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Chitra.S.M, Vinoba.V
and Padmavathy.T.V

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3 Ansichten6 SeitenChitra.S.M, Vinoba.V
and Padmavathy.T.V

Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)

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Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856

Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 0

Abstract: Wireless sensor networks create numerous

fundamental coordination problems. For example, in a

number of application domains including homeland security,

environmental monitoring and surveillance for military

operations, a networks ability to efficiently manage power

consumption is extremely critical as direct user intervention

after initial deployment is severely limited. In these settings,

limited battery life gives rise to the basic coordination

problem of maintaining coverage while maximizing the

networks lifetime. In this paper we proposed game theory.

Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method that describes

the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between

intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory

has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor

networks (WSNs).In this paper; we propose the game theory

in the analysis of resource management in wireless sensor

networks. The game theoretic scheme is proposed to study

power control in a multi-source transmitting to multiple

clusters in wireless sensor network. A game where each

sensor chooses its transmitting power independently to

achieve a target signal it is shown that the game has Nash

equilibrium and it is unique under certain constraints.

Numerical results are provided to show the effectiveness of

the proposed game considering distance-dependent

attenuation with various path loss exponents.

Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks, Game Theory,

Routing, Lifetime.

1. INTRODUCTION

Wireless Sensor Networks is a new technology which is

used in a huge majority of applications. This network is a

graph which consists of a large number of sense nodes.

These nodes are able to gather the information and

process it and send it to the relevant destinations. The

sensors have some individual characteristics such as

small dimension and low power consumption. Because of

these characteristics, they could be used in different fields

such

as military, agricultural, industrial, and biomedical

applications [1]. Furthermore, they could easily be used in

different environments such as unreachable or dangerous

regions. Since there is no need to use a large amount of

wire and complicated configuration and installation for

these sensors in the network, we could use them with

lower cost in comparison with traditional networks.

Recently, some research efforts have focused on

establishing efficient routing paths for transmitting

packets from a sensor node to a destination in wireless

sensor networks [2]. Routing means finding the best

possible way for data transmission from source node to

the destination node in the network by considering

networks parameters (e.g. stability, consumed and

remained power, data transmission speed, and etc).

Network Lifetime is one of the important factors.

Shortening the route length can help reduce the

transmission overhead and delay time, as well as increase

the packet delivery ratio. Therefore, these networks must

be designed and used in a way to optimize the power

consumption and life time of the network. In this paper,

by using Game Theory approach for WSN, optimal route

in WSN is found. In this approach, routing and sensor

nodes are assumed to be the game and players

respectively. All players want to increase their benefit.

So we use a mixed strategy model as well as profit and

loss calculation for each player. In this model, the

destination node pays a recognition to the source node for

each data packet successfully reception. Moreover, the

source node pays a portion of this credit to each

intermediate node or relay node that participates in data

packet transaction. Furthermore, each node sustains a

cost for each data packet transaction to other node. This

cost is called Transmission Cost and related to different

parameters. Also each node transmits the received data

packet to the next hope with the probability, calculated by

the reliability of the node. This parameter is depending on

Maximizing Network Lifetime using Reliable

Energy Efficient Routing Protocol Based on

Non Cooperative Game Theory for Wireless

Sensor Networks

Chitra.S.M

1

, Vinoba.V

2

and Padmavathy.T.V

3

1

Research Scholar, Bharathidasan University,

TamilNadu, India,

2

K.N.Government Arts College,,

TamilNadu, India

3

R.M.K. college of Engineering and Technology,

TamilNadu,, Chennai

I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)

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Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856

Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 1

several items, e.g. failure probability, sleep cycling, etc.

2. RELATED WORKS

There are some secure routing protocols for ad hoc

networks [3], [4], but because of the assumption of small

scale networks, large memory and high power they are

not suitable for WSNs. Some security protocols for

wireless sensor networks were also proposed. The authors

in [5], addressed secure communication in resource

constrained sensor networks by introducing two low-level

secure building blocks. The Security Protocols for Sensor

Networks (SPINS) consists of SNEP and TESLA. SNEP

provides confidentiality, authentication, and freshness

between nodes and the destination, and TESLA provides

authenticated broadcast. But disadvantage of SPINS

protocol is: route discovery depends on the detection of

authenticated beacons and node to node authentication by

the destination.

