TEN MEMO-WRITING PRINCIPLES 1. KNOW YOURSELF. In particular, know your own writing protocols.

How you should write, as well as how you actually do write. You almost certainly write, then go back-and-forth to revise earlier portions based on what you subsequently think and write. KNOW WHERE YOURE GOING. Know your reader, your message, your purpose. Is the reader truly uninformed, and just wants you to do his/her thinking about the issue? Does the reader already have an opinion or political position on the issue? KNOW HOW TO GET THERE: With accuracy, clarity, concision, and logical coherence. Use mostly short, declarative sentences. Avoid the passive voice. Consider using factual bullets to support your case. Use caveats to clarify what you know and to indicate degrees of uncertainty. PREWRITING PROTOCOL to organize your thinking into writing. made visible. Writing is thinking

2.

3.

4. 5.

DRAFTING PROTOCOL that focuses on getting the architecture right. Is it appropriate for you to include your own recommendations? Should you take the tone of a dispassionate observer? An advocate? Should you anticipate and answer in advance the readers likely questions? Does the reader have a hidden agenda in tasking you for the memo? Will you be a fall-guy? Good writing happens in REVISION (after revision after revision). TOPIC SENTENCES ATOP INVERTED PYRAMIDS. Put the central theme at the top, and use the remaining paragraphs to support the theme. APPROPRIATE WHITE SPACES. These separate paragraphs, thoughts, and invite the readers eyes to continue down the page. READ OUT LOUD TO CHECK FOR GRAMMAR AND STYLE. If it sounds awkward when you read it aloud, then it is awkward and should be revised.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. PREVENT THE READER FROM QUITTING. Maintain the logical flow and eliminate unnecessary verbiage to hold the readers interest.

WRITING AN INTELLIGENCE MEMO FOR A POLICYMAKER/PRESENTING A BRIEFING 1. Narrow Policy Question: The policymaker asked you to research and present your conclusions on a narrowly-defined policy question. The policymaker wants you to do most or all of his thinking for him, not present him with the facts and a range of possible choices. The policymaker normally needs the memo, sometimes quickly, to prepare for a decisionmaking meeting with others. You will not attend the meeting, so you must prepare the policymaker with clear facts and analysis. 2. Contract with the Policymaker: The subject line is a contract between you and the policymaker. The subject line should contain the answer to the narrow policy question, for example Is the conflict in Iraq truly a civil war?: If It Walks Like A Duck 3. Shorter is Better: The memo should be 2 5 pages long, and two or three pages are better than five. The policymaker wants to read only the facts, informed assessment, and analysis that lead you to the conclusions. The memo should be your thinking made visible on the written page. Caveats: Caveats can give the reader a clearer sense of the analysts judgements in the following ways. -- Caveats can indicate your degree of uncertainty: Qualifiers such as almost certainly, likely, probably, possibly, or conceivably, while difficult to define in terms of statistical probability, can give the reader an idea of the analysts degree of uncertainty. These caveats, although vague and subjective, are particularly useful for policymakers who have to rank-order possible outcomes to make the best possible decision. -- Low probability/high impact events: Occasionally the analyst needs to mention to policymakers a conceivable outcome that the analyst judges to be of low probability but which, if it happens, has such a high impact that the analyst feels the policymaker should bear it in mind. A standard caveat in this case is we cannot rule out the possibility that Ahmadinejad may decide to . -- Be sure to give the reader an idea of the factual basis for your caveats: Based on a body of intelligence reporting, we are confident that or Iranian President Ahmadinejads recent speeches to the Iranian Majlis tend to confirm our judgement that he plans to -- Caveats can signal to the reader the quality of the information used in the assessment: Use caveats to clearly signal what you know with certainty from information which is somewhat credible, but in which you have less confidence: At the high end of the reliability scale are caveats such as A significant body of reporting over time from reliable sources and trusted foreign liaison services indicates that or Iranian President Ahmadinejad has repeatedly told several of his confidants privately that or Based on fragmentary reporting from third-country diplomats sympathetic to the U.S. who discussed the topic directly with President Ahmadinejad . At the lower end of the reliability spectrum are caveats such as, Based on limited reporting from a new source with unproven access to the information, or A proven source, much of whose past reporting has been confirmed, reported second-hand information from an identified subsource of unknown reliability that, down to An anonymous letter from an unknown person mailed to our Embassy in Beirut alleged that. -- Caveats can tell policymakers to expect a future update: Pending the results of the upcoming Iranian mid-term parliamentary elections, we judge that Ahmadinejad likely will or If, as we expect, Iranian Supreme Leader Khameini delivers a public rebuke to Ahmadinejad on this issue, it will strengthen the hand of reformist politicians to. -- Caveats can highlight signs of policy failure or policy opportunities: One of the most sensitive and difficult occasional tasks of an analyst is to report to policymakers that U.S. policy appears to be failing to achieve its objectives. A caveat to signal this unwelcome bit of news might typically be, The implication of our assessment of Ahmadinejads reactions to the recent U.S. Presidents public statements may well signal a failure of our policys objectives to rein in Ahmadinejads tendency to . On the positive side, analysts may want to flag a foreign policy opportunity with a caveat such

4.

as Our assessment of Ahmadinejads recent willingness to openly discuss with Western leaders his future plans raises the possibility of fruitful private discussion between Ahmadinejad and an appropriate senior U.S. official. Be careful, though, not to prescribe a course of action; this is the role of policymakers, and the analyst risks contaminating analysis with political considerations.

