LICHAUCO & COMPANY., petitioner, Vs.

SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondents Facts Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. The petitioner asseted that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code (amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from phom-pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippin Islands and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions. Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6 Issue Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum? Held Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency and not inconsistent with Section 1762. Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction. Dispo We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.