Secure Auction-based routing (SAR) was proposed in

[6], based on the concept of sealed auctioning. In this

case nodes of the sensor network are the players of the

game which compete with each other, to be a member in

the route and the amount of the bid that each bidder

suggests is the amount of utility it had achieved during

past plays. This idea is implemented on DSR protocol

although this protocol is not well suited for WSNs, and

the other drawback is that when a packet on a path does

not get to the destination, all the nodes on that path get

negative reputation, regardless of being malicious or

normal. Utility-based dynamic source routing (UDSR)

was proposed in [7]. It was based on a two player, non-

cooperative and non zero-sum game between attacker and

IDS residing at base station. It has the same two

weaknesses of SAR protocol, although the IDS can only

defend one cluster and the attacker can also attack only

one cluster at a time.

The authors in [8], [9], [10] proposed Game theory

which has been used in sensor networks, with

incentives for forwarding nodes and punishing

misbehaving nodes [11]. In the autonomous sensor

network using non cooperative game technique, Nash

Equilibrium is used to get optimal solutions of energy

conservation. Optimal probability of the two states is the

sleep and wakeup use in repeated games.

3. PROPOSED RELIABLE ENERGY

EFFICIENT ROUTING PROTOCOL

Due to the resource constraints, a sensor node in our

protocol does not need to have global information about

the network. The following sections explain the

mathematical model to prolong the network lifetime. In

the proposed work, since the nodes are static, all nodes

know their own locations before network initialization. In

the initialization stage of the network, each node sends its

own location information to its one hop neighbors.

Meanwhile, each node also receives all the location

information from all its one hop neighbors. When nodes

acquire their neighbor location information, they compute

the distance between themselves and the sink, and the

distance between every one hop neighbor and the sink.

4. MATHEMATICAL MODEL

In the distributed sensor network the game equation has

to be found, with application of a game strategy. It is

assumed that all the nodes in the sensor network are the

same and that all nodes are in the interference range. The

activity of all the nodes is at the same level and it

increases with the increase of power level transmission.

In the non-cooperative game theory, it is assumed that

nodes are transmitting high power, because of a high

interference. Thus, the equilibrium game strategy has

been applied for control of non-cooperative behavior.

Powers levels of the nodes are the minimum transmit

power and the maximum transmit power.

Theorem 1: Every game with complete information

and a finite tree has atleast one equilibrium point.

Although not all finite n-person non-cooperative games

have pure strategy equilibria we can ask about the

situation if mixed strategies are permitted. His result,

which generalizes the Von Neumann mini-max theorem,

is the main objective of this section and certainly provides

one of the strongest arguments in favour of equilibrium

points as a solution concept for n person non-cooperative

games.

The mini-max principles say, minimizes the maximum

losses ie minimizes the number of node failure due lake of

energy threshold level. The maximum losses with respect

to different alternatives of player B(node2), irrespective of

player As (node1) alternatives, are obtained first. The

minimum of these maximum losses is known as the mini-

max value and the corresponding alternative is called as

Mini-Max strategy.

Let index set I be the set of nodes. For an n person

game { } n I ,..... 3 , 2 , 1 = . Let

i

x be an arbitrary mixed

strategy for the

th

i player, and the probability of

distribution of set

i

S of that players pure strategies. The

probability assigned by

i

x to some

i i

S e is denoted

by ) (

i i

x . Since the game is non-cooperative, the

mixed strategies of all players ) ,..... 3 , 2 , 1 ( n , viewed as

probability distributions are jointly independent. The

probability ) ( x of arriving at the pure strategy n - tuple

is ( )

n

....., , ,

2 1

= ,

i i

S e is assumed to

be ( ) ( ) ( )

n n

x x x x ....... ) (

2 2 1 1

= . In terms of pure

strategies the payoff to player i is given by

i

P ,

where R xS x S S P

n i

= ..... :

1

, that is

i

P is a function

which maps each S

n

e = ) ,...... (

1

to a real

I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)

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Volume 1, Issue 2, July August 2012 ISSN 2278-6856

