Case # 4 CUI V CUI FACTS: The main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui and

Antonio Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barii, a charitable institution established by Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui. Jesus and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders of the institution. Antonios claim to the position is based on a convenio where then administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus, however, had no prior notice of this. Jesuss claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of donation (which recognized their father Mariano as a legitimate descendant to the position) as he is the older of the two. The deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a titulo de abogado or a doctor, or a civil engineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to the one who pays the highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not a member of the Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar (he was formerly disbarred, though, by the SC and was just reinstated weeks before assuming the position) ISSUE: Who has a better right to the position of administrator between Jose and Antonio? What does the term titulo de abogado mean? HELD: Antonio. The term titulo de abogado is not just mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one to the practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable to qualify as a lawyer since completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. It was also argued that Antonio is disqualified for having been previously disbarred since the deed also provided that an administrator may be removed if found to lack a sound moral character. However, Antonio was reinstated. This reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar. Antonios restoration to the roll of lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities resulting from the previous disbarment.

In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan. Simbillos advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court. Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Courts indulgence, this rings hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001. Issue: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. Rulings: Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore, suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Held: Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely Ratio: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration Reasoning: -Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business - Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. - Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar maybe disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. - The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary

Case # 8 Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo Facts: Simbillo advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist. These advertisements appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed that similar advertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in the Philippine Star in August 5, 2000.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. - Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Case # 9 [A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005] ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent. Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor because he was too busy. Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services. Complainant filed this complaint but later on withdrew. Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Still, the severance of the relation of attorneyclient is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the case. Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel. There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case.

Case # 10 Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003) DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. FACTS: Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila, Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, Sulyap, Inc. paid, among others, advance rentals, association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreement stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25% attorneys fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right. Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyap filed a writ of execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyaps fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in case of default in payment. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein. Sulyap presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the compromise agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz and even noted that it was more than one

year from receipt of the judgment on compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection. ISSUE: Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement. HELD: YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated consent or forgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreement approved by the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioners failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof. Finally, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled because Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Such was never established in the instant case. Case # 11 [A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003] LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.

FACTS: Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed. Because of respondents transgressions, his client was haled to court as part-defendant. Respondent also refused to return petitioners money in spite of his meager service. Held: GUILTY of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN the money of complainant with interest. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar. ***** CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite demands after his failure to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainants papers. This conduct violated the following Canon: CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

Case #12: Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974) Facts: Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. The SC found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume on that day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that his work as an election registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high court described the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing and added that the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. case # 13 CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN A.C. No. 5835 CELIA ARROYO-POSIDIO vs ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN A.C. No. 6051 VIOLETA TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN A.C. No. 6441 MAR YUSON ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN A.C. No. 6955 Promulgated: August 10, 2010 RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: This refers to the undated Petition filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on July 28, 2009 by

Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, praying that he be reinstated as member in good standing of the Philippine Bar and be allowed to resume the practice of law, claiming that he had already served the penalty of suspension imposed on him, and that he is now reformed. As background, four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on October 21, 2004,[1] Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the Decision. He was further ordered to return the amount of P30,000 to complainant for legal services he did not render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12, 2005. In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 15, 2005,[2] Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. Per records, the Courts decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005. In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27, 2006,[3] respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2) years. This was modified by the Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the penalty was reduced to six (6) months suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was full payment of the loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007. In this connection, the OBC noted respondents shrewdness by moving out of his given address to evade receipt of the copy of the decision/resolutions of the Court. After diligent efforts at searching for respondents correct address proved unavailing, the Court in its Resolution dated July 17, 2007, considered the March 6, 2007 Resolution as having been served on respondent. In the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 2, 2007,[4] respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought after he had received the amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning. The Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should have lapsed on April 18, 2008. Upon the recommendation of the OBC, the four administrative cases were consolidated. In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 years. Accordingly, respondent

should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Courts resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong, where the Court clearly stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring respondent.It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2 years. The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondents Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively; 2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows: (a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005; (b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008; (c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and (d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006. 3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof: (a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned; and (b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. SO ORDERED. case # 14 OLBES v DECIEMBRE Facts:

