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A Translation of Chapter One:


( P R A T Y A YA)

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The Madhyamaka 2 school is one of the two major philosophical schools of Mahfiyfina Buddhism, along with the Yogficfira school. The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness (d~nyatd). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of discernment" (prajgd-pdramitd) sfitras, which are among the earliest Mahfiyfina sfitras. While the sfitras expound emptiness in a discursive way, the Mfidhyamikas use systematic argument. Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are empty of intrinsic nature (svabhdva). All Buddhists hold that conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions. For the Mfidhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination (pratftya-samutpdda) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic, self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in which mirages and dreams exist. 3 The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nfigfirjuna (active c. 150--200), the author of the M~la-rnadhyamaka-kdrikd (MMK). The MMK inspired a number of commentaries which not only expounded the meaning of the MMK but also often acted as vehicles for the commentators' own views. The Akutobhayd seems to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nfigfirjuna himself.4 The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author s
Journal of Indian Philosophy 21: 209--259, 1993. 9 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.


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is that of Buddhapfilita (c. 500). Buddhapfilita closely followed Nfigfirjuna's own method, which utilized mainly prasatiga arguments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's position leads to consequences (prasaliga) unacceptable to the opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mfidhyamika to affirming a contrary position. Bhfivaviveka (c. 500--570) was the next important Mfidhyamika philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the Praj~dpradipa, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the Madhyamakahr.daya-kdrikd and its autocommentary, the Tarkajvdld. Bhfivaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he strongly criticized Buddhapfilita for failing to do so. He felt that the author of a commentary should state independent inferences (svatantra-anumdna), rather than simply giving prasa~ga arguments. Bhfivaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakirti, who defended Buddhapfilita in his own commentary on the MMK, the Prasannapadd. Bhfivaviveka's Prajfi@radfpa is, in the first place, of great interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka. Bhfivaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapfilita in the Prajfidpradipa resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools: the Svfitantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhfivaviveka and the Prfisaflgika-Madhyamaka of Buddhapglita and Candrakirti. (The names of these subschools, derived from svatantraanumdna and prasatiga, seem to have originated some centuries after Candrakirti and are known to us only from Tibetan sources.6) Moreover, the Prajfidpradipa is the first commentary on the MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively. Bhfivaviveka's accounts, in the Prajfidpradipa and elsewhere, of the positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day. Chapter one of the MMK opens with two dedicatory verses (MMK 1--A,B) which characterize dependent origination with eight negations, including "without origination" (anutpgMa). Dependent origination is a basic Buddhist concept, and Nfigfirjuna's seemingly paradoxical characterization of it as "without origination" means that whatever originates



in dependence on causes and conditions does not originate by its own intrinsic nature. Thus, as Bhfivaviveka explains, origination occurs conventionally but not in ultimate reality. The chapter proper deals with the four causal conditions (pratyaya) recognized in the Sarvfistivfidin Abhidharma. Nfigfirjuna's argument can be understood as showing that causality is unintelligible if it is conceived of as a relationship between causes and results which exist by intrinsic nature. Since chapter one is thus one of the most important chapters of the MMK, Bhfivaviveka's explanation of it is of particular interest. Moreover, in his commentary on MLMK 1--1, he explains his own methodology and criticizes Buddhapfilita's methodology in some detail. He also discusses the views of a number of different philosophical
schools. 7

Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadd, the Prajgdpradipa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly rather poor; 8 but the Tibetan translation, done by Jfifinagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to be excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's massive subcommentary on the Praj~dpradipa,called the Praj~dprad~pa-t~kd. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.) The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions and made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence. I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the Prajfi@radipa is often terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be amplified with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes may need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the entire Praj~@radipa, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text. An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for


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important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the Prajh@radipa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized translation equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 1 For more details on all the matters discussed in this introduction, see Ames (1986), "Part I: Introduction," and the sources cited therein. 2 As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy; a follower of the school is called a "Mfidhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and n. 3. 3 See, e.g., MMK 7--34 and 17--33. 4 On the Akutobhayd, see Huntington (1986). s There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaflga which deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1--A,B). See Ruegg (1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989). 6 See Ruegg (1981), p. 58. 7 Chapter one of the Prajh@radipa has been translated into German; see Kajiyama (1963) and Kajiyama (1964). To the best of my knowledge, there is no other English translation. s See Kajiyama (1963), p. 39.



[Translators' homage:] I pay homage to the Three Jewels. I pay homage to Mafijugr~, the young prince (kurndrabh~ta). 2 I pay homage to the dcdrya, 3 noble 4 Nfigfirjuna. I pay homage to the dcdrya, venerable (bhadanta) Bhfivaviveka. [Text of chapter one:[ I pay homage to that [Buddha[ who taught the reality of dharmas (dharma-tattva), which is quite free from conceptual constructions ( vikalpa). It pacifies all conceptual proliferation (prapahca) 5 and destroys all the defective vision (timira) of false opinions (blo ngan,

*durmati ).
Though [reality] is not an object of speech, [the Buddha taught] reality by means of imputation (sarndropya), 6 So that ]beings] might acquire all levels [of existence and spiritual attainment] .7 The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] has taught [both] the correct verbal expression and the reality 8 of inference (anumdna) and refutation (d~san.a) just by means of [his M~la-madhyamaka-]kdrikd [MMK]. He has stated the doctrine (naya) of the perfection of discernment (praflid-pdramitd), which puts an end to the net of bad views. Nevertheless, some of [our[ fellow Buddhists 9 have not understood [the MMK]. Therefore, wishing to make them understand, [I] will explain the Madhyamaka~dstra [i.e., the MMK] according to scripture
(agama). 10

As to that, the connection 11 of ]this] treatise (gdstra) is stated [as follows:] Here the Blessed One, 12 having intellect [as well as] zeal 13 produced by excellent compassion, bore the burden of the measureless accumulations of merit (pun.ya) and wisdom (jhdna) for immeasurable hundreds of thousands of niyutas of kotis 14 of aeons (kalpa). His mind was not depressed even by the suffering of losing his own life, [since he] was intent on the arising of benefit for others. He saw that the world was thrashing about in the dense net of conceptual proliferations, such as origination, cessation, annihilation, permanence,


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coming, going, multiplicity, oneness, and so on; and [he saw that the world] was without light. I5 [Then] he churned the ocean of objects of knowledge (j~ieya) by means of discernment and obtained the nectar (amr.ta) 16 of the reality iv of all dharmas, which is quite free from the entire net of conceptual proliferations, without dependence on others, is ]and] without conceptual construction. [Having done so,] he taught to those travelling on the Best Vehicle 19 the excellent jewel of dependent origination (pratilya-samutpdda), which does not disregard birth, age, caste, place of residence, and time of day,2~ and which is not shared by all the founders of non-Buddhist sects (tirthakara), the ~r~vakas, and the pratyekabuddhas. 21 [He taught dependent origination] by means of expressions such as "origination" and "nonorigination," etc., depending on the superficial and ultimate truths (sam. vrti-

and pararndrtha-satya ).22 The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna[ also understood the Tathfigata's 23 doctrine,
which is taught by means of terms such as "nonorigination" [and which is] nonfalsity (avitathatd). 24 [Then] an intense force of joy arose [in him], so that he praised the Blessed One according to the [Blessed One's] doctrine as he had understood it; and he wished to write [this] treatise, z5 Because [Nfigfirjuna] possessed a mind moistened by the water of compassion, he wished to make [those] persons for whom inference is important and who wish to understand, 26 comprehend [this treatise]. [Thus] he said: He who taught dependent origination, [which is] without cessation, without origination, Without annihilation, without permanence, without coming, without going, [MMK l--A] Not something manifold, not one thing, the quiescence of conceptual proliferation, tranquil (~iva), [Is] the perfect Buddha (sam. buddha). I pay homage to that best of speakers. [MMK I--B] Although the word "who" (yah.) is general, it is connected only with the Blessed One, because [Nfigfirjuna] wishes to say by means of this [pair of verses] that [the Blessed One] is the teacher of dependent origination which possesses special distinguishing qualities. 27 "Dependent origination" is stated because even if qualifying words (vi~esan.a)



are expressed, if the noun to be qualified (vi~esya-ndman) is not indicated, that ]noun] is not understood [by the hearer]) 8 First objection: As for "dependent origination" (pratitya-sarnutpdda), some 29 say: Because the indeclinable ]prefix] prati has the sense of "repetition" and because [the verbal root I i has the sense of "meeting," and because the word sarnutpdda has the sense of "origination," ]therefore one says] pratitya-samutpdda, that is, "origination having met with this and that. ''3~ Second objection: Others 31 say that pratitya-samutpdda ]means] "the arising individually of perishables. ''32 Answer: 33 That also is not [logically] possible (ayukta), because both meanings are absent in this [scriptural] statement: "Visual consciousness originates depending on the eye and visible forms. ''34 What then [is the correct interpretation]? The meaning of the fact of having this as a causal condition (idam.pratyayatd), [that is,] "Because this exists, this becomes; because of the origination of this, this originates, ''35 is the meaning of dependent origination. 36 Objection: 37 If the result (phala) meets with causal conditions (pratyaya) prior to its origination and later originates, there would be ~ origination" of that ]result]. But the result does not meet causal conditions prior to its origination, because it does not [then] exist. Therefore the term "dependent origination'' is not established (asiddha). Even if [you] say that there is no fault [in your interpretation] because [you] accept that the two [activities] "depending" (pratitya) and "origination" (samutpdda) are simultaneous, [that is not the case, because:] [Thesis:] The term "dependent origination" does not describe [literally, "have"] two simultaneous activities (kriyd), [Reason:] because [a gerund-forming suffix] -ya is expressed [in

[Example:] as [when one says,] "[After] having washed, he eats. ''39 Also, [Thesis:] Without an agent (kartr), an activity without a basis (gzhi, probably d~raya) is not possible, [Reason:] because [the agent] does not exist, [Example:] just as the going of a childless woman's son [is not possible] .40


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Answer: That is not good, [1] because if one accepts that an activity has as its defining characteristic (laksana) the origination of a [previously] nonexistent result, [then the reason in YOUr first syllogism] is inconclusive (anaikdntika) [even] for [your]self, and [2] because even in the case of origination from [a previously] existent [result], the success of the reason 41 [in your second syllogism] is not established. [The first syllogism is not correct] because [its reason] is inconclusive, [since:] [Thesis:] Two activities having a single agent may also exist simultaneously, [Reason:] because [a gerund-forming suffix] -ya is expressed [in such cases also], [Example:] as [when one says,] "He sleeps with his mouth open" and "It moves along filling the roadway. ''42 [The success of the reason in the second syllogism is not established] because there will be the stated fault [both] in [the case of] an existent agent and [in the case of] a nonexistent [agent].43 [This is so even] if [you] state a reason which is established for [your] opponent, 44 because there would [then] be overextension (atiprasahga). 45 The teaching of that [comprehension of the reality of the nature of all dharmas] is the action (karman) [which brings about that comprehension as a resulq. 46 [That teaching is as follows:]
Without cessation, without origination, without annihilation, without permanence, Without coming, without going, not something manifold, not one thing. [MMK l--A] 47 In that connection, without understanding the meaning of the words, one cannot understand the meaning of the sentence, the chapter, and the treatise. Therefore, first of all, [1] will state the meaning of the words. Commentr s The meanings of the words, etc., serve (upakdrin) the meaning of the sentence and so on; but one part of a word [does not serve the meaning of the sentence, etc., just as one part of the foot does not serve for] walking on the road. 49 Answer: Because the words and so on produce mental formations (sam.skdrdh), s~ they are able to serve for understanding the meaning of



the treatise with all its parts; but the previous supposition is not logically possible. "Cessation" (nirodha) is "disappearance" (7ig pa). "Origination" (utpdda) is "arising" ('byung ba). "Annihilation" (uccheda) is "the breaking of continuity" (rgyun chad pa). "Permanence" (dddvata) is "remaining at all times" (dus thams cad du gnas pa). "Coming" (dgama) is "coming towards." "Going" (nirgama) is "going away." "Something manifold" (ndndrtha) is "a thing divided [into parts]" (don tha dad pa). 51 "One thing" (ekdrtha) is "a thing which is not divided [into parts]" (don tha mi dad pa), that is, "not different." As to that, "without cessation" [means] "cessation does not exist in this." [The other negations are to be similarly understood[ up to "not one thing" also [means[ "one thing does not exist in this. ''52 Objection: 53 Cessation and origination and manifoldness and oneness are negated in ultimate reality (paramdrthatah.). Annihilation and permanence are negated conventionally (vyavahdratah.). Going and coming are negated in both (ways). Answer: Here all ]eight] are negated in ultimate reality, because [that is] specified 54 [by the context[. Nor are [these negations] contradictory in some other way, [1[ because there is no contradiction in the qualifiers (videsana) of the qualificand (vides.ya) as they have been stated 55 and [2] because [the teaching of ultimate reality] is what is primarily aimed at (ipsitatama) by the agent through [his] teaching, s6 ]Dependent origination is] "the quiescence of conceptual proliferation" (prapaticopadama) because attachment (abhiniveda) to the nature of verbal expression is pacified. 57 [Dependent origination is] "tranquil" (diva) because it is free from all harm or because it is empty of intrinsic nature (svabhdva). "Taught" [means] "expounded." The "perfect Buddha" (sam.buddha) is the Blessed One. [He is so called] because he understood correctly [and] without error the absence of self (nairdtmya) 58 in dharmas and persons (pudgala). "Speakers" are drdvakas and pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas. [They are called "speakers"] since by teaching dependent origination correctly, they teach the path which causes one to attain the higher realms (svarga) and emancipation (apavarga). 59 "Best" (vara) ]means] "most excellent." [The perfect Buddha is the best of speakers] because he expounded dependent origination with the stated nonerroneous


