THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PESSIMISM

Thomas J. Donahue Institute for Philosophical Research UNAM tjdonahu@gmail.com tom@filosoficas.unam.mx

Main Text: 8,792 words

Notes: 498 words

References: 671 words

ABSTRACT: Philosophical pessimism consists of a set of theses offering a gloomy view of humanity and its destiny. Those theses core claim is that the world and human beings are structured such that most of the deepest interests and desires which human beings have will be thwarted. The philosophical position these theses comprise has been held by Giacomo Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Camus, E. M. Cioran, and perhaps Unamuno and Freud. This paper asks: What are this positions theoretical foundations? What are the theories which underpin and justify pessimisms constituent theses? In answer, the paper argues that pessimisms foundations consist of three theories: a theory of human nature, a theory of human reason, and a theory of the universe. In arguing to this thesis, the paper specifies the 27 characteristic theses of philosophical pessimism, explicates the notion of a theoretical foundation, and tries to refute four alternative views of pessimisms foundations. KEY WORDS: philosophical pessimism, theoretical foundations, human nature, reason, the universe

Theoretical Foundations of Pessimism

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PESSIMISM

I. THE PROBLEM Philosophical pessimism consists of a set of theses offering a gloomy view of humanity and its destiny. According to this position, it is more likely than not that most of the deepest interests and desires any human being has will be thwarted. The theses offering that latter view together constitute a philosophical position, a position which has been held by Giacomo Leopardi, Schopenhauer,1 Eduard von Hartmann, Nietzsche, Camus, and E. M. Cioran; and perhaps also by Rousseau, Weber, Freud,2 Miguel de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, the later Heidegger, Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault, Woody Allen,3 David Benatar,4 and John Gray. 5 Among the theses comprising the pessimistic position are that things appear to get better while in fact they get no better; and that try as we may, we cannot ensure that there is more good than bad. We all have a rough and ready idea of the theses comprising philosophical pessimism. And some fine work has recently been done on specifying those theses (Dienstag 2006). The question this paper presses is: On what theoretical foundations do those theses rest? What, in other words, are the theories which underpin and justify pessimisms characteristic theses? Without an answer to this question, we wont be able decisively to decide whether pessimism is true or false. Moreover, without such an answer, we cannot give a complete account of the foundations of conservatism. For philosophical pessimism, as John Kekes (1998, 41-45) has ably shown, is almost certainly one of conservatisms essential elements.6 There are also more general philosophical reasons for wanting an answer to the question, reasons independent of whether we are interested in pessimism. By scrutinizing

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the relation between pessimisms foundationsits characteristic justificatory baseand its superstructurethe theory properwe may be able to glean generalizable insights into the nature of theoretical foundations and of the foundation-superstructure relationship. This should be useful, because while the notion of theoretical foundations is widely and prominently used by philosophers (e.g., Waldron 1985; Carter 2004; Williams 1985; Martin 2008, 32, 46; Gotthelf 1999, 44; Machery 2006, 398, 403-4; Canto-Sperber 2006, 272), it has not been very carefully examined. Hence scrutinizing pessimisms theoretical foundations may give us tools which will allow us to more soundly identify the foundations of other philosophical theories. In answer to the question, then, this paper argues that pessimisms theoretical foundations consist of three theories: what I call the algesic theory of human nature, the hamartiac theory of human reason, and the eikaic theory of the universe. The algesic theory holds that human beings are essentially mortal and conscious of it, acutely conscious of times passing, prone to keenly desire what they cannot achieve and what cannot be, prone to believe what they strongly desire to be true, prone to suffer when they (realize they) cannot fulfill their desires or when their desire-driven beliefs are undermined, prone to keenly desire that everything come out well, and prone to believe that things in general get better. The hamartiac theory holds that human theoretical reason is a powerful tool for discovering the truth of things; but when using practical reason, humans tend to set themselves ends their pursuit of which leads to bad or unwanted consequences. The eikaic theory holds that the universe and the flow of events have no propensity to make things in general get better; so too, they are both replete with change, chance, and unexpected events. Call the view that these theories comprise pessimisms

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foundations the threefold foundation thesis. I believe that this thesis helps us understand some of the similarities and differences between pessimism and related philosophical positions, such as nihilism or tragic pluralism (cp. Harris 2006, 231-61). The paper is organized as follows. Part II specifies the characteristic theses of philosophical pessimism, as these are presented by the leading survey of this position, Joshua Foa Dienstags (2006) important book. I specify 27 such theses identified by Dienstags anatomy of pessimism. I there invite the reader either to accept the theses as correctly specifying the pessimist position, or to make the papers inquiry conditional, such that it asks: if these theses did correctly specify pessimism, what would be its foundations? In this part, I also claim that pessimism is a philosophical position, not a philosophical theory; I explain what hangs on that distinction. Part III then begins the argument for the threefold foundation thesis by explicating the idea of theoretical foundations. I there argue that a theory is an adequate theoretical foundation of a viewpoint if and only if it entails it, justifies it, is not semantically equivalent to it, and explains its truth if true. Part IV considers four alternative views of pessimisms theoretical foundations, inspired by the work of Raymond Geuss, George W. Harris, Mark Migotti, John Kekes, and Dienstag. The part tries to refute all four views. Part V then argues for the threefold foundation thesis. The argument is from the explication of theoretical foundations presented earlier. Part VI concludes. Before beginning, I want to say a word about what this paper does not do. The paper neither claims nor implies that the three theories specified in the threefold foundation thesis are themselves true. Nor does the paper claim or imply that philosophical pessimism itself is true. For I want to examine, independently of their truth-value, the form and

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mechanics of the relationship between pessimisms superstructureits characteristic thesesand its characteristic justificatory baseits theoretical foundations. If you like, I am examining the syntax of this relationship, rather than the semantics of its terms. So I am, for purposes of this paper, largely uninterested in the truth-conditions and truth- value of these theories. What interests me is their justifcatory-derivational relationships. (If the reader wants to know, I think that while philosophical pessimism is a plausible and important philosophical viewpoint, it is ultimately false. I also think that the three theories which, I claim, constitute pessimisms foundation are all of them ultimately false.)