Spouses Olbes (Franklin & Lourdes) were employees of the Central Post Office in Manila. They filed this case for disbarment against Atty. Deciembre. Lourdes, with the help of Deciembre, acquired a loan from Rodela Loans in the amount of P10K. Lourdes then issued 5 PNB blank checks to respondent to serve as collateral. Subsequently, Lourdes paid Deciembre the amount of the loan plus interest and surcharges. Notwithstanding payment, Deciembre filled up the blank checks in the amount of P50k each. Siyempre tumalbog yun mga cheke.Deciembre then filed BP22 & estafa cases against the Olbes spouses. Reklamo siyempre sila Olbes. They are even saying that some of their officemates suffered the same fate under Deciembre. Investigating officer: Deciembres version of the facts is highly doubtful. There are discrepancies between his oral and written testimonies. Issue: W/N Deciembre should face disciplinary sanctions Held: Siyempre! He is in violation of Rule 7.03 He committed falsification when he filled up the blank checks even if this was not agreed upon and despite knowledge that the loan had already been paid. He even filed BP22 cases against the couple. This shows the vileness and wretchedness of his soul. Franklin was even detained for 3 months because of the cases. Deciembre is found to be lacking good moral character. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. The penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for 2 years is too mild. Deciembre is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.

Case # 15 COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN FACTS: Ricardo Hermoso commenced a civil case against Damaso Perez and Gregorio Sumbong, for recovery of sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of Hermoso. Judgment was rendered in favor of Hermoso, ordering the defendants to be held jointy and severally liable. The Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock registered in Damaso Perezname with the Republic Bank.

 Petitioners used the rules of procedure to suspend the execution of judgment. (and they managed to have thesale suspended 6x)They alleged that levy was highly excessive and unjust. Even the wife of Damaso Perez, filed to lift the writ of execution alleging that the shares of stock were conjugal assets and that the debt was a personal obligation. ISSUE: WoN petitioners restored to tricky, sneaky and maneuvering tactics to thwart the ends of justice? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. During the protracted litigation, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.

HELD: YES! The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before the SC by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. Respondents clearly defied and challenged the orders of the SC by willfully taking the lawyers oath before the notary public despite the resolution of the SC denying their petition to be admitted to the bar. The ruling of the lower court is wrong for assuming to be an attorney, x x x, and acting as such without authority, is only one of the grounds under Rule 64, section 3. Also, by taking the oath of office as attorney-at-law and notifying the SC of what they had done and their intent to practice law in all courts of the Philippines, the respondents had, for all intent and purposes, held out to the public as such as attorney-at-law The case is remanded to the court of origin Case # 18 UI v BONIFACIO FACTS LESLIES side of the story LESLIE Ui married CARLOS and had 4 children with him Subsquently, LESLIE found out CARLOS was having illicit relations with Atty IRIS Bonifacio and begot a daughter CARLOS admitted this relationship with LESLIE who confronted IRIS IRIS told LESLIE everything was over between her and CARLOS However, LESLIE found out later the illicit relations continued and IRIS even had 2nd child with CARLOS LESLIE filed a complaint for disbarment against IRIS on ground of immorality IRIS side of the story Met CARLOS who represented himself as a bachelor with children by a Chinese woman with whom he had long been estranged CARLOS and IRIS got married in Hawaii Upon return to Manila, they did not live together because CARLOS wanted his children with the Chinese woman to gradually know and accept his marriage with IRIS When IRIS knew about the 1st marriage, she cut all ties with him In proceedings before the IBP Commission, LESLIE filed a motion to cite IRIS in contempt for making false allegations in her Answer to impress upon the IBP that

Case # 17 PEOPLE v DE LUNA FACTS: De Luna, ET al., respondents, know that they did not pass the bas examination. Although they sought admission under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were notified of the decision of the SC denying their petitions. But notwithstanding their disqualification to be admitted to the bar, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the SC of such oath taking and that they will engage in the practice of law in all courts of the Philippines RTC: not guilty of contempt of court unless the respondents actually engaged in the practice of law or held out to the public that they are lawyers by means of circulars ISSUE: W/N the act of the respondents of taking their oath before a notary public constitutes contempt of court

