N e w s ,

B U R M A ISSUES
A n a l y s i s & P e o p l e s
9

S t o r i e s

January 1 9 9 9

Volume 9 Number 1

"Development has been a weapon used time and again to eliminate opposition. It is a double edged knife. If you allow it, you and your people shall perish. If you don't, then you'll be accused of prohibiting progress and prosperity to the people. It's an old story to the rest of the world, but in Burma, it has only just begun." A Thai activist commenting on development projects in Burma, particularly the damming of the Upper Salween Basin in the Shan State.

Painting by Hay Blut Gay, age 12, of Huay Kaloke Refugee Camp

Burma Issues, the monthly

newsletter of Burma Issues, highlights current information related to the struggle for peace and justice in Burma, it is distributed internationally on a freesubscription basis to individuals and groups c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the s t a t e of affairs in Burma. P . O . Box 1 0 7 6 Silom Post O f f i c e Bangkok 1 0 5 0 4 , T h a i l a n d d u r h a m @ m o z a r t . i n e t . c o . th

INSIDE
IDPs: Silent Nights
SANCTIONS: Sanctions or Constructive Engagement: The Dilemma of the

International Community, Part 2

DEVELOPMENT:

Dammed if they Do, Dammed if they Don't What Others Have to Say About Burma

SOCIETY: The Current Situation in Irrawaddy Division

THE LAST W O R D :

INFORMATION

FOR A C T I O N

CAMPAIGNS

FOR P E A C E

GRASSROOTS

EDUCATION

A N D ORGANIZING

IDPs

SILENT
n the mid 1970s the Burma Army's "Four Cuts" strategy against ethnic insurgencies was driving an ever increasing number of rural people away from their village homes into the thick surrounding jungle in search of safety. This strategy was designed by the military to destroy ethnic armed insurgencies by preventing village peasants from providing the insurgents with food, information, new recruits and funds. To do this, the military enters villages, destroys all food stocks and forces the villagers to move to new location sites under complete control of the military. In these new relocation sites, life is not much better than slavery, so many villagers opt to flee info the jungle in order to avoid the military completely. With only a few household items packed in baskets carried on their backs, these internally displaced persons (IDPs) move constantly from jungle clearing to jungle clearing in hope of the chance for at least one night's sound sleep. It was on a Christmas Day during this time, that some Karen youth heard that a small group of IDPs had set up makeshift houses in a valley not far from their own KNU (Karen National Union) camp. They decided to make a visit to the villagers on this holiday and try to bring them some cheer. After several hours trekking through the thick jungle, the young KNU friends found the villagers sitting around a small fire preparing a meager meal of roots and leaves scavenged from the surrounding hills. Their houses consisted of simple bamboo frames covered with leaves. These improvised huts and the villagers' ragged clothes did little to keep out the cold and damp winter winds blowing down from the surrounding mountains. The youth first shared some food rations with the villagers and then began singing the Christmas carol "Silent Night." Immediately, a look of fear appeared on the faces of the villagers. "Please don't sing," they requested. "If the soldiers hear you, they will come and find us. It's best to remain silent. We don't want to suffer any more." The night became a truly silent night once again - not to commemorate a religious event, but a silence symbolizing the realities of life for hundreds of thousands of IDPs throughout Burma.

NIGHTS
of IDP life for so many years, will finally turn into nights of calm and rejoicing? Oddly enough, perhaps one of the strongest symbols of hope is the IDPs themselves. For several decades already, they have refused to give up. They hide in the jungles and they maintain their silence so as to go undetected by roving military units, yet they survive amidst this oppressive system and cling to their right to live as they wish within the land which they call home. The suffering they have endured all these years goes far beyond what any words can describe, and still they persevere. What right then do we, who live in relative freedom and ease, have to feel tired and discouraged in the struggle for peace and justice in Burma? Can we not draw our energy and determination from these IDPs who symbolize not only the brutality of the civil war in Burma, but also the will to survive and live in peace and dignity? We too easily see the fear and suffering etched in the faces of the oppressed. This raises our own feelings of sympathy and pity for them; but perhaps, does not give us the hope we need to energize our actions in more creative and effective ways. Let us be aware too that the faces of the IDPs also reflect determination and a will to survive. This is what we need to focus on more .deliberately.

