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The reduction of irregularities in the use of process FMEA


Carla Estorilio
Department of Mechanical Engineering, Federal Technological University in Parana (UTFPR), Curitiba, Brazil, and

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Received March 2009 Revised June 2009 Accepted June 2009

Richard K. Posso
Renault do Brasil SA, Sao Jose dos Pinhais, Brazil
Abstract
Purpose Use of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a requirement of ISO/TS 16949. However, research has shown that there are inconsistencies in the way the technique is applied in automotive suppliers. The aim of this study is to identify these irregularities and to propose a strategy to minimize them. Design/methodology/approach Questionnaires were applied in seven of the main suppliers to a European automotive company, and ten FMEAs from each company were analyzed. Findings The study identies irregularities in the development of process FMEAs and highlights seven factors that contribute to these inconsistencies. Based on these data, a strategy including a partially precongured FMEA form is suggested. When tested with three of the suppliers, the strategy was found to result in a signicant improvement. Originality/value The study describes an application strategy for automotive companies to correct problems associated with the use of FMEAs. The strategy includes a partly parameterized spreadsheet for a cold stamping process that allows companies to implement their process FMEA in a collaborative supply chain environment. Keywords Failure modes and effects analysis, Reliability management, Automotive industry, Brazil Paper type Case study

1. Introduction According to Biasoli (2003), the failure of a product in the warranty period not only implies costs for the company, but also compromises the companys credibility. One technique for improving reliability is failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), which allows preventive analysis of failures that may compromise reliability (Stamatis, 2003; Palady, 1997; Puente et al., 2002). Dale and Shaw (1990) state that the main reason for having an FMEA procedure in most companies is that it is a mandatory requirement of their customers. Many organizations use FMEA, especially automotive companies, as it is a QS-9000 quality system requirement (Instituto de Qualidade Automotiva, 2002). ISO/TS 16949 (World Automotive Standard), which is equivalent to QS-9000, is a standard that denes quality requirements for suppliers. However, a number of questions have been raised about FMEA. According to Tumer et al. (2003), it is laborious, requires a considerable amount of time, and is expensive. In addition, the results obtained using the technique are unsatisfactory because of inconsistencies in the descriptions of the functions and failures of the object being analyzed.

International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management Vol. 27 No. 6, 2010 pp. 721-733 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0265-671X DOI 10.1108/02656711011054579

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Teng and Ho (1996) concluded in their research that if too much time, manpower and effort are spent just on the development of an FMEA report, then the implementation of FMEA is highly questionable. Aguiar and Salomon (2007) found irregularities in some of the FMEAs they analyzed and suggested that this occurs because rst-level suppliers delegate part of their production to smaller companies, which do not comply with quality requirements. According to Kaufman and Sato (2004), some organizations do not take advantage of the benets of FMEA. Surveying more than 100, the authors concluded that most of them use this methodology to comply with quality requirements. According to Teng et al. (2006), companies need to establish a collaborative supply chain environment to enhance their manufacturing and business performance. The use of FMEA as a platform is of great benet to these companies in their endeavors to increase prots. Teng and Ho (1996) suggested that the input from supplier(s) and customer(s) be included in the development of the design FMEA and proposed that design and process FMEAs be linked through a number of steps to ensure that FMEA is used appropriately in a supply chain. Teng et al. (2006), aiming to further enhance the collaborative supply chain environment for FMEA applications, developed a tool to determine the sample size and reliability for attribute tests, such as a go/no go test. After practical tests were carried out, there was found to be a gap between actual practices and the required knowledge for the process FMEA to be successfully implemented in a collaborative environment. Hence, they suggested that further research be carried out into the development of a more comprehensive tool for all types of testing and the design of an FMEA platform for all supply chain operations. In light of both this suggestion and the regulatory requirements, this study analyzes the process FMEA used in an automotive company and seven of its suppliers with a view to identifying irregularities during its completion and developing a strategy to reduce these discrepancies. The study investigates the factors that give rise to disparities in FMEAs and the information needed to conduct them. The authors also describe an application strategy that includes a partly parameterized spreadsheet for a cold stamping process that was tested at three suppliers.

