IBP2194_12 ANLISE DE RISCO APLICADA A NAVIOS TRANSPORTADORES DE GS NATURAL LIQUEFEITO (GNL) Nilton Hiroaki Ikeda1, Marcelo Ramos Martins 2

Copyright 2012, Instituto Brasileiro de Petrleo, Gs e Biocombustveis - IBP Este Trabalho Tcnico foi preparado para apresentao na Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012, realizado no perodo de 17 a 20 de setembro de 2012, no Rio de Janeiro. Este Trabalho Tcnico foi selecionado para apresentao pelo Comit Tcnico do evento, seguindo as informaes contidas no trabalho completo submetido pelo(s) autor(es). Os organizadores no iro traduzir ou corrigir os textos recebidos. O material conforme, apresentado, no necessariamente reflete as opinies do Instituto Brasileiro de Petrleo, Gs e Biocombustveis, Scios e Representantes. de conhecimento e aprovao do(s) autor(es) que este Trabalho Tcnico seja publicado nos Anais da Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012.

Resumo
Tendo em vista a crescente importncia do gs natural na matriz energtica do Brasil, o Gs Natural Liquefeito (GNL) apresenta-se como uma forma flexvel de suprimento para responder demanda sazonal das usinas termoeltricas quando os reservatrios das hidreltricas se apresentarem em nveis crticos, garantindo deste modo, maior segurana energtica. Alm da possibilidade de utilizao de GNL produzido nas plataformas de petrleo da camada Pr Sal. Por estas razes h a tendncia de aumento do trnsito de navios transportadores de GNL na costa Brasileira e, conseqente exposio da populao aos potenciais riscos. Embora no se tenha registros de graves acidentes, a cadeia de GNL apresenta grandes riscos. Navios transportadores de GNL representam uma fonte de risco, inerente ao seu potencial energtico, especialmente na aproximao de terminais, no somente em relao possibilidade de ocorrncia de um acidente martimo como tambm pode representar um alvo para aes de sabotagem ou terroristas. Por este motivo, a anlise dos riscos associados a tais operaes tem sido fonte de preocupao internacional. Este trabalho analisa os riscos de um vazamento de GNL de navio transportador na costa brasileira e tem como objetivo identificar as possveis consequncias avaliando o impacto de possveis acidentes na regio costeira. uma questo de razovel complexidade, pois requer a compreenso do desenvolvimento dos fenmenos fsicos envolvidos aps o vazamento. Ser dada ateno especial anlise de consequncias para a populao sujeita aos efeitos da radiao trmica de possveis exploses e fogo resultante alm de propor medidas preventivas e mitigadoras, com a utilizao dos resultados obtidos, para reduo do impacto e das consequncias populao na regio costeira.

Abstract
Considering the growing importance of natural gas in Brazil's energy matrix, the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is presented as a flexible source of supply to meet the seasonal demand of power plants when the hydroelectric reservoirs are in critical levels, thus ensuring, greater energy security. Besides, there is the possibility of using the LNG produced at the oil platforms of the Pre Salt Layer. For these reasons, there is a tendency to increase the transit of LNG carrier in the Brazilian Coast and consequently the public exposure to potential risks. Although there are no records of serious accidents, the LNG chain has major risks. A LNG carrier represents a source of risk inherent due to its potential energy, especially when approaching the terminal, not only in relation to the possibility of an accident at sea but also may represent a target for sabotage or terrorist attack. For this reason, the analysis of risks associated with such operations has been a source of international concern. This paper analyzes the risk of a leak of LNG carrier vessel in the Brazilian coast and aims to identify the possible consequences evaluating the impact of potential accidents in the coastal region. It is not a simple task, but a matter of reasonable complexity and requires understanding of the development of the physical phenomena involved after the leakage. Special emphasis will be done in the consequence analysis for the population subject to the effects of thermal radiation from possible explosion and resulting fire and at the end the paper proposes preventive and mitigation measures, using the results obtained, to reduce impact and consequences to the population in the coastal region.

