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18.09.

2012

Seminar for PETROVIETNAM 18th to 19th September 2012

Seminar on Depressurization and Safety of Process Plants


Other Issues on Blowdown and Safety
Dr. Geir Langli
Petrell as Olav Tryggvasonsgt. 40 Trondheim Norway

Topics
The legislative regime in Norway Important regulations Standards Scenario-based design Management of technical safety Blowdown and other safety systems Summary

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Setting the stage


Risk analysis / acceptance criteria Fire and Explosion Strategy Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Strategy Blowdown and Flare Strategy Overall concept

Legislative regime (Norway)


Acts and regulations
Parliament Oil & energy department

Ensuring compliance with acts and regs


Petroleum Safety Authority
Issues guidelines to regulations Audits projects and operations

Regulations can refer to standards


NORSOK, ISO, API etc.

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Legislative regime (Norway)


Petroleum act
http://www.npd.no/en/

Plan for development and operation


Safety Case

Working environment act Pollution and waste act

Relevant regulations (Norway)


Framework HSE Management Technical and Operational
Technical, operational matters onshore facil.

Facilities
Design and outfitting of facilities

Activities
Conducting activities, HSE

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Framework HSE Regulation


Section 11 Risk reduction principles Harm or danger of harm to people, the environment or material assets shall be prevented or limited in accordance with the health, safety and environment legislation, including internal requirements and acceptance criteria that are of significance for complying with requirements in this legislation. In addition, the risk shall be further reduced to the extent possible. In reducing the risk, the responsible party shall choose the technical, operational or organisational solutions that, according to an individual and overall evaluation of the potential harm and present and future use, offer the best results, provided the costs are not significantly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved. If there is insufficient knowledge concerning the effects that the use of technical, operational or organisational solutions can have on health, safety or the environment, solutions that will reduce this uncertainty, shall be chosen.

Management regulation
Section 4 Risk reduction In reducing risk as mentioned in Section 11 of the Framework Regulations, the responsible party shall select technical, operational and organisational solutions that reduce the probability that harm, errors and hazard and accident situations occur. Furthermore, barriers as mentioned in Section 5 shall be established. The solutions and barriers that have the greatest risk-reducing effect shall be chosen based on an individual as well as an overall evaluation. Collective protective measures shall be preferred over protective measures aimed at individuals.

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Management regulation
Section 9 Acceptance criteria for major accident risk and environmental risk The operator shall set acceptance criteria for major accident risk and environmental risk. Acceptance criteria shall be set for: a) the personnel on the offshore or onshore facility as a whole, and for personnel groups exposed to particular risk, b) loss of main safety functions as mentioned in Section 7 of the Facilities Regulations for offshore petroleum activities, c) acute pollution from the offshore or onshore facility, d) damage to third party. The acceptance criteria shall be used when assessing results from risk analyses, cf. Section 17. Cf. also Section 11 of the Framework Regulations.

Facilities regulation
Section 7 Main safety functions The main safety functions shall be defined in a clear manner for each individual facility so that personnel safety is ensured and pollution is limited. For permanently manned facilities, the following main safety functions shall be maintained in the event of an accident situation: a) preventing escalation of accident situations so that personnel outside the immediate accident area are not injured, b) maintaining the capacity of load-bearing structures until the facility has been evacuated, c) protecting rooms of significance to combatting accidents so that they remain operative until the facility has been evacuated, d) protecting the facility's secure areas so that they remain intact until the facility has been evacuated, e) maintaining at least one escape route from every area where personnel are found until evacuation to the facility's safe areas and rescue of personnel have been completed.

