When Does Evidence of Eyewitness Confidence Inflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial?

Author(s): Amy Bradfield and Dawn E. McQuiston Reviewed work(s): Source: Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Aug., 2004), pp. 369-387 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4141735 . Accessed: 22/09/2012 02:21
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Law and Human Behavior.

http://www.jstor.org

Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 4, August 2004 (O 2004)

When Does Evidence of Eyewitness Confidence Inflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial?1
Amy Bradfield2,5and Dawn E. McQuiston3'4

Two studies investigated perceptions of eyewitness confidence inflation: increases in a witness's confidence between the time of the identification and the trial. Experiment 1 (N = 90) demonstrated that, for White participants, assessments of the strength of the defense case, the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when there was evidence that the eyewitness's confidence increased over time (mere inflation condition), compared with a control condition. In addition, assessments of the defendant's guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when the eyewitness was aggressively challenged about the change in her confidence report (inflation + challenge). Experiment 2 (N = 360) demonstrated that, for Hispanic participants, sensitivity to confidence inflation did not interact with manipulations of the eyewitness's or defendant's race (White vs. Hispanic). In addition, the confidence inflation effect did not replicate with the Hispanic participants. Results are interpreted in terms of the ingroup bias in legal judgments and directions for future research.
KEY WORDS: Eyewitness; confidence; inflation; identification.

"... [I]nnocent people are sentenced to death with materially greater frequency than was previously supposed..." U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff in United States v. Alan Quinones (2002)

Thanks to popular media coverage of wrongful convictions (e.g., "Free Again," 2001), even a casual observer of judicial matters in the United States should recognize that the justice system is fallible. A new popular press book underscores this point by describing recent exonerations of many wrongfully convicted individuals (Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2001). One conclusion from these stories is that an overwhelming proportion of wrongful convictions are the result of mistaken
1Portions of these data were presented at the 2002 Biennial Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society. 2Department of Psychology, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine. 3Department of Psychology,University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas. 4Present address: Arizona State University West, Phoenix, Arizona. 5To whom correspondence should be addressed at Department of Psychology, 4 Andrews Road, Bates College, Lewiston, Maine 04240; e-mail: abradfie@bates.edu. 369
0147-7307/04/0800-0369/1 ? 2004 American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychology Association

370

Bradfield and McQuiston

eyewitness identifications; a large proportion of cases (over 80% in Scheck et al., 2001) are due, at least in part, to mistaken eyewitness identifications (see also Rattner, 1988). One reason that mistaken identifications contribute to wrongful convictions is due to the way in which triers of fact evaluate the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Most people rely heavily on the witness's confidence report (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). In fact, confidence reports are so powerful that they distort perceptions of other testimony-relevant criteria. In one study, participants who read a transcript in which a witness's confidence was high remembered the witness as having a better view than did participants who read a transcript in which the witness's confidence was low (Bradfield & Wells, 2000). Even when participant-jurors are explicitly instructed that confidence is not a reliable predictor of accuracy, high eyewitness confidence leads to more favorable evaluations of the eyewitness than does low confidence (Fox & Walters, 1986). This reliance on eyewitness confidence reports as a cue to identification accuracy can be problematic because of the complex relationship between confidence and identification accuracy. Although research indicates that there is a nontrivial relationship between confidence and accuracy (e.g., see meta-analysis by Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995), this relationship is muddied by myriad variables that inflate confidence reports without affecting identification accuracy. Such variables include information about a cowitness's identification (Luus & Wells, 1994), witness preparation for cross-examination (Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981), giving confidence reports in public versus private (Shaw, Kerr, & Woythaler, 2001), and a lineup administrator's expectations (Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001). These variables create a dangerous situation for an innocent defendant because a witness who is confident, even if he or she is wrong, is compelling evidence against a defendant (e.g., Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002). One particularly troublesome variable that affects eyewitness confidence but not identification accuracy is postidentification feedback. In a series of experiments, Wells and Bradfield (1998, 1999; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003) demonstrated that randomly assigning eyewitnesses to hear confirming feedback about the accuracy of their identification dramatically inflated their retrospective reports of how confident they were at the time of their identification, compared with a control condition (i.e., confidence inflation). In addition, confirming postidentification feedback distorted a host of other testimony-relevant judgments (e.g., witnesses' reports of how good their view was, how much they were paying attention, how easily they made their identification). One reason postidentification feedback is so troubling is that it decreases the magnitude of the confidence-accuracy correlation by inflating retrospective certainty judgments for inaccurate witnesses but not for accurate witnesses (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002). Therefore, whatever utility confidence has as a cue to accuracy is diminished when witnesses have been given postidentification feedback. The number of real cases in which postidentification feedback occurs (and thereby confidence inflation) is unknown because identification procedures are not routinely videotaped (see Kassin, 1998; Sporer, 1993). However, confidence inflation

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

371

clearly occurs in at least some real cases. For example, consider Missouri v. Huchting (1996) in which the eyewitness labored over the identification procedure for half an hour before ultimately selecting a photograph. At trial, she testified that, "[t]here was no maybe about it... I was absolutely positive." An expert's evaluation of such an eyewitness would almost certainly be tempered by knowledge that the witness's confidence had grown over time. Indeed, 73% of eyewitness experts surveyed indicated that they would be willing to testify that, "An eyewitness's confidence is not a reliable predictor of his or her identification accuracy." (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001).6 However, it is not clear that lay assessments would result in a similar adjustment in evaluations of an eyewitness; jurors and experts rarely agree on factors that influence eyewitness identification accuracy (e.g., Kassin & Barndollar, 1992). One way people could respond to evidence of confidence inflation is by treating it as a form of inconsistency in the witness's report. Some research indicates that inconsistency affects evaluations of eyewitnesses (e.g., Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995; Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986). For example, Wells and Leippe (1981) demonstrated that eyewitnesses who changed their reports about whether a stolen calculator had a carrying case were evaluated less favorably than were eyewitnesses whose reports did not change. However, other research indicates that witness inconsistency sometimes fails to affect evaluations of an eyewitness or defendant (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002; Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992; Lindsay, Lim, Marando, & Cully, 1986). For example, when Leippe and Romanczyk (1989) manipulated credibility by introducing inconsistency into an eyewitness's testimony, they found that inconsistency did not affect either verdict or eyewitness credibility ratings for adult or 10-year-old eyewitnesses.7 Given these conflicting research outcomes, it is difficult to make a clear prediction about how judgments of an eyewitness or defendant might be influenced by evidence of confidence inflation. Experiment 1 was designed to explore how evidence of eyewitness confidence inflation in a criminal trial would affect assessments of the defendant and the eyewitness. EXPERIMENT 1 Method Participants Ninety students (83% White) at a small northeastern college volunteered to participate. Students were recruited in psychology classes and received extra course credit in return for their participation.