II. PESSIMISMS CHARACTERISTIC THESES What are the characteristic theses of philosophical pessimism? This question is more complex than may at first appear. For what it seeks are the characteristic theses of a philosophical position, not a philosophical theory. II.1. A philosophical theory is an answer to a fairly well-specified question

deemed philosophical, where that answer consists in a set of propositions which attribute properties to all the members of a set of entities where there is, or has been, some widespread doubt about whether those entities bear those properties.7 Take, for example, the mixed theory of punishmentdue to John Rawls (1999) and H. L. A. Hart (1968/2004). This theory consists in the following two propositions: (1) that the practice of punishment is justified insofar as it prevents or deters actions having deplorable consequences, while (2) individual punishments are justified only if they are inflicted on a person who broke a recognized, public rule proscribing a certain action. The target entities of the mixed theory are (i) the practice of punishment generally, (ii) the instances of the

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practice found in various societies and associations, and (iii) all individual punishments. The properties attributed by the theory to the target entities are justifiedness under certain conditions. For our purposes, the distinction between philosophical theories and philosophical positions can be drawn with respect to two properties. First, philosophical theories are allor-nothing affairs, while philosophical positions are not; second, the propositions of philosophical theories are precisely formulated answers to the questions to which they respond, while the propositions of philosophical positions are vague and ambiguous. Consider first the all-or-nothing property. You cannot hold a philosophical theory, such as the mixed theory of punishment, unless you hold all of its propositions. By contrast, philosophical positions, such as philosophical pessimism, lack that feature: you can hold a philosophical position without holding all of its characteristic theses. For unlike a philosophical theory, a philosophical position is not an answer to a fairly well-specified question. Rather, it is a picture of a given philosophical terrain, a picture which gives a set of rough and fairly vague answers to a set of rough and fairly vague philosophical questions which have some intrinsic relationship. This in turn explains the second difference between theories and positions: philosophical theories are comprised of precisely formulated propositions which together answer a precisely formulated question or set of questions. Philosophical positions are comprised of fairly vague and ambiguous propositions because they aim to provide a rough map of a philosophical terrain: they give rough-and-ready answers to a set of vague philosophical questions. For concreteness, consider an example of a philosophical position. Let us take expressivism in philosophical anthropology and philosophy of nature, the viewpoint

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famously delineated by Charles Taylor (1975, 13-29; 1989, 374-386) and attributed by him to Herder and his admirers. The central notion of this philosophical position, we might say, is the thesis that human life and human activity are expressions of ourselves and of nature; and that it is in and by such expression of ourselves and nature that we come to see ourselves as what we are, and define ourselves as what we are (Taylor 1975, 13-17; Taylor 1989, 374-5). But this expressivism also includes a host of accompanying characteristic theses about humanity and nature, theses which are not easily reducible to this central notion: for example, the thesis that we are obligated to live up to the individuality which arises from our expression of ourselves (Taylor 1989, 375), or the thesis that since we share a mutually sustaining life system with other beings, to be in tune with life is to recognize that we have a kind of solidarity with other living beings (Taylor 1989, 384). Note, first, that Herderian expressivism is not all-or- nothing. These theses are such that you can reject some of them and still hold the overall philosophical picture. For example, someone who rejected the obligation-to-individuality thesis would still be a Herderian expressivist so long as she accepted the bulk of expressivisms other characteristic theses. Second, note that the expressivist theses mentioned are all fairly vague and ambiguous, especially so by comparison with the two propositions of the mixed theory of punishment. This is because they provide rough-and-ready answers to a set of rough-and-ready questions about a conceptual terrain: questions like, What is the relationship between human activity and nature? and What role does nature play in our coming to self-knowledge? Compare these questions to the considerably more precise questions which the mixed theory of punishment answers: Under what conditions is the

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practice of punishment justified? and Under what conditions are individual punishments justified? So a philosophical position is a theoretical picture, a rough map of a philosophical terrain, which offers a set of fairly vague theses answering a set of fairly vague philosophical questions which bear some intrinsic relationship to one another. Moreover, in order to count as holding a philosophical position, one need not hold all of its characteristic theses. If the position in question is x, you count as a full-blooded x-ist so long as you hold a substantial majority of xs characteristic theses. My claim, then, is that philosophical pessimism is a position, not a philosophical theory. This explains how all the thinkers listed above can be philosophical pessimists, while at the same time relatively few of them agreed on any one precisely stated pessimistic theory. They do not, for example, all share Schopenhauers particular version of pessimism, which has been ably and precisely described by Christopher Janaway (1999), among others. What they do share, and what distinguishes them from nonpessimist thinkers, is that they all accept most of a set of rough and ready, characteristically pessimistic theses. II.2. What, then, are these theses? Here I shall rely on Joshua Dienstags (2006)

important work. Dienstag offers a painstaking anatomy of philosophical pessimism, covering the work of Schopenhauer, Freud, Leopardi, Camus, Unamuno, Cioran, Nietzsche, Ortega, and (somewhat controversially) Rousseau. In the course of making his anatomy, Dienstag offers the following as philosophical pessimisms characteristic theses. They number 27 all told, and are: 1. Human life is full of unhappiness, and fated to remain so (Dienstag 2006, 33).

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2. History, taken as a whole, is not progressive. Neither human society nor human nature can permanently change for the better (25, 18). 3. We should not expect anything (40).

4. History is linear, not circular or cyclical (25).

5. Applying reason to social and political conditions does not ultimately improve those conditions (25). 6. Time-consciousness is a burden to human beings (21).

7. Humans are unique in their capacity for time-consciousness; they are marked out from all other animals by it (20). 8. Humans do and should acknowledge the inevitability of death (22).

9. There is constant change to no particular effect (22).

10. Human existence is fleeting (22).

11. This fleetingness implies that human life is somewhat unreal (22).

12. All human striving is from some perspective futile (22-3).

13. Time-consciousness is more important than death-consciousness (24).

14. Things appear to get better while in fact they get no better (25).

15. Reason produces at least as much unhappiness as happiness (25-7).

16. Reason undermines happiness by destroying illusions (26).

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17. When we are not suffering, and not distracting ourselves from accepting the truth about things, boredom is the natural reaction (30).

18. Technological and intellectual achievements almost invariably cause much human suffering (32).

19. The tools of self-betterment are also instruments of suffering (32).

20. Freedom and happiness are incompatible, where freedom is conceived as the regular use of the capacity to set purposes and seek to achieve them (35-6). 21. There is a persistent mismatch between human purposes and the means to obtain them (33, 35). 22. Ordinary human life is so full of suffering that there is a decent reason to give it up (36). 23. Human life needs justification (36).