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attributes [i.e., without cessation, etc.]. Therefore [Nfigfirujuna says,] "I pay homage to that [best of speakers]," that is, "I bow [to him]." Objection: 6~ If it is dependent origination, how is it without origination? But if it is without origination, it is not possible also ]to say,] "dependent origination." Therefore, [Thesis:] [If you say that dependent origination is without origination, your] own statement will be contradicted (svavacana-virodha); and [your] thesis will be faulty (pratijfig~-dosa), [Reason:[ because that [statement] itself has nihilistically negated (apavad) the meaning of that ]statement], [Example:] [as with the statement,] "All that is said is false." Answer: If [we] asserted that all dependent origination is without origination, there would also be that fault; but [we do not assert that all dependent origination is without origination] because the word "all" includes the superficially real (sdm. vr.ta) dependent origination, which [we do] accept. And [we] have not nihilistically negated that [ultimately real dependent origination, after] having ]first] accepted that dependent origination exists in ultimate reality. Therefore the meaning of [the opponent's] reason is not established. 61 For example, although giving and so on are not wholesome in ultimate reality, one does not have a faulty thesis if one says that they are wholesome from [the point of view of] gathering a following ('khor sdud pa las). 62 And [to take another example,[ one does not have a faulty thesis if one [firstI accepts that cognition (vijhdna) is the self (gltman) [conventionally], 63 and [then] asserts that in ultimate reality, cognition is not the self. And to take a [further] example, in the origination of a magically emanated (nirmita) person, there is no origination of the intrinsic nature of a person. Likewise, the nature (dtman) of the inner @atanas, 64 which are like a magical illusion or a mirage, also originates in superficial reality, but not in ultimate reality. Therefore there is no fault [in saying that dependent origination is without origination]. 65

]Thesis:] It is proper to negate cessation after origination [rather than vice versa, as Nfigfiljuna has done,] [Reason:[ because ]cessation[ has that [origination[ preceding it, [Example:] just as annihilation [is preceded by origination and so is properly negated by Nfigfirjuna after origination.] 66



Answer: Because samsfira has no beginning, origination is also

preceded by cessation; [but I it is not accepted that [origination must 1 be negated afterwards. Therefore [the opponent's syllogism] has the fault of an inconclusive reason. 67 There is no fault [in negating cessation before origination] [1] because the negation does not depend on the order of origination 68 and [2] because [this is] an examination of the meaning 69 and [3] because even if the statement were made differently, the same undesired consequence (prasafiga) would remain. 70 Objection: Some of [our] fellow Buddhists 71 (svayd~thya), who wish to negate the composition (drambha) of [this] treatise, say: Dependent origination, characterized by nonofigination, etc., is unconditioned (asam.skr.ta). Therefore it is established for our own position (paks.a) also; and it is not the case that ]your doctrine of] dependent origination is not shared by the Jrdvakas. Therefore it is not appropriate [for Nfigfiljuna] to compose [this] treatise. Answer: [Our doctrine of dependent origination is not shared by the ~rdvakas] [1] because [we] teach dependent origination, characterized by nonorigination, etc., by means of negation, 72 and [2] because there is no inference for showing that unconditioned dependent origination exists. If [you] suppose that that origination from definite causal conditions is just unconditioned, 73 [that is not so] because origination has been negated; therefore it is not possible that ~oeing unconditioned] is a property (dharma) of that [origination]. 74 [Moreover,] ]Thesis:] Origination is not unconditioned, [Reason:] because it possesses a cause, [Example:] like continuation (sthiti). By inference, that [unconditioned dependent origination[ does not exist; therefore it is not the case that [this treatise] is not appropriate. Objection: Others 7s of [our] fellow Buddhists say: ]Thesis:] [Dependent origination is said to be] "without origination," ]Reason:[ because [a result] different from that does not originate, 76 [Example:] as ]when one says that dependent origination is] "without a Lord (~vara). ''77 [Thesis:] lit is] "without cessation," [Reason:[ because the cessation imagined by the founders of nonBuddhist sects does not exist,


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[Example:] as [when one says,] "without self" (andtman). 7s [Dependent origination is] "without annihilation, without permanence," because the result arises in dependence on the cause and when the result arises, the cause ceases. [It is] "without coming, without going," because [dharmas] cease in the very place where they originated] 9 [Thesis:] [It is] "not something manifold, not one thing," [Reason:] because [cause and result] cannot be said to be the same or different, [Example:] just as fire which has arisen from contact with a jewel or fuel or the sun [is not the same as or different from them] .8o Since such dependent origination is the doctrine of scripture (pravacana), it is not the case that it is not shared by the drdvakas. Therefore it was not necessary to compose [this] treatise [i.e., the M~]. Answer: [We] teach that origination itself has just the intrinsic nature of nonorigination. Because dependent origination characterized by nonorigination, etc., is accepted [in that sense by us and differently by you], that is a very great difference [between our two positions]? 1 Therefore it is not the case that it was unnecessary [for N~gfirjuna] to compose [this] treatise. The (icdrya [Nfigfiajuna] has praised the Blessed One as teaching that very dependent origination which possesses the special characteristics of nonorigination, etc. Thinking that it would be easy to teach the characteristics of noncessation and so on [after] having taught nonorigination, [Nftgfitjuna] wished to teach nonorigination first. He perceived the conceptual constructions of origination imagined by others. For some proponents of origination (utpgldavgldin) say that entities originate from themselves. Others say that [they originate] from another. Some say that [they originate] from both, others that [they originate] from no cause. When one investigates [these theories] by means of reasoning (rigs pa, yukti or nyglya) and scripture, [one finds that] origination cannot be proved in any way. By virtue of his certainty [about that fact], [Nfigfil-juna] said, Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from no cause, Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere. [MMK 1--1]




This sets forth the general thesis. As to that, to begin with, what [does] "not from themselves" [qualify]? [It qualifies the second line,] "Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere." [The second line] should be connected with each [of the negations in the first line]. "From itself" (svatah.) means '~from [its own I self" (dtmanah.). Since the intended meaning of a statement is not established by a mere assertion (pratij~d-mdtra), here the reason 82 is understood to be existence; for "from itself" is designated in [connection with[ an existing selfY An example [is given] by virtue of the [property] to be proved (sddhya-dharma) and the proving property (sddhana-dharma), because it is an example of a subject [of a syllogism I (dharmin) which possesses a [property] to be proved and a proving property which are common knowledge [to both sides in a debate] .84 The negation, "not from themselves," (na svatah.) should be regarded as having the meaning of a simple negation (prasajyapratis.edha),85 because it is predominantly (gtso che ba, perhaps prddhdnya) negation. [This is so] because [Nfigfirjuna's] intention is to establish nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpaka-jfidna) which is endowed with all cognizable objects (j~eya-vis.aya), by negating the net of all conceptual constructions (kalpand). If it is taken to be an implicative negation (paryuddsa-pratisedha), [then] because that is predominantly affirmation (vidhi), it would be distinct from [our] doctrine (krtdnta). [This is so] because [that implicative negation] would teach nonorigination by affirming that dharmas are unoriginated. 86 For it is said in scripture that if one practices (spyod, root car) the nonorigination of matter (r@a), one does not practice the perfection of discernment. 87 Here one should specify that entities do not [emphasis represents eva] originate from themselves. If one specifies otherwise, one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate from themselves" [emphasis represents eva]; rather they originate from another." Likewise one would ascertain, "Entities do not originate just (eva) from themselves; rather they originate from themselves and another." Therefore that also is not accepted, because it is distinct from [our] doctrine. 88 Here the syllogism (prayoga-vdkya) is: 89 [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, 9~ it is certain that the inner dyatanas do not originate from themselves,



[Reason:] because they exist [already], [Example:] like consciousness (caitanya). 91 Objection: It has n o t b e e n shown that the reason, existence, is absent from dissimilar cases (vipaksa). 92 Therefore [your syllogism] lacks a [valid] reason. Answer: Because ]dissimilar cases] simply do not exist, there is no absence [of the reason] in that [nonexistent dissimilar case]. Therefore, here and in all [similar syllogisms], there is no fault ]in not giving a dissimilar example]. 93 Objection: Here some among the Still1.khyas 94 make a rebuttal: What is the meaning of this thesis [of yours]? Does "from themselves" [mean] '~from the nature of the result?" or "from the nature of the cause"? The point is this: 9s If [you mean that they do not originate] from the nature of the result, [you] establish what is [already] established [for us] (siddha-sddhana). But if [you mean that they do not originate] from the nature of the cause, [your reason] has a contradictory meaning (viruddhdrthatd), since everything that originates (utpattimat), originates from what already (eva) exists as the nature of [its] cause. 96 Answer: That is not good, because [we] negate just "origination from itself. ''97 Even if [one considers] "origination from the nature of the cause," [we] reject origination either from [a cause which is the same as the result] itself or from [a cause] which is different [from the result]. 98 Therefore [even in that case, your objection is not valid]. Because consciousness (caitanya) characterized by potentiality (gakti) is also included [in our example], there is no fault [in our example] .99 [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]a~176 comments: Entities do not originate from their own selves, because their origination would be pointless and because there would be no end (anavasthd) to origination. ~~ [Bh~vaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, because no reason and example are given and because faults stated by the opponent are not answered. [Also,] because it is a prasahga-argument, 1~ a [property] to be proved and a property [which proves] that, opposite in meaning [to that intended], ]become] manifest by reversing the original meaning. [Specifically, the opponent could say that] entities originate from another, because origination has a result and because



origination has an end. Thus [Buddhapgdita's own] doctrine would be contradicted) ~ Objection: The S.agtkhyas 104 say: [Thesis:l That [thesis of yours[ that entities do not originate from themselves is not correct, [Reason:] because it rejects a previous position (pgtrva-paksa) which is supplied by [your] own fancy, [Example:] like [a thesis] rejecting [the idea that] the three worlds originate from a hare's horn. I~ Answer: Since potentiality (gakti) and manifestation (vyakti) do not have separate natures, just as [manifestation and] its own self [do not have different natures], [therefore] origination from that [potentiality] is "origination from itself." Thus the previous position is established [as being the position which you do, in fact, hold]. 1~ Even if [we] have conceptually constructed the [previous[ position, there is no fault [in doing so] because that [alternative of origination from itself[ is included in order to state that [origination] is not [logically] possible. 1~ Thus, to begin with, entities do not originate from themselves. What [does the phrase] "not from another" [modify., in MMK 1--1]? The context is: Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere. [MMK 1--1cd] '~ another" (paratah.) means "from [something] different." The full meaning of the negation is as before. 1~ Here also the property of the subject [which proves the thesis] (paksa-dharma) 1~ is manifest, because the otherness of the other is the [proving] property. 11~ An example [is given[ by virtue of that [proving property and property to be proved[.1 u Here the syllogism is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the inner dyatanas do not originate from their causal conditions, [which are] different [from them], [Reason:] because they are different [from those causal conditions], [Example:] just as a jar [is different from the causal conditions of the inner dyatanas and so does not originate from them]. ~1~ Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is certain that the alleged (vivaks.ita) [causal conditions] which bring about the inner dyatanas, the eye and so on, 113 [and which are] different [from them], are not causal conditions [of the inner dyatanas],


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[Reason:] because they are different [from the inner @atanas], [Example:] just as threads [are different from the inner g~yatanasand so are not their causal conditions]. 114

[Thesis:] That ]reason which you give], "because they are different," is not a [logically] possible reason, [Reason:] because it is one part of the meaning of the thesis, 115 [Example:] like [the reason in the fallacious syllogism,] "sound is permanent, because it is sound." Answer: That is not good. One sees that one part of the meaning of a thesis is [sometimes] established as a reason, [as in the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] The sound of the Vedic hymns (sdman) is impermanent, [Reason:] because it is sound, [Example:] like the sound of a drum. 116 Therefore [the opponent's] reason, ["because it is one part of the meaning of the thesis,"] is inconclusive. Objection: From among the Vaigesikas, [some] maintain that it is established that the part-possessing (avayavin) substances (dravya) which are named H7 earth, water, fire, and air, originate just from atoms (pararndnu), [which are] different [from those whole substances], [and that they originate] by the stages of dyads (dvyanuka) and so on. 11s ]Those Vaigesikas] make the following rebuttal: If the meaning of [your] reason, "because they are different," is supposed to be a quality (guna), the meaning is not established for [your]self) 19 If it is supposed to have a meaning different from that, there will be conflict with common knowledge (prasiddhi-bddha).12~ Answer: That is not good. The cause of the cognition of difference is just the establishment of the general property (sdm(mya-dharma) [of difference]. [This is so] [1] because [our] reason, ["because they are different,"] is stated in general and [2] also because the consideration (sems pa, probably cintg of whether that [difference] is a quality [in 0 the Vaigesika sense] or something else, is a different consideration. 121 Also, there is no conflict with common knowledge, because [our] thesis is qualified [by the phrase, "in ultimate reality"]J 22 [Moreover, the Vaigesikas' atomic theory does not hold in ultimate reality, as the following syllogism shows:]



[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, atoms of earth do not produce ~23 the substance called "earth," [Reason:] because they are atoms, [Example:] like atoms of fire. Likewise, one should also say that atoms of fire also do not produce the substance fire, etc. Objection: The Abhidharmikas 124 say: If [your reason,] "difference," is stated about [things] which are empty of the power [to produce] the result, [then] the meaning of [your] reason is not established. ~25 If it is stated about [things] which are not empty of that ]power], [then your] example, ]"jar" or "threads,"] will not possess the proving property. 126 Answer: A general property, which produces the cognition of difference in relation to a different thing (gzhi, probably vastu), has been stated in general. ~27 Therefore that futile rejoinder (jdti) [of yours states] a specious nonestablishment and a specious nonpossession of the proving [property]) 28 Objection: The Naiyfiyikas~29 say: Because [you] do not accept the outer and inner dyatanas in ultimate reality, the subject [of your thesis] is not established. Therefore since [its] locus is not established (ddrayaasiddhi), there will be the fault that the meaning of your ]reason] is not established. ~3~ Answer: We accept conventionally the locus of that ]reason[, the dyatanas, [which include such things as] jars, eyes, and so on, and [the reason itself,] difference. Therefore the fault which [you] have stated is not [logically] possible, and that [criticism of yours[ is not correct) 31 [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapfilita] 132 comments: Entities also do not originate from another. Why? Because it would follow that everything would originate from everything.~33 [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] Therefore, because there is a prasahgaargument 134 in that [commentary of yours], ]then] having reversed the [meaning of] the [property] to be proved and the proving ]property], ]one could say that] entities originate from themselves or from both or from no cause, because some ]particular thing] originates from some [particular thing]. Then ]your] previous position would be contradicted. Otherwise, [if such an alteration of the property to be proved and the proving property is not allowed,] that ]reason], "because it would follow that everything would originate from everything," would be