6It is not a foregone conclusion that this opinion among experts will persist. For example, ongoing research is pursuing experimental manipulations that will calibrate confidence and accuracy more closely. For a recent example of such a manipulation see Brewer, Keast, and Rishworth (2002). 7Credibility ratings were affected by inconsistency for 6-year-old eyewitnesses; credibility ratings were significantly higher for consistent witnesses compared with inconsistent witnesses.

372

Bradfield and McQuiston

Materials Transcript. Participants read one of three fictitious trial transcripts, each of which was approximately three pages long. Before reading the transcript, participants read that the defendant (Roger Greene) was arrested for the armed robbery of an elderly victim (Edna Cameron). The defendant was charged with stealing the victim's purse which contained $780 in cash. The defendant was arrested a short distance from the scene of the crime because he matched the general description of the culprit given to police. He was found in possession of $750, which he claimed was from his paycheck. He was subsequently identified by Mrs. Cameron in a police-lineup. Each transcript presented the direct and cross-examination of the victim/eyewitness. The ethnicity of the eyewitness and defendant were unspecified. Manipulation of Confidence Inflation. Experiment 1 had one independent variable with three levels. In the first (control) condition, the eyewitness reported being "positive" in the accuracy of her identification at the time of the identification and was "positive" at the trial. In the second (mere inflation) condition, the eyewitness reported being "not sure" at the time of the identification but she was "positive" at the trial. The mere inflation condition was included because reports of defense attorneys sleeping through capital cases (e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 2001) highlight the possibility that evidence of confidence inflation might go unchallenged. A third (inflation + challenge) condition was included because strategies recommended in trial preparation manuals (e.g., Bailey & Rothblatt, 1985) encourage attorneys to focus on witness inconsistency. In this third condition, the defense attorney aggressively challenged the eyewitness's inflated confidence report. Table 1 includes the manipulated sections of the trial transcript for each experimental condition. Dependent Measures Questionnaire. Participants were instructed to read each question carefully and circle the number that best represented their belief. The questionnaire included 9 questions (see Table 2 for order of dependent measures and end points of scales). Participants completed two items designed to serve as a manipulation check: "At the trial, how confident do you think Mrs. Cameron was in her identification?" The second manipulation check was: "Compared to how confident she was at the trial, do you think Mrs. Cameron was more confident, less confident, or as confident when she first made her identification?" Participants chose one of three options: (a) I think she was less confident before the trial than she was at the trial, (b) I think she was equally confident before and at the trial, and (c) I think she was more confident before the trial than she was at the trial. Participants also answered six critical dependent measure questions. Three of the six critical questions concerned the defendant: "Do you think Roger A. Greene, the defendant, is guilty?"; "How strong do you think the defense's case is?"; "If Mr. Greene is convicted, what do you think his sentence should be?" The remaining three critical questions concerned evaluations of the eyewitness: "Do you think the eyewitness made an accurate identification?"; "How confident are you that Mrs. Cameron identified the correct man in the police line-up?"; "Do you think Mrs. Cameron got a good look at the culprit from the information you received about the robbery?" Finally, participants answered one exploratory question: "How often would you estimate that eyewitness identifications are correct, in general?"

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses Table 1. Manipulation of Evidence of Confidence Inflation

373

Mr. Reeder: Did you indicate how confident you were at the time you initially made your identification? Mrs. Cameron: Yes, I said that I was positive. [Yes, I think I said that I wasn't that sure.] Mr. Reeder: Judge Cooper, I would like to enter into evidence the statement that Mrs. Cameron made on the day of her identification. Judge Cooper: Accepted. Mr. Reeder: Mrs. Cameron, is this the statement you completed on the date of the identification? Mrs. Cameron: Yes, it is. Mr. Reeder: Would you read what you wrote on the day of your identification for the court, please? Mrs. Cameron: I wrote "I picked out photograph #3. I'm not sure that this is the guy who robbed me but I'm pretty sure." Mr. Reeder: So, when you made your identification you were "prettysure." And yet, a few moments ago, you told me that you are positive that you made an accurate identification. How can you be so confident now? Mrs. Cameron: I'm not sure what you mean. Mr. Reeder: What I mean Mrs. Cameron, is that when you identified my client you were not sure that you were right. Now, you report that you are positive that my client is the man who robbed you. How did that happen? How are you more confident now than you were then? Mrs. Cameron: Um... Mr. Reeder: Because memory doesn't get better with time, Mrs. Cameron. Why are you so confident now that my client is the man who robbed you? Mrs. Cameron: I don't know. I just am. Mr. Reeder: OK, I have no further questions, Your Honor. REDIRECT BY MR. WALKER: Mr. Walker (Prosecutor): Mrs. Cameron, how confident are you right now that you made an accurate identification? Mrs. Cameron: I'm positive. Mr. Walker: Thank you, I have no further questions. Note. Excerpt from fictitious trial transcript read by participants. The control condition included only those lines indicated in normal text. The mere inflation condition added the lines indicated in bold. The inflation + challenge condition included the lines indicated in bold and added the lines indicated in italics.

Table 2. Dependent Measures for Experiments 1 and 2 1. Do you think Roger A. Greene [Sanchez], the defendant, is guilty? from 1 (not at all guilty) to 10 (very guilty) 2. Do you think Mrs. Cameron [Rodriguez], the eyewitness, made an accurate identification? from 1 (definitely not) to 10 (definitely yes) 3. How confident are you that Mrs. Cameron [Rodriguez] identified the correct man in the police lineup? from 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (very confident) 4. How strong do you think the defense's case is? from 1 (not very strong at all) to 10 (very strong) 5. If Mr. Greene [Sanchez] is convicted, what do you think his sentence should be? from 1 (lightest possible sentence) to 10 (heaviest possible sentence) 6. At the trial, how confident do you think Mrs. Cameron [Rodriguez] was in her identification? from 1 (not confident) to 10 (very confident) 7. Compared to how confident she was at the trial, do you think Mrs. Cameron [Rodriguez] was more confident, less confident, or as confident when she first made her identification? a. I think she was less confident before the trial than she was at the trial. b. I think she was equally confident before and at the trial. c. I think she was more confident before the trial than she was at the trial. 8. Do you think Mrs. Cameron [Rodriguez] got a good look at the culprit from the information you received about the robbery? from 1 (not at all guilty) to 10 (very guilty) 9. How often would you estimate that eyewitness identifications are correct, in general? from 1 (almost never) to 10 (almost always) Note. Manipulations of the eyewitness and defendant names for Experiment 2 are in brackets.

