LIGAYA SANTOS V. DOMINGO ORDA JR.

, 158236 (SEPTEMBER 1, 2004) NATURE: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision which granted the petition for certiorari filed by Domingo Orda Jr. and nullifying the orders of the RTC Paranaque in the criminal case, People v. Ligaya Santos et al. FACTS: On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda, the son of respondent Domingo Orda Jr., was shot to death in Paranaque City. 1. Gina Azarcon, an eyewitness in the crime, executed her sworn statement that she saw 3 male persons commit the crime and later identified two of the assailants as Rolly Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano. Thus, an Information for the crime of murder was filed against Tonion and Soriano and docketed as Criminal Case no. 01-0425 2. Ernesto Regala and his son, Dennis Regala, also came out as witnesses. On the day before Francis was shot to death (April 1, 2001), Ernesto saw petitioner Santos hand a gun to Tonion, saying Gusto ko malinis ang trabaho at walang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na naman si Orda. For his part, Dennis alleged Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos a few days after the incident. Santos also instructed him to monitor the activities of respondent 3. Based on the accounts of Ernesto and Dennis, an Information was filed against Santos and Edna Cortez. Upon further testimony of Azarcon, the information was amended to include petitioner Robert Bunda 4. Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. In June 2002, DOJ issued a joint resolution directing the city prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Informations filed against the accused on the ground that testimonies of the witnesses were not credible because of their recantation. 5. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an order allowing the withdrawal of the Informations against the accused and consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest 6. This prompted respondent Orda to elevate the matter to CA. CA nullified the trial courts orders and declared that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Informations without making an independent evaluation on the merits of the case 7. Petitioner argues that the trial court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the prosecutor to withdraw the two Informations as ordered by DOJ. Petitioner avers that CA erred in relying on the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul since the case involves the withdrawal of the Informations and the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations and not to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. Moreover, the trial court could not dismiss the case since the it had yet to acquire complete criminal jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused 8. On the other hand, OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative relief ISSUE: WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the Informations and in lifting the warrant of arrest against the petitioners on the DOJs finding that there was no probable cause for the filing of said Informations HELD: Yes.

The ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the trial court. This rule applies in motion to withdraw the Information or dismiss the case even before or after the arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused. As the Court emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals, the trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the prosecution. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court relied solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order. In granting the public prosecutors motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice. Worse, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which had not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations. In fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste. Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail. Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the pendency of her petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. PRINCIPLES: 1. Withdrawal of Information already filed in court. Once a criminal complaint is filed in court, any disposition of the caseor dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the trial court 2. The trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the DOJ that no crime was committed on that the evidence of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused

LIGAYA SANTOS AND ROBERT BUNDA V. DOMINGO ORDA JR., G.R. NO 189402 (MAY 6, 2010) NATURE: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 ROC, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision FACTS: In G.R. no 158236, SC affirmed the CA decision on September 1, 2004. Unsatisfied, petitioner Santos filed a motion for reconsideration 1. Pending resolution of her motion, Santos filed an urgent petition for bail. In opposition to the motion, the prosecutor presented two witnesses, Frias and Agnote. 2. Frias testified that on the day of the incident, he heard gunshots and saw 3 armed men run towards the parked van where Santos was. On the other hand, Agnote alleged that Santos approached him to contract a hired killer who would be willing to assassinate respondent Orda. Based on the testimonies of the two, RTC denied the petition for bail 3. RTC later dismissed the case for murder holding that there was no probable cause in this case. As such, it lifted the arrest warrants and ordered the immediate release of the accused 4. Thereafter, respondent Orda filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause existed against the accused 5. CA granted the petition citing that RTC failed to appreciate the evidence presented by the prosecution. In particular, Frias positively identified the accused and related in detail their supposed participation in the killing Ordas son. Thus, CA found it necessary that a full blown trial be conducted to unearth the truth behind their testimonies ISSUES: 1. WON a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is the correct remedy in assailing the RTC decision

2. WON CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against petitioners HELD: FIRST ISSUE: No. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is inappropriate. Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 65 cannot cure a partys failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal. The general rule is that a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, except: 1. When the public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate 2. When the broader interest of justice so requires 3. When the writs issued are null and void 4. When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority 5. When, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or 6. In other meritorious cases None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, the general rule must apply. Respondent not having availed himself of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the case against petitioners, the dismissal has become final and executory. SECOND ISSUE: No. When an information is filed, the task for the court is to first determine whether a probable cause exists for the arrest of the accused.

Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction. Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion. Records show that the RTC, on motion of the prosecution, allowed the withdrawal of the Informations for murder, holding that the prosecution witnesses testimonies were not credible. Pursuant to the SCs decision in G.R. No. 158236, RTC reviewed again the records of the case and made an independent evaluation of the evidence presented to ascertain the existence or non-existence of probable cause to indict the petitioners. After such evaluation, the court, on September 30, 2005, dismissed the case for murder against the accused, including petitioners herein, ratiocinating that no probable cause existed to indict them for their crime. RTC allowed the withdrawal of the Information and consequently dismissed the case against petitioners on the following grounds: 1. The incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis because of their subsequent recantation 2. The improbability of Ernesto and Dennis testimony in view of the counter-evidence presented by Santos 3. Lack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for determining probable cause 4. The incredibility of the testimonies of Frias and Agnote because of the absence of corroborating evidence

Based on these, RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause existed to indict the petitioners for the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of the Presiding Judge. On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations and evidence on record. PRINCIPLES 1. Certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy and as such, can only be availed if there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy. 2. A petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, except: a. When the public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate b. When the broader interest of justice so requires c. When the writs issued are null and void d. When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority e. When, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or f. In other meritorious cases 3. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.