It is now some twenty years later and nothing has improved for the IDPs. Their numbers have continued to increase; they still seek protection in distant jungle havens and require silent nights and silent days to avoid attracting soldiers to their hiding places. Fear remains etched on their weathered faces, but so does determination - the determination to

charcoal drawing by Nyah Phaytimet

survive and to remain free. The new year gives little cause to hope that the ongoing IDP pilgrimage for a more secure life and a future of peace for their children will soon end. The Burmese military is reportedly building up its troop strength in many areas along the borders of the country and recruiting a growing number of porters a sign that new military campaigns are to be launched soon. New refugees have been arriving at the Thai/Burma border, and in many cases have been denied entry into refugee camps on the Thai side. International campaigns have not yet been strong or coordinated enough to convince the Burmese military to move back to their barracks, and the United Nations remains unforgivably weak in their meager efforts to protect the lives of these long-suffering peasants. Where, then, lies the symbol of hope that these silent nights, which have sadly been a normal part

The world has not been silent about the deplorable situation in Burma, but has yet to be effective enough to help bring it to an end. The struggle for peace and justice remains the responsibility of the people of Burma themselves, but the international community must help by neutralizing the military's ability to so thoroughly hold their oppressive force over the people. Given space; the people, including the IDPs, can and will move to bring the civil war to an end. The silent nights, the faces of the IDPs these are the symbols we must look to for hope and energy as we move into a new year of campaigns and supportive activities for peace and justice in Burma. M. Ediger

3 January 1999

SANCTIONS

SANCTIONS OR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT: THE DILEMMA OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, PART 2

Sanctions can address the morality of lending support directly, or indirectly, to Burma's military government; primarily via consumer responsibility campaigns. In an increasingly global economy, buying groceries in Tokyo, clothes in London, electronics in New York City or petrol in Sydney all have ramifications far beyond the immediate locality. As one U.S. Burma lobbyist stated, people "have to start conActivists and government representatives have the fronting as we move into the right to demand direction from the Burma global economy. We are goSanctions are concrete acopposition in extending sanctions against the SPDC ing to have to assume some tions on the part of governresponsibility for the effects of ments, human rights groups the dollars we spend..." 6 In this complex and individuals designedvto pressure totalitarian and oppressive governments to On the other hand, proponents of change in international picture, brand name products change. According to Stuart Eizenstat, former Burma through normalized diplomatic rela- such as Iridium cellular phones and Suzuki U.S. Under Secretary of State for economic tions and economic investment argue that motorcycles take on another dimension of exposure to western values and the free mar- value. On top of the normal consideration and business affairs : ket economy will motivate the government of price and product quality, conscious con"Sanctions are intended to highlight mis- to move towards a more open society. How- sumers have to consider how their purchase conduct by rogue regimes, to alter the be- ever, it is unclear what their plan is. The ar- might support human rights abuses in Burma havior that threatens our national inter- gument that as the government moves more and other countries. Boycotts of products ests and the stability of the international towards a free market economy democracy and municipal and state level selective purcommunity. Sanctions address misconduct will naturally follow is suspect. Singapore is chasing laws addresses questions of conin human rights, terrorism, narcotics, weap- a prime example of an open market economy sumer responsibility. Such measures allow ons of mass destruction, and other areas with a totalitarian government. Ultimately, individuals to become educated on the huwhere such conduct is considered unaccept- nations and companies involved in Burma man rights abuses of the government of must choose whether financial gain or moral Burma and to act accordingly. This also adds able by world standards. factors are the priority in determining their an ethical dimension to the market system Therefore sanctions are geared towards mo- continued engagement in the country. If which doesn't inherently address questions tivating change, and they allow individuals there is no clear strategy for change, invest- of human rights. These sanctions are justiment will reinforce the current behavior of fied on moral grounds alone. However, if to act ethically in the global economy. the military government. Levi Strauss, whose they are utilized as part of a larger plan, they Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League investment was contingent on the standard can also.be tools for change. for Democracy party have continually called that their products "are manufactured in a for the international community to apply way that is fair and humane and compas- Sanctions to apply pressure sanctions in Burma, but governments have sionate" dropped contracts with suppliers The withdrawal of humanitarian aid, visa been slow to respond. Immediately after the in Burma. A spokesman for the company bans on the military rulers, bans on new inbloody 1988 anti-democracy crackdown, said the move was made, based on "a very vestment, trade restrictions and other govmost countries withdrew non-humanitarian serious review of the social and economic ernment sanctions have often been initiated aid to Burma, but the push for sanctions and political environment there as well as due to moral concerns. However, governquickly lost steam. Recently, the U.S., health and safety issues [and] the human ment level sanctions are inherently of a difCanada and the E.U. enacted arms embar- rights environment... ."5 If a clear priority is ferent nature than boycotts and selective goes, bans on military cooperation and re- placed on human rights and a strategy for purchasing laws which focus on withdrawtained bans on non-humanitarian aid. In May change is in enacted, countries and compaing support from an oppressive regime. Govof 1997, U.S. President Clinton signed a ban nies will set out goals for change, and act if ernmental sanctions are primarily designed on all new investment in Burma, the stronthose are not met. to directly change the behavior of the targest economic sanctions of any country 2 geted government. Governments have the against Burma. More recently, in October 1998, the E.U. voted to extend and strengthen Proponents of sanctions need to analyze the prerogative to attach clear conditions to its own sanctions, including the expulsion role of sanctions in effecting change. Sanc- sanctions, instead of merely withdrawing of Burma's military personnel from embas- tions are not a one-size-fits-all solution to support. The effectiveness of governmensies and a ban on transit visas for Burma's the problems of human rights abuse around the world. There are many factors that play Continued on page 7

