'Examination of Causal Conditions': (Pratyaya)

BHAVAVIVEKA'S
PRAJALAPRADIPA
A Translation of Chapter One:

'EXAMINATION OF CAUSAL CONDITIONS'
(PRATYAYA)
by
W I L L I A M L. A M E S
Part Two* Objection: Now [our] fellow Buddhists I say:

There are four causal conditions: the cause (hetu); the object of cognition (dramban.a/dlambana); the immediately preceding
([sam]anantara);
As well as the dominant (ddhipateya/adhipati). [MMK 1--2abc] [The opponent continues:[ The Teacher [i.e., the Buddha] has said in [both] the sfitras and the treatises of abhidharma 2 [that there are only these four causal conditions] in [our] own and others' systems (gzhung lugs, mata or samaya), as well as [in] the heavens and [on] the surface of the earth. There is no fifth causal condition. [MMK 1--2d] [The opponent continues:[ The causal conditions imagined by another school, 3 [namely,] what has arisen before, presence, and absence, are also included in just these [four]. As to that, the causal condition [which is] the cause (hetu-pratyaya) [consists of] the five [types of] cause [known as] the simultaneously arisen (sahabhVt), the similar (sabhdga), the conjoined (samprayukta), the universal (sarvatraga), and [the cause of] maturation (vipdka). 4 The causal condition [which is] the object of cognition (dlambana-pratyaya) [consists of] all dharmas. 5 The immediately preceding causal condition
* Part One appeared in Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 209--259 of this journal.
Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 93--135, 1994. 9 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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(samanantara-pratyaya) consists of [all] minds (citta) and mental factors (caitta) which have originated, except for the last [mind and mental factors of an Arhat]. 6 The dominant causal condition (adhipatipratyaya) is the nonobstructing cause (kdrana-hetu). 7 [We] maintain that [results] originate from just those four [causal conditions], which are different [from their results]. 8 In that connection, the author of [this] treatise [i.e., Nfigfirjuna] has asserted [in MMK 1--1a] that entities do not originate from another; [but] that [assertion] will be in conflict with what [he himself] accepts (abhyupagatabddha). 9 Answer: Therefore [Nfigfirjuna] says:
The intrinsic nature of entities (bhdva) does not exist in [their] causal conditions, etc. [MMK 1--3ab] "Of entities" [means] "of the eye and so on." "Intrinsic nature" [means] "[its] own self" (rang gi bdag nyid, probably svdtman). "In [their] causal conditions, etc.," [means] "in semen and blood, etc.''1~ The use of the word "etc." includes other [alleged causes] also, such as the totality (tshogs, probably sdmagn-) [of causes and" conditions], the Lord, and so on. "Does not exist" is the negation. Because that [intrinsic nature of the result] does not exist [in them], from what 11 will those causal conditions be different? Even if that [intrinsic nature] existed, it would not originate from those [causal conditions different from it], because of the conflict with inference (anumdna-bddha) which [we] have stated. 12 [Therefore] there will be no conflict with that [teaching which you have cited]. 13 Objection: Some 14 who arbitrarily 15 suppose that the meaning of our proof is false say: We do not specify that entities just originate from [anything] other. Rather, we specify that that which originates, [originates] just from another, but not from itself. Therefore, though there is a difference [of the result] from [things] which are not [its] causal conditions (apratyaya), [the result] does not originate [from them] .16 Answer: As to that, if that statement [of yours] is intended to negate origination from [the result] itself, it proves what [we] maintain. But if it is intended to show that [previously] unoriginated [entities] originate from another, even so, there will be the fault that [we can make] the
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same objection (paryanuyoga)17 [as before]. Therefore that is also not [logically] possible. But if [that statement of yours,] "[Entities] do not just originate from [anything] other," negates the origination of [a result] different from that [causal condition], it establishes [our] example) 8 Thus that [half-verse, MMK 1--3ab] has stated [the property] that ]results,] such as the eye and so on, do not exist in [their] causal conditions, such as semen and blood, etc.; and [it has also stated] the property that the causal conditions of the eye and so on are also empty of those [results, the eye and s o on]. 19 If Ientities'] own nature (bdag gi dngos po, svabhdva) does not exist, the nature of another (gzhan gyi dngos po, parabhdva) does not exist. [MMK 1--3cd] [That is,] if [entities'] own nature does not exist in [their] causal conditions, etc. "The nature of another" [means] "arising from others. ''2~ "Arising" ('byung ba) [means] "origination" (skye ba). [That] does not exist in the causal conditions. 21 That [haft-verse, MMK 1--3cd] has stated the meaning to be proved (sddhya-artha). Thus here also, as before, the example is manifest. Therefore, by making the result and the causal conditions the subject [in turn], there will be two syllogisms: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the dyatanas, the eye and so on, do not originate from causal conditions such as semen and blood, etc., [Reason:] because they do not exist in those [causal conditions], [Example:] just as a jar [does not exist in semen and blood and so does not originate from them.] Likewise, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, causal conditions such as semen and blood do not produce the dyatanas, the eye and so on, [Reason:] because they are empty of those [dyatanas], [Example:] just as a loom and so on [are empty of the dyatanas and so do not produce them]. Therefore one should understand that the Blessed One declared that in ultimate reality, entities do not originate from the four causal conditions, the cause (hetu) and so on. One [also] should understand that [the Blessed One] declared the [four] causal conditions -- the
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cause, the object of cognition, the immediately preceding, and the dominant -- in order to teach the conventional truth as it is, out of compassion (anukampd) for persons whose intellects are confused by doctrines of no cause and [doctrines of] causes which do not correspond [to their alleged results]. 22 Therefore there will be no conflict with what [we ourselves] accept. 23 Alternatively, [MMK 1--3] may be considered in a different way. This ]verse] is also to be examined with regard to (prati) those 24 who teach that entities originate from another, [as follows:] Objection: Here, There are four causal conditions: the cause; the object of cognition; the immediately preceding; As well as the dominant. [MMK 1--2abc] [We] maintain that those [causal conditions] produce entities. ]Other causal conditions] which are different in name [and] which are imagined by other [Buddhist] schools and imagined by the Vai~esikas, etc., are, in fact (laksanena), also included in just those ]four]. Therefore it is stated definitively that, There is no fifth causal condition. [MMK 1--2d]
Answer: In ultimate reality, it is not [logically] possible that those [causal conditions] are indeed different [from their result]. Why? Therefore [Nftgfirjuna] says:
The intrinsic nature of entities does not exist in [their] causal conditions, etc. [MMK 1--3ab] "Of entities" [means] "of inner, subtle, and gross [entities]. ''25 "Intrinsic nature" [means] "[itsI own self." "In ]their] causal conditions, etc.," [means,] to begin with, "in [their] separate and combined causal conditions." By the word, "etc.," it also ]means] "in the totality of common and special causes and conditions 26 and [in] others. ''27 "Does not exist" means "is nonexistent." When ]and] in what way [does it not exist]? Prior to [its own] origination, [both] conventionally and in ultimate reality. If [entities'] own nature does not exist, the nature of another does not exist. [MMK 1--3cd]
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That very own nature [of entities], which is about to originate, 28 does not [yet] exist. [In that case, 1 how will [those entities'] causal conditions have the nature of another, ]that is,] otherness? The idea is that otherness simply (eva) does not exist, because the cause (nimitta) of [other]ness is absent. 29 Objection: 3~Bearing in mind the entity which is about to originate, 31 those causal conditions are different. [That is, they are different] by virtue of relation [to the entity about to arise]. Objection: 32 [The causal conditions are different[ because they possess [the gun.a] "difference" (paratva). Answer: If one ]thus] designates [difference], that is a mere conventional designation (vyavahdra); and those [causal conditions] do not have the nature of another. 33 Therefore one should not be attached to this ]notion]. Though difference exists conventionally, it was shown previously that in ultimate reality, there is no origination from that. Objection: The Sfimkhyas 34 make a rebuttal: We accept that the intrinsic nature of an entity does indeed exist in [its[ causal conditions as a subtle nature (cha phra ba'i bdag nyid du), 35 and that that is also made manifest later. Thus even though the result is not manifest, it is established that the causal conditions are different ]from the result]. Therefore that [argument of yours] does no harm [to our position]. 36 Answer: That is not good, [1] because it is difficult to show the subtle nature of [things] which are commonly known in the world, such as jars, etc., 37 and [2] because [we] have already given ]our] answer to ]your theory of] manifestation. Objection: Others among the SSm.khyas 38 say: If [you] prove that a result does not originate from causal conditions, different [from it], which are empty of the potentiality for [that] result, [you merely] establish what is [already] established [for us]. But if [you] say that origination simply does not exist, [you] have [thereby] accepted the doctrine of eternality (ktTtt.asthavdda).39 Therefore [you will be in] conflict with [your own] previous position. Answer: That is not good, because [we] negate origination in every way. 4~ [Entities] are also not eternal, because [we] do not accept that an unoriginated entity exists even conventionally. Objection: Others 41 say: The causal conditions alone do not produce the result. For [we] maintain that the activity (kriyd) of origination of [visual] cognition (vijfidna) produces that [cognition],
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[and that that activity of origination] possesses causal conditions
(pratyayavatt-) by means of the causal conditions [which are] the eye, visible form, light, space, and attention (manasikdra). We are able to
say that that [activity possessing causal conditions] also exists: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the activity of origination of cognition produces its own result, [Reason:] because it possesses causal conditions, [Example:] just as the activity of cooking boiled rice possesses the causal conditions of a cooking pot, water, rice, fire, and fuel. Therefore ]your] previously stated inferences will be in conflict with [this] subsequent reasoning (uttara-tarka) 42 [of ours]. Answer: Therefore [Nftg~rjuna] says: Activity (kriyd) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1--4a] In ultimate reality, we do not accept the activity of cooking boiled rice, due to which that [inference of ours] would be in conflict with [your] subsequent reasoning [using] the stated example. Alternatively, Activity (kriyd) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1--4a] [This means that] in ultimate reality, the activity of producing cognition does not possess causal conditions, because the origination of an existent or a nonexistent result will be negated later [in MMK 1--6[. If that [syllogism of yours] is stated in regard to ultimate reality, [then] because the activity is unoriginated, the meaning of [your] reason is not established. Even if that is stated in general, the meaning [of your reason] is contradictory. [The fact] that the activity of origination of the nature (bdag nyid, dtman) of cognition possesses causal conditions, is an object of knowledge (shes pa) in superficial reality, because of necessary connection (avindbhdva). 43 [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here [BuddhapSlita[ 44 comments: Another [opponent] teaches the origination of entities [as follows:] What use do we have (kho bo cag la ci bya) for this [statement], "Entities originate from themselves or from another, etc"? For the eye and so on are the causal conditions of the activity of origination of visual cognition, as, for example, a cooking pot and so on are causal conditions of the activity of cooking.
