should be granted.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1. The Supreme Court is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of the enrolled bill shall prevail over journals. 2. The use of Reference statutes a. Refers to other statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of legislation b. Incorporated in full 3. Adopted statutes a. Statute patterned after, or copied from another country * In numbers 2 & 3, Im not quite sure, coz they talk about statutes. Not sure if applicable to cases too.

* In numbers 2 & 3, Im not quite sure, coz they talk about statutes. Not sure if applicable to cases too.