n early October 1998 a meeting was held in Chilston Park, England. Attended by UN officials and diplomats from Asia and the West, they gathered to look at a new approach to the problem of Burma - giving the U.N. the power to actively mediate the situation. There seems to be general consensus that both the "constructive engagement" approach used by Asian countries and sanctioning by the West have failed. As the international community reevaluates strategies for political change, proponents of democracy and human rights need to analyze their approaches towards Burma. The political situation in Burma is highly complex. A clear understanding of the role of the international community and a well laid out strategy towards effective political change are required.

military leaders.3 Activist groups have been most successful in boycotting companies and effecting change at the local level. Twenty-eight municipalities in the U.S. and Australia and the state of Massachusetts have all passed laws restricting their governments from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business in Burma,4 and boycotts have convinced Pepsi Inc., Ericsson Communications and others to withdraw their investments in Burma. While sanctions have been increasing in strength they have also come under fire for not effecting change within Burma.

into the validity and effectiveness of sanctions: What is the ethical response towards investment in Burma? Whose responsibility is it to initiate change? Is there a clear strategy towards change? How do we decide if sanctions are effective? Sanctions need to be evaluated in terms of these questions.

Sanctions and moral responsibility

January 1999 3

DEVELOPMENT

DAMMED IF THEY DO, DAMMED IF THEY DON'T

ecent reports confirm that surveying for a dam is underway at a site in southern Shan State along the Salween River. According to an NGO coalition report,1 a series of teams including, Japanese, have been traveling with Thai staff from large infrastructure specialists MDX Pic Co, have been traveling from northern Chiang Mai province up to the dam site. Burma army soldiers have been providing security - this is a civil war area which is being subjected to military operations and systematized relocation programmes resulting in the displacement of thousands of people. There is speculation that the dam will not only produce electricity for Thailand and Burma - an estimated 3,700 megawatts - but may also entail a water diversion scheme which will bring the water through Mong Ping and across 300 km into Thailand. It would be delivered to the drought-crippled Bhumibol reservoir in northern Thailand. A feasibility study is being Carried out by consultants from Thai and Japanese corporations. NGOs anticipate that finance for construction of the dam may come from the Japanese government's US$30-billion aid package for Asian crisis hit countries. The project will be sponsored by the Burmese government's national programme, the Border Areas Development Programme (BADP). The programme's major tasks relate broadly to infrastructure and socio-economic development. Military regime sponsored development has serious immediate and long term human rights and natural resources consequences. If the dam project goes ahead, the foreign investors will reap benefits extracted through repressive practices and widespread social disruption.