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[Buddhapfilita continues:] In order to negate that, [Nfigfirjuna] says this: Activity (kriyd) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1--4a] [This is so] because the activity of producing cognition is not possible with respect to a cognition which has [already] originated or one which has not [yet] originated or one which is [in the process of] originating.45 [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, because both the former and the latter positions are mere assertions, a6 Objection: Here [the opponent], having agreed to 47 the meaning of [our] refutation, says: Since activity is unoriginated, an activity which possesses causal conditions does not exist. Thus the example [in our previous syllogism] does not exist. Nevertheless, to begin with, activity exists. Therefore the inference should be stated according to the way in which positive concomitance (anvaya) exists [between a reason and a similar example]: 4s [Thesis:] The activity of producing cognition produces its own result, [Reason:] because it is activity, [Example:] like the activity of cooking boiled rice. Answer: Here [Nfigfirjuna] says: An activity which does not possess causal conditions does not exist. [MMK 1--4b l An isolated (kevala) activity, not characterized by possessing causal conditions, also does not exist. Because it is like the previous [syllogism], there will be that same fault which [we] have just stated. 49 [Gun.amati's commentary:] Here [Gun.amati] s~ states the meaning of the verse differently: Some [take] the position that the activity of origination is the nature of cognition (vijfidna-dtma-bhd~ta).sl To them, [Nfigfirjuna] says this: Activity (kriyd) does not possess causal conditions. [MMK 1--4a] [This is so] because the activity of the origination of cognition, like cognition, does not exist; therefore an affix (pratyaya) with the meaning of "possession" is also not [logically] possible in ]reference to] the nonexistent. 52
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[Gunamati continues:] Some [take] the position that [the activity of origination of cognition] is not the nature [of cognition but] is established by intrinsic nature. 53 To them, [Nfigfirjuna] says: Activity which does not possess causal conditions does not exist. [MMK 1--4b l [This is so] because [the activity] itself does not exist, since it does not possess causal conditions. [Bhg~vaviveka's critique:] We reply: 54 Since the causal conditions assist each other, [then] in the next (anantara) moment [after that mutual assistance], the moment in which an activity which is able to produce a result comes into being (dtma-l~bha), produces the entity which is about to originate, ss [We Mfidhyamikas] do not reject [that process] conventionally. Thus it is not the case that [the activity of origination] does not exist [conventionally]. s6 It is also not the case that an affix with the meaning of "possession" is not [logically] possible [conventionally]. Since [in Gunamati's explanation] a mere assertion refutes an opponent's position which is [also] a mere assertion, that [explanation] is useless (anartha). Objection: Other proponents of origination make a rebuttal in a different way: [Thesis:] [Causal conditions,] the eye and so on, do indeed produce visual cognition, [Reason:] because they possess activity, [Example:] just as a seed, earth, water, fire, air, etc., produce a sprout. Therefore [your] previously stated inferences will be in conflict with [this] subsequent reasoning [of ours]. Answer: Here [N~gfirjuna] says: [Things] which do not possess activity are not causal conditions.
[MMK 1--4c1
Here origination in ultimate reality has been negated. Therefore since the activity [of origination] does not exist, causal conditions such as a seed and so on do not possess that [activity]; but [things] which do not possess activity cannot be causal conditions. Because those are not established as causal conditions, [your] example is defective; and [our inference] will not be in conflict with subsequent reasoning.
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Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain ('bru) and so on do indeed have [the property of] possessing activity, [Reason:] because it is accepted that it is so in superficial reality. [Example:] That which is accepted to be a [certain] way in superficial reality is also like that in ultimate reality. For example, a hare's horn does not exist [in superficial reality and so does not exist in ultimate reality, either]. You also accept that in superficial reality, a seed grain and so on do possess activity. Therefore since the example [in our previous syllogism] is established, what [we] maintain is established. Answer: Here [Nfigfirjuna] says: Do [causal conditions] which possess activity exist o r [Not]? 57 [MMK 1--4d] [The answer,] "no," is [supplied from] the context. 58 Nevertheless, it is not established that causal conditions possess activity, because even conventionally, it is not established that a hare's horn possesses activity, s9 Because in ultimate reality, it is also not established that a hare's horn is nonexistent, it is not the case that the stated fault [in your syllogism] does not exist. 6~ Objection: The Sfi.mkhyas make a rebuttal: [Thesis:] The nonexistence of a hate's horn is indeed an existent entity, [First reason:] because [the genitiveI "of" is indicated and [Second reason:] because it is [a substantive] to be qualified (vides.ya), [Examples:] like visible form and a blue lotus [respectively]. 61 Answer: That is not good. [This is so] because ]your] examples are defective, since in ultimate reality, existence and [the fact of] being [a substantive] to be qualified are not established for either visible form or a blue lotus. Objection: [rhe Sfirn.khyas 62 reply:] We are not able to show you that visible form and so on exist; [but] likewise you, too, are similarly unable to show us that visible form and so on do not exist. Therefore [our] faults are equal. Answer: It is not so. Since [they] possess nonorigination just because of the negation of origination, [we] negate the "entityness" [of visible form and so o@ 63 and [we] also do not teach the view, which
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[we] want to abandon, that [visible form and so on] are nonentities
(abhdva-dr.sti). 64 Therefore [we] have not fallen into the two extremes
of the view of entities and [the view of] nonentities; [and so we] are not similar to [you] who have fallen into the extremes of the views of entities and nonentities. [Then] how does it follow that [our] faults are equal? Precisely (eva) because there is no inference which demonstrates entities or nonentities, just what we maintain will be estabfished, since [we] do not wish to prove that; but [your[ own position is not established. 65 Alternatively, [one may explain MMK 1--4cd as follows:] One should ask the proponents of origination 66 whether causal conditions do not possess activity or do possess activity prior to the origination of the result. As to that, if they maintain the former supposition [i.e., that causal conditions do not possess activity prior to the origination of the result], in this case [Nfigfirjuna] says: [Things] which do not possess activity are not causal conditions. [MMK 1--4c] The rest of the sentence is "which produce the result. ''67 "[Things] which do not possess activity" are empty of the activity of producing the alleged result. [Thesis:] Those [causal conditions] which are as stated [that is, which do not possess the activity of producing the result] do not produce that [result], [Reason:] because they are empty of that [activity], [Example:] like causal conditions different from those [which allegedly produce the result].68 That has been shown [already].69 But if [the opponent] says that [the causal conditions] do possess activity [prior to the origination of the result[, in this case, [Nfig~rjuna] says: [Causal conditions] also do [not] possess activity. [MMK 1--4d] "Not" is [supplied from] the context.7~ The word "also" (uta) has the meaning of an alternative. Here one shows [conventionally] that causal conditions possess activity because they produce a result; but even that is not maintained in the case of a result which is not about
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to originate (utpdda-abhimukhibhtita). 71 Therefore the meaning of [your] reason ["because they possess activity"] 72 is not established. Objection: The Sautrfintikas say: Just at the time when the result originates, causal conditions which possess activity assist each other; [and] thus [we] accept that they are causal conditions. 73 Therefore it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason ["because they possess activity"] is not established, nor is it the case that there is no subsequent reasoning [which refutes your syllogism]. TM Answer: Here [Nfigfirjuna] says: ]A result] originates in dependence on (pratitya) these; therefore these are said to be (kila) causal conditions. [MMK 1--5ab] A result originates in dependence on these [things] such as a seed grain and so on. Therefore you, at least (kila), maintain that these [things] such as a seed grain and so on are causal conditions in ultimate reality. The use of the word kdla here shows that the dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] does not maintain [this]. Therefore [Nfigfirjuna continues,] As long as [a result] does not originate, how is it that these are not nonconditions (apratyaya)? [MMK 1--5cd] As long as a result does not originate, how is it that these [things] such as a seed grain and so on are not also nonconditions? The meaning of the sentence is that these do not possess [the property of] being conditions. For example, it is like [the rhetorical question,] "As long as one does not study, how is it that one is not unlearned?" Objection: 75 We do not maintain that the causal conditions are causal conditions prior to the origination of the result. Therefore that [refutation of yours] does no harm [to our position]. Answer: It is not the case that it does no harm. [This is so] because here the author of [this] treatise [Nfigfirjuna] wishes to show that since [you] 76 teach that causal conditions are nonconditions prior to the origination of the result, they are also nonconditions at the time when the result originates. Why? [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on do not have the intrinsic nature of causal conditions at the time when the sprout originates,
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[Reason:] because they are indescribable as the same or different [in relation to the sprout], 77 [Example:] like those very [things, seed grain and so on,] at a previous moment. Objection: In regard to that [negation in MMK l--lab,] "Entities do not originate from themselves or another or both," some 78 say: That [negation[ establishes what is [already[ established [for us]. [This is so] because the two, the result and the cause, are also indescribable as the same or different. Although they are indescribable [as the same as or different from the result], those [causal conditions] do indeed produce the result. Answer: By this [last syllogism given by Bhfivaviveka[, those [opponents] are also to be refuted in that [same] way. Objection: The proponents of origination again make a rebuttal: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions of those [inner glyatanas] do indeed produce the inner gtyatanas, [Reason:] because they are causal conditions, 79 [Similar example:] just as [a sprout's causal conditions,] a seed grain and so on, produce the sprout. [Dissimilar example:[ That which does not produce [a result] does not have [the property of] being a causal condition, like a hare's horn. Answer: Here [we] reply: In this case, if [something] is a causal condition in ultimate reality, it must be [a causal condition] of either an existent or a nonexistent [result]; [but] it is not logically possible (rigs pas mi rung) that it is [a causal condition] of either of those. Therefore [N~gflrjuna] says: Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing (artha), is a causal condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1--6ab] This [half-verse] sets forth two theses. As to that, showing how a causal condition of a nonexistent [thing] is not [logically] possible, [Nflgfirjuna says,] If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condition? [MMK 1--6c] Here, of what nonexistent [thing], such as a sky-flower and so on, should one understand a mdlu-creeper s~ to be a causal condition? The
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meaning of the sentence is that those [mdlu-creepers] are not causal conditions of any ]nonexistent thing such as] a sky-flower and a hare's horn. That sets forth a similar example, sl If the result does not exist, the property of the causal condition is that [its] result does not exist; and the property of the result is also nonexistence. 82 Therefore the inference is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on do not have the intrinsic nature of causal conditions, [Reason:] because their result does not exist, [Example:] just as space (nam mkha') [does not have the intrinsic nature of a causal condition] because no [result of it such as a] skyflower (nam mkha'i me tog) exists. Likewise, [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on are also not causal conditions of a sprout, [Reason:] because [the sprout] does not exist, [Example:] just as a sky-flower [does not exist and so space is not a causal condition of it]. Alternatively, [one may explain M M K 1--6c as follows:] Objection: [We] do not maintain that a [totally] nonexistent [thing] originates; but [we] do maintain that [a thing] which possesses origination (utpattimat) originates, because it does not exist before [its origination].S3 Answer: To them, [Nfigfirjuna] replies: If [a result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condition? [MMK 1--6c] Even if [the nonexistence of which you speak] is the nonexistence of a jar, a cloth, a grass hut, and so on, having the defining characteristic of nonexistence prior to origination ]rather than absolute nonexistence], [nevertheless we still ask,] of what nonexistent [thing] are a seed grain and so on held to be causal conditions? The meaning of the sentence is that [they] are not ]causal conditions] of anything. 84 Therefore, again, one can make that understood [by the following syllogism:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a seed grain and so on are not causal conditions of a sprout,
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[Reason:] because [the sprout] does not exist prior to [its] origination, [Example:] like a jar and so on. Also, as to the second case [namely, a causal condition of an existent thing], If it does exist, what is the use of a causal condition? [MMK 1--6d] The idea is that even if [the result] does exist: [Thesis:] One does not maintain even conventionally that a seed grain and so on are causal conditions for a sprout which exists by its own self, [Reason:] because ]that sprout] does not require (bltos pa) an activity of origination, [Example:] like that very [sprout when it has already] originated or [like something] different [which has already originated] such as a jar and so on. 85 Therefore the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism, "because they are causal conditions,"[ is not established. Objection: [Some] among the Samkhyas 86 say: Because that ]result] which exists [already] is made manifest by causal conditions and because it is made tangible (sthlila) [by them], [therefore] that [statement of yours,] If it does exist, what is the use of a causal condition? [MMK 1--6d] is not [logically] possible. Answer: Because their [theory of] manifestation has been rejected [already] and also because tangibility will have the faults stated for an existent and a nonexistent [result], 87 [therefore] that ]argument of theirs] is worthless. Objection: The SautrS_ntikas say: It is true that Neither for a nonexistent nor for an existent thing, is a causal condition [logically] possible. [MMK 1--6ab] Nevertheless, when the result is about to originate (utpdda-abhimukha), [its] causal conditions attain the nature (guma-lglbha) of being able to produce the result in dependence on [their own] mutual assistance; [and we] accept that [those] are causal conditions in ultimate reality. At that time, it is not the case that the result does not exist, because it
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is [in the process of] originating (utpadyamdna); but it is not the case that it does exist, because it has not [yet] originated (anutpanna). Therefore the proof which [you] have stated does no harm to our position. Answer: To that hypothesis (kalpand), also, [Nfigfirjuna replies,] A causal condition is not [logically] possible for a thing which is neither nonexistent nor existent.88 [MMK 1--6ab] The idea is that [this is so] because [a result] which cannot be described as existent or nonexistent is of neither kind [i.e., neither existent nor nonexistent] like [something which is also in the process of originating but which is] different from that [result]. s9 Here that which is held to be indescribable as existent or nonexistent is neither existent nor nonexistent; therefore, [Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, those [alleged causal conditions such as] the eye and so on, are not causal conditions of those [alleged results, such as] visual cognition and a sprout, [Reason:] because the result of those [alleged causal conditions] cannot be described as existent or nonexistent, Example:] like [a result] different from that [alleged result]. Therefore that [objection of yours] is not an answer [to our argument@ It is also established that conventionally, an entity which is free from the intrinsic nature of existence and so on, originates. 9~ Objection: The proponents of both ]existence and nonexistence]91 say: We accept that there are causal conditions of a result which is [both] existent and nonexistent. Therefore the faults which [you] have stated do not exist [for our position]. Answer: Because the doctrine of both [existence and nonexistence] has been rejected by means of the proofs shown in both cases [separately],92 those [proponents of both] should also not be encouraged
(dbugs mi phyin).
