Issue Brief

Non-Alignment Movement Summit at Tehran and Future Arab Politics

Dr. Zakir Hussain Introduction The Islamic Republic of Iran has claimed that the 16th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit held at Tehran from August 26-31, 2012 has been a memorable occasion next only to the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The representatives of 120 countries, including UN gathered at Tehran1 despite the U.S.-Israeli insistence to boycott the venue, has indeed broken Tehrans three decade long international isolation. Iran got a rare and bigger opportunity 2to host such a large summit and utilise it to showcase its own side of arguments/explanations of nuclear controversy, locus standi of the U.S.-E.U. unilateral sanctions and the cascading impact of their policy of intimidation and intervention on the Iranian economy, society and polity. The NAM Summit provided an opportunity to Iran to directly present the baseless allegations3 against its peaceful nuclear programme as well as to highlight the alleged complicity of Israel in the assassinations of its four nuclear scientists.4 Irans Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told NAM delegates I insist that the Islamic Republic of Iran is never seeking nuclear weapons5 and decreed (issued Fatwah)6 earlier that acquiring nuclear weapons were un-Islamic and a sin7 and Iran has no intention of acquiring them.8 However, the Supreme Leader asserted that Iran would never give up the right to peaceful nuclear energy.9 Iran contends that the U.N. Security Council resolutions are invalid because Iran has signed the NPT that entitles it to enrich and reprocess spent fuels for peaceful purposes.10 Iran puts forward two main arguments for going nuclear. First, to meet its increasingly growing domestic energy requirements Iran needs to supplement hydrocarbons by promoting the use of alternative energy sources like solar and nuclear. Irans domestic energy consumption is growing at a fast rate of five-six per cent per annum11 and 99 per cent is met from hydrocarbon sources. Iran, on an average, consumes more than 45 per cent12 of the total oil it produces, leaving little scope for the government to increase export and finance growing

developmental and diversification programmes. Second, Iran needs nuclear expertise for research and health purposes. It argues that the country requires a large number of nuclear isotopes to diagnose and treat its more than 8, 50,000 cancer patients.13 NAM, Sanctions and Iran The NAM platform has also provided an opportunity to Tehran to communicate the debilitating impact of the series of the protracted unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S.-West, including the infamous Iran Threat Reduction Act (December 2011), targeting the Central Bank and oil industry. Oil plays crucial in sustaining and propelling the rentier economy of Iran. Still the Iranian economy depends on oil revenue for 58 percent of export commodities, twothird of the countrys hardcurrency earnings, and 40-50 percent of government revenue.14 Indeed, the protracted sanctions and embargoes have severely pared Irans economic capacity. This has been acknowledged by both the Iranian Supreme Leader and the President. In a statement Ahmadinejad said the enemy is putting great pressure on the country and has fostered difficult conditions and urged the government to save money to deal [with] the problem.15 During these years the rates of inflation (more than 30%), trade balance (annual income dropped 50 % around $50 billion) and unemployment (20%) have significantly been affected ;1 paucity of funds for carrying out developmental and human resource development programmes, including education, training and skill upgradation, has also significantly been compromised in the country. Sanctions imposed on the Iranian Central Bank and oil industry is creating its own cascading effects. This has eroded governments ability to manage internal as well as external economic activities, including the Balance of Trade (BOT) and currency stabilisation. This has frankly been acknowledged by the Iranian President Ahmedinejad, Our banks cannot make international transactions anyone.
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In

the last couple of years, the market value of the Iranian rial vis-a-vis dollar has declined to approximately 140 percent, from 11,000 rial to 24,000 rial a dollar. Depreciation of the Iranian rial has made import extremely costlier, leaving little room for the government to handle developmental and diversification programmes. Consequently, government has failed to generate adequate employment opportunities, which is adding fuel to the restive Iranian youth. In Iran
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Roxane Farmanfarmanian, Iran's strategy under new sanctions 10 August 2012, Al Jazeerah and Agency, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/08/201288142724224103.html

almost three-fourth of the total population i.e. around 76 million, are below 33 years. 17

