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I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)

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Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856


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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks create numerous
fundamental coordination problems. For example, in a
number of application domains including homeland security,
environmental monitoring and surveillance for military
operations, a networks ability to efficiently manage power
consumption is extremely critical as direct user intervention
after initial deployment is severely limited. In these settings,
limited battery life gives rise to the basic coordination
problem of maintaining coverage while maximizing the
networks lifetime. In this paper we proposed game theory.
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method that describes
the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between
intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory
has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor
networks (WSNs).In this paper; we propose the game theory
in the analysis of resource management in wireless sensor
networks. The game theoretic scheme is proposed to study
power control in a multi-source transmitting to multiple
clusters in wireless sensor network. A game where each
sensor chooses its transmitting power independently to
achieve a target signal it is shown that the game has Nash
equilibrium and it is unique under certain constraints.
Numerical results are provided to show the effectiveness of
the proposed game considering distance-dependent
attenuation with various path loss exponents.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Game Theory,
Routing, Lifetime.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks is a new technology which is
used in a huge majority of applications. This network is a
graph which consists of a large number of sense nodes.
These nodes are able to gather the information and
process it and send it to the relevant destinations. The
sensors have some individual characteristics such as
small dimension and low power consumption. Because of
these characteristics, they could be used in different fields
such
as military, agricultural, industrial, and biomedical
applications [1]. Furthermore, they could easily be used in
different environments such as unreachable or dangerous
regions. Since there is no need to use a large amount of
wire and complicated configuration and installation for
these sensors in the network, we could use them with
lower cost in comparison with traditional networks.
Recently, some research efforts have focused on
establishing efficient routing paths for transmitting
packets from a sensor node to a destination in wireless
sensor networks [2]. Routing means finding the best
possible way for data transmission from source node to
the destination node in the network by considering
networks parameters (e.g. stability, consumed and
remained power, data transmission speed, and etc).
Network Lifetime is one of the important factors.
Shortening the route length can help reduce the
transmission overhead and delay time, as well as increase
the packet delivery ratio. Therefore, these networks must
be designed and used in a way to optimize the power
consumption and life time of the network. In this paper,
by using Game Theory approach for WSN, optimal route
in WSN is found. In this approach, routing and sensor
nodes are assumed to be the game and players
respectively. All players want to increase their benefit.
So we use a mixed strategy model as well as profit and
loss calculation for each player. In this model, the
destination node pays a recognition to the source node for
each data packet successfully reception. Moreover, the
source node pays a portion of this credit to each
intermediate node or relay node that participates in data
packet transaction. Furthermore, each node sustains a
cost for each data packet transaction to other node. This
cost is called Transmission Cost and related to different
parameters. Also each node transmits the received data
packet to the next hope with the probability, calculated by
the reliability of the node. This parameter is depending on
Maximizing Network Lifetime using Reliable
Energy Efficient Routing Protocol Based on
Non Cooperative Game Theory for Wireless
Sensor Networks
Chitra.S.M
1
, Vinoba.V
2
and Padmavathy.T.V
3


1
Research Scholar, Bharathidasan University,
TamilNadu, India,

2
K.N.Government Arts College,,
TamilNadu, India

3
R.M.K. college of Engineering and Technology,
TamilNadu,, Chennai

I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
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Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856


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several items, e.g. failure probability, sleep cycling, etc.