Thus to begin with, having demonstrated the negation of causal conditions in general, one [now] desires [to show] the form (rnam pa) of the negation of those [causal conditions] individually; therefore the following is said: First of all, with regard to the causal condition [which is] the cause (hetu-pratyaya), although here the causal condi-
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tions are similar [in being conditions for the origination of the result], that causal condition which produces [the result] to be produced is held to be the causal condition [in particular]. 93 Objection: Well, since the origination of [the result] to be produced is dependent on the totality [of causes and conditions], the producer is not any one condition alone. Answer: Because origination has been negated, [we] maintain the impossibility of that [causal condition which is the cause]. Nevertheless, having accepted the definition (rnam par gzhag pa, vyavasthd(na)) of a conventional cause, we will explain how it is not possible that a [supposed] ultimately real cause is a cause. 94 Here the cause is as follows: It is maintained that it brings about [a result] which is either existent nor nonexistent or [both] existent and nonexistent. As to that, When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existentnonexistent dharma is brought about, [MMK 1--7ab] Then in ultimate reality, How is the cause "that which brings about" (nirvartaka)? ]MMK 1--7c] That [alleged cause] simply does not bring about [the result]. The idea is that [this is so] [1] because [if the cause brings about an existent or a nonexistent result,] there will be a conflict with inference since [the result] exists [already], like [the cause] itself, or since it does not [yet] exist, like another [result], and [2] because [if the cause brings about a result which is both existent and nonexistent,] there will be the faults of both positions. 95 Thus because it is not possible that the [supposed] cause is a cause, that [origination of the result] is also n o t p o s s i b l e . 96 That a [supposed] cause is a cause is shown by [its] bringing about ]the result] to be produced; but [in ultimate reality,] it does not bring about [a result] with a nature having the defining characteristic of existence and so on. Therefore it is established that the origination of the caused from the cause is conventional, and that the cause is also just like that [i.e., it is conventional]. Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 1--7 as follows:]
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Objection: [Our] fellow B u d d h i s t s 97 again make a rebuttal:

[Thesis:] [Causal conditions,] the cause and so on, which produce the inner dyatanas, do indeed exist, [Reason:] because the Tathfigata has so taught. [Example:] That which has been taught by the Tathftgata is so, as for example, that nirvana is peace (sdnta). 98 [Application:] Likewise, the Blessed One has also taught that the cause (hetu) is that which brings about [the result[; the object of cognition (dlambana) is the object of cognition of mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta); the immediately preceding (samanantara) [causal condition] is the mind and mental factors which have just ceased, except for the last ]mind and mental factors of a n A r h a t ] ; 99 and the dominant (adhipati) ]causal condition] is [the condition such that] something arises when that exists. [Conclusion:] Thus since the causal conditions, the cause and so on, exist with the intrinsic nature of causal conditions, [our] reason ["because the Tathfigata has so taught"] is established; and the point which [we] maintain will not be lost. i~176 Answer: That is not [logically] possible, because [we] accept that [the four causal conditions are] so in superficial reality and because we have [already] answered by stating a fault in [your] exampleJ ~ Again, one should raise an objection in the form of a question (brga[ zhing brtag par bya):1~ Here what is the intended meaning of your reason? Is it "because the Tathfigata has so taught" as superficial reality, or because he has [so] taught as ultimate reality? If as superficial reality, the meaning is not established for yourselves. But if as ultimate reality, [Nfig~rjuna replies:] When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existentnonexistent dharma is brought about, [MMK 1--7ab] Then because a causal condition of a result which is existent or nonexistent or has the nature of both, has been rejected, How is the cause "that which brings about"? That being so, [a cause] is not possibleJ ~ [MMK 1--7cd] The meaning of the sentence is that that is simply not a cause which brings about [a result]. Therefore because in ultimate reality,
110
[the result] which is to be brought about and [the cause] which brings [it] about are not established, [then either] the meaning of the reason [in the opponent's last syllogism] is not established or else ]its] meaning is contradictory. 1~ [Devaiarman's commentary:]1~ In the Madhyamaka teaching, the lack of intrinsic nature [in things] should be shown by following a method [in which] one does not set up a doctrine (gzhung) [of one's own]. 1~ In that [Madhyamaka teaching], there are two objects of negation: attachment to the ]verbal] expression and attachment to what is expressed? ~ In that connection, attachment to what is expressed has been negated by the negation of origination. Desiring [to state] a way of negating attachment to the [verbal] expression, [Nfigfirjuna] says the following: When neither an existent nor a nonexistent nor an existentnonexistent dharma is brought about, How is the cause "that which brings about"? That being so, [a cause] is not possible. [MMK 1--7] [Devagarman continues:] Here the meaning in brief [is the following:] It is maintained to be a cause because it brings about [a result]; but that is also not possible for a result which is existent or nonexistent or has the nature of both. Thus there is no reason (byed rgyu, kdrana) for the use of the expression "cause" (hetu). 1~ Therefore since it is not ]logically] possible that the [supposed] cause is a cause, that [argument] which [you] have stated, "entities do indeed originate because [their] cause exists," is not established. 1~ [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]110 says: [You, the opponent,] have stated that in ultimate reality, entities do indeed originate, because [their] cause exists; ]but] since an entity which is existent or nonexistent or has the nature of both is not brought about, the defining characteristic of a cause is not possible. Thus the meaning of [your] reason is not established, m [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That [explanation] is not good, because [we] have [already] answered [it].112 Thus to begin with, it is not [logically] possible that the causal condition [which is] the cause is [in fact] a causal condition. Now [N~gfirjuna] will examine how it is also not [logically] possible that the
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causal condition [which is] the object of cognition is [in fact] a causal condition. It is taught that this dharma which is [without an object of cognition] 113 is indeed without an object of cognition. [MMK 1--8ab] In [that half-verse], "is" (fin pa = san) has the meaning of "being [such-and-such]" (gyur pa, probably bhfita). A dharma [is so-called] because it bears its own defining characteristicJ 14 [The word] "this" (ayam) indicates [the six cognitions,] visual cognition and so on, which one has borne in mind (blo la bzhag pa). "Objects of cognition" (dramban.a/dlambana) are those [objects] which are to be apprehended (dmigs par bya ba). "Object of cognition" means "object to be grasped [by a subject]" (grdhya). "[It is taught] that it is indeed without an object of cognition" [means[ "[it is taught] as having no object of cognition."115 Why do [visual cognition and so on] have no objects of cognition? Because the origination of those [cognitions] in ultimate reality has been negated. [This is true not only of cognitions which have already originated and those which have not yet originated, but also of cognitions which are in the process of originating, because:] t16 [Fhesis:] [Cognitions] which are [in the process of] originating also have no object of cognition, [Reason:] because they are [in the process of] originating, [Example:] like visible form. Therefore, in that way, it is taught that this dharma which is [without an object of cognition] is indeed without an object of cognition. [Visual cognition and so on are said to] "have an object of cognition" (sdlambana) in order to set forth the system of conventional truthJ 17 When [a cognition] originates by means of some object of cognition, it originates having the appearance of that [object of cognition]. Therefore [it is said to] "have an object of cognition;" but it is not [so called] because of a simultaneous connection, like [the one between] a wealthy person [and his wealth]. 118 Therefore [Nfigfirjuna says,] If a dharma is thus 119 without an object of cognition... [MMK 1--8c]
112
[This is so] because in ultimate reality, [the cognition] which apprehends [the object] does not exist. Some 12~have imagined that there is an object of cognition of a nonapprehending [cognition]. Since ]that,] also, is not possible, How could an object of cognition exist? [MMK 1--8d] Here the meaning of the sentence is that the object of cognition simply does not exist. It is like [the rhetorical question,] "How could one who commits [a misdeed] of immediate retribution 121 (dnantarya) have a realization (abhisamaya) [of the Four Noble Truths]?" That being so, the meaning of that very reason 122 [of yours] is again [either] not established or contradictory. Objection: Others 123 also make [the following] futile rejoinder [which alleges] that the alternatives are equal (vikalpasama): What [you have said,] "Visible form has no object of cognition, 124 because it is included in the aggregate of matter," is [logically[ possible, since in the [abhidharma] treatises, too, it is said, "What are the dharmas which have no object of cognition? Matter and nirvfina." But to accept that mind and mental factors have no object of cognition is not [logically] possible, since [you] accept that statement [in those same treatises,] "What are the dharmas which have an object of cognition? They are as follows: mind and mental factors. ''1z5 Answer: That is not ]logically] possible, because [the texts you cite] establish [our] example. Objection: [We] say that the fact that [cognition] is not matter depending on the elements (bhautika) is a reason [showing that, unlike matter, cognition does have an object of cognition]. Answer: Even so, [that is not logically possible] because there is no example [of something which is not bhautika and does have an object of cognition].126 Objection: The object (artha) of those [i.e., the mind and mental factors] is [as follows:] "The object to be grasped [by a subject] (grdhya) is the object of cognition (dlambana). ''127 Answer: Even if [you] suppose so, [that is not logically possible,] because [later we] will negate the object to be grasped by mind and mental events. [We will do so] because by the very method which has
BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJfiIfiPRADIPA
1 13