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neither a proof (sddhana) nor a retutation (dgtsana); and therefore that [argument of yours] would be incoherent in meaning (asam.gatdrtha). 135 For instance, it would be like [the following incoherent verse:] [A certain] grass, 136 [a certain] creeper, 137 and the tamarind are beneficial for fever. There is nothing charming about harlots. Bamboo shoots are heavy in the stomach (guru) and kha bag

yod. 138
The rays of the moon are cool in the hot season. 139 Therefore, in that way, entities do not originate from another. Objection: The S.anakhyas say: A result, such as a sprout, originates [both] from causal factors (kdrana) which are distinct [from it] and [from a causal factor] which is not distinct [from it]. [In the case of a sprout, these two kinds of causal factors] have the characteristics of soil, etc., and a seed [respectively])4~ Answer: Because they think that [entities] originate from both [themselves and another], therefore to them [Nfigfirjuna] says the following: "Not from both" (na dvdbhydm) [MMK 1--1bl]. The meaning is, "Not from both themselves and another." The meaning of the negation is as before. What [is said to be "not from both"]? The context is: Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere. [MMK 1--1cd] Why? The idea is that [this is so] [1] because [the proof] is included in the proofs [already] shown in both cases 141 and [2] alSO because there is no inference which shows that entities originate from both. [Nfigfirjuna] has stated this [negation], "not from both," etc., also in order to negate the position of the Jains) 4a [This is so] because they say that a gold ring originates [both] from [its primary cause,] gold and [from its causal conditions,] fire and so on, [that is,] from [both] itself and others. Therefore, in that way, [entities do] not [originate] from both [themselves and another]. Now "nor from no cause" (napy ahetutah.) [MMK 1--1b2] is to be discussed. The meaning [of "from no cause"] is "without a cause" (rgyu med par, perhaps nirhetutah). What [is said to be "not from no cause"]? The context is:



Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere. [MMK 1--1cd] Why? The idea is that [this is so] [1] because there is no inference showing that [uncaused origination] and [21 also because there would be the fault of conflict with [both] inference and common knowledge. As to that, the conflict with inference [is as follows:] [Tllesis:[ The entities which are the inner dyatanas, which are accepted according to superficial reality (sam.vrtyd), do not originate from no cause, [Reason:] because they possess generality and particularity, 143 [Example:] like a sprout. The conflict with common knowledge [is as follows:] It is common knowledge that whatever exists in this world originates from causes, just as cloth [originates] from threads and a grass hut (sab ma, k6yarndna) originates from grasses (rtsi rkyang)} 44 Alternatively, "no cause" (ahetu) [may also mean] "a bad cause" (kuhetu), as [when one says,] "no wife" (abhdryd) [to mean "a bad wife" (kubhdryd)] 14s and so on. What is a bad cause? [Bad causes are such things as] intrinsic nature (svabhdva), the Lord (~vara), spirit (purusa), primary matter (pradhdna), time (kdla), [the god] Nfirfiyana, etc} 46 [They are bad causes] because they are unreal (abh~ta). [Nfigfir]una's] idea is that entities do not originate from those noncauses, because there is no inference showing that they originate from them and also because there would be conflict with inference. Objection: In that connection, to begin with, the proponents of intrinsic n a t u r e (svabhdvavddin) 147 say: [Thesis:] [We] assert that the inner dyatanas originate from ]their own] intrinsic nature, [Reason:] because various bodies x4s are brought about, [Example:] like the beautiful color, shape, leaves, stalk, petals, stamens, and calyx of lotuses, or like the area of the neck of peacocks which is dark blue like sapphir@ 49 and the eyes of [peacocks'] tailfeathers, which are multi-colored and iridescent. Answer: Therefore [your syllogism[ establishes what is [already] established [for us], if that meaning of the thesis in that [syllogism] is [the following:] In superficial reality, the inner dyatanas which are the domain (gocara) of the cognition of the superficially real (sdm.v.rtajfidna), originate from definite causal conditions, because they do not


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depend on the activity of an independent agent and because they are indeed not made by anyone. But if [your thesis concerns origination] in ultimate reality, [then your] example does not exist, because [we] do not accept that lotuses, etc., originate in ultimate reality. If those who say that there are no causes (ahetuvddin) 15~wish to prove to us that everything [originates] from no cause (ahetutah.) and wish to prove their thesis TM by means of a reason (hetu), [that] is inconsistent with [their own] previous position, ls2 Objection: Without [giving] a reason (hetu), [we] cannot demonstrate [our thesis] to one who says that causes (hetu) exist, just as [one cannot communicate] with a foreigner (mleccha) [unless one speaks] a foreign language. Therefore, even though [we] adduce a reason, there is no conflict with [our own] previous position. Answer: Even though [the words] have been translated into another language, the meaning of a possessor of a logical mark (lihgin) [can be] demonstrated only by means of a logical mark (lihga) 153 as it has been understood [by oneself]) 54 For example, that one who demonstrates to a foreigner that fire exists in this place because smoke [exists here], [only uses] a different means of [causing] the understanding of the logical mark to arise [in his hearer]. 155 Therefore that answer [of yours] is not [logically[ possible. Objection: The followers of [iug stobs can 156 say: [Such things as] embryos (arbuda) and sprouts, etc., originate from no causal condition; but since jars and so on originate because of having causal conditions, they do not originate from [their own] intrinsic nature. Therefore [the Mfidhyamikas' thesis] that all entities do not originate from their own intrinsic nature, establishes what is [already] established [for us]. Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because [we] have negated the origination of all [results] from all [causal conditions]. 157 Thus, to begin with, there is no origination from intrinsic nature. Objection: Those who maintain that the Lord is the cause [of all things] ls8 say: That one who dwells, subtle, alone, in the source of creation (yoni) Creates and destroys all this. That is the ruler who answers prayers, the praiseworthy god,




The maker of good qualifies (yon tan byed pa), who has absolutely attained peace. 159 Man (ayam jantuh.) is unknowing, without mastery over his own happiness and suffering. Impelled by the Lord, he indeed goes either to heaven or to hell. 16~

Answer: That is a mere assertion. [Thesis:] Even in superficial reality, the Lord cannot be the cause of the origination of the whole world [of living beings] (jagat), [Reason:] because he is the cause of joy for some and sorrow [for others], 161 [Example:] like a cowherd. Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] It is certain that the world [of living beings] does not possess as its cause, a sole creator called "the Lord," [Reason:] because it is an object of correct knowledge (prameya), [Example:] like the Lord [himself]. Thus even in superficial reality, entities do not originate from that [Lord]. Even if the Lord is a cause, the result must be either [the Lord's] own self, or different [from him], or both. Whichever one it is supposed to be, the negation [of the origination of such a result] has been stated previously; and the origination of [either] an existent or a nonexistent [result] will also be negated. 162 Therefore in ultimate reality, entities do not originate from the Lord. Objection: Action (karman) which is the cause of the variegated world that is counted as [the world of] beings (sattva) and the physical [world] (bhdjana), is called "the Lord." [This is so] because it produces continuation, origination, and cessation, happiness and suffering, and increase and decrease. Answer: On the side of convention, that establishes what is [already] established [for us]; [but[ not in ultimate reality, because in ultimate reality, [we] do not accept even the origination of action. Objection: Those who maintain that spirit (purus.a) is the c a u s e 163 also assert that just spirit is the cause of the origination of the whole world [of living beings]. [Thus it is said:]
As a spider [is the cause] of threads, as a moonstone [is the cause] of waters,


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As a fig-tree [is the cause] of shoots, that [spirit] is the cause of all embodied beings (dehin)) 64 Likewise, [it is said] that "just spirit [is the cause] of all this which has been and which will b e , ''165 etc. [It is also said] that "that moves; that does not move; that is far; that is near; that is in the middle; that is both; that is outside; [that is the cause] of all. ''166 Answer: Here the refutation should be made according to [the refutation] of those who hold that the Lord is the cause [of all things]. Furthermore, [the following syllogism] should be stated: [Thesis:] Devadatta's self (dtman) 167 is not the cause of Devadatta's body and sense organs, [Reason:] because it is a self, [Example: ] like Yajfiadatta's self. Alternatively, [one can state the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] The creator of the totality of Yajfiadatta's body and sense organs is not Yajfiadatta's self, [Reason:] because [that totality] is a cause of the origination of happiness and suffering and cognition, 16s [Example:] like the totality of Devadatta's body and sense organs. Alternatively, [one can also state the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] The bound (baddha) self is not the cause of all, [Reason:] because it is the self, [Example:] like the liberated (mukta) self. [Your] own thesis will be faulty, because the inherent nature (svart?tpa) of [its] property [to be proved] has been rejected. 169 Objection: The meaning of [your] reason, "because it is the self," is one part of the meaning of [your] thesis. Therefore [that reason] is not established. Answer: Since [that objection] has been answered [already], there is no fault [in our syllogism]. Objection: Our "self" [i.e., spirit] is just single; but it is metaphorically designated as multiple [selves], just as the space in jars and so on is metaphorically designated as [many] separate [spaces]) 7~ Thus [two of your] examples do not exist. 171 Therefore there is no conflict with inference, nor will [our] thesis be faulty. Answer: That is not good, [for the following reasons:] [1] Since



space is unoriginated, it indeed lacks the nature of an entity, ~72 like a sky-flower; therefore [your assertion that space is] established as being one is mere words. [2] Even conventionally, there is no inference showing that the generally accepted self is one5 v3

[Thesis:] The bound self is not different from the liberated self, [Reason:] because it is self, [Example: 1 like the liberated self. Answer: It is not established that in the realm of nirvfina without aggregates remaining (nirupadhigesa-nirvdna-dhdtu), the liberated self exists and is one. Therefore it is not the case that [your syllogism] will not have the faults which [we] have stated. 174 An extensive examination [of these questions] will be made in the ]eighteenth] chapter [of the MMK], "Examination of the Self" (dtma-pariksd). Objection: Those who maintain that primordial matter (prakrti) 175 is the cause [of the universe] accept that primordial matter is the cause of the origination of the manifestations (vyakti) of [everything from] Brahma and so on down to a sprout. They say: [Thesis:] It is certain that the causes of internal distinctions 176 are pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), and confusion (rnoha), 177 [Reason:] because [the internal distinctions] possess those [three],
[Example:] for even in the world, it is known that that which possesses something has that [which it possesses] as its cause, like a piece of sandalwood, a potsherd (gyo too), a vessel, an ornament, etc. 178 ]Application:] Likewise, the internal distinctions also possess pleasure, pain, and confusion. ]Conclusion:] Therefore, by the stated reason, the causes of the internal distinctions are pleasure, pain, and confusion. [The Mfidhyamika may say that the meaning of the Sfi.mkhya's reason is not established, because it is not established that the four aggregates other than the aggregate of feeling possess pleasure, pain, and confusion. In that case, the Sfina.khya replies:] 179 ]Thesis:] One should grasp that the aggregates having the characteristics of matter (rtipa), perception-conception (samjhd), mental formations (sam.skdrdh.), and cognition (vij~dna), also have the intrinsic nature of pleasure, pain, and confusion,


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[Reason:] because they are aggregates, ]Example:] like the aggregate of feeling (vedand). Therefore it is also not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestablished. Answer: As to that, here sandalwood and so on are not established in ultimate reality; therefore the example [in your first syllogism] does not exist. Even conventionally, confusion is included in the aggregate of mental formations [not in the aggregate of feeling]; therefore the example [in your second syllogism] is not established. 18~ ]Thesis:[ It is certain that dharmas which are [1] different from pleasure and pain [and 2] are not consciousness (caitanya), do not possess the intrinsic nature of pleasure and pain, ]Reason:] because they are objects of correct knowledge, [Example:] like cognition (shes pa, perhaps jhdna). 181 Therefore by [the immediately preceding] inference also, that ]first syllogism of yours] is not [logically] possible. The example [in our last syllogism] is taken just from generally established cognition (shes pa); therefore it is also not the case that [our] example] does not exist. 182 [Against the Sfi.mkhya theory of the transformations of primary matter, one can state the following syllogism:] ]Thesis:] Primary matter is not the cause of principles (tattva) such as the "great" (mahat) and so on, 183 [Reason:] because it is unmanifested (avyakta), [Example:] like spirit. Therefore those who hold that primordial matter is the cause [of the universe] will be in conflict with their own inferenceJ 84 Objection: If the meaning of ]your] reason, "because it is unmanirested," is stated in regard to the state prior to manifestation, ]then your] example will have the fault of not possessing the proving property. But if it is stated in regard to consciousness [i.e., spirit], the meaning of [your] reason is not established) 85 Answer: That is not good. [Our] reason is stated in general; or, even if it is stated particularly, the application (upanaya) makes it the same in general) 86 ]Therefore] that futile rejoinder [of yours] (fftti) [expresses] a specious nonestablishment (asiddhy-glbhdsa) [of our reason]. The general refutation of those who hold that primordial matter (prak.rti) or time (kgda) or [the god] Nfirfiyan. a is the cause [of the



universe] should also be understood according to the [the negation of] the Lord [as cause]. Therefore, in that way, entities also do not originate from no cause. Objection: Some of the Sfi.mkhyas Is7 say: [You] have said, Not from themselves, nor from another, nor from both, nor from no cause, Do any entities ever originate anywhere. [MMK 1--1] It is true that they are unoriginated; rather, they are manifested. 188 Answer: One should ask them the following: What is made manifest, [and] how? If, for instance, it is like jars and so on ]being made manifest] by a lamp, [then we ask,] how does an unoriginated lamp make unoriginated jars, etc., manifest? The unoriginated horn of a horse can never be made manifest. Even if, in order to establish the system of conventional truth, it is accepted that those ]jars, lamps, etc.,] exist, [still the following] must be said: What does a lamp do for a jar? If it makes [the jar] an object (grdhya) [of cognition], [then] since that [fact of being an object of cognition] does not exist prior [to the lamp], [the lamp] creates that very [fact]) 89 But if [the lamp] makes [the jar] an object of visual cognition [in particular], [then] since [that fact of being an object of visual cognition] does not exist prior [to the lamp] when [the jar] is in darkness, [the lamp] creates that very [fact]. 19~ Even if [the lamp] removes the darkness which obstructs the jar as object, [then the lamp] creates that very [removal of darkness]5 9~ But if [the jar] is an object [already], [then] since that same [jar as object] is seen, what more is there to be done by the lamp? ~92 For our position, what is called a "jar" is also a collection of [momentary] elements (bh&a) and matter dependent on the elements (bhautika)J 93 When the lamp has arisen, [the momentary jar] originates together with light (snang ba). Therefore even conventionally, [the lamp] is a nonobstructing cause (kdrana-hetu) ~94of an entity [the jar] which arises in a series (samtdnena) [of moments] from its own causes [such as day]. Because [the lamp] is a cause of [the jar's] arising together with light, it is considered to make [the jar] manifest) 95 In regard to ultimate reality, the negation of manifestation is also the same as the negation of origination. [Thesis:] The unmanifested (avyakta) is not made manifest,