2. RELATED WORKS
There are some secure routing protocols for ad hoc
networks [3], [4], but because of the assumption of small
scale networks, large memory and high power they are
not suitable for WSNs. Some security protocols for
wireless sensor networks were also proposed. The authors
in [5], addressed secure communication in resource
constrained sensor networks by introducing two low-level
secure building blocks. The Security Protocols for Sensor
Networks (SPINS) consists of SNEP and TESLA. SNEP
provides confidentiality, authentication, and freshness
between nodes and the destination, and TESLA provides
authenticated broadcast. But disadvantage of SPINS
protocol is: route discovery depends on the detection of
authenticated beacons and node to node authentication by
the destination.
Secure Auction-based routing (SAR) was proposed in
[6], based on the concept of sealed auctioning. In this
case nodes of the sensor network are the players of the
game which compete with each other, to be a member in
the route and the amount of the bid that each bidder
suggests is the amount of utility it had achieved during
past plays. This idea is implemented on DSR protocol
although this protocol is not well suited for WSNs, and
the other drawback is that when a packet on a path does
not get to the destination, all the nodes on that path get
negative reputation, regardless of being malicious or
normal. Utility-based dynamic source routing (UDSR)
was proposed in [7]. It was based on a two player, non-
cooperative and non zero-sum game between attacker and
IDS residing at base station. It has the same two
weaknesses of SAR protocol, although the IDS can only
defend one cluster and the attacker can also attack only
one cluster at a time.
The authors in [8], [9], [10] proposed Game theory
which has been used in sensor networks, with
incentives for forwarding nodes and punishing
misbehaving nodes [11]. In the autonomous sensor
network using non cooperative game technique, Nash
Equilibrium is used to get optimal solutions of energy
conservation. Optimal probability of the two states is the
sleep and wakeup use in repeated games.

3. PROPOSED RELIABLE ENERGY
EFFICIENT ROUTING PROTOCOL
Due to the resource constraints, a sensor node in our
protocol does not need to have global information about
the network. The following sections explain the
mathematical model to prolong the network lifetime. In
the proposed work, since the nodes are static, all nodes
know their own locations before network initialization. In
the initialization stage of the network, each node sends its
own location information to its one hop neighbors.
Meanwhile, each node also receives all the location
information from all its one hop neighbors. When nodes
acquire their neighbor location information, they compute
the distance between themselves and the sink, and the
distance between every one hop neighbor and the sink.

4. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In the distributed sensor network the game equation has
to be found, with application of a game strategy. It is
assumed that all the nodes in the sensor network are the
same and that all nodes are in the interference range. The
activity of all the nodes is at the same level and it
increases with the increase of power level transmission.
In the non-cooperative game theory, it is assumed that
nodes are transmitting high power, because of a high
interference. Thus, the equilibrium game strategy has
been applied for control of non-cooperative behavior.
Powers levels of the nodes are the minimum transmit
power and the maximum transmit power.
Theorem 1: Every game with complete information
and a finite tree has atleast one equilibrium point.
Although not all finite n-person non-cooperative games
have pure strategy equilibria we can ask about the
situation if mixed strategies are permitted. His result,
which generalizes the Von Neumann mini-max theorem,
is the main objective of this section and certainly provides
one of the strongest arguments in favour of equilibrium
points as a solution concept for n person non-cooperative
games.
The mini-max principles say, minimizes the maximum
losses ie minimizes the number of node failure due lake of
energy threshold level. The maximum losses with respect
to different alternatives of player B(node2), irrespective of
player As (node1) alternatives, are obtained first. The
minimum of these maximum losses is known as the mini-
max value and the corresponding alternative is called as
Mini-Max strategy.
Let index set I be the set of nodes. For an n person
game { } n I ,..... 3 , 2 , 1 = . Let
i
x be an arbitrary mixed
strategy for the
th
i player, and the probability of
distribution of set
i
S of that players pure strategies. The
probability assigned by
i
x to some
i i
S e is denoted
by ) (
i i
x . Since the game is non-cooperative, the
mixed strategies of all players ) ,..... 3 , 2 , 1 ( n , viewed as
probability distributions are jointly independent. The
probability ) ( x of arriving at the pure strategy n - tuple
is ( )
n
....., , ,
2 1
= ,
i i
S e is assumed to
be ( ) ( ) ( )
n n
x x x x ....... ) (
2 2 1 1
= . In terms of pure
strategies the payoff to player i is given by
i
P ,
where R xS x S S P
n i
= ..... :
1
, that is
i
P is a function
which maps each S
n
e = ) ,...... (
1
to a real
I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
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number. If mixed strategies I i x
i
e , are used the payoff
will be the statistical expectation of
i
P with respect to the
distribution ( ) x , namely,
( ) ( ) ( )

x P x x x P
S
i n i
e
= ,.... ,
2 1

( ) ( ) ( )
[
= e e
=
n
j
j j
S
n i n i
x P x x P
n n
1
1 1
1 1
,......, ...... ,....,