The Japanese foreign ministry released a statement in December saying that "Given the situation at home and abroad involving Myanmar, Japan does not see the nation as subject to the so-called Miyazawa plan."10 However, Brigadier General Kyaw Win, deputy president of the Office of Strategic Studies under the Burmese Defence Ministry (currently visiting Japan), is believed to be "sounding out Tokyo about the possibility of resuming yen loans."11 The Thai cabinet recently approved a Science Ministry Who's Involved? Talk of damming the Salween's hydroelec- feasibility study on the Salween Water Ditric potential, and exporting the electricity to version Project to solve drought problems Thailand, has been around for nearly twenty in the future. The Science Minister plans to fund the study through years. Five potential dam sites on the Miyazawa Plan. 12 the Salween have specifically been Therefore, the Japanese proposed within the past 10 years. The BADP is initiative could possibly The proponents of the dams include a significant be used to fund the dam the governments of Thailand and project in Burma either diBurma (who have formed a Joint link between rectly, depending on the Working Commission and signed a the military's outcome of Kyaw Win's memorandum of understanding efforts to visit, or indirectly through [MoU] in July 1997 as to purchase Thailand. of electricity and, more recently, to pacify ethnic the use of water from the Salween and River 4 ), the Asian Development Feasibility Studies indigenous Bank, and China. Dam-building Although a feasibility consultants from Norconsult in minority study is being conducted Norway, and Japan's Electric Power at the site, proponents of populations Development Company (EPDC) and building dams in the and resulting Japanese International Cooperation Salween River basin have Agency (JICA), have been most human rights not initiated environmenactive in securing bilateral aid contal and social impact asviolations tracts from their respective governsessments to address the ments to carry out pre-feasibility possible damage of pro* studies for dams. JICA (a governposed dams on the whole ment agency), has been working in coopera- river basin,.or the cumulative effects of the tion with Burma in the areas of irrigation and construction of such a large number of dams forestry for 10 years.5 Several Thai compa- and river diversion schemes on the Salween nies, including Ital-Thai, MDX Pic, and log- River's ecology, biology and local people's ging company Thai Sawat, are also involved.6 means of livelihood. Such studies should be the auspices of the BADP are also widespread. Thousands of people have already been forcibly relocated from the surveying area. The Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) estimates that 61 villages - 2,031 households (an average household containing at least five people) - were relocated in Mong Pan township, and 24 villages - 285 households - from Mong Ping between 1997 and 1998.3 The feasibility study in the Wan Hsa La area is being carried out by consultants from MDX (through its subsidiary GMS Power) along with experts from EPDC. 7 The SSA has allowed the survey to go ahead but warns they want to consult with NGOs and their people before agreeing to its construction. 8 based on the knowledge of potentially affected local people, who understand the rivers, forests, and agroecosystems upon which they depend for their means of livelihood. These should identify the short and long term harm the dams might cause the environment before being built, and find ways to lessen or solve the problems. As the people in this area have been targeted as enemies of the SPDC, their participation or consultation in such a process is highly unlikely.

The Area
The site where the dam is being surveyed is in the region of the Wan Hsa La (Ta Sala) river area. There is currently a major bridge being built across the river at Wan Hsa La near Ta Hsang village. The crossing links the roads between Mong Pan and Mong Turn townships. This area is a civil war zone, until recently categorised by the military regime as a "black" zone (insurgent-dominated area). Due to heavy military offensives since 1996, the area is being transformed into a "brown" zone (government-insurgent shared area). The civilian population continues to be subjected to military operations against the main active ethnic resistance group in the area (the Shan United Revolutionary Army [SURA] faction of the Shan States Army [SSA]). 2 Systematized relocation, and "development" programmes under

Who's financing?
Local sources familiar with the project quote the cost of the planned dam between 4 billion to 7 billion US dollars. NGOs anticipate the project is being designed to get financing from the so-called Miyazawa Plan, which aims to invest US$30 billion for Asian crisishit countries. The plan, introduced by Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa last October, includes offering official development-aid loans, in yen, to Asian countries.9

Immediate Consequences
There are considerable strategic benefits for the SPDC in building the dam in this area. The benefits will be similar to those gained by the activities of the Thai and Chinese loggers and the builders of the Yadana gas pipeline in Tenasserim Division, an area occupied by Mon and Karen ethnic nationalities. The army can extend its efforts to transform

5 January 1999

DEVELOPMENT

the area into an insurgent-free zone, bring the ethnic populations under SPDC control, and cut off support from Thai authorities now wanting to secure their interests. Security fears by the SPDC were used as a justification for a build up of soldiers in the construction areas of the Yadana project. Consortium partners US oil company Unocal and its French partner Total have recently been accused of financing soldiers to suppress ethnic groups along the pipeline route. Both Unocal and Total have denied any direct payment to the military for security services.13 Unocal is battling a lawsuit in the U.S. over this issue and responsibility for the effect the project has had on local communities. The presence of consortium partners legitimizes military activity as the MoU allocates responsibility for ensuring security to the SPDC. This furthers both the regime's economic and military agendas in the region. Thai authorities, who had previously allowed the Mon and Karen insurgent groups to move back and forth across the border, warned them against sabotaging the project. This led to a cease-fire agreement with the Mon and significantly weakened the Karen insurgency. A senior MDX advisor and former government minister, has already asked the SSA, through intermediaries, not to interfere with the project. Regardless of whether the SSA agrees to construction or not, as it is highly unlikely the local peoples will be consulted about the project or compensated for resulting loss of lands and livelihoods, they are "dammed if they do and dammed if they don't." Along with a natural corresponding increase in human rights violations due to increased military presence, there is extensive documentation that villagers who have been relocated in civil war areas become a readily available labor pool to consolidate military objectives. With increased infrastructure work in the region comes an increased demand on villagers to labor on these projects, along with duties at army camps and logging. A recent U.S. embassy report notes that "'People's contributions,' chiefly in the form of uncompensated labor, have been extensively used, not only in local rural development construction projects, but also in larger regional and national physical infrastructure construction projects..." 14 A report released by the International Labor Organization (ILO) last year emphasized: "There is abundant evidence..showing the pervasive use of forced labor imposed on the civilian population throughout

