Impact of Counter-Terrorism On Communities - Germany Background Report

Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Germany Background Report
ECKARD JESSA AND TOM MANNEWITZ
Executive Summary
This report forms a starting point for those wishing to understand and assess the impact of counterterrorism policies on minority communities in Germany, with a special focus on Muslims and immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries at the beginning of the 21st Century. The report will place this impact into its proper context, detailing the community, legal, policing, security and political context which surrounds this issue. Section one details the population and community context, highlighting demographic trends and outlining the distribution and makeup of Muslims in Germany. There are c. four million Muslims living in Germany, the majority of whom are of Turkish origin (2.6 million). The average immigrant Muslim is male, 36 years old, lives in a four person household in one of the western states, has a low level of education and is gainfully employed. More than 2000 individual Muslim communities form the nucleus of Muslim life in Germany. Some of these are organised into nationwide umbrella organisations, of which the predominantly Turkish DITIB and the multi-ethnic Muslim Council (IRD) are the largest. Together with two other umbrella organisations both affiliated with the Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM) in 2007. Among the roles of these umbrella organisations is the representation of Muslim interests within the German Islam Conference (DIK). The DIK is a state institution, created in 2006 to provide a forum for Muslim organisations and, as well, for prominent individuals living in Germany to support the integration of Muslims, strengthen social cohesion and prevent extremism. There are annual meetings (Plenum of 30) and a number of task-group sessions that take place during the year. The Initiative Security Partnership is another institution that is supposed to improve the cooperation between Muslims and German security authorities, in order to handle Islamist extremism and terrorism. While Muslims criticise the lack of recognition of Islamophobia and the general suspicion towards Muslims regarding counter-terrorism, they generally reject violence and extremism. What is more, most Muslims say they have not been subject to discrimination, yet think that Muslims (as a group are
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany frequently discriminated by the majority society. The atmosphere of cooperation can thus be described best as both critical and constructive. The majority of Germans are positive about counter-terrorist measures and support the introduction of further measures. Section two highlights the key pieces of counter terrorism legislation on the statute books in Germany. The core legislation on terrorism remains the penal code and -most recently- the 2012 Amending Law on the Protection of the Constitution, which renews the anti-terror-laws from 2002 (TBG) and 2007 (TBEG). The legislation raised the threshold for security authorities to interfere; parliament was given supervisory powers over counter-terrorism; and the preparation of severe state-endangering acts of violence was made a punishable offence. The policy and policing context is analysed in section three. Examining concrete measures draws a clearer picture. Police may conduct identity checks in order to avert dangers and prosecute crimes; however, ethnic profiling is prohibited. Foreigners may be deported due to terrorist-related actions. Preventive detention is only applied to foreigners who are to be deported due to terrorist-related actions but would have to face torture or the death penalty in their country of origin. Punishable terrorism-related actions include the support of terrorist organisations, the recruitment of members for terrorist organisations, or the incitement thereof. How are Muslims and ethnic minorities protected against general suspicion and discrimination by state authorities? The most important checks and balances on the measures of counter-terrorism legislation have constitutional status; Articles 3 (the equality principle) and 33 of the constitution say that humans are equal before the law; nobody shall be discriminated against or given preference due to sex, descent, race, language, homeland or origin, belief, religious or political views. Germanys key policy is built on five pillars: (1) Destroying terrorist structures by the increased use of search and investigative measures in order to prevent terrorism, (2) Fighting the causes of terrorism by preventing radicalisation processes, (3) Protecting the population and reducing the countrys vulnerability, (4) Managing attack consequences in a sustained manner, and (5) Using the opportunities of European international cooperation. Counter-radicalisation (number two) is the most important one. It includes a multi-dimensional approach utilising civic education and religious-political dialogue as well as a policy of integration. The Federal Agency for Civic Education, the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees, and several civil society projects are key instruments. This strategy, inclusive of the prevention policy, has been continuous and without major inconsistencies since 2001. The key institutions occupied with counterterrorism proper (excluding civil society measures and national defence) are the police authorities on the one side, and the intelligence services on the other. The separation requirement, however, sets limits to their cooperation. However, they work together in the recently established Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) and the Joint Internet Centre (GIZ).
Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany The police polarise German Muslim opinion, with most holding an absolutely positive or deeply negative view of the police. This is likely due to a disturbed relationship following some high-profile mosque checks subsequent to terrorist attacks in New York, London and Madrid. However, a number of measures have been taken to prevent discrimination by policemen, particularly via educational courses. In recent years, the Federal Government had to provide opposition parties with information on these measures, since the latter had posed minor and major intercessions concerning discrimination by police authorities against Muslims. Not least the intensified cooperation of both police and Muslims with the help of the Initiative Security Partnership should have improved the relationship. The security situation which informs these policies is outlined in section four. In 2011 there were 19 arrests and 12 convictions related to Islamist terrorism, which meant a peak in the past five years. This mirrors the increased number of Islamist extremists (38,080 in 2011). Nevertheless, Germany has fallen prey to only one single successful Islamist terrorist attack; in March 2011 Arid Uka, a 20 year old native of Kosovo, killed two US soldiers at Frankfurt Airport. Other bombing plots (e. g. the Sauerland Group) were revealed early as a result of the cooperation of security authorities. Key officials rate the level of threat proceeding from Islamist extremism as constantly high. Muslims, in turn, deem the risk of an Islamist terrorist attack in Germany as low. The political context is dealt with in section five where it is concluded that all in all, the Federal Government proceeds cautiously and adopts measures moderately. The parliamentarian control mechanism balances the security interests of the government well. Politicians treat Islam like a hot potato, for they know that they may burn their fingers. The general public seems to be divided on Islam. One half does think that it belongs in Germany, the other half does not. Both the wider society and politicians create the impression of being a little over-challenged as, for a long time, they have not devoted the attention -to Muslims in particular and immigrants in general- that they actually deserved. It seems that the set of problems related to 9/11 has caught German society off its guard. The final section deals briefly with the sparse research in existence with deals with this area. Research on the impact of counter-terrorism is limited to four points: (1) Overviews, (2) The pure efficacy of CT measures, (3) The problem of military operations abroad, and (4) The impact on the principles of constitutional democracy from a juridical perspective.