5.

More typical caveats and their definitions from the 3 Dec 07 NIE on Irans Nuclear Weapons Program (view at http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf): What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimateand probabilistic terms such as probably and likelyto convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have proof that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues. In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often conveys 1) our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we ascribe to the judgment. Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to reflect the Communitys estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance. The terms unlikely and remote indicate a less then even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. Terms such as might or may reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, we cannot rule out, or we cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to our assessments, as follows: High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A high confidence judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong. Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Low confidence generally means that the informations credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources.

6.

Lead Paragraph: Include in the lead paragraph the answer to the narrow policy question, as well as a brief summary of the supporting facts. This way, if the busy policymaker reads only one paragraph then he will see the essence of the memo. If the policymaker wants to show it to his even busier boss such as the President then all he has to do is to cut out the first paragraph. Conversely, if the policymaker wants to present an expanded version to a wider group, such as all U.S. ambassadors in the Middle East, then you can quickly and easily expand the memo to suit the ambassadors need for more details.

7.

Anticipate and answer policymaker questions: Put yourself into the role of the policymaker reader of your memo. Anticipate the additional questions that your memo will raise in the mind of the reader. Answer the questions in the memo before the reader has a chance to ask them, and it will give additional credence to your conclusions. Fail to anticipate and answer the additional questions, and it may make the reader wonder how you could miss obvious and logical follow-on questions.

8.

Analytical Value-added in response to policymaker needs: The policymaker may know as much about the topic as you do, may have more foreign affairs experience than you do, and may even know personally the foreign leaders you write about. In that case you must adjust your writing style and level of detail to what he wants and needs. Normally, the most important task of your memo is to clarify in the policymakers mind the narrowlydefined issue, your conclusion, and the supporting facts and analysis. You are preparing the policymaker with a concise set of facts and analysis in bullet format. One of the biggest values that a good analyst brings to policymakers is to provide an assessment that goes prudently beyond what the analyst can support with the facts alone. The policymakers normally have access to the same facts and intelligence reporting as the analyst. What the analyst has, though, that policymakers usually do not have is the time and skill to review all relevant information, analyze, and then carefully construct a logical, plausible, persuasive assessment in response to the narrowly-defined policymaker question.

9.

Short Oral Briefing: Your briefing should last no more than three minutes, and should review only the main points that the policymaker must keep in mind to discuss the conclusion clearly during his upcoming decision-making meeting. This is the policymakers chance to ask you questions to clarify the bullets in his own mind, so that he can discuss them with confidence and clarity at the policy meeting.

10. Remember: Your success is measured by the clarity and confidence with which the policymaker understands and can discuss the points in your memo in a decision-making meeting.

Real-Life Example:

Bin Ladin Determined to Strike at the U.S.

Declassifed Presidential Daily Briefing for 6 Aug 01

(view at http://www.cnn.com/2004/images/04/10/whitehouse.pdf).

Read carefully this now-famous intelligence assessment and then note the following elements described above:

Subject line, Bin Ladin Determined to Strike the U.S., foreshadows the answer to a narrow policymaker question on the degree of threat from Osama Bin Ladin.

The lead paragraph, with only two sentences, sums up the implications of the rest of the memo.

The length of the piece is less than two pages, with plenty of white space between sections to draw the eye down the page and to emphasize the most important details of the assessment.

Caveats indicate degrees of uncertainty in the facts and assessments, and indicates the facts on which the writer bases the caveats: The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike; Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation; We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting.

The memo anticipates and answers policymaker questions: Al-Qaida members including some who are U.S. citizens have resided in or traveled to the US for years.

Analytical added value that goes prudently beyond available facts: Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded [as of the 6 Aug 01 date of the memo], his attacks against US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.

BAD MEMO

To: From: Subject:

Assistent Secretary for Political Reconstruction Joe Finarkie, Strategic Analysis Unit The Situation in Iraq

1. The Iraq conflict is a civil war, period. The SAI reached this conclusion by examing all the evidence and consulting with senior analysts and practitioners from the intelligence, scholarly, and US policymaking communities. That said, some phenomena on the ground dilute our conclusion somewhat, and well get into that momentarily. 2. As per the tasking of the AS/PR, we examined the evidence, consulted widely, and considered alternatives. SAU reached the considered conclusion that the current conflict in Iraq should be considered, for all intents and purposes, a civil war. Moreover, former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi believes a civil war already exists. Earlier this year he said, if this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is. We are in a terrible civil conflict now. The most recent DOD report on Measuring Stability in Iraq was flatly wrong in denying that a civil war exists in Iraq.