24. The question: Is the suffering that comes with time-consciousness justified? is important and has a true presupposition (39).8 25. The costs of doing systematic philosophy are often greater than the benefits (8).

26. Good philosophy aims to fortify us in the face of a limited existence (4, 22, 267).

27. If philosophy wants to help people, it must recognize its limitations and the limitations of reason (32). The first thing to note about these theses is that they are a long way from meeting most philosophers criteria of perspicuity and precision. But that is a function of their

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being characteristic theses of a philosophical position, as opposed to being propositions of a philosophical theory. They are answers to a set of extremely rough-and-ready philosophical questions, questions that might be boiled down to this: Given that we observe so much suffering, unreason, purposelessness, and self-defeating activity in humanity and the universe, how then should we understand it? The second thing to note is that it might be doubted that these are indeed pessimisms characteristic theses. Unfortunately, I lack the space here to argue against the doubt. So I present the reader with two alternatives. First, I will say that I rely on Dienstags arguments for the claim that these indeed are the characteristic theses; I assume that these arguments succeed. If the reader wants to review them, I refer her to Dienstags book.9 But if the reader is inclined to reject the arguments, I invite her to make the papers inquiry conditional. It would then ask: If these indeed were pessimisms characteristic theses, then what would be its theoretical foundations? Let us then turn to identifying the theses foundations.

III. THE IDEA OF THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS III.1. In order to specify the theoretical foundations of philosophical pessimism, it will help to explicate the nature of such foundations. When philosophers appeal to the notion of a theoretical foundation, they say that with respect to the theories of which it is the foundation, it underpins or supports them;10 justifies them;11 entails them, implies them, or has them as a consequence;12 and helps to explain their truth if true.13 We can give some order to these ascribed properties by attributing four necessary and jointly sufficient

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conditions to theoretical foundations. These four conditions are given by the following four theses. First, we have The Entailment Thesis: Propositions p, q, r, can be the theoretical foundations of theses t, u, v only if p, q, r together entail t, u, v. The idea here is that a theory is in a derivation relationship with its theoretical foundations. If we have correctly identified a theorys theoretical foundations, then we should be able to deduce the theory in a fairly straightforward way. We might have to introduce some bridging principles in order to generate the theory, but these should be relatively theoretically non-partisan. It might be asked why the foundation must entail the theory it underpins, rather than simply providing inductive support for it. The reason is that this is part of what it means for a theory or set of theories to underpin another theory. Theoretical underpinning is a deductive-derivational relationship: it is not like the inductive-support relationship between theory and evidence. The second condition on being a theoretical foundation is stated by The Justification Thesis: Propositions p, q, r, can be the theoretical foundations of theses t, u, v only if p, q, rs being justified would justify accepting t, u, v. The idea in this thesis is that no proposition p can be the theoretical foundation of another proposition q if ps being justified would not itself justify accepting q. So, for example, the theory holding that Law necessarily lays claim to legitimate authority (Raz 1994) could not be a theoretical foundation of the theory holding that x is a true proposition just in case there is a belief state B such that x is the content of B and B corresponds to a fact

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(Armstrong 1973, sect. 4.iv). The reason is that the first theorys being justified could not justify accepting the second theory. There are two reasons for accepting this thesis. The first follows from the Entailment Thesis: entailment is justification-preserving. If a proposition p is justified, and p entails q, then q is also justified. The second is analytical: we just do take theoretical foundations to provide reasons for the theories they found. Part of the point of specifying a theorys foundations is to discover what the reasons backing it are. It is important to note that the reasons provided by a theoretical foundation need not be foundationally ultimate. They are not the bedrock reasons described by foundationalism about justification. My explication of theoretical foundations remains neutral about the truth or falsity of foundationalism. p, q, r could be theoretical foundations of t, u, v even where there are yet more foundational reasons supporting t, u, v. Turn then to the third condition on being a theoretical foundation. This is given by The Non-equivalence Thesis: p, q, r can be the theoretical foundations of t, u, v only if p, q, r are not sematically equivalent to t, u, v. The idea here is that Most bachelors are unhappy could not be a theoretical foundation for Most unmarried men are unhappy, because the two propositions are semantically equivalent. The reason for this thesis is that a specification of a theorys foundations should be more than just semantically informative. We seek out a theorys foundations because we want to know more than what the theory means: we want to know what (some of) the main reasons for accepting it are. If the foundation were simply semantically equivalent to the theory, then it would not provide any non-circular reasons for accepting

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it. (p could be the foundation of t if it were extensionally equivalent, but not intensionally equivalent, to t. But that is another matter.) The fourth and last condition on being a theoretical foundation for a theory is given by The Explanation Thesis: p, q, r can be the theoretical foundations of t, u, v only if, if t, u, v were true, then p, q, rs being true would be an integral part of a plausible explanation of why. This means that theoretical foundations are the key player in some plausible philosophical explanation of a theory, in Nozicks (1981) sense of that term.14 The reason for this condition is that any specification of a theorys foundations is meant in part to show how we are to unify that theory with other theories. It is meant to help us locate that theory in a system of other theories, as well as help us understand how the theory could possibly be true. This is the explanatory function which theoretical foundations perform. III.2. These four conditions, I claim, are necessary and jointly sufficient for a theory consisting of propositions t, u, v having p, q, r as its theoretical foundations. However, it might be objected, against this, that the conditions are not jointly sufficient. For it might be objected, first, that p can be a theoretical foundation of q only if most people who hold q and have adequate reasons for holding it would accept that p is qs theoretical foundation. Call this the majority-acceptance objection. It might also be objected that p can be a theoretical foundation of q only if p is itself a thesis that most people who understand the matter would consider a likely candidate for being included among the characteristic theses of q. Call this the inclusion objection. Let us tackle each objection in turn.