1. Introduction ______________________________ 1 Engenheiro Naval Escola Politcnica da Universidade de So Paulo 2 PHD, Engenheiro Naval Escola Politcnica da Universidade de So Paulo

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This item is a brief presentation of concepts related to this analysis. Frequency is the number of occurrences of an event per unit of time and incident is the loss of containment of material or energy; according to American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) (2000) Hazards are possible events and conditions that may result in severity, i.e. cause significant harm, according to Kristiansen (2005) and Hazard is a chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to people, property or the environment according to AIChE (2000). In this work, hazards or threats are conditions which exist which may potentially lead to an undesirable event, according to American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) (2000). An accident can be defined as an undesirable event that results in damage to humans, assets and/or the environment, Kristiansen (2005). Incident outcome is the physical manifestation of the incident, and consequence is a measure of the expected effects of an incident outcome according to AIChE (2000). An event is an occurrence that has an associated outcome, according to ABS (2000). Likelihood is a measure of the expected probability or frequency of occurrence of an event, according to AIChE (2000) The term risk has many different definitions. Risk is an evaluation of hazards in terms of severity and probability, according to Kristiansen (2005) and risk due to a specific activity can be defined as a measure of an undesired event in terms of both the incident probability and the magnitude of the undesired consequence, according to The Netherlands Organization (TNO) (2005). According to AIChE, risk is a measure of human injury, environmental damage or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. ABS (2000) defines risk as the product of the frequency with which an event is anticipated to occur and the consequence of the events outcome. In this work, risk can be defined as potential of loss due to a hazard exposure. A Risk Analysis is applied considering a scenario, the likelihood, the consequences and severities, associated with an exposed population, according to Ayyub et al (1998) apud Souza (2009).

2. Consequence Analysis
Frequency of a potential undesirable event is expressed as events per unit time, usually per year. The frequency should be determined from historical data, according to ABS (2000) Consequence can be expressed as the number of people affected (injured or killed), property damaged, amount of spill, area affected, outage time, mission delay, money lost, etc. Regardless of the measure chosen, the consequences are expressed per event according to ABS (2000). The Consequence Analysis is a mandatory step in the Risk Quantitative Analysis of hazardous materials operation. Concerning the LNG transportation, this is a fundamental analysis, due to the evaluation of the range of the affected area subject to the consequences of undesirable events (like fire or explosion due to leaks). The Risk Assessment Process is a systematic method to determine risk levels, according to ABS (2000). This process consists on the basic steps: Hazard Identification, Frequency Assessment, Consequence Assessment and Risk Evaluation. The hazards can be identified by methods like as Literature Search, What-if-Review, Safe Audit, Checklist, Brainstorming, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability studies), FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), HAZID (Hazard Identification studies). The frequency can be assessed by the assessment methods like the analysis of historical records, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Human Reliability, Common Cause Failure Analysis (CCFA). The consequences can be assessed by the following methods: Source Term Model, Atmospheric Dispersion models, blast and thermal radiation, aquatic transport models, effect models and mitigation models. Finally, the risk can be evaluated by the methods: Risk Matrix, F-N Curve, Risk Profile, Risk Isopleth, Risk density curve or Risk Index. The first step of the analysis is an exhausted analysis of historical records considering the risk events. The subsequent step is the identification of the model for the consequence assessment. Then, the next step is the evaluation of the models and the consequence analysis of the events. Considering the results from the assessment, the possibility of implementation of mitigation measures to minimize the unacceptable levels is evaluated. Then, emergency procedures planning can be elaborated. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed a methodology for conducting formal safety assessments (FSA) to be used with LNG carriers IMO (2007). These studies analyze many possible accident scenarios like collision (estimated frequency of 6.7x10-3 per ship year), grounding, contact, (estimated frequencies of 2.8x10 -3 per ship year), fires, explosions and incidents while loading and unloading cargoes, scenarios with no fatalities or large discharges. According to PARFOMAK (2003), the favorable safety record of LNG tankers is largely due to their doublehulled design, and the LNG carriers are less prone to accidental spills because they are inherently more robust. They also carry many of safety electronic devices like positioning, alerts, automatic distress systems, cargo safety systems (emergency shutdown systems), gases and fire detection systems. 2

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 According to the IMO (2007) FSA for LNG carriers, to reduce risks related to collision, grounding and contact, risk control options are the following: maintenance plan for critical items (propulsion system, steering systems, navigational and cargo handling systems), increase double hull width, increase double bottom depth or increase hull strength, redundant propulsion system (two shaft lines), improve of navigational safety (Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), track control system, Automatic Navigation Systems (AIS) with radar, improved bridge design), restriction on crew schedule to avoid fatigue of crew, increase the use of simulator training.

3. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

Liquefied Natural Gas is produced by liquefaction of natural gas. The liquefaction process includes pre-treatment of the natural gas stream to remove impurities (e.g. water, nitrogen, carbon-dioxide and sulphur compounds), according to IMO (2007). In liquefied form, LNG is 600 times less than the same amount of natural gas at ambient temperature. The LNG is consisted of mostly methane with small amount of other hydrocarbons and nitrogen, at minus 162,2oC and non toxic. According to FOSS (2006), LNG is a clear, odorless, non toxic, cryogenic liquid at normal atmospheric pressure. LNG vapors can cause asphyxiation due to lack of oxygen, the weight of LNG is less than the weight of water, thus the LNG spilled on water will float, according to IMO (2007). There are cryogenic hazards when handling LNG, for instance: cryogenic tissue damages caused by direct contact with LNG, lung damage due to breathing cold vapors, and embrittlement to materials according to LUKETA-HANLIN (2005). When LNG comes in contact with water there is the possibility of Rapid Phase Transition (RPT), a noncombusting type of explosive expansion. These expansions can produce significant overpressures that can result in structural damage, IMO (2007). According to LUKETA-HANLIN (2005), LNG is almost half of the density of water and its boiling point the vapor is 1.5 times the density of air. When vaporized, LNG forms a flammable, visible vapor cloud (temperature lower than ambient dew point), according to LUKETA-HANLIN (2005). LNG vapors, as it returns to a gas phase, can become flammable under certain conditions of the flammability range, FOSS (2006). The flammability range is the range between the minimum and maximum concentrations of vapor in which air and LNG vapors form a flammable mixture that can be ignites and burn. According to SANDIA (2004), LNG vapor is colorless, odorless and non toxic. The flammability range is approximately between 5 and 15 percent by volume according to IMO (2007). When LNG is spilled, it will cool down throw surroundings as it vaporizes and mixes with diluting air. When spilled on water, heat will be transferred through the water and the LNG pool will float and boil on the water, vaporizing until the LNG pool is evaporated. The LNG vapor may travel some distance before it is diluted below the lower flammable limit. For a mixture of 10% methane vapor and air at atmospheric pressure, the auto ignition temperature is above 540 oC. If the vapor within the flammability range encounter an ignition source in the form of a spark or a source of heat of more than 540oC. According to FOSS (2006) above -110oC the LNG vapors are lighter than air and disperse rapidly in accordance with IRVINGS (2009). However in the boiling temperature is heavier than air when dense clouds of vapor occur. 3.1. LNG Hazards According to FOSS (2006), the potential hazards concerning operators of LNG facilities and surroundings communities come from the basic properties of natural gas. Primary containment (storage tanks with appropriate material), second containment (double, full containment dikes), safeguard systems (regular maintenance, detection, remote and automatic shut off systems, procedures, training and emergency response) and separation distance (by regulations based on vapor dispersion data and thermal radiation contours) provide multiples layers of protection. These measures provide protection against hazards associated with LNG. According to ABS CONSULTING (2004), the principal hazards from LNG result from its cryogenic temperature (-162,2oC), flammability and vapor dispersion characteristics. Three types of fires jet fires, pool fires and flash fires are postulated to the purpose of LNG Carriers. Jet Fire - If compressed or liquefied gases are released from storage tanks or pipelines, the material discharging through the hole form a gas jet that mixes with the ambient air. The occurrence of fire depends on the existence of an ignition source and the flammability range. Could occur during loading, unloading or transfer operations with pressures increased by pumping. This kind of fire cause severe damage, but affect locally. Pool Fire When a flammable liquid is released from a storage tank or pipeline a liquid pool may form. While the pool formation, some of the liquid evaporate and if an ignition source is available, the flame can travel back to the spill, resulting in a pool fire, which involves the burning of vapor above the liquid pool as it evaporates and mixes with air. Flash Fire When a volatile, flammable material is released to the atmosphere, a vapor cloud forms and disperses (mixes with air). If the resultant vapor cloud is ignited before the cloud is diluted below its LFL, a flash fire may 3