Myanmar by the authorities and the military for portering, the construction, maintenance and servicing of military camps, other work in support of the military, work on agriculture, logging and other production projects undertaken by the authorities or the military..., the construction and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other infrastructure work and a range of other tasks. " 15 The regime, in its submission to the ILO (Article 118), denied allegations of forced labor specifically referring to the Yadana gas pipeline project - despite extensive documentation by the ILO Commission to the contrary. One of the environmental consequences will be deforestation. Forests will be cleared during construction of access roads to the dam. More areas of forest for the planting of food crops will be cleared out of necessity, as local people are evicted from their land, forcibly resettled, or flee from areas under SPDC control. Reduction in forest cover destroys or reduces habitat for forest animals and increases danger of rainy-season floods in down-stream areas. This will undermine food security as sustainable agriculture and gathering of forest foods are the primary means of subsistence for ethnic groups living in this area. Local people who suffer physical and environmental damage as a result of the project have no legal avenue for relief in Burma. This also allows the foreign consortium parties to act without accountability.

development project for the foreign investors. The local population will not benefit from the loss of resources, as the foreign exchange generated will be used by the SPDC to strengthen its military structure. Ironically, the communities in this area will remain "underdeveloped" as the high levels of military spending and the build-up of arms utilizes resources that could be used in pursuit of social and economic development. Foreign investment with the military regime fuels these consequences. Foreign exchange funds these development projects which adversely affect rural populations. Human and natural resources are expendable commodities for Burma's regime. The BADP is a significant link between the military's efforts to pacify ethnic and indigenous minority populations and resulting human rights violations. Foreign companies should delay investment until a democratic government has been formed, and the local peoples concerned have been consulted and can participate in decisions concerning this project and other development initiatives. V. Coakley

Endnotes 'Dammed if they do9

1 "Inside Source: Update On the Salween Dam Project in Shan State/' BurmaNet ed, 12 Jan 1998 2 Refer to Burma Issues newsletter, November 1998 for explanation of the various Shan groups and their relationship with the SPDC 3 Shan Human Rights Foundation report, "Dispossessed: Forced Relocation and Extrajudicial Killings in Shan State/' Apr 1998 4 "Salween water diversion study gets green light The Nation, 21 ]an 1999 5 "japan to implement two technical programs for Myanmar" Xinhua, 5 Jan 1999 6 "Hydroelectric and Trans-Basin Water Diversion Projects in the Salween River Basin, Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance, (TERRA) Bangkok, Thailand, July 1997 and N G O coalition report 7. James Fahn, "The Salween under attack again The Nation, 26 Jan 1999 8 S.H.A.N, "The Salween Dam - an upcoming reality?" 11 Dec 1998 6t ibid 9 K. Chanrapanya, "Japan aid package 'the right tonic' The Nation, 5 Oct 1998 10 "Japan Denies Myanmar Included in Miyazawa Plan" Kyodo, 10 Dec 1998 11 "Japan urges junta talks with Suu Kyi" The Nation, 22 Jan 1999 12 "Salween water diversion study gets green light The Nation, 21 Jan 1999 13 Preecha Srisatham, "Funding said coming from Unocal, Total" Bangkok Post, 6 Jan 1999 and Alex Katz, "Unocal Implicated in Burma strife" Los Angeles Weekly, 15 Jan 1999 14 U.S. Department of Agriculture Attache, Report on trade and crop situation in Myanmar/Burma, (American Embassy Rangoon, 31 Mar 1998, unofficial document) p. 81 15 International Labor Organization (ILO), News release No. 98/32, 20 Aug 1998 16 U.S. Department of Agriculture Attache report, P. 1 17 Frame work adapted from Mathews George Chunakara, The Militarisation of Politics and Society: Southeast Asian Experiences (Hong Kong: D A G A Press, 1994).