Select Macro Indicators of the Iranian Economy

Indicators Population Per Capita Income (US$) GDP Growth (%) Inflation (%) Unemployment (%) Gross National Expenditure (% GDP) Whole Sales Price Index 2003 67.2 1732.1 7.5 14.3 12.8 96.2 71.5 2004 68.1 1989.5 7.1 16.5 -98.5 79.0 2005 68.9 2369. 3 5.1 14.8 10.3 96.9 89.0 2006 69.7 2753. 6 4.6 13.4 12.1 91.6 100.0 2007 70.6 3157.7 5.9 11.9 -92.0 109.2 2008 71.4 4004.4 7.8 17.2 10.6 89.4 126.2 2009 72.3 4678.2 2.3 25.5 10.5 -71.5

Data source: World Bank website. Undoubtedly, sanctions have precipitated the exiting state of Iranian society, economy and polity into a grim situation. This might be chilling the spines of the Ayatollahs as the country might steam another potential revolution, if the twin phenomena of economic hardship and international isolationism continue. It may also be construed that triggering off another revolution, which could potentially overthrow the Ayatollahs, seems to be the ultimate U.S. policy agenda of the protracted sanctions on Iran. In the last Iranian Presidential election (2009), the popular Green Movement, although was suppressed, is seen by many as the beginning of the end of Ayatollahs hold on power. The controversial election results forced the youth to chant death of dictator and even death of Khamenei. Even once respectful subordinates, including reformist leaders like Mohammad Khatami, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, were found openly defying Khemenei. 18 Egypt at Tehran Summit Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi paid a visit to Tehran to apparently hand over the baton of NAM to his successor Ahmadinejad, but his address from the NAM platform revealed the future domestic and foreign policy direction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is believed that the NAM summit at Tehran provided an historic opportunity to both the countries, Egypt and Iran, to end their three decade old diplomatic logjams.19 It seemed that Iran's leaders also

relished the opportunity to demonstrate progress in overcoming its isolation in the Arab world and to gain some democratic and revolutionary legitimacy by proxy.20 As it appears both the countries need each other to share and shape some of the emergent regional and domestic issues. Their alliance also seems to be forged on common imperatives such as drawing motivations from the same ideological visions, that Iran terms as Islamic Awakening and their respective democratic support-base at home. Both the countries perhaps need to satisfy the aspirations of the people on the Arab street, amplify their support, may be symbolic, to the Palestinian cause as well as checkmate the strategic weight of Israel, besides solving the Syrian crisis and indigenising the regional security architecture. However, the political viewpoint, which President Morsi shared from the NAM platform, sitting beside his Iranian counterpart, indicates that Iran, of course, got Egypt but as a half friend. If Morsi sent a positive signal towards Iran by visiting and sharing the dais with Ahmadinejad and earlier letting Iranian naval ships pass through the Suez Canal ever since the World War II, which Israels foreign minister Avigdor Liebermar, described as provocation21, he also signalled an altogether different political tone and temper of the future Egyptian foreign policy, including future MBs strategic alignments. Morsis stance on Syria appeared quite depressing, perhaps unexpected, for the Islamic Republic. He announced from the NAM platform, Our solidarity with the struggle of the Syrian people against an oppressive regime that has lost its legitimacy is an ethical duty as it is a political and strategic necessity22 and I am here to announce our full and just support for a free, independent Syria that supports a transition into a democratic system and that respects the will of the Syrian people for freedom and equality at the same time, preventing Syria from going into civil war or going into sectarian divisions.,23 Seemingly, through the NAM Summit the Muslim Brotherhood (MBH) tried to obtain two major policy objectives. First, by supporting the anti-Assad forces in Syria, he tried to win over the Riyadh-Doha-Washington axis. The main policy intent of the Egyptian President can be interpreted as to obtain economic blessings from the cash-rich Gulf monarchies on one hand and signal a positive note to the U.S. that the current government in Egypt is not altogether opposed to Washington. In fact, Morsi tried to convey that under the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) Egypt means business; Egypt needs active economic assistance from all around the world in general and the U.S. in particular,