Vol ume 1 , I ssue 2 Jul y-August 2 0 1 2 Page 2 1 2

number. If mixed strategies I i x

i

e , are used the payoff

will be the statistical expectation of

i

P with respect to the

distribution ( ) x , namely,

( ) ( ) ( )

x P x x x P

S

i n i

e

= ,.... ,

2 1

( ) ( ) ( )

[

= e e

=

n

j

j j

S

n i n i

x P x x P

n n

1

1 1

1 1

,......, ...... ,....,

(1)

It is convenient to introduce the following notation:

For the strategy n tuple ) ,..... (

1 n

x x x = then this can be

written as, ) ........ , , ,.... (

1

'

1 1

'

n i i i i

x x x x x x x

+

= . This

means that the player i has in x replaced the strategy

i

x by

'

i

x . Now equation (1) can be written as,

( ) ( ) ( )

j

n

j j

j

S S S S

i i i

x P x P

i i i i n n

[

= = e e e e

= =

=

1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1

....... ...... .....

(2)

Definitions:

Anon-cooperative game { } { } ) ( = I

e e I i i I i i

P X , I, , in

which the sets of players is I , the set of strategies for

player i is

i

X and the payoff to player i is given by

R X P

I i

i i

[

e

: , Here the sets

i

X could be taken to be

sets of pure or mixed strategies. If the

i

X to consist of

mixed strategies then I is called the mixed extension of

the original pure strategies. A mixed strategy n - tuple

( ) , , ,.....

1 i i n

X x x x x e = is an equilibrium point of an

n person non-cooperative game I if for each

, 1 , n i i s s and

i i

X x e

'

, ( ) ( ) x P x x P

i i i

s

'

.

Theorem 2: A mixed strategy n -tuple ( )

n

x x x ,.....

1

= is

an equilibrium point of a finite game I if and only if for

each player index , i ( ) ( ) x P x P

i i i

s (3)

for every pure strategy.

Theorem3: For any mixed strategy n -tuple

( )

n

x x x ,.....

1

= each player , 1 , n i i s s possesses a

pure strategy

k

i

such that ( ) 0 >

k

i i

x and

( ) ( ) x P x P

i

k

i i

s . (4)

5. LIFETIME EXTENSION FOR NASH

EQUILIBRIUM

In game theory, players are picking their own strategies

simultaneously. Any finite n person non-cooperative

game I has at least one mixed strategy equilibrium

point. By using Nash equilibrium condition every player

tries to maximize their utility. In the game theory no

player is getting benefit by changing their strategy until

other player changes their strategy. The set of strategy

and the corresponding utilities is a foundation of Nash

equilibrium. Every player should show their best response

of their strategy, which results in Nash Equilibrium.

Let us consider non-cooperative n person game in which

each player or each node I i e has exactly two pure

strategies, either 1 =

i

(node1) or 2 =

i

. The payoff

is,

( ) ( ) ( ) I i P

i j

j i i n i

e =

[

=

, , 1 ) ,..... (

1

(5)

Where is the kronecker given by

( )

=

=

otherwise

if

j i

j i

0

, 1

,

(6)

If node i uses a mixed strategy in which pure strategy 1 is

chosen with probability ) ( I i p

i

e , then

1

1

2 1

1

+

=

n

i

p ,

I i e and for 3 , 2 = n this is the only equilibrium

point.

Proof: For node1, if , 1

1

= then

1

P = 0 unless

, 2 ......

2

= = =

n

in which case . 1

1

= P If , 2

1

=

then

1

P = 0 unless , 1 ......

2

= = =

n

in which case

2

1

= P similarly for other players also. Consider now the

mixed strategy n -tuple ( )

n

x x x ,.....

1

= , where

) 1 , (

i i i

p p x = for n i s s 1 and

i

p is the probability

of choosing 1 =

i

.

From the above observation we obtain,

[ [

= =

+ =

1 1

) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) (

j

j j

j

i i i

p p p p x P (7)

Also

( ) 1 ) 1 (

1

= =

[

=

i

j

i i i

if p x P (8)

( ) 2 2

1

= =

[

=

i

j

j i i

if p x P (9)

According to theorem 2, A mixed strategy n tuple

( )

n

x x x ,.....