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There are two replies to the majority-acceptance objection. The first is that it mistakes the explicandum. The explicandum for which my four conditions are an explicans is p, q, r are an adequate theoretical foundation of t, u, v. The explicandum is not p, q, r are the true theoretical foundation of t, u, v. As an explication of adequate theoretical foundation, my four conditions are perfectly apt. We do not need the objections additional necessary condition to properly explicate that explicandum. We should need it only if we were trying to explicate true theoretical foundation. But that is not the task at hand. The second reply to the majority-acceptance objection is that it is also unlikely to be right in its explication of true theoretical foundation. Being accepted as a theoretical foundation of q by most of those holding q who have adequate reasons for holding it is not genuinely necessary for being the true foundation of q. Let us call this alleged necessary condition the acceptance thesis. The thesis implies that if theory p is not so accepted, then it is impossible that p is a foundation of q. Consider now the case of liberalism. This is a theory-cum- ideology holding that government should seek to protect and promote the negative freedom, equality, and autonomy of individual persons; and that it should do this by granting and enforcing strong individual rights, by allowing goods to be allocated through market mechanisms, and by protecting and promoting private property.15 Now, most liberals who have adequate reasons for being liberals would not hold that their doctrine finds its theoretical foundation in the view that government ought always to treat all its citizens as equals (as does Dworkin 1985, 187, 190-192). For some liberals who have adequate reasons for liberalism hold that it is founded on the view that all social conditions should be made justifiable to every individual person (Waldron 1985); others claim that its foundation is the principle of utility (Riley 1988); while others hold that its

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foundation is the view that we should in all things treat all people with (equal) respect (Larmore 1999, sect. II, III). Most thoughtful liberals would thus disagree with the claim that liberalisms theoretical foundation is the view that government ought always to treat all its citizens as equals. But then, if the acceptance thesis is right, then it is impossible that this view is the foundation of liberalism. For, again, that thesis implies that if most liberals do not accept a view as liberalisms foundation, then it is impossible that that view be liberalisms foundation. But it is at least possible that liberalism is founded on the view. It is possible that liberalism is founded on a principle of equal treatment. But if so, then the acceptance thesis implies a falsehood, and so is itself false. So the acceptance thesis is not a genuine necessary condition on being a true theoretical foundation. So the majorityacceptance objection, which was premised on that thesis, fails. Turn then to the inclusion objection. The idea in it is that, for example, the Dworkinian view that government ought always to treat all its citizens as equals could be the theoretical foundation of liberalism only if most people who understand the matter would consider that view a likely candidate for being a characteristic thesis of liberalism. On this objection, p could be a theoretical foundation of q only if most experts about q would think that p had a good claim to be itself a characteristic thesis of q. (Note that a proposition can be a characteristic thesis of a theory or position without being exclusive to that theory. The thesis that government should protect and promote the negative freedom of persons is a characteristic thesis of liberalism, but it is also a characteristic thesis of civic republicanism, even when that doctrine is construed as a rival theory to liberalism (Pettit 1997; cf. Dagger 1997).)

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Against the inclusion objection, I reply that it smuggles in an unwarranted antireductionist premise. Were we to accept the objections condition on being a theoretical foundation, then no proposed theoretical foundation f of a true theory t could ever give a reductive explanation of ts truth. That is, the only explanation which f could give of ts truth would operate at the same ontological level as t, for all the theories in f would also be probable characteristic theses of t. But to be probable characteristic theses of t, they would have to operate at the same ontological level as ts characteristic theses. So, for example, were we to accept the objections condition on being a theoretical foundation, then it would be conceptually impossible that the relevant principles of statistical mechanics were the theoretical foundations of the laws of thermodynamics (cf. Nagel 1961, 338-345; Sklar 1993, 333-364), since the principles of statistical mechanics deal with entities inhabiting a more basic ontological level (molecules, kinetic energy) than do those picked out by the laws of thermodynamics (gases, temperature). But this seems too strong a consequence to accept. Statistical mechanics may not provide the theoretical foundations of thermodynamics, but it seems entirely too strong to say that it is conceptually impossible for it to provide those foundations. For the relationship between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics is a paradigm instance of a plausible case of a foundation-superstructure relationship. (This is not to say that statistical mechanics gives us a correct explanation of thermodynamics; see Sklar (1993, 333-374).) So the inclusion objection smuggles into the analysis of theoretical foundations a highly controversial and limiting anti-reductionist condition. Even those who, like myself, deny that all good explanations are reductionist, should agree that this unwarrantedly settles a difficult philosophical question by unargued definitional fiat.

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IV. FOUR ALTERNATIVE FOUNDATIONS Our aim is to identify the theoretical foundations underpinning the characteristic theses specified in Part II. The threefold foundation thesis is my view of what those foundations are. But before presenting and defending that view, I want first to evaluate four alternative views. The aim here is to help us get a better grip on the exact nature of the problem by considering the merits of some alternative solutions, and to give us a better sense of what the adequacy conditions on a solution would be. I shall argue that while each of these four rival solutions is plausible, none ultimately specifies an adequate theoretical foundation for pessimism. The solutions are inspired by the work of Raymond Geuss, George W. Harris, Mark Migotti, John Kekes, and Dienstag. In what follows, I shall consider and try to refute each view in turn. Each of these attempted refutations appeals to the premise that the 27 theses listed above are indeed pessimisms characteristic theses. Some might object to this that it is unlikely that any of these authors would accept that those theses do correctly describe philosophical pessimism: so why think that their views about pessimisms foundations are refuted by appeal to such a premise? That, however, is why I say that these alternative views are inspired by these authors work. They are not directly attributable to these writers themselves. For while I have extracted these views from statements they have made describing the most fundamental features of philosophical pessimism, I am considering these views under a particular interpretation: that they aim to identify the theoretical foundations of philosophical pessimism, itself interpreted to consist in the 27 theses specified above. For remember (vide II.2) that the inquiry here is conditional; we are

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asking: if those 27 theses genuinely are the characteristic theses of pessimism, then what is their theoretical foundation? Hence I do not attribute any of these views of pessimisms foundations to any of the five writers mentioned. IV.1. Let us then consider these four alternative solutions to our problem. The first is inspired by the work of Raymond Geuss. On this view, pessimisms theoretical foundation is The Interest-Thwarting Thesis: The world and human beings are structured such that most of the deepest interests and desires which human beings have will be thwarted.16 This thesis is a somewhat more encompassing variant on Schopenhauers pessimism, the doctrine that happiness is impossible because of the deep structure of the nature of things.17 Let us call the view that the thesis is pessimisms foundation the singlethesis view.18 That view has the following advantages. First, the Thesis describes the core of the philosophical position articulated by the 27 theses. If we think of philosophical pessimism as a position which elaborates upon and articulates a simple picture of human beings and the world, then the Thesis seems admirably to describe that picture. Second, the Thesis seems to capture the basic point which philosophical pessimism wants to make. Suppose that a philosophical pessimist were asked to state in one sentence the message she and her philosophical colleagues wanted to convey to the world. It seems that she could hardly do better than to utter the Interest-Thwarting Thesis. From these considerations, we may infer that the Thesis can justly be labeled the Fundamental Thesis of philosophical pessimism. All these considerations suggest as a conclusion the single thesis view: that the Thesis is pessimisms theoretical foundation.