2. Research methodology The approach adopted in this study included a review of the literature, as it was deemed important to understand the concepts and methods involved (Gil, 2002). Because the aim of the study was to identify irregularities in the way that FMEAs were lled out, a case study involving an automotive manufacturer and its suppliers was carried out. The study is, in fact, an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in a real environment, and the demarcation between the phenomenon itself and the context in which it occurs is not clearly dened. The stages for a case study suggested by Yin (2008) were followed and are described below: (1) Choice of a theoretical basis (lling out of the FMEA spreadsheet). (2) Selection of the case (automotive company and seven main suppliers).

(3) Preparation of data selection (factors that have an impact on the way the FMEA is lled out). (4) Execution of the study: . Review of the literature related to, amongst other things, reliability, quality, the cold stamping production process and the commonest defects associated with this process. . Collection of data from the seven suppliers selected for the study by means of a semi structured questionnaire (Gil, 2002) with questions related to the company and the way in which the FMEAs are lled out. The seven suppliers chosen were selected because they supply the bulk of the parts to the manufacturer 327 out of a total of 357 parts and are therefore the most representative suppliers. . Collection of data from each supplier: ten process FMEAS that had been completed in the previous 24 months were collected from each supplier. (5) Reparation of the report (diagnosis). (6) Suggestions for improvements. . Proposed changes carried out in stages: critical analysis of each parameter identied; diagnosis of the possible causes of the parameters that exert an inuence; and suggestions for improvements to both the methodology and the spreadsheet to minimize any discrepancies when preparing and using the FMEA. . Validating the proposed changes application of the FMEA at three of the seven suppliers. The FMEA incorporates the proposed changes, which include a partially parameterized spreadsheet suggested by the authors to take into account the study diagnosis. All three suppliers are different sizes (small, medium-sized and large) and were chosen to determine whether the variable company size had any impact. To draw up the spreadsheet a stamped part that met the following criteria was chosen: it should involve no more than three stamping operations; it should be of average geometric complexity; and the suppliers involved must be starting to produce the part and make it commercially available in Brazil. Once the spreadsheets had been collected, they were compared and analyzed in the same way as the rst spreadsheets that were collected. The results obtained with the standard FMEA spreadsheet were then compared with those obtained using the partially parameterized spreadsheet after some of the suggestions to ensure that the FMEA was developed more effectively had been implemented. 3. Quality, reliability and failure Quality is the basis upon which products are judged by users. The focus of quality assurance is to assure compliance of the product with what has been specied. Compliance is measured by the variation of product characteristics around specied values (Xenos, 1998; Shirose, 1995). Slack et al. (2007) dene reliability as the capability of a system to perform as expected during a certain time interval. In spite of the importance attached to reliability, the possibility of unforeseen events occurring always exists, although not all such events may be critical. Hence, it is

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important to measure the impact of a failure, as suggested by Aguiar and Salomon (2007). Moubray (1999) mentions that the origins of failures are normally related to human error. According to Juran (2000), some failures can be controlled and afford an opportunity for us to learn from them. Moore (1997) mentions seven mechanisms for identifying failures, including failure analysis methods. One of these is FMEA, which, according to Palady (1997), has been extensively used to analyze the reliability of products and manufacturing processes and is the most efcient low-risk technique for preventing problems and identifying solutions. 3.1 FMEA The QS 9000 FMEA manual denes FMEA as a group of activities aimed at recognizing and evaluating the potential failure of a product/process and its effects, identifying actions that may eliminate or reduce the likelihood of a potential failure mode occurring, and documenting the analysis process. The method was used by Volkswagen in the 1950s and developed by NASA in 1963. In 1977 it started to be used by Ford in automobile manufacturing (Fernandes and Rebelato, 2006). FMEA uses metrics to evaluate the gravity of the failure; the product of the different rates (occurrence, severity and detection) gives the risk priority numbers (NPR), which provide an indication of the need for corrective actions. The approach used in FMEA is to reason from the bottom to the top in an attempt to determine failure modes, their causes and how they affect the upper system levels (Silva et al., 1997). 4. Analysis of how FMEAs were conducted The seven suppliers investigated are located in three states in Brazil; two are large, two medium-sized and three small. One of the rst questions posed related to the number of people who attended meetings, and it was found that only three companies held meetings with four or more people. The next piece of information collected, which was gathered in order to understand the existing level of integration, was the number of people per department who were involved in preparing FMEAs. It was found that because of the subdivision of specialties, the larger the company, the greater the number of departments that took part. There was found to be a lack of participation by the operators in company A, and a lack of participation by the car manufacturer in all the companies. The time spent preparing FMEAs was then determined, and suppliers were asked whether they felt this time was excessive. Only one supplier spent more than four hours, but all considered FMEA meetings to be too lengthy. In light of the statement by Teng et al. (2006) that one of the keys to the successful implementation of FMEA is to ensure that all participants understand how to use the technique, the interviewees in each company were asked about this. In large companies, all those involved had mastered the method, but in medium-sized and small companies this was not a requirement and not everyone had this level of knowledge. FMEA spreadsheet data was then collected and analyzed to identify whether there were any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the way the spreadsheet was being lled out.