been stated, 128 it is not accepted that cognition apprehends [an object] in ultimate reality. The Blessed One, also, has said [in the Suvikrdntavikrdmipariprcchd-stitra], 129 "Moreover, Suvikrfintavikrfimin, when a bodhisattva practices in that way, he does not apprehend (dlambate) matter. He does not apprehend [anything], up to and including the possession of enlightenment.13~ Why is that? Suvikrfintavikrfimin, all dharmas have no object of cognition, because dharmas do not have any grasping (grahana) in which they could have an object of cognition. TM "For, SuvikrfintavikrSmin, matter is not the [cognition] domain (gocara) of matter, up to cognition is also not the [cognitive] domain (gocara) of cognition. 132 Suvikrfintavikrfimin, because it is not a [cognitive] domain (agocara), matter does not know (samjdMte), does not see matter; up to cognition, also, does not know, does not see cognition. This which is the not knowing, the not seeing of matter, feeling, perception/conception, mental formations, and cognition, is the perfection of discernment.''133 Thus the causal condition [which is] the object of cognition has also been examined. TM Now, since the [next] topic is the immediately preceding causal condition, that will be examined. Here because in ultimate reality, all dharmas have been negated in every way, 135 [Nfigfirjuna] has shown that all dharmas are unoriginated. Therefore, [he says,] If dharmas are unoriginated, [their] cessation is not possible. [MMK 1--9ab] This is so [because they are unoriginated, just as the cessation of a [nonexistent] second head [is not possible]. What follows from that? 136 Therefore the immediately preceding is not [logically] possible. [MMK 1--%] [That is, the immediately preceding causal condition is not possible] in ultimate reality. Therefore that same [reason] will have [either] an unestablished meaning or a contradictory meaning. 137
114
Alternatively, even if origination is accepted in general [i.e., conventionally], one should explain [how the immediately preceding causal condition is not possible in ultimate reafity]J 38 Here the immediately preceding [causal condition] is as follows: That group (tshogs) of mind and mental factors which has [just] ceased is considered to be the immediately preceding causal condition [of the mind and mental events of the next moment]; but [Thesis:] It is not [logically] possible that that [group of mind and mental factors which has just ceased] is also a causal condition of the group which is about to originate, [Reason:] because it has [already] ceased, [Examples:] like a cognition which ceased long ago or like matter [which has ceased]. 139 As to that, [Nfigfirjuna says,] Also, if it has ceased, what is the causal condition? [MMK 1--9d] The idea is that it is simply not possible that that is a causal condition, because what has ceased cannot assist an entity which is about to originate. The word "also" (ca) [is used] in order to include [both] negations, [namely,] that [what has ceased] is not an immediately preceding causal condition and that it is also not a causal condition in general. Objection: When an entity is [in the process of] originating by virtue of specific (pratiniyata) causes and conditions, that which is [in the process of] ceasing assists [it] by making room [for it]; 14~ a n d if it is not obstructed by past moments other than that, [then the next moment of mind does originate]. Therefore since it is established that [the moment of mind which is in the process of ceasing] is an immediately preceding causal condition, there is no fault [in our position]. Answer: Immaterial (artipin) [dharmas] do not exist in a place; 141 and the "mental organ" (manas) which has just ceased [and not the one which is in the process of ceasing], is the [alleged] causal condition. As it is said [in the Abhidharmakoga], Of the six [types of cognition], that cognition which has just ceased is the "mental organ" (manas). 142 [AK 1--17ab]
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Therefore [that] answer [of yours] is not [logically] possible. Even if [you] suppose that that which is [in the process of] ceasing is a causal condition, s o m e 143 say that because [that which is ceasing] is simultaneous [with that which is originating], it cannot be an immediately preceding causal condition. [Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita] 144 comments: The latter half of the verse, Therefore the immediately preceding is not [logically] possible. Also, if it has ceased, what is the causal condition? [MMK 1--9cd] is also stated in regard to the unoriginated. [That is,] the word "also" (ca) should be seen here as referring to the unoriginated ]result]. Since a seed which has ceased and a sprout which has not [yet] originated are both nonexistent, it follows that both the cessation of the seed and the origination of the sprout would be without cause? 45 [Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not good. ff one accepts that meaning [for MMK 1--9cd, then the following difficulty will occur:] Since the cessation of what has ceased has no cause, if one supposes that [the result] which is about to originate originates from that [cause] which does not remain [when the result originates], ]then] cessation and origination would both be without cause. But by reversing [that argument], the stated fault [of causelessness] does not exist. Then, because it is a prasahga-argument, ~46the meaning of a statement with a reversed ]property] to be proved and proving [property] is manifest. Thus we have the following:147 What has not ceased is a causal condition] 48 because it has a cause. Origination, also, has as its cause the group of mind and mental factors which have not ceased, because it has [an existent] cause) 49 [But] that, too, is not [logically] possible, since in the former [statement], the reason is not established. ~5~ [Moreover, it is not logically possible] because the latter [statement] conflicts with [your own] previous position, since origination from anything has been negated. TM Thus since that verse, also, has rejected the immediately preceding causal condition, that same reason will have [either] the fault of an unestablished meaning or the fault of a contradictory meaning. ~52
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Thus the immediately preceding causal condition has also been examined. Now, since the [nexq topic is the dominant causal condition, that will be examined. You 153 maintain that that [cause such that] when it exists, some [result] arises, is the dominant causal condition. Here, for our position, it has been shown that in ultimate reality, there is no origination. Thus entities have not attained a nature of their o w n 154 and are empty of intrinsic nature like a magical illusion (mdyd). Therefore, in this way, Because there is no existence (sattd) of entities which lack intrinsic n a t u r e . . . [MMK 1--10ab] ]That is, because they] have no existence. [The dominant causal condition is unestablished] not only in ultimate reality, but also according to worldly convention. Because it is not accepted that a result originates when only a partial (nyi tshe, prddedika) cause exists, lss This ]statement,] "When this exists, this arises," is not possible. [lVlMK 1--10cd] Therefore that same fault of the reason pursues you.
Objection: 156
]Thesis:] Those [causal conditions] do exist [in ultimate reality], [Reason:] because they are accepted to be so in superficial reality, [Example:] as it is said that nirvfina is peace, a57 Answer: The fault of ]your] example is as before. 158 [The Buddha] taught that nirvfina is peace in order to cause [his followers] to desire (nye bar 'dun par bya ba'i phyir) that [nirvfina], after he had [firsq turned [their] desire away from conditioned (sam.skrta) [dharmas], which are faulty due to the defects of impermanence and so on. [This teaching] also belongs to conventional truth, but that [nirvfina] does not exist in ultimate reality. For the Blessed One, also, having imputed [various qualities to nirvfina] by means of conceptual construction, praised nirvfina with qualities such as "peace" and so on in order to encourage persons to be trained (vineya-jana) who were interested in the profound dharma; [but we] accept even [this teaching] as conventional truth. In ultimate reality, even nirvfina is empty of the intrinsic natrue of existence and so on. Therefore since [your] example does
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not exist, [your] reason is not established; and because that [reason] does not exist, the point which [you[ maintain is not established. Objection: Although [Nfigfirjuna] has thus negated [the four alleged causal conditions' property of] being causal conditions, still others 159 make a rebuttal [as follows:] [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions which bring about the inner dyatanas, the eye and so on, do indeed exist, [Reason:] because their result [i.e., the inner dyatanas] originates, [Similar example:] just as a seed grain and so on, the causal conditions which bring about a sprout, [exist because the sprout does originate]. [Dissimilar example:] That which does not exist also has no causal condition, as with a tortoise-hair coat. Answer: One must question them as follows: Does the result exist in your causal conditions, individually or collectively, with the nature (dtman) of the result; or does it not [so exist]? The point is thisJ 6~ If it does exist, [our] answer to that position has been made [already]: If it does exist, what is the use of a causal condition? [MMK 1--6d] But if it does not exist, [our] answer to that has also been made: ff [the result] does not exist, of what would there be a causal condition? [MMK 1--6c] Nevertheless, we will explain again. When That result does not exist in [its alleged] causal conditions, individually or collectively, [MMK 1--1 lab] Then How could that which does not exist in causal conditions originate from causal conditions? [MMK 1--11cd] The meaning of the sentence is that in ultimate reality, the result simply does not originate, [because] it does not exist in the causal conditions. ]As one might say,] "How could curds arise from threads, since curds do not exist in them?" Objection: Even though [sprouts] do not exist [in seed grains], one observes the origination of [results[ such as sprouts and so on from
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[causes] such as seed grains and so on. [That origination] is part of conventional usage (vyavahdra) [and] is a [cognitive] domain (gocara) common to [all persons] with spiritually immature (bdla) minds. [Therefore we] maintain that even in ultimate reality, the inner dyatanas, the eye and so on, do originate. Answer: Therefore [Nfigftrjuna] says, But if that [result] originates from those causal conditions, even though it does not exist [in them], [MMK 1--12ab] Then Why does the result not also originate from nonconditions (apratyaya)? [MMK 1--12cd] Therefore, since here [the opponent has made] a statement affording an opportunity [for censure], 161 it is certain that just as a result which does not exist [in them] does not originate from nonconditions, [so a result which does not pre-exist in its causal conditions] also does not originate from [those] causal conditions. For example, [one could similarly ask,] "If sound, which is made, is permanent, why is a jar, which is made, not also permanent?" If one speaks thus, [the following] meaning will be understood: [Thesis:] Sound is impermanent, [Reason:] because it is made, [Example:] like a jar. Therefore here [in the case of MMK 1--1 2,] the syllogism is: [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that that [sprout] originates from a seed grain and so on which are empty of the sprout. [Reason:] because the sprout is a result, [Example:] like curds. 162 Therefore it is not the case that the stated fault does not exist.