374

Bradfield and McQuiston

Procedure Participants completed the experiment in a classroom setting. Upon arriving at the experiment location, participants completed a consent form and were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. Participants read the trial transcript of an eyewitness's testimony and then completed the dependent measures questionnaire. Finally, participants were orally debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. Results Analyses are presented below for the manipulation checks, the six critical dependent measures, and then the exploratory question. Manipulation Checks A one-way univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on participants' ratings of the eyewitness's confidence at trial, revealing a nonsignificant omnibus effect, F(2, 87) = 1.67, p = .19. This was the expected result because in all transcript versions, the eyewitness reported being "positive" in the accuracy of her identification at the trial. For the second manipulation check, participants compared the witness's confidence before the trial and at the trial. These data were analyzed by condition because participants in each condition should have answered that question differently. In the control condition, participants should have chosen the second option (b) because the witness was equally confident before the trial and at the trial. However, participants in the control condition chose each option equally frequently, X2(2, N = 30) = 0.60, p = .74. In the mere inflation condition, participants should have selected the first option (a) because the witness reported being "not sure" at the time of the identification and "positive" at trial. Indeed, participants overwhelmingly chose the first option (86.7%), X2(2, N = 30) = 38.60, p < .01. In the inflation + challenge condition also, participants should have selected the first option (a). Again, participants overwhelmingly selected the first option (76.7%), X2(2, N = 30) = 25.40, p < .01. Critical Dependent Measures For the six critical dependent variables, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with transcript type as the independent variable and the following dependent variables: evaluations of the defendant's guilt, the eyewitness's accuracy, confidence in the eyewitness's identification, strength of the defense case, sentencing recommendations for the defendant, and evaluations of the eyewitness's view. This analysis revealed a significant effect of transcript type, F(12, 164) = 2.72, p < .01, q72= .17 To determine the effect of the transcript variable, a series of univariate one-way ANOVAs were conducted. These analyses revealed significant omnibus effects of the transcript variable on five dependent measures: assessments of guilt, evaluations of the eyewitness's accuracy, evaluations of the eyewitness's view, confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy, and strength of the defense's case, all Fs(2, 87) > 4.41, ps < .02. There was no effect of the transcript variable on

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

375

Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Univariate Omnibus Statistics for Dependent Measures in Experiment 1 Control Guilt Belief in accuracy Confidence in identification Strength of defense case Degree of sentence Trial eyewitness confidence Eyewitness view of culprit General eyewitness accuracy 6.60a (1.77) 6.37a (1.85) 6.40a (1.77) 4.40a (1.98) 5.17a (1.90) 8.23a (1.81) 5.27a (1.89) 5.70a (1.54) Mere inflation 6.17a (1.74) 5.53a,b (2.11) 5.13b (1.94) 6.03b (2.17) 5.00a (2.13) 7.83a (2.55) 3.90b (2.02) 5.27a (1.86) Inflation + challenge 4.97b (1.56) 4.97b (1.50) 4.57b (2.01) 6.30b (2.14) 4.40a (1.99) 7.17a (2.42) 4.03b (1.97) 5.58a (1.72) F 7.64 4.41 7.23 7.22 1.21 1.69 4.42 0.33 p <.01 <.02 <.01 <.01 .30 .19 .02 .72 r~2 .15 .09 .14 .14 .03 .04 .09 .01

Note. N = 90. Standard deviations are in parentheses. F statistics represent values for univariate one-way ANOVAs. For each dependent measure, means sharing different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05.

participants' sentence recommendations, F(2, 87) = 1.21, p = .30 (see Table 3 for individual statistics and effect size estimates). For the dependent measures with significant univariate omnibus effects, Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) tests were conducted. These tests revealed that the mere inflation condition (compared with control) produced evaluations significantly more favorable to the defense on three dependent measures: ratings of the defense case, the quality of the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the accuracy of the eyewitness's identification (all significant comparisons differ at p < .05, ds > .68). Tukey's HSD also revealed that the inflation + challenge condition (compared with control) produced evaluations more favorable to the defense on five dependent measures: ratings of the defense case, the defendant's guilt, the eyewitness's accuracy, the quality of the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the accuracy of the eyewitness's identification, (all significant comparisons differ at p < .05, ds > .64). There was only one significant comparison between the mere inflation and inflation + challenge conditions. Participants in the mere inflation condition rated the defendant as guiltier than did participants in the inflation + challenge condition (p < .05, d = .66). Exploratory Analysis A one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of transcript type on general impressions of eyewitnesses, F(2, 87) = 0.33, p = .72. Discussion Participants read one of three fictitious trial transcripts in which evidence of an eyewitness's confidence inflation was manipulated. Results indicated that any evidence of confidence inflation-whether it was mere inflation or inflation challenged by an attorney-produced evaluations more favorable toward the defense in terms of participants' confidence in the eyewitness's identification, ratings of the strength of the defense case, and evaluations of the witness's view. Interestingly, evaluations of the defendant's guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy were not affected

376

Bradfield and McQuiston

by mere inflation. It was not until the eyewitness was aggressively challenged about the change in her confidence report that ratings of defendant guilt and eyewitness accuracy became more favorable to the defense, compared to the control condition. These results are consistent with previous research indicating that witness inconsistency negatively affects evaluations of the witness (e.g., Brewer & Burke, 2002). However, the effect of confidence inflation demonstrated here assumes that a record of the witness's confidence at the time of the identification exists. In spite of guidelines published by the United States Department of Justice encouraging police departments to collect such a record (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999), it is unclear how often departments collect confidence reports at the time of an identification. One unexpected result from Experiment 1 was the responses of some participants to the second manipulation check question. Recall that participants chose one of the three options describing the relationship between the witness's confidence at the time of the identification and at the trial (i.e., "I think she was less/equally/more confident before the trial than she was at the trial."). Although participants in the control condition read a transcript in which the eyewitness was equally confident at the time of the identification and at the trial, they chose each of the three options with equal frequency. The majority of participants in both the mere inflation and inflation + challenge conditions correctly chose the first option indicating that the witness was less confident before the trial than she was at the trial. One explanation for this result is that inconsistency in testimony is more salient than consistency; if a confidence report is discrepant at two points in time, people remember it. If it is consistent across time, people may have difficulty recalling the prior confidence report. Research in which participants are asked to explicitly recall the eyewitness's first confidence report might support this explanation. Experiment 1 is a preliminary exploration of what happens when people are confronted with evidence of confidence inflation in eyewitnesses. As noted above, it was interesting that the inflation + challenge and mere inflation conditions did not produce different evaluations of the defendant or eyewitness, except on assessments of guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy. This was especially intriguing in light of the explicit recommendation by trial preparation manuals that attorneys capitalize on witness inconsistency: "When a witness contradicts a statement he has made previously... [p]ress your advantage all the way." (Bailey & Rothblatt, 1985, p. 311). Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether there were circumstances in which this recommendation is justified. Specifically, it was designed to test whether there are combinations of variables that would produce more favorable evaluations for the defense in the inflation + challenge condition versus the mere inflation condition. EXPERIMENT 2 One circumstance in which it is easy to imagine the inflation + challenge condition producing especially favorable evaluations of the defense is if people are looking for reasons to acquit a defendant or evaluate an eyewitness favorably. Under these circumstances, people might be prone to evaluate available evidence selectively. For