I.
Population and Community Context
Germanys population consists of about 82 million people (2010) of which c. 75 million are of German and seven million of foreign nationality. In order to paint a clear picture of minorities in Germany, it is important to keep in mind that two different definitions circulate in the responsible agencies. This is
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany crucial here, as all information comes from government agencies. People with a migration background1 includes people who (1) do not possess German citizenship or (2) who were born abroad after 1949 and have immigrated to Germany afterwards or (3) of whom at least one parent was born abroad and immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Cf. Statistisches Bundesamt 2012c). The other definition concentrates on citizenship. Hence, foreign people are those who do not possess German citizenship. It includes those who were born abroad and have immigrated subsequently to Germany and are not of German citizenship but also those whose citizenship is unclear. Foreigners are thus a subgroup of people with a migration background. This definition is, however, in retreat. Since 2005, administrative bodies in Germany have tended to use the term migration background. This paper will follow this trend.
C OU NT R I ES O F O RI G I N, G E ND E R AN D AG E D IS T R IB UT IO N
In total between 3.8 and 4.3 million people in Germany are of Muslim faith, i.e. between 4.6 and 5.2 percent of the whole population (including immigrants and non-immigrants) (Cf. Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 75). Only 45 percent of these c. two million people are German citizens. The countries making up the five largest immigrant groups in Germany are Turkey (2,485,000 immigrants), Poland (1,311,000 immigrants), the Russian Federation (1,049,000 immigrants), Italy (745,000 immigrants) and Kazakhstan (728,000 immigrants). Thus, as two out of five countries are predominantly Muslim, a significant proportion of immigrants in Germany have a Muslim background (see Table One). The first of the four columns indicates the countries of origin, the second one reveals the ones with own, i. e. personal/direct migration experience, the third one those without own migration experience, and the last column summarises both groups. The red marked countries are the largest predominantly Muslim immigrant countries. If we regard Muslim immigrants as the basic population, we can take a closer look at where they come from. Table two shows that Muslims are from a variety of different backgrounds. The majority of Muslims are of Turkish origin (c. 2.6 million Muslims, 63 percent of all Muslims) followed by those from the countries that succeeded Yugoslavia (540,000 Muslims) and from Morocco (164,000 Muslims). Around 70 percent of all Muslims with a migration background were born abroad (Cf. Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, pp. 110-115). They belong to the so called first generation of immigrants. The other 30 percent where born in Germany as children of immigrants. They thus belong to the second generation. However, the proportion of the population that is second generation is higher for those from Turkey (34.5 percent) and North Africa (34.7 percent), reflecting the longer history of labour migration and family settlement. They constitute the largest share of Muslims in Germany. It must be noted, however, that among social surveys, only people older than 16 are interviewed. This suggests that the proportion of these
1
population
that
are
second
generation
immigrants
may
be
much
higher.
German: Migrationshintergrund.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Table One: Major countries from which immigrants come Country/region of origin Of migratory background/ with experience of migration Absolute % 3.381 231 420 1.112 372 3.985 154 226 977 184 1,497 227 7.366 343 280 1.819 1.199 696 496 783 10.591 5.577 5.013 3.264 581 221 1.403 605 537 39 73.0 61.6 56.4 84.8 86.9 72.3 74.4 67.5 93.1 70.8 60.2 88.7 72.6 70.6 70.4 84.8 88.6 95.6 77.0 30.4 67.3 78.0 58.3 Without migratory background Absolute 1.251 144 325 199 56 1.526 53 109 72 76 987 29 2.776 143 118 326 154 32 148 1.791 5.155 1.570 3.583 in % 27.0 38.4 43.6 15.2 13.1 27.7 25.6 32.5 6.9 29.2 39.7 11.3 27.4 29.4 29.6 15.2 11.4 4.4 23.0 69.6 32.7 22.0 41.7 4.632 275 745 1.311 428 5.511 207 335 1.049 260 2.485 256 10.142 486 398 2.145 1.353 728 644 2.574 15.746 7.147 8.598 3.264 581 221 1.403 605 537 39 Total
EU-27 among them: Greece Italy Poland Romania Other Europe: amongst them from: Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Russian Federation Serbia Turkey Ukraine Europe (whole) Africa America Asia, Australia, Oceania amongst them from Far and Middle East Kazakhstan South and Southeast Asia No details Total of individuals with a migratory background/experience of whom are: Foreign nationals German nationals among them are: ethnic German repatriates from Poland from Romania from the territory of the former Soviet Union among them: from the Russian Federation from Kazakhstan from Ukraine
Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior 2011a, p. 191.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Table Two: Number of Muslims with a migration background (foreigners and Germans)
Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 81.
Taking the gender distribution of people with and without a migration background into account, a slight difference appears that seems to persist over the years. Whereas there is an insignificant female majority among the population without a migration background (51.3 percent) the distribution among people with a migration background turned out to be vice versa. There are less female (49.7 percent) than male people. Yet, this difference should not be overemphasised.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Table Three: Gender distribution Population With Migratory Background German Nationals Foreign Nationals Together With Without With Without Personal Experience of Migration in 1000 15,749 5,013 3,585 5,577 1,570 7,921 7,825 2,413 2,601 1,860 1,724 2,791 2,787 857 713
Gender
Total
Without Migratory Background
Total Male Female
81,715 40,059 41,657
65,970 32,138 33,832
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2012b
As within the overall group of foreigners (and immigrants in general), the Muslim group consists of more men (52.5 percent) than women (47.5 percent) (Cf. Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 95). This ratio is even more pronounced in the group of Muslims coming from Northern Africa (60 percent men) and Africa in general (66.4 percent men), but is not true for those from Central Asia (only 48.9 percent men). The age profile of the Muslim population also differs from that of other religious groups (Cf. Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, pp. 108f.); the average age of Muslims living in Germany is 36.2 years old, compared to 39.8 years for other religious groups. This holds true especially for Muslims coming from South East Europe, from Central Asia, and South (East) Asia (32 to 33 years old), whereas Muslims from Turkey, the Middle East, and Africa were clearly older (36 to 39 years old).