Objection:
[Thesis:] One grasps that in ultimate reality, the causal conditions of i n t e r n a l e n t i t i e s 163 do indeed exist, [Reason:] because [the internal entities] are made of 164 those [causal conditions], [Example:] as a jar [is made of its cause, clay]. "Because they are made of those" means "because they consist o f 165
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those." [This is so] because "is made of" (-maya) is said for "consists of" (-*bhata), as [when one says,[ "The jar is made of clay." Answer: Here [N~gfirjuna] says, If the result is made of [its] causal conditions, [MMK 1--13a] [That is,] if it consists of [its] causal conditions, But the causal conditions are not made of themselves... [MMK 1--13b] The meaning is that they do not have the intrinsic nature of causal conditions. [This is so] because "is made of" is said in regard to "intrinsic nature," as, for example, [one says,[ "The heart of a Brfihmana is made of butter." [We] have explained previously how causal conditions do not have the intrinsic nature of causal conditions. Therefore How could that result, which [originates] from [causal conditions[ which are not made of themselves, be made of [those[ causal conditions? [MMK 1--13cd] The meaning of the sentence is that in ultimate reality, the result is not made of [its] causal conditions. For example, [one might ask,] "If Devarfita was celibate from [his] youth, how could Bharata be his son?" [If] a jar has originated from a lump of clay emanated (nirmita) by a magician, which is empty of the intrinsic nature of that [clay], [then] even conventionally, [that jar] cannot be understood by the wise as consisting of that [clay]. Therefore it is not made of [its] causal conditions. [MMK 1--14a] Therefore the result is not made of [its] causal conditions. Hence [your] example does not exist, because it is deficient in ]both the property] to be proved and the proving property. I66 Therefore, as before, your reason has [either] a meaning which is not established or else a contradictory meaning. 167 Objection: Here others, having agreed to the meaning of [our[ refutation, 168 say: [You] have shown that [our] inference does not exist, because a result is not made of [its] causal conditions. Nevertheless, since the result does not abandon the intrinsic nature of a result, that
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WILLIAM L. AMES
[result[ has not been negated. Therefore [we] can speak in some other
w a y ) 69
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, the causal conditions of the inner fiyatanas do indeed exist, [Reason:] because [the inner dyatanas[ are a result, [Example:] like a sprout and so on. Answer: Here [Nfigfirjuna] says, A result which is made of nonconditions does not exist. [MMK 1--14b, cl] If a result which consists of nonconditions cannot be understood [to exist[ even conventionally, what need is there to speak of ultimate reality? Objection: If in ultimate reality, causal conditions are empty of the intrinsic nature of causal conditions, well then, [you[ have accepted that causal conditions are not empty of the intrinsic nature of nonconditions. Therefore [they] are established [as[ nonconditions, so that what [we] maintain is established. Answer: That is not good. [By speaking of a] "noncondition, ''17~ we have indicated the mere negation of the intrinsic nature of a causal condition. Because [we[ have used a negation with the meaning of a simple negation, 171 [we] do not indicate the intrinsic nature of a noncondition. Dividing the text [of M M K 1--14d], it reads "noncondition" and "how can b e . . . a condition? ''172 The meaning of the sentence is that nonconditions could not have the intrinsic nature of conditions. Alternatively, [one can explain M M K 1--14d as follows:] The origination of an existent or a nonexistent result has [already[ been rejected by the method stated. Therefore, Because the result does not exist, how can a noncondition be a condition? [MMK 1--14c2,d] H o w can impossible conditions, which do not have the nature of those [conditions], be conditions? 173 The meaning of the sentence is that they simply are not [causal conditions]. The idea is that [this is so] because the result of those [causal conditions], which causes that
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cognition and word [i.e., "causal condition"] to occur, simply does not
exist. 174
Here that [first chapter[ has concluded by rejecting the intrinsic nature and particular characteristics (vides.a) of the causal conditions stated by others, beginning from There are four causal conditions: the cause; the object of cognition; the immediately preceding; As well as the dominant. [MMK 1--2abc] Here the meaning of the chapter is the teaching of nonorigination. 175 Therefore those scriptures such as the following, [which teach that] dependent origination [is] without origination, are established: 176 [From the Arya-ndgardja-anavatapta-pariprcchd-slttra, 177] That which originates by causal conditions is unoriginated. There is no origination of that by intrinsic nature. That which is dependent on causal conditions is called "empty." He who knows emptiness is heedful (apramatta). 178 Likewise, [from the Arya-lahkdvatdra-sittra, 179] One for whom nothing originates and nothing ceases, [And[ who sees that the world is isolated (vivikta): for him, existence and nonexistence do not exist. [Lahkdvatdra 3--14 = 10--196] Likewise, [from the
Arya-sarvabuddha-visaydvatdra-jhdndlokd-
lamkdra_st~tra180]
The Tathfigata always has the property of nonorigination; All dharmas are like the Sugata. 181 Likewise, ]from that same sfitra, 18z] Therefore, Mafiju~ri, in this way also, you should understand the following: That ]phrase,] "nonorigination and noncessation," is a term for the Tathfigata) 83 Likewise, [from the Arya-brahma-pariprcchd-s&ra, ~84] Where all craving (trsn.d) ceases, that is nonorigination. That which is nonorigination is enlightenment (bodhi). The world is attached to origination, [but] here the arising of a Buddha does not exist, and nirvfina also does not exist. ~85
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L i k e w i s e , [from t h a t s a m e sfitra, 186] A l t h o u g h t h o s e w h o t h o r o u g h l y c o m p r e h e n d (pari-f~d) t h a t t h e a g g r e g a t e s d o n o t o r i g i n a t e a n d d o n o t arise A c t (car) in the w o r l d , t h e y d o d o d w e l l i n this w o r l d . 187 T h e first c h a p t e r , " E x a m i n a t i o n o f C a u s a l C o n d i t i o n s , " o f t h e
Prafhdpradipa, a c o m m e n t a r y o n [Nfighrjuna's] M~lamadhyarnaka

c o m p o s e d b y dcdrya B h a v y a k a r a / B h a v y a k f i r a (legs ldan byed) 188 [is concluded].
N O T E S T O T R A N S L A T I O N O F PRAJ1VAPRADiPA, CHAPTER ONE, PART TWO i "All the gr~vakas, the Sautr~nfikas and Vaibhfisikas, etc.," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P180a--5,6; D156b--l,2. 2 See AK 2--61cd,62. See also the discussion of the doctrine of four pratyayas and six hetus and its sources in Lamotte (1980), pp. 2163 ft. 3 This other school is the "Arya-Sthaviras," according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P180b--7, D157a--1. The three causal conditions listed correspond to three of the twenty-four paccayas of the Theravhda school. "What has arisen before" (mdun na skyes pa) corresponds to puref6ta. (Note that mdun na means "before" in the sense of "in front." The P~li abhidhamma takes pure in purejdta to mean "previously.") "Presence" (yod pa) corresponds to atthi, and "absence" (med pa) to natthi. See, e.g., Nyanatiloka (1938), pp. 117--26. It is interesting that Bhfivaviveka and Avalokitavrata had at least some knowledge of the Sthavirav~din abhidharma. From Nfighrjuna on, Mfidhyamikas used the Sarv~stivhdin abhidharma almost exclusively. 4 On these five types of hem, as well as the sixth, the nonobstructing cause (kdranahetu), see AK 2--49 to 55b and Lamotte (1980), pp. 2163 ft. s All dharmas may be objects of cognition and thus be dlambana-pratyayas of the corresponding cognition. See AK 2--62c. 6 In general, the mind and mental factors of one moment are sarnanantara-pratyayas of the mind and mental factors of the next moment. See AK 2--62ab. 7 Every dharma is a nonobstructing cause of every conditioned (sa.mskrta) dharma, with the exception of itself. This simply means that no dharma obstructs the origination of any dharma which does, in fact, originate. See AK 2--50a, with bh6s.ya. s See Ava P183b--2,3; D159a--7. 9 N~tgfirjuna, as a Buddhist, accepts the teachings of the Buddha; but in negating origination from another, he has rejected the teaching of the four causal conditions. See Ava P184a--1,2,3; D159b--4,5. 10 According to ancient Indian physiology, the father's semen and the mother's blood produce the physical embryo, into which the reincarnated consciousness enters. Thus semen and blood are causal conditions of the sense organs such as the eye.
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11 su'~ literally, "of whom," probably corresponding to kasya. The subcommentary makes it clear that the idea is the following: Since the result does not pre-exist in the causal conditions, the causal conditions cannot be said to be "different" in relation to the result. See Ava P184b--l,2,3; D160a--3,4,5. 12 See Ava P184b--4 to 7, D160a--5,6,7. The reference is to the earlier argument against origination from something different. 13 See Ava P184b--7, D160a--7 to 160b--1. 14 Fellow Buddhists, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P185a--3, D160b--3,4. 15 tshod dpags su. Goldstein (1975), s.v., gives "estimation, guess" for tshod dpag(s). The "proof" (sddhana) referred to is the M~dhyamika's argument against origination from another. See Ava P185a--4,5; D160b--4,5. 16 The opponent here holds that entities originate not from any causal conditions which are different from them, but only from causal conditions of similar (rigs mthun pa) kind. See Ava P185a--2,3; D160b--3. 17 paryanuyoga usually refers to "a question raised in objection." Here Avalokitavrata glosses it by quoting Bh~vaviveka's previous pair of syllogisms against origination from another. See Ava P185b--7 to 186a--2, D161a--5,6,7. 18 In his previous pair of syllogisms, Bh~tvaviveka used a jar as an example of something which is different from the causal conditions of the inner dyatanas and so does not originate from them. He used threads as an example of things which are different from the inner dyatanas and so are not their causal conditions. The opponent's assertion that things do not originate from dissimilar (rigs mi mthun pa) causal conditions merely confirms Bhfivaviveka's examples. See Ava P186a--2 to 5, D161b--l,2,3. 19 Avalokitavrata glosses "property" (chos, dharma) as "property of the subject [which proves the thesis]" (phyogs kyi chos, pak4.a-dharma ). See Ava P186a--7 to 186b--1, D161b--3,4,5; and compare the next syllogisms. zo gzhan gyi dngos po ni gzhan las 'byung ha'o, perhaps parabhdvah parebhyah sambhavah.
zl "According to Avalokitavrata, if the result does not exist at the stage when the causal conditions exist, then the causal conditions cannot be termed "other." That is, they do not have "the nature of another." Something can be "other" or "different" only in relation to a thing different from it. In the absence of the result, the causal conditions are not designated as "other than the result;" and thus the result cannot be said to originate from another. See Ava P186b--2 to 8, D161b--6 to 162a--3. 22 rgyu mi mthun pa, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "Nfirfiya.na, the Lord, etc." See Ava P188a--1, D163a--2. 23 The M~dhyamika accepts the Buddha's teaching about the four causal conditions as conventional truth. He negates origination from the causal conditions in ultimate reality. Hence there is no conflict. See Ava P188b--7 to 189a--2, D163b--4 to 7. 24 The Valbhfisikas and SautrLqtikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P189a--4, D164a--1. 25 According to Avalokitavrata, inner entities are the six inner dyatanas, that is, the six sense organs. Subtle (cha phra ba, probably stiks..ma) entities are atoms, and gross (rags pa, sthSla) entities are visible objects. See Ava P189b--5,6; D163a--7 to 163b--1.