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

377

example, people who are looking for reasons to evaluate a defendant favorably might be particularly sensitive to the blow delivered to the eyewitness's credibility in the inflation + challenge condition. In contrast, if people are not particularly interested in a favorable assessment of the defendant, they might not react to aggressive crossexamination of the eyewitness by reducing assessments of the witness's accuracy; assessments will be the same in the mere inflation and inflation + challenge conditions. A well-established social psychological phenomenon known as the ingroup bias provides a rationale for why one might expect such selective evaluations of evidence. According to the ingroup bias, people have a tendency to favor members of their own group over members of another group in terms of attributing favorable qualities and distributing rewards (e.g., Tajfel, 1979; Turner,Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). The biases observed in favor of one's ingroup are not dependent on an existing group to which one already belongs. In fact, group membership can be easily created within the context of a psychological experiment on the basis of irrelevant criteria (e.g., allegedly random computer printouts, Taylor & Moriarty, 1987). Even then, researchers find clear evidence of an ingroup bias (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). When one does measure the ingroup bias by using existing groups, the magnitude of the bias is exacerbated. For example, White participants favored their ingroup (a dyad created within the experiment) more than an outgroup dyad, especially if the outgroup dyad was Black rather than White (Taylor & Moriarty, 1987, see also Huddy & Virtanen, 1995). Rather than artificially creating group membership for Experiment 2, we elected to use the existing group membership of race. Research on race in the legal system has already demonstrated that it is a critical variable. A defendant's race routinely affects culpability ratings by both White and minority research participants (e.g., see metaanalyses by Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Sweeney & Haney, 1992). However, most of the existing research has focused on Black and White participants and defendants. Hispanics, the fastest-growing minority in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2000), remain largely unstudied in experimental research in general (e.g., see Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002), and in psycholegal research in particular. For example, the 1992 meta-analysis by Sweeney and Haney could not include research on Hispanics because only one simulation study investigating culpability among different racial groups examined Hispanics defendants (Andrews, 1981). Some research on Hispanics in the legal system has been conducted since the publication of this meta-analysis and is consistent with the finding that legal decisions are routinely biased against minority defendants. For example, several studies indicate that, compared with White defendants, Hispanic defendants are more likely to be convicted or receive harsher punishment (e.g., Jones, 1997; Munoz & Lopez, 1998; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier & DeMuth, 2000; Thomson, 1997). Hispanic participants were used in Experiment 2 to assess whether the ingroup bias would affect perceptions of confidence inflation evidence. The ingroup bias has been successfully demonstrated in prior psycholegal research with Hispanic participants (e.g., Worthen, McGlynn, Solis, & Coats, 2002). For example, Hispanic jurors' judgments are more lenient when a defendant is Hispanic versus White (Daudistel, Hosch, Holmes, & Graves, 1999; Huddy & Virtanen, 1995; Perez, Hosch, Ponder, & Trejo, 1993).

378

Bradfield and McQuiston

By manipulating the race of the defendant and the eyewitness (Hispanic vs. White) in Experiment 2 of the present research, four predictions were created that are consistent with research on the ingroup bias. The first prediction was that Hispanic participants would produce evaluations less favorable to the defense (and more favorable to the eyewitness) when the eyewitness was Hispanic versus White. The second prediction was that Hispanic participants would be less willing to accept the culpability of a Hispanic defendant compared with a White defendant, thereby producing evaluations more favorable to the defense (and less favorable to the eyewitness) when the defendant was Hispanic versus White.8 The third prediction applied the ingroup bias to evaluations of evidence rather than evaluations of eyewitnesses or defendants. Some research suggests that biases in evaluating defendants of different racial backgrounds occur because race affects perceptions of evidence (e.g., Klein & Creech, 1982). For example, evidence in a death penalty case was determined by White participants to be more mitigating when it applied to White defendants than when it applied to Black defendants (Lynch & Haney, 2000). In another study, White participants were not affected by pretrial publicity against a Black defendant if they considered racist motives for the publicity (Fein, Morgan, Norton, & Sommers, 1997). Finally, Black participants evaluating a traffic stop vignette rated a police officer's behavior as less fair than did White participants (Wiley, 2001).9 If people are motivated to evaluate members of an ingroup favorably, there should be differences in sensitivity to information that would facilitate favorable evaluations. For example, suppose Hispanic jurors are evaluating a White eyewitness. In the mere inflation condition, evaluations of the eyewitness's accuracy should be more negative than in the control condition. In addition, if evidence of confidence inflation is particularly salient (i.e., in the inflation + challenge condition), it should lead to even more negative evaluations of the White eyewitness. However, if Hispanic jurors are evaluating a Hispanic eyewitness, their motivation to incorporate negative information (e.g., evidence of confidence inflation) into an assessment of the eyewitness's accuracy will be minimized. Therefore, they will not adjust their evaluations of the eyewitness's accuracy from the mere inflation to the inflation + challenge condition. Based on this rationale, a two-way interaction was predicted in which Hispanic participants would react to the inflation + challenge condition by decreasing judgments of accuracy (compared with the mere inflation condition) when the eyewitness is White but not when the eyewitness is Hispanic.
8It was not predicted that results would be consistent with the Black Sheep effect, a phenomenon in which people derogate negative representatives of their ingroup (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). To be consistent with the Black Sheep effect, Hispanic participants would react negatively to a fellow Hispanic who is a defendant in a criminal trial. However, we believed that this would not occur because negative evaluations of an ingroup member depend on clear evidence of negative attributes associated with that ingroup member (e.g., poor performance in a competitive game; Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999, see also e.g., King, 1993). In the current research, knowledge that a fellow Hispanic is a criminal defendant does not automatically imbue that person with negative attributes. 'Recent research offers some promising views of the future. Among some participants, racial biases disappear when participants are motivated or reminded to be fair (e.g., Devine, Plant, Amodio, HarmonJones, & Vance, 2002; Petty, Fleming, & White, 1999; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; White & Harkins, 1994).