Foreign Investment fueling militarization

Foreign investment should not be used to finance SPDC sponsored infrastructure development projects. The links between foreign investment and military spending are concrete. Much of the money goes into military buildup and arms procurement. Burma's need for military force appears to be growing smaller due to the numerous cease-fires in place with rebellious groups, the pacification of areas following successful offensives, and the lack of external threats. However, the size of the army continues to expand. Defence spending is estimated to be at least half of the total government expenditure, at 8-10 percent of recorded GDP, while real expenditure on health and education has been cut. 16 The conseqences of militarization in areas where the BADP operative are at least threefold: repression and human rights violations; loss of resources; and underdevelopment.17 Repression and human rights violations have already been evidenced in the dam surveying area. This will increase as the military takes responsibility for the security of the

January 1999 5

SOCIETY

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRRAWADDY DIVISION

he following story is composed of ed ited extracts of information recently provided by a Burma Issues information collector from central Irrawaddy Division, western Burma. The deteriorating economy and increased hardships at the subsistence level are notable, given that the Irrawaddy Delta is famous as "the rice bowl" of Burma.

but all of the surplus items (oil, salt, sugar, condensed milk, beans, fish paste) have been cut to half of the previous level. Currently, to get extra money, soldiers in the delta go out on "conscription" drives. They visit Village/ Ward Council officers and inform them they want to conscript one or two people, and tell them how much it will cost

Economic Conditions
In my opinion, the main issue in the last year has been the price of food- it has doubled, but wages are unchanged. So too have the costs of almost all basic goods. For example, the lowest quality polished rice, which is in fact the roughage discarded from the highest quality stuff, has gone from 50 Kyat to 100 Kyat per pyi (4.6 lb.). One viss (3.5 lb.) of salt has jumped from 10 to 22 Kyat, and vegetable oil from 300 to more than 700 Kyat per gallon. Ajinomoto (MSG) seasoning sachets that used to be sold for 5 Kyat were enough to last for a few meals, but now 5 Kyat sachets are being made out of a bit of plastic and paper by shopholders, and are only enough for one meal. All kinds of people are facing problems. In July 1998,1 met a schoolteacher on the roadside in a central delta township. The teacher was pushing a bicycle loaded with dried goods and basic household items. He explained to me that he and his sister both teach primary school and must take the main responsibility to support their family of six. The 1,200 Kyat (U.S.$ 3.50) monthly salary they each receive is not enough, but they are not given permission to resign their positions and find other work. Therefore, to survive he goes to buy small goods in town and resells them in the village where he teaches a couple of times per week. It takes about one and a half hours travelling time on the bicycle each trip. Most teachers must find extra sources of income like this to survive. Teachers, like other civil servants, continue to receive 6 pyi (27.6 lbs) of discounted polished grain from the government agencies (sold at about 30 Kyat per pyi) per month, but it is generally of poor quality, and sometimes rotten. Some resell this rice and some re-polish [the inferior rice to get to the white core of the grain for health and visual appeal]. This August, I met with a soldier from a local battalion. I didn't ask him anything, but of his own accord he complained about the rations received by his battalion. They are still receiving rice rations of 6 pyi per month,

1997/ Jan 1998, merchants paid 450 Kyat per basket for resale to the government. Some farmers sold most or all of their surplus at that time. Then the government reintroduced the quota system and demanded that farmers give as previously, so some had to repurchase paddy at a higher rate than 450, to resell to the government at 300. In my opinion, the government tried to change the system initially because it is afraid that the farmers will revolt if things get too difficult for them.

Around June- July 1998, the Myanma Agricultural Service officials came around and assessed farmers land for the coming 98/99 fiscal year round of procurements. They made farmers sign documents to the effect that they would deliver the assessed quantity of paddy by a given date, and then gave 50% of the value accorded to it by the government up front. The Irrawaddy Delta, 1998 Most people think that the govto opt out. They don't make the cash amount ernment wants the quota paddy mainly for too high. Right now nobody really wants to export to China. There are a lot of things become a soldier, as their conditions aren't from China being used in the delta now, such as good as before, so the soldiers know that as ferry boats and trucks. People think that people will pay the money. The money is the government is exchanging paddy for split between the soldier collecting it and Chinese materials. his superiors. Both last year and this year, water levels are Agriculture way down in river tributaries. This is in spite Farmers are facing higher rates of compul- of the fact that rains in both years were good. sory paddy procurement by the government. The reasons for this are probably mainly Previously, the standard rate was 12 baskets connected to heavy deforestation, and also per acre, but after the attempted reforms earthe effects of irrigation. Wells are increaslier this year reverted to the old system (see ingly empty too. In the past, people were Burma Issues, July 1998), the rate has behappy to let neighbors share water from come inconsistent, and in some areas 16 to wells, but in this last year, families were re18 baskets are demanded per acre. The govserving wells for their use only, and even ernment agencies pay 300 Kyat per basket, then sometimes didn't have enough water. and the current market rate is around 600. Between December 1997 and February 1998 the state-run media made much of a new "market-oriented" paddy purchasing system, introduced in an effort to do away with the inefficiencies and corruption inherent in the old system, and quell growing dissatisfaction among farmers. The new system supposedly offered farmers alternative avenues for the sale of their produce to the government. Brokers and agents were licensed to purchase paddy at prices more akin to the true market value, and then. resell it to the government on condition that it was of good quality. After a short period of time, the much-touted reforms were quietly scrapped and the former compulsorypurchase system re-introduced. At the time of the attempted reforms in Dec