3. Among its many errors and confusons, the DOD report asserts that no general agreement exists on what constitutes a civil war. We beg to differ. Scholars have a well established checklist that, when you go down it, indicates that Iraq is in civil war. The following are the questions SAU answered in the affirmative after its examination of the evidence and consultations with experts. Is the focus of the war control over which group governs the political unit? Is there at least two groups of organized combatants? Is the state one of the combatants? Are there at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average? Is the ratio of total deaths at least 95 percent to 5 percent? Is the war occurring within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state or entity?

4. What is the greatest threat the US faces as a result of full-blown civil war in Iraq. The greatest threat to US regional interests is from potential spillover neighboring countries will be burdened by hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. Moreover, civil wars are typically accompanied by other collateral problems, all of which will be visited on the region like a sequence of Biblical plagues. And it goes without saying that Iraqi conditions are particularly conducive to spillover. 5. In conclusion, SAUs examination of the evidence and the correspondence of the evidence with all of the conditions that scholars generally associate with civil wars leads us to concluse that iraq is definitely fighting a civil war. We recommend that official US pronouncements take this into account and that the actual facts on the ground be acknowledged by official spokespeople. 5. Should you have any questions or comments on this matter, please hesitate to call or email the author at (202) 321-0010 or dschsrules2006@sau.usa.gov.

MEMO WITH EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS 6 October 2006 To: From: Subject: Assistent Secretary for Political Reconstruction Joe Finarkie, Strategic Analysis Unit The Situation in Iraq

Can we chat about the heading for a moment? We need to sharpen the subject line. Theres always a situation in Iraq. What particular situation does this memo address? If Im the AS/PR and I glance into my inbox and see the name Joe Finarkie and The Situation in Iraq, I may or may not pick the memo up. We need some additional information in the subject. And you should at least let her know in the subject that youre being responsive to something she asked for. You dont have to use a megaphone: you can allude. And please at least run the spell-checker before you give me something to review. 1. The Iraq conflict is a civil war, period. The SAI reached this conclusion by examing all the evidence and consulting with senior analysts and practitioners from the intelligence, scholarly, and US policymaking communities. That said, some phenomena on the ground dilute our conclusion somewhat, and well get into that momentarily. Im not crazy about the tone youre hitting in the first para. Your lead announces an end to all controversy. Wouldnt you love to be that certain? And you really havent made a slam-dunk case here, have you? Well, you havent convinced me, and right now Im your only audience. In addition, you didnt bother to allude to any of the criteria we tried to develop, or to any of the supporting facts weve pulled together in contesting the conclusion of the Pentagon paper. We need to do better here. (And please: run that spell-checker.) 2. As per the tasking of the AS/PR, we examined the evidence, consulted widely, and considered alternatives. SAU reached the considered conclusion that the current conflict in Iraq should be considered, for all intents and purposes, a civil war. Moreover, former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi believes a civil war already exists. Earlier this year he said, if this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is. We are in a terrible civil conflict now. You come across as pretentious here. Look at the first sentence alone: theres a lot of needless verbiage and truly disagreeable bureau-speak: as per, considered conclusion as opposed to unconsidered conclusion? for all intents and purposeswhere do you get this stuff from? Never write something youre used to seeing in print. Or, I should add, sick of hearing in conversation. And whats with that Allawi statement? You write it as though it clinches your argument. While a part of intelligence reporting is what influential and insightful people say privately on foreign policy issues, we need some context for the Allawi comment, and some additional material that, say, helps the reader to understand that Iraqis across the board are behaving not as though civil war is a prospect but that THEYRE NOW IN a civil war. Yeah, in a sense this is semantic. But the distinction is significant if policymakers may calibrate policy based on the difference between a potential versus real and active civil war. The most recent DOD report on Measuring Stability in Iraq was flatly wrong in denying that a civil war exists in Iraq. You are absolutely correct to acknowledge DoDs alternative interpretation of the situation, and to explain why you do not agree. Please dont simply state, however, that the report was flatly wrong. Use some finesse in contesting the views of colleagues. 3. Among its many errors and confusons, the DOD report asserts that no general agreement exists on what constitutes a civil war. We beg to differ. Scholars have a well established checklist that, when you go down it, indicates that Iraq is in civil war. The

following are the questions SAU answered in the affirmative after its examination of the evidence and consultations with experts. It occurs to me that were in the third paragraph and you still havent defined what you mean by civil war. Somewhere, preferably up front, youre going to have to do that. You cant begin by gratuitously slapping around your DoD colleagues. You simply cant. So rewrite your criticism in a more measured tone. We beg to differ sounds sarcastic, should never be written and hardly ever spoken. Are you trying for some powerful rhetorical effect, a short, crisp interjection? Cmon. And what follows is very sloppy. Please rewrite, simply for flow for thinking made visible. We want the reader to keep reading, not to switch back-and-forth in the text or to simply give up trying to follow your thinking, logic, and analysis of the facts. And read it for content again: you seem to suggest that a checklist, from any phenomena or so-called facts on the ground, can determine civil war. Through your research and consultations with experts, you with a number of solid facts that support your thesis that this is a Use them succinctly. disassociated a case for have come up civil war.