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 occur. The combustion normally occurs within only portions of the vapor cloud (where mixed with air in flammable concentrations), rather than the entire cloud. A flash fire may burn back to the release point, resulting in a pool or jet fire but is unlikely to generate damaging overpressures (explode) when unconfined. Explosions If some confinement of the vapor cloud is present, methane can produce damaging overpressures. Confinement can be provided by spaces within the ship or nearby structures, such as a building on shore or another ship. Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) Related to the nearly instantaneous transition from the liquid to vapor phase and an associated rapid pressure increase. In an RPT, a portion of the spilled LNG changes from liquid to gas virtually instantaneously. When LNG forms a pool on water, the heat from the water rapidly vaporizes the LNG; however, this boiling is not the phenomenon referred to as RPT. Cryogenic effects Spills of LNG in contact with the hulls can lead to brittle fractures of the deck or tank covers. The releases are related with the LNG transfers, near the piping systems. Appropriate steel are used in the areas where LNG leakage might be expected, according to ABS CONSULTING (2004). Freezing Liquid - If LNG is released, direct human contact with the cryogenic liquid will freeze the point of contact. Containment systems also separate the tank from other equipment. All facility personnel must wear gloves, face masks and other protective clothing as a protection from the freezing liquid when entering potentially hazardous areas. This potential hazard is restricted within the facility boundaries, according to FOSS (2003). Rollover LNG supplies of multiple densities that do not mix at first. After a period of time the layers themselves spontaneously rollover to stabilize the liquid in the tank. The excess pressure can result in cracks or other structural failures inside the tank. Distributed temperature sensors and pump-around mixing systems, and preventive measure of the density of the new cargo are used to prevent stratification inside the tanks. Vapor clouds - As LNG leaves a temperature-controlled container, it begins to warm up, returning the liquid to a gas. Initially, the gas is colder and heavier than the surrounding air. It creates a fog a vapor cloud above the released liquid. As the gas warms up, it mixes with the surrounding air and begins to disperse. The vapor cloud will only ignite if it encounters an ignition source while concentrated within its flammability range, according to FOSS (2003). Pollution - LNG spills will cause minimal pollution. LNG is neither toxic nor persistent. In a LNG spill scenario, the released LNG will vaporize and either disperse into the atmosphere or, in some special circumstances, ignite and burn until there are no LNG left, according to IMO (2007).

4. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers are considered among the safest ships in navigation, and this reputation is due to be carefully designed, constructed, well maintained, managed and operated with focus on safety in all aspects. For these reasons, fatal accidents or accidents involving large accidental discharges did not occur in the last 30 years in LNG shipping LNG ships are well designed and maintained, which reduces the chances and severity of incidents. LNG safety measures prevent breaching of cargo tanks and involvement of multiple tanks in accidents. There has never been a spill from a ship into the water from either a collision or grounding, according to OSTVIK et al. (2005). According to PARFOMAK (2003), LNG carriers are less prone to accidental spills than typical tankers because they more robust and because of the double-hulled design. LNG carriers are purpose-built tank vessels for transporting LNG at sea. All types of LNG carriers are doublehull vessels, but there exist different cargo containment systems of independent or integrated cargo tanks. The current LNG fleet is dominated by two main types of vessel designs, i.e. the membrane tank designs and the spherical tank designs. In membrane tank designs, the cargo containment system consists of a very thin invar or stainless steel doublewalled, insulated cargo envelope that is structurally supported by the ships hull. The spherical tank carriers, also referred to as Moss tankers, have spherical aluminum tanks or prismatic-shaped stainless steel tanks that are self-support supporting within the ships hull. These tanks are insulated externally, according to VANEM et al (2008). LNG ships may represent a remarkable risk source, especially when approaching a land terminal, not only due to the possible occurrence of maritime accident, but also since they may represent a suitable target for terrorist attacks, according to BUBBICO et al. (2009). The LNG transport chain is under considerable change with an expectance to double in size in a decade, by the increasing of buildings, and building of larger ships, with the use of new alternative propulsion systems, the new trade routes and operations (offshore production of LNG). There will possibly have a lack of qualified and well trained crew in the near future. This development in the LNG industry could bring an increase in the level of risk in the near future.