1

= is an equilibrium point of a finite game

I if and only if for each player index i ,

( ) ( ) x P x P

i i i

s for every pure strategy

i i

S e .

x is an equilibrium point iff

[ [ [

= = =

+ s

i j

j i

i j

j i

i j

j

p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( and

[ [ [

= = =

+ s

i j

j i

i j

j i

i j

j

p p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2 for every

I i e .

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Rearranging equation (1), then

[ [

= =

s

i j

j i

i j

j i

p p p p ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( this can be

simplified as,

[ [

= =

s

i j

j

i j

j

p p 2 ) 1 ( (10)

Similarly rearranging the (2) gives

) 1 ( ) 2 2 2 (

[ [

= =

s +

i j

j i

i j

j i

p p p p

) 1 ( 2

[ [

= =

s

i j

j

i j

j

p p (11)

From equation (3) and (4) it follows that x is an

equilibrium point if and only if,

[ [

= =

=

i j

j

i j

j

p p 2 ) 1 ( for every I i e (12)

For 3 2or n= the system of equation (5) has no solution

with any 1 0or p

i

= , but for 4 = n these are several such

solutions, for example . 0 , 1

3 2 4 1

= = = = p p p p If

5 > n , we can find the solutions with

0 , 1

3 2 4 1

= = = = p p p p , and the remaining

i

p n 4 arbitrary. To complete the analysis suppose

1 0 < <

i

p for every I i e .

Considering the equation (12) for , , l i k i = = where

then l k , =

[ [

= =

=

i j

j

i j

j

p p 2 ) 1 ( and

[ [

= =

s

l j

j

l j

j

p p 2 ) 1 (

Let

[ [

= =

j j

p B and p A ) 1 ( ,since

1 0 < <

i

p for all i

Then the expression can be written as

l l k k

p

B

p

A

p

B

p

A 2

1

,

2

1

=

Since 0 0 = = B and A , then

l k

p p = , but k and

l where arbitrary, so that every player or every node use

the same mixed strategy in x . Equation (12) can be

rewritten as ,

1 1

2 ) 1 (

=

n n

p p , by solving p can be calculated as,

p p

n 1

1

2 ) 1 (

=

) 2 1 ( 1

1

1

+ =

n

p

1

1

2 1

1

+

=

n

p (13)

6. LIFETIME EXTENSION ALGORITHM

In this section, we propose a non-cooperative game

lifetime extension algorithm. In order to implement the

algorithm, on the one hand, the node i receives the sum

of interference power ( )

[

e = =

n n

S

j

n

j j

j

x

1 1

and on the

other hand, the lifetime of sensor node increased by twice

according to the equation (9).When a node want to send

data message, it will search its information table and

compute its transmitting power according equation (2),

then send the power value to sink node, iterate this

process until reach Nash Equilibrium.

7. SIMULATION RESULTS AND

DISCUSSION

The proposed algorithm has been simulated and validated

through simulation. The sensor nodes are deployed

randomly in a 100x100 meters square and sink node

deploy at the point of (50, 50), the maximum transmitting

radius of each node is 80m, other simulation parameters

are displayed in Table 1. In this section, we first discuss

utility factor and pricing factors influences on

transmitting power, then evaluate the algorithm of NGLE

algorithm and compare it with other existing algorithm.

Table1: Simulation Parameters

Parameters Value

Transmission Range 250 m

Network Area 100 x 100

Number of Sensors 50-100

Packet rate 5 pkt/sec

Packet size 50bytes

Radio Bandwidth 76kbps

Transmitting Power 75mW ( 270J)

Receiving Power 36mW (129.6J)

Power Consumption in Sleep

mode

100 W (0.36 J)

Sending and Receiving Slot 50msec

Type of mote Mica2

Inital energy of sensor node 2KJ

Energy Threshold E

thd

0.001mJ

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Network Lifetime

Number of Rounds

N

u

m

b

e

r

o

f

N

o

d

e

s

A

li

v

e

LEACH

LEACH-M

HEED

REER

Figure 1: Network Lifetime of Sensor Networks

I nt ernat i onal Journal of E mergi ng Trends & Technol ogy i n Comput er Sci ence (I JE TTCS)

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The network lifetime for each simulation is showed in