(1)
It is convenient to introduce the following notation:
For the strategy n tuple ) ,..... (
1 n
x x x = then this can be
written as, ) ........ , , ,.... (
1
'
1 1
'
n i i i i
x x x x x x x
+
= . This
means that the player i has in x replaced the strategy
i
x by
'
i
x . Now equation (1) can be written as,
( ) ( ) ( )
j
n
j j
j
S S S S
i i i
x P x P
i i i i n n


[
= = e e e e
= =
=
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
....... ...... .....
(2)
Definitions:
Anon-cooperative game { } { } ) ( = I
e e I i i I i i
P X , I, , in
which the sets of players is I , the set of strategies for
player i is
i
X and the payoff to player i is given by
R X P
I i
i i

[
e
: , Here the sets
i
X could be taken to be
sets of pure or mixed strategies. If the
i
X to consist of
mixed strategies then I is called the mixed extension of
the original pure strategies. A mixed strategy n - tuple
( ) , , ,.....
1 i i n
X x x x x e = is an equilibrium point of an
n person non-cooperative game I if for each
, 1 , n i i s s and
i i
X x e
'
, ( ) ( ) x P x x P
i i i
s
'
.
Theorem 2: A mixed strategy n -tuple ( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= is
an equilibrium point of a finite game I if and only if for
each player index , i ( ) ( ) x P x P
i i i
s (3)
for every pure strategy.

Theorem3: For any mixed strategy n -tuple
( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= each player , 1 , n i i s s possesses a
pure strategy
k
i
such that ( ) 0 >
k
i i
x and
( ) ( ) x P x P
i
k
i i
s . (4)

5. LIFETIME EXTENSION FOR NASH
EQUILIBRIUM
In game theory, players are picking their own strategies
simultaneously. Any finite n person non-cooperative
game I has at least one mixed strategy equilibrium
point. By using Nash equilibrium condition every player
tries to maximize their utility. In the game theory no
player is getting benefit by changing their strategy until
other player changes their strategy. The set of strategy
and the corresponding utilities is a foundation of Nash
equilibrium. Every player should show their best response
of their strategy, which results in Nash Equilibrium.
Let us consider non-cooperative n person game in which
each player or each node I i e has exactly two pure
strategies, either 1 =
i
(node1) or 2 =
i
. The payoff
is,
( ) ( ) ( ) I i P
i j
j i i n i
e =
[
=
, , 1 ) ,..... (
1
(5)
Where is the kronecker given by
( )

=
=
otherwise
if
j i
j i
0
, 1
,

(6)
If node i uses a mixed strategy in which pure strategy 1 is
chosen with probability ) ( I i p
i
e , then
1
1
2 1
1

+
=
n
i
p ,
I i e and for 3 , 2 = n this is the only equilibrium
point.
Proof: For node1, if , 1
1
= then
1
P = 0 unless
, 2 ......
2
= = =
n
in which case . 1
1
= P If , 2
1
=
then
1
P = 0 unless , 1 ......
2
= = =
n
in which case
2
1
= P similarly for other players also. Consider now the
mixed strategy n -tuple ( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= , where
) 1 , (
i i i
p p x = for n i s s 1 and
i
p is the probability
of choosing 1 =
i
.
From the above observation we obtain,
[ [
= =
+ =
1 1
) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) (
j
j j
j
i i i
p p p p x P (7)
Also
( ) 1 ) 1 (
1
= =
[
=
i
j
i i i
if p x P (8)
( ) 2 2
1
= =
[
=
i
j
j i i
if p x P (9)