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

379

Similar to the interaction described above, a fourth two-way interaction was predicted for evaluations of the defendant. It was expected that participants would use salient evidence of confidence inflation (i.e., in the inflation + challenge condition) to adjust evaluations of the defendant when the defendant is Hispanic. When the defendant is White, there should be no difference in assessments between the mere inflation and inflation + challenge conditions. Method Participants Participants (N = 360) were Hispanic students at a large southwestern university who volunteered to participate. Students were recruited in psychology and criminal justice classes and received extra course credit in return for their participation. Materials The materials for Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that the race of the eyewitness and defendant were manipulated. Participants read about a Hispanic or White eyewitness in the demographic information at the beginning of the transcript. The name of the eyewitness (Edna D. Rodriguez vs. Edna D. Cameron) was altered to be consistent with the race manipulation. Participants also read about a White or Hispanic defendant. This manipulation was reflected in changes to the defendant's name from Roger A. Greene in the White defendant condition to Roger A. Sanchez in the Hispanic defendant condition. Participants completed the same set of dependent measures as in Experiment 1 except that the names of the eyewitness and defendant were changed to reflect the race manipulation. The variables introduced in Experiment 2 produced a 2 (Race of Eyewitness: Hispanic vs. White) x 2 (Race of Defendant: Hispanic vs. White) x 3 (Confidence Inflation: Control vs. Mere Inflation vs. Inflation + challenge) fully randomized between-groups factorial design. Procedure Participants completed the experiment in a classroom setting. After completing a consent form, participants were randomly assigned to one of the twelve experimental conditions. After reading the transcript, participants completed the same dependent measures questionnaire, with the same instructions used in Experiment 1 (see Table 1). After completing the dependent measures questionnaire, participants were orally debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. Results As in Experiment 1, analyses are presented below for the manipulation checks, the six critical dependent measures, and the exploratory question.

380

Bradfield and McQuiston

Manipulation Checks A three-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the effects of transcript type, eyewitness ethnicity, and defendant ethnicity on participants' ratings of the eyewitness's confidence at trial. Results revealed a significant main effect for transcripttype, F(2, 348) = 5.95, p < .01; q2 = .03. Tukey's HSD test indicated that participants in the inflation + challenge condition rated the eyewitness as less confident in her identification at trial (M = 5.86; SD = 3.22) compared to both the control (M = 6.93; SD = 2.63) and mere inflation (M = 6.99; SD = 2.70) conditions, ps < .01. No other main effects or interactions from the three-way ANOVA were significant, ps > .05. For the second manipulation check, participants compared the witness's confidence before the trial and at the trial. Because the independent and dependent variables are both categorical, a 3 x 2 x 2 x 3 hierarchical loglinear analysis (HILOG) was conducted to examine the effects of transcript type, eyewitness ethnicity, and defendant ethnicity on participants' evaluation of the witness's confidence before and at the trial. Results indicated a significant Transcripttype x Evaluation of witness confidence interaction, X2(4) = 62.47, p < .001; 4 = .41. Follow-up analyses were conducted by transcript condition because participants in each condition should have answered the manipulation check question differently. The results are similar to those reported for Experiment 1. Participants in the control condition chose each option equally frequently, X2(2, N = 120) = 2.15, p = .34. A large portion of participants in both the mere inflation condition and in the inflation + challenge condition chose the first option (64.2 and 60.0%, respectively), X2(2, N = 120) = 54.15, p < .001 and X2(2, N = 120) = 76.65, p < .001, respectively. None of the other two- or three-way interactions were statistically significant, ps > .37. Critical Dependent Measures A MANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of transcript type, eyewitness ethnicity, and defendant ethnicity on the six critical dependent variables. This analysis revealed one significant effect, a Transcript type x Defendant ethnicity interaction F(12, 686) = 1.79, p = .05, i72 = .03. However, follow-up univariate tests revealed no significant Transcripttype x Defendant ethnicity interactions or main effects of either variable, Fs(2, 348) < 1.87, ps > .15, q2s < .01. No other main effects or interactions from the MANOVA were statistically significant, ps > .20, 12s < .02 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations for all dependent measures). Exploratory Analysis A three-way ANOVA assessing the effects of transcript type, eyewitness ethnicity, and defendant ethnicity on general impressions of eyewitnesses revealed a main effect of eyewitness ethnicity, F(1, 348) = 7.98, p < .01, q12= .02. Participants who read a transcript in which the eyewitness was Hispanic rated the general accuracy of eyewitnesses as higher (M = 5.17; SD = 1.67) than those who read a transcript in which the eyewitness was White (M = 4.65; SD = 1.82). No other main effects or interactions were statistically significant, ps > .05.

Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for Dependent Measures in Experiment 2 White defendant Hispanic eyewitness Mere Inflation + Control inflation challenge White eyewitness Control Mere Inflation + inflation challenge

Hisp

Dependent measures Guilt Belief in accuracy Confidence in identification Strength of defense case Degree of sentence Trial eyewitness confidence Eyewitness view of culprit General eyewitness accuracy

5.60(1.89) 4.86(2.23) 4.97(2.50) 5.33(2.28) 4.68(2.01) 4.47(1.98) 4.97 (2.44) 4.34 (2.45) 4.77 (2.80) 4.77 (2.62) 4.06 (2.21) 3.67 (1.83) 5.13 (2.56) 4.21 (2.18) 4.60 (2.94) 4.73 (2.89) 4.23 (2.26) 3.33 (1.88)

Hispanic eyewitness Mere Inflat Control inflation chall 4.67 (2.07) 5.23(2.06) 5.00(2 4.20 (2.16) 4.40 (2.53) 3.67 ( 4.13 (2.37) 4.43 (2.50) 3.93 (

5.33 (1.95) 5.72 (2.45) 6.97 (1.97) 5.80 (2.33) 6.42 (2.01) 5.77 (2.54) 5.67 (2.23) 6.50 (2.03) 6.60 (