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[Reason:] because the "great" and so on are not manifest, [Example:] like a sky-flower. Therefore, in that way, manifestation is also not good [i.e., not a defensible thesis]. [BuddhapMita's commentary:] [BuddhapSJita] 196 comments: Entities also do not originate from no cause, because it would follow that everything would always be originating from everything, and s o o n . 197 [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] Since here also there is a prasafigaargument, t98 if one accepts the meaning of a statement with a manifestation (vyakti) of a reversed [property I to be proved and proving [property], [then[ that [argument] has stated the following: Entities originate from a cause, [because] some [particular] thing originates from some [particular] thing at some [particular] time and [because] undertakings do have results. Thus that [commentary of yours] is not [logically] possible, because of faults which [we] have stated previously. But if it is otherwise, [that is, if the argument is not reversed,] it is incoherent, as before. 199 Therefore, in that way, [entities] also do not [originate] from no cause. [The last two pddas of MMK 1--1,] "Do any originated entities ever exist anywhere," should be connected with each [of the four negations of MMK 1--lab, "not from themselves," etc.]. "Any ]entities]" (kecana) [means] entities of affliction (sam. kle~a) and purification (vyavaddna). "Anywhere" (kvacana) [means] in either our own doctrine or [in] what is established according to particular systems (pratitantra). "Ever" (jdtu) [means] "at any time." Therefore it is established that dependent origination possesses the ]eight] characteristics, nonorigination and so on, which are not taught by the founders of non-Buddhist sects, etc. 2~176




Buddha, Dharma, Safigha, i.e., the teacher, the teaching, and the community of practitioners of the teaching. 2 On Mafiju/ri, see Lamotte (1960). On the epithet kurnara-bh(~ta in particular, see ibid., pp. 2, 14 n. 38.




3 An dcdrya is a "master" in the sense of a "learned teacher." Avalokitavrata explains betow that an dcdrya is one who has realized and understood the procedures (cho ga, dcdra) for attaining the higher realms and liberation. He also gives some alternative etymologies. See Ava P23a--3 to 6; D19a--3,4,5. '~ "Noble" translates drya. In the Buddhist context, it refers to one who has attained the Path of Seeing and thus has direct insight into the Four Noble Truths or, in a Mahfiyfina formulation, emptiness. 5 On vikalpa and prapahca, see Williams (1980), pp. 27--34. Avalokitavrata explains that vikalpa is an activity of mind (serns kyi spyod pa), whereas prapahca is an activity of speech or language (ngag gi spyod pa); see Ava P2b--8 to 3a--3, D2b--2 to 5. See also Ava P4b--2 to 5, D4a--1,2,3. 6 See Ava P4b--6 to 5a--2, D4a--4 to 7. 7 See Ava P3a--8 to 3b--2, D3a--l,2,3 and P5a--2 to 7, D4a--7 to 4b--3. Avalokitavrata glosses 'byor pa as dbang phyug, "mastery." s gsal ba dang de kho na dag, where de kho na translates tattva and gsal ba perhaps translates vyakti, "manifestation." The translation, "correct verbal expression," for vyakti comes from Avalokitavrata's gloss. Also, he explains tattva as meaning that the inferences and refutations are not specious (-dbhdsa). See Ava P6b--8 to 7a--3, D6a--1,2,3. 9 tshangs pa mtshungs par spyod pa rnams, sabrahmacdrinah., more literally, 'Yellow students," glossed by Avaloldtavrata as theg pa mchog gi 'gro ba rnams, "Mahfiyfinists." Avalokitavrata says that those who have not understood the MMK are those who require a full explanation (vipa~citajfia), as opposed to those who can understand a condensed statement (udghat.itaflia). See Ava P8a--3,4,5; D7a--1,2. 10 Avalokitavrata glosses this as "not according to [my] own opinion," rang gi blos (P: blo) ma yin par. See Ava P9a--6, DSa--1. Earfier, Avalokitavrata remarked that one's desired object ('clod pa'i dngos po) is not established by mere scripture without inferential reasoning; see Ava P8a--5,6; D7a--3. 1~ 'brel pa, sarnbandha. Avalokitavrata explains that 'bret pa is twofold: rigs pa'i 'brel pa (perhaps ny@a-sam, bandha) and don gyi 'brel pa (artha-sam. bandha). One might suppose that rigs pa'i 'brel pa meant something like "logical connection," but Avalokitavrata glosses it as bla ma brgyud pa, guru-param, pard, "the lineage of teachers." The don gyi 'brel pa, "connection of meaning," refers to the "meavAng of the parts" of the explanation of the rigs pa'i 'brelpa. See Ava P10a--5,6,7; DSb--4,5,6 and P32a--7,8; D27a--5,6. ~-~ According to Avalokitavrata, Bhfivaviveka here refers to the time when the Buddha was an drya-bodhisattva practicing the supramundane path (lokottara-mdrga). See Ava P l l b - - 6 to 12a--3, D10a--2 to 5. ~3 Specifically, zeal to teach "the excellent jewel of dependent origination to those travelling on the Best Vehicle." "Intellect" (blo gros, mati) here means "discernment" (praf~d). See Ava P i 2 a - - 8 to 12b--3, D10b--2,3,4. 1~ A niyuta is 1011, i.e., a hundred billion (U.S.); a koti is ten miltion. ~5 That is, the light of supramundane discernment; see Ava P15b--5, D13a--4. ~6 An allusion to the myth in which the gods produce nectar by churning the ocean; see Ava P l l b - - 3 , 4 ; D9b--6,7 and P15b--8 to 16a--5, D13a--6 to 13b--3. What is being referred to is the Buddha's attainment of enlightenment (Ava ibid.). ~7 Avalokitavrata remarks that reality (rattva) is nondeceptive (bslu ba rned pa, probably avisamvddin). It is that which is ultimately (paramdrthatah.) unchanging and empty of intrinsic nature (svabhdva). See Ava P i 6 b - - 2 , D13b--6.


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18 That is, one must understand it for oneself. See Ava P17a--2,3; D14a--4,5. 19 That is, the See Ava P17b--1, D14b--3. 20 Dependent origination, characterized by the eight negations of MMK 1--A,B, is to be taught to those born as gods and humans, not to those born in the lower realms. It is not to be taught to one who is too young or too old. It is to be taught to those who are brgthmanas or ksatriyas, not to vai~yas or gfidras. It is to be taught to those born in the middle country and those living in villages or monasteries; it is not to be taught to those born in the border countries and those living in cemeteries or crossroads. It is to be taught at dawn and in the daytime or nighttime, not at dusk. See Ava P18a--1 to 18b--4, D15a--1 to 15b--2. It is difficult to see how the statements about caste can be reconciled with the usual Buddhist attitude on this subject. It is noteworthy that Avalokitavrata quotes from a "text of the non-Buddhists" (phyi rol pa rnams kyi gzhung) in connection with caste. See Ava P18b--l,2; D15a--6,7. 21 grdvakas, "hearers/preachers," and pratyekabuddhas, "individual Buddhas," are both followers of the The drdvakas follow the teaching of a Buddha and become arhats. The pratyekabuddhas, as a result of practice in past lives, attain enlightenment without a teacher and do not teach others; see AK 3--94cd. Neither ~rdvakas nor pratyekabuddhas attain the complete enlightenment of a perfect Buddha (sam.buddha); see LVP AK I, p. 2, and AK 7--28ab. While both ~rdvakas and pratyekabuddhas understand ordinary dependent origination, they do not comprehend it in the profound sense of the eight negations of MMK 1--A,B. See Ava P32b--7 to 33a--1, D27b--5,6. 22 "Origination" is part of the superficial truth, and "nonorigination" is part of the ultimate truth. See Ava P21b--7 to 22a--6, D18a--3 to 7. The two truths will be discussed later in the MMK. Here we simply note that Avalokitavrata gives a long discussion of them. See Ava P19a--4 to 21b--7, D15b--7 to 18a--3. 2~ tathdgata, "thus gone" or "thus come," is a common epithet of the Buddha. Avalokitavrata explains that "thus" (de bzhin, tath?0 refers to nirvfina, which is "thus" (and not otherwise) because it is nondeceptive. "Gone/come" (gshegs pa, gata or dgata) is used in the sense of "understood." Thus the Tathftgata is one who has understood and perfectly awakened to (abhisarn.budh) nirvfina. Avalokitavrata goes on to give a long list of alternative etymologies. See Ava P23b--3 to 25b--5, D19b--2 to 21b--1. 24 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence refers to Nfigfirjuna's attainment of the bh~mi ("stage") called pramuditd, "the joyful," which is the first bodhisattva-bhrmi according to the Dagabhfirnika Sfitra. Using the terminology of the Bodhisattva-bhfimi section of the Yogdcdrabht2mi, Avalokitavrata also calls it the attainment of the adhydgaya-viguddhi-bhfimi, which follows the adhimukti-caryd-bh~mi. See Ava P22b--3,4; D18b--4,5 and P26b--7,8; D22a--7 to 22b--1. On these bh&mis, see Dayal (1932), pp. 278--83. 25 The "intense force of joy" again refers to the first bhfimi, called "the joyful" (Ava P28a--7,8; D23b--5). The "praise" referred to is contained in MMK 1--A,B (Ava P29a--7 to 29b--1, D24b--3,4). Nfigftrjuna praised the Buddha in order to ripen his own Buddha-dharmas and also in order to ripen other sentient beings (Ava P29b-3,4,5; D24b--5,6,7); and he wished to write this treatise for the latter reason (Ava P28a--7, D23b--4,5). 26 Avalokitavrata explains that the persons referred to are those who can understand




a condensed statement (udghat.itajha). They can understand the MMK (without a commentary) because they are able to supply the remaining members of a syllogism when only one has been stated. That is, the statement of a thesis alone or a reason alone or an example alone is enough to enable them to comprehend the entire syllogism. See Ava P31b--6,7,8; D26b--5,6,7. Earlier, Avalokitavrata explained that this commentary is written for those who require a full explanation (vipa~citajha). See note 9. 27 That is, dependent origination qualified as "without cessation," etc., which is a special teaching not shared by non-Buddhists or Hinayfinists. See Ava P32b--7 to 33a--1, D27b--5,6. 2~ That is, if Nfigfirjuna had simply said "without cessation," etc., without mentioning dependent origination, one would not have understood that these attributes belong to dependent origination. See Ava P33b--2 to 7, D28a--6 to 28b--2. 29 Some Mfidhyamikas, according to Ava P34a--2, D28b--5. See also LVP AK HI, p. 78. 3o Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti with some variants; see PSP 7.6, 7 and n. 6. The opponent explains pratitya-sarnutpddah, as tdms tdn prdpya sambhavah. 3~ Other Mfidhyamikas, according to Ava P34a--8, D29a--3. See also LVP AK III, pp. 80--1. 32 Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti (with variants?); see PSP 7.7--8.1. 33 Literally, "one who is not other says," where "one who is not other" means Bhfivaviveka himself. See Ava P34b--4, D29a--6. 34 That is, neither of the opponents' interpretations of dependent origination fits the scriptural statement quoted. The sentence quoted occurs many times in the Pfili Canon; see PSP p. 6 n. 5. 35 Also occurs frequently; see the references in PSP p. 9 n. 7 (with addendum, p. 596). 36 Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti; see PSP 8.10, 11 and 9.7, 8. ~v Avalokitavrata identifies the opponents here as vaiydkaran@, "grammarians," or at least non-Buddhist opponents using grammatical arguments. See Ava P36a--4,5,6; D30b--3,4,5. The same objection is raised and answered in Vasubandhu's bhdsya on AK 3--28ab. See LVP AK III, pp. 78--80. 38 I have translated pratitya as "dependent." It is actually a gerund rather than an adjective and could more literally be translated as "having depended." 39 sndtvd bhulikte; see LVP AK III, p. 78. Thus according to the opponent, the Buddhist cannot claim that "dependent origination" means that depending and originating occur simultaneously, because the grammatical form of pratitya implies that dependence precedes origination. Cf. Pfinini 3--4--21. 40 According to Avalokitavrata, the Buddhist may try to avoid the difficulty presented by the first syllogism by admitting that the result pre-exists potentially (nus pa'i tshul gyis). The grammarian then puts forward the second syllogism. The Buddhist holds that there is no "personal inner agent" (nang gi byed pa po'i skyes bu) apart from causes and conditions. For the grammarian, an activity must have an independent agent (svatantrah. kartd; see PSxfini 1--4--54). For example, the activity of chopping wood with an axe does not take place without a person who chops. Causes and conditions alone cannot produce the result any more than an axe can chop wood by itself. See Ava P37a--7 to 38a--1, D31b--4 to 32a--5. See also LVP AK III, pp. 78--9.