HO US EH OL D, E DU C A TI ON A N D E MP L O Y M E NT SI TU A T IO N
In general, Muslim immigrants tend to live in significantly larger households than other religious minorities from their countries of origin and other immigrant groups (Cf. Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, pp. 125-127). The average German household is 2.1 persons. By contrast, a Muslim household consists, on average, of 3.9 persons. The largest Muslim households are among Muslim immigrants from South East Europe, South (East) Asia and from the Middle East. Five percent of Muslims (and 12 percent of immigrants in general) who have settled down in Germany live in single-person households. Individualisation is thus far from being a Muslim-typical phenomenon. Among non-immigrants, the proportion of people living by themselves is 20 percent. Education levels influence the opportunities for societal participation. The educational situation of Muslim immigrants differs substantially from that of non-Muslim immigrants from the same countries. There is a significantly lower educational level among them, even if qualifications acquired both in the country of origin and in Germany are included.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Table Four: Educational situation of people from predominantly Muslim countries
Almost 15 percent of all Muslims with an immigration background have no educational qualification (compared to 7 percent of non-Muslim immigrants), whereas only 34.1 percent are highly qualified (compared to 42.2 percent of non-Muslims). Hence, among those immigrants who have come from predominantly Muslim countries Christians, Jews and others are significantly better educated than Muslims. There are, however, significant differences between different groups within the Muslim category. The education levels of those from Iran, Central Asia and South (East) Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malaysia) are higher than those from Turkey and the Middle East. This, in part, reflects different migration patterns; immigrants from Turkey and the Middle East came to Germany in the context of recruitment agreements as unskilled or low-skilled workers. The educational situation of women is clearly worse than that of men; 30 percent of female immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries have completed school in their country of origin without any educational qualifications (25.5 percent of men). However, the situation is better for those who have had their school career in Germany. Only 12.7 percent of male Muslims and only 11 percent of female Muslims with an immigration background have completed their school career without any formal qualification. The study Muslim Life in Germany2 concludes: The majority of interviewees are in gainful employment or were serving an apprenticeship at the time of the survey (72 percent in total) (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 214). The highest unemployment rates can be found among Muslim immigrants from Central Asia, the Middle East and Iran (between 12.8 and 17.6 percent). Moreover, unemployment rates are higher among Muslim than among non-Muslim immigrants. Labour participation follows gender differences; only 43 percent of female immigrants are employed.
German: Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland.
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Figure One: Employment situation of Muslims in Germany
What is more, it seems that formal educational qualifications do not influence the employment rates of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries. Table Five: Muslim immigrants aged 16 to 64 in gainful employment or training
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany The situation seems to be less favourable among those who have acquired formal qualifications in their country of origin. This suggests a lack of recognition of foreign qualification. High employment and training rates among those who have no qualifications at all from their country of origin or Germany point to the major role of a) the low-skill sector and b) ethnic niche economies for Muslims.
RE G IO N AL DI S T RI BU TI ON , OR GA N IS AT I O N L IF E AN D S E T TL EM E NT P A TT E R NS
Considering the regional distribution of Muslims, there is an astonishing and unambiguous pattern in Germany; almost all Muslims -98.4 percent- have settled in the western Federal States3. The highly industrialised west and the economically prosperous south of Germany -North Rhine-Westphalia (33.1 percent), Baden-Wurttemberg (16.6 percent) and Bavaria (13.2 percent)- play major roles as Muslim settlement regions. In contrast, only 1.6 percent of all Muslims living in Germany are based in the new federal states, i. e. Germanys east. Table Six: Regional distribution of Muslims in Germany
Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 102
There are 2342 local Muslim parishes and mosque societies in Germany (Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2012, p. 52). Their origins are quite heterogeneous. Most of them are attended by Turkish immigrants, followed by Bosnian and Pakistani immigrants. Some of the local parishes form part of nationwide
German: Laender (sg.: Land).
10
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Muslim community associations, of which, in turn, a few form the Coordinating Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM)4, which is perhaps the key Muslim umbrella organisation. The KRM is composed of the four largest Muslim organisations in Germany: DITIB5, IRD6, ZMD7, and VIKZ8. It was founded on 11 April 2007 as the Muslim contact body for wider society and for politicians; according to media information it represents c. 280,000 (of 3.8 to 4.3 million) Muslims, including both Shiite and Sunnite Muslims, although Alevi Muslims are excluded. Three of the four Muslim umbrella organisations send two representatives to the KRM General Assembly; DITIB has three representatives and possesses a power of veto. This is significant, for example when it comes to a decision on a membership application (which is limited to umbrella organisations). Table Seven: Muslim communities in Germany and their origins Frequency
No dominant group Turkey Bosnia Pakistan Germany Afghanistan Albania Lebanon Ghana Kosovo Macedonia Tunisia Egypt Iraq Iran Greece Algeria Bangladesh Indonesia Saudi Arabia Togo Other No details 56 731 51 29 9 6 6 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 21 205
%
4.9 64.1 4.5 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8 18.0
Total
1141
100
German: Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM). The Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (German: Tuerkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion e.V.) was founded in 1984 and consists of c. 900 mosque societies. 6 The Muslim Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (German: Islamrat fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) was founded in 1986, represents about 140,000 Muslims and is another large association of Muslims living in Germany. 7 The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (German: Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland) was founded in 1994 and, as a multi-ethnic association, counterbalances the predominantly Turkish Muslim Council. 8 The Association of Muslim Cultural Centres (German: Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren) is the oldest and one of the largest Muslim associations, founded in 1973.