According to theorem 2, A mixed strategy n tuple
( )
n
x x x ,.....
1
= is an equilibrium point of a finite game
I if and only if for each player index i ,
( ) ( ) x P x P
i i i
s for every pure strategy
i i
S e .
x is an equilibrium point iff
[ [ [
= = =
+ s
i j
j i
i j
j i
i j
j
p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( and
[ [ [
= = =
+ s
i j
j i
i j
j i
i j
j
p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 for every
I i e .
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Rearranging equation (1), then

[ [
= =
s
i j
j i
i j
j i
p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( this can be
simplified as,
[ [
= =
s
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( (10)
Similarly rearranging the (2) gives
) 1 ( ) 2 2 2 (
[ [
= =
s +
i j
j i
i j
j i
p p p p
) 1 ( 2
[ [
= =
s
i j
j
i j
j
p p (11)
From equation (3) and (4) it follows that x is an
equilibrium point if and only if,
[ [
= =
=
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( for every I i e (12)

For 3 2or n= the system of equation (5) has no solution
with any 1 0or p
i
= , but for 4 = n these are several such
solutions, for example . 0 , 1
3 2 4 1
= = = = p p p p If
5 > n , we can find the solutions with
0 , 1
3 2 4 1
= = = = p p p p , and the remaining
i
p n 4 arbitrary. To complete the analysis suppose
1 0 < <
i
p for every I i e .
Considering the equation (12) for , , l i k i = = where
then l k , =
[ [
= =
=
i j
j
i j
j
p p 2 ) 1 ( and
[ [
= =
s
l j
j
l j
j
p p 2 ) 1 (
Let
[ [
= =
j j
p B and p A ) 1 ( ,since
1 0 < <
i
p for all i
Then the expression can be written as
l l k k
p
B
p
A
p
B
p
A 2
1
,
2
1
=


Since 0 0 = = B and A , then
l k
p p = , but k and
l where arbitrary, so that every player or every node use
the same mixed strategy in x . Equation (12) can be
rewritten as ,
1 1
2 ) 1 (

=
n n
p p , by solving p can be calculated as,
p p
n 1
1
2 ) 1 (

=
) 2 1 ( 1
1
1

+ =
n
p
1
1
2 1
1

+
=
n
p (13)

6. LIFETIME EXTENSION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a non-cooperative game
lifetime extension algorithm. In order to implement the
algorithm, on the one hand, the node i receives the sum
of interference power ( )
[
e = =
n n
S
j
n
j j
j
x


1 1
and on the
other hand, the lifetime of sensor node increased by twice
according to the equation (9).When a node want to send
data message, it will search its information table and
compute its transmitting power according equation (2),
then send the power value to sink node, iterate this
process until reach Nash Equilibrium.

7. SIMULATION RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
The proposed algorithm has been simulated and validated
through simulation. The sensor nodes are deployed
randomly in a 100x100 meters square and sink node
deploy at the point of (50, 50), the maximum transmitting
radius of each node is 80m, other simulation parameters
are displayed in Table 1. In this section, we first discuss
utility factor and pricing factors influences on
transmitting power, then evaluate the algorithm of NGLE
algorithm and compare it with other existing algorithm.

Table1: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Value
Transmission Range 250 m
Network Area 100 x 100
Number of Sensors 50-100
Packet rate 5 pkt/sec
Packet size 50bytes
Radio Bandwidth 76kbps
Transmitting Power 75mW ( 270J)
Receiving Power 36mW (129.6J)
Power Consumption in Sleep
mode
100 W (0.36 J)
Sending and Receiving Slot 50msec
Type of mote Mica2
Inital energy of sensor node 2KJ
Energy Threshold E
thd
0.001mJ
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Network Lifetime
Number of Rounds
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

N
o
d
e
s

A
li
v
e

LEACH
LEACH-M
HEED
REER


Figure 1: Network Lifetime of Sensor Networks
I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)
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The network lifetime for each simulation is showed in
Figure 1. These curves are showing that lifetime of
network for various routing protocols after 500 rounds,
about 27% of nodes in the network are alive in the
proposed REER routing protocol, but 1%,5% and 7% of
nodes are alive in existing protocols LEACH, LEACH-M
and HEED respectively. So the network lifetime is
increasing about 73% with using of our model and
algorithm.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Average Delivery Delay
Transmission Rate (Packets/Second)
A
v
e
a
r
g
e