5.33 (1.95) 4.52 (2.11) 4.50 (2.50) 4.80 (2.50) 5.29 (2.40) 3.77 (2.16) 4.87 (2.03) 4.80 (2.02) 4.80 ( 6.83 (2.87) 7.17 (3.15) 7.07(2.36) 6.37 (2.86) 6.94 (2.85) 5.30(3.28) 7.43 (2.37) 6.93 (2.39) 5.67(3

4.20 (2.33) 3.90 (2.30) 4.07 (2.33) 4.00 (2.61) 4.29 (2.19) 2.90(1.75) 3.63 (1.88) 3.73 (2.38) 3.63 (

4.60(1.48) 5.45 (1.57) 5.23(1.55) 4.67 (1.97) 4.74(1.77) 4.33(1.69) 5.17 (1.44) 5.47 (1.80) 5.13(2

382

Bradfield and McQuiston

Discussion Experiment 2 was designed to test whether participants, all of whom were Hispanic, would react differently to evidence of confidence inflation when the race of the defendant and eyewitness were manipulated. Some support was found for the ingroup bias; participants rated the general reliability of eyewitnesses as greater when the eyewitness was Hispanic than when the eyewitness was White. However, because the ingroup bias appeared only on one dependent measure, it is not surprising that the predicted interactions between race and confidence inflation were not obtained; a fair test of the interaction hypotheses proposed here depends upon a robust ingroup bias. Concerning the effects of confidence inflation, the results in Experiment 2 do not replicate those found in Experiment 1. One explanation for this difference could be the racial background of the participants in Experiment 1 (mostly White) versus Experiment 2 (all Hispanic). Previous research indicating that race affects perceptions of other types of evidence supports the possibility that participant's race accounts for the differences observed in Experiments 1 and 2 (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). However, because there was no direct comparison group available for the Hispanic participants in Experiment 2, it is difficult to know whether race explains the different effects of the confidence inflation manipulation in Experiment 1 versus 2. Future research should investigate whether disparities in reactions to evidence of confidence inflation persist among different racial groups. It was surprising that more evidence of the ingroup bias was not found, especially in light of previous research documenting the ingroup bias with Hispanics on some of the same dependent variables collected here (e.g., sentence length in Daudistel et al., 1999). The possibility that low statistical power accounts for these null results seems untenable given that there were 360 participants in a 12-group design. Instead, other explanations seem more plausible. For example, it is possible that null effects appeared here because the crime used (armed robbery) is not one that produces judgments that vary by race; effects of race can depend on crime type (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Other methodological differences between this study and previous research could also explain our null effects. For example, one previous study involving the ingroup bias examined the decisions made after real juries deliberated (Daudistel et al., 1999). Another study did not involve judicial decisions (Worthen et al., 2002) and a third manipulated Latino subgroups and found no ingroup bias for Latinos overall, only for participants' own subgroup (Huddy & Virtanen, 1995). In addition, the race manipulation used in Experiment 2 was not visual. Some research indicates that visually manipulating race leads to stronger biases than does manipulating race in written descriptions (Sweeney & Haney, 1992; see Wells & Windschitl, 1999, for methodological concerns related to manipulations of race). Finally, some researchers have argued that ingroup biases may not be observed in communities where the minority group is a numerical majority, as is the case in the southwestern city in which the data in Experiment 2 were collected (e.g., Perez et al., 1993). Given the existence of the ingroup bias among some research populations and not others, it is important for future research to clarify the circumstances under which the bias will be observed among Hispanic participants in the context of legal judgments.

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

383

There were two significanteffects of the manipulationcheck dependent measuresin Experiment As in Experiment1, participants the controlconditionchose 2. in each option equallyfrequentlywhen they were instructedto indicatehow confident the witness was at the trial comparedto before the trial. Most participantsin the mere inflationand inflation+ challengeconditionscorrectlyselected the response indicatingthat the witnesswas less confidentbefore the trialthanshe was at the trial. Also in Experiment2, participants the inflation+ challenge condition rated the in in eyewitnessas less confidentat the time of the trialthan did participants the mere inflationor control conditions.This was unexpectedbecause all participants read a in in at transcript whichthe witnessreportedbeing "positive" her identification trial. It is not clear why the manipulation checks did not producethe expected patternof results.However, the resultsfrom the manipulationcheck items are consistentwith the failureof the confidenceinflationmanipulation, replicatefromExperiment1. to

GENERAL DISCUSSION Two studies investigated perceptions of eyewitness confidence inflation evidence.Experiment1 demonstrated thatjudgmentsrelatedto criminaltrialare most favorableto the defense in the absence of evidence of eyewitness confidenceinflation. The favorabilityof certainjudgmentsdecreasedwhen evidence of confidence inflationwas present.However,it was not until confidenceinflationwas challenged by the defense attorneythatassessmentsof the defendant'sguiltandthe eyewitness's were affected.Experiment2 demonstrated that sensitivityto confidenceinaccuracy flationdoes not interactwith either race of the defendantor race of the eyewitness. Because the effect of confidenceinflationfound in Experiment1 did not replicatein the Experiment2, cautionmustbe used in interpreting effect of confidenceinflation evidence amongHispanicpopulation. In the presentresearch,participants were askedto respondto a varietyof questions on the basis of eyewitness evidence presentedin a trial.However, askingeyewitnessesthemselvesto reportanythingthat mighthave influencedtheirconfidence is a poor alternativeto havinga confidencereporton recordfor at least two reasons. feedback effect has demonstratedthat parFirst,researchon the postidentification ticipantsare unable to reliablyreporton variablesthat might have influencedtheir confidencereport;participantswho acknowledgethat feedback might have influenced them producereportsthat arejust as inflatedas do participants who deny that feedbackinfluencedthem (Wells& Bradfield,1998).Second,people are notoriously unable to accuratelyreporton variablesthat affect their behavioror attitudes (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Therefore,the best source of informationabout what an eyewitness experiencedat the time of an identificationis a written or videotaped record.
It will be important to examine whether people evaluating the credibility of eyewitnesses are sensitive to inflations in reports other than confidence. For example, postidentification feedback inflates participants' reports of the extent to which the culprit's face "popped out" at them from the photospread (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).