4 5
11
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany

DITIB and the Muslim Council IRD are the two largest Muslim umbrella organisations affiliated with the Coordinating Council, and in general. The IRD, founded in 1986, is the largest, representing c. 140,000 Muslims in 30 organisations (among them Milli Goerues, an organisation observed by the domestic intelligence service BfV see below) (Cf. taz 2007). DITIB, in turn, represents 110,000 Muslims in 600 parishes (Cf. taz 2007). It is connected to Turkey, as it is supervised by the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Ankara, and is thus responsible for Turkish Muslim affairs in Germany, such as the sending of imams and religious scholars. Almost two-thirds of the parishes (65 percent) are located in medium and large size cities. Only five percent of them are located in small municipalities. The majority (53.7 percent) of mosques are located in city centres, with one quarter (26.8 percent) in residential areas and one seventh (14.7 percent) in industrial parks. Table Eight: Location of Muslim communities Type Small community Small town Medium town Large town Large city Don't know Not specified Total Inhabitants Less than 5000 5,000-20,000 20,000-100,000 100,000-500,000 500,000+ N/A N/A Frequency 60 278 385 236 129 38 15 1141 % 5.26 24.36 33.74 20.68 11.31 3.33 1.31 100
IN S T I TU TI ON AL IS E D C OOP E R AT IO N : T H E ISL A M C ONF E R EN C E A ND OT H ER P ROJ E C TS
Since September 2006, there has been state-led institutionalised cooperation between the Federal Government and Muslims living in Germany through the German Islam Conference9. The DIK was initiated by the-then Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schuble (currently Federal Minister of Finance) in order to improve the institutional and societal integration of Muslims in Germany. According to the recent coalition agreement of CDU/CSU and FDP, the DIK has initiated a process of integrating Muslims into German religious constitutional law. The Conferences long-term goal is (1) to strengthen societal cohesion, (2) to improve the integration of Muslims into German society, and (3) to prevent extremism.
German: Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK).
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany The first phase (2006-2009) aimed to build the agreed theoretical foundations for future action, to discuss fundamental questions, and discuss legal framework conditions. Phase two (2010-2013) has a more practical focus. The Conference is focused on three issues in phase two: (1) the establishment of institutionalised cooperation between the state and Muslims, which includes Muslim theological courses at universities, basic and advanced training for Muslim religious officials and research on Muslim communities and religious officials; (2) the establishment of gender equality as a common value which includes the discussion of barriers to labour market participation, of patriarchal role models and of ways in which women can exercise their rights effectively; and (3) the prevention of extremism, radicalisation and societal polarisation. The latter includes the promotion of tolerance towards Muslims, and the prevention of prejudices and stereotypes. The Conference works on two levels. The Plenum of 3010 as the highest organ of the Conference, constitutes the upper level and meets annually. It is composed of three parts (1) 16 representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany (six from the Federal Republic, six from the Laender, and six from exemplary municipalities plus the Federal Minister of the Interior as the host) (2) seven representatives of Muslim umbrella organisations and (3) ten representatives of non-organised Muslims. The main task of the Plenum of 30 is to adopt proposals and recommendations of the lower level institutions of the Conference, to control the overall processes. The lower level of the Conference consists of working groups. Three working groups have so far been established, one on German social system and value consensus, another on questions on religion within German constitutional law and the third on the economy and media as bridge systems. There is also a discussion group on security and Islamism11. It is their task to prepare for the annual plenum during bimonthly meetings. The most recent plenum took place in April 2012. It adopted a statement against domestic violence and forced marriage. It presented further measures, such as a symposium on Muslims and Job Markets Promote Diversity, Use Potentials, an interim report on Preventive Work with Young People, a handout on role models and role model problems and a youth prize competition (Stories of Success12). A core issue was the publication of the research project Muslim Community Life in Germany13 which follows the project finished in 2009, Muslim Life in Germany14. Both studies have the character of pilot projects, as they are the first ones to provide significant data on Muslims in Germany. These have become key social scientific data sources for those who work on Muslims in Germany.
German: Plenum der Dreissig. Islam and Islamism should not be confused. When the term Islamism is used subsequently it refers to Islamist extremism, i. e. the condemnation of constitutional democracy or one of its fundamental pillars (separation of powers, pluralism, human rights) by Muslims. Thus Islamism and Islamist extremism are used interchangeably hereinafter. Self-evidently, only a radical minority of Muslims rejects the principles of constitutional democracy. To put it briefly, Islamism can be grasped as the abuse of Islam for political purposes. Islamist terrorism, in turn, is regarded here as a sub-phenomenon of Islamist extremism and will be named explicitly at the appropriate place. 12 German: Erfolgsgeschichten. 13 German: Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland. 14 German: Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland.
10 11
13
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany There are other projects that involve partnerships between Muslims and the state. The Initiative Security Partnership Together with Muslims for Security15 is an initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany (represented by the Federal Ministry of the Interior16) and Muslim citizens. It was founded in 2011 in order to fight radicalisation, violence, and Islamism. The atmosphere is ambiguous. Both groups, the state and Muslims, seem to see the need for cooperation, learning and discussion. This, however, does not mean that they always sing from the same hymn sheet. The discussion is quite often controversial, but, for the most part, constructive. At the same time, prejudices in society, which individual politicians want to exploit in order to win elections, pose a serious threat to the process of rapprochement.