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~1 Ava P38a--2, D32a--5 has gtan tshigs kyi don yod pa for PP's yod pa 'i gtan tshigs kyi don. Avalokitavrata glosses gtan tshigs kyi don ( hetv-artha) as byed pa po yod par sgrub pa, "proving that the agent exists" (Ava P38b--2,3; D32b--5,6). Thus artha here seems to mean "purpose, aim, goal," rather than "meaning;" and so I have translated don yod pa (or yod pa'i . . . don) as "success." In other words, Avalokitavrata says that the point (artha) of the second syllogism is to show that the agent must exist, since no activity is possible without an agent. This point is established neither for the Buddhists nor for the "Sfi.mkhyas, etc." See Ava P38b--3,4,5; D32b--6 to 33a--1. 42 The first example is dsyam vydddya fete; see LVP AK III, P. 80 and n. 2, and the vdrttika on Pgnini 3--4--21. The point of both examples is that the gerund is also used when one activity is simultaneous with another activity by the same agent. Thus the reason in the opponent's first syllogism, i.e,, the use of the gerund pratig,a, is inconclusive. 43 Avalokitavrata says that the grammarian holds that activities take place with an independent agent, while the Buddhist holds that activities take place without an independent agent. Thus the reason, "because [the agent] does not exist," is not established for the grammarian; and we have the fallacy of anyatara-asiddha, "[a reason] which is not established for one of the two [parties to a dispute]." See Ava P39b3 to 40a--3, D33b--6 to 34a--4. ~.4 Note that Ava P40a--4, D34a--5 has gzhan la grags pa'i for PP's gzhan la yang

grags pa'i.
45 ff the grammarian abandons his own doctrine and accepts that the agent does not exist, he will also have to reject [the independent existence of] all the other kdrakas, the instrument, direct object, etc., just as the Buddhist does. See Ava P40a--3 to 7, D34a--4 to 7. 46 This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation; see Ava P40a--8 to 40b--2, D34a--7 to 34b--2. karman might also be used in the grammatical sense of "direct object." "Dependent origination" is the direct object of the verb "teach" in MMK 1--A,B; and the eight negations which follow agree with it in being in the accusative

47 These eight negations constitute MMK 1--A in Sanskrit. The Tibetan translation, for reasons of Tibetan syntax, translates pdda a of MMK l--B, yah. pratftyasamutpddam., as the first pgzda of MMK 1--A. Avalokitavrata shows that these negations are found in several Mahfiygna sfltras; see Ava P40b--3 to 41a--7, D34b--3 to 35a--6. 48 According to Avalokitavrata, there is an objection, left unstated by Bhfivaviveka, that the meaning of the syllables should be explained before the meaning of the words. The following sentence gives some other Mfidhyamikas' answer to this objection. See Ava P42a--5 to 42b--6, D36a--3 to 36b--3. 49 Avalokitavrata points out that in Sanskrit, pada may mean either "word" or "foot." Thus padaikadeEa may mean either "one part of a word'' (i.e., a syllable) or "one part of a foot." The phrase rgya gar skad Ias pa dai ka de sha (P: pa ddm ka da sha) zhes bya ba (Ava P43a--4, D37a--1) must have been added by the translators to make the subcommentary intelligible in Tibetan. Avalokitavrata says that the syllables are the cause of the meaning of the word; but they do not contribute to the understanding of the sentence, etc., because they have no parts. See Ava P43a--5 to 8, D37a--2 to 5. so Avalokitavrata explains that the mere utterance of words could not serve the




meaning of the sentence, since each word ceases as soon as it has been pronounced. Each word, however, produces mental formations (sam.skdrah as the fourth aggregate) of cognition (blo, probably buddhi) and memory (dran pa, srnr.ti), which grasp the meaning of the word and do not forget it, respectively. Thus the meanings of the words can be put together to give the meaning of the sentence. Avalokitavrata says that Bhfivaviveka does agree, however, that it is not necessary to explain the meaning of the letters. The letters do not produce mental formations because they are ~'without conventional meaning" (tha snyad reed pa). See Ava P44a--1 to 45a--1, D37b--5 to 38b--4. (These and related issues were much discussed in ancient Indian linguistic treatises. See, e.g., Coward and Raja (1990), pp. 116--7, 131 ft.) Avalokitavrata goes on to quote and criticize the subcommentary on this passage by Gunadatta, author of another tikd on the PrajFz@radipa. See Ava P45a--2 to 46a--4, D38b--4 to 39b--5. Avalokitavrata next remarks that the two initial verses of homage (MMK 1--A,B) are the body of the treatise and that the rest of the twenty-seven chapters explain the eight negations. He says that this is the pdramarthika-abhidharrna, while what is found in the tripit.aka is the sdmvrta-abhidharma. This leads him into a long discussion of the ekaydna doctrine. See Ava P46a--4 to 48a--6, D39b--5 to 41b--5. st Avalokitavrata gives the example of fire on water. See Ava P48b--4,5; D42a--2,3. s2 Avalokitavrata explains that since in dharma-tattva, "the reality of the dharmas," no dharma is apprehended, there is no cessation, etc., of any dharma in that reality. See Ava P48b--6 to 49a--3, D42a--4 to 42b--1. Thus Bhfivaviveka and Avalokitavrata explain all eight negations as bahuvrihi compounds. So do the author of the Akutobhayd (P34b--5 to 8, D29b--7 to 30a--3), Buddhapfilita (Saito 2.10,11), and Candraldrti (PSP 11.1--3). The Tibetan translation, however, seems to take andndrtha and anekdrtha as karrnadhdrayas, since it translates the negation with rain pa, "not," rather than meal pa, "without." It is perhaps for this reason that the Tibetan transposes anekdrtharn andndrtham with andgamarn anirgarnarn, thus making tha dad don rain don gcig rnin the last two of the eight negations. Finally, anek~rtharn and andndrthara are transposed in the Tibetan, apparently for metrical reasons. (My translation follows the Tibetan on all these points.) See Tachikawa (1980--1) for further discussion of these problems. 53 The opponents are "some Mfidhyamikas," according to Avalokitavrata. They make the point that conventionally, things are indeed said to arise and cease and to be the same or different. On the other hand, nothing in the world is permanent; nor is it totally almihilated, due to the succession of cause and effect. Going and coming do not exist conventionally, because, according to Buddhist doctrine (siddhdnta), all conditioned dharmas are momentary and therefore have no time in which to move. Furthermore, Nfigfirjuna also negates motion from the point of view of ultimate reality in chapter two of the MMK. See Ava P49a--6 to 49b--6, D42b--3 to 43a--3. Evidently, the opponents do not mean to claim that permanence and annihilation are accepted as ultimately real. The point is simply that ultimately real permanence and annihilation are not explicitly negated in the MMK, whereas ultimately real going and coming are explicitly negated. 24 nges par gzung ba, avadhdrana or nirdhdrana, literally, "specification." The point is that, as Bhfivaviveka stated previously, ultimate reality is what Nfigfirjuna wishes to deal with here. To say that cessation, etc., are negated in ultimate reality means that


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they do not exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P50a--1 to 4, D43a--5 to 43b--1. ss According to Avalokitavrata, there is no contradiction with worldly usage (lokavirodha) or with scripture (dgama-virodha). The qualifiers are the eight negations; and the qualificand, the noun to be qualified, is "dependent origination." See Ava P50a--4 to 50b--1, D43b--1 to 5. 56 As Avalokitavrata makes clear, this is an allusion to Pfinini's definition of the direct object (karman) of an action: kartur ipsitatamam karma ('ni 1--4--49). Here the "agent" is the Buddha. Although he teaches both ultimate and conventional truth, he is primarily concerned with ultimate truth in this context. See Ava P50b--1 to 7, D43b--5 to 44a--6. s7 "Verbal expression" (brjod pa) is glossed as "expression in the sounds of speech after having directly perceived the entities to be expressed." "Nature" (bdag nyid, dtman) is glossed as "intrinsic nature" (ngo bo nyid, svabhdva). See Ava P50b--8 to 51a--1, D43a--3,4. 58 "Absence of self" (nairdtmya) is glossed as "lack of intrinsic nature" (nihsvabhdvatd). Avalokitavrata says that erroneous understanding of dharmas and persons is to think that: [1] just as they are without self in ultimate reality, so they are also absolutely nonexistent in superficial reality; or [2] just as all entities exist in superficial reality, so they also exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P51b--1 to 4, D44b--4,5,6. 59 Here dependent origination is the twelve-membered dependent origination beginning with ignorance (avidyd). The higher realms are the states of existence (gati) of gods and humans in the desire realm (kdma-dhdtu), plus the two realms of form (~pa-dhdtu) and formlessness (dr@ya-dhdtu). Emancipation is nirvfina. The path to rebirth among men and gods of the desire realm consists of the ten wholesome paths of action (karma-patha). The path to rebirth in the realm of form consists of the four concentrations (dhyfma). The path to rebirth in the realm of formlessness consists of the four formless meditational attainments (samdpatti). The path to nirvfina is the noble'eightfold path. See Ava P52a--3 to 52b--2, D45a--5 to 45b--3. 60 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponents here are the same as those who earlier objected to the term pratitya-samutpdda on grammatical grounds; see n. 37. Here they use a "trick of the Naiy~yikas" (rigs pa can gyi sgyu thabs). See Ava P53a--6,7,8; D46a--5,6. 61 The point is that on the conventional, superficial level, things do originate in dependence on causes and conditions; but on the ultimate level, they do not originate, because they are empty of intrinsic nature. Thus the Madhyamika does not say that superficially real dependent origination is without origination on the superficial level. Nor does he accept that dependent origination exists in ultimate reality; rather, that is the level where nonorigination obtains. See Ava P54b--3 to 55a--7, D47a--7 to 48a--2 (where, however, intrinsic nature is not mentioned). Avaiokitavrata mentions that the Yogficftra writer, Dharmap~la, in his commentary on Aryadeva's Catuhdataka, criticizes this answer of Bhfivaviveka's. See Ava P55a--7 to 55b--1, D48a--2,3. For references to the Chinese translation of Dharmapfila's commentary, see Kajiyama (1963), p. 45 n. 6; and see also Kajiyama (1968), pp. 200--2. 62 In ultimate reality, only liberation is wholesome. See Ava P55b--3,4; D48a--5,6, and also AK 4--8bc. Giving (ddna) is one of the four sam. graha-vastu, "articles of attraction," or means of gathering a following. 63 See Ava P56a--5, D48b--5,6.




64 The twelve dyatanas (sometimes translated "sense fields") are the six sense organs (the five physical sense organs plus the mind, manas) and the six corresponding sense objects. (Dharmas are the objects of mind.) The inner flyatanas are the six sense organs. The outer dyatanas are the six sense objects. 65 Avalokitavrata remarks that throughout the Prajfidpradipa, opponents will charge that the Mfidhyamika has contradicted his own statements (svavacana-virodha) or scripture (dgarna-virodha) or worldly usage (loka-virodha) or perception (pratyaks.avirodha) or inference (anumdna-virodha). Bh~vaviveka has answered all such objections in this very passage (on dependent origination and nonorigination). Therefore in what follows, the argument will not be repeated again and again at length. See Ava P56b--6,7,8; D49a--6,7. 66 See Ava P57a--5 to 57b--1, D49b--4 to 8. 67 Origination and cessation follow each other in beginningless succession. Therefore it is impossible to say that one is necessarily first and the other second, and hence there is no necessary order in which they should be negated. See Ava P57b--4 to 58a--1, D49a--2 to 7. 68 Avalokitavrata explains that in a treatise which posits entities as referents of words (paddrtha), they mus~ be posited in due order. In this treatise, all such entities are negated, in accordance ~ith nonconceptual wisdom; and there is no need to negate them in a particular order. See Ava P58a--2 to 5, D50a--7 to 50b--2. 69 don brtag pa, as opposed to an examination of the words. See Ava P58a--5,6; D50b--2,3. 70 Even if Nfigfirjuna had said, "Without origination, without cessation," the opponent could ask, "Why didn't you say, 'Without cessation, without origination'?" See Ava P58a--7 to 58b--2, D50b--3 to 6. Presumably, this is so because of the beginninglessness of samsfira. q Avalokitavrata says the opponents here are "grfivaka-Vaibhfisikas." See Ava P58a--6, D51a--2. The Vaibhfisikas of Madhyadega did consider dependent origination to be unconditioned; see Lamotte, Trait~ V (1980), p. 2183. Other Vaibhfisikas, however, disagreed; see LVP AK III, pp. 77--8 and 77 n. 1. Avalokitavrata has the opponent present an argument that the Arhat's ksaya-j~dna and anutpdda-jhdna are, on the one hand, dependently originated because they have an indirect cause (brgyudpa'i rgyu) in the practice of the path. On the other hand, they are unconditioned because they have no direct cause (mngon sum gyi rgyu). See Ava P59a--2 to 60a--1, D51a--5 to 52a--3. Compare LVP AK II, pp. 275--8 on nirvfina (or pratisamkhyanirodha or visam, yoga) as unconditioned. See AK 6--76ab on unconditioned liberation. 72 Whereas the opponent accepts it as an entity. See Ava P60b--3,4; D52b--3,4. 73 Again, Avalokitavrata says that this refers to the Arhat's ksaya-jhdna and anutpdda-jhdna, which lack an immediate cause. See note 71 and Ava P60b--8 to 61a--8, D53a--1 to 6. 74 See Ava P61b--l,2; D53a--7 to 53b--2. 75 Identified by Avalokitavrata as "some of the gr~vaka-Sautrfintikas." See Ava P62b--6,7; D54b--2,3. 76 That is, only the appropriate result arises from a given set of causes and conditions. See Ava P62b--8 to 63a--7, D54b--5 to 55a--3. 77 Things do not arise from idvara, but do arise from appropriate causes. See Ava P63a--7,8; D55a--3,4.


