Updates on the Fukushima Accident - Plant Status, Findings and Impacts Wednesday, 18 April 2012 Yoichiro Kishimoto

Unit 1

Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, Feb. 26, 2012, The Yomiuri Shimbun
An aerial photo taken by Taro Konishi from a aircraft Mirai. The no-fly zone around the plant was narrowed from a radius of 20 kilometers to three kilometers on February 25.

Temperature at the Bottom of Reactor Pressure Vessel

200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
Cold Shutdown Declared on Dec. 16, 2011

Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3

Source: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/f1/index5-e.html Note: Failed measurements at Unit 2 between Feb. 1 and Feb. 23 were deleted.

Status of Reactors: Units 1 to 4

As of April 7, 2012

unit status
Core (No. of FA)

Unit 1
Covered R/B
Melt began at 4 hours(400)

Unit 2
Borescope Observation
Melt began at 77 hours(548)

Unit 3
Debris Removal
Melt began at 44 hours(548)

Unit 4
Debris Removal
-

remarks
Analysis by TEPCO, Mar. 12, 2012

RPV

Water flow rate (m3/h) T () Nitrogen

6.5 24.7
injected

9.1 49.9
injected

7.1 55.3
injected

Total 22.7 x 24 = 544.8 m3/d

Bottom temperature

PCV

Gas Treatment Facility

Nitrogen No. of FA

Installed Dec. 8, 11
injected 392

Installed Oct. 28, 11

injected 615

Planned
injected 566

1,535

Dehumidified, Filtered, Monitored and Exhausted

SF Pool

T ()

14.0 Built

14.4
-

14.2
Not yet announced

24
Planned

Cooled by circulating water system

Building Cover

Video Image Scope

Source: Mar 26, 2012, Result of the second investigation inside of Primary Containment Vessels, Unit 2,Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Handouts at press conference, TEPCO

Upper Surface of Grating

Internal wall of PCV

Source: Investigation inside of Primary Containment Vessel, Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi NPS, January 19, 2012, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Source: Result of the second investigation inside of Primary Containment Vessels, 7 Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Handouts at press conference, Mar 26, 2012.

Source: Mar 27, 2012Result of the dose measurement in the second investigation inside of Primary Containment Vessels, Unit 2, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Handouts at press conference, TEPCO

Source: Changes in radioactive concentration and air dose rate at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, December 3, 2011, 9 Handouts at press conference, Tokyo Electric Power Company

Spent Fuel Pool

10

Removal of Overhead Traveling Crane Girder from Unit 4 R/B

A cover structure (69mL x 31mW x 53mH) with a overhead crane will be constructed from next summer. (March 7, 2012)

Source: Removal Works of Debris on the Upper Part of the Reactor Building of Unit 4 in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, March 6, 2012, Handouts at press conference, Tokyo Electric Power Company 11

Fukushima Accident Investigation Committees

Japanese Governments Investigation Committee (1) Primary organization Committee chaired by
Established/Start ed

Diets Investigation Committee (2) The National Diet Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
The Act was enforced on Oct. 7, 2011. Members were appointed on Dec. 8, 2011.

Independent Investigation Commission (3) Private Think Tank Koichi Kitazawa, former Chairman of the Japan Science and Technology Agency
Established in September 2011. Announced on Nov. 15, 2011.

The Japanese Government Yotaro Hatamura, Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo
Cabinet decision on May 24, 2011

Reports

The Interim Report released on Dec. 26, 2011. Expected to submit a report six months after the start of the The final report will be investigation, i.e., in June. English version will be compiled in late July, ready in summer 2012. 2012.

Final report in Japanese and not for sale on Feb. 28, 2012. Published by Mar. 11. 2012.

(1) http://icanps.go.jp/ (2) http://www.naiic.jp/ (3) http://rebuildjpn.org/en/fukushima/infobox 12

Immediate cause of the accident

[Reference: Private Independent Investigation Commission Report]

Immediate cause of the accident is insufficient preparedness against tsunami which caused the loss of power and a number of equipment failures. The release of radioactivity could not be suppressed because alternative water injection measures could not have been utilized as required. The reasons for these are the lack of preparedness for severe accident and the confusion of communication system. In the background, limited communication and transportation measures in a complex disaster and deteriorated working environment caused by hydrogen explosion could be pointed out.
13

Findings
2011 East Japan Earthquake was Beyond All Expectations
It is thought that the hypocenter area extends widely from the region off-shore of Iwate to Ibaraki prefectures. The Earthquake Research Committee has evaluated earthquake motion and tsunami for the individual region, the off-shore of Miyagi prefecture and the area from the off-shore south of Sanriku along the trench to the south off-shore of Ibaraki prefecture, but occurrence of the earthquake that is linked to all of these regions has been out of hypothesis. (March 11, 2011, Earthquake Research Committee, Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion)
[Comment] We need pertinent anticipation of disasters. Our use of science in both predicting and preparing disasters has to be improved. 14

Findings
Tsunami Design Basis of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (1) Tsunami design basis was updated in 2002 based on the published guideline by Japan Society of Civil Engineers, and the maximum wave height was increased from 3.122m to 5.7m.
The position of the lower end of seawater pumps was raised to 5.8m above sea level on 2002 update.

The estimated height of 2011 tsunami was 13 m.*1

In July 2002 the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion released Long-term Evaluation of Earthquake Occurrence and a possibility of earthquake with magnitude of about M8.2 was pointed out in the near plate boundaries area from off Fukushima to off Chiba where no earthquake is in recorded history.
*1 The height at the tide station was estimated to be 13m. Observed heights of water
immersion ranged from about 11.5m to about 15.5m above sea level in Units 1 to 4 area where the ground level is 10m above sea level. 15

Findings
Tsunami Design Basis of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (2)
In 2009 a geologist called attention to a possible larger scale earthquake including AD 869 Jogan seismic source in off Fukushima area at the Joint Working Group on Earthquake-Tsunami and Geology-Ground at NISA. Various seismic motions from individual seismic source had seriously been considered as the external input forces to NPP, however, the probabilistic methodology for the estimation of tsunami height had been under development. Furthermore, the occurrence of multiple earthquakes and tsunamis from spatially-distant focal faults in a wider area simultaneously or sequentially in complex cascades of events had never been assumed to be a seismic design basis. Those involved in the nuclear regulation failed to adequately consider the risks of external events, especially those intrinsic to the Japanese archipelago and surrounding areas. 16

Quick Review of Major Events/Problems

Station Black Out
Electric System Equipments Damaged by the Earthquake Is Accident Due to Earthquake and/or Aging ? Tsunami Attacked

What was the Tsunami and the Earthquake? IC Operation in Unit 1 --- An Example of Emergency Response Failure Findings
17

Station Blackout in Units 1 to 5 at Fukushima Dai-ichi NP Station

Time Events

Unit 1
BWR- 3 460 MWe Operated

Unit 2
BWR- 4 784 MWe Operated

Unit 3
BWR- 4 784 MWe Operated

Unit 4
BWR- 4 784 MWe

Unit 5
BWR- 4 784 MWe

Unit 6
BWR- 5 1100 MWe

Before the earthquake 14:46 Earthquake External power 14:4714:48 15:27 15:35 15:3715:41 Emergency DG 1st and 2nd Tsunami Waves Emergency DG power lost DC Power