Health
In June-July 1998 many children died from dengue fever due to heavy rains. Adults also suffered the disease, but didn't die. Every day children were brought into our town hospital from surrounding areas and two to three per day were dying for a period of some weeks. In one case in July, a father had paid 2,000 Kyat hire for a boat to bring his child to the hospital, and then the doctor refused treatment and told him it was too late for the child. The father told him, "Whether too late or not, give the medicine!" and was ready to pay for it. But the doctor refused, and shortly after the child died. The father in a fury swore and abused the doctor and hospital staff. For those children who

Continued on the next page

6 January f 999

SOCIETY

survived, it took two to three weeks in the hospital to recover. This cost parents more than 20,000 kyat per child. At the hospital absolutely everything must be paid for.

to contribute 5 Kyat for the travel costs of the township representatives going to the rally. The doubling of prices in the last year means that regular people are slowly understanding more about how this government is no good for them. They see that the authorities are only working for themselves and not the broader communities. Most people are hoping that this government will fall, although this has not yet extended to action. As a result of economic hardship there are more political ideas among people than before.

Education
A large number of children are forced to drop out of school after Standard 2 or 3 (7-10 years of age). A member of my family works at a school where most of the children attending are particularly poor. At that school, the children who attend often come with no food for the day, and no sandals. The school materials are also all insufficient. At another primary school, the staff gathered together money for textbooks early in the year, but until now nothing has arrived.

structures also would allow the current government the option to hand over power if and when pressures are strong enough. South Africa is an excellent example of a relatively smooth and peaceful transfer of power. The African National Congress party had created a strong coalition of South Africans with a relatively resilient leadership structure. It was not without fault or detractors, but it was unified enough to direct action against the apartheid government and then take over power in a relatively peaceful and gradual transition. Activists and government representatives have the right to demand direction from the Burmese opposition in extending sanctions against the SPDC. Saying that companies can renew investment, tourists can visit the country and governments can normalize relations with Burma after the military falls, isn't good enough. The international community is waiting to hear what kind of political roadmap the opposition is laying out towards democracy, lending credence to sanctions. Sanctioning is not a quick solution to the many difficult and complex problems of Burma. The issues of human rights abuses and problems of ethnic chauvinism that have caused so many years of strife are not going to be solved overnight. However, without strong guidance from the people of Burma, sanctions only serve as a way for the international community to wash its hands of the situation. With a strong plan of action from the people and concerted international support, it could become a truly effective policy for change.

Electricity
In town, power is on for only 2-3 hours per day. People talk about why there's ho electricity. During the summer, people claim officials say, "There's no water in the dam, so the generators won't work," and then during the rainy season, "Everybody switches on all of their appliances before the current has arrived, so it causes a surge that damages the transformer." But people with some knowledge about electricity don't accept these excuses.

Continuedfrom page 3
tal sanctions is, in the end, measured by the change in behavior of the targeted country.