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78 The self imagined by the non-Buddhists does not exist, but the self of the five aggregates does exist. Likewise, cessation does not have the causes imagined by nonBuddhists; but there is cessation. See Ava P63b--2 to 8, D55a--5 to 56b--3. 79 Since they cease as soon as they have originated, there is no time for motion to take place. so A n effect does not exist in its causes and conditions, but it cannot exist apart from them. See Ava P64a--8 to 64b--3, D56a--3,4,5. 81 See Ava P65a--3 to 65b--4, D56b--4 to 57a--5. 82 phyogs kyi chos, paksa-dharma, literally, "property of the subject [of the thesis]." The thesis (prati]fid) of a syllogism is composed of a subject (paksa or dharmin) plus a property to be proved (sddhya-dharma). The reason (hem) states a property of the subject (paksa-dharma), also called the "proving property" (sddhana-dharma). The fact that the subject possesses the proving property shows that it also possesses the property to be proved. (One should note that hetu, "reason," is sometimes simply synonymous with paksa-dharma/sddhana-dharma. Also, pak4.a is sometimes used to refer to the whole thesis, not simply the subject of the thesis.) 83 In other words, entities do not originate from themselves, because they already exist. (See the next syllogism in the text.) They could not be said to originate from themselves unless they already had a "self" from which to originate. 84 The example in a syllogism must possess the proving property and the property to be proved. It must be acknowledged by both sides in a debate (vadin and prativddin). See Ava P72b--4 to 73a--5, D62b--7 to 63b--4. "Common knowledge" here translates grags pa dang ldan pa, probably prasiddhimat. ss This paragraph and a portion of Avalokitavrata's commentary on it are translated and discussed in Kajiyama (1973), pp. 168--73. On prasa]ya- and paryuddsapratisedha generally, see Ruegg (1981), pp. 37--8, 65 and Kajiyama (1973), pp. 162, 167--75. s6 That is, it would teach that nonorigination exists or that unoriginated dharmas exist. See Ava P75a--4 to 8, D65a--4,5,6. s7 Avalokitavrata identifies the sfitra in question only as Bhagavati PraffidpSramitd. He gives a fuller quotation in which the Buddha also says that one who practices the origination of matter does not practice the perfection of discernment. ss This paragraph is translated and discussed in Kajiyama (1973), pp. 168--9. s9 The Sanskrit of this syllogism is quoted by Candraldrti (with a variant). See PSP 25.9 to 26.2. 90 According to Avalokitavrata, the negation here is made with regard to ultimate reality from the standpoint of the truth of superficial reality (sam.v.rti-satya); but in ultimate reality itself, even the conventional designation (vyavahSra) of negation does not exist, because there is no verbal expression. See Ava P77a--l,2,3; D66b--l,2. 91 Avalokitavrata remarks that in the texts of the Sfi.mkhyas, etc., consciousness is said to be the intrinsic nature of spirit (purus.a). See Ava P78b--7,8; D67b--6,7; and compare Sdmkhyak~rikd 11. Presumably, this example is used here because the Sfim.khyas' theory of satkdryavglda (pre-existence of the effect in the cause) is a form of "origination from itself." Avalokitavrata also says that the example is common knowledge to both sides, since the Mgtdhyamikas accept that cognition (rnam par shes pa nyid, *vi]fidnatd) exists in superficial reality. See Ava P79a--5 to 79b--1, D68a--4 to 7. 92 Here "absent" translates ldog pa (vyatireka or vydvr.tti). Dissimilar cases are those




which lack the propecty to be proved (sddhya-dharma). If the reason is to establish the sddhya, it must also be absent from dissimilar cases. 93 The opponent thinks that Bhfivaviveka should give a dissimilar example, that is, an example of something which lacks the property to be proved and the proving property, in order to show that the reason is not present in cases where the property to be proved does not exist. Here a dissimilar case would be something which originates from itself (opposite of the property to be proved) and which does not exist already (opposite of the proving property). For the Mfidhyamika, there are no such cases, since nothing at all originates in ultimate reality. Avalokitavrata states that a dissimilar case would be something which originates from another, but this seems wrong. See Ava P81b--3ff., D70a--3ff. On this and other issues connected with Bhfivaviveka's logical method, see Lindtner (1986). 94 Some Sfimkhyas who propound the intrinsic nature of cause and result and both ('bras bu dang rgyu dang gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid smra ba), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P82a--7,8; D70b--5. 95 des cir 'gyur, kim. cdtah, literally (in the Tibetan), "What comes about by means of that?" This is a rhetorical question meaning, "What is the point of our asking the meaning of your thesis?" 96 The Sanskrit of this paragraph is quoted (with variants?) by Candraldrti. See PSP 16.11--18.1. The point of the argument here seems to be that the manifest result arises from its previous unmanifest state in the cause. 97 That is, we do not specify "itself in the state of the cause" or "itself in the state of the result." We simply negate "origination from itself" in general. See Ava P83b--8 to 84a--4, D72a--2 to 5. 98 If one says that the result originates from the nature of the cause, then the cause must be either the same as or different from the result; but we refute both origination from self and origination from another. See Ava P84a--4 to 84b--1, D72a--5 to 72b--1. 99 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence is a reply to other Sfi.mkhyas who are proponents of potentiafity (daktivddin). They explain that although consciousness is the intrinsic nature of spirit (purus.a), it is not always manifest. Citing what may be Sdm.khyakdrikd 37ab, they say that spirit is actually conscious only when intellect (buddhi) presents an object to it. Therefore consciousness characterized by potentiality always exists; but actual, manifest consciousness does not. Thus consciousness is not an appropriate example of something which does not originate from itself because it already exists. Bhfivaviveka replies that his example covers both potential and actual consciousness. See Ava P84b--1 to 85a--5, D72b--1 to 73a--3, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 76--82. loo "di las gzhan, literally, "one different from this." Identified by Avalokitavrata as dcdrya (or Sthavira) BuddhapNita. See Ava P85a--6 and 85a--8ff., D73a--4 and 73a--6ff. Here Avalokitavrata lists eight persons who have written commentaries on the MMK: Nagfirjuna himself; Sthavira BuddhapSlita; Candrakirti; Devagarman; Gunagff; Gu.namati; Sthiramati; and Bhgtvaviveka. See Ava P85a--7,8; D73a--4,5. ~01 Tibetan in Saito (1984) 10.12--14. Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti (with variants), PSP 14.1,2. BuddhapS.lita amplifies his argument by going on to say (immediately after the sentence quoted here), "For there is no purpose in the origination again of entities


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which [already] exist by their own selves. If they do originate again even though they exist [already], they would never not be originating." ~02 The Sanskrit, as quoted by Candraldrti (PSP 15.1), has prasafiga-vakya; but the Tibetan translation of the Prajhdpradipa has flags yod pa'i tshig, which would usually correspond to s~vakd~avacana, "a statement affording an opportunity." This does not necessarily mean that the translators had a different Sanskrit text. They may have translated prasafiga-v~kya in this way because of the context and because of Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Avalokitavrata glosses glags yod pa'i tshig as rgol ba gzhan gyi klan ka'i glags yod pa'i tshig, "a statement affording an opportunity for censure by an opponent" (Ava P86a--8, D74a--2). See Kajiyama (1963), p. 50 n. 13 and Ruegg (1981), p. 64 and n. 203. See also PSP 24.1--6, where both prasariga and sdvakdda are used. 103 Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti (with variant), PSP 14.4--15.2. ~04 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata as S.agfld~yas who are proponents of potentiality. See Ava P87b--3, D75a--1. 105 The Sfirg.khya says that no one holds that an already manifest result arises from itself. Rather, a potentiality (dakti) for producing a particular result exists at the stage when the cause is manifest; and from that potentiality, the manifestation (vyakti) of the result arises. See Ava P88b--2, D75b--4 to 7, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 100--1, 155, 253--4, 274. 106 See Ava P88b--7 to 89b--8, D76a--1 to 76b--6, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 153. 107 Even if no one holds that entities originate from themselves, it is legitimate to refute that position in order to negate every conceivable way in which things might originate. See Ava P90a--1 to 6, P76b--7 to 77a--3. 10s That is, it is a simple negation (prasajya-pratisedha), not an implicative negation (paryuddsa-pratis.edha). See Ava P91b--l,2; D78a--4,5. 109 paks.a-dharma is a synonym of sddhana-dharma, "proving property." See note 82. 110 See the following two syllogisms. 111 See Ava P93b--4,5,6; D80a--2,3. 112 See Ava P96b--2 to 5, D82b--1,2,3. 113 They bring them about in superficial reality. See Ava P99b--4, D84b--4. 114 The Sanskrit of these two syllogisms is quoted by Candraldrti; see PSP 31.13-32.1. There are some variants; see PSP 31 n. 38. Avalokitavrata quotes a criticism of the second syllogism made by Sthiramati (whom he refers to as dcgwya or, mostly, Sthavira Sthiramati) in Sthiramati's own commentary on the MMK. The quotation is translated in Kajiyama (1968), pp. 198-9. Avalokitavrata then proceeds to refute Sthiramati's criticism. See Ava P103a--1 to 105a--l, D88a--2 to 89b--4. Avalokitavrata makes the interesting remark that Sthiramati himself is a M~tdhyamika (gnas brtan blo brtan de yang dbu rna pa kho na yin pas); see Ava P103b--7, D88b--5.

:is darn bcas pa'i don gyi phyogs gcig, pratijhglrthaikadeda.

116 See Kajiyama (1963), p. 52 n. 15. Avalokitavrata explains that this is an example of a syllogism where a particular (i.e., the sound of the Vedic hymns) is the subject of the thesis and a generality (the fact of being sound in general) is the proving property. See Ava P106a--7ff., D90b--7ff. 117 Literally, "which have the synonyms (pary@a), earth, water, fire, and air." 11s Among the nine substances of the Valgesikas, the physical elements (earth, water,




fire, and air) are wholes (avayavin, "part-possessors") made up of atoms. According to the Vaige.sikas, the wholes are different from their parts. The whole is caused by its parts, but it is not constituted by them. See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 69--90. ~19 One of the six or seven categories (pad(zrtha) recognized by the Vaiiesikas is guna, "quality." One of the twenty-four qualities is paratva, "remoteness?' (See e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 112, 123 and Sinha (1956), p. 413.) This word more commonly means "difference;" and in this latter sense, it occurs as the reason in Bhfivaviveka's two syllogisms. (I have translated paratvdt as "because they are different." A more literal translation would be "because of difference.") The Buddhists, however, do not recognize the Vaigesikas' system of categories and thus, according to the opponent, should not be using the term paratva. In the Peking edition of the Bstan 'gyur, a textual peculiarity occurs at this point in Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. At P110b--7, following rang la ma grub pa'i don, an insertion occurs, wNch begins smras tei 'di I t a r . . . The insertion ends at P11 l b - - 7 with de ltar dngos po rnams gzhan las skye ba rned do zhes bya ba ni don dam par. The text resumes immediately with nyid do zhes bya ba ni . . . This insertion does not occur at D95a--1, where one has (beginning on D94b--7) rang Iama grub pa'i don nyid do zhes bya ba ni . . . without a break. The insertion in P should occur later in the text, at P121a--7, following.., ma dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba, immediately before phyi dang nang gi dngos po r a n m s . . . The misplaced passage in P begins in D at D103a--3 and ends at D104a-3. It occurs in D at its proper place. The passage misplaced in P is almost exactIy the length of one two-sided folio of P, but it does not begin and end where the woodblocks from which P was printed begin and end. This suggests that a folio was placed out of order during the compilation of P, before the woodblocks were carved. 120 If paratva is not used as a Vaiiesika technical term, but simply in the conventional sense of "difference," then the Mfidhyamika will be in conflict with the consensus of the world that results arise from causes which are different from them, as, e.g., sprouts arise from seeds. See Ava P112a--2 to 8, D95a--3 to 95b--1. 121 In other words, Bhfivaviveka can use "difference" as the reason in his syllogism without going into the various theories of what difference is. See Ava P112b--7 to 113b--1, D95b--6 to 96a--7. 122 See Ava P113b--3,4,5; D96b--2,3. 123 rtsom par byed pa, 6-rabh. The Nyfiya-Vaige.sika doctrine of drambhavdda, "productionism," holds that an effect is a new production and does not pre-exist in its cause. See, e.g., Sinha (1956), p. 589. 124 Identified by Avalokitavrata as "grfivaka-Vaibhfisikas." See Ava P115a--6, D98a--2. ~2s If the Mfidhyamika is speaking of things which are different from the result and are empty of the power to produce it, then it is not established that the causal conditions of a result are empty of the power to produce it. See Ava P115a--8 to 116b--2, D98a--3 to 99a--3. 126 That is, a jar does not possess the combined property of (1) being different from the inner @atanas and (2) not being empty of the power to produce them. See Ava loc. cit. and P116b--2 to 117a--3, D99a--3 to 99b--3. 127 In other words, Bhfivaviveka has used the general idea of difference between one thing and another in his reason, without distinguishing between things which have or


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do not have the power to produce an effect. This is similar to his answer to the last objection. See Ava P117a--7 to 118a--2, D99b--5 to 100a--7. 128 That is, the Abhidharmika's charge, that either the reason is not established or else the example does not possess the proving property, is specious. 129 Literally, "others." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P118b--2, D100b--6. 130 The "locus" (dgraya) of the reason is the subject (dharmin) of the thesis, since the reason is a property of the subject. In the Indian view, a correct syllogism must have an existent subject. See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 182--3, 191. 131 Avalokitavrata remarks that all similar allegations that the example, etc., are not established for the Mfidhyamika himself, are to be answered in the same way. See Ava Pl19b--5,6; D101b--6,7. The qualification "in ultimate reality" applies to the predicate (the sddhya-dharma, the property to be proved) of the thesis, not to its subject (the dharmin, the propertypossessor). See Bhfivaviveka's remarks on this point in the Tarkajv6ld, his autocommentary on the Madhyamaka-hr.daya-k~rikd (MHK), on MHK 6--28 in Iida (1980), pp. 84--5. 132 Literally, "another." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P119b--7ff., D102a-lff. 133 Tibetan in Salto (1984) 10.18,19. Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti (with variants), PSP 36.11,12. 134 glags yod pa'i tshig. See note 102. 135 The Sanskrit of this paragraph up to this point is quoted by Candrakirti (with variant), PSP 36.13--37.3. 136 gla sgang, musta, Cyperus rotundus. 137 sld tres, gud.ftci, Cocculus cordifolius. 138 The meaning of kha bag yod is uncertain. Also, "bamboo shoots" for smig rnde'u dag is conjectural. 139 According to Avalokitavrata, the idea is that BuddhapS.lita's argument is incoherent if left as it stands because (1) "the origination of everything from everything" does not prove that entities do not originate from another and (2)"the origination of everything from everything" is not, in fact, a property of entities. Because of (1), there is no connection between Buddhapfdita's thesis and his reason, just as there is no connection between the lines of the verse quoted. See Ava P l l l a - - 3 to 111b--2, D103a--7 to 103b--6. (On the text's being out of place in Ava P, see note 119.) 140 That is, results originate both from their primary cause (hem) and from various causal conditions (pratyaya). In the case of a sprout, its primary cause is the seed; and its causal conditions are soil and so forth. A result is distinct from its causal conditions but not from its primary cause. See Ava P121b--1 to 122a--5, D104b--7 to I05a--2. Compare ktrana and nimitta in Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 53--4, 62--4, 68--73. 141 That is, the proofs already given that entities do not originate from themselves or from another, respectively, also show that entities do not originate from both. "Included" is a somewhat conjectural translation of gtad khongs (PNDC: khungs, Ava P&D: khongs) su chud pa. 142 geer bur rgyu ba dag. gcer bu pa corresponds to nirgrantha; perhaps the Sanskrit here was something like nirgranthacdrin. Avalokitavrata's gloss is phyogs kyi gos can, digarnbara. See Ava P125a--l,2,3; D107b--2,3.