Why are the criteria well-established in the first place? Because a hundred historical conflicts that we conventionally label civil wars all satisfy the conditions. The implicit argument of your memo is: if we easily agree on these conflicts, why not on this? This is logical nonsense, and a sharp reader will see it as nonsense. One more issue is that you introduce the list of criteria in a way that, I think, may cause the AS to ball your memo up and toss it across the room: Scholars have a list Come ON. Thats a double-MEGO (my eyes glaze over) phrase: scholars and list. The AS will intuitively know that something other than a list is going to determine the case for civil war. So, I think it was a good idea to lead a list of bullets with a single idea that knits them all together: essentially, youve stated, weve said yes to all the following conditions of civil war. But I dont think youve given the AS enough information about our reasoning, or about our use of these criteria, to convince her that weve said something worth agreeing with. Is the focus of the war control over which group governs the political unit? Are there at least two groups of organized combatants? Is the state one of the combatants? Are there at least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average? Is the ratio of total deaths at least 95 percent to 5 percent? Is the war occurring within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state or entity? About the list itself: apart from the illogic of simply using a checklist of criteria for a civil war, I dont like the use of questions that force the reader to answer herself. You need to transform the questions into statements statements about the Iraq conflict that respond to issues raised by the questions. And dont beg any additional questions. In particular, if its not intuitively clear why you believe such indicators are indeed criteria, you need to explain. For example, why do I care if the state is a combatant? And whats the meaning of that death ratio? 4. What is the greatest threat the US faces as a result of full-blown civil war in Iraq. The greatest threat to US regional interests is from potential spillover neighboring countries will be burdened by hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. Moreover, civil wars are typically accompanied by other collateral problems, all

of which will be visited on the region like a sequence of Biblical plagues. And it goes without saying that Iraqi conditions are particularly conducive to spillover. I dont like to lead with a question: take the question and make an answer of it. Its an irritating way of forcing the reader to think. Our reader has asked US a question. We dont get to ask questions in return. And then you left off the question mark. Moreover, I have no idea of what specific threats you associate with spillover. You did a lot of work on this and you shortchange yourself by simply gliding past your thoughts on this issue. It goes without saying is a ridiculous phrase. You need to nail the generalization down with some details about Iraqi conditions that are conducive to spillover into neighboring countries. And Biblical plagues? Thats a reach, isnt it? You are straining for rhetorical effect. I dont think a senior policymaker will welcome the biblical allusion. I certainly dont welcome it. What Id prefer are more specific references to some of those typical problems that accompany civil wars. 5. In conclusion, SAUs examination of the evidence and the correspondence of the evidence with all of the conditions that scholars generally associate with civil wars leads us to concluse that iraq is definitely fighting a civil war. We recommend that official US pronouncements take this into account and that the actual facts on the ground be acknowledged by official spokespeople. You really dont need this paragraph. And even if you did, its a weak conclusion. The important conclusions belong at the top of the memo. And please lose those recommendations both of them in the rewrite. No one cares or wants to know what you recommend. And fix the typos. Please: when you resubmit this, Im going to ask you if youve proofed it carefully, even aloud. Please be able to say yes. 5. If you have any questions or comments on this matter, please hesitate to call or email the author at (202) 321-1101 dschrules2006@sau.usa.gov. And fix the Freudian typo please hesitate to call. para fives? And did you know you had two

Overall, this is not a very strong effort or a very compelling argument. You didnt handle the material well, you beg questions, and thus you risk annoying the reader and wasting the readers precious time. I suppose you know who youre writing to, but its not clear from the intermittently colloquial tone. Your purpose for writing the piece isnt very well developed: why should anyone read this? Frankly, you dont make a compelling case. And your message is incompletely developed. From an analytical tradecraft perspective this simply isnt the best you can do. Look at the architecture: if I read the title and the topic sentences, I still dont know the central theme. It has a lot of white space a good thing but the thinking you display in writing can be better. Rewrite this and give me something that better answers the AS/PRs question.

GOOD MEMO 6 October 2006 To: From: Subject: Assistant Secretary for Political Reconstruction Joe Finarkie, Chief, Strategic Analysis Unit The Iraq Conflict Is Now A Civil War.