Charting a strategy
In looking at who is responsible for change, an aide to U.N. Secretary General hit on the primary point: "The solution to the problems of Myanmar must-be attained essentially amongst the people of that country." 7 As the problems are the people's; so, ultimately, must be the responsibility for initiating change and monitoring effectiveness. Sanctions from the outside cannot initiate lasting change by themselves. Even if the State Peace and Development Council loses their grip on the country, without alternate power structures in place the emergence of a representative and stable government is unlikely. One of the primary roles of sanctions must be to provide space and support for the people to create the structures necessary for transition to an open and civil society. Only the people, and their chosen leadership, have the legitimate right to set an agenda for change. .Without this kind of agenda, sanctions serve merely to isolate Burma. Human Rights Watch Asia recently criticized both the uncritical engagement of Asean and the uncritical isolationism of western sanctions. The regional human rights group suggested that the junta should he offered a "road map" by which verifiable, concrete human rights improvements would be rewarded with normalized economic and diplomatic relations.8 If such a "road map" were indeed charted by the Burma opposition it would allow sanctions proponents to act with a greater degree of confidence. Without strong guidance from groups representing the people, sanctioning governments have no assurance that there will be representative structures to fill the void if the government is removed from power. The formation of well defined power

Politics
Due to all these difficulties, people are getting stronger political conceptions. More and more people consciously recognize that they are poor due to the bad government. There is more cautious resistance than before, both out of the need to survive and out of resentment of the administration. For example, 5-6 years ago, farmers had to give the compulsory paddy quota, whatever the case. Now, they try to find ways not to give full amounts, and the government is more cautious in its treatment of them. Traders recognize that taxes are high, and there are a lot of problems for them under the regime. They think that if there was "democracy" then economic conditions would improve. In fact, most people equate democracy with better economic circumstances. More people are daring to listen to the overseas news broadcasts, and even holding discussions about what was on. It is primarily just educated people who support the NLD. The NLD lacks a broad base of active support because nobody understands much about them, except that if they were in power there would be "democracy" and then things are meant to be better. No one really believes the anti-NLD rallies on the radio or TV. In Irrawaddy Division there was only one rally at the Bathein Stadium, so only officials and government servants were called to attend, not the regular people. However, every house in our township had

E. Miller

Endnotes, 'Sanctions'
1 "State Department's Elzenstaton U.S. Sanctions/' Economic Perspectives, 17 Sep 1997 2 "U.S. Envoy puts faith in sanctions/' Bangkok Post, 29 Sep 1998 3 "EU Tightens Sanctions/' Bangkok Post, 28 Oct 1998 4 "Los Angeles Passes Burma Law 13-0," Seattle Burma Round Table, 16 Dec 1998 5 "Burma Remains a Vexing Case for American Businesses,j Bangkok Post, 23 Feb 1996 6 ibid 7 "Solution to Myanmar Problems," Xinhua, 8 Dec 1998 8 Dorgan, Michael. " 1 0 Years After Bloody Takeover, Nation Wallows in Human Misery," The Asia Report, 12 Aug 1998

January f 999

The Last Word

What Others Have to Say About Burma
"Now that sanctions against Myanmar have proven to be ineffective the idea of offering carrots in the form of a UNWorld Bank assistance is being floated. According to the plan US$1 billion would be forthcoming if the government agreed to a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. It is obvious that those making the proposal are aware of neither the role of the international organizations in promoting sustainable development nor the principles on which the Myanmar government stands. Myanmar will neither succumb to the lure of carrots nor be cowered by the threat of sticks." Press statement by the embassy of Myanmar [Burma] Washington, DC

At this time, the people are facing ever greater restrictions imposed [on trade] by the SPDC. Furthermore, this year has brought drought and people have been unable to grow paddy as in previous years. The paddy which has been planted has wilted for lack of water, and so has not borne seeds and has shriveled up. Karen infromation Centre news report from Taungoo region, Pegu Division, November 1998.

"You don't say what you believe is true, or what you know will be good for the country. Instead, you try to ensure that your presentation and analysis don't deviate too much from the official line. Under these circumstances, self-censored and self-serving economic reports that have been produced in considerable abundance contain a wealth of information on the objectives of the government. But they don't shed much light on what is happening to the people of Myanmar ordinary citizens, such as farmers, laborers, students and office clerks." A local economist and retired Unite'd Nations official on the reasons that the Burma's military government has an unrealistic view of conditions in their country.

They can't bear it, yet they must bear it. Most people just work harder, such as by finding more land to clear and crop. They spare no energy in their efforts to survive. They can't leave and go anywhere else- there is no work in the cities, and the hills and jungles are free-fire zones. They have to try to survive there. BI information collector on the conditions described above, and corresponding high taxation by the military in the area, December 1998.

"They [the Shan people] need permanent plots of land to grow rice and other crops, and they don't have them. People in the Shan state have turned to growing poppy because it takes a short time, or a few months to harvest, and they can shift the location of opium fields in the jungles." Colonel Yod Suk, commander of the Shan State Army, speaking about the drugs problem in Shan State saying the Shan people and other ethnic minorities have been forced into opium cultivation by the actions of the Burma Army

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