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26 byed rgyu, kdrana, a near-synonym of rgyu, hetu. Glossed by Avalokitavrata as rkyen, pratyaya, "condition." See Ava P190a--1, D164b--3. 27 "Others" are glossed by Avalokitavrata as "Nfirfiyaga, the Lord, primary matter, etc." See Ava ibid. 28 "About to originate" translates skye bar 'dod pa, probably utpitsu, literally, "desirous of originating." 29 See note 21 and Ava P190a--7 to 190b--3, D164b--7 to 165a--3. Avalokitavrata glosses nimitta as kdrana and hetu. 3o Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to the Abhidharmikas. They hold that although the result does not pre-exist in its causal conditions, one bears in mind the result which is about to arise. Then, in relation to that [mental image of the result], the causal conditions become "other." See Ava P190b--3,4,5; D165a--3,4,5 and P190b--7 to 191a--1, D165a--6 to 165b--1. Compare LVP AK III, p. 79. 31 "Bearing in mind" translates blo la rnam par bzhag nas, glossed as snying la bzhag ste. (See references to Ava in the previous note.) "About to originate" again translates skye bar 'dod pa. (See note 28.) 32 According to Avalokitavrata, the Vai~esikas say that even when the result does not yet exist, the causal conditions are different because they possess the gun.a of "difference" or "otherness." On the Vaigesika gun.as and paratva in particular, see note 119 to the translation of chapter one, part one, and note 165 to the translation of chapter two (forthcoming). See Ava P190b--5, D165a--5 and P191a--2 to 191b-1, D165b--1 to 6. 33 In the first case, the causal conditions are different only in relation to [a mental image of] a result which is about to arise. In the second case, according to Avalokitavrata, the causal conditions are different [from the result ] because they [also] possess the quality (gu.na) of "self" (bdag nyid, dtman). This is not one of the twenty-four Vaigesika gu.nas, being, in fact, a dravya. The idea may be that the gu.na of paratva does not apply to the causal conditions themselves. Avalokitavrata explains that the causal conditions do not have the nature of another (gzhan gyi dngos po nyid, parabhdvatddtva) because their "otherness" or "difference" is created by relation or dependence (apeks.d), but it does not exist by intrinsic nature. Intrinsic nature, like the heat of fire, is not relative to or dependent on anything. Since the "otherness" of the causal conditions is relational, it is a mere conventional designation. See Ava P191b--2 to 6, D165b--7 to 166a--3. 34 Those of the S~O.khyas who are proponents of manifestation (vyakti), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P192a--6, D166b--1, and note 187 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 3s Avalokitavrata has the S-arpkhyas give the example of the way in which the future roots, trunk, and branches of a tree pre-exist in its seed. See Ava P192a--7,8; D166b--2,3. 36 Contrary to what the Mfidhyamika has said, the result does indeed exist at the same time as its causal conditions, albeit in a subtle state. Thus the Mfidhyamika's argument against ultimately real difference fails in the case of the Sfimkhya. See Ava P192a--5 to 192b--3, D166a--7 to 166b--4. 37 One cannot show even conventionally that a jar with a subtle nature exists at the stage of the clay. See Ava P192b--4,5,6; D166b--5,6. 38 According to Avalokitavrata, the first sentence is spoken by proponents of
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potentiality (~aktivddin), while the remaining two sentences are spoken by proponents of unchangeability (ktitasthavddin). See Ava P192b--7 ft., D166b--7 ff. 39 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that although entities exist, they do not originate. See Ava P193a--4,5; D167a--3,4. Presumably, in this view, things exist for all eternity. They need never have come into existence because there never was a time when they did not exist. 40 In ultimate reality, we negate origination without qualification as to whether the causal conditions are supposed to be empty of potentiality or not. See Ava P193a-7,8; D167a--5,6. 41 According to Avalokitavrata, these are again the Vaibhfisikas and the Sautrfintikas, who, unable to establish origination by mere scripture, resort to a grammatical argument. See Ava P193b--3,4; D167b--1. 42 That is, Bhfivaviveka's syllogisms against origination from something different will be in conflict with or be annulled by (bddh) the syllogism just stated by the opponent. See Ava P194a--8 to 194b--4, D168a--2,3,4. 43 The Mfidhyamika does accept that in superficial reality, the activity possesses causal conditions. Nevertheless, it is contradictory for the opponent to attempt to prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only in superficial reality. The last sentence means that the fact that the activity of origination of cognition possesses causal conditions is an object of knowledge only in superficial reality, never in ultimate reality. Also, superficial reality is invariably characterized by the fact that the activity of origination of cognition possesses causal gonditions. See Ava P195b--4 to 196a--5, D169a--1 to 7. 44 Literally, "another;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P196a--8 ff., D169b-2ff. 45 This is a highly abridged version of Buddhapfilita's commentary. See Saito (1984) 13.21--15.5. Compare also PSP 79.1 ft. 46 That is, both the opponent's position and Buddhapfilita's subsequent refutation are mere assertions. 47 sgro btags nas. This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P198a--l,2,3; D170b--4,5,6. 4s See Ava P198a--6,7; D171a--1,2. 49 If the cooking pot and the other causal conditions do not exist, the activity of cooking rice does not exist. As for the opponent's syllogism, its example is defective just as before, because the Mfidhyamika does not accept that the activity of cooking rice exists in ultimate reality. See Ava P198b--4 to 7, D171a--5,6,7. so Literally, "others;" identified by Avaloldtavrata. See Ava P198b--8 to 199a--1, D171b--l,2. Gunamati was a te~tcher of Sthiramati. (See Frauwalhaer (1961), pp. 136--7.) As we have seen, Sthiramati criticizes the Praj~@radipa in his own commentary on the MMK. See note 114 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 51 The idea seems to be that the activity of origination of cognition is not different from cognition itself, and that that activity occurs whenever the right causal conditions are present. See Ava P199a--2 to 6, D171b--2 to 5. 52 Since, according to the opponent, the activity of origination of cognition is the same as cognition itself, then as long as cognition has not originated, the activity of origination also does not exist. But a nonexistent activity cannot "possess" causal conditions. That is, the possessive suffix -vatf in pratyayavali cannot refer to activity.
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That rkyen, pratyaya, is used here in a grammatical sense is clear from the context and from Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. See Ava P199a--5 to 199b--1, D171b-5,6,7. s3 The activity of origination is different from cognition. That activity does not possess causal conditions but instead is established by intrinsic nature. The activity of origination produces cognition. See Ava P199b--2,3,4; D172a--l,2. s4 Literally, "some say." Identified by Avalokitavrata as Bhfivaviveka himself. See Ava P199b--7,8; D172a--5. ss The various causal conditions "assist each other," as, for example, in the production of visual cognition, the eye assists visible form by seeing it and visible form assists the eye by being present in front of it. Then, in the next moment after that "mutual assistance," that which is able to produce the result is the moment in which the activity comes into being. That activity produces the entity which is about to originate, e.g., visual cognition. See Ava P200a--2 to 200b--4, D172a--6 to 172b--7, especially P200b--l,2; D172b--5. 56 See Ava P200a--2 to 200b--4, D172a--6 to 172b--7. Bhhvaviveka says that the Mhdhyamika does accept that on the conventional level, the activity of origination produces the result. Gunamati has incorrectly negated this process both in ultimate reality and in superficial reality. s7 bya ba ldan nam 'on te na, kriydvantag ca santy uta. This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation in Ava P202b--7, D174b--4,5. The understanding of this pdda depends on how one interprets uta. It may indicate emphasis, a double question ( k i m . . . uta ...), or an alternative (uta vd). See the discussion in Saito (1984), translation, pp. 224--6 n. 16. ss According to Avalokitavrata, the negation na in MMK 1--4c carries over and supplies a negative answer to the question posed by MMK 1--4d. See Ava P202b--8 to 203a--2, D174b--5,6. In fact, Bh~vaviveka gives no indication of how he understands uta. Despite Avalokitavrata's explanation, it might be simpler to suppose that Bh~vaviveka understands uta as emphasis, with na from MMK 1--4c supplying the negation. Thus MMK 1--4d would be "And ]causal conditions] which possess activity do not exist." 59 The example in the opponent's syllogism, a hate's horn, does not possess the property to be proved, possessing activity. Thus the syllogism is faulty. See Ava P203a--2,3,4; D174b--6 to 175a--1. 60 The conceptual constructions of existence and nonexistence do not apply to ultimate reality. If origination exists, there will be a concept of nonexistence in relation to it; but in ultimate reality, all entities are unoriginated. Thus the example in the opponent's last syllogism ("a nonexistent hate's horn") does not really possess the proving property, either; and the syllogism fails completely. Since the opponent's last syllogism was stated in a effort to refute the Mhdhyamika's criticism of the syllogism before that, the criticism stands. See Ava P203a--4 to 203b--3, D175a--1 to 6. 61 According to Avalokitavrata, the S~.. khyas hold that even though no hare's horn is perceived, the three gu.nas are still present in their unmanifest state. In the S.aIokhya's syllogism, the example "visible form" (rfipa) corresponds to the first reason. Just as the whiteness or roundness of [genitive] a visible form is an existent entity, so the nonexistence of a hare's horn is an existent entity. The term "blue lotus" may be qualified by various adjectives and so is a substance which possesses qualities. The same applies to a hare's horn. See Ava P203b--8 to 204a--7, D175b--2 to 176a--1.
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62 Identified by Avaloki{avrata. See Ava P204b--3,4; D176a--4,5. 63 By negating origination, we merely negate the "entityness" (dngos po nyid, bhdvatd/tva) imagined by others; but we do not establish "nonentityness" (dngos po reed pa nyid, abhdva-tgz/tva). See Ava P204b--7 to 205a--5, D175a--7 to 176b--5. In other words, the Mfidhyamikas deny that there are entities (bhdva) without asserting that there are nonentities (abhg~va). 64 The view of nonentities involves attachment (abhinive~a) to [the idea of] nonentities. See Ava P205b--1, D176--7 to 177a--1. 6s If the S-argkhya negates the view of nonentities, this (along with the negation of the view of entities) establishes what the Mfidhyamika maintains. But since the S.m?khya holds that there are entities and nonentities, his own position is not established. See Ava P206a--8 to 206b--2, D177b--5,6,7. 66 The Sautrfintikas and Vaibhfisikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P206b--4, D178a--1. 67 This phrase modifies "causal conditions." See Ava P207a--3, D178a--6,7. 68 For Avalokitavrata's explanation of this syllogism, see Ava P207a--6 to 207b--1, D178b--2,3,4. 69 This refers to Bhfivaviveka's first two syllogisms against origination from another (or MMK 1--1a), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P207b--l,2,3; D178b--4,5. 7o As before, the negation na in MMK 1--4c carries over to 4d. 71 Because one observes that in superficial reality, a result is produced, one infers that its causal conditions possess activity. But as long as the result is not about to arise, there is no reason to maintain that its causal conditions have activity. See Ava P207b--7 to 208a--3, D179a--2 to 5. 72 See the opponent's syllogism immediately before the first occurrence of MMK 1--4c. See also Ava P208a--3 to 7, D179a--5,6,7. 73 The Sautrfintikas hold that causal conditions possess activity only at the time when the result originates. Thus they do not fall into the error of claiming that the causal conditions are active before that time. See Ava P208b--1,2,3; D179b--1,2,3. 74 Again, see the opponent's argument immediately before the first occurrence of MMK 1--4c. 75 The Santrfmtikas again. See Ava P209b--2, D179a--7. 76 See Ava P209b--7,8; D180b--5. 77 The seed, etc., and the sprout are obviously not identical; but since the sprout originates from the seed, etc., they are not different, either. See Ava P210a--5 to 2 1 0 b - - l , D181a--2 to 5. 78 Some who [attempt to] establish origination. See Ava P210b--4, D181a--7. 79 The opponent's idea is that although the causal conditions cannot be shown to possess activity, they are nonetheless causal conditions; and therefore they produce the result. See Ava P211b--1 to 5, D182a--2 to 5. 8o maluta seems to be a variant of, or mistake for, mdlu(t(O. See Edgerton (1953), s.v. mdlutd. 81 Just as a mdlu-creeper is not a causal condition of nonexistent sky-flowers, so a seed is not a causal condition of a sprout which does not [yet] exist. This is so because something is designated as a causal condition only when one observes its result. See Ava P212b--1 to 7, D 1 8 2 b - - 7 to 183a--5. 82 The properties (dharma) referred to here are the proving properties (sgtdhanadharma) in the next two syllogisms. 83 The opponent's idea is that one must distinguish between the absolute non-
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existence of sky-flowers and so on, which never originate, and the limited nonexistence of sprouts, etc., which do not exist prior to their origination but do exist after they originate. See A v a P 2 1 3 b - - 4 to 8, D 1 8 3 b - - 7 to 184a--3. 84 A seed is not considered to be a causal condition of a nonexistent sprout. The idea seems to be that when a seed exists, one has no way of knowing whether it is a causal condition of a sprout. Only later, when the seed has actually sprouted due to favorable conditions, can one say the seed was a causal condition of the sprout. Thus the seed's quality of being a causal condition of a sprout is contingent, not inherent. C o m p a r e Ava P 2 1 4 a - - 5 to 214b--6, D 1 8 3 a - - 7 to t 8 3 b - - 6 . s5 This seems to mean that a result which somehow exists before its origination has no need of origination or of causal conditions, just as a result which has already originated does not need to originate again. C o m p a r e Ava P215a--5 to 215b--1, D185a--5,6,7. s6 Those S.arnkhyas who are proponents of potentiality (gakti) or manifestation (vyakti), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P215b--5, D 1 8 5 b - - 4 . 87 ff the causal conditions produce a tangibility which does not exist already, one has the case of a nonexistent result ( M M K 1--6c). If they produce a tangibility which does exist already, one has the case of an existent result ( M M K 1--6d). See Ava P 2 1 6 a - - 2 to 6, D 1 8 5 b - - 7 to 186a--3. 88 The context indicates that Bhfivaviveka interprets M M K 1--6ab in this way here. 89 O n this sentence and the following syllogism, see Ava P 2 1 7 b - - 1 to 219a--1, D 1 8 7 a - - 6 to 188a--7. A sprout which is in the process of originating and a jar which is in the process of originating are both indescribable as existent or nonexistent. The idea seems to be that there is no way to distinguish two things, both of which cannot be described as existent or nonexistent. Thus one can no more say that a seed is a causal condition of a sprout which is in the process of originating than one can say that a seed is a causal condition of a jar which is in the process of originating. 90 Conventionally, entities which cannot be described as existent or nonexistent do indeed originate from their assembled causes and conditions; but not in ultimate reality. See Ava P219a--5,6; D188b--3,4. This passage is probably one reason why Bhfivaviveka is classified as a Santrfintika(Sv~tantrika)-Mftdhyamika in the Tibetan tradition. Here he affirms the Sautrfintika position on the conventional level, while denying that it holds true in ultimate reality. 91 rnam pa gnyis su smra ba dag, glossed by Avalokitavrata as gcer bur rgyu ba dag, that is, the Jains. (On the term gcer bur rgyu ba dag, see note 142 to the translation of chapter one, part one.) They hold that a result which is both [already] existent and not [yet] existent originates. For example, a gold ring is not perceptible as such in unworked gold; but the gold of which the ring will be made already exists. See Ava P 2 1 9 a - - 7 to 219b--6, D 1 8 8 b - - 5 to 189a--3. 92 Insofar as the result pre-exists in the cause, it will be subject to the arguments against the origination of a pre-existent result. Insofar as it does not pre-exist, it will be subject to the arguments against the origination of a nonexistent result. See Ava P 2 1 9 b - - 7 to 220a--8, D 1 8 9 a - - 3 to 189b--3. 93 A seed, the four elements, etc., are all causal conditions for producing a sprout; but the sprout actually originates only from the seed. Thus the seed is the causal condition (pratyaya) which is the sprout's primary cause (hem). See Ava P 2 2 0 b - - 7 to 221a--1, D190a--2,3. 94 In ultimate reality, there is no origination and thus, in particular, no origination
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from a single causal condition which is the cause. Nevertheless, the Mftdhyamikas do accept the various kinds of causes and conditions on the conventional level. Having done so, they must explain how what is conventionally designated as the cause is not a cause in ultimate reality. See Ava P221a--3 to 221b--4, D190a--4 to 190b--4. 95 This "unpacking" of Bh~vaviveka's highly elliptical argument follows Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P222a--2 to 5, D191a--1 to 4, Bhfivaviveka's terseness is probably due to the fact that he is simply repeating arguments already set forth in connection with MMK 1--6. 96 It is not possible that what is conventionally designated as a causal condition which is the cause, is a cause in ultimate reality. Therefore the origination of the result is also not possible. See Ava P222a--5,6; D191a--4. 97 The SautrS.ntikas and the Vaibhfisikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P223a--2, D191b--5,6. 9s The Sanskrit of the thesis, reason, and example of this syllogism is quoted by Candrakirti. See PSP 31.1--3. In the Derge edition of the Bstan 'gyur, a textual peculiarity occurs at this point in Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. At D192a--5, following 'di la dper na de bzhin and immediately before yang brgal zhing brtag . . . . an omission occurs. The omitted passage is inserted later in D. At D193a--2, immediately following gang gi phyir bdag g/s, the insertion begins with de bzhin gshegs p a s . . . The insertion continues to D193b--5, where it ends w i t h . . , zhes bya ba'i tshig, just before phrag dog gis . . . The passage misplaced in D occurs in P at its proper place, beginning at P223b--2 and ending at P224b--1. Thus the passage misplaced in D is almost, but not quite, the length of one two-sided folio in P. Presumably, this reflects the length of the folios of the text from which D was compiled. A folio was apparently placed out of order during the compilation of D, before the woodblocks were carved. A similarly misplaced passage occurred earlier in P (not D). See note 119 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 99 See note 6. 100 That is, the thesis of the syllogism will not fail to be established. See Ava P223b--7 to 224a--2, D193a--5,6,7. 101 According to Avalokitavrata, this alludes to the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK I - - 4 d and Bh/tvaviveka's refutation of it. See Ava P224a--5 to 224b--1, D 1 9 3 b - - 2 to 5. 102 The text from "Here what is t h e . . . " up to, but not including, Devagarman's commentary is quoted in Sanskrit by Candrakirti (with a variant). See PSP 31.4--10. 103 The Tibetan appears to read MMK 1--7d as evam sati na yujyate, instead of PSP's evam sati hi yujyate. See PSP 83 n. 2. 104 If the reason is asserted of ultimate reality, it is not established. If it is asserted of superficial reality, it is contradictory to try to prove a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which holds only ha superficial reality. See Ava P225a--5,6,7; D192b-6,7. t05 Literally, "others say." Identified as dcg~rya Devagarman by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P225a--7,8; D193a--1. Avalokitavrata adds that Bhfivaviveka is quoting from Devagarman's commentary on the MMK, called dkar po 'char ba (~ukidbhyudaya?). [This work has not survived.] He explains that Bh~vaviveka does not criticize Buddhapfilita's commentary out of jealously, but because it is incorrect. Likewise, he does not quote Devagarman's commentary out of partiality (rjes su chags pa), but
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because it is faultless. See Ava P225a--8 to 225b--2, D193a--1,2 and 193b--5,6. (On the insertion in D, see note 98.) Bhfivaviveka will also quote part of Deva~arman's commentary on MMK 3--2. See note 35 to the translation of chapter three (Ames (1986), pp. 138--139). 106 Avalokitavrata explains that to "set up a doctrine" (gzhung) is to establish one's own doctrine (siddhdnta), independently of any refutation of others' doctrines. The Mfidhyamika, on the other hand, just refutes others' doctrines without establishing any doctrine of his own, since he merely negates the entities conceptually constructed by others. In the M~dhyamikas' doctrine, what is to be shown is the mere negation of the intrinsic nature of all entities conceptually constructed by others; but it has been shown (read bstan pa yin with Ava D194a--3; P225b--8 has bstan pa ma yin) that the Mfidhyamikas do not accept any dharma in ultimate reality. See Ava P225b--3 to 8, D193b--7 to 194a--3. 107 Avalokitavrata explains "[verbal] expression" (brjod pa, probably abhidhdna) as "words," and "what is to be expressed" (brjod par bya ba, probably abhidheya) as "the meaning of the words." See Ava P226a--1, D194a--4. 108 That is, no result is produced, so there is no reason to speak of a cause. See Ava P226b--3,4; D194b--4,5. 109 This refers to an argument given by an opponent in Devagarman's commentary. See Ava P226b--5 to 8, D194b--6 to 195a--1. 110 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P226b--8 to 227a--1, D195a--l,2. 111 This is a highly condensed paraphrase of Buddhapglita's argument. For Buddhap~lita's commentary on MMK 1--7, see Saito 19.9--20.7. 112 According to Avaloldtavrata, Buddhapfilita again fails to give reasons and examples, that is, formal syllogisms. See Ava P227a--7 to 227b--2, D195a--6 to 195b--1. 113 In MMK 1--8a, the Tibetan has yin pa (the copula) for san, rather than yodpa (verb of existence). This follows Bh~vaviveka and Avalokitavrata's explanation of the verse. For the phrase in square brackets, see Ava P227b--8, D195b--5,6 and P228a--5,6; D196a--2,3. 114 Or "because it bears a specific characteristic" (svala~an. adhdrandt). This is the standard definition/etymology of dharma. 115 dmigs pa mealpa kho nar zhes bya ba ni[ dmigs pa reed pa nyid du'o [[; perhaps andrambana evety andllambana-tvena/tay~. Avalokitavrata adds that cognitions have no objects of cognition "in ultimate reality." See Ava P228~--5,6; D196a--2,3. 116 See Ava P228a--8 to 228b--2, D196a--4,5,6. 117 According to Avalokitavrata, the teaching in the Abhidharma that the six cognitions do have objects of cognition refers to conventional truth, not to ultimate truth. See Ava P229a--2,3,4; D196--5,6. 118 Since all dharmas are momentary, the object of cognition has already ceased when the cognition occurs; but the cognition originates having the aspect (rnam pa, dkdra) of the object of cognition. Thus since the cognition and its object do not exist at the same time, it is not strictly correct, even conventionally, that the cognition "has an object of cognition." This statement is true only through imputation. See Ava P229a-5,6,7; D196b--7 to 197a--2.
BHAVAVIVEKA'S
PRAJ~[APRADiPA
131
119 "Thus" translates de Itar. The Sanskrit of PSP has atha (PSP 84.2). The translators of PP may have read tath~n&ambane for athfm(trarnbane. 120 Some proponents of origination, according to Avalok]tavrata. See Ava P229b--2, D197a--4. 121 On the five misdeeds which invariably result in the next rebirth's taking place in hell, see AK 4--96,97. 122 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the reason, "because the Tathfigata has so taught," in the syllogism stated by the opponent toward the end of Bh~vaviveka's commentary on MMK 1--7. If the opponent asserts that the causal condition which is the object of cognition is taught as ultimate reality, that is not so; and the reason is unestablished. If he asserts that it is taught as conventional reality, it is contradictory to adduce a reason which is true only conventionally in order to prove a thesis about ultimate reality. See Ava P229b--6,7,8; D197a--7 to 197b--2. 123 Other Abhidharmikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P229b--8, D197b--2. 124 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the example in Bh~vaviveka's last syllogism, concerning cognitions which are in the process of originating. See Ava P229b--8 to 230a--3, D197b--2,3,4. 125 Compare AK 1--34ab. The opponent argues that the same Abhidharma texts which establish the example in Bh~vaviveka's syllogism also contradict the thesis of that syllogism. As a Buddhist, Bhhvaviveka must accept both statements. See Ava P230a--6 to 230b--2, D 1 9 7 b - - 7 to 198a--3. 126 The opponent cannot use the mental factors as an example, because their having an object of cognition can be refuted in the same way. See Ava P230b--5 to 231a--3, D198a--5 to 198b--2. 127 See Ava P231a--6,7,8; D198b--4,5,6. i28 The method of the perfection of discernment, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P231a--8 to 231b--1, D198b--7. 129 Identified by Avalokitavrata by its alternative title of Strdhadvisdhasrik~ Aryaprajhdp&amit~. See Ava P231b--2, D199a--1. 130 byang chub dang ldan pa, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "omniscience" (sarvdkAra]hat6). See Ava P231b--5, D199a--3,4. 13i This paragraph is a highly condensed version of a passage found in Hikata (1958), pp. 94--5. 132 According to Avalokitavrata, because the aggregates are unoriginated, form does not apprehend form, and so on up to cognition does not apprehend cognition. See Ava P231b--7,8; D199a--5,6. 133 This paragraph is a somewhat condensed version of a passage in Hikata (1958), p. 29. Compare the fuller quotation of the same passage at the end of chapter three. 134 We have investigated how that which is conventionally designated as "the causal condition [which is] the object of cognition" cannot be a causal condition in ultimate reality. See Ava P232a--4, D199b--2. 135 That is, the origination of dharmas from self, other, both, or no cause has been negated. See Ava P232a--7, D199b--4,5. 136 des cir 'gyur zhe na. See note 95 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 137 See note 122.