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This conclusion is plausible but false. For the reasoning backing it fails to satisfy the Entailment Thesis discussed in Part III. For the Interest-Thwarting Thesis obviously cannot entail all 27 of pessimisms characteristic theses. For example, the Thesis obviously does not entail thesis 4: History is linear, not circular or cyclical. For if it did, then one could not consistently deny that latter thesis and accept the Interest-Thwarting Thesis. But clearly one can consistently do that. So the Thesis does not entail thesis 4, and thus does not entail the 27 characteristic theses. If anything, its inferential relation to them seems rather the reverse. It seems to be the conclusion of a fairly strong inductive inference from the characteristic theses, rather than the main premise of a deductive inference to those theses. So, since the Thesis cannot entail all the characteristic theses, the single thesis view does not satisfy the condition laid down by the Entailment Thesis. So the InterestThwarting Thesis cannot be an adequate theoretical foundation for pessimism. It may justly be called pessimisms Fundamental Thesis, but it cannot be the theory on which pessimism is founded. A theorys fundamental thesis is one thing, its theoretical foundation another. IV.2. Let us then turn to another view of pessimisms theoretical foundations, a view which is really two views, which, although not extensionally equivalent, are extensionally very similar. These two views are inspired by the work of George W. Harris and Mark Migotti, though they are not directly attributable to them. They both hold that pessimisms foundations consist of claims about the value or justifiedness of human life. On the Harris- inspired view, pessimisms foundations consist of three theses: H1. The amount of suffering undergone by humans and animals does not justify the existence of humanity; human (and animal?) existence is a tragedy.

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H2. The extent of suffering that is bound to accompany the future of humanity does not justify the continuation of human (and animal?) existence; such continuation is a tragedy. H3. The surplus of bad over good in the continuation of human history is greater than the surplus of bad over good in the existence of humanity; the continuation of human existence is a greater tragedy than the existence of humanity.19

On the Migotti- inspired view, the foundations consist of the following theses: M1. All life in this world is suffering. M2. All striving is vain and futile. M3. Human life is not choiceworthy; no human life is, upon cold and mature reflection, preferable to non-being.20

We have here two plausible views of pessimisms foundations. I believe, however, that they are ultimately false. For they both run afoul of the Entailment Thesis. It is hard to see how the three claims specified by H1-H3, or the three claims given by M1-M3, could entail such characteristic theses as There is constant change to no particular effect. Even were we to interpret M2 to imply that there is constant change, it still would not follow that all of this change was to no particular effect. If this is right, then neither of these views can have identified pessimisms theoretical foundations. Might they then have identified its fundamental theses, in the sense that they describe the core of the philosophical position articulated by the 27 characteristic theses, and capture the basic point which philosophical pessimism wants to make? Perhaps, but I think that the Interest- Thwarting Thesis is a better candidate for that role. My reason is that

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the Harrisian suffering-centered claims and the Migottian life-centered claims do not sufficiently bring out one of the main themes of the characteristic theses: that the world is structured such that many of the deepest human interests will not be realized. The InterestThwarting Thesis, by contrast, does justice to this theme. IV.3. Let us then consider a third view of pessimisms theoretical foundations. This one takes them to consist in claims about badness. The view is inspired by John Kekes work on the pessimism underlying conservatism. Kekes holds that the pessimism underlying conservatism consists of two claims and a definition. K1. Evil is prevalent. K2. Its prevalence is the result of human beings unchangeable propensity to cause it.21 K3. Evil consists in serious and morally unjustifiable harm that human beings inflict on other human beings (Kekes 1998, 69). Now it is obvious that these three claims cannot be the theoretical foundations of philosophical pessimism. For that sort of pessimism is concerned with more than just evil (though it is undeniably concerned with evil). Its main concern is rather with badness, the genus of which evil is a species. This suggests, however, that if we replace the evil in Kekess first two claims with badness, we get a plausible view of philosophical pessimisms foundations, according to which they are the two claims: K1'. Badness is prevalent (in the world). K2'. Its prevalence is the result of human beings unchangeable propensity to cause it.

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So now we have a plausible badness-centered view of pessimisms foundations. It is inspired by Kekess work on the pessimism underlying conservatism, but it is not attributable to Kekes. Does, then, the view give an adequate account of pessimisms foundations? I think not, for it does not satisfy the Justification Thesis described in Part III. It is hard to see how the justifiedness of K1' and K2' would justify accepting all 27 of the characteristic theses. Suppose both the former claims are justified. How would this justify us in accepting, say, the sixteenth characteristic thesis, according to which reason undermines happiness by destroying illusions? In order for the two claims to transfer their justifiedness to characteristic thesis 16, they would have to lend at least some inductive support to the thesis. But to do so, they would at least have to mention something concerning reason or happiness. Since they do not, it seems they do not lend the theses any inductive support. So it seems that their justifiedness cannot transfer to the thesis. Hence this badness-centered view of pessimisms foundations runs aground on the Justification Thesis. It cannot, therefore, be an adequate account of pessimisms foundations. IV.4. The fourth and final view we should consider is inspired by Joshua Dienstags work. According to this view, pessimisms theoretical foundations are the following theses: D1. Time is a burden. D2. The course of history is ironic. D3. Freedom and happiness are incompatible. D4. Human existence is absurd.22