RE AC T IO NS OF MU SL I MS TO W A RDS C O UN T ER -T E RR OR IS M
Counter-terrorism strategies and measures have not played a major role in Germanys Muslim communities so far. Surprisingly, their overall feedback to counter-terrorism strategies -among them the DIK as one of the measures- seems to be ambiguous. For example, in 2009, The Muslim Council in Germany (IRD) supported the German Islam Conference of that year but objected to several of its conclusions. There was particular objection to the restriction of talks on security measures and a prevention approach that categorised Muslims as potentially dangerous for German society, without concrete reasons. The central point of criticism from the IRD and elsewhere thus concerns the general suspicion under which Muslims live in Germany. In contrast, the IRD notes, Islamophobia and spreading racism towards Muslims is not a subject of discussion (Cf. Islamrat fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2009, p. 6f.). The IRDs main critique of Germanys official counterterrorism strategy is that it creates suspicion towards Muslims (Cf. Sahinoez 2011), a consequence that will undermine further dialogue between Muslims and the state. The DIK constitutes a core part of the states counter-terrorist strategy in a wider sense. In 2011, the main criticism towards the DIK was that it provided a culture of denunciation among Muslims, that the measures only represented a political gesture, and that Muslims were used as instruments for the states security politics (Cf. Islamkonferenz von Kontroversen ueberschattet 2011). High-profile German Muslims such as Cem Oezdemir and Omid Nouripour (both politicians of Buendnis 90/Gruene), in cooperation with other Muslim associations as well as other prominent individual Muslims, condemned acts in the name of Islam that kill innocent people (Cf. Oezdemir et al. 2004). They united in the Muslims against Terrorism Initiative17, an association that aims to take a public stand against terrorism on behalf of Muslims in order to dispel the perception that Muslims were somehow pro-terrorism. (Cf. Muslime gegen Terror 2012).
German: Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft Gemeinsam mit Muslimen fuer Sicherheit. German: Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI). 17 German: Muslime gegen Terror.
15 16
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G EN E RAL OP I N IO NS ON C OU NT E R- T ER RO RI SM
Surveys suggest that the majority of Germans believes that the state should do more in order to prevent terrorism and to protect its people. Infratest dimap and the Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD) are the most important polling agencies that sometimes poll social attitudes and opinions towards terrorism and counter-terrorism. Infratest dimap frequently asks for public opinions on the states counter-terrorism strategy. Their standard question is Which opinion do you hold on aspects of counterterrorism in Germany? Respondents are given a choice of possible answers: I expect attacks to happen in Germany, too. They should do more in order to discover further security gaps. All in all our country is well protected against terrorism. The effort for permanent controls and surveillance is exaggerated.
However, the options available to respondents differ slightly between different surveys. For example, in 2011, the response They should do more in order to discover further security gaps and All in all our country is well protected against terrorism were added, whereas the responses I am watching increasingly for suspicious looking people and objects in everyday life and I avoid large gatherings of people like Christmas markets and stations were removed. They were included in the 2010 version of the survey. Between 2010 and 2011, the proportion of respondents who expected terrorist attacks to occur in Germany increased from 71 percent to 79 percent. The percentage of respondents who thought that the government should do more in order to discover security gaps increased from 55 percent in 2010 to 67 percent in 2011. Moreover, the share of people who thought that the effort for permanent controls and surveillance was exaggerated decreased from 24 percent in 2010 to 18 percent in 2011. In 2011, only a few months before the TBEG18 expired, 79 percent of respondents were of the opinion that the TBEG should be renewed (Cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2011).
18
Complementary Law on Counter-Terrorism (German: Terrorismusbekaempfungsergaenzungsgesetz TBEG), see below.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Figure Two: What the German population thought about counter-terrorism in 2011 What is your opinion with regards to aspects of counter terrorism in Germany?
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% I expect attacks to More should be done All things considered, The costs of constant happen in Germany to detect loopholes in our country is well controls and security protected from surveillance outweigh terrorist attacks the benefits
Source: Infratest dimap 2011.
Agree Disagree
Polling by the IfD explored opinions and attitudes towards terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. In 2006, they found 61 percent of respondents considered terrorist attacks possible. 69 percent of the interviewees supported video surveillance and 42 percent thought that armed security guards in trains would improve security (Cf. Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach 2006). In 2011, five percent of the interviewees in a survey conducted by the IfD took the view that the state should do more in the area of counter-terrorism (Cf. Deutsche Telekom/T-Systems 2011, p. 32). At the same time, five percent of the respondents wanted fewer encroachments by the state, e. g. by the use of data surveillance. In a 2011 survey, two thirds of respondents rejected the retention of data without reason for six months; they only supported retention of such data where there was suspicion of a crime. (Cf. Muehlbauer 2011).
DI SC R I M IN A T IO N L E V EL S
Evidence of experiences of discrimination can be found in several studies. The study Lifeworlds of Young Muslims in Germany19 measured two aspects of discrimination: Personal discrimination (I have already been teased or offended due to my descent.) Group-related discrimination (The condemnation of Muslims as terrorists in public after terrorist attacks enrages me.)
19
German: Lebenswelten junger Muslime in Deutschland.