besides the cash-rich Arab countries. Indeed the FJP got an economically bankrupt, socially chaotic, religiously divided and politically moribund Egypt. The FJP won the presidential election by a narrow margin of less than three per cent of votes against Ahmed Shafiq, Prime Minister of the erstwhile Hosni Mubarak regime. Consequently, the domestic circumstances have forced President Morsi to balance the countrys economic realism on one hand and the political ambitions of the parent MB on the other. Morsi utilised the NAM summit to succinctly convey that Egypt was ready to align with the traditional and new players without any hangover. Morsis intentions are matched by his recent political activities, including the foreign visits. Despite knowing the fact that Saudi King Abdullah not only opposed the MBHs struggle for democracy in Egypt but also pressurised the U.S. to remain loyal to Hosni Mubarak, Morsi chose Saudi Arabia as the first country of his foreign visit. Morsi was also found hobnobbing with Arab sheikhs during the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit at Makkah.24 In a larger geo-strategic perspective, Morsis siding with Riyadh-DohaWashington axis at the NAM summit also hints that the MBH is interested in improving its mutually suspicious relations with the US. However, at the same time by referring to the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people without referring to the two-state solution and equating Palestinian with the Syrians struggling for independence25 Morsi has amply indicated that the FJP is not interested in restoring the entire gamut of relationship with Israel, little to say, of the 1979 Agreement. The US may also acknowledge the fact that politically the MBH would not be in a position to justify and adjust its diplomatic relations with Israel, particularly in the eyes of its own followers in such a short span of time. There are two reasons to believe in this hypothesis. First, the current MBH regime in Egypt cant afford to lose $1.3 billion annual economic aid from the US.26 To continue the aid flow, the FJP needs to concede the US with a fresh mindset. For this Morsi has justify the domestic supporters at home. In this direction, he may possibly attempt to counterbalance the US against Israel. Consequently, the MBH would never give Israel the same status and privileges once it enjoyed during the Mubarak era, at least in the foreseeable future. This may frustrate Israel as so far it has also not been able to get any firm assurance from the US on Irans nuclear issue. Israels impatience may spoil Obamas

election game plan. As a result of these possible outcomes, the situation in West Asia may really become explosive even before the results of the US elections are declared and the new administration at the White House may be forced to start with a new troublesome Middle East. Second, by announcing that ousting the minority Allawite regime in Syria from the power as ethical duty... [and] a political necessity, Morsi purported the larger political agenda of the FJP in the Arab world and beyond. Morsis vocal support to the struggling opposition groups in Syria carries two likely intensions. One, Morsi wants to convey that the MBH is supportive of democratic ethos and wishes the majority to form the government in Syria and in other countries. Second, it shows that Morsi is also quite aware of the fact that the variants of the MBH are the major political contestants in different Arab countries passing through democratic upsurge. Looking at future dynamics in the region, Morsi has cast the die in Tehran and tried to woo the struggling democratic forces against the collapsing regimes. This will definitely give the MBH a strategic depth in the region and presumably, the FJP views Egypt to assume the role of Umm al-Dunya (Mother of the World) and once again desires to turn the Arab leadership in its favour. Syrias Fate NAM vs. OIC On the Syrian front, the NAM summit proved for both, Iran and the Assad regime, a misfortune event. Although Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, tried to mobilise the NAM gathering, neither could he convince nor garner any sympathy for the battling Assad regime. Instead, the Egyptian President roiled the Iranian occasion by evoking ethical and political and strategic necessity to support the rebels, forcing the Syrian envoy to walkout from the summit. In fact, the destiny of the minority Allawite regime in Syria had already been decided in the extraordinary OIC summit that was held 15 days ahead of the NAM summit at Makkah on August 14-15, 2012. Indeed, the Makkah Summit was purposely convened by the Riyadh-Doha axis with Washingtons blessings, to achieve twin objectives and apparently both went in favour of the Saudi-led coalition. First, to tone down the Syrian issue to such an extent that it fails to get any serious attention at the NAM forum. They expelled Syria from the OIC. Although expulsion of any member country on such a flimsy ground is against the

very charter of the OIC, no country objected the move except Iran and Algeria and that too went unheeded. This pre-emptive move at the OIC possibly made Syria a non-starter at the NAM summit. As a result, despite Ayatollah Khamenies vehement opposition to the foreign intervention in Syria, nothing substantial could be achieved. The second objective of the Makkah summit seems to discredit and expose the hollowness of Irans claims of leadership of the Muslim world. The silence of the OIC members against the unlawful expulsion of Syria also showcased the degree of Irans growing trust deficit among the Muslim countries; hence, bringing the Islamic Republics leadership claims under question.