4.1 FMEA comparison and analysis The investigation was based on the Institute for Automotive Quality (IQA) spreadsheet, in which a letter is assigned to each column, and the columns were compared individually between all the spreadsheets. The columns that were compared and analyzed are described below in the order in which they appear in the spreadsheet. 4.1.1 Process function. A lack of uniformity in naming operations was identied. For the purposes of standardization, the main stamping operations were therefore identied as follows: (1) receiving receipt of raw materials (support function); (2) cutting initial cutting operation; (3) stamping drawing, where plastic deformation occurs; (4) folding folding the material; (5) drilling drilling or punching the material; (6) cutting making external or internal cutouts in the part; and (7) packing packing the part (support function). 4.1.2 Potential failure mode. This refers to potential failure modes identied for each process operation. Four suppliers identied three failure modes for the fold operation, while three small suppliers identied only one. As the identication of failures is the starting point for developing the entire process, the spreadsheet may already be compromised in this phase. 4.1.3 Potential effect of the failure. This refers to the consequence for the product and, consequently, the user. For each failure mode there may be one or more related effects. No signicant variations were detected for this item. 4.1.4 Severity and classication. The impact that the failure mode has on the operation is dened. Comparison of the severity index revealed that each supplier uses different criteria for the same operations. Only three suppliers were found to have completed the item classication, which is used to classify any process characteristic that requires additional control. 4.1.5 Potential cause and mechanism of the failure. This refers to how the failure may occur, in terms of items that can be corrected or controlled. A great variation was found from supplier to supplier; while for some suppliers only one cause was found, in others three were identied. 4.1.6 Occurrence. This refers to the probability of the failure occurring, and may be based on histories of previous failures. This item was not compared because each supplier had different failure histories. However, the IQA warns that the subjectivity of the evaluation may result in low scores being assigned to avoid the need for action plans. 4.1.7 Current process controls. This refers to the types of controls that can detect or prevent the failure. All the companies investigated were found to have controls for preventing and detecting failures. 4.1.8 Detection. This refers to the ability to detect potential failures. This topic was not compared because it depends on the sequence of operations at each company. 4.1.9 Risk priority number (RPN) and recommended actions. The RPN is the product of the severity, occurrence and detection rates. Its purpose is to indicate the priorities for recommended actions. Palady (1997) suggests that if the NPR is greater than 100 or

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the severity greater than 8, then corrective actions are required. The same requirement is used by the car manufacturer in this study. For this item, it was observed that some companies implemented actions when the NPR was equal to 40 and others when severity was equal to 7. It would appear, therefore, that the car manufacturers rules are unclear. 4.1.10 Results of actions. According to the Instituto de Qualidade Automotiva (2002), the rates should be analyzed and, if actions are needed, the analysis should be repeated, with a focus on continued improvement. In the present study, however, the FMEAs were outdated and did not serve as a source of lessons learned. 4.2 Suggestions for improvement The items with the greatest discrepancies are: . failure modes; . severity; . classication; . potential cause of failure; . recommended actions; and . results of actions. Analyzing the 70 FMEAs, it was found that the major problem is the lack of information about the failure, whether it be severity, classication or cause. In view of this, partial parameterization of the spreadsheet is suggested in order to standardize the analyses. The items Function, Mode, Effect, Severity, Classication and Cause should be completed in advance by the car manufacturer. An example of the parameterization suggested by the authors, in this case for the operation Drill, is shown in Figure 1. The severity and classication columns are blocked so that they cannot be changed, as large discrepancies were observed for severity, and the classication column was not used. It is proposed that the parameterized FMEA should contain this history. Continuous updating of this information would be the responsibility of the manufacturer, in whose interest it is to obtain satisfactory results. The authors also suggest that the supplier send the FMEA spreadsheet together with the part, as this would not only make the quality managers job easier, but also allow the failure history to be updated. So that the FMEA can be developed in a team and can incorporate general process and product information, the car manufacturer should attend the meeting, which the