16
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany There is surprisingly little research on general levels of discrimination. Furthermore, the only surveys that focus on discrimination levels against Muslims are state-sponsored studies. Research related to this topic has not been conducted yet by university institutes or independent polling agencies. In the Lifeworld study, levels of both general and group discrimination were measured on a five-point Likert scale from one (full disagreement) to five (full agreement). It found that the levels of experience of personal discrimination are quite low (average: 2.31). This suggests that most Muslims do not see themselves as victims of discrimination. Around half of Muslims do not report any direct experiences of discrimination. Respondents in the study reported on a fairly negative and unapproachable attitude of Germans towards Muslims and people of Turkish or Arabian descent, respectively. Individuals also reported experiences of direct, partially fierce discrimination by Germans. (Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 72). Muslims point to the role of the media as contributing to the growing distance between Germans and Muslims (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 72). The first mentioned study was by order of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. These findings are supported by another study by the BMI. Only a small minority (3.4 percent) report being discriminated against personally in a very fierce manner, and 18.6 percent in a fierce manner (Bundesministerium des Innern 2007, pp. 104-107). These findings do not rest on individual sentiments but on quasi-objective data (number of common assaults, insults etc). Therefore they rather reflect de facto discrimination (though resting on individual statements) rather than the level of perceived discrimination. Figure Three: Personal discrimination (increasing agreement from left to right)
Source: Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 181.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany In contrast to personal discrimination, measures for the level of group-related discrimination are considerably higher. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement The condemnation of Muslims as terrorists in public after terrorist attacks enrages me. On a five point scale, the average response was 4.28 (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 182). However, caution is needed in interpreting these findings. The question does not ask how widespread or frequent the practice of condemning Muslims as terrorist is, but how respondents feel or would feel about this practice. In order to measure the level of perceived discrimination the question should be The ongoing condemnation of Muslims as terrorists in public after terrorist attacks enrages me or In my eyes Muslims are under continuous general suspicion of being terrorists. Similar criticism can be made of two out of the three statements used to measure group discrimination in the BMI study; Germans reject Muslims, Muslim children are disadvantaged in Germany and (with reversed polarity) Muslims can practice their religion freely in Germany. The refusal of a minority group by the majority may give information on the context or causes of discrimination. However, it is probably not a measure of discrimination. Moreover, the free practice of religion is a mere feature of constitutional democracy instead of an indicator of social discrimination in terms of disadvantageous treatment. Only the disadvantageous treatment of Muslim children could be a good indicator of social discrimination. A majority of the respondents (51.8 percent) agreed with this statement in 2007. Figure Four: Group discrimination (increasing agreement from left to right)
Source: Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 182.
All in all, there is a so-called personal/group discrimination discrepancy, a synonym for low empirical correlations between both dimensions of discrimination that other surveys have reported on too (Cf.
18
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Bundesministerium des Innern 2012h, p. 180). These fundamental indications are not affected in a substantive manner by minor methodological objections considered here. The level of perceived personal discrimination is generally lower than the level of group discrimination. This finding is reported elsewhere, too; in 2011 Yasin Ba voiced an opinion that might be common within the Muslim immigrant group. He might be right, appearing to articulate the views of many Muslims: The Islam issue has been strongly politicised and discussed ideologically after 9/11. Muslim immigrants as well as their religion are juxtaposed in opposition to the Christian or German majority population. Its about simple friend-foe-thought patterns []. A change in the perception of minorities has taken place in Germany and Europe: Before 9/11 immigrants have been associated with attributions such as Turk, Moroccan, Indonesian, or Albanian. The majority population nowadays talks of Muslims instead of Turks. Thus, Muslims are reduced to their religion. What is more, after 9/11 integration and Islam are used and abused more and more by parties and elites for political campaigning. [] In addition after 9/11 debates on dominant culture, on headscarves, burkas, forced marriages, honour killing, oppression of women, violence and macho behaviour, on terror and mosques and minarets have intensified. Assaults on mosques, like incendiary agents, daubs, and damage to property, have increased [219 assaults between 2001 and 2011 (Cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2012b, pp. 4-22)]. Almost daily there are reports on successful, however clearly more on failed integration processes. Discriminations on the job markets are currently increasing (See Peucker 2010) [] Many Muslims complain about living under general suspicion due to the public perception and debates since 9/11 (Ba 2011, pp. 3f.).
II.
Legal Context
K E Y L E G ISL AT I ON
Penal Code20 129 (a) and (b) relate to the formation of terrorist organisations. Both subparagraphs were passed in 1976 as part of the legal response to the actions of the Red Army Faction (RAF). They are also known as Lex RAF. Under paragraph 129, the foundation and the membership of organisations whose purposes or acts are targeted at murder, homicide, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violating personal liberties (unlawful detention and extortionate abduction) is made an offence, punished with up to ten years imprisonment. Moreover, the foundation and membership of such organisations are made punishable offences, whose purposes and acts are targeted at causing physical or mental harms, homicidal offences (e. g. criminal property damage, incendiarism, causing nuclear explosions and explosions, abuse of ionising radiance), several offences against the environment (i. e. release of toxins), against some paragraphs of the Gun Control Law21, and of the Weapons Control Act22, provided that these acts are
German: Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). German: Waffengesetz (WaffG). 22 German: Waffenkontrollgesetz (WaffKontrG).

20 21
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany intended for intimidating the population in a considerable way, coercing government agencies or international organisations by the use or threat of violence in order to impair the basic economic, political, social, or constitutional structures of a state or an international organisation. The threat of such acts is punished with a sentence of up to five years imprisonment. As a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the legislature23 has adopted extensive legislative amendments that, all in all, consist of more than 25 different measures. Core elements of this new security architecture are (1) the Law on Counter-Terrorism24 from 11 January 2002 and (2) the Complementary Law on Counter-Terrorism25 from 10 January 2007. The TBEG only prolongs the regulations made in the TBG that were in force from January 2002 until January 2007. It is therefore the result of an evaluation and readjustment of the TBG (Bundesministerium des Innern 2006). Both laws summarise amendments of more than 15 laws into one package and extend the powers of the security services. However, some of the laws that were enacted for the improvement of counter-terrorism were integrated in other legislation procedures. Both laws -the TBG and the TBEG- are framework legislation. They include rules on: Improvement of data exchange. Prevention of terrorist offenders entry. Implementation of identity-proving measures in visa procedures. Improvement of border controls. Enlargement of the Federal Criminal Police Offices26 powers. Intensified screenings of security vulnerable activities. Inclusion of biometric characteristics into identification papers. Restrictions of extremist foreign associations.