~43 spyi dang khyad par nyid, srmdnya-vi~esa-td/tva. Avalokitavrata explains that all the dyatanas have the general property of being dyatanas. The inner @atanas have the individual characteristics of being different kinds of sense organs or of belonging to different kinds of beings. See Ava P131a--5 to 8, D113a--3 to 6. 144 rtsi rkyang is defined as rtswa zhig, "a grass," in Dge bshes Chos kyi grags pa (1957), s.v. 145 Cf. AN bhgl.sya on AK 3--29ab. i46 These are causes propounded by various non-Buddhist schools. Bhfivaviveka will discuss them one by one. Avalokitavrata also mentions under this heading Brahma, Prajfipati, Manu, Fate (daiva), (?) of the Persians, and Yuna (?) of the barbarians (barbara). See Ava P132a--8 to 132b--1, D l 1 4 a - - 5 . ~47 Avalokitavrata identifies the svabhdvavddins as Lokfiyatas, followers of Maharsi 'fig rten mig (perhaps Lokacaksu.h or Lokfiksa or Lokalocana). See Ava P133b--3,4; Dl15a--5,6. 148 l//,S, glossed by Avalokitavrata as rang gi ngo bo nyid, probably svar@atd/tva. He cites different colors and shapes as examples of various lus. See Ava P134a--5,6; D115b--7 to 116a--1. 149 Literally, "like mahdnila and indranffa," both of which are words for sapphire. 150 That is, the svabhdvavddins who put forward the last syllogism, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P137b--6, D119a--4. They hold that things originate by themselves, without dependence on other causes and conditions. 151 bsgrub par bya ba, sddhya; see Avalokitavrata's gloss, Ava P137b--8, D 1 1 9 a ~ 5 . ~5z That is, the opponent cannot both deny that there are causes and also prove his contention by means of a reason, which is a cause of the proof. This argument can be stated more facilely in Sanskrit, in which the words for "cause" (hetu) and "reason" (hetu) are identical. ~s3 "Logical mark" (l#iga) is a synonym of "reason" (hem) or "proving property" (sddhana-dharma). Avalokitavrata defines "possessor of the logical mark" (lihgin) as "that object of inference (anumeya) which possesses the logical mark." In the following example, fire is the possessor of the logical mark. See Ava P139a--l,2; D120a--5,6. 1s4 See Ava P138b--4,5; D 1 2 0 a - - l , 2 and P139a--2,3; D119a--6. 155 That is, he uses a foreign word for "smoke," so that his hearer will understand the logical mark, i.e., smoke. Thus the reasoning is the same even if the words of the syllogism are in a different language. See Ava P139a--7 to 139b--1, D120b--2,3,4. ls6 According to Avalokitavrata, 'jug stobs can (Prav.rttibalin?) was a disciple of Maharsi 'fig rten mig (see note 147), who founded another branch of the Lokfiyatas. See Ava P139b--7,8; D121a--2,3. i57 The Mfidhyamikas negate the origination, in ultimate reality, of all conceivable results from all conceivable causal conditions (including from no cause). See Ava P140a--8 to 140b--3, D121b--2 to 5. 158 See Ava P141a--4, D122a--5. 159 A quotation, with variants, of ~vetd~vatara-Upanisad 4--11; see Kajiyama (1963), p. 56 n. *. In the text of Bhfivaviveka's autocommentary Tarkajvdld on MHK 8--16, a different Tibetan translation of this verse is given. The translation in the Tarkafvdld is closer to the Sanskrit. See Gokhale (1958), p. 178 n. 42 and Nakamura (1958), p. 189. 160 Mahdbhdrata 3--31--27. See Kajiyama (1963), p. 57 n. *


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~6~ See Ava P143b--2,3,4; D124a--7 to 124b--2. 162 See MMK 1--6. 163 The Vedfintavfidins, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P151a--l,2; D131a-1,2. 164 Also quoted (with variants in the Tibetan) in TarkajvMd on MHK 8--16. The Sanskrit is quoted by Kamalag~a in his Tattvasam.graha-pahfik& see Gokhale (1958), p. 178 n. 47. 165 A quotation of Rgveda 10--90--2 = ~vetddvatara-Upanisad 3--15, with a variant. See Kajiyama (1963), p. 58 n. ** 166 A quotation of [~6-Upanisad 1--5, with variants. See Kajiyama (1963), p. 58 n. ***. Also quoted in Tarkajvdlgl on MHK 8--16; see Gokhale (1958), p. 178 n. 46. My insertion of "]that is the cause]" in the last clause follows Avalokitavrata's interpretation. See P152a--5,6; D132a--3. 167 Devadatta and Yajfiadatta are names used to indicate that one is speaking of mankind in general, like "Everyman" or "John Doe." According to Avalokitavrata, Devadatta's self is "Devadatta's intrinsic nature of spirit (purus.a), [that is,] consciousness (caitanya)." See Ava P153a--3,4; D132b--7 to 133a--I.) Thus, presumably, Devadatta's self would be no different from Yajfiadatta's self. i68 By performing meritorious (punya) and nonmeritorious (apunya) actions, the body and sense organs become causes of happiness and suffering, respectively. By studying, they become causes for the origination of cognition. See Ava P153b--5,6,7; D133b--1,2. 169 The opponent's thesis is that the bound self (i.e., the bound spirit) is the cause of the universe; but this has been disproved by the immediately preceding syllogism. See Ava P154b--l,2,3; D134a--2,3. 170 The opponents here are others who hold that spirit is the cause of the universe. They maintain that spirit, or self, has a single intrinsic nature but is metaphorically designated (upac&a) as many, just as the intrinsic nature of space is one and the same, although one speaks of separate spaces in separate containers. See Ava P155a--6 to 155b--7, D l 3 4 b - - 4 to 135a--5. Compare Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 80--1. 171 Bhfivaviveka stated three syllogisms concerning the self as cause. In the first syllogism, "Yajfiadatta's self" was used as an example to show that the self, in general, is not the cause of Devadatta's body and sense organs. In the third syllogism, "the liberated self" was used as an example to show that self, in general, is not the cause of the universe. The opponent, however, claims to have an explanation for how the self can have one intrinsic nature, but yet appear to be many selves with different causal properties. Hence the opponent holds that Bhfivaviveka's examples are not valid. See Ava P155b--7 to 156a--2, D135a--5,6,7. 172 dngos po nyid, probably bhgtva or vastu plus -t~ or -tva. 173 The Buddhists also accept a self on the conventional level. Since that self is based on the five aggregates, it is different in each individual. Also, according to worldly common knowledge, Devadatta and Yajfiadatta are not the same. See Ava P157a--3 to 7, D136a--5 to 136b--1. 174 The opponent stated the preceding syllogism in order to refute the Mfidhyamika's contention that there is no inference which shows that the conventional self is one. Since the opponent's syllogism fails, the M~dhyamika's criticism stands. See Ava P157a--8 to 157b--3ff., D136b--2,3,4ff. ~7s In the SSxn. khya system, primordial matter (prakrti, literally, "original nature") is a




synonym of primary matter (pradhdna). All phenomena other than spirit (purus.a) are transformations (parindma) of primordial matter. Primordial matter is composed of three (literally, "qualities;" but in this system, they are substances). The three are sattva ("goodness"), rajas ("passion"), and tamas ("darkness"). Primordial matter is the state of equilibrium of the three gu.nas. It is unmanifest (avyakta). Manifestation occurs when the equilibrium of the three gunas is disturbed and one or the other of the gunas predominates. For a more detailed account of primordial matter and the, see, e.g., Frauwallner (1973), pp. 227ff.; Sinha (1952), pp. 3ff.; and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987.,), pp. 65--73, 152--4, 161. See also Ava P159b--8 to I61a--8, D138b--5 to 140a--2. 17~ Avalokitavrata glosses "internal distinctions" (nang gi bye brag mares, perhaps ddhydtmikd bheddh) as "the inner dyatanas, the eye and so on, which are distinguished by mutually different characteristics." See Ava P161b--6, D140a--7. ~77 The three gunas are sometimes designated by the qualities associated with them. Thus sattva ("goodness") is called sukha ("pleasure"); rajas ("passion") is called duhkha ("pain"); and tamas ("darkness") is called rnoha ("confusion"). See Ava P161b--6 to 162a--1, D140a--7 to 140b--2, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 26--7, 71. 178 Here "to possess" (ldan pa) seems to mean "to have the intrinsic nature of." A piece of sandalwood "possesses" sandalwood in the sense that it has the intrinsic nature of sandalwood. Thus it has sandalwood as its cause. Likewise, a potsherd has clay as its cause, etc. See Ava P162a--6 to 162b--1, D140b--6 to 141a--1. ~v9 See Ava P162b--4,5,6; D141a--4,5. ts0 The example, "the aggregate of feeling" does not possess all of the property to be proved, namely, "having the intrinsic nature of pleasure, pain, and confusion," since confusion is not included in the aggregate of feeling. See Ava P163b--5,6; D142a-2,3. 18i According to Avalokitavrata, here "consciousness" or "cognition" is, for the Buddhist, equivalent to the aggregate of cognition (vijhdna) and, for the S-arnkhya , equivalent to the spirit (purus.a). Pleasure and pain are not included in the aggregate of cognition, and the spirit is free from pleasure and pain. See Ava P164a--5 to 165a--1, D 1 4 2 b - - 2 to 143a--5. The point seems to be that the Buddhist can use spirit as an example to force the Sfirn. khya to admit that not everything need be made up of the three gunas. ls2 As explained in the previous note, cognition in general is established both for the Buddhist (as the aggregate of cognition) and for the Sfimkhya (as the spirit). See Ava P165a--3 to 6, D142b--5,6,7. 183 SSm.. khya classifies the constituents of reality into twenty-five principles. One of these is spirit (purusa); another is primary matter (pradhdna = prakfti). The remaining twenty-three are transformations (parindma) of primary matter. The first trm~sformarion, or evolute, of primary matter is buddhi, "intellect," also called ruahat, "the great." For more details, see the references in note 175 and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 73--83. 18n That is, it is inconsistent for the Sfi.mkhya to hold both that primordial matter is the cause of the universe and that it is unmanifest. See Ava P165b--5,6; D143b-5,6,7. 18s The point is that primary matter and spirit are unmanifested for different reasons. Primary matter is imperceptible because of its subtlety (sauks..mya); but its transformations are perceptible. Spirit is imperceptible because it is pure subject (drastr,


W I L L I A M L. A M E S and cannot become an object of consciousness. See Ava P165b--7 to 166b-2, D144a--1 to 144b--2, the references in note 175, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 80--1, 153. ~8~ The reason, "because it is unmanifested," refers to non-manifestation in general, without going into the reasons for it in a particular case. Alternatively, even if particular circumstances are envisaged, the reason is used in the syllogism in a general sense, so that it applies both to the subject of the thesis and to the example. For example, although a sound and a jar are made by different causes, one can still infer that sound is impermanent, because it is made, like a jar. See Ava P166b--5 to 167a--1, D144b--3 to 7. 187 From among the many kinds of Sfirn.khyas, those who speak of manifestation (gsal ha, vyakti). See Ava P172b--1, D149b--3. On the Sfim.khya doctrine of manifestation, see Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65--73. 188 That is, what does not exist previously cannot originate in any way; but what does exist previously becomes manifest through causal conditions. See Ava P172b--2,3; D149b--4,5. 189 See Ava P173b--3,4; D150b--3,4. 190 See Ava P173b--5 to 174a--1, D150b--4 to 7. 191 See Ava P174a--2,3,4; D151a--2,3. 192 The opponent may say that the jar is already an object (grdhya), even in darkness, because it is an object of touch (sprast.avya). Thus its pre-existent "objectness" is merely made manifest by the lamp. BhRvaviveka's reply seems to mean that if it is pre-existent as an object of vision, then it would be seen even in darkness. See Ava P174a--4 to 174b--2, D151a--3 to 152b--1. 193 The four "great elements" (mahdbhuta) are earth, air, fire, and water. On bhfita and bhautika, see chapter four of the Prajhdpradfpa. 194 On the kdran,a-hetu, see LVP AK 1I, pp. 246--8. Note also Ava P175a--7ff., D152a--4ff. 198 Since the jar is momentary, what happens when the jar is illuminated is the following: A moment of jar and a moment of darkness cease simultaneously; and at the next moment, a moment of jar and a moment of light arise simultaneously. Since the former moment ceases, it is not the case that a pre-existent jar is illuminated. Thus the lamp "makes the jar manifest" only by being a causal factor in the arising of "jartogether-with-light," not by illuminating a pre-existent dark jar. See P174b--5 to 176b--7, D 1 5 1 b - - 2 to 152b--3. 196 Literally, "another;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P176b--7ff., D153b-lff. 197 Tibetan in Saito (1984) 10.21,22. Sanskrit quoted by Candrakirti (with variant), PSP 38.10,11. "And so on" apparently stands for a second reason which Buddhap~lita gives, but which Bh~tvaviveka does not quote: " . . . and because there would be the fault that all undertakings would be pointless." (Tibetan in Saito (1984), 10.22,23.) Bhfivaviveka's critique does allude to this second reason. 198 glags yodpa'i tshig. See note 102. 199 The Sanskrit of all but the last sentence is quoted by Candrakirti (with variants), PSP 38.12--39.3. 200 Literally, "which are not shared by [or "not in common with"] the founders of non-Buddhist sects, etc." "Etc." refers to irdvakas and pratyekabuddhas; see Ava P179b--7, D156a--3,4.