384

Bradfield and McQuiston

This result is particularly troubling given that this very report has been used successfully to distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Dunning and Stern (1994) found that eyewitnesses who endorsed automatic recognition processes (e.g., "His face just popped out at me") were more likely to be accurate than were eyewitnesses who endorsed a process of elimination strategy (e.g., "I compared the photos to each other in order to narrow the choices."). These strategies are also intuitively appealing; participants demonstrated some understanding that automatic recognition processes would be associated with accuracy more than would process of elimination strategies (Dunning & Stern, 1994). Would people evaluating eyewitnesses appropriately disregard reports of "pop out" after learning of postidentification feedback? The breadth of people's sensitivity to inflated eyewitness reports is unclear at this point, but important to pursue. Other elements of actual criminal trials present three interesting avenues for future research. First, jury deliberations are a critical component of actual court cases (e.g., Bernard, 1979). Some research indicates that deliberations help to reduce bias among White jurors (Shaw & Skolnick, 1995; Sommers, 2002). Would mere inflation be a point of conversation among jurors during deliberation? Second, actual trials include more information than testimony from one witness. Would the effect of confidence inflation be muted when it is embedded in a longer trial? How would jurors evaluate multiple witnesses who have varying levels of confidence in their identification? Finally,judicial instructions were not included in this research. Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) found that instructions to be "free from sympathy or prejudice" mitigated a previously observed racial bias in White participants. Importantly, neither incomprehensible instructions (Lynch & Haney, 2000) nor prohibitive ones (Shaw & Skolnick, 1995) are effective in mitigating bias. Could instructions be designed to sensitize participants to mere inflation? It is clear from the experiments reported here that White participants' evaluations are sensitive to evidence of confidence inflation. However, evidence of confidence inflation only produced changes in assessments of the defendant's culpability and the eyewitness's accuracy when the eyewitness was aggressively challenged by the defense attorney. We suggest that Experiment 1 provides additional support for the recommendation that confidence reports be collected at the time of an identification (e.g., Bradfield et al., 2002). In addition, because the pattern of confidence inflation results did not replicate with Hispanic participants, Experiment 2 argues for the increased use of Hispanic participants in research to understand how their approach to evidence in a criminal trial is different from White participants and when the ingroup bias is relevant. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Tim Castor, Kim Gaitens, Jill Kopicki, Jessey Lacox, Libby McConnell, Julia Price, Tena Spitsberg, and Laura Zimmerman for assistance in data collection. We thank Luke Douglass, Michael Sargent, and Sam Sommers for their valuable comments on drafts of the manuscript. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

385

REFERENCES
Andrews, F. M. (1981). The influence of evidenciary [sic] and extraevidenciary [sic] factors on decisions in a simulated rape trial. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Colorado State University. Bailey, E L., & Rothblatt, H. B. (1985). Successful techniques for criminal trials. New York: Clark, Boardman & Callaghan. Berman, G. L., & Cutler, B. L. (1996). Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decision making. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(2), 170-177. Berman, G. L., Narby, D. J., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Effects of inconsistent eyewitness statements on mock-jurors' evaluations of the eyewitness, perceptions of defendant culpability and verdicts. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 79-88. Bernard, J. L. (1979). Interaction between the race of the defendant and that of jurors in determining verdicts. Law and Psychological Review, 5, 103-111. Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Billings, L. S. (1999). Black Sheep and expectancy violation: Integrating two models of social judgment. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(4), 523-542. Bradfield, A. L., & Wells, G. L. (2000). The perceived validity of eyewitness identification testimony: A test of the five Biggers criteria. Law and Human Behavior, 24(5), 581-594. Bradfield, A. L., Wells, G. L., & Olson, E. A. (2002). The damaging effect of confirming feedback on the relation between eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87(1), 112-120. Brewer, N., & Burke, A. (2002). Effects of testimonial inconsistencies and eyewitness confidence on mock-juror judgements. Law and Human Behavior, 26(3), 353-364. Brewer, N., Keast, A., & Rishworth, A. (2002). The confidence-accuracy relationship in eyewitness identification. The effects of reflection and disconfirmation on correlation and calibration. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8(1), 44-56. Brewer, N., Potter, R., Fisher, R. P., Bond, N., & Luszcz, M. A. (1999). Beliefs and data on the relationship between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13, 297313. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 E3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001). Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Dexter, H. R. (1990). Juror sensitivity to eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 14(2), 185-191. Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Stuve, T. E. (1988). Jury decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Law and Human Behavior, 12, 41-56. Daudistel, H. C., Hosch, H. M., Holmes, M. D., & Graves, J. B. (1999). Effects of defendant ethnicity on juries' dispositions of felony cases. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29(2), 317-336. Devine, P. G., Plant, E. A., Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., & Vance, S. L. (2002). The regulation of explicit and implicit race bias: The role of motivations to respond without prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(5), 835-848. Dovidio, J. E, Gaertner, S. L., Kawakami, K., & Hodson, G. (2002). Why can't we just get along? Interpersonal biases and interracial distrust. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 8(2), 88-102. Dunning, D., & Stern, L. B. (1994). Distinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitness identifications via inquiries about decision processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(5), 818835. Fein, S., Morgan, S. J., Norton, M. I., & Sommers, S. R. (1997). Hype and suspicion: The effects of pretrial publicity, race, and suspicion on jurors' verdicts. Journal of Social Issues, 53(3), 487-502. Fox, S. G., & Walters, H. A. (1986). The impact of general versus specific expert testimony and eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgement. Law and Human Behavior, 10(3), 215-228. Free again. (2001, January 16). Available from http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/dailynews/dnaco nvict010116.html Garrioch, L., & Brimacombe, C. A. E. (2001). Lineup administrators' expectations: Their impact on eyewitness confidence. Law and Human Behavior, 25(3), 299-315. Huddy, L., & Virtanen, S. (1995). Subgroup differentiation and subgroup bias among Latinos as a function of familiarity and positive distinctiveness. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 68(1), 97-108. Jones, M. (1997). Preventing the application of stereotypic biases in the courtroom: The role of detailed testimony. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27(20), 1767-1784. Kassin, S. M. (1998). Eyewitness identification procedures: The fifth rule. Law and Human Behavior, 22(6), 649-653. Kassin, S. M., & Barndollar, K. A. (1992). The psychology of eyewitness testimony: Comparison of experts and prospective jurors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22(16), 1241-1249.