Figure 1. Parameterization for the Drill function

supplier would be responsible for calling and organizing. A suggestion for attendees at the meeting is given in Table I. While it is recommended that the meeting last a maximum of 90 minutes the average time for which a person remains focused there is no ideal time. What there must be, however, are certain rules: having a purpose, prioritizing tasks, delegating and enforcing (Kausen, 2003). It is important that the manufacturer make information based on previous failure histories that are available and, furthermore, that both the person leading the meeting and the other attendees have mastered the method and have experience in developing FMEAs. Table II shows a summary of the items that inuenced the development of the FMEA together with suggestions for minimizing their effects. 4.3 Validation of the suggested strategy The strategy was tested with three of the seven suppliers, as they were preparing cost estimates of the chosen part (Figure 2), whose function is to support clips to hold cables inside the car engine compartment. This part was chosen because it has the characteristics described in item 2-validation. Details of the characteristics of the part and the work methodology are found in Posso (2007). Five functions were identied for the part. They are: (1) receiving the plate, which is already cut to controlled dimensions, is received, and various characteristics of the part are checked; (2) cutting the part is cut to its initial and nal shape; (3) drilling a 9-mm hole and two 9 11 mm oblong holes are made; (4) forming the three indentations intended to increase the strength of the part are produced; and (5) packing the part is stored in packages in accordance with the work instructions. In the stamping process, four failures were identied for the cutting operation, ve for the drilling operation, and six for forming. At least one effect was identied for each failure. Figure 3 shows part of the parameterization of the spreadsheet for the forming operation.

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Supplier Head of production Process development engineera Product development engineera Materials engineera PPC Person responsible for supplier quality Person responsible for stamping sector Person responsible for tool room

Customer (manufacturer) Product engineer Person responsible for stamping sector

Note: aIn small and medium-sized companies these functions may be concentrated in one person

Table I. Suggested attendees

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Summary of proposed improvements The number and types of failure modes identied in FMEAs prepared by medium-sized and large companies are similar because their employees have similar backgrounds. Employees in small companies, however, do not have sufcient knowledge of this method In the item Causes of failures, small suppliers do not identify the root cause. This may be the result of a lack of training The analysis depends on peoples knowledge of this, and there is no failure history Suppliers described the team that took part, but there is no proof Standardize process functions Manufacturer to dene functions, modes, effects, severity, classication and causes of previous failures Spreadsheets for all suppliers to be identical Freeze severity and classication columns Person leading meeting to be a supplier representative with experience in the method Attendees must have training or at least be acquainted with the method Use FMEA as a failure database Feed back information whenever there is a new project or a problem is identied Customer (manufacturer) to take part in preparation of the FMEA Hold meeting on the suppliers premises Supplier to organize and chair the meeting Work to be carried out by a previously dened team Work with a view to the meeting lasting no more than 90 minutes Use a database updated by the manufacturer Develop the FMEA with a team that has been trained in the method

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Training

Failure history

Teamwork and synergy between supplier and manufacturer

Table II. Summary of proposed improvements

Time to complete the method Suppliers FMEA considers its manufacturing process alone. Classication is seldom lled in, because suppliers often do not know where the part will be assembled or what the function or importance of the part are No meetings were attended by the manufacturer, whose engineering group only validates the FMEA Control An FMEA takes time, making the method unattractive. It was observed that subjective estimates were used for the occurrence rate instead of previous histories

For each problem identied at the customer it is mandatory that the revised FMEA be sent so that the failure history can be updated

After the format of the FMEA had been determined, the three suppliers were advised about the strategy for applying the FMEA: . The meeting would be scheduled and organized by the supplier, would require the participation of the manufacturer, and should last 90 minutes at most. . Attendees should be fully versed in FMEA.

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Figure 2. Part analyzed

Figure 3. Breakdown of failure modes for the forming operation


. .

Failure control and occurrence information should be available. After the meeting, the proposal would be evaluated and commented upon by attendees.

4.4 Analysis of the results Using the strategy described above, no signicant variations were found in the way the FMEA was completed. No comparison was made for the item Occurrence, since each supplier has its own failure history, which depends on the reliability of its equipment. The failure rate information was completed with no discussions and in less time than expected, and detailed controls were included in the Controls (Prevention and Detection) section of the FMEA. For the RPN and Recommended Actions, the three

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suppliers took actions for RPNs greater than 50 or severity greater than 7, as stipulated in the form. After the meeting, the applied strategy was evaluated and commented upon by attendees. This resulted in 45 ideas (31 strengths and weaknesses and 14 criticisms and suggestions for improvements), as follows: . Strengths Less time needed to ll out the FMEA, fewer mistakes when completing the analysis, standardization, and customer-manufacturer participation. . Weaknesses A lack of macros to automate the process of completing the FMEA, a lack of elds for new failures and the Excel table (too controlled). . Suggestions Use Microsoft Access, create macros and leave the spreadsheet open for any changes required. 4.5 Comparison of the results Table III shows a comparison of the columns in the normal and proposed FMEAs, as well as the behavior of the items of inuence when completing the FMEA. A number of factors were observed in this study: . With the new spreadsheet, which served as an updated failure history, knowledge operated at a company level. . There was a reduction in the time required to complete the FMEA, resulting in satisfaction among those involved. . Supplier-manufacturer involvement was fundamental to improve the quality of the information and team participation. . Mastery of the method proved to be fundamental in the analysis. . The suggestion of using Microsoft Access is only feasible if all those involved have this application. In practice, Microsoft Excel is more common, making this a more logical choice. However, macros could be implemented to automate the procedure. 5. Conclusions This paper has described an approach that uses process FMEA as a platform in supply chain operations to enhance manufacturing operations in all the supply chain partners. The approach addresses and resolves the following issues, which are important for true supply chain collaboration: . It ensures that all those involved have the same level of knowledge about the method. . It makes an updated failure history based on data from all involved parties available. . It brings the supplier and manufacturer together while the FMEA is being developed. . It provides a partly parameterized spreadsheet that makes the analysis easier to perform and reduces variability in the identication of stamping process operations and failures that can occur in these operations, as well as providing a historical basis, using company historical data, for some of the rates.

Designation FMEA spreadsheet Process function Failure mode Effect of failure Severity

Current FMEA At the discretion of each supplier

Improved FMEA

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Classication Cause and mechanism of failure Occurrence

Controls (prevention/ detection) Detection

Dened by customer according to FMEA history At the discretion of each supplier Dened by customer according to FMEA history At the discretion of each supplier Dened by customer according to FMEA history Many suppliers considered severity at According to the effect on the end their plant rather than at the customers. customer. Single choice table for severity The choice table used was not for all the suppliers on the form standardized Many cases not considered Customer denes classication according to criticality at the customers plant. At the discretion of each supplier Dened by customer according to FMEA history Highly subjective. The choice table used Statistical results must be presented at was not standardized the meeting; these must be obtained in advance. Remember that all the suppliers studied have ISO 9000 and must have controls in their process. Single occurrence choice table for all suppliers (present on the form) Specic for each supplier Specic for each supplier In some cases this was not completed Training or knowledge of method correctly because of a lack of knowledge. required to attend the meeting. Single The choice table was not standardized detection choice table for all suppliers on the form The values used to dene actions were Standardized that for NPR values of 50 not specied or severity values .7, recording of actions to reduce the rate is obligatory. These values have been inserted into the FMEA spreadsheet Present according to suppliers Actions inserted according to the result understanding for the NPR Spreadsheet not reviewed Reviewed to take into account problems at the customer plant Centralized and people-dependent Not interconnected to FMEA Universal and belonging to the company The spreadsheet itself becomes a historical source of failure information Doubts about actual attendance by all Customer attends the meeting and people mentioned in the heading of the conrms attendance of the various FMEA supplier departments Customer did not attend meeting Customer attends the meeting, which is held at the suppliers premises Lengthy (more than two hours) Good (less than two hours) There were people at meeting who did Knowledge of method required in order not have any training in or knowledge of to attend the meeting the method Spreadsheet not reviewed The FMEA must be updated to take into account any problems at the customer plant and sent along with the 8D (problem-solving methodology to improve process and product)

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RPN

Recommended actions Results of actions Factors inuenced Knowledge Failure history Teamwork Supplier-manufacturer synergy Time to complete Training Control

Table III. Comparison of the data collected

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Initially, ten standard FMEA spreadsheets were collected from each of seven suppliers for an automotive manufacturer, and it was found that, in general, items such as operations, failure modes and effects of failures in FMEA are subjective and that this tends to compromise the accuracy of any analyses. Furthermore, each supplier uses a very low risk priority number (NPR) to identify actions to prevent possible failures. When the proposed strategy, which involves a partly parameterized spreadsheet, was applied in three of these suppliers, this variability was found to be reduced. Application of the proposed strategy allowed us to conclude that training, standardization of the language related to processes involved in the analysis and updating of failure history are fundamental factors in ensuring true supply chain collaboration. In addition, the presence of the manufacturer at the meetings is vital to ensure integration between the parties involved and the availability of updated information about the manufacturing process, the product and the end customer. The authors suggest that further studies be carried out to improve this strategy based on suggestions collected from suppliers and that the strategy be tested in a bigger group with a part requiring a larger number of operations.
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Shirose, K. (1995), TPM Team Guide, Productivity Press, Portland, OR, p. 176. Silva, C.E.S., Tin, J.V. and Oliveira, V.C. (1997), Uma analise da aplicacao da FMEA nas normas de: Sistema de Gestao pela Qualidade (ISO 9000 e QS 9000), Sistema de Gestao Ambiental (ISO 14000) e Sistema de Gestao da Seguranca e Saude do Trabalho (BS 8800 futura ISO 18000), Proceedings of the 17th Encontro Nacional de Engenharia de Producao, Gramado. Slack, N., Chambers, S. and Johnston, R. (2007), Operations Management, 5th ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, p. 728. Stamatis, D.H. (2003), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to Execution, 2nd ed., ASQ Quality Press, Milwaukee, WI, p. 494. Teng, S. and Ho, S. (1996), Failure and effects analysis: an integrated approach for product design and process control, International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 8-26. Teng, S., Ho, S., Shumar, D. and Liu, P. (2006), Implementing FMEA in a collaborative supply chain environment, International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, Vol. 23 No. 3. Tumer, I.Y., Stone, R.B. and Bell, D.G. (2003), Requirements for a failure mode taxonomy for use in conceptual design, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Engineering Design ICED 03, Stockholm. Xenos, H.G.P. (1998), Gerenciando a Manutencao Produtiva, Editora de Desenvolvimento Gerencial, Belo Horizonte. Yin, R.K. (2008), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, p. 240. About the authors Carla Estorilio obtained her PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Sao Paulo (USP-Br); her research was partially conducted at Craneld University (UK). She has an MSc in Ergonomics of Industrial Systems, also from the University of Sao Paulo, an MPhil in Simultaneous Engineering, and an MSc in Information Technology from the Federal Technological University in Parana (UTFPR-Br). She graduated in Mechanical Engineering from UFPR/Unitau-Br. She has worked as Lecturer and Researcher at the Federal Technological University in Parana for the past 17 years and has been involved with consultancy in the industrial engineering area, emphasizing subjects like process reengineering, and focusing on issues such as performance analysis of the product development process (PDP), methods to improve PDP performance, and techniques to support product design phase, as well as simultaneous engineering, Six Sigma, design methodologies, and some integrated methods (e.g. QFD, AV, DFX, FMEA). Carla Estorilio is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: amodio@utfpr.edu.br Richard K. Posso obtained an MS in Mechanical Engineering (2007) and graduated in Mechanical Technology from the Federal Technological University in Parana, Brazil (UTFPR) in 2004. He has been involved with the automotive industrial sector through Renault Brazil since 2002 in the manufacturing area. He has also been involved with industrial activities in France, with the aim of reaching good manufacturing integration between industries in Brazil and France.

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