Rolito Go versus Court of Appeals FACTS: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before

the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before theinformation was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE/S: The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following: 1. whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and 2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation. RULING: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for apreliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded theproper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder. Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990] - In RE: Umil vs. Ramos Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOUCAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City

an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority. (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003]

Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,

informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver. Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtuds implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtuds lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtuds box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.

People versus Macalaba

PEOPLE V. ROBERT FIGUEROA (G.R. NO. 134056) Accused was convicted of violating Sec 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 972 Unauthorized manufacture of regulated drugs. He contends that since his alleged co-conspirator was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence to prove that she conspired with him, he should likewise be acquitted. HELD: Once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own respective acts. Accordingly, appellants criminal liability in this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof required in criminal cases.

People vs Molina Overview: SPO1 Paguidopon received a tip about drug pushers. He previously caught a glimpse of one of them, Mula, so he was able to point to him and his companion, Molina, to arresting officers when they were aboard a trisikad. Upon accosting them, the police were able to find marijuana in a bag carried by Molina, leading to their arrest. The court however held that they were illegally arrested because their case dont fall under the exception of an in flagrante delicto arrest, there being no outward indication that could justify their arrest. Statement of Facts: On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcylce who just passed by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest. In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's housee where they'll wait for the drug pushers will pass by. Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point, Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina. Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this." Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted

to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial court still found them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved for the acquittal of the two.

Issue and Held: Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless arrests? NO Applicable Laws: Article III, Sec. 2, Article III, Sec. 3 Rationale: The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest. For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a valid warrant of arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests: (a) In flagrante delicto - when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (b) Arrest effected in hot pursuit - when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the trial court found that the warrantless arrest and seizure were valid apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the prohibited drugs. But the question is: does the present case aptly fall within the exceptions to the warrant requirement? In in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify in flagrante delicto arrests. o People vs Chua Ho San: The arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the person he is arresting has committed, is committing or is about to commit the offense. o People vs Aminnudin: The accused was just disembarking the vessel. He only became suspect when the informer pointed him to the officials. o People vs Mengote: eyes darting from side to side while holding one's abdomen, is not indicative of probable cause to suspect the accused of committing the offense. o People vs Encinada: riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs is also not indicative of probable cause o Malacat vs CA: "standing on the corner with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that come nearer to them" is not an act evidencing that the accused is attempting to commit a crime. There was no ground to even believe that the accused was armed with a weapon since even a telltale bulge at the front waistline of the accused wouldn't be visible from the officers' view. To constitute in flagrante delcito arrests, there are two requisites: 1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime 2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In the present case, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication to justify their arrest. Holding a bag, Molina saying "Boss, if possible we will settle this", which allegedly arouse the suspicion of the officers, are not constitutive of probable cause. Were it not for Paguidopon, the accused won't even be identified nor found suspicious. - As to Mula and Molina's identity, Paguidopon said that he conducted a surveillance of Mula, and caught a glimpse of him on the road. However, he doesn't even know his name or address. As to Molina, he admits not seeing him before the arrest. With this, Pamplona's claim that he knew of the name of the accused is baseless. - This case is different from People vs Encinada, because there the officers knew the identity of the person to be arrested. Nevertheless the arrest was still held illegal since the accused did not show any suspicious behavior. - It can't be said that the accused waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure just because they had an implied acquiescence to the search. This was mere passive conformity given the circumstance. Judgment: Mula and Molina are acquitted. Both the arrest and the seizure are illegal.

PEOPLE vs LAGUIO

FACTS: On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. The police operative planned an entrapment proceeding. During the entrapment Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor in Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang.

They disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.

May 17 1996, Wang, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) the police officers approached wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed 9mm automatic Pistol. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing shabu (b) cash in the amount ofP650,000.00 (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales (d) an unlicensed 9mm Pistol with magazine.

Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case. The respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.

ISSUE: W/N there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant HELD: NO. Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest. Regarding the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein

Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.

People versus Roman Lacap

People vs. Joselito del Rosario GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS: The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects. After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated. (2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful. HELD

(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included invitations by police officers in the scope of custodial investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime. However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver. (2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed; and when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991] Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. Issues: (1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. (2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible. Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

People v. Alvario 275 SCRA 529

FACTS: On January 29, 1993, Esterlina Quintero (Ester), a 29-year oldgirl, took her time off as a housekeeper at Pasong Tirad,Makati, to look for another place of employment. Eventually,she found a house in Bel-Air Subdivision where she wasaccepted by Armando Alvario as a cook and a laundress .(Alvario was just a caretaker of the house). Based on Esterstestimony, Alvario would barge into her room in the maidsquarter, point a gun at her and rape her. Also, she testified that Alvario did not allow her to go out of the house and to use the telephone. However, on January 28, she phoned her sister and asked her from her. Subsequently, her sister and 4 Makati police came to the house in Bel-Air. When Alvario and Ester opened the door, she pointed at Alvario and say that heraped her. Then and there, Alvario was arrested. ISSUE: W/N the arrest of Alvario is valid? RULING: No. The arrest of Alvario violated his constitutional r i g h t a g a i n s t w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t s . A s r e q u i r e d b y Rules on Criminal Procedure, a person can be arrested even without a warrant when an offense h a s i n f a c t b e e n c o m m i t t e d a n d t h e p o l i c e m a n making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.

SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU November 3, 1993 Cruz, J. FACTS: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp. At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

 The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou. On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction. ISSUES/HELD: WON Sanchez was unlawfully withheld of his right to Preliminary Investigation- NO WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue of the jurisdiction subsequently acquired) The Preliminary Investigation. The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits. On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious. Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense. At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6 If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment. The Arrest "Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 12 The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for investigation. In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest

that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him. It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for questioning. It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested." His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or fortysix days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested. The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal. Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that: Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.