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Facilities regulation
Barriers Section 29 Section 30 Section 31 Section 32 Section 33 Section 34 Section 35 Section 36 Section 37 Section 38 Section 39 Section 40 Passive fire protection Fire divisions Fire divisions in living quarters Fire and gas detection system Emergency shutdown system Process safety system Gas release system Firewater supply Fixed fire-fighting systems Emergency power and emergency lighting Ballast system Open drainage systems

Facilities regulation
Section 35 Gas release system Facilities equipped with or attached to process facilities, shall have a gas release system. The system shall prevent escalation of hazard and accident situations by quickly reducing the pressure in the equipment, and it shall be designed so that the release of gas does not harm personnel or equipment. It shall be possible to trigger the depressurisation manually from the central control room. Liquid separators installed in the gas release system shall be secured against overfilling.

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Facilities regulation
Re Section 35 Gas release system The requirement regarding the gas release system as mentioned in the first subsection, entails that gases that are flammable or harmful to health shall be routed to a safe emission site, and that any potential heat load shall be calculated, cf. Section 11. In order to fulfil the requirement regarding the gas release system as mentioned in the first subsection, the standards NS-EN ISO 13702 Chapter 6 and Appendix B.2, ISO 23251, NORSOK S-001, Chapter 11 and P-100 Chapter 16 should be used, with the following additions: a) rapid depressurisation should be selected rather than passive fire protection. For fire loads, reference is made to Section 11,

Facilities regulation
Section 5 Design of facilities Facilities shall be based on the most robust and simple solutions as possible, and designed so that a) b) c) d) e) f) they can withstand the loads as mentioned in Section 11, major accident risk is as low as possible, a failure in one component, system or a single mistake does not result in unacceptable consequences, the main safety functions as mentioned Section 7 are maintained, materials handling and transport can be carried out in an efficient and prudent manner, cf. Section 13, a safe working environment is facilitated, cf. Chapter IV,

Scenario-based design

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Facilities regulation
Section 5 Design of facilities g) operational assumptions and restrictions are safeguarded in a prudent manner, h) i) j) health-related matters are safeguarded in a prudent manner, the lowest possible risk of pollution is facilitated, prudent maintenance is facilitated.

Measures to protect facilities against fires and explosions shall be based on a strategy. The facility's areas shall be classified such that design and location of areas and equipment contribute to reduce the risk associated with fires and explosions.

Scenario-based design

Standards
International standards and design codes National standards (Norway)
NORSOK OLF Guidelines

Company standards

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Standards
NORSOK
Developed by the industry based on initiativ by the Government (1983) in order to reduce project execution time and cost

OLF Norwegian Oil Industry Association


A professional body and employers association for oil and supplier companies engaged in E&P on the NCS Issues guidelines

NORSOK S-001 Technical Safety


This NORSOK standard describes the principles and requirements for the development of the safety design of offshore installations for production of oil and gas. Where applicable, this NORSOK standard may also be used for mobile offshore drilling units. This standard, together with ISO 13702, also defines the required standard for implementation of technologies and emergency preparedness to establish and maintain an adequate level of safety for personnel, environment and material assets.

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Management of technical safety


Technical safety management in project development and design processes comprises activities to identify risks, develop safety strategies and performance requirements for safety systems and barriers. Technical safety management shall also facilitate the design process to ensure that studies, analysis and reviews are performed in due time and properly documented with due consideration of the needs for timely input to design and procurement processes.

Source: NORSOK S-001

Management of technical safety


For modification projects (e.g. upgrading of existing installation/module, tie-in of satellite field), technical safety management activities adjusted to project scope and complexity shall be performed, including new analyses or updating of existing analyses for factors that are considered to be affected by the modification.

Source: NORSOK S-001

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Management of technical safety


A follow-up system shall be established that enables proper documentation, handling, follow-up and closeout of agreed actions and recommendations from the various studies and analyses in the project. The individual project or installation shall perform specific hazard identification and risk evaluation process, and supplement the requirements as necessary to manage the actual risk picture.