Periodic Inspection Shutdown Lost 1 checked 1 started Lost 2 started Lost 3 started

Automatic Shutdown (All control rods fully inserted.) Lost 2 started Lost 2 started Lost 2 started

All the sea water pumps for cooling lost at 15:38 15:42. An air-cooled D/G at Unit 6 survived. 2 DG lost at 15:37 Lost Mar. 22 (11 days ) 2 DG lost at 15:41 Lost Mar. 20 (9 days) 2 DG lost at 15:38 Yes (1) Mar. 22 (11 days) 2 DG lost at 15:38 Lost Mar. 22 (11 days) 2 DG lost at 15:40 Yes 2 DG lost at 15:36 Yes -

Started reception of External Power (Blackout days)

(1) The DC power system in Unit 3 lasted for at least 8 hours, probably 13 hours, and then ran out. 18

Example of Damages of Breakers, Isolators, Insulators, etc.

Air Blast Breaker

Damaged Breaker Insulator

The base to support stays was deformed. The stays were installed to enhance resistance to earthquake.
19

Damaged Breakers, Isolating Switches, etc.

20

Before the Earthquake

After Coseismic Landsliding

21

The groundwater level existed in the embankment. The slope failure of embankment occurred because the foundation strength at the groundwater level decreased since the embankment was subject to repeated stresses by long-running strong ground motion.

Collapsed Embankment by Landslide

Source: Feb. 17, 2012

22

Seismic Impact to Buildings and Major Components Analyzed

The impact of the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake to the buildings and structures of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (Units 1 6), Fukushima Dai-ni NPS (Units 1 4), was analyzed. Responses of major seven components in R/B and T/B to the seismic motion were analyzed and confirmed to be within the safe limits. Major seven components were: (1) control rods, (2) core support structure, (3) residual heat removal pumps, (4) residual heat removal piping, (5) RPV, (6) PCV and (7) main steam piping. The equipments such as the isolation condenser piping in Unit 1 and the high pressure coolant injection system piping in Unit 3 whose integrity against earthquake was questioned were assessed for seismic responses. The results were within the safe limits and indicated that they kept safety function during and after the earthquake.

23

Damaged buildings and structures assessed and reinforced

The damaged buildings and structures of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS were assessed for seismic safety. The shear strain of the seismic wall was analyzed to have safe margin to that corresponding to the ultimate limit state of reinforced concrete, therefore, the impact of the earthquake could not have adverse effects on the seismically important components . The analysis of the Unit 3 and 4 whose upper part of the reactor buildings were intricately damaged was performed using detailed three dimensional model and assuming stiffness degradation of floor and wall due to explosion, fire and pool water temperature rise. The results were within safe limits. The bottom part of the spent fuel pool in the Unit 4 was reinforced, and it was confirmed that the stress was reduced by about 20 percent. (February 8, 2012)
24

Impact of the Aging Degradation of Equipment and Systems

The impact of the aging degradation of equipment and systems on the initiation, the evolution and the escalation of the event into a severe accident was analyzed with conservative assumption of 60 years degradation. The past analyses of Unit 1, 2 and 3 aging degradation for 60 years for all the components important to safety with old standard earthquake motion were reviewed using the input earthquake motion of this time. It was confirmed that the impact were well within the allowable range of safety design.

25

 With the evaluation based on the latest knowledge, it's highly unlikely that there were aging and earthquake impacts to lose function of equipment and systems important to safety.

It is also highly unlikely that the aging degradation was the cause of the accident initiation and escalation before the accident escalated to exceed the design conditions.
(February 7, 2012)

26

The hypocenter of this earthquake was located in B area which was off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture, as shown in Figure above, and the rupture was estimated to have propagated simultaneously from the hypocenter to the area in the north and to the areas off Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures in the south. It is estimated that the rupture started at the hypocenter propagated westwards to area A, and further spread to the area east to area B. The area with large slip was east to northeast side of the rupturing start point (shallower than the hypocenter) and the maximum slip was about 30 m (up to 50 m). The areas with large slip is distributed in northeast side of the seismic source. Results of slip distribution analysis by the JMA and tsunami analysis by Fujii and Satake indicate that a large slip at the shallow plate boundary in the east side of the start point of rupturing is a factor that brought about the large tsunami.
Source: Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, June 2011 27

The March 11 Tsunami Recorded Off Kamaishi

This tsunami had already been recorded by ocean bottom pressure gauges in the sea off Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, immediately after the earthquake (see diagram). These ocean bottom pressure gauges are connected to seafloor cables laid by the Earthquake Research Institute, The University of Tokyo, one at a depth of 1,600m (TM1) some 76km out to sea and the other at 1,000m (TM2) 47km from the shore. Tsunami wave 1, recorded as a gradual rise in the offshore sea level, was caused by movement of the seafloor within about 100km from the coast. Tsunami wave 2, recorded next as a sharp rise in sea level, was caused by movement of the seafloor near the Japan Trench, even further out to sea.

Source: Kenji SATAKE, Using Ocean Bottom Observation to Elucidate the Mechanism of Earthquakes and Tsunamis, Ship & Ocean Newsletter No.269 October 20, 2011 28

B. Short-period

Superposition of A and B.
NPS North American Plate

A. Long-period
Tsunami wave

large-amplitude Tsunami wave Pacific Plate

Interplate Earthquake

Tsunami Earthquake

A relatively long-period wave caused by interplate type earthquake and a short-period large-amplitude wave generated along trench axis shortly thereafter were superposed to create a giant tsunami at the coast.
Source:

29

Tsunami Attacked Fukushima Daiichi NPP, March 11, 2011

The first waves of about 4m high arrived at 15:27. The second waves arrived at 15:35 were the overlapped high waves of about 15m.

Wave Height at 1.5km Offshore 4m

The second waves arrived. Off scale.

30

New Findings on Earthquake from

the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake
1.

Sequential movements of seismic segments in focal area near the plate boundary
Fault slip amount was more than expected. Sequential and complex movements of asperities and seismic segments in a broad focal area caused large seismic movements and tsunamis.

2.

Superposition of two tsunamis; one caused by interplate earthquake and the other produced by earthquake at near trench axis
Relatively long-period waves generated by interplate earthquake and shortperiod large-amplitude waves produced near trench axis shortly thereafter were superposed to cause waves with large amplitude at the coast.

3.

Induced seismic activity in continental plate by a large scale tectonic deformation

A very large tectonic deformation influenced a broad stress field in continental plate and some normal fault type earthquakes were induced.
Even if the separation distance between two faults on a line is more than 5 kilometers, the possibility of coupled motion should be assessed by evaluating the tectonics and stress accumulation.