251 TO

S A N S K R I T T E X T O F MMK, C H A P T E R O N E , A C C O R D I N G PSP AS E M E N D E D BY J . W . DE J O N G ( 1 9 7 8 ) A N D F U R T H E R E M E N D E D BY A K I R A S A I T O ( 1 9 8 5 ) anirodham anutpfidam anucchedam agfigvatam anekfirtham an/m~rtham anfigamam anirgamarn, ii yah pratityasamutpfidam prapaficopagamam givam[ deiayfimfisa sambuddhas tam vande vadatfim varamj[ na svato nfipi parato na dvfibhyfin), nfipy ahetutah[ utpannfi jfitu vidyante bhfivfih kvacana kecanai[ catvfirah pratyayfi hetur firambanam anantaram tathaivfidhipateyam ca pratyayo nfisti paficamah [ na hi svabhgtvo bhfivfingu.n pratyayfidisu vidyate] avidyamgme svabhfive parabhfivo na vidyate[i kriyfi na pratyayavat~ nfipratyayavat~ kriyfi] pratyayfi nfikriyfivanta.h kriyfivantag ca santy uta[ utpadyate prat~tyemSn itime pratyayfi.h kila yfivan notpadyata ime tfivan nfipratyayfih katham., i] naivfisato naiva sarah pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate! asatal?, pratyayal? kasya satag ca pratyayena kimi] na san nfisan na sadasan dharmo nirvartate yadfi[ katham nirvartako hetur evam sati hi yujyateij anfirambana ev~ya.m san dharma upadigyate! athfinfirambane dharme kuta firamban, arn. punahi[ anutpannesu dharmesu nirodho nopapadyate[ nfinantaram ato yuktarn, niruddhe pratyayag ca kal..~j[ bhfivfinfim nihsvabhfivgnfim na sattfi vidyate yatal?.] sat~dam asmin bhavat~ty etan naivopapadyate[] na ca vyastasamastesu pratyayesv asti rat phala .m! pratyayebhyah katharn tac ca bhaven na yatjJ athfisad api tat tebhyal) pratyayebhyat~, pravartate I phalam apratyayebhyo 'pi kasmfin nfibhipravartate!l phalar~, ca pratyayamayarn, pratyayfig c~svay.agunaygt?.i phalam asvamayebhyo yat tat pratyayamayarn, katham[!


11 12 13


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tasmfin na pratyayamayarn nfipratyayamayar9 phalarg[ samvidyate phal~bhfivftt pratyaygpratyaySl.1, kuta.hll


GLOSSARY English about to originate absence of self action activity aeon agent affliction afflictive aggregate appropriation appropriator assertion attachment attention basis (a) being Blessed One causal condition, condition cause cause of maturation cognition Tibetan skye bar 'dod pa bdag reed pa nyid las bya ba bskal pa byed pa po nyon mongs pa kun nas nyon mongs pa nyon mongs pa can 'phung po nye bar len pa nye bar blang ba nye bar len pa po dam boas pa mngon par zhen pa yid la byed pa gzhi seres can bcom ldan 'das rkyen rgyu rgyu rnam par stain pa'i rgyu blo rnam par shes pa shes pa bdag nyid thob pa grags pa rnam par rtog pa rtog pa spros pa lhan cig nyid, lhan cig gi dngos po 'dus byas 'du byed gnod pa gti mug mtshung par ldan pa'i rgyu shes pa yod pa nyid Sanskrit utpitsu nairfitmya karman kriyfi kalpa kartr klega samklega klista skandha up~dfina upfidfitr pratijfia abhirfive~a manasikfira figraya, etc. sattva bhagavan pratyaya hetu kfirana vipfika-hetu buddhi vljnana jnana fitma-lgbha prasiddhi, prasiddha vikalpa kalpanfi prapafica sahabhfiva
. ~ .

coming into existence common knowledge conceptual construction conceptual proliferation concomitance conditioned conditioned factor conflict confusion conjoined cause consciousness

samskrta samskfira b~dha moha sa.mprayukta-hetu caitanya

B H A V A V I V E K A ' S PRAJNAPRADIPA convention, conventional designation, conventional activity conventional truth conventionally conviction counterbalanced counterexample, dissimilar case, set of all such; counterposition craving criticism defective vision defining characteristic dependent designation dependent origination desire direct object disadvantage discernment doctrine thasnyad vyavahgra


tha snyad kyi bden pa tha snyad du dad pa 'gal ba 'khrul pa med pa mi mthun pa'i phyogs

vyavahfira-satya vyavahfiratah graddhfi viruddha-avyabhicfirin

domain dominant causal condition element (to) emanate emancipation entity established establishing what is [already] established fact of having this as a causal condition feeling fellow Buddhist (more literally, "coreligionist") founders of non-Buddhist sects futile rejoinder hatred higher realms identifying mark

sred pa sun dbyung ba rab rib mtshan nyid brten nas gdags pa rten cing brel par 'byung ba 'dod chags 'dod pa 1as nyes dmigs shes rab tshul mdzad pa'i mtha' grub pa'i mtha' spyod yul bdag po'i rkyen 'byung ba khams sprul pa byang grol dngos po grub pa grub pa la sgrub pa rkyen 'di dang ldan pa nyid tshor ba rang gi sde pa mu stegs byed ltag chod zhe sdang mtho ris mtshan ma

trsnfi dfisana timira laksana up~dfiya prajfiapti prafftya-samutp~da r~ga k~ma karman fid~nava prajna naya krtfinta siddh~nta gocara adhipati/fidhipateyapratyaya bhfita dhfitu nir-mfi apavarga bhfiva vastu siddha siddha-sfidhana
. ~ _

idarnpratyayatfi vedanfi svayfithya tirthakara jfti dvesa svarga nimitta

immediately preceding causal condition implicative negation imputation m superficial reality in ultimate reality inconclusive inference inherent nature instrument internal intrinsic nature invariable locus logical mark [logically] possible manifestation material matter matter dependent on the elements meditation meditational attainment meditative concentration (in) meditative concentration meditative cultivation meditative sphere mental factor mental formation mere assertion merit mind moral conduct necessary connection negation neutral nihilistic negation noble nonconceptual wisdom noncondition nonobstructing cause

W I L L I A M L. A M E S de ma thag pa'i rkyen ma yin par dgag pa sgro 'dogs pa kun rdzob tu don dam par manges pa rjes su dpag pa rang gi ngo bo byed pa nang gi ngo bo nyid rang bzhin 'khrul pa reed pa gzhi rtags rigs pa gsal ba gzugs can gzugs (as first aggregate) 'byung ba las gyur pa'i gzugs bsam gtan snyoms par 'jug pa ting nge 'dzin mnyam par bzhag pa bsgom pa skye inched sems las byung ba 'du byed (as fourth aggregate) dam bcas pa tsam bsod nams seres yid tshul khrims reed na mi 'byung ba dgag pa lung d u m a bstan pa skur pa 'debs pa 'phags pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes rkyen ma yin pa byed pa'i rgyu (sam)anantarapratyaya paryudfisa-pratisedha samfiropa sam.vrtyfi param~trthata.h anaikfintika anumfina svarfipa karana ~dhyfitmika svabhfiva svabh~va avyabhicftrin ~graya (as in figraya-asiddhi) lifiga yukta vyakti rfipin rfipa bhautika-rfipa dhygma samfipatti samfidhi samfihita bhfivanfi fiyatana caitta samskfira pratijfig-mfitra punya citta manas g~a avinfibhfiva pratisedha avyfikrta apavfida firya nirvikalpaka-jfifina apratyaya kfirana-hetu

BHAVAVIVEKA'S object object, object to be grasped [by a subject] object of cognition object of correct knowledge object of knowledge one who desires one who hates original meaning, point under discussion overextension perception-conception perfection person position positive concomitance potentiality previous position primary matter primordial matter, original nature property of the subject [which proves the thesis] property to be proved proving property question raised in objection reality reason reasoning refutation result scripture secondary matter self-contradiction sense organ separate set of all similar examples similar cause similar example simple negation simultaneously arisen cause specific specification specious yul gzung ba

vi.saya grfihya


dmigs pa gzhal bya shes bya chags pa sdang ba skabs kyi don ha cang thal ba 'du shes pha rol tu phyin pa gang zag phyogs rjes su 'gro ba nus pa phyogs snga ma gtso bo rang bzhin phyogs kyi chos bsgrub par bya ba'i chos sgrub pa'i chos brgal zhing brtag pa de kho na gtan tshigs rigs pa sun dbyung ba 'bras bu 'bras bu lung gsung rab rgyur byas pa'i gzugs dgag pa mi mthun pa dbang po tha dad pa mthun pa'i phyogs skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu chos mthun pa'i dpe reed par dgag pa lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu so sor nges pa nges par gzung ba ltar snang ba

firambana, filambana prameya jfieya rakta dvista prakrta-artha atiprasafiga sa.mjna p~ramitfi pudgala paksa anvaya gakti pfirvapaksa pradhfina prakrti
. ~ _ sfidhya-dharma sfidhana-dharma paryanuyoga tattva hetu yukti, nyfiya dfisana phala kfirya gtgarna pravacana upfidfiya-rfipa vipratisedha indriya prthak, bhinna, vyatirikta, etc. sabhfiga-hetu sfidharmya-dr.stgnta prasajya-pratisedha sahabhfi-hetu pratiniyata avadhfirana, nirdh~rana -fibhfisa

256 spirit spiritually immature state of existence student subject [of a thesis] subsequent reasoning substance superficial reality superficial truth superficially real supramundane syllogism system thesis thing characterized tranquil trace treatise true state ultimate reality ultimate truth ultimately real unconditioned undesired consequence universal cause unreal unwholesome valid means of knowledge virtue visible form wholesome wisdom

W I L L I A M L. A M E S skyes bu byis pa "gro ba slob ma chos can rtog ge phyi ma rdzas kun rdzob kun rdzob kyi bden pa kun rdzob pa 'jig rten las 'das pa sbyor ba'i tshig gzhung lugs dam bcas pa mtshan nyid kyi gzhi zhi ba bag chags bstan bcos yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin nyid don dam pa don dam pa'i bden pa don dam p a p a 'dus ma byas thal ba kun tu 'gro ba'i rgyu yang dag pa ma yin pa midge ba tshad ma chos gzugs (as an fiyatana) dge ba ye shes bfila gati gisya dharmin uttara-tarka dravya samvrti sam.vrti-satya sfimvrta lokottara prayoga-vgtkya mata, samaya pratijfifi laksya giva vfisan~ ~fistra yfithfitathya (?) paramfirtha paramfirtha-satya pfiramfirthika asamskrta prasafiga sarvatraga-hetu abhfita akugala pramfi9, a dharma rfipa kngala jfi~na



The Abhidharmakoda and Abhidharmakodabhds.ya of Vasubandhu -See Abhidharmakoda and Bhdsya of Acdrya Vasubandhu with Sphutdrtha Commentary of.Acdrya Yadomitra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series, vols. 5, 6, 7, and 9, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973 and The Abhidharmako~abhds.yam of Vasubandhu, ed Prahlad Pradhan, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 8, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975 (2nd rev. ed.). Akutobhayd In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95.




Bp C




Avalokitavrata's Prajfi@radipatikd. Chapters one and two in Dbu ma Wa: D vol. 4; P vol. 96. Chapters three through sixteen (part) in Dbu ma Zha: D vol. 5; P vol. 97; Chapters sixteen (part) through twenty-seven in Dbu ma Za: D vol. 6; P vol. 97. Buddhapfilita's Buddhapdlita-M~lamadhyamakavrtti. In Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and in Saito (1984). Co ne edition of bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Published on microfiche by the Institute for the Advanced Study of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York, 1974. ("C" without further specification refers to PP C.) Sde Dge Tibetan Tripit.aka Bstan Hgyur, Dbu Ma, eds. K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, 17 volumes and index, Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1977. ("D" without further specification refers to PP D.) L'Abhidharmako~a de Vasubandhu, tr. Louis de La Vall6e Poussin, 6 volumes, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923--31 (reprinted 1971--2 as vol. 16 of Mdlanges Chinois et Bouddhiques). Nfigfirjuna's Mtilamadhyamakakdrikd. Sanskrit in CPP. Tibetan in Dbu ma Tsa: D vol. 1; P vol. 95 and also in Akutobhayd, Ava, Bp, PP, and PSP. Snar thang edition of the bstan 'gyur, Dbu ma Tsha. Photocopy of the blockprint in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. ("N" without further specification refers to PP N.) The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, ed. D. T. Suzuki, 168 volumes, Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1957--61. ("P" without further specification refers to PP P.) Bhfivaviveka's Pra]fi@radfpa. In Dbu ma Tsha: D vol. 2; P vol. 95. Candraldrti's Prasannapadd. Sanskrit in M~lamadhyamakakg~rikds de Ndgdrjuna avec la Prasannapadd, Commentaire de Candrakirti, ed. Louis de La Vall6e Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4, St. P6tersbourg: Acad6mie Imp6riale des Sciences, 1913. Tibetan in Dbu ma 'a: D vol. 7; P voL 98.



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