Source: NORSOK S-001

Management of technical safety

Source: NORSOK S-001

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Safety strategies
Process design Risk analysis / acceptance criteria Fire and Explosion Strategy Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Strategy Blowdown and Flare Strategy Materials / specifications Layout

Source: EN ISO 17776:2002

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Management of technical safety


Chain of events Loss of containment Insufficient venting or draining Accummulation of flammables Detection of gas/vapour or liquid Loss of system pressure Chain of events (cont'd) ESD Alarm Possible ignition Fire or explosion Fire fighting Evacuation Maintain safety functions, prevent escalation

Source: NORSOK S-001

Management of technical safety


Safety barriers
Layout segregation, safe by distance Process safety control abnormal op. conditions Containment prevent leakages Ventilation/HVAC control flammable atmosphere Gas detection alarm, input to ESD ESD shut down the plant Open drain collecting flammable liquids Ignition source control remove risk of fire Fire detection trigger ESD and BD

Source: NORSOK S-001

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Management of technical safety


Safety barriers
Emergency depressurization and flare/vent prevent overpressure, safe disposal of gas Active fire protection control fire Passive fire protection prevent escalation Emergency power supply emergency users Alarm & communication alert personnel Escape, evacuation and rescue safe escape Structural integrity prevent escalation

Source: NORSOK S-001

Management of technical safety


Blowdown system
System interfaces Design basis input Standards Other safety issues

Source: NORSOK S-001

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Blowdown and other safety systems


System interfaces
Process safety ESD Gas detection Fire detection Passive fire protection (PFP) Utilities
UPS, hydraulic power, instrument air

Blowdown and other safety systems


Design basis input
Process data (P, T, composition, flow) Process segments (volumes, BDVs) Flare capacities & limitations Layout & arrangement Risk analysis Emergency preparedness analysis Acceptance criteria Safety related design philosophies

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Blowdown
Standards
API 521 / ISO 23251 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems API 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of PressureRelieving Devices in Refineries NORSOK S-001 (Norway) Technical safety IEC 61508, IEC 61511 regarding SIL Norway: OLF 070
IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems IEC 61511: Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

Blowdown
Blowdown is the primary mean of protection
As fast as possible (automatic v manual) PFP only considered a supplement to BD

Two situations
Cold blowdown Blowdown during a fire situation

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Blowdown and other safety systems


Some issues on layout & arrangement
Reduce piping lengths in order to reduce segment inventory Re-route piping to reduce exposure
On land: possibility of burying flowlines

Minimize number of flanges


From a leakage point of view: use compact flanges

Blowdown and other safety systems


Some process safety issues
Flare limitations: hydraulic, radiation Sectionalisation (ESD) and other process safety valves, check valves shut-in volumes Manual v automatic blow-down Location of BDVs Do not trust PSVs for blowdown! Design criteria for KOD, flare, vent

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Blowdown and other safety systems


Time to activation is crucial
Fast and reliable detection of gas or fire
Remove as much gas as possible from the leaking system

Fast activation of the BD system


Minimize the overpressure caused by heating-up of the segment due to fire, and

Automatic v manual BD

Manual BD (5 mins dalay)

Automatic BD (45 sec dalay)

Manual BD (2 mins dalay)

Automatic BD (15 sec dalay)

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Automatic v manual BD
In this particular case, 4 pipes would rupture with a delay of 2 mins or more.

With automatic activation only 2 pipes would rupture

Blowdown and other safety systems


Flare capacity
Delimited by radiation requirements Delimited by hydraulic capacity

Flare capacity can be better utilized by staged blowdown

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Radiation

Source: API 521 / ISO 23251:2006

Case: Multiple BDVs


BDV B EV EV
Accidental release Pipeline A Pipeline B To flare header

EV EV

FV FV

XV

Two 12" pipelines (~7 km incl. risers) between A and B for export of excess gas
95 barg, 60 kg/s (each line)