her 1st child by CARLOS was within wedlock IRIS indicated in Answer she got married to CARLOS in Oct 22, 1985 However, Certificate of Marriage certified by State Registrar revealed that date of marriage was actually Oct 22, 1987 ISSUE W/N IRIS SHOULD BE DISBARRED HELD NO RATIO Immorality Requisites to admission to practice of law includes being a person of good moral character and possession of such must be continuous Loss of good moral character is a ground of revocation of the privilege of the practice of law In the case at bar, IRIS was imprudent in her personal affairs Circumstances existed which should have at least aroused her suspicion that something was amiss (i.e. not living together as husband and wife, children by another woman, etc) but she did not do anything about it However, the fact remains that IRIS relationship with CARLOS was clothed with marriage and cannot be considered immoral Moreover, such conduct to warrant disciplinary action must be grossly immoral that is so corrupt and false to constitute a criminal act or moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community IRIS act of immediately distancing herself belies the alleged moral indifference and proves she has no intention of flaunting the law Hence, IRIS should not be disbarred False allegation Any normal bride would recall date and year of marriage Difficult to fathom how IRIS could forget the year of her marriage Moreover, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading especially in this case since IRIS had personal knowledge of facts stated therein Hence, IRIS should be reprimanded for attaching marriage certificate with an altered date Case # 19 Narido v Linsangan (58 SCRA 85) Plaintiff: Flora Narido Respondent: Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan FACTS:

Narido filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Linsangan (counsel of

the adverse party in the workmens compensation case) for alleged violation of attorneys oath by submitting a perjured statement. Atty. Linsanagan denied the complaint and also hold Atty. RufinoRisma (counsel of Narido for the workmens compensation case) for having instigated his client (Narido) to file the complaint in which according to him (Linsangan) is malicious and false resulting to embarrassment, humiliation and defamation against a brother profession. RULING: The alleged perjured statement filed by Atty. Linsangan in the workmens

compensation case was not proven. The accusation was false. It was not also proven that Atty. Linsangan had intention to mislead the court or to violate his oath. On the other hand, there was no direct evidence to show that Atty. Risma acted in bad faith in advising his client to file the complaint against Atty. Linsangan. What he did is to fight for the rights of his client. Mutual bickering and unjustifiable recrimination between lawyers detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from the court. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Case # 20 Laput vs. Remotigue , 6 SCRA 45(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962) LABRADOR, J. (En Banc) FACTS: Petitioner ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT charge respondents ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. In May 1952, Nieves RillasVda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty . Laput to handle her "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had prepared two pleadings: (1) closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of said estate. Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a

written appearance as the new counsel for Mrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as Mrs. Barrerascounsel.Petitioner alleged that: (1) respondents appearances were unethical and improper; (2) they made Mrs. Barrera sign documents revoking the petitioners Power of Attorney" purportedly to disauthorize him from further collecting and receiving dividends of the estate from Mr. Macario Barreras corporations, and make him appear as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client; and (3) Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner. Respondent Atty. Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan. 1955 Mrs. Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging his services. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he filed his appearance on 7 Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel. The SC referred the case to the SolGen for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter recommended the complete exoneration of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases. RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for Mrs. Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner because Atty.Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, the petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. The SC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also not guilty of unprofessional conduct in as much as he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955, only on 7 February 1955, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance. As to Atty. Patalinghugs preparation of documents revoking the petitioners power of attorney, the SolGen found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Case dismissed and closed for no sufficient evidence submitted to sustain the charges.

Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machine. ISSUE: W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of HELD: According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavoured to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and that it renders legal services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling illegal activities. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent clients in court since law practice is not limited merely to court appearances. Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. The proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Exceptions of Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon of Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of his name, the law firm, address and branch of law practiced. Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

Case # 23 IN RE CUEVAS FACTS: Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which permitted him to take the Bar Exams subject to the condition that should he pass the same he shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the court. This resolution was due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The conviction stemmed from Cuevas' participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA College of Law, where Raul Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. He was later discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, Cuevas prays that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath at the court's most convenient time. ISSUE: W/n Cuevas should be allowed to take the lawyers oath... HELD: YES. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. The court nonetheless is willing to give Cuevas a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino (case sa \ legprof), petitioner's co accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. His discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certification attesting to his righteous peaceful and civicoriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character. Case # 24 ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC FACTS: Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381).