Source: ,,,

31

Station Blackout in Units 1 to 5 at Fukushima Dai-ichi NP Station

Time Events

Unit 1
BWR- 3 460 MWe Operated

Unit 2
BWR- 4 784 MWe Operated

Unit 3
BWR- 4 784 MWe Operated

Unit 4
BWR- 4 784 MWe

Unit 5
BWR- 4 784 MWe

Unit 6
BWR- 5 1100 MWe

Before the earthquake 14:46 Earthquake External power 14:4714:48 15:27 15:35 Emergency DG 1st and 2nd Tsunami Waves

Periodic Inspection Shutdown Lost 1 checked 1 started Lost 2 started Lost 3 started

Automatic Shutdown (All control rods fully inserted.) Lost 2 started Lost 2 started Lost 2 started

All the sea water pumps for cooling lost at 15:38 15:42. An air-cooled D/G in Unit 6 survived.

15:3715:41
-

Emergency DG power lost in Units 1 to 4

DC Power

2 DG lost at 15:37
Lost Mar. 22 (11 days )

2 DG lost at 15:41
Lost Mar. 20 (9 days)

2 DG lost at 15:38
Yes (1) Mar. 22 (11 days)

2 DG lost at 15:38
Lost Mar. 22 (11 days)

2 DG lost at 15:40
(Powered by DG of Unit 6)

2 DG lost at 15:36 1 DG saved

Yes

Yes

Started reception of External Power (Blackout days)

(1) The DC power system in Unit 3 lasted for at least 8 hours, probably 13 hours, 32 and then ran out.

Isolation Condenser (IC) in Unit 1

Water 100 t

Atmospheric Discharge

Reactor Pressure Vessel

IC (A)

IC (B)

fire extinguishing system

Makeup water system

Reactor Building

33

Failure to Operate Isolation Condenser (IC) at Unit 1 (1)

1. In the Unit 1 reactor there is a residual heat removal system called Isolation Condenser (IC) which is operable without power supply. The IC has a large tank of 110 m3 capacity (water capacity: 100t) in which cooling pipe is placed. Two ICs are installed. The cooling pipes which connect IC tank and RPV have motordriven isolation valves, one in the inlet tube and the other in the outlet tube. The inlet valve had always been open. When the valve in the outlet tube leading to RPV was opened, the steam in the RPV would flow into the cooling pipe by itself and the steam would be cooled by the water in the tank to return back. Six minutes after the earthquake, at 14:52, the ICs started up automatically following the pressure rise in RPV. After the SBO the operator in the control room could not know the status of the IC since it was dark and there was no indication of instrumentation. The ECCS could not work because of the loss of AC power, and most of the core-cooling functions were lost. 34

2. 3.

4.

Failure to Operate Isolation Condenser (IC) at Unit 1 (2)

5. Manual operation of the isolation condenser in Unit 1 could be possible in in the event of power loss, however, the plant operator in charge had no experience of the operation. 6. At 17:50 the operator tried to confirm the water level in the condenser at the 4-th floor of R/B, but the access was avoided because of higher radiation level. 7. At 18:18 some lights on the control panel went on and two of the valves which should be open if the IC was operating were indicated to be closed. Then these valves were opened at the panel, however, one of them was closed at 18:25 since it was assumed that the IC had not been in operation. 8. The recent analysis by TEPCO showed that the core damage initiated at 4 hours after the earthquake and that the damage to the RPV started at 01:50 am, 11 hours after the earthquake. (The Yomiuri Shimbun, March 12, 2012) 9. If the IC operation was resumed manually within two hours after SBO before radiation level went up significantly, the core could 35 have been successfully cooled down.

Findings
Severe Accident Management
Severe accident management programs for NPP in Japan had been prepared only for the accidents initiated by internal events. All the measures that had been prepared for severe accident management program at Fukushima Daiichi NPP were not effective after the loss of electric power, i.e., the external power, the emergency diesel generators and the DC power for instrumentation. No alternative power source had been included in the program. Manual operation of the isolation condenser in Unit 1 could be possible in in the event of power loss, however, the plant operator in charge had no experience of the operation.
36

Responses of the Government

Observations Shown in the Report of Private Independent Investigation Commission

1. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was set up in the office of the Prime Minister at 19:03 Mar. 11, and the confusion in the responses at the headquarters and the insufficient information sharing among the headquarters and TEPCO resulted in poor cooperation among relevant organizations. 2. It is not clear whether the intervention by the Prime Minister's office in the operation at NPP was useful to the prevention of disaster. It is undeniable that it could have increased unnecessary confusion and risks to develop accident.
37

Responses of the Government

Observations Shown in the Report of Private Independent Investigation Commission

3. Many people in Japan looked for information frantically in fear of nuclear accident and radioactivity, however, the government failed to be a trustworthy supplier of reliable information. Communication to the international community which has concern about the release of radioactivity and evacuation was further poor. 4. One of the causes of social confusion to radiation exposure lies in the insufficient scientific understanding of low level radiation exposure.
The government compared the exposure to radiation from accidental releases with the dose to X-ray diagnosis. The difference in risks and benefits was not accounted resulting in the generation of distrust in the government. 38

Safe Operation and Supervision of NPP (1)

Observations Shown in the Report of Private Independent Investigation Commission

There are three major players in safe operation of NPP. 1. The electric utilities have primary responsibility for the safety of NPP, the NISA supervises the utilities and the NSC prepares the safety guides for regulation in Japan. 2. The NISA does not have enough technical resources in response to the utilities and sufficient capability to execute regulatory enforcement. 3. The NSC does not have the sufficient legal authority and research and analysis capacities.

39

Safe Operation and Supervision of NPP(2)

Observations Shown in the Report of Private Independent Investigation Commission 4. The electric utilities have overwhelming technical capability and financial power but did not fulfill their responsibility for the enhancement of safety. 5. The Japanese nuclear regulatory standards largely satisfies international standards formally, however, these players have made safety practices consistent with each concern and interest. 6. In Fukushima emergency situation these players did not perform sufficient functions. [Comment] Full responsibility for the safety of operation of nuclear facilities can only be taken by management predicated on the principle: Make safety the first priority. Safety can only be realized through continuous improvement of risk management capabilities by full participation of all members of the facility.

40

Fukushima Daiichi Plant Status

Message of plant's chief Contaminated water treatment & storage Releases of Radioactivity to the Environment

41

Fukushima Daiichi plant's chief Takeshi Takahashi

Press conference, February 20, 2012
Are you confident that the reactors are stable? I think the reactors are in quite stable condition. The thermal power of the reactor has decreased to a low level in a year. We can handle them with a big margin. One of the thermometers of the Unit 2 was found to be damaged. We cannot say the others may not be damaged, however, we have multiple thermometers. We will continue to see considering other factors, such as pressure and water flow, together. What is difficult problems? The most important one is to prevent leakage of circulating cooling water to outside the system. Wed like to replace the system from the hurriedly constructed present one to a permanent one which is more reliable.
42

What to do with the contaminated water used for cooling? Store and Further Decontaminate
Storage The groundwater has been flowing into the reactor buildings at a rate of 200 - 500 m3 per day(*1), therefore, the total volume of water including treated cooling water is about 210,000 m3 which doubled from last May.
The water increases have been stored in tanks at the site whose capacity is about 165,000 m3, and 70% of which are already occupied. (About 120,000m3 were stored in tanks by Mar. 9, 2012, while about 93,000m3 were in the basements of buildings as of Oct. 18, 2011.)