Blowdown of pipelines dependent of BD-arrangement at A (no BD of pipelines at B) BD capacity OK for one pipeline. Situation: Increased gas production, use both lines. The performance criterion for successful blowdown at A in case of a leakage from the riser pipeline A or B at B is that the leak rate shall be 1 kg/s within 20 minutes Single BDV at A, manual activation

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Case: Multiple BDVs

Blowdown and other safety systems


passive fire protection is only a supplement to blowdown
PFP should be considered last resort
Cost of engineering Cost of application Cost of inspection/service (corrosion hazard)

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Pipe schedule & wall thickness

Use of passive fire protection

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Gas detection
Fast and accurate detection of gas and fire F&G detectors
Type of detectors Layout

Camera-assisted detection
Can be crucial in identifying where the problem is, hence important re: decisionmaking (i.e. which segment to blowdown first)

Reliability
IEC 61508
Functional safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related systems

IEC 61511
Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector

OLF guideline no. 070


Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry

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Reliability
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements apply to functions such as:
Process sectionalization Depressurization Emergency shutdown F&G detection Active fire fighting Ignition source control Well safety

Reliability
Safety function SIL 2 Functional boundaries for given SIL requirement / comments The SIL requirement applies to the sub-function needed for opening of one blow own valve, i.e.: - ESD-node - Blowdown valve including solenoid(s) and actuator Note: The given requirement assumes a standard blowdown system. If another design solution, such as e.g. sequential blowdown, is implemented, this must be treated as a deviation if the SIL 2 requirement is not fulfilled. Note: The OLF requirements are minimum requirements.

Depressurisation (blowdown);

(opening of one blowdown valve)

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Effect of water on heat loads


Water contents in the fluid
Presence of water in a gas/oil/water fluid may reduce the heat load an ignited leakage can produce Extensive calculations and laboratory tests may be required

Effect from deluge on the heat load


Laboratory tests and simulations suggest significant reduction in background heat loads

Blowdown analysis in design


The more developed a project is the more costly it becomes to introduce changes
Degrees of freedom Feasibility

Concept

FEED

Detailed design

Construction

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Blowdown analysis in design


Start in the concept phase, before the main design is frozen
Layout and arrangement
Segregation of main areas Large vessels and equipment packages Routing of main piping and flowlines Welding v flanges; flange philosophy Process sectionalization Flare system (location, radiation) Escape and evacuation

Blowdown analysis in design


Start in the concept phase, before the main design is frozen
Process design
Sectionalization Location of safety critical valves Pressure-protection Depressurization and flare

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Blowdown analysis in design


Blowdown and flare philosophy/strategy
Plant blowdown or segment(s) by segment(s)
Sequence of blowdown of segments (escalation risk)

Volumes to be flared radiation envelope


Flare tower height, location

Automatic v manual activation Utilisation of flare capacity


Use of multiple BDV arrangement

Issues relating to escape Input to/from risk analysis

Blowdown analysis in design


Blowdown system design is a co-operation between
Process discipline Instrument discipline Piping & Layout discipline Materials discipline Technical safety discipline Mechanical discipline Structural discipline

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Blowdown analysis in design


Means available to ensure fire integrity
Degrees of freedom
Blowdown/flare philosophy Escape & evac philosophy Fire & explosion strategy Layout & arrangement Material specifications Pipe schedules Process sectionaliz. Wall thickness piping Re-routing of piping Passive fire protection (PFP)

Layout & arrangement Material specifications Pipe schedules Process sectionaliz. Wall thickness piping Re-routing of piping (PFP)

Wall thickness piping Re-routing small bore PFP

PFP

Feasibility

Concept

FEED

Detailed design

Construction

Summary
The operator is required to define acceptance criteria and use risk analysis in design & engineering (scenario-based design) Management of technical safety Safety barriers Aspects of blowdown system design

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Petrell AS Olav Tryggvasons gate 40 NO-7011 Trondheim Norway Phone: (+47) 73805500 Fax: (+47) 73805501 post@petrell.no www.petrell.no

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