The latest development in this field is the Amending Law on the Protection of the Constitution27 from 10 January 2012. This amendment became necessary as the powers of the secret services that were regulated in the TBEG expired on this date. Following an evaluation in 2009 of the efficacy and proportionality of the powers given to the secret service, the 2012 law extended the powers until 2016. However, several powers of the intelligence services that were provided for in the TBEG until 2012 have been removed; these include the power to obtain information on postal traffic (Where does who send what post?), the
German: Deutscher Bundestag. German: Terrorismusbekaempfungsgesetz (TBG). 25 German: Terrorismusbekaempfungsergaenzungsgesetz (TBEG). 26 German: Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). 27 German: Gesetz zur Aenderung des Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetzes.
23 24
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany use of certain technical measures in accommodations in order to protect servants of the intelligence services, and the power to obtain information on data about postal services. All other security service powers have been retained. This includes the right to obtain information from airline companies, financial services companies, telecom companies and teleservices companies. These powers permit the intelligence services to obtain information on several target persons. However, the threshold for the use of these powers has been increased by the 2012 law; evidence is needed to justify the assumption that the target person forcefully endangers the interests legally protected by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution28. Thus, counter-terrorist measures can only be directed at people on whom information is available. Moreover, the secret services may obtain information on flight bookings and account data. What is more, in 2012 the coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP has increased parliamentary oversight and control over these processes. A committee of the German Bundestag, (G10-Committee) is able to supervise the actions of the secret services in obtaining information from airlines and financial companies. Until now, these powers have only been supervised by the ministry. The government has also strengthened the rights of individuals potentially under surveillance; in particular, the law now forbids discrimination against individuals on the grounds of information obtained. For example, nobody may be discharged from employment due to the fact that intelligence services requested personal data from their employer. Finally, the increased powers of the security services are connected to an improved evaluation procedure. The capacities efficacy has to be interrelated with (1) the frequency; and (2) the consequences of encroachments upon fundamental rights. Concrete impacts of the latest legislation on everyday life include, for instance: Stricter security clearances in air traffic. Security personnel being subject to annual reliability checks. Identification papers being adjusted to computer-based identifications and complemented by biometric characteristics. Extremist religious communities may be outlawed, as the law on associations was amended in 2001 (deletion of the religious privilege). The capacities of various security services have been extended.
28
German: Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV).
21
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany The BKA may prosecute members of foreign terrorist organisations and take action in matters of cyber-crime. Hence the punishment of membership of terrorist associations has been extended to foreign organisations. The Federal Police29 may deploy sky marshals. The BfV may observe actions of individuals and groups that may harm international understanding and peaceful coexistence. It is supposed to track capital flows of terror suspects through information obtainment. The police and secret services have gained access to a so-called Counter-Terrorism File30.
The latter point is a consequence of the Joint Data Law31 from 22 December 2006, which enables the intelligence services, the police of the Federal Republic, and states to summarise and access information concerning terrorism in a joint database, the Counter-terrorism File.32 The database contains information that allows conclusions about terrorist attacks: Affiliation to terroristic associations. Possession of firearms. Telecommunications and internet data. Bank accounts and lockers. School education and vocational education details, and job positions. Family status, religious affiliation. Loss of identification papers. Travel movements and known sojourns at places with terror backgrounds (such as terrorist training camps). The Law on Data Retention33 regularised governmental data retention in Germany from 2008 until 2010. However, on 2 March 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court34 declared the law unconstitutional. Up to
German: Bundespolizei (BP). German: Anti-Terror-Datei. 31 German: Gemeinsame-Dateien-Gesetz. 32 These are the Federal Department of Public Prosecution (German: Staatsanwaltschaft), the BKA, the Federal Police, the BfV, the 16 State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (German: Landesaemter fuer Verfassungsschutz LfV), the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (German: Militaerischer Abschrim-Dienst MAD), the Customs Criminal Investigation Office (German: Zollkriminalamt ZKA), the Federal Intelligence Service (German: Bundesnachrichtendienst BND), and 16 State Offices of Criminal Investigations (German: Landeskriminalaemter LKA). 33 German: Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Telekommunikationsueberwachung und anderer verdeckter Ermittlungsmanahmen sowie zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2006/24/EG Gesetz zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung.
29 30
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany the present day, a controversy about the concrete arrangement of the EU Directive rumbles on between the Federal Ministry of Justice35, represented by Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (FDP), and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, represented by Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU). Preventive online searches, i. e. governmental spying on personal data saved on a personal computer, have been another hotly-disputed topic in German counter-terrorism. According to a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2008, online searches are not in conflict with Articles 1036 and 1337 of the constitution38. However, they are permitted by law for the averting of danger if, and only if, they are sufficiently plainly regulated by law, if they protect outstanding legally protected interests, and if they are enabled by a court. Preventive online searches are statutorily regulated by 20k of the BKA Law. Hence, only officials of the BKA may run these searches. There was a significant reform of the penal code in 2009. Before 2009, the judiciary could sentence terror suspects only if they were guilty of being members of terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda or if they conducted terrorist offences. The amendments in 2009 made the preparation of severe state-endangering acts of violence a punishable offence. That includes handling firearms and explosives (up to ten years in prison), socialising with people in order to attend terrorist training (up to three years in prison) or participating in such training, provided that violent intentions can be attested.
L E GA L D E F I N IT I ONS OF T E RR OR IS M
Although there is comprehensive, and to some extent decades-long, legislation on terrorism, there is no uniform nationally consistent definition of the term terrorism. While the definitions of various agencies are consistent in their basic terms, it is still necessary to outline the different legal definitions of terrorism. According to the BMI, terrorism is the most aggressive and most militant form of political extremism that can pursue extremist objectives with the measures of a long-term forcible fight by systematic use of massive acts of violence. The core feature of terrorism is the perpetration of severe plots by strictly clandestinely operating groups based on the division of labour. (Bundesministerium des Innern 2012i). The Offices for the Protection of the Constitution derive their terrorism definition from the acts that are subsumed under 129 a StGB (formation of terrorist organisations). Accordingly, terrorist offences are one form of politically-motivated crime (Landesamter fuer Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, Bremen, and Baden-Wuerttemberg 2012). Terrorism is defined by the intelligence services as the long term, systematic fight for political objectives that are forced through with outrages against other peoples health and life,
German: Bundesverfassungsgericht. German: Bundesministerium der Justiz (BMJus). 36 Article 10 GG guarantees postal privacy and secrecy of telecommunications. 37 Article 13 GG guarantees the inviolability of the home. 38 German: Grundgesetz (GG).