Tanks with capacity of about 66,000 m3 will be added by next summer, however, all the space will be used up by autumn. Preventing the inflow of groundwater could not have been successful because of high radioactive concentration. Decontamination Facilities to decontaminate residual radioactivity in the stored water will be set up.
(*1) Sources: Ground water of 200 500 m3 per day possibly flows into the basements of R/B (Sep. 20, 2011, NHK). The contaminated water is increasing 200 500 m3 per day (Mar. 2, 2012, The Mainichi Shimbun, and Mar. 9, 2012, The Sankei Shimbun). 43

Contaminated Water Stored in the Building Basements

Facility Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Stored Volume (m3) (*1) 16,250 21,400 22,600 Water Levels (O.P. m) (*2) T/B 4.952 2.915 3.137 R/B 4.562 2.990 3.275 W/B 2.981 2.935 3.182

Unit 4
Subtotal Facility

18,300
78,550 Stored Volume (m3) (*1)

3.123

3.144

3.029

Water Level (*1)

Process Bldg
HT Incinerator Subtotal Total
(*1) As of October 18, 2011.

10,310
4,120 14,430 92,980
(*2) As of October 7, 2011.

2.592
2.841

8 231022Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

44

The tanks were installed to contain an increasing amount of water with low levels of radioactive substances. About 1,000 tanks contain 120,000 tons of contaminated water. 45 Feb. 26, 2012, The Yomiuri Shimbun

The emergency cooling water injection pump to damaged reactors loaded on the back of a truck located at an elevated place, 35 m above sea level. Photo taken by Tsutomu Kobayashi at Okuma town, Fukushima, 0:10 pm, Feb. 20, 2012.

46

The Release of Radioactive Cesium into the Atmosphere Sufficiently Suppressed and Controlled
Released Amount (108 Bq/h)

Unit 1 (Covered buildng) : 0.004 x 108 Bq/h Unit 2 (Blow-off panel open): 0.01 x 108 Bq/h Unit 3 (Wrecked/Full open) : 0.1 x 108 Bq/h

Source: 2.1 Accident Recovery Progress, 2. Present Status of Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Implemented Countermeasures, Fukushima Daiichi - A One Year Review, http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html The reactor building cover for Unit 1 completed on Oct. 28, 2011. 47

Source: Changes in radioactive concentration and air dose rate at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, December 3, 2011, 48 Tokyo Electric Power Company

Source: Changes in radioactive concentration and air dose rate at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, December 3, 2011, 49 Tokyo Electric Power Company

Cesium concentration of ocean sediment soil inside the port

50

Sea sediment soil in the port will be covered by the mixture of cement and bentonite.
60 cm Thick

Covered area will be about 900 m width and 80 m offshore, i.e., about 72,000 m2.
Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Start of marine soil coating construction inside the port, 51 February 21, 2012, Tokyo Electric Power Company

52

Some Impacts on the Environment and the Society

Rice Planting Stricter Standard for Radioactivity in Food Some Examples of Impacts on Other Agricultural Foods Fisheries under Stricter Standard

53

Control of rice had been successful before October, 2011.

A farmer sweats from rice harvest: Sep. 29, Shimo-oguni district, Date city, about 50 km 54 northwest of Fukushima Daiichi NPP; Photographed by Yuki Iwanami, The Yomiuri Shimbun

Control of Rice after the detection of radioactive cesium exceeding the limit in November 2011
Oct. 12: The governor of Fukushima Prefecture declared all rice grown there to be safe to eat. Oct. 28: Health minister Yoko Komiyama announced that the government will lower the allowable amount of radioactive cesium in food products from 5 mSv/y to 1 mSv/y. Nov. 16: It was announced that radioactive cesium exceeding the provisional regulatory limit of 500 Bq/kg was detected in the rice produced at Onami district in Fukushima city. Nov. 17: Rice shipments from the district was banned. Nov. 18: Japan Agricultural Cooperatives expanded testing from previous randomly chosen basis to a farmhouse-tofarmhouse basis in Fukushima city.
55

 Nov. 28: The Fukushima prefectural government announced rice produced at three farms in Date city exceeded the 500Bq/kg limit. Dec. 1: The Fukushima prefectural government asked the national government to support testing instrumentation, personnel and finance. Dec. 7: It was announced that rice produced at a farm in Nihonmatsu city exceeded the 500Bq/kg limit. Dec. 26 : The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries decided to complete investigation of all farms in 29 municipalities by February next year, and the results will be reflected on the planting restriction of next spring.
The ministry decided to ban rice planting next year in areas where rice crops were found this year to contain radioactive cesium beyond the limit of 500 Bq, however, ban in the area between 100 and 500 Bq/kg would be studied. 56

Absorption of Cesium in Rice

Interim report Dec. 25 by Fukushima Prefecture and the farm ministry
Paddies yielding rice with cesium levels exceeding the safety standard of 500 Bq/kg had relatively low potassium concentrations which was 6.7 milligrams per 100 grams of soil, or about one-third the average of rice fields in Fukushima city, according to the study. In those paddies, the cesium level in the soil layer from the surface to 5 centimeters deep was 3.6 times higher on average than for soil 5 to 15 centimeters from the surface. Many of these paddies were in narrow parts of mountain areas that are inaccessible to tractors and other large farming equipment. This landscape may have prevented the rice plants from taking root deep in the soil, allowing them to more easily absorb cesium from the upper layers, the report said. Radioactive cesium which adhered to organic materials such as fallen leaves, weed and rice straw could be easily absorbed by rice plant root via soluble cesium formed by organic matter decomposition. (Professor Sho Shiozawa, Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo) 57

Radioactive Cs Concentration in Brown Rice (Bq/kg) Concentration of Exchangeable K2O in Soil (mg/kg)
Source: Interim report Dec. 25 by Fukushima Prefecture and the farm ministry

58

Upper Limits of Radioactive Cesium (Cs134 + Cs137) Concentration in Food compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
[Effective on April 1, 2012, except rice and beef effective from October 1, 2012]

Food classification
Drinking Water
Mineral water, Soft drink made from water, Tea, Soft drink made from tea (1)

New Standard
10 Bq/kg

Provisional Standard Applied after the Accident

200 Bq/kg

Milk
Baby Food Common Food

Milk, milk product, milk beverage

Baby Food Foods other than those listed above (2); Vegetable, Cereal, Meat, Egg, Fish, etc.

50 Bq/kg
50 Bq/kg 100 Bq/kg

200 Bq/kg
500 Bq/kg

(1) Applicable to tea infused from tea leaves (2) Applicable to both dried materials of mushroom, seaweed, fish and vegetables and their soaked ones. Applicable to rice oil made from rice bran and vegetable fat and oil made from seed.

59

Health ministry should rethink radiation regulatory plan

The proposed plan's criteria are far stricter than the government's current provisional figures, the science ministry's council argues that introducing the proposed restrictions will be unlikely to have any effect in helping prevent people's radiation exposure. The proposed regulations are projected to reduce a person's radiation exposure through food by an additional 0.008 millisievert per year. The current regulations have achieved the health ministry's goal of restricting people's radiation exposure levels to 1 millisievert or less per year. The method used by the health ministry to calculate the figures in question. Officials crunched their numbers on the extreme premise that all food in the country is contaminated with radioactive materials. But the reality is different. Most of Japan's land has not been affected by the massive dispersion of radioactive materials from the crippled nuclear plant. Regulations have to be comprehensively determined after taking into account not only radiation risks, but also other inherent dangers such as possible harm to farming and other industries. 60
[Excerpt from The Yomiuri Shimbun Editorial, Feb. 5, 2012]

Policy for the Farmers Planting Rice (1)

Dec. 27 : The Ministry of Agriculture announced to set up a system to buy rice exceeding 100 Bq/kg in next year. It will require about 1 billion yen for 4,000 t of this year harvest. Jan. 5: The Fukushima prefectural government decided to make one hundred percent inspection of every package of rice before shipment.
Installation of a number of conveyor inspection systems would be required to reduce inspection time. BGO (Bismuth Germanate) scintillator system can screen a 30kg rice bag in 5 seconds.

Feb. 28: The agriculture ministry announced it will permit rice planting this year in municipalities where radioactive cesium contained in last year's harvests was found to be from 100 Bq/kg to 500 Bq/kg, under the conditions that
1. 2. 3. Implementation of absorption reduction measures, such as deep plowing and potassium fertilizing, Complete production management, and Inspection of all packages of rice.

61

Policy for the Farmers Planting Rice (2)

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries decided that the rice produced in Fukushima prefecture last year and exceeded 100Bq/kg will be buyback and disposed of. This is applied to about 70 districts in 12 municipalities. The new standard of 100 Bq/kg comes into effect in April, and will apply to rice harvested from around October this year. The Ministry decided to go ahead with the move to alleviate consumers' concerns while supporting farmers. The estimated amount and cost are 37,000 t and 9 billion, respectively. The Ministry will purchase the rice through a corporation and it will bill TEPCO for this expense. (Mainichi Japan, March 30, 2012)
62

Some Examples of Impacts on Other Agricultural Foods

Dec. 9, 2011: Kiwifruit shipments from Soma city and Minami Soma city in Fukushima prefecture were banned. Feb. 29, 2012: No radioactive cesium was detected in the product of milk factories in east Japan. The detection limit was 10 Bq/kg. (The Japan Dairy Industry Association) Mar. 22, 2012: Fukushima prefecture announced to enhance sampling and inspection plans for fruits & vegetables at production and shipment steps from April. April 5. 2012: The government requested Miyagi, Chiba and Fukushima prefectures to ban shipment of some of the mushrooms, bamboo shoots and mountain trout, respectively, based on the new standards. April 5, 2012: Ibaraki prefecture requested voluntary ban on the shipment of some of outdoor-grown mushrooms and bamboo shoots based on the new standards.
63

Radioactive Cesium Concentration in Sakhalin Surf Clam (Bq/kg)

Shinchi, 40 km north Yotsukura, 30 km south Numanouchi, 40 km south

Time since the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake (Days)
Source: Fukushima Prefectural Fisheries Experiment Station,
http://wwwcms.pref.fukushima.jp/pcp_portal/PortalServlet?DISPLAY_ID=DIRECT&NEXT_DISPLAY_ID=U000004&CONTENTS_ID=10797

64

Coastal fishing is still suspended

The heads of local fisheries cooperatives decided to continue voluntary ban of fisheries during the month of March (Feb. 28, 2012). Fisheries products from the Fukushima coastal area have been monitored by the Fukushima Prefectural Fisheries Experiment Station. Among 152 species tested in January and February, samples with radioactive concentration more than 500 Bq/kg were found in 23 species such as greenling, rockfish, Japanese seaperch, brown hakeling, slime flounder and marbled sole, however, no increasing trend was shown. Local fisheries cooperative associations are considering resumption of operation, while fishermen fear being hurt by rumors that Fukushima products are contaminated by radioactive materials.

65

Voluntary Ban on the Fisheries Extending and Expanding

1. Fukushima Prefecture Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations decided on March 26, 2012 to continue voluntary ban on the fisheries after April at the Fukushima coastal area.
Among fish species monitored 30% of them exceeded the new standard of 100 Bq/kg.

2.

Ibaraki Prefecture, located on the south of Fukushima prefecture, and Ibaraki Coastal Areas Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations decided a voluntary ban on the shipping of fishes exceeding 50 Bq/kg from March 27, 2012, considering the new regulation on foods by the Health Ministry.
Fifteen species such as flounder, Japanese seaperch and marbled sole are listed, and the list will be revised monthly depending on the monitoring results.

3.

Miyagi Prefectural Liaison Conference on Countermeasure to Radioactivity in Fishery Products asked fishery operators a voluntary ban on the landing of Japanese seaperch from March 30, 2012, since the radioactivity exceeded the new standard in the test at the end of February. 66

Next Topics
Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap Summary Rezoning the Evacuated Areas for Homing & Controlling NPP Safety is Enhancing

67

Mid-and-long-Term Roadmap Objectives

Decided at the first Government and TEPCO's Mid-to-Long Term Countermeasure Meeting* held on December 21, 2011.

Step 1 and 2 (2011)

Finished Achieved Stable Conditions on Dec 21,2011 1. Condition equivalent to cold shutdown 2. Significant Suppression of Emissions

Phase 1 (2011 2013)

Within 2 years Start fuel removal from the spent fuel pools, especially from Unit 4.

Phase 2 (2013 2021)

Within 10 years Start fuel debris removal Complete the fuel removal from the spent fuel pools at all Units

Phase 3 (2021 - )
Within 30-40 years Period to the end of decommissioning 1. fuel debris removal (in 2025 years) 2. Decommission (in 30-40 years) 3. radioactive waste processing and disposal

* The Meeting was established in the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the Government on December 16, 2011.

68

Rezoning the Evacuated Areas for Homing & Controlling

Restricted Area is the area within a radius of 20 km designated on April 21, 2011. Deliberate Evacuation Area designated on April 22, 2011 is the area outside the Restricted Area and whose dose rate may reach 20 mSv/y. These two areas are redefined from April 1, 2012 as one of the three zones shown below.
zones where residency is prohibited for at least 5 years zones with restricted residency zones being prepared for residents' return
69

Rezoning the Evacuated Areas

Zone Residency Prohibited Zone Present Annual Dose Greater than 50 mSv Between 20 mSv and 50 mSv Less than 20 mSv Policy / Action

Residency Restricted Zone Return Preparation Zone

Residency is prohibited for at least 5 years. Buying of immovables by the government considered. Restricted residency. Few years required to be less than 20 mSv/y. Temporal homing possible. Zones being prepared for return of residents

Restricted Area was the area within a radius of 20 km. Deliberate Evacuation Area was the area outside the Restricted Area and whose dose rate may reach 20 mSv/y. These two areas were redefined on April 1, 2012 as one of the three zones shown above.

70

Dose Rate vs. Annual Dose

Return Preparation Zone: Green: 1.93.8 Sv/h 3.8 Sv/h = 20 mSv/y Residency Restricted Zone: Yellow: 3.89.5 Sv/h 9.5 Sv/h = 50 mSv/y Residency Prohibited Zone: 9.5 Sv/h = 50 mSv/y Pink, Red: 9.5 Sv/h Red: 19.0 Sv/h
Released by the Ministry of the Environment, February 24, 2012

71

3.8 Sv/h corresponds to 20 mSv/y

The number 3.8 Sv/h which corresponds to 20 mSv/y was first recommended by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology to be applied to school buildings and yards in Fukushima prefecture on April 19, 2011. This number raised issues on appropriate dose levels to be accomplished for children and young people. (3.8 Sv/h x 8h/d + 3.8 Sv/h x 0.4 x16h/d) x 365 d/y x 10-3 m/= 20 mSv/y
Radiation dose rate in the air = 3.8 Sv/h Stays 8 hours per day in the outside environment Stays 16 hours per day in the wooden building

20 mSv/y / ((8h/d +0.4 x 16h/d) x 365 d/y) x 103 /m = 3.8 Sv/h

72

Municipalities and Dose Rate

The information was released Feb. 24 by the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry, the Cabinet Office's nuclear accident evacuees life support team and the Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Ministry. The readings were measured during flights over 73 the area. The Daily Yomiuri, The Yomiuri Shimbun (Feb. 26, 2012)

Futaba and Okuma towns at risk of disappearing

Percentage of Approx. Number of Population within Population within Municipalities Residency Prohibited Residency Prohibited Zone Zone as of December 1, 2011 Iitate Village 900 10+ % Minami-Soma City 70 0.1 % Naime Town 4,400 20 % Kuzuo Village 200 10+ % Futaba Town 4,800 70 % Okuma Town 10,000 90 % Tomioka Town 5,000 30 %
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, Jan. 9, 2012

74

Return Preparation Started

Among eleven municipalities in the Restricted Area within 20km radius and the northwest Deliberate Evacuation Area, Tamura city in western part of the Restricted Area was designated as Return Preparation Zone on April 1, 2012. Kawauchi village in south-west part of the Restricted Area was divided into Return Preparation Zone and Residency Restricted Zone on April 1, 2012. Minami-Soma city, which is in the northern area of the Restricted Area, was divided into three zones on April 16, 2012. Mayor of Okuma town has been requesting to the government to designate the whole town as Residency Prohibited Zone, since more than 90% of population have houses in the area under that category.
75

NPP Safety is Enhancing

1. Thirty measures in five categories were presented by NISA
7 Measures among 30 are against Tsunami Adding Filtered Vent Facility to NPP in Japan

2. Utilities Establish an Independent Organization for Safety 3. Revision of NSC Regulatory Guides 4. Reforming Nuclear Regulation
76

Thirty measures in five categories were presented by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).
Based on the analyses of the sequences of events in the Fukushima accident, thirty measures have been identified for the prevention of evolution/escalation of events or for the mitigation of consequences.

Thirty measures were presented in five categories:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. External Power Supply System Station Service Electrical system Cooling System Containment System Command/Communication, Instrumentation/Control System and Emergency Response system
77

(February 8, 2012)

7 Measures among 30 are against Tsunami

1. Diversified Power Supply Systems 2. Waterproofed Buildings, Breakwater Construction 3. Additional Deployment of Air Cooled Emergency Generators 4. Strengthened Emergency Batteries 5. Additional Emergency Power Sources for Important Instrumentation 6. Standardization of Cable Connection for Emergency Power Systems 7. Reserved Spare Articles for Electrical Equipment such as Lighting Apparatus and Cables necessary for Recovery Processes
78

Adding Filtered Vent Facility to NPP in Japan

From the Press Conference Comments Made by Makoto Yagi, FEPC Chairman, on January 20, 2012

the power companies have been diversifying and adding redundancy to the core-cooling functions and power sources as a part of tsunami countermeasures following the March earthquake, to improve the reliability of the key safety functions of "stopping", "cooling and "containment". The companies will continue to step up safety measures by strengthening the water injection system to cool the reactors, the DC power supply, etc. In addition to preventing accidents through these measures we will also consider introducing a new vent facility for the air from the containment vessel, containing a filter to reduce the release of radioactive substances to the external environment even in the event of an accident. The DF of the filter is supposed to be larger than 1000 to minimize the long-term evacuation area by land contamination. The vent facility can be operated manually even in loss of driving source.

79

Stack Filtered Vent Facility

N2 Injection
Rapture Disc

Rapture Disc Bypass Valve

Shield

Manual Valve Extension

Extension Rod

Source: The 13rd materials, 07.Feb.2012, New Nuclear Policy Planning Council, Atomic Energy Commission

80

Utilities Establish an Independent Organization by the end of this year for enhanced nuclear safety
From the Press Conference Comments Made by Makoto Yagi, FEPC Chairman, on January 20, 2012

We have been working hard on thorough safety measures to avoid a repetition of the accident on March 11 last year, and have decided to establish an independent organization to upgrade the safety measures of nuclear power stations, including measures against severe accidents. The details of actions to be taken will be considered in New Organization Preparatory Office for Reactor Safety, which will be set up in February. The new organization will build a network among various industries in Japan and work closely with organizations abroad, and serve as a hub for gathering both domestic and overseas information and for studying safety improvement measures. It will also give suggestions, instructions and recommendations to power companies, and the power companies will then promptly implement the necessary measures. The new organization will have the independence to make decisions without being influenced by the intention of power companies. In addition, by efforts such as staffing highly expert personnel, the new organization will be given an effective system that enables the power companies to act promptly based on the highest level of knowledge and information.

81

Roles of the new organization (outline)

82

Revision of NSC Regulatory Guides

In June 2011 Nuclear Safety Commission initiated work to revise the following Regulatory Guides based on the experience of Fukushima accident.
Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities

Interim report on the revision was released in March, 2012. 1. Modeling methodology for tsunami analysis will be included. 2. Criteria against the station blackout will be revised. 3. Requirements for the measures and provision against severe accidents will be recommended. Regulatory Guide on Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities is also under revision.

83

Revision of Regulatory Guide (1)

Present Guide Tsunami Regulatory Guide: Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities Draft Revision Guide Regulatory Guide: Reviewing Safety Design for Earthquake and Tsunami of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities

8. Consideration of the The design principles for tsunami are accompanying events of earthquakes defined including formulation of design tsunami. Safety functions of the Facilities shall not be significantly impaired by Consideration shall be given to tsunami which could be reasonably Specified causes of tsunami postulated to hit in a very low Tsunami wave source area probability in the service period of Geological evidence of tsunami the Facilities. deposits, etc.
Source:

84

Revision of Regulatory Guide (2)

Present Guide Guideline 27. Design Considerations against Loss of Power The nuclear reactor facilities shall be so designed that safe shutdown and proper cooling of the reactor after shutting down can be ensured in case of a short-term total AC power loss. Draft Revision Guide An alternative power source shall be equipped against SBO. Design requirements for the alternate power source are specified.

Guideline 48. Electrical Systems

Abbrev.

Several requirements are added for the off-site power system with two or more power transmission lines, the emergency on-site power system, etc.

Source:

85

Revision of Regulatory Guide (3)

Present Guide Guideline 26. Systems for Transporting Heat to Ultimate Heat Sink Draft Revision Guide (1) The systems for transporting heat No revision required to an ultimate heat sink shall be designed to be capable of transferring heat generated or accumulated in SSCs with safety functions of especially high importance to an ultimate heat sink. (2) The systems for transporting heat No revision required to an ultimate heat sink shall be properly provided with redundancy or diversity and independence so that they can fulfill their safety functions even in case of unavailability of off-site power in addition to an assumption of a single failure of any of the components that comprise the systems. They shall also be designed to allow testing with respect to their functional capability
Source:

86

Revision of Regulatory Guide: Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities

Present Guide Draft Revision Guide

Nuclear Emergency Situation

Zoning

Decision based on radiation doses and the status of nuclear reactor

Within 8 to 10-km radius: EPZ (Emergency Planning Zone)

Based on the status of reactor; Alert Site Area Emergency General Emergency
Within 5-km radius: PAZ (Precautionary Action Zone) In case of General Emergency PAZ is immediately evacuated. Within 30-km radius: UPZ (Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone) Within 50-km radius: PPA (Plume Protection Planning Area) is set up.

87

Revision of Regulatory Guide: Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Facilities

Present Guide Draft Revision Guide

Off-Site Center

Locate at a place where relevant people can easily get together

Based on calculation of dispersion of radioactive materials Predicted dose of 100mSv. Not necessary at ages more than 40.

Multiple hubs for countermeasure execution Emergency Response Center at a place such as prefectural government office
Based on the status of reactor and measured radiation dose Medicine at home within 30-km radius. Predicted 7 days dose of 50mSv. Consider at ages more than 40.

Decision on Evacuation Stable Iodine Preparation & Administration

88

Reforming Nuclear Regulation

The government adopted January 31 a bill to reform Japan's nuclear oversight that would establish a regulatory body under the Environment Ministry and set a 40-year cap on nuclear power reactors. The bill will be submitted to the current ordinary session of the Diet, or Japan's parliament, for enforcement on April 1. The nuclear regulatory body will replace the industry ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency. The current agency has been criticized for being affiliated with the ministry that promotes the use of nuclear power. While a draft bill stated the government "must allow" nuclear reactors to run for over 40 years if they meet safety requirements, the adopted bill says the government "can allow" them to do so, noting that their extended operations beyond the 40-year cap are exceptional cases. For nuclear reactors that have been in operation for more than or nearly 40 years, the legislation calls on the government to set, in a cabinet order, a grace period of up to 10 months after the law's enforcement. The new regulatory body will establish criteria for permitting longer reactor operations.
Source: Japan Govt Adopts Bill to Reform Nuclear Oversight, 01/31/2012, Tokyo, Jan.31 (Jiji Press)

89

New Regulations related to setting up Nuclear Regulatory Agency

New Regulations
A system is introduced for the application of new standard formulated based on the latest findings to the existing NPP. Safety of NPP The period of operation is limited to 40 years as a general rule. The application of life extension can be approved only once if the Minister of Environment finds that the application conforms with the safety standards. NRA will prepare a guideline for emergency preparedness. Emergency Responses EPZ will be revised to expand to the area within 30km radius. and Preparedness The operator shall be obligated to prepare countermeasures against serious accident. Handling of TPCO Fukushima Nuclear Accident NRA is assigned to the safety regulator for the facilities of accident.

90

Last Topics
Electric Power Generation in Japan Steps to Restart Nuclear Power Plants Steps to Enhance Safety
The largest possible Nankai Trough Earthquake was modeled in Offshore Pacific central Japan

Power Costs Re-evaluated Scenarios for the revision of Basic Energy Plan Public Opinion Polls on Nuclear Power
91

Monthly Generated Electric Power in Japan (Billion kWh)

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
March 11, 2011

66%

90%

28%

4.8%

Others Hydro Thermal Nuclear

92

Steps to Restart Nuclear Power Plants

1. Electric utilities files the Results of Stress Test Phase 1 after the plant is ready to restart showing the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand earthquake and tsunami exceeding design basis. --- 18 reactors filed by Apr. 6. NISA examines Interim Assessment based on the Results of Stress Test Phase 1. --- Review on 3 reactors finished by Mar. 26. NSC confirms the NISA examination. --- Review on 2 reactors finished by Mar. 23. The Prime Minister, the chief Cabinet secretary, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry and Nuclear Accident Minister make a judgmental decision on the restart of a nuclear power plant based on the agreement of the prefecture and municipalities where the plant locates.

2.

3.
4.

93

A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of Existing NPP

July 6, 2011, Nuclear Safety Commission
NSC requested NISA to report a comprehensive assessment on the robustness of existing nuclear power plants against the external events which may exceed the design basis. The government initiated Stress Tests in Japan. Reference points of the assessment are as follows; 1. Explicitly indicate the relation to defensive measures based on the concept of defence in depth. 2. Assuming each of the defensive measures might fail one after another, scenarios leading to a severe accident should be presented. At each level of defence the effectiveness and the limitation of each measure should be analyzed to indicate margin to failure. 3. Assessment should be based on the deterministic approach. 4. The most severe operating conditions should be assumed. 5. The existing knowledge on the internal events PSA and seismic and tsunami PSA should be employed. 94

Issues on Restart Problem

The government should revise safety standards for nuclear power plants reflecting the findings of Fukushima accident before restarting the plant operation. A clear message about the necessity and significance of nuclear power is also requested. (Several prefectural governors)

Old thermal power plants and privately-owned electrical power facilities are in full-capacity operation. Power supply is on a tightrope where shutdown of a large scale plant by some operational trouble may cause power shortage immediately and relevant area is at risk of a large-scale blackout. (Energy observers)
Fuel costs are largely increasing because of rising price for fossil fuel. 10 to 15 % increase of electricity price is inevitable if nuclear power is replaced by thermal power. (Utilities)
95

Steps to Enhance Safety

Urgent Measures to be taken immediately after the Fukushima accident Interim Assessment based on the Results of Stress Test Phase 1 Improvements in 2-3 years based on the Results of Stress Test Phase 2 Further enhancement of the nuclear plant safety
96

An 18m Barrier Wall Planned in front of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plants

(A A) Cross-Section
wave-dissipating blocks

Barrier Wall: 1.6 km long

Dune Bank
Barrier Wall
This is the area affected by the continuous movements of the Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai Earthquakes.

Bed Rock

The barrier wall will be constructed by the end of 2012. The construction began on Nov. 11, 2011. Source: Press release, July 22, 2011, Chubu Electric Power Co., Ltd.

97

The top of the seawall will be 18 meters above the sea level.

One of the 218 base substructures which is made of reinforcing steel frame cage vertically laid down to form a foundation of the seawall. These substructures are placed at 6 meter interval.