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Dienstag maintains that these four theses are, in their bluntest form, the characteristic theses of pessimism. He then goes on to show that the characteristic theses give a good analysis of these four basic theses. He suggests that the 27 characteristic theses are (roughly) all and only those theses we should use in analyzing the four basic theses.23 Obviously, if that analysis is right, then the claim that these four theses are the foundations of pessimism would fall afoul of the Non-equivalence Thesis described in Part III. So on that interpretation, the four theses could not constitute pessimisms foundation. Suppose, however, that we drop Dienstags claim that the four theses are intended as analytically equivalent to the 27 characteristic theses of pessimism. Suppose, instead, that we construe these four theses to have their common-sense, ordinary language meanings. They would then not mean the same as the 27 characteristic theses. The view that these four theses constitute pessimisms foundations would no longer violate the Nonequivalence Thesis. We would then have a plausible candidate for pessimisms theoretical foundations. However, the four theses under this interpretation would still fall afoul of the Entailment Thesis. For on that thesis, propositions p, q, r can be the theoretical foundations of propositions t, u, v only if p, q, r together entail t, u, v. Now taken in their commonsense, ordinary language meanings, the four basic theses D1-D4 evidently do not entail all 27 characteristic theses. Take just one example: the ninth characteristic thesis: There is constant change to no particular effect. How will any combination of D1-D4, construed to have their common-sense, ordinary language meanings, entail that thesis? D1Time is a burdenis a claim about time and the human relation to it. D2The course of history is ironicis a claim about history, the humanly significant past: it says that history heads in

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ways contrary to what would be expected. D3Freedom and happiness are incompatibleis a claim about freedom and happiness. And D4Human existence is absurdconcerns our relation to our existence. Now There is constant change to no particular effect is a claim about the momentousness of the changes that occur in the flow of events. How can any combination of D1 through D4 entail a claim about such momentousness? It seems that no such combination could entail such a claim. So, taken in their common-sense meanings, D1 through D4 probably do not entail at least one of pessimisms characteristic theses. Hence the four theses specified by Dienstag, even under this interpretation, could not be pessimisms theoretical foundations.

V. PESSIMISMS THREEFOLD FOUNDATION I must now show that the theoretical foundations for pessimisms characteristic theses are three theories: the algesic theory of human nature, the hamartiac theory of human reason, and the eikaic theory of the universe. To show this, I shall first explicate the theories. I shall then try to prove that they constitute an adequate theoretical foundation for pessimism. Again, I neither claim nor imply that any of these three theories is true; in fact, I think that each of them is largely false. So it is no objection to my argument here that one or more of the theories is probably false. What I want to argue is that these are pessimisms theoretical foundations, regardless of whether they or pessimism itself are ultimately false. V.1. The algesic theory of human nature is so-called because it describes humans

as naturally prone to pain and suffering: in medical lingo, algesic. The theory holds that human beings are essentially mortal and conscious of it, acutely conscious of times passing, prone to keenly desire what they cannot achieve and what cannot be, prone to

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believe what they strongly desire to be true, prone to suffer when they (realize they) cannot fulfill their desires or when their desire-driven beliefs are undermined, prone to keenly desire that everything come out well, and prone to believe that things in general get better. The algesic theory aims to explain and unify the welter of phenomena presented to us by our experience of ourselves and of other human beings. It is a theory of human nature in the sense that it specifies traits which seem fairly universally manifested by human beings, traits which it implies are quite difficult to change. The hamartiac theory of human reason takes its name from how it characterizes human reason. Hamartia, in Aristotelian poetics, refers to the fault or error which confounds the tragic hero (cp. Oxford English Dictionary). The hamartiac theory accordingly holds that human theoretical reason is a powerful tool for discovering the truth of things; but when using practical reason, humans tend to set themselves ends their pursuit of which leads to bad or unwanted consequences. The hamartiac theory aims to characterize the propensities of human reason. It thus tries to identify those consequences which human reason tends to produce. On the theory, reason in its theoretical aspect often tends to get at, or get closer to, the truth of things. But reason in its practical aspect tends to set ends of a particular kind. These ends are such that, given fairly invariant facts about human beings, their pursuit of these ends will predictably lead to bad or unwanted consequences. For example, Julie may set herself the end of being a leading ballerina. But, given fairly invariant facts about human beings, her pursuing this end will probably lead to bad or unwanted consequences, as well as good. For example, she may achieve the end, but at the expense of having downtrodden and humiliated several members of the corps du ballet.

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The eikaic theory of the universe is so-called because it describes the universe as purposeless and disordered: in ancient Greek, eikaios (Liddell and Scott). Thus the eikaic theory holds that the universe and the flow of events have no propensity to make things in general get better; so too, they are both replete with change, chance, and unexpected events. The eikaic theory has two prongs. The first denies that the universe has any structure or order such that good will eventually preponderate over bad. It should not be confused with a declinist theory, a theory holding that the universe is structured such that bad will eventually preponderate over good. The eikaic theory takes no position on that question. It simply denies that the universe has general goodness as a telos. The theorys second prong concerns the amount of randomness in the universe. It holds that there is a great deal of such randomness. The theory implies that no matter which spatiotemporal expanse of the universe you choose, you will find it replete with randomness and unexpected events. The theory does not deny that regular and discoverable causal connections exist. Nor does it deny that we can often successfully predict future events, especially small-scale physical events in the immediate future. It simply claims that unpredictable flux and randomness are fundamental and ubiquitous features of the universe. V.2. I want now to defend the threefold foundation thesis. I shall argue for it by

showing that the three theories specified by the thesis satisfy all four of my necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being an adequate account of a theorys foundations. Schematically, the argument runs: 1. Propositions p, q, r are an adequate theoretical foundation of the position given by propositions t, u, v just in case (1) p, q, r entail t, u, v; (2) p, q, rs being justified

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would itself justify accepting t, u, v; (3) p, q, r are not semantically equivalent to t, u, v; and (4) if t, u, v are true, then p, q, rs being true would plausibly explain why. (From Part IIIs explication of being an adequate theoretical foundation) 2. The algesic, hamartiac, and eikaic theories entail pessimisms 27 characteristic theses. (Premise) 3. They are also such that their being justified would itself justify accepting the characteristic theses. (Premise) 4. But they are not semantically equivalent to the characteristic theses. (Premise)

5. If the theses are true, then the theories being true would be an integral part of a plausible explanation of why. (Premise) 6. (From 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Therefore, the theories are an adequate theoretical foundation of philosophical pessimism. (The threefold foundation thesis) I defended premise 1 in Part III. So I turn to defending the other premises. The second premise is surely plausible. All one need do to verify it is to look over the three theories and then ask, of each characteristic thesis, whether it is entailed by some combination of the three theories. For example, take the sixteenth thesis: Reason undermines happiness by destroying illusions. This is entailed by combining three propositions of the algesic theory of human nature with a proposition of the hamartiac theory of human reason, as follows. Take first these three propositions of the algesic theory: AP1. Human beings are prone to keenly desire what cannot be. AP2. Human beings are prone to believe what they strongly desire to be true.

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AP3. Human beings are prone to suffer when they (realize they) cannot fulfill their desires or when their desire-driven beliefs are undermined. And combine it with the following proposition of the hamartiac theory: HP1. Human theoretical reason is a powerful tool for discovering the truth of things. The four propositions together entail the thesis. For on the one hand, they claim that human beings are prone to desire the impossible, and to believe what they strongly desire to be true, and suffer when they realize its impossibility. On the other hand, they claim that human theoretical reason reliably gets at the truth of things. Hence reason will lead (many) human beings to realize that their desire-driven beliefs are false, and thus cause them to suffer. So, since desire-driven false beliefs are illusions, reason undermines happiness by destroying illusions. Hence the three theories together entail the thesis. Mutatis mutandis, we could run the same proof for any of the other 26 theses. So the premise is probably true. The third premise does not require much defense. For if the foregoing argument to show that the theories entail the theses succeeded, then if the theories are justified, the theses are also justified. The reason, again, is that entailment is justification-preserving. If a proposition p is justified, and p entails q, then q is also justified. So this premise is probably true. The fourth premise maintains that the theories are not semantically equivalent to the theses. This premise I defend as follows. If p, q, r are semantically equivalent to t, u, v, then p, q, r are true if, and only if, t, u, v are true. But if p, q, r are true if and only if t, u, v are true, then t, u, v are true only if p, q, r are true. So if the theses and theories are semantically equivalent, then the theses are true only if the theories are true. But it is false

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that the theses are true only if the theories are true. So the theses and theories are not semantically equivalent. My argument for the last premise in the above paragraph runs as follows. Suppose that all the theses are true. Now suppose that the eikaic theory is false. Say that it is false because in fact the universe and the flow of events are not replete with change, chance, and unexpected events. Suppose that there is simply a moderate amount of such change and chance. Now surely it is possible that this is the case and yet all the characteristic theses are true. Surely the eikaic theory can be false in this way and yet all 27 of pessimisms characteristic theses can be true. Yet if so, then it is false that the theses are true only if the theories are true. For we have found a possible case in which (some of) the theories are false and all the characteristic theses are true. And if there is such a possible case, then the theories being true is not a necessary condition for the theses being true. Hence, if there is such a case, then it is false that the theses are true only if the theories are true. So the last premise in the above paragraph is true. Thus the theses and theories are not semantically equivalent. The fifth and final premise maintains that if the theses are true, then the theories being true would be an integral part of a plausible explanation of why. This premise I defend as follows. p plausibly explains the truth of q, r, s just in case p specifies an event the occurrence of which it is plausible to think caused q, r, s to be true. Now suppose that pessimisms characteristic theses are true. In this case, if the theories are also true, then it is plausible to think that the truth of the theories caused the theses to be true. A quick review of the theses and the theories will confirm this. So, since being a cause of is sufficient for being an integral part of a plausible explanation of, this premise is probably true.

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So if my arguments here are right, the premises in the argument are probably true. Hence my three theories probably identify an adequate theoretical foundation for pessimism. Given this, and given that we have refuted four alternative views of pessimisms foundations, it seems probable that these three theories have identified the best or the true theoretical foundations of pessimism.

VI. CONCLUSION I have argued for the threefold foundation thesis, the view that pessimisms theoretical foundations consist of three theories: the algesic theory of human nature, the hamartiac theory of human reason, and the eikaic theory of the universe. If my arguments are right, then pessimism is a philosophical position with the following three-tiered structure. The first tier is the positions core: the 27 theses presented in Part II. The second tier is then the fundamental thesis of philosophical pessimism, which is The Interest-Thwarting Thesis: The world and human beings are structured such that most of the deepest interests and desires which human beings have will be thwarted. These two tiers together may be said to comprise philosophical pessimism. The third tier then consists of pessimisms theoretical foundations. They are not themselves part of the position, but they underpin, justify, entail, and help explain it. If my thesis is true, this gives us a deeper understanding of the famous conflict between pessimism and progressivism, the view that it is possible for us to make progress and improve the world. For it seems impossible that progressivism, in any form, could rest on the algesic, hamartiac, and eikaic theories. Surely it must rest on fundamentally different theories of human nature, human reason, and the universe. Hence the quarrel

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between pessimism and progressivism is not a cousins quarrel, like that between liberalism and socialism. The latter is a quarrel between parties who accept roughly the same sort of foundation for their viewssay, that social conditions be justifiable to everyonebut quarrel over which views that foundation entails.24 Instead, the quarrel between pessimism and progressivism is one between parties who root their clashing viewpoints in foundations which themselves clash. Now of course the inquiry here broaches more questions than it answers. First, are the three theories true? What evidence would count for or against them? Second, if they are false, what should we think of the truth-value of pessimism? Since the theories together entail pessimism, but are not entailed by it, proving the theories false would not refute pessimism itself. For denying the antecedent is a fallacy. Yet if the theories were false, this would seem to undermine pessimism, somehow. In what sense would it be undermined? These are only some of the questions that arise when we consider the gloomy view of humankind which pessimism offers.25

REFERENCES Achinstein, Peter. 1968. Concepts of Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Alvarez Matinnen, Bertha. 2009. The Metaphysical Foundations of Reproductive Ethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26: 190-204. Armstrong, David. 1973. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Canto-Sperber, Monique. 2006. The Normative Foundations of Cosmopolitanism.