34 35
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany and property, especially with felonies named in 129 a subparagraph 1 StGB. A synonym for the felonies named in this paragraph is severe politically motivated violent offences.
RI G HTS T O S TOP , S E A RC H A N D Q U ES T I ON P E OP L E
The right to stop, search and question people is regulated by federal state law, as, in most cases, the police authorities39 of the Laender are responsible for identity checks. It serves as an exclusive measure for protection against threats and criminal prosecution. Whenever these checks are not conducted by police authorities of the Laender, the Federal Police40 is responsible, for instance in trains or at borders. It includes identity verifications, verifications of authenticity of documents, and the check of vehicles (exclusive of traffic checks). As their purpose is the protection against threats and criminal prosecution, a concrete suspicion concerning an individual is not a prerequisite; although there must be a general and assignable reason for identity checks, a person need not necessarily be suspicious in order to be checked by police. What is more, ethnic profiling is prohibited. If there is a general cause for identity checks (such as averting dangers), everybody may be subject to an identity check on principle.
D ET A IN M E NT A ND D EP OR TA T IO N
The question of detainment of people cannot be answered properly without a look at the relevant legislation on expulsion and deportation: According to 5 subparagraph 441 and 54 no. 542 of the Residence Act43 a foreigners residence status is usually refused if the facts justify the conclusion that he is, or was, a member of an association that supports terrorism, or in the case that he supports or supported such an association. Moreover, he will be deported if he endangers the liberal-democratic constitutional order or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, or if he takes part in violent activities in the pursuance of such aims, or if he calls for the use of violence publicly or if he offers violence. According to 58a44 of the Residence Act (Deportation Order45) a supreme federal state authority46 may deport a foreigner expeditiously if facts allow the prognosis that his deportation will prevent exceptional
German: Landespolizei. German: Bundespolizei (BP). 41 A residence title shall be refused if one of the grounds for expulsion pursuant to Section 54, nos. 5 to 5b applies. Exemptions from sentence 1 may be approved in justified individual cases, if the foreigner divulges said activities or allegiances to the competent authorities and credibly distances himself or herself from his or her actions posing a threat to security. In justified individual cases, the Federal Ministry of the Interior or a body designated by the Federal Ministry of the Interior may permit exemptions from sentence 1 prior to the foreigner entering the country for the purposes of crossing the border, and for a subsequent stay of up to six months.
39 40
42
A foreigner will generally be expelled if () 5. facts justifiably lead to the conclusion that he or she belongs to or has belonged to an organisation which supports terrorism or supports or has supported such an organisation; expulsion may only be based on membership or supportive acts in the past insofar as they form the basis for a currently prevailing danger, 5a. he or she endangers the free democratic basic order or the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, participates in acts of violence or publicly incites violence in pursuit of political objectives or threatens the use of violence, 5b. facts justifiably lead to the conclusion that he or she is preparing or has prepared a serious violent offence endangering the state as specified in Section 89a (1) of the Criminal Code pursuant to Section 89a (2) of the Criminal Code; expulsion may only be based on preparatory acts in the past insofar as they form the basis for a special clear and present danger, (). 43 German: Aufenthaltsgesetz (AufenthG).
44
(1) The supreme Land authority may issue a deportation order against a foreigner without prior expulsion on the basis of a prognosis based on facts, in order to avert a special danger to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or a terrorist threat. The deportation order shall be
24
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany risks to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany or terrorist threats. The BMI has the right to initiate such proceedings if an exceptional interest of the Federal Republic justifies this step. However, all of the mentioned rights to deport foreigners as a consequence of terrorism-related acts have turned out to be irrelevant, as the charge of the supply of terrorism has to be proved beyond any doubt. In 2004 and 2005, there was a lively discussion within German politics on whether terrorism suspects who may not be deported given the threat of the death penalty or torture in their country of origin may be detained preventively without any particular cause. The participants in this debate did not divide along party lines. Since 1 January 2005, the law has allowed for preventive detention of foreigners -and only foreigners- who shall be deported as a consequence of terrorism related activities ( 58a of the Residence Act Deportation Order). They may be detained preventively47 for a period of up to 18 months, when deportation cannot be enforced immediately. For this reason, preventive detention is one form of detention pending deportation. The other one is preparatory detention48.
OF F EN C ES R EL A T E D TO I NC IT E M E NT A ND SUP P OR T OF T E RR OR IS M
129a subparagraph 5 StGB concerns the support of terrorism. The mere support of terrorist organisations is punishable with up to ten years imprisonment (clause 1). The support of organisations that only threaten terrorist acts is punished with up to five years imprisonments or with a fine (clause 1). The recruitment of members for terrorist organisations is punishable by up to five years imprisonment (clause 2). According to subparagraph 8 of the same paragraph, courts may adjudicate somebodys right to hold an office or his passive electoral right. 129 b only expands the purview of 129 to terrorist organisations abroad. In general, the police are responsible for averting terrorist dangers, not the German Armed Forces. Incitement of an offence is also punished just as the offence itself, on condition that the person concerned incites intentionally and that the executing offender was not bound and determined yet ( 26 StGB). It is important to distinguish incitement of an offence from the public demand for offences ( 111 StGB). A person who demands unlawful acts in public, in assemblies or by distributing publications will receive the same sentence as somebody who commits the crime concerned. If the demand remains unsuccessful, the offender will be punished with a prison sentence of up to five years or a fine. However the sentence for an unsuccessful demand shall not be more severe than for a public demand for offences that bears fruit.
immediately enforceable; no notