Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
18 September 2012
Enhanced NPPs Safety and Protection after Fukushima French Industry experience: a responsible approach EDF / Areva
Michel Debes - EDF Generation and Engineering Division (michel.debes@edf.fr) Bertrand Delepinois - Areva (bertrand.delepinois@areva.com)
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
CONTENT - The industry prime responsibility of safety - Importance of periodic safety reassessments - Avoid environment contamination, even in extreme situations - Results of EDF Stress Tests and improvements for existing NPPs - The EPR safety at the light of Fukushima - Main lessons drawn for nuclear development and new projects - Enhancing collective international safety responsibility
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
Flam anville
Blayais Golfech
900 M W
1 300 M W
1 50 0 M W
1400 M W
1300 MW
30000 20000 900 MW 10000 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Decommissioning program: 9 reactors (6 GGR, HWGCR Brennilis, SFR Creys Malville, PWR Chooz A)
After Fukushima, the nuclear industry collectively shares the sense of a burning priority to be put on nuclear safety, in all circumstances
ASN, including safety controls and a consistent set of modifications Plants built for decades must get regular design improvements Necessity for the operator to remain continuously involved in engineering issues Need for an organization encompassing adequate engineering and operational skills
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
Harden the vital safety systems Put in place mobile means Ensure containment integrity in case of extreme hazards and severe accident
Fukushima stresses the need for a reinforced and shared objective worldwide : nuclear plants must be able to face extreme, beyond design, situations. Objective : prevent a severe accident or, should it occur, avoid long term contamination. (design objective for new reactors, to be addressed for existing plant through PSR)
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
Results of "Stress tests" for French NPPs : - Complementary Safety Assessments - Improvements for existing NPPs and emergency planning
Main objective - The future NPPs have to be designed and operated with the objective that no accidental scenario may lead to long term contamination in neighbouring territories. - This objective should be used for existing plants, underlining the importance of Periodic Safety Review process (PSR)
1/ In-depth assessment of the current safety layers according to the current design basis of: Physical protections such as dikes, embankments, anchorage, water resources, Design Basis accident management All relevant systems used for the safety demonstration => confirmation of adequate margins for all NPPs 2/ New analysis going beyond the current design basis referential: Efficiency of protections Consideration of extreme situations Hard core of systems and equipment enabling to avoid releases with significant long term consequences => If necessary, implementation of supplementary means Equipment Human resources Local/national organization
Copyright EDF April 2012
Increasing water make-up and electrical power supply capacity, to cool the reactor and avoid fuel uncovery (reactor core, spent fuel pool)
- additional water reserve (basin, underground table) - reinforcement of the back up cooling water supply (tank...) - implementation of additional back up diesel generator s on each unit: supply of AFW pumps, water make-up to RCS and spent fuel pool, thermal pump to supply water in RCS - spent fuel pool operation: instrumentation (level, temperature), supply systems, fuel handling..
Protective measures in case of core meltdown, minimizing radioactive releases to avoid significant long-term contamination of surrounding areas
- robustness and efficiency of U5 containment filter to limit external releases (cesium...), seismic resistance, improvement of fitration capabilities (iodine), - soda in reactor building sumps (to trap iodine) - studies of countermeasures to avoid contamination of the water table (in case of basement melt through)
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Nuclear Rapid Response Force (FARN) - The setting up a supplementary "resilient" line of defense through a national "Rapid Action Force" (FARN) ready to support a site in trouble within 24h (event involving multi-units ), to maintain or restore core cooling and to avoid any significant release: support team, mobile means (pumps, power, plug and play connections,...), accident management, logistics , - reinforcement of crisis management premises on site
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EPR Genesis
Three Miles Island (1979): Core meltdown accident Modifications on operating plants (human factor, severe accidents) Considerable R&D on severe accidents
Eliminate the risk of experiencing consequences on populations similar to the Chernobyl disaster (incl long term consequences)
30 years of experience of French and German fleets Operating experience Probabilistic Safety Assessment of current plants
Ensure that a terrorist attack will not cause a severe accident in the context of nuclear technology diffusion worldwide
The EPR design includes, from its origin, all safety progresses. Voluntary choice of an evolutionnary design, for safety reasons
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
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Increase robustness against terrorist attacks ( resist lo a large commercial aircraft crash) Simplify operation Deterministic approach, complemented by probabilistic assessment
Severe accident mitigation is included in the design These objectives define the Gen 3 (or 3+) reactors
Convention SFEN 8 et 9 mars 2012 Analyse sret de lEPR
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Watertight buildings and doors Margin assessment demonstrate with a high level of confidence that a Fukushima quake would not have impacted EPR capabilities to avoid a severe accident Buildings, would have resisted dynamic impact of the wave and a 3-4 m of flooding without risk of excessive leaks
IAEA General Conference - September 2012 - Industry Forum
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SBO
Diesels
Diesels & fuel tanks housed in reinforced buildings earthquake resistant doors designed to resist explosions & floods
2 buildings located on each side of the reactor building impossible for both of them to be damaged by an external hazard (explosion, airplane crash)
4 main 100% redundant diesels: 72 hours autonomy each, at full load 2 additional SBO diesels : fully diversified, 24 hours autonomy each batteries: 12h autonomy
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3 2
4 safety trains located in 4 dedicated safeguard buildings 2 safeguard buildings are further protected by the APC shell One train is enough to cool the core (100% train)
Pressurizer
Highly redundant cooling systems, with two ways to cool down the core in accident conditions
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In case of loss of main heat sink access 1 ,the EPR reactor can rely: On an alternate heat sink source1 2 (against floods or earthquakes) On significant protected water reserves: four EFWS2 tanks 3 in the safeguards buildings a large fire fighting tank 4 the IRWST3 5 in the reactor building
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Core melting at high system pressure can potentially lead to loss of containment integrity and major melt dispersal The EPR design includes additional dedicated primary depressurization valves
Minimize H2 concentration : Large reactor building with interlinked compartments Reduce H2 quantity: Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners
Reinforced containment Core catcher Long term cooling (severe accident dedicated system) Basemat integrity ensured
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France : ASN reported that the enhanced design of [the EPR ensures already an improved robustness with respect to the severe accident
Finland : STUK highlighted that earthquakes and flooding are included in the design to ensure safety functions to a high level of confidence
UK : ONR issued the EPR interim Design Acceptance in December 11, stating that there is no show stopper regarding EPR safety
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EPR synthesis
EPR safety principles are conforted after Fukushima :
robustness towards external hazards enhanced defence in depth severe accident mitigation included in the design
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Establishing optimal industrial organisation for new nuclear plant construction Selecting a technology
- Building a solid, secure plan for the entire nuclear fuel cycle (front end, back end, waste management...) - Setting up an efficient operation system - Training, boosting national expertise - Involving local suppliers in the programme (qualification, oversight...)
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The independence of the regulator : a key factor International institutions greater role (IAEA, OECD/NEA etc.) in the development of new nuclear power programs (forwarding high safety standards) Role of WANO to enhance operator's responsibilities at international level.
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