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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 265-81. Carter, Alan. 2004. Some Theoretical Foundations for Radical Green Politics. Environmental Values 13: 305-28. Clarke, J. J. 1970. Sunt Lacrimae Rerum: A Study in the Logic of Pessimism. Philosophy 45: 193-209. Clegg, Jerry. 1980. Freud and the Issue of Pessimism. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 61: 37-50. Conrad, Mark. 2004. God, Suicide, and the Meaning of Life in the Films of Woody Allen. Woody Allen and Philosophy, ed. Mark Conrad and Aeon Skoble. Chicago: Open Court: 7-23. Dagger, Richard. 1997. Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dienstag, Joshua. 2006. The Anatomy of Pessimism. Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 3-49. Dworkin, Ronald. 1985. Liberalism. A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 181-204. Fernndez, Jordi. 2006. Schopenhauers Pessimism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 646-64. Garrett, Jeremy. 2008. History, Tradition, and the Normative Foundations of Civil Marriage. The Monist 91: 446-74. Geuss, Raymond. 1998. Art and Theodicy. Morality, Culture, and History: Essays in German Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 78-115. Gotthelf, Allan. 1999. A Biological Provenance. Philosophical Studies 94: 35-56. Gray, John. 2002. Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. London: Granta. -------------. 2004. Heresies: Against Progress and Other Illusions. London: Granta.

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Harris, George. 2006. Reasons Grief: An Essay on Tragedy and Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hart, H. L. A. 1968/2004. Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment. Punishment and Responsibility, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1-27. Holmes, Stephen. 1995. The Liberal Idea. Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 13-41. Janaway, Christopher. 1999. Schopenhauers Pessimism. The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, ed. Christopher Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 318-43. Jarvie, Ian. 2004. Arguing Interpretations: The Pragmatic Optimism of Woody Allen. Woody Allen and Philosophy, ed. Mark Conrad and Aeon Skoble. Chicago: Open Court: 48-65. Kekes, John. 1998. What Is Conservatism? A Case for Conservatism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 27-47. Larmore, Charles. 1999. The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism. Journal of Philosophy 96: 599-625. Lefkowitz, David. 2008. On the Foundation of Rights to Political Self- Determination. Journal of Social Philosophy 39: 492-511. Liddell, Henry and R. Scott. 1940. eikaios. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised by H. Jones. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Machery, Edouard. 2006.Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 1: 398-412. Martin, John. 2008. The lover of the beautiful and the good: Platonic foundations of aesthetic and moral value. Synthese 165: 31-51. Migotti, Mark. 1995. Schopenhauers Pessimism and the Unconditioned Good. Journal of the History of Philosophy 33: 643-60.

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Nagel, Ernest. 1961. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Newey, Glen. 2006. Grays Blues: Pessimism as a Political Project. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9: 263-84. Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Oxford English Dictionary. hamartia. http://oed.com. Accessed 2 June 2010. Pettit, Philip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Rawls, John. 1999. Two Concepts of Rules. Collected Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 20-46. Raz, Joseph. 1994. Authority, Law, and Morality. Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 210-37. Riley, Jonathan. 1988. Liberal Utilitarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sklar, Lawrence. 1993. Physics and Chance: Philosophical Issues in the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1975. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ------------------. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. Waldron, Jeremy. 1985 Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism. Philosophical Quarterly 37: 127-50. Wicks, Robert. 2008. Natural Beauty and Optimism in Schopenhauers Aesthetics. European Journal of Philosophy 16: 273-91. Williams, Mary. 1985. Species Are Individuals: Theoretical Foundations for the Claim. Philosophy of Science 52: 576-90.

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NOTES
1

For a perceptive analysis of some of Schopenhauers less-known criticisms of

optimism and its lures, see Wicks 2008.

2 3

Although see Clegg 1980 for argument that Freud was not a philosophical pessimist. See for discussion Conrad 2004. But for argument that Allen is not a philosophical

pessimist, see Jarvie 2004.

4 5 6

See Benatar 2006. See Gray 2002; Gray 2004, Pt. 1. For useful discussion, see Newey 2006. Kekes (1998, 41-45) claims that pessimism is one of the four bases of conservatism.

A case in point is John Gray, whose pessimism led him for a time to embrace Oakeshottian conservatism. On this, see Newey 2006, 271-3.
7 8 9

For a more thorough analysis of the concept of a theory, see Achinstein 1968, 122-29. According to Dienstag, Schopenhauer answers Yes, Nietzsche No. The arguments for this view, in effect, extend the length of the book. Alvarez Matinnen 2009, 199; Waldron 1985, 128; Canto-Sperber 2006, 272. Lefkowitz 2008, 492; Garrett 2008, 446; Machery 2006, 398, 403-4. Martin 2008, 32, 46; Carter 2004, 317, 323; Williams 1985, 585. See Gotthelf (1999, 44), arguing that Aristotles metaphysics is a foundation of his

10 11 12 13

biology in that the biology instantiates and embodies the metaphysical theories.
14 15

In the sense of answering, How is it possible that t, u, v? See Nozick 1981, 11. For a useful anatomy of liberalisms core policies, as opposed to its underlying

principles, see Holmes 1995, 13-41.

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16

Geuss (1998, 88) attributes something very like this thesis to Schopenhauer as his

central doctrine.
17 18

For explication of this doctrine, see Fernndez (2006, 647-649), and Janaway (1999). Again, the view is inspired by some remarks made in Geuss (1998, 88). But the view

is not attributable to Geuss himself.

19

Harris 2006, 33. Note that Harris there claims that these theses comprise

philosophical pessimism. So he is not claiming that they are pessimisms foundations.

20

In fact, Migotti (1995, 645-6) holds that these three theses are the best candidates for

being the core of Schopenhauers pessimistic point of view. So he is not committed to thinking that they are also the theoretical foundations of pessimism tout court.
21

Cp. the view of Clarke (1970, 194-5), that it is because man is incapable of

transforming himself that his life is considered [by pessimism] a matter for anguish and regret.
22

See Dienstag (2006, 19), arguing that the characteristic theses of pessimism are, in

their bluntest form, as follows: that time is a burden; that the course of history is in some sense ironic; that freedom and happiness are incompatible; and that human existence is absurd.
23

See, e.g., Dienstag (2006, 19), just after presenting the four base theses: What does

it mean to think of time as a burden? He then goes on to offer several of the characteristic theses as specifying the meaning of this basic thesis.
24

Liberals say strong protection of, and emphasis on, private property and relatively

free markets. Socialists dispute this. For discussion, see Waldron 1985, passim.
25

For helpful comments on the arguments presented here, I thank IDENTIFYING

INFORMATION OMITTED.

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