D
e
l
i
v
e
r
y

D
e
l
a
y
(
m
s
e
c
)



LEACH
LEACH-M
HEED
REER

Figure 2: Average Delivery Rate with various
Transmission Rate

Figure 2 shows the average delivery delay with increasing
transmission rate. The average delivery delay means the
average time delay between the instant the source sends a
packet and moment the destination receives this packet.
When the transmission rate is 1 packet per second, we
can see that the average delivery delay of LEACH,
LEACH-M is lower than the proposed REER protocol
and HEED. This is because LEACH is always tries to
discover a high speed path for forwarding packets. Since
the transmission rate increases, the average delivery delay
of LEACH increases significantly. This is because
congestions occur at the intermediate nodes in LEACH.
In the proposed protocol, when the packets reaches at
destination, the relay or intermediate nodes have a lower
forwarding probability than normal nodes by using
multiple strategy. In the forwarding node selection game,
the probability that a great amount of packets are
forwarded by the same node is relatively low. Thus, the
average delivery delay of our protocol does not
significantly increase with an increase in transmission
rate.
Figure 3 shows the energy consumption of the four
protocols. For LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED protocols,
the source always selects the node closest to the
destination in the neighbor set. However, normally the
closest node is the local superior decision, not the global
optimal decision. This has been proven by lemma 2. For
our protocol, in the forwarding node selection game, if
some node has a lesser angle with the line formed by
source and destination, it has the high probability to be
the forwarding node. Thus, the proposed REER protocol
consumes less node energy for transmitting data between
the nodes.












Figure 3: Energy Consumption with various
Transmission Rate













Figure 4: Packet Delivery Ratio with various
Transmission Rate

Figure 4 shows the packet delivery ratio of proposed
protocol is compared with existing protocols. The plot
infers that the proposed REER protocol has better
performance than LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED. With
the increase of transmission rate, LEACH, LEACH-M
and HEED always forward packets along the relay nodes
by perimeter approach. This leads to a high probability of
packet congestion around the relay node. In REER
protocol, since the process of forwarding node selection is
a game process, the source has lower probability to make
the same candidate gain too much benefit from the game
process. This is the reason the packet delivery ratio of our
protocol does not significantly decrease with the increase
of transmission rate.

8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a game theory for extending
sensor network lifetime. In the process of network
initialization, we use the connectivity property of nodes to
determine the connectivity of nodes that can be forward
any packets to its neighbour nodes. This approach
improves the transmission success rate and decreases the
Energy Consumption
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
20 40 60 80 100
Transmission Rate (packets/Second)
E
n
e
r
g
y

C
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n

(
m
J
)
REER
HEED
LEACH-M
LEACH
Packet Delivery ratio
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
20 40 60 80 100
Transmission Rate (packets/Second)
P
a
c
k
e
t

D
e
l
i
v
e
r
y


r
a
t
i
o
(
%
)
REER
HEED
LEACH-M
LEACH
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transmission delays of packets. In the aspect of setting up
the routing path, we consider the residual energy. We
conclude the forwarding probability and payoff function
of forwarding participants. Finally, the Nash Equilibrium
exists when it is assume for minimum and maximum
threshold for channel condition and power level. By
using Non cooperative game theory the network lifetime
is extended, that is after 500 rounds 27% of node are alive
where as 1%,5% and 7% of nodes are alive in existing
protocols LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED respectively.
So the network lifetime is increasing about 73% with
using of our model and algorithm.
In our future, we plan to implement our algorithm in s
real application scenario to verify the effectiveness in the
real world. Also, in this paper, we assume that all nodes
are stationary. There are some application scenarios
where we need the nodes to be able to move. In such a
case, we will need to consider the nodes mobility in our
future work.

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