132
138 See Ava P232b--6,7; D200a--3,4. 139 Matter is not considered to be an immediately preceding causal condition of mind and mental events. Rather, the idea is that the mind can originate only from an immediately preceding moment of mind, though it may also be influenced by other causal conditions. 140 If the previous moment has not ceased, the future moment does not originate. See Ava P233b--6, D201a--2. 141 Since mind and mental factors do not occupy space, there is no question of "making room" for them. See Ava P234a--3,4,5; D201a--6 to 201b--1. 142 In the case of visual cognition (caksur-vijgdna), the corresponding sense organ (indriya) is the eye (calq.uh.) and the corresponding sense objects (vis.aya) are visible forms (n?tpa). The same threefold structure of cognition, organ, and object holds for the remaining four physical senses. In order to maintain the same pattern in the case of mental cognition (mano-vijhdna), the corresponding sense organ is taken to be the moment of cognition (which may be of any one of the six types) which has just ceased. This "mental sense organ" is called the manas, which simply means "mind." See A K 1--17cd. In the Abhidharmakoga-bhdsya, Vasubandhu says that the last moment of mind of an Arhat is not an immediately preceding causal condition (since no next moment of mind occurs), but it is nevertheless manas. See LVP AK I, pp. 32--3 and LVP AK II, p. 305. 143 Bh~vaviveka and some other Mfidhyamikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P234b--1, D201b--3,4. 144 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P234b--4 ff., D202a-6ff. 145 This is a condensed paraphrase of BuddhapSlita's commentary. See Saito 22.13-23.10. Compare PSP 86.1 ft., especially 86.9,10. The idea seems to be that if the cause has already ceased before the result originates, then the cessation of the cause cannot be caused by the appearance of the result. Likewise, the result would originate without a cause, since the cause no longer exists when the result appears. 146 See note 102 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 147 . . . mngon pas cir 'gyur zhe na. Literally, "what comes about by the manifestation ]of that reversed statement]?" 148 PNDC have 'gags (PN: 'gag) pa ni rkyen ma yin te, "what has ceased is not a causal condition." Ava P236a--1 agrees with DC when it quotes the text, and Ava D202b--7 agrees with PN, but Avalokitavrata's explanation of the text implies ma 'gags pa ni rkyen yin te. (See Ava P235b--7 to 236a--3, D202b--6 to 203a--2.) The latter reading also fits the context better, so I have translated it here. 149 Thus the causal condition and the result would both have a cause. See Ava P236a--2,3; D203a--l,2. 150 ff the seed has not ceased, the sprout does not originate. See Ava P236a--5, D203a--3. lsl To say that a result originates from a cause which has not ceased contradicts the total negation of origination in MMK 1--1. See Ava P236a--5,6,7; D203a--3,4,5. 152 See note 122. 153 The SautrS_ntikas and Vaibh~sikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P236b-8, D203b--4,5.
BHAVAVIVEKA'S
PRAJNAPRADiPA
1 33
154 rang gi bdag nyid ma thob, perhaps alabdhasvdtman, fiterally, "have not attained their own selves," glossed by Avalokitavrata as "have not attained a self established [as] their own intrinsic nature." See Ava P237a--3,4; D203b--6,7. 155 A sprout does not originate from a seed if other necessary conditions are absent. See Ava P237b--l,2; D204a--4,5. ls6 Ascribed to "fellow Buddhists" by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P237b--5, D204b--1. 157 The M~idhyamika accepts that in superficial reality, nirv~, a is peace; but it is also peace in ultimate reality. Likewise, the causal conditions, which the Mhdhyamika accepts in superficial reality, also exist in ultimate reality. See P237b--8 to 238a--2, D204b--3,4,5. Compare the opponent's syllogisms following MMK 1--4c and 1--7c. 158 Avalokitavrata cites a Prajfirpdramit6 Sfttra to show that even nirvS_na does not exist in ultimate reality. See Ava P238a--3 to 6, D204b--5,6,7. 159 Other Buddhists, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P239b--4, D206a--3. 16o des cir 'gyur. See note 95 to the translation of chapter one, part one. 161 glags yodpa'i tshig. See note 102 to chapter one, part one and Ava P242a--2 to 6, D208a--2 to 5. Here the point is that if the opponent says that a sprout arises from a seed in which it does not pre-exist, he leaves himself open to the reply that one might as well say that a sprout arises from a pebble, in which it likewise does not pre-exist. 162 Since curds are a result, they do not originate from seed grains, etc., which are empty of those curds. See Ava P243a--2,3; D208b--6. 163 That is, the inner 6yatanas, the eye and so on. See Ava P243a--6,7; D209a--2 and P243bl,2; D209a--4. 164 Here byung ba, "arisen, come forth, come about," translates -maya, "made of, consisting of." See MMK 1--13. 16s gyur pa, probably -bhFtta, "being or being like, consisting of," etc. 166 That is, the example in the opponent's last syllogism, "a jar," lacks the property to be proved (namely, that its causal conditions exist in ultimate reality) and the proving property (namely, that it is made of its causal conditions). See Ava P245a--5,6; D210b--3,4. 167 See note 122 and Ava P245a--7 to 245b--1, D21Ob--4,5,6. 168 See note 47 and Ava P245b--l,2; D210b--6,7. 169 That is, since the intrinsic nature of the result still exists, the opponent can prove the existence of the result's causal conditions in some other way. See Ava P245b--5, D21 la--2. 170 Note that Ava P246b--8, D212a--1 have rkyen ma yin pa zhes smras pa gang yin pa ni for PNDC rkyen ma yin te zhes bya ba ni. 171 Avalokitavrata explains that in this Madhyamaka-~dstra, the negation ma yin (a/an- or na) should be understood in all contexts as a simple negation (prasajyapratisedha). See Ava P247a--3 ft., D212a--3 ft. 172 In PSP, the Sanskrit text of MMK 1--14d is pratyayrpratyaydh, kutah.. Bh~vaviveka evidently read pratyayo 'pratyayah. kutah. See Kajiyama (1964), p. 127 n. * "Dividing the text" translates sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba byas has, probably yogavibhrgam k.rtvd, yoga-vibhdga, literally "rule-division," is a method of interpreting grammatical rules, especially PS.nini's sfitras. One divides a single rule into two in order to explain the formation of certain words which would otherwise be ungrammatical. See Abhyankar (1961), yoga-vibhdga, s.v. 173 "Impossible" translates 'thad pa med pa, probably anupapanna. Avalokitavrata
134
explains that the nature of a causal condition is to produce a result. If in ultimate reality, there is no result, there can be no causal condition, either. See Ava P248a--3 to 248b--4, D213a--1 to 7. 174 The origination of a result causes one to think of something as a causal condition and to use the word, "causal condition." See Ava P248b--5 to 249a--2, D213b--1 to 5. 175 According to Avaloldtavrata, this sentence is a response to the question, "What is the result of that investigation by reasoning?" See Ava P249b--2, D214a--4. 176 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence is a response to the question, "What good quality (gu.na) is attained through teaching nonorigination?" Avalokitavrata goes on to say that the scriptures referred to are, first, those that teach that even in superficial reality, entities which dependently originate merely appear to originate, like phantoms (mdyd-purusa); but they do not originate by intrinsic nature. Secondly, the scriptures referred to are those that teach that in ultimate reality, entities do not originate from themselves, from another, from both, or from no cause. See Ava P249b--3 to 8, D214a--6 to 214b--2. Avalokitavrata introduces the following sfitra quotations by citing the objection, "The negation of causal conditions and the proof of n o n o r i g i n a t i o n . . , have been established by a mere limited (prfzdegika) treatise of desiccated logic (~uska-tarka)." Avalokitavrata replies, "They will also be established by reliable (dpta) scriptural sources." See Ava P249b--8 to 250a--2, D 2 1 4 b - - 2 and also P251b--3,4,5; D215b--7 to 216a--2. Avalokitavrata seems to be saying that scripture (dgama) and reasoning (yukti) are mutually dependent and that each needs to be supported by the other. Thus scriptural doctrines are proved through logical investigation; but, on the other hand, scripture establishes the relevance of these investigations to spiritual life. 177 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P250a--2, D214b--2,3. The Sanskrit of this verse is quoted four times in PSP; see PSP 239.10--14, etc. 178 Avalokitavrata explains that afflictions (klega) will not arise for one who sees that sense objects are like an illusion. See Ava P250a--7,8; D214b--6 to 215a--1. 179 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P250b--1, D215a--1. The Sanskrit of the verse (which differs slightly from the Tibetan) is found in Nanjio (1923), pp. 147, 290. The term vivikta is used in Mahfiyfma sfitras as a synonym of g(mya, "empty." 180 See Ava P250b--3,4; D215a--3. Sanskrit in PSP 449.5,6; see also de Jong (1978), p. 237. 181 Sugata, "Well-gone," is another epithet of the Buddha. Avalokitavrata explains that all dharmas are like the Sugata in that they have the intrinsic nature of nonorigination (or, an intrinsic nature without origination: skye ba med pa'i ngo bo nyid, anutpddasvabhdva). See Ava P250b--6, D215a--4,5. 182 See Ava P250b--6,7; D215a--5. 183 Specifically, it indicates the Tathfigata's dharmakg~ya, according to Avaloldtavrata. See Ava P251a--2, D215a--7. 184 See Ava P251a--2, D215b--1. Avalokitavrata apparently means the Aryabrahma-vi~esacintd-pariprcchd-sgttra, since he identifies the Buddha's interlocutor as Brahmavi~esacintfi (loc. cit., following line). 185 Avaloldtavrata explains that the abandonment of all afflictions (klega) is attained by one who understands nonorigination. One should not fear nonorigination; nonorigination itself is enlightenment. The world does not attain enlightenment,
BHAVAVIVEKA'S
PRAJfiTAPRADIPA
135
because it is attached to origination. A Buddha does not have the concept of the arising of a Buddha or of final nirvS~,a (parinirvdn.a). See Ava P251a--4 to 8, D 2 1 5 b - - 2 to 5. 186 Identified by Kajiyama; see Kajiymnaa (1964), p. 128 n. ******. Cited by Avalokitavrata only as "other sutrdntas;" see Ava P25 la--8, D215b--5. 187 Avalokitavrata comments that although they act in this world, they are not stained by the sufferings of salpsfira; and for as long as samsgra continues, they benefit beings. See Ava P251b--2, D215b--6. tss On the various names of "Bhfivaviveka," see de La VaU6e Poussin (1932--3), pp. 60--1; Gokhale (1958), pp. 165--6 n. 1; Iida (1980), pp. 5--6; and Ruegg (1981), p. 60 n. 183. 9211b13 164--170

'Examination of Causal Conditions': (Pratyaya)

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'Examination of Causal Conditions': (Pratyaya)

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BHAVAVIVEKA'S

A Translation of Chapter One:

Part Two* Objection: Now [our] fellow Buddhists I say:

[and that that activity of origination] possesses causal conditions

Objection: [Our] fellow B u d d h i s t s 97 again make a rebuttal:

Prafhdpradipa, a c o m m e n t a r y o n [Nfighrjuna's] M~lamadhyarnaka

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