386

Bradfield and McQuiston

Kassin, S. M., Tubb,V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the "General Acceptance" of eyewitness testimony research. American Psychologist, 56(5), 405-416. King, N. J. (1993). Postconvication review of jury discrimination: Measuring the effects of juror race on jury decisions. Michigan Law Review, 92, 63-130. Klein, K., & Creech, B. (1982). Race, rape and bias: Distortion of prior odds and meaning changes. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 3(1), 21-33. Leippe, M. R., Manion, A. P., & Romanczyk, A. (1992). Eyewitness persuasion: How and how well do fact finders judge the accuracy of adults' and children's memory reports? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(2), 181-197. Leippe, M. R., & Romanczyk, A. (1989). Reactions to child (versus adult) eyewitnesses: The influence of jurors' preconceptions and witness behavior. Law and Human Behavior, 13(2), 103-132. Lindsay, R. C. L., Lim, R., Marando, L., & Cully, D. (1986). Mock-juror evaluations of eyewitness testimony: A test of metamemory hypotheses. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16(5), 447-459. Lindsay, R. C. L., Wells, G. L., & Rumpel, C. M. (1981). Can people detect eyewitness-identification accuracy within and across situations? Journal of Applied Psychology, 66(1), 79-89. Luus, C. A. E., & Wells, G. L. (1994). The malleability of eyewitness confidence: Co-witness and perseverance effects. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79(5), 714-723. Lynch, M., & Haney, C. (2000). Discrimination and instructional comprehension: Guided discretion, racial bias, and the death penalty. Law and Human Behavior, 24(3), 337-358. Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J. (1988). The "Black Sheep Effect": Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 18(1), 1-16. Mazzella, R., & Feingold, A. (1994). The effects of physical attractiveness, race, socioeconomic status, and gender of defendants and victims on judgments of mock jurors: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24(15), 1315-1344. Missouri v. Huchting, 927 S.W.2d 411 (1996). Munoz, E. A., & Lopez, D. A. (1998). Misdemeanor sentencing decisions: The cumulative disadvantage effect of "Gringo Justice." Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 20(3), 298-220. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259. Perez, D. A., Hosch, H. M., Ponder, B., & Trejo, G. C. (1993). Ethnicity of defendants and jurors as influences on jury decisions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23(15), 1249-1262. Petty, R. E., Fleming, M. A., & White, P. H. (1999). Stigmatized sources and persuasion: Prejudice as a determinant of argument scrutiny. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(1), 19-34. Pfeifer, J. E., & Ogloff, J. R. P. (1991). Ambiguity and guilt determinations: A modern racism perspective. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21(21), 1713-1725. Rattner, A. (1988). Convicted but innocent: Wrongful conviction and the criminal justice system. Law and Human Behavior, 12(3), 283-293. Scheck, B., Neufeld, P., & Dwyer, J. (2001). Actual innocence: When justice goes wrong and how to make it right. New York: Signet. Shaw, J. I., & Skolnick, P. (1995). Effects of prohibitive and informative judicial instructions on jury decision-making. Social Behavior and Personality, 24(4), 319-326. Shaw, J. S., III, Kerr, T. K., & Woythaler, K. A. (2001). Public eyewitness confidence ratings can differ from those held privately. Law and Human Behavior, 25(2), 141-154. Sommers, S. R. (2002). Race and juries: The effects of race-salience and racial composition on individual and group decision-making. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan. Sommers, S. R., & Ellsworth, P C. (2000). Race in the courtroom: Perceptions of guilt and dispositional attributions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(11), 1367-1379. Spohn, C., & Holleran, D. (2000). The imprisonment penalty paid by young, unemployed Black and Hispanic male offenders. Criminology, 38, 281-306. Sporer, S. (1993). Eyewitness identification accuracy, confidence, and decision times in simultaneous and sequential lineups. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 22-33. Sporer, S., Penrod, S., Read, D., & Cutler, B. L. (1995). Choosing, confidence, and accuracy:A meta-analysis of the confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315-327. Steffensmeier, D., & DeMuth, S. (2000). Ethnicity and sentencing outcomes in U.S. federal courts: Who is punished more harshly? American Sociological Review, 65, 705-729. Sweeney, L. T., & Haney, C. (1992). The influence of race on sentencing: A meta-analytic review of experimental studies. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 10, 179-195. Tajfel, H. (1979). Individuals and groups in social psychology. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 18(2), 183-190.

Confidence Inflation in Eyewitnesses

387

Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149-178. Taylor, D. A., & Moriarty, B. E (1987). Ingroup bias as a function of competition and race. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31(1), 192-199. Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence. (1999). Eyewitness evidence: Aguide for law enforcement (NCJ 178240). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Thomson, E. (1997). Discrimination and the death penalty in Arizona. Criminal Justice Review, 22(1), 65-76. Turner,J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest in ingroup favouritism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 9(2), 187-204. United States Census Bureau. (2000). Projections of the resident population by race, Hispanic origin, and nativity: Middle series, 2001 to 2005 (NP-T5-B). Washington, DC: Author. United States v. Alan Quinones, 761 S.D.N.Y. 761 (2002). Available from http://www.lexisnexis.com/universe Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1998). "Good, you identified the suspect": Feedback to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(3), 360-376. Wells, G. L., & Bradfield, A. L. (1999). Distortions in eyewitnesses' recollections: Can the postidentification feedback effect be moderated? Psychological Science, 10, 138-144. Wells, G. L., Ferguson, T. J., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (1981). The tractability of eyewitness confidence and its implications for triers of fact. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66(6), 688-696. Wells, G. L., & Leippe, M. R. (1981). How do triers of fact infer the accuracy of eyewitness identifications? Using memory for peripheral detail can be misleading. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 66(6), 682-687. Wells, G. L., Lindsay, R. C. L., & Ferguson, T J. (1979). Accuracy, confidence, and juror perceptions in eyewitness identification. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64(4), 440-448. Wells, G. L., Olson, E. A., & Charman, S. D. (2002). The confidence of eyewitnesses in their identifications from lineups. Psychological Science, 11(5), 151-154. Wells, G. L., Olson, E. A., & Charman, S. D. (2003). Distorted retrospective eyewitness reports as functions of feedback and delay. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9(1), 42-52. Wells, G. L., & Windschitl, P. D. (1999). Stimulus sampling and social psychological experimentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(9), 1115-1125. White, P. H., & Harkins, S. G. (1994). Race of source effects in the elaboration likelihood model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(5), 790-807. Whitley, B. E., & Greenberg, M. S. (1986). The role of eyewitness confidence in juror perceptions of credibility. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 16(5), 387-409. Wiley, D. C. (2001). Black and White differences in the perception of justice. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 19, 649-655. Worthen, J. B., McGlynn, R. P., Solis, L. Y., & Coats, S. (2002). Proximity attitudes toward objects and people: Reference to a category and a self-representation? American Journal of Psychology, 115(2), 233-250.