The seawall extends 1.6 km along the seashore.

An example of the Additional Safety Cost. The safety cost against tsunami at Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc. would be about 140 billion.

Construction of Seawall substructure at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, February 27, 2012. 98 Source: The Nikkei, Feb.28, 2012

The largest possible Nankai Trough Earthquake was modeled in Offshore Pacific central Japan
The expert panel under the Cabinet Office announced on March 31, 2012

Nuclear Power Station

Kaminoseki - Planned NPP (Chugoku Electric Power Co.) 3.9m 4.6m -

Ikata (Shikoku Electric Power Co.) 3m 3.49m 14.2m

Hamaoka (Chubu Electric Power Co.) 21m

*2

Tokai Daini (Japan Atomic Power Co.) 2.6m 5.72m

Estimated Tsunami Height *1 Current Design Basis for Tsunami Allowable Height (Stress Test)

10m

Not yet filed Not yet filed

(*1) The largest possible mega earthquakes and tsunamis were considered from every possible angle. The projection of occurrence probability and time of the modeled earthquakes is almost impossible. These were modeled by the Expert Panel under the Cabinet Office considering the experiences of 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake. 99 (*2) The ground uplift of 2.1m by crustal movement is included.

Eurasian Plate

Philippine Sea Plate (110,00km2)

The largest possible Nankai Trough Earthquakes Model

Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun, Apr. 2, 2012,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120401002932.htm 100

Power Costs Re-evaluated based on Fukushima Accident

Capital

added expenses
Operation Maintenance
Power Cost Fuel Additional Safety Social
CO2 cost for thermal power

Environmental Accident Response Administrative

Incl. compensation

Local Subsidies

R&D

101

Compensation Amount Estimated by the Study Committee

(Trillion yen)
Temporary Loss (Note 1)
Annual amount of compensation through termination

Compensation

First Year
0.74

Second and the following year 0.61

Damage caused by government evacuation orders Damage due to radiation fears Indirect damage suffered by business partners Total Accumulated total Decommissioning

0.58 1.30 0.74 2.62

0.28 1.02 3.64

0.29 0.90 4.54

1.15 102

Note 1: Temporary loss such as property damage, damage by radiation fears, etc. Note 2: No consideration given to the case decontamination cost exceeds property value.

Source: Report of the Study Committee on Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s Management and Financial Conditions, Oct. 3, 2011

The Comprehensive Special Business Plan for TEPCO shall be approved by the government
A one trillion yen capital injection by the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund A one trillion yen additional funding from financial institutions Increase in electric rates for home from July 2012 Resumption of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS operations by the end of FY2013 Transition to a Company with Committees Chairperson of the board of directors from outside Majority of the committee members from outside
Source: The Nikkei Shimbun, March 30, 2012

103

Accident Risk Response Cost (Damage Cost) = 0.5/kWh for nuclear power
Nuclear power generated in Japan in FY2010 = 2.722x1011 kWh/y (Excluding Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 4) Damage Cost in Fukushima accident = 5.8 x 1012 Damage Cost in Unit Power = 5.8 x 1012 / (2.722x1011 kWh/y x 40 y ) = 0.5/kWh If the damage cost increases, the incremental power cost would be 0.09/kWh for an addition of 1.0 x 1012 (1 trillion yen).
104

Revised Nuclear Power Generation Cost Estimates(1)

Estimates in 2004 Present Estimates

Capital Cost Operating and Maintenance Costs Fuel Cycle Cost Additional Safety Cost Administrative Cost Accident Risk Response Cost

2.3 2.1 1.5 -

2.5 3.1 1.4 0.2 1.1

0.5
(2)

Total

5.9

8.9 (2)

(1) Discount rate: 3%/y, Capacity factor: 70%, 40 years operation. (2) There is a 0.1/kWh increase for every 1 trillion increase of accident risk response cost.
Source: Cost study committee report, The Energy and Environment Council, December 19, 2011

105

2011 Estimates
Nuclear
8.9 or more 9.50.2
0.4 10.7

2030 Projection
Nuclear Coal LNG
8.9
10.3 0.3 10.9 0.5 23.8 9.2 2.4 8.8 8.6
8.5 4.2

or more

Coal
LNG Oil Geothermal Wind (Land)

20.8 9.2 2.4 9.9 7.4 9.4

2.9

Oil

Geothermal
Wind (Land) Wind (Shore)
4.9 15.7

Wind (Shore)
Solar (Residential) Solar (Mega Solar)
0

13.7

14.5
10.1 14.3

33.4 30.1 10 20 30

Solar 9.9 Solar (Mega 12.1

50

40

10

20

30

Electric Power Cost Estimates (/kWh)

Lower Estimate Add this number to get Higher Estimate

106

Discussion on Scenarios for the revision of Basic Energy Plan

Electric Power Generation
Electric Power Options Range of Scenario Discussion at 2030

Nuclear Power Generation

Renewable Energy Generation

Thermal Power Generation

Cogeneration and In-house Power Generation

0% - 35%
(0,20,25,35%)
45.4%
26.4%

25% - 35%
(25,30,35%)
20%
10.5%

25% - 50%
(25,35,50%)
22.8%
56.9%

15%
12.1%
6.2%

Current Plan at 2030 (1)

2010 Results

Note (1): In the current basic energy plan the proportion in 2030 is shown as 53% nuclear, 21% renewable and 26% fossil, excluding cogeneration and in-house generation.

Source: The Fundamental Issues Subcommittee, Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, April 11, 2012

107

What's best to do with the domestic nuclear power plants?

60
49 51 51 53

50
40 30 20

46

44 34

45

46

Should be increased Maintain present level

29

32

29 25
21

23
22

24
21

15

24

Should be decreased

19

10 0

15 12 10 4

16

Should be totally eliminated

Polled by The Yomiuri Shimbun on Nuclear Power from April 2011 to February 2012.

108

BBC News, polled 23,231 people in 23 countries from July to September 2011 India Pakistan Spain
18 21 23

22 32
35 37 38 39 44 44 44

21

39 55
13 43 52 43 14 15 35 39 37 16 27 25 6 15 42 9 7 18

China Russia
Germany Mexico USA UK Brazil Japan France 0%

Use existing plants but don't build new ones

Close all operating nuclear power plants Build new nuclear power plants Other/Don't know/No answer
100% 109

57 58

20%

40%

60%

80%

Important lessons from the Fukushima accident

1. Responsible use of nuclear power plants prepared for emergencies and the releases of radioactive materials to the environment is mandatory. 2. Safety culture based on the safety first principle is necessary for the operation of nuclear power plant.
110

Important lessons from the Fukushima accident

The knowledge on the cooling function of a nuclear power plant which is absolutely necessary for the plant operational personnel was deficient at Fukushima Daiichi NPP. The NKM system of the operator shall be reviewed, reformed to fill up deficiencies and improved continuously.
111

Important lessons from the Fukushima accident

Without anticipation of disasters we cannot prepare for them. We have to periodically review the basis of design against disasters. We have to prepare the best ways of anticipation of disasters. We have to prepare for the anticipated events beyond design basis.
112