Indias Stand at NAM The only country which was the star performer27 at Tehran was India. Although the Indian media reported that New Delhi was ambushed at Tehran, referring to the unscheduled programme where Ahmadinejad shared the dais with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the NAM summit provided India an opportunity to cogently put forth its policy stand on several vexed issues, including Syria and Irans controversial nuclear programme. India reiterated its policy stand on Syria of non-intervention and internal solution as the only viable, acceptable and longlasting solution to the ongoing Syrian imbroglio. On the Iranian nuclear issue, India clearly reinforced the relevance of the international bodies like the U.N. and the I.A.E.A. and suggested that Iran resolve its problems through these mechanisms. India categorically discarded the notion and the scope of imposing unilateral sanctions in a globalising interdependent world. However, the NAM Summit also put India into a tough act of balancing its national interest, between the U.S. and Iran on one hand and between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the other. Indias stakes on Iran and Saudi Arabia are well known. India needs the Riyadh-Arab League axis for energy, remittances, trade and strategic depth purposes, while Tehran is needed for Indias geo-strategic-transnationalcorridor and energy purposes,28 besides being partners locked-in a deep historicalcultural relationship since the time of valley civilisations.

Regarding Iran versus the U.S., indeed the NAM Summit put India into a tough position. India ignored the advice of the U.S. not to attend the Tehran summit and by sharing the dais with Ahmadinejad it also gave the world a sense that Iran is not alone. However, the results of these two acts are not known as no perceptible reaction from Washington has been received yet. Irans Report card at NAM The positive side of the Tehran Summit although has offered Iran the much needed platform to project its cause directly, the grey side is quite dismissive of its achievements. It questions the very relevance of the NAM in the post-Cold War era itself.29 The bonhomie at Tehran, as they argue, will not deliver Iran anything concrete and significant except feel good factor; the Islamic Republic would struggle with the same old issues once the bonhomie of NAM evaporates. Nevertheless, everything will not evaporate so soon and fast as claimed by the NAM pessimists. NAM has not lost its relevance, particularly in the age of boundary-less media warfare, where world opinions for war are formulated, mobilised on doubtful pretexts in the air. NAM provides a global forum, second largest to the U.N., to its member-countries to directly communicate their side of arguments to the representatives of more than half of the globes population. The NAM forum is indeed, free, organic and still expanding, has all the potentials to emerge as a likely precursor of global parliament, with peace, negotiation and consensus rather than intervention and intimidation as means to address and resolve the post-Cold War disorders. The Tehran Summit will not only set NAMs future tone and tenor but also help it to counter the unjustified tools of isolationism and unilateralism imposed by select group of countries of the world. Dr. Zakir Hussain is a Research fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs. ***

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However, only 28 heads of states attended the opening ceremony. On 09-11 December 1997, Iran hosted the 11th summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation at Tehran. Delegates and representatives of 55 nations gathered at Tehran. The Summit was addressed by the Rahbar Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. 3 Sanctions have not hindered Irans nuclear program: IAEA envoy, Tehran Times, 2 September 2012, http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/101112-sanctions-have-not-hindered-irans-nuclear-program-iaea-envoy, 4 Israel is widely accused of preventing nuclear proliferation by killing the nuclear scientists and attacking and destroying the locations suspected for nuclear developments in the West Asian countries. In 1981, Israel bombed French-built Iraqi nuclear establishment at Osirak. In 2007, again Israel bombed the building in Syria suspected of developing nuclear devices. Similarly, Iran claims its four nuclear scientists have been killed by Israel. 5 Morsi criticises Syria at Tehran meeting, 30 August 2012, Al Jazeera and Agencies, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128308579560767.html 6 Vilayat-a-Faqi embodies the Iranian Supreme Leader both spiritual and political authorities. He can issue fatwah (religious decree) and statuary order. On nuclear issue he used his authority to convey Irans stand. 7 Rick Gladstone Iranian Says Nuclear Talks Have Reached Critical Point, 29 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/middleeast/irans-un-envoy-denouncing-sanctions-says-nuclear-talks-are-atcritical-point.html 8 In 2003, for the first time Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proclaimed that nuclear weapons were un-Islamic and since then has repeated this numerous times. Mike Shuster, Iran's Nuclear Fatwa: A Policy Or A Ploy?, 14 June 2012, http://m.npr.org/story/154915222 9 Morsi criticises Syria at Tehran meeting, 30 August 2012, Al Jazeera and Agencies, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128308579560767.html. 10 Rick Gladstone Iranian Says Nuclear Talks Have Reached Critical Point 29 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/middleeast/irans-un-envoy-denouncing-sanctions-says-nuclear-talks-are-atcritical-point.html 11 Several factors such as lavish subsidy, high energy intensity, inefficient energy saving technologies, living style and less care towards energy saving have contributed to the growth energy consumption invariably in all the energy rich countries, including Iran in the region. Iran consumes approximately 45 percent of its total oil production. This leaves little scope to increase oil export as Iranian oil industry is facing sanctions. 12 Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012, Organisation Petroleum Exporting Countries.