5. Spill modeling and calculation method

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Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 According to AIChE (1999), for the modeling the spill of volatile products such as LNG it has to determinate the appropriate scenario. This scenario consider the spillage or leakage source, material discharge phase, thermodynamic path and endpoint, hole size, leak duration, and other issues. In the case of LNG carriers leakage, it is adopted the model of the liquid spillage onto water, formation of boiling pool and subsequent formation of an evaporating cloud. The environment data of ambient that the leakage occurs such as the location, magnitude and duration of the concentrations of gas and air (within the limits of flammability) are important parameters to the dispersion of gases and vapors. According to AIChE (1999), for the description of an event and its consequences, proposes the following procedure, involving the steps: description of the scenarios, definition of input parameters, the source model, definition of the vapor dispersion model and models of concentration of gas / air. The calculation method that is used in the computational program of DNV PHAST RISK, considered the following steps: scenario screening: LNG spill, forming an LNG pool, spreading of the pool and simultaneous and subsequently formation of vapor cloud. The DNV PHAST program and the models from AIChE, TNO consider the same input parameters for the evaluation of the consequences. The properties of the environment (stability condition), the quantity or mass of the source, surface roughness and obstructions and as output we have the distances of the impacts. In the following items there is a brief description of the calculation methodology. 5.1. Scenario Screening In the case of LNG leakage or spillage the most likely scenario is the discharge of cryogenic liquid, forming a pool and vapor formation. There would also be a formation of vapor from the continuous liquid flowing through the hole of the ship tank ship. Estimation of the flow turns necessary to evaluate the spreading of the pool formed. Energy released due to a collision is sufficient as an ignition source when a catastrophic leak (with large amount of LNG are discharged). However, the vapor must be LNG with the concentration inside the limits of flammability, according to HIGHTOWER (2004). The properties of the environment in which the event occurs, are also important input parameters: air temperature, wind velocity, humidity, stability conditions, height of the mixture air / gas, sunlight, temperature of the water where the leakage / spill occurs. The surface roughness must also be considered, as well as obstructions and change the building height of the terrain. 5.2. Source Model The model used is the catastrophic rupture of the tank and all the contents released are considered, according to AIChE (1999). In this model, there is a pool formation and spreading. 5.3. Cloud Vapor Dispersion Model Input parameters for the model are: the form (jet, dense gas, gas floating, neutral gas, or passive), the thermodynamic parameters (heat exchange with the environment, condensation and vaporization, heat exchanges due to chemical reactions). 5.4. Input Parameters For any adopted models, data material, the types of emission sources, meteorological conditions, characteristics of the site and the data in range of locations must be predetermined in order to ensure conservative results According to CARSON AND MUNFORD (2002), LNG is predominantly methane. Methane has boiling point at minus 162C, the critical temperature is minus 82C, the density at boiling point is 424 kg/m3, its ignition temperature is 537C and has flammable limits from 5% to 15%. 5.5. Local Parameters The characteristics of the area and location of the vessel and positions of buildings, roads and living areas shall be included in data analysis. The surface roughness influences the intensity of the turbulence of the air. The existence of containment barriers such as dams, their size and characteristics of the spill are additional parameters to the model. Meteorological data are important input parameters usually obtained from weather historical database. The class of stability can be identified from the data (stability classes Pasquil-Gifford A,B,C,D,E,F), and are input parameters for computational programs. According to LUKETA-HANLIN (2006), the LNG vapor heavier than air will float near the surface resulting in a flat cloud near water. As the temperature increase the LNG vapor become lighter than air and dissipate into the environment. According to AIChE (1996), the geometry of the source depends on the geometry and dimensions of the tanks either the characteristics of the hole as major size (catastrophic spill) or minor (continuous jet discharge). The location above or below the surface where the spill occurs is also an important factor.

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6. Consequence Analysis Results