Figure 1. These curves are showing that lifetime of

network for various routing protocols after 500 rounds,

about 27% of nodes in the network are alive in the

proposed REER routing protocol, but 1%,5% and 7% of

nodes are alive in existing protocols LEACH, LEACH-M

and HEED respectively. So the network lifetime is

increasing about 73% with using of our model and

algorithm.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Average Delivery Delay

Transmission Rate (Packets/Second)

A

v

e

a

r

g

e

D

e

l

i

v

e

r

y

D

e

l

a

y

(

m

s

e

c

)

LEACH

LEACH-M

HEED

REER

Figure 2: Average Delivery Rate with various

Transmission Rate

Figure 2 shows the average delivery delay with increasing

transmission rate. The average delivery delay means the

average time delay between the instant the source sends a

packet and moment the destination receives this packet.

When the transmission rate is 1 packet per second, we

can see that the average delivery delay of LEACH,

LEACH-M is lower than the proposed REER protocol

and HEED. This is because LEACH is always tries to

discover a high speed path for forwarding packets. Since

the transmission rate increases, the average delivery delay

of LEACH increases significantly. This is because

congestions occur at the intermediate nodes in LEACH.

In the proposed protocol, when the packets reaches at

destination, the relay or intermediate nodes have a lower

forwarding probability than normal nodes by using

multiple strategy. In the forwarding node selection game,

the probability that a great amount of packets are

forwarded by the same node is relatively low. Thus, the

average delivery delay of our protocol does not

significantly increase with an increase in transmission

rate.

Figure 3 shows the energy consumption of the four

protocols. For LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED protocols,

the source always selects the node closest to the

destination in the neighbor set. However, normally the

closest node is the local superior decision, not the global

optimal decision. This has been proven by lemma 2. For

our protocol, in the forwarding node selection game, if

some node has a lesser angle with the line formed by

source and destination, it has the high probability to be

the forwarding node. Thus, the proposed REER protocol

consumes less node energy for transmitting data between

the nodes.

Figure 3: Energy Consumption with various

Transmission Rate

Figure 4: Packet Delivery Ratio with various

Transmission Rate

Figure 4 shows the packet delivery ratio of proposed

protocol is compared with existing protocols. The plot

infers that the proposed REER protocol has better

performance than LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED. With

the increase of transmission rate, LEACH, LEACH-M

and HEED always forward packets along the relay nodes

by perimeter approach. This leads to a high probability of

packet congestion around the relay node. In REER

protocol, since the process of forwarding node selection is

a game process, the source has lower probability to make

the same candidate gain too much benefit from the game

process. This is the reason the packet delivery ratio of our

protocol does not significantly decrease with the increase

of transmission rate.

8. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we introduce a game theory for extending

sensor network lifetime. In the process of network

initialization, we use the connectivity property of nodes to

determine the connectivity of nodes that can be forward

any packets to its neighbour nodes. This approach

improves the transmission success rate and decreases the

Energy Consumption

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

20 40 60 80 100

Transmission Rate (packets/Second)

E

n

e

r

g

y

C

o

n

s

u

m

p

t

i

o

n

(

m

J

)

REER

HEED

LEACH-M

LEACH

Packet Delivery ratio

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

20 40 60 80 100

Transmission Rate (packets/Second)

P

a

c

k

e

t

D

e

l

i

v

e

r

y

r

a

t

i

o

(

%

)

REER

HEED

LEACH-M

LEACH

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transmission delays of packets. In the aspect of setting up

the routing path, we consider the residual energy. We

conclude the forwarding probability and payoff function

of forwarding participants. Finally, the Nash Equilibrium

exists when it is assume for minimum and maximum

threshold for channel condition and power level. By

using Non cooperative game theory the network lifetime

is extended, that is after 500 rounds 27% of node are alive

where as 1%,5% and 7% of nodes are alive in existing

protocols LEACH, LEACH-M and HEED respectively.

So the network lifetime is increasing about 73% with

using of our model and algorithm.

In our future, we plan to implement our algorithm in s

real application scenario to verify the effectiveness in the

real world. Also, in this paper, we assume that all nodes

are stationary. There are some application scenarios

where we need the nodes to be able to move. In such a

case, we will need to consider the nodes mobility in our

future work.

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