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Nuclear standoff could hurt Iran's cancer patients The National, 18 November 18, 2010 http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/nuclear-standoff-could-hurt-irans-cancer-patients 14 Ellen Lust (2011) The Middle East, CQ Press, Washington. 15 Iran's Khamenei: Reliance on Oil Sales a trap", 30 July 2012, The Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/30/us-iran-oil-khamenei-idUSBRE86T06420120730. 16 Thomas Erdbrink Ahmadinejad admits impact of sanctions on Iran, November 1, 2011, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ahmadinejad-admits-impact-of-sanctions-oniran/2011/11/01/gIQAvBIacM_story.html 17 Karim Sadjapour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington,2009. 18 Karim Sadjapour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Irans Most Powerful Leader, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington,2009. 19 The Islamic Republic severed its all diplomatic s ties with Egypt ever since the late Sadat offered the late Shah haven to pass his final days in peace. Hamid Dabashi Morsi in Tehran: Crossing the boundaries, 5 September 2012, Al Jazeera and Agencies, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/20129375930824837.html 20 Geneive Abdo Iran Spins Morsi Visit, 31 August 2012, Middle East Institute, Washington, http://www.mei.edu/content/iran-spins-Morsi-visit 21 On 11 February 2012, the Egyptian authorities approved the passage of two Iranian ships, 15,00-tonnes Alvand, a patrol frigate, and 33,000-tonnes Kharg, a supply ship, to pass through the Suez Canal. Since the Islamic Revolution 1979, this was the first occasion that the Iranian ships crossed the canal. Israel has taken this as a grave view and an act of provocation from the Iranian side. Basically, the passage of the ships indicates more of improving relationship between Iran and Egypt than anything else significant and this might have alarmed the Israelis.. Iranian navy ships exit Suez canal, The Al Jazeerah and Agency, 22 February 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201122244215758692.html

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Selected Excerpts of Morsis Speech, 30 August 2012, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/world/middleeast/selected-excerpts-of-president-mohamed-Morsis-speech.html? _r=1&pagewanted=all 23 Geneive Abdo Iran Spins Morsi Visit, 31 August 2012, Middle East Institute, Washington, http://www.mei.edu/content/iran-spins-Morsi-visit 24 Morsis landing at Beijing before he landed at Tehran can also be interpreted as carrying both economic and political significance. Economically, Morsi in China is seen as seeking the Chinese assistance to strengthen the Egyptian economy. Politically, Morsi is seen as developing alternative alliance with Beijing away from Washington. 25 Morsi sparks controversy with anti-Assad comments in Tehran, Alahramonline.com, 30 August 2012.http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentPrint/1/0/51612/Egypt/0/Morsi-sparks-controversy-with-antiAssadcomments-i.aspx 26 Since Israel and Egypt concluded the Camp David Agreement in 1979, US is giving $1.3 billion aid to Egypt for military modernization annually. However, since the MBH backed FJP came to power speculation is rife that in case of nonabidance to the 1979 Agreement the US would most likely cut the aid. Looking at the current state of economy, Egypt can hardly afford to lose this huge sum. In fact, the entire existence of the FJP depends upon its economic performances. Bread, job and economic equality were the initial slogans that led the common Egyptians to fight against the plutocracy bulwarked by the Mubarak regime. 27 Indrani Bagchi, PM Manmohan Singh took NAM centre stage, 2 September 2012, The Times of India,http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-09-02/india/33547918_1_Morsi-nam-summit-mahmoud-ahmedinejad 28 Zakir Hussain, Iran Crisis and Indias Policy Predicaments, Viewpoint, 17 February 2012, Indian Council of World Affairs, http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/VBIndiaIran.pdf 29 Responding to the question of the significance of NAM Summit going on in Tehran, C. Raja Mohan during his first Sapru House lecture on India and the Great Powers: Managing Strategic Triangles, at Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, on 31 August 2012, argued that NAM has no relevance in the post-cold war era- Who remembers what happened in the last NAM Summit held at Sharmal al-Sheikh, Egypt.