The effect distance of the impacts depends on regional atmospheric characteristics. Atmospheric stability makes the distances of the impacts greater the lower the turbulence. The most catastrophic scenario is the flash fire in a cloud bounded by the Lower Flammability Limit (conservatively considered to be half of this value), according to DNV PHAST RISK 6.54 (2009). The effect distance of the impacts of fire resulting from spills of a LNG ship refers to the extent of radiation heat of the pool fire until 5kW/m2 and scope of LNG vapor clouds, within the limit of Lower Flammability Limit of 5%. These are results of computer programs such as the DNV PHAST RISK, commercially available, adopted and experimentally validated. For the event the effects will involve the crew of the vessels and the property within the effect distance. The average emissive power of the burnt LNG is 220 kW/m2 according to CABRILLO PORT (2006) while 5kW/m2 can cause second degree burns in 30 seconds of exposure according to ABS Consulting (2004). A second degree burn is characterized by the formation of blisters (vesication) in the skin, in accordance with WELL, GEOFF (1997). Considering a collision of vessels, and the size of breaches and the cascade events, according to HIGHTOWER SANDIA (2004), can lead to the rupture of two full tanks of the LNG tanker (in this work a total of 52,000m3 of a 138.000 m3 LNG tanker) result in Flash Fire effect distances and late Pool Fire effect as follows in figure 1 and 2. As a simplification for the entry data in the software DNV-PHAST RISK used for this analysis, it was assumed that the LNG is composed only of Methane. The assumed weather and atmospheric conditions are atmospheric pressure (1atm), average air temperature of 25oC, wind speed of 10 m/s. It was considered a stability condition Pasquil-Guifford C (slightly unstable 10 m/s) during the day (Dia, Figure 2) and Pasquil D (neutral 10 m/s) during the night (Noite, Figure 2).

Figure 1. Pool Fire effect distances (two tanks rupture) For two tanks the late Pool Fire effect distance are about 3,400m as seen in figure 1 and the Flash Fire Effect distance are about 3,650m. For two tanks rupture, the Flash Fire effects, for events occurring during the day, the effects distances vary from 1,950m (LFL) to 2,550m (LFL) and for events ocurring in the night from 2,600m (LFL) to 3,650m (LFL) as seen in Figure 2. This variation overnight depends on the weather stability. During the night, due to the winds, the clouds disperse slowly and can reach greater distances. The LFL conducts to a conservative value for dispersion zones around terminals and is recommended from the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) Reference Standard NFPA 59A, according to PARFOMAK (2007). The consequences as pool fire and flash fire are shown as the effect distances. Inside these boundaries undesirable events will occur to people and property. Preventive measures have to be adopted to avoid the occurrence of the event, and if the undesirable event happens mitigation measures should be considered. 6

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 Considering the effect distances, the harbor or terminal must be in a safe distance from populated or industrial areas. The cascade events adopted (two tanks) consider the breach caused by a deliberated attack or intentional collision. HIGHTOWER (2004). The consequence of the events affecting the vessel affects a minimum of 40 persons in the LNG tanker. Preventing measures, reliable and automatizated systems of prevention and trained personnel of this industry contribute to assure proper safety in the operations related to LNG. The effects of thermal radiation from the fires for the population in the coast region will depend on the affected area within the effect distance.

Figure 2. Flash Fire effect distances (two tanks rupture)

7. Preventive, Mitigation Measures and rules

There are rules when a LNG carrier is approaching the terminal as a preventive measure for collision or terrorist attack. According to TRANSPETRO (2008), all ship operations at the flexible LNG terminal must comply with the recommendations by the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT), the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), the Marine Terminal Baseline Criteria and Assessment Questionnaire, and the International Conventions of IMO. According to MARINHA DO BRASIL (2006, 2012) the estimate time arrival (ETA) must be provided 48 hours before, estimated time berthing (ETB) and ship information. The passenger traffic must not cross the ship from afterwards. The LNG carrier arrival can only be done during the day, and will be escorted by two tugs with appropriated Bollard Pull (80 ton), and a third one in the berthing time. Security exclusion zone around the LNG carrier of 600m and no traffic admitted. The pilotage service of the Port will inform in order to exclude the maritime traffic in the channel. The speed of the vessel must not be over 8 knots, the wind speed less than 20 knots and wave height less than 1 meter. There must be an exclusion zone of 600m around the vessel and ISPS Code, a firefighting vessel (mitigation measure) and a tug 24 hours a day nearby, pilotage crew in shift schedule, in case of emergency. According to HIGHTOWER (2004), deliberate acts can often produce greater consequences than accidental mechanisms because the perpetrator can maximize the effects of an attack by choosing the time and place. In fact, the perpetrator might coordinate several, simultaneous attacks, thus compounding the consequences. Consequences can include local, cascading, and delayed effects. All these effects must be considered in developing an overall risk reduction and risk management approach. 7.1. Preventive Measures that are adopted for the handling of LNG: LNG ships/carriers and LNG terminals for loading/unloading must be located in remote locations as far as possible from populated or industrial areas. The processes of LNG loading/unloading must comply with strict rules due to the inherent danger due to the risk of fire, explosion and cryogenic hazards according to the strict rules and procedures 7

Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 for transferring, loading and unloading according to The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Ltd. SIGTTO (2000, 2004). According to TRANSPETRO (2008), safety procedures should be followed for the LNG transfer. The following steps must be conducted, following the operational process of transfer, prior to arrival, vessels that do not meet safety conditions are removed from the terminal. The estimated time of arrival (ETA) of the LNG carrier should be notified with 72, 48, 24 and 4 hours in advance. Following the approach procedure and the ship docks and mooring lines are checked. Weather conditions must be in accordance for the process of unloading. Security procedures for the landing of the crew must be followed and special clothing is required. Before the transfer of cargo, electrical grounding is checked, the connections of the electronic sensors are also connected and the vapor return is the first arm being connected. A check of procedures ("checklist") should be checked and filled. Prohibitions on maintenance procedures of various items of the vessel while unloading, prohibition of unauthorized small boats in the vicinity, do not permit moving propellers of ships anchored nearby, and appropriate responsibility for the consequences. The transfer rate is monitored and recorded as though pressures and temperatures during the process of charge transfer, hour after hour. It is not allowed to carry out repairs or maintenance of any order, because it involves the risk of producing sparks or other ignition sources. The interruption of the process of loading or unloading can occur in case of any dangerous situation for both the ship and for the terminal, or in case of non-compliance with rules and regulations regarding security procedures internationally accepted and adopted in shipping. In emergency situations, the terminal can disrupt operations focusing on the use of all its resources to mitigate an accident. 7.2. Threat Mitigation, safeguards for LNG facilities and ships in approaching. According to CABRILO PORT (2006), safeguards, security plans and protective actions should be adopted to mitigate threats, like as: - Research on employees antecedents of employees (temporary and permanent), service and maintenance staff and operators to access the terminal; - Inspection (inspection or search) physics to all individuals who are admitted to the vessel; - Access restricted and monitored from sensitive areas; - Training of the crew of the vessel and officials responsible for security in care and prevention. - Establish forwardness safety reactions on board and with the support staff on the port; - Planning and coordination exercises with the Marine Police and Fire Services, with responsibility agreements for each of the agencies involved; - Ensure constant inspection of the tugboat and the terminal in order to avoid the introduction of explosive charges; - Monitoring of communications security. 7.3. Threat Mitigation, protective action for LNG Protective actions to mitigate the threats may be: - Establishment of exclusion areas and the area to be avoided; - Use of communication networks internationally known for notifying vessels of any maintenance or construction activities, the location of these and what duration of activity. These vessels are instructed to call the vessel periodically. - Tugs nearby for possible dangers of collision with any vessel approaching without warning would be intercepted by tugs. - Use of monitoring uninterrupted 24 hours, such as radar, sonar and visual observation; - Establish procedures to prevent the intrusion of small boats; - Conduct periodic exercises of emergency fire, discharge of products, accidents, and terrorist incidents.

7.4. Threat Mitigation, preventing systems for LNG About the prevention systems, the following shall be adopted: - Monitoring the airspace (radar and visual); - Restrict the helicopter landing area only for authorized use; - Installation of automatic protection and fire fighting (fire) systems with automatic shutdown; - System monitoring of discharges with an automatic shut off; - Additional protection of pipelines; - System of containment of vapors with water sprays curtains. - Containment System (prevent further spread of the pool).

8. Conclusion and recommendations for further work

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Rio Oil & Gas Expo and Conference 2012 The scenario (incident) depends on the probability of occurrence of equipment failures, in this case, depends also on the probability of occurrence of the cascading events of failure of many safety devices. The security actions must be adopted to avoid premeditated terrorist actions. There is an increased in the demand of LNG due to the use in thermal electrical power plants instead of using Nuclear Power in some countries; the use of LNG as fuel in ships, vessels, trucks and buses; seasonal thermal electrical power plants. The future embarked LNG production trains on the Floating Production and Storage Offloading vessels will also contribute to the increase of the LNG maritime transportation increasing the probability of undesirable events. Safety measures up to now adopted must be strictly well used.

9. Acknowledgements
This work was developed as part of a Project sponsored by Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute (IBP) whose support the author gratefully wishes to acknowledge.

10. References
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