1. Summary. You recently tasked the Strategic Analysis Unit (SAU) to assess whether the Iraq conflict is a civil war and to evaluate implications for US interests. SAU concludes that the Iraq conflict is indeed a civil war. In our review, we consulted with senior analysts and practitioners from the US intelligence, scholarly, journalistic, and policymaking communities and evaluated the Iraq situation against criteria that capture essential traits of past civil wars. If unchecked, an Iraqi civil war would almost certainly spill over into neighboring states, with potentially destabilizing effects. 2. Iraq in the midst of civil war. SAU assesses the Iraq conflict to be a civil war - that is, an indigenous war between at least two armed contestants, in which the right to govern is the prize. We examined a broad range of evidence and consulted broadly. Virtually all authorities and opinion leaders with whom weve consulted Biddle, Byman, Krauthammer, Pollack, Toft agree Iraqs Shia-Sunni conflict is indisputably a civil war. Moreover, Sunnis view themselves as waging a civil war, and the statements of key Shia leaders indicate they now hold a similar assessment. Moqtada al Sadrs spokesmen have begun invoking civil war in their briefings, and former interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi recently observed, if this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.

3. Contrary to the view expressed in the recent DOD report on Measuring Stability in Iraq that no general agreement exists on what constitutes a civil war, and that the situation in Iraq currently does not fit the profile of a civil war our review unequivocally identifies the Iraq conflict as a civil war. We recognize the dispute is to an extent semantic. But for every slant on the material weve taken be it practical, formally methodological, or comparative we get the same answer. We distill our findings to six facets of the conflict that define a civil war. Sovereignty and rule at stake. Sunni and Shia groups are competing through force of arms to determine which group will rule. Each contestant rejects the legitimacy of the other(s). This dispute is underscored by Iraqs geographic separation into areas of sectarian sovereignty, enclaves, and no-go zones defended by sectarian armed force. An armed competition. Civil war cannot consist solely of mob actions and rioting. In Iraq, two broad groups Sunni and Shia - have organized and armed for war. A third, the Kurds in the northeast, are well armed and in the wings. The state as participant. This criterion excludes from consideration merely communal conflicts of, say, two warring identity groups. The turnover of authority to Iraqis in June 2004 and the formation of an Iraqi government brought the Iraqi state into the fray. Excessive casualties. The conventional threshold of at least 1,000 battle deaths per year excludes other types of violence such as crime, riots, and smaller-scale insurgencies. Over the last two years war-related deaths in Iraq have far exceeded that baseline figure. Minimal lethal capacity demonstrated. Iraq surpasses the commonly cited casualty ratio criterion of 95 percent to five percent in which the stronger side must suffer at least five percent of the casualties. Each side is taking a proportion of casualties much greater than five percent. An internal, not transboundary, conflict. The criteria for civil war exclude war between two sovereign states. Even taking into account transboundary aspects such as US and Iranian involvement the primary conflict is now internal.

4. The greatest threat full-blown civil war poses to US interests is from the inevitable escalation of violence and resulting spillover effects in friendly nearby states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The thousands of displaced and refugees will harbor zealots seeking to foment unrest, instability, and copycat secession attempts. This will be in addition to concerns typical of civil wars, such as death and disease on a massive scale and, as the economy becomes a target, commodity-price instability. Iraqi conditions are, moreover, conducive to spillover. Iraqs ethnic, tribal, and religious groups exist in neighboring states and share similar grievances. Iraq has a history of violence with its neighbors, which has fostered desires for vengeance and constant clashes. Iraq has resources its neighbors covet such as oil and important religious shrines and its borders are porous.

5. If you have any questions or comments on this matter, please do not hesitate to call or email me at (202) 321-0010 or thomyorke1968@sau.usa.gov.

EXAMPLE OF A GOOD IC MEMO FROM A STUDENT Dear Student: You clearly understand and can use skillfully the IC memo style of writing. Sentence to sentence, and paragraph to paragraph, you move smoothly and logically through your analysis. The writing becomes virtually invisible, as the reader focuses on your ideas, and follows your thought process to arrive at your conclusions. At the end of the memo, the reader understands clearly your assessment and how you arrive there. The reader may or may not completely agree with you, but does understand your arguments and is compelled to follow them to the end. Whether or not you are totally convincing, your writing style is not an obstacle to you speaking your mind to the reader. This is the goal of good writing. You are there. Good job and solid A.

November 8, 2007 To: From: Subject: 1. National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee (US DoD) Student, South Asia Affairs Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency Dealing More Directly with the Al-Qa'ida Threat within Pakistan

Summary: The DIA recommends that the National Security Council consider three options for augmenting the Pakistan Frontier Corps effectiveness as an anti terrorism fighting force in the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP). Despite the billions of dollars worth of military aid directed at Pakistan since 2001, the Frontier Corps operating in Pakistans Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) have been poorly trained, woefully ill-equipped and have received minimal operational support. In light of intelligence, which indicates that significant Al-Qa'ida forces, including leaders such as Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, have found safe haven in the NWFP, the DIA has formulated three possible approaches to realistically assisting the Frontier Corps. The first approach involves indirectly supporting the Frontier Corps through increased border security and collaboration with local tribal leaders that are sympathetic to the Frontier Corps objectives. The second approach consists of providing both limited air support and sufficient arms directly to the Frontier Corps. The third approach is more aggressive in that it calls for the deployment of American Special Operations forces along with air strikes to directly assist the Frontier Corps in their fight against Al-Qa'ida. The Indirect Approach: This option consists of a dual pronged approach in which the Frontier Corps are indirectly supported through securing the border between the NWFP and Afghanistan and collaboration with local tribal leaders. Increasing border security would be helpful to the Frontier Corps because a secure border would both limit the mobility of hostile forces and act as a wedge between hostile forces on either side of the border which are now free to collaborate. Furthermore, the use of mines along this border, as already advocated by Islamabad, would likely be the most realistic method of securing the border because foreign forces in Afghanistan are already stretched to maximum mission capacities. In view of recent successful collaboration with local Iraqi leaders in Anbar province, positive effects could be accomplished by simply aligning the interests of sympathetic local tribal leaders in NWFP with objectives of the Frontier Corps. Additionally, actively engaging local elements would almost certainly lead to better intelligence and less overall friction between the Frontier Corps forces present in the region and civilian populations. This option does however have several drawbacks, which include: Securing the border is made far more difficult by the fact that Afghanistan presently disputes Pakistans border claims. Any active attempt to secure a border between the two countries would obviously need to be preceded by some broader understanding about where the actual border lies. The use of mines in securing the border is complicated by Afghan sensitivities to these devices. Due to the history of conflict in Afghanistan it is one of the most mined countries in the world and is therefore reluctant to allow further use of mines.

2.

Successfully closing the border could make collaboration with local leaders more difficult because the populations of certain Pushtan tribes straddle the border. Leaders that have been cut off from their people would be very dubious of collaboration.

 3.

Knowledge of which leaders may be receptive to collaboration is currently largely unavailable. This sort of intelligence would take time to develop.

The Limited Direct Approach: This option also consists of a dual pronged approach. It calls for directly arming and providing limited air support to the Frontier Corps. Directly arming the Frontier Corps avoids the waste of military financial aid through corruption while assuring that U.S. assistance is directed at Pakistans role in the war on terror rather than contributing to an arms race with India. The modernization of Frontier Corps weaponry is desperately needed before the force can be expected to effectively confront Al-Qa'ida. The type of armaments needed (i.e. assault rifles, grenades, etc.) could be easily furnished by the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. has already provided the Frontier Corps with communication equipment, bullet-proof helmets, spotting scopes, Global Positioning Systems, and bullet proof jackets. All of this equipment will do little good though if modern weaponry is unavailable. The value of air support need not be defended and could be provided to the Frontier Corps at little risk or cost, via the RQ1 Predator, or other unmanned aircraft. The Aggressive Direct Approach: The dual pronged approach embodied by this option involves the deployment of American Special Operations forces along with air strikes to directly assist the Frontier Corps. Embedding forces within the Frontier Corps would expedite the professionalization of the Frontier Corps while greatly improving its effectiveness. Additionally, independent actions accomplished by either American Special Operations forces or CIA assets could lead to remarkable intelligence collection opportunities. Air strikes could then make use of that intelligence to destroy terrorist training camps and possibly eliminate certain Al-Qa'ida leaders. This option, however, does have definite drawbacks as well. These include: The limited deployment of U.S. forces in the NWFP could be inadequate to ensure that those American military elements would not be overrun. If U.S. soldiers were either publicly killed or taken hostage in the NWFP the political fallout and damage to U.S. credibility would be disastrous. While air strikes could impede terrorist training activities and hinder fluid organization of Al-Qa'ida in the NWFP, it is highly unlikely that hostile forces would be driven from the area.

4.

The use of airstrikes often results in collateral damage. In this case air strikes could easily result in serious instability in light of the volatile political situation within Pakistan.

5.

Conclusion: Every option advanced here has clear associated benefits. However, in view of the problems and possible consequences associated with implementation of either the indirect approach or the aggressive direct approach, the limited direct approach warrants further investigation and serious consideration.

Linchpin Analysis:

1. Since the late 1990s, an alternative analytical technique, linchpin analysis, has become the gold standard for the most sophisticated and useful analysis for U.S. policymakers. Linchpin analysis works best for critical issues we understand deeply and about which we have plenty of facts; it tends to work less well for fast-breaking, unexpected events. The four main anchors of linchpin analysis are summarized below. Identify the key variables or drivers likely to drive the outcome of an issue, their relative importance, and their inter-relationships. Discuss what we know about the key variables and acknowledge our levels of uncertainty about the drivers. Define the linchpin premises (our analytical assumptions about the drivers). Normally, these assumptions can be expressed in conditional phrases such as, ifthen; or We have moderate confidence that X and Y are happeningconsequently, it is probable that Z will result; or "If it turns out that X happens, but not Y, then we are less confident in our assessment that Z will result. Define the facts and judgements that support and justify the linchpin premises. Define how changes (or our own errors) in drivers would change the linchpin premises and our analysis. Identify observable indicators that signal changes in drivers. Identify potential triggers that could change the momentum and direction of change in the issue.

2. Linchpin analysis usually includes a paragraph at the end of an analytical piece that outlines plausible developments (triggers) that could change the likely outcome, and key indicators that analysts and policymakers can watch for a hint of these changes.

3. Please note how this analytical style provides a clear and logical "if-then" roadmap of how a plausible series of events can lead to various outcomes. This is the major added value of intelligence and analysis for policymaker understanding of what may happen in the future. 4.Example of lynchpin analysis: Below, please see an example of this lynchpin technique that I wrote out of pure imagination.

-------------------------------------------------------Subject: Pakistan's Continued Failure to Confront Terrorist Groups in the FATA Might Ultimately Result in a Coup or Islamist Takeover 1. Summary: The NSC requested we provide a assessment of the likely effects continued Pakistani opposition to the new U.S. policy to unilaterally strike at terrorist targets in Pakistans Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). We judge that before Pakistan can act effectively against terrorist groups in the FATA, it is essential for President Zardari to forge a strong alliance with Chief of Army Staff General Kayani. In the near term over the next three months, or so, a failure to form such an alliance likely will lead to continued government paralysis, and conceivably a military coup or even ultimate Islamist takeover of the government -- with consequent uncertainy over Pakistan's nuclear weapons. While he clearly understands U.S. concerns, a variety of pressures confront newly elected President Zardari from senior Army officers with a weak commitment to counterinsurgency operations in the FATA, from an ISI with longstanding ties to the insurgents, and from an increasingly Islamist public critical of his leadership. These pressures are pushing Zardari to defend against perceived U.S. military violations of Pakistans sovereignty and to defuse a growing public perception that Zardaris policies serve U.S. interests at the expense of Pakistans. While Zardari has privately expressed a degree of understanding to senior U.S. officials that the fate of his country is at stake in the FATA, we assess that his current weak domestic political position likely will drive him to continue condemning any official U.S. announcement of the new policy toward the FATA, as well as continue Pakistani paralysis toward the growing terrorist threat. Given President Zardari's political weakness and General Kayani's mistrust and disdain for Zardari's corrupt political past, we assess that the Zardari-Kayani alliance essential to a strong Pakistani action in the FATA would most likely come from a combination of U.S. inducements and persuasion. 2. Senior Pakistani Officials' Inaction in Addressing U.S. Concerns over the FATA: Absent a strong U.S. effort to overcome the Pakistani government's reluctance to risk a public backlash or possibly even open revolt in the FATA, we judge with a fair degree of confidence that President Zardari is likely to continue his open condemnation of the new U.S. policy of unilateral counterterrorist operations in the FATA. Zardari's continued opposition to unilateral U.S. military operations in the FATA, in our judgement, make it most unlikely that the Pakistani army and civilian government can overcome their longstanding paralysis in the face growing domestic terrorist attacks. Pakistan's failure to take decisive action in the FATA against the well-entrenched terrorist groups within the next several months could raise the prospect of another military coup or even an eventual Islamist takeover of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Like his predecessors, Zardari fears the possibility that open confrontation in the FATA could lead to open revolt that could threaten to break apart the country on tribal lines. A series of well-sourced intelligence reports dating back to 2005 indicates clearly that senior Pakistani military and civilian officials were aware of U.S. concerns about AQ/Taliban safehavens in the FATA, but felt constrained from taking effective action out of fear of an ethnic-Pashtun revolt capable of splitting the country along tribal lines. Because of Pakistani government concerns over the possibility of an ethnicPashtun revolt in the FATA if the Punjabi-dominated Army aggressively pursues terrorist groups there, the government in Islamabad has consistently attempted to make only token efforts against the AQ/Taliban in the FATA to minimally satisfy U.S. demands, while avoiding any major military operations that might provoke open Pashtun rebellion.

3. President Zardari's Weak Political Base: We assess that Chief of Army Staff General Kayani is key to Zardari's ultimate success in dealing with terrorist groups. Kayani, reportedly an honest, nonpolitical, career officer, has allowed himself to openly expressed his mistrust and disdain for Zardari. Unless Kayani decides to commit himself

and the army to support Zardari, however, we assess with confidence that Zardari will remain unable to break the current political stalemate that prevents effective action in the FATA. We judge that the best hope for Zardari to solidify his political support in the coalition government is through the active cooperation of General Kayani. Given his negative feelings toward Zardari, however, this outcome is only possible if Kayani judges that army support to Zardari is the main hope to prevent the Islamists from ultima Since succeeding General Musharraf as President in August 2008, Zardari's inability to overcome his reputation for corruption and dishonesty has hindered his efforts to gain Kayani's political support or to confront the direct challenge to his government from terr If Zardari does manage to gain Kayani's open support -- an outcome more likely with the aid of continuous non-public U.S. political pressure and inducements on Kayani -then we are confident that Zardari can rally the coalition parties under his leadership. If, however, Kayani refuses to openly commit the army's power and prestige to Zardari, then we expect the Pakistani government will remain in its current position of disorganized powerlessness in the face of the increasing terrorist threat.

4. General Kayani's Intentions to Protect Pakistan's Cohesion and Sovereignty Trump U.S. Interests: While senior U.S. officials consistently praise Kayani's professionalism and his professed understanding of U.S. concerns in the region, a body of sensitive intelligence reporting makes it clear that Kayani privately believes that Pakistan cannot rely on a long-term U.S. commitment to provide financial and military aid against the perceived threat from India. Consequently, Kayani judges that it would be imprudent for Pakistan to dedicate the military resources to fully support a U.S. counterterrorist campaign in the FATA; instead, Kayani prefers to continue the balancing act of supressing terrorist groups just enough to maintain stability, while avoiding a Pashtun revolt in the FATA. Based on our assessment of General Kayani's history and character as a proud army officer, we are virtually certain that he is serious when states he is willing to fire on U.S. forces that he perceives to violate Pakistani sovereignty. Kayani has made it clear to his U.S. military counterparts that he is mindful of the threat to national unity of a potential ethnic-Pashtun revolt in the FATA, and that he considers it his duty to balance the threat of revolt against the need to take gradual but effective action against the terrorists there. Kayani also recently noted to U.S. officials that U.S. concerns over terrorist attacks originating from safehavens in the FATA do not outweigh his duty to preserve Pakistani national unity. We are currently uncertain if the recent Marriott Hotel bombing incident in Islamabad is a sufficient escalation of the terrorist threat to convince Kayani that the delicate balancing act in the FATA is no longer working. Subsequent intelligence reporting that we have shared with Zardari and Kayani, however, makes it clear that the terrorist groups intend to mount a sustained campaign of attacks throughout the country, intended to destroy the civilian government. There is fragmentary intelligence reporting, however, that Kayani has begun contingency planning with key subordinates for how best to counter the escalating threat emanating from the FATA and reaching into Islamabad. This development raises the possibility of a Zardari-Kayani alliance that might tacitly accept the unilateral U.S. policy as the best of some bad choices.

5. ISI's Role as a Rogue Terrorist Supporter: ISI's continuing ties and support to terrorist groups, at least partly out of the control of the Islamabad government, threaten to disrupt any government effort to control the situation in the FATA. In an attempt to regain at least a degree of army control over the activities of ISI and somewhat assuage U.S. concerns, General Kayani recently appointed his trusted subordinate and former Chief of Military Operations, LTG Shujaa, as head of ISI. Military attache reporting from our Embassy in Islamabad indicates that Shujaa has the

full support of Kayani to remove or retire any military officers in ISI who resist Shujaa's reassertion of army control over the organization. It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which Kayani and Shujaa might succeed in their efforts to restrain ISI's secret, unsanctioned support to terrorist groups. We expect, with a fair degree of confidence, that ISI rogue officers will strongly resist Shujaa's attempts to regain control, most likely with the lethal cooperation of terrorist groups that would view Shujaa's success as directly leading to the end of their dominance in the FATA. If it turns out that Kayani and Shujaa are not largely successful in reining in ISI support to the terrorists, then we judge with fair confidence that even a strong Zardari-Kayani alliance will be insufficient to suppress the efforts of entrenched ISI-supported terrorist groups to ultimately destroy the civilian government. 6. Most-Likely Outcomes of a U.S. Unilateral Military Policy toward the FATA, Absent a Zardari-Kayani Alliance: We would expect to see the following outcomes to stepped-up unilateral U.S. military operations in the FATA, in descending order of probability: An almost certain and immediate public Zardari denunciation of the unilateral U.S. policy; anti-U.S. protests in Pakistan; renewed orders from General Kayani to Pakistani troops to fire on U.S. forces perceived to violate Pakistan's sovereignty. A likely increased private willlingness by Zardari and Kayani in concert to engage in protracted, quiet negotiations with the U.S. over how best to counter the terrorist groups in the FATA. This scenario probably represents the best chance to gain a degree of Pakistani cooperation for the new unilateral U.S. policy. If LTG Shujaa is able regain control over ISI and put an end to ISI support to terrorist groups, then Pakistani troops with U.S. military support may make slow-butsteady progress in exerting dominance over the FATA. If Shujaa is unable to regain control over ISI, then Kayani may well be reluctant to even attempt to push back the terrorist groups with military force, recognizing it as an exercise in futility that may provoke the revolt he fears. Instead, Kayani and Zardari may simply cede the FATA to the terrorists to avoid revolt, despite a U.S. determination to eliminate the terrorist safehavens there. If Zaradari and Kayani are unable achieve some sort of alliance and a private agreement with the U.S. to cooperate against the terrorist groups in the FATA, and Shujaa cannot regain control over ISI, then the Kayani government likely will remain mired in disorganized powerlessness against the terrorist groups that threaten to take over Pakistan. Even if the army stages one of its periodic coups and takes over the government, it is unlikely to have any more success against the terrorists than did General Musharraf during his term in office, 1999-2008. In the worst-case scenario, we cannot rule out the possibility that continued government paralysis, escalating terrorist attacks in Islamabad, and growing public repudiation of civilian rule might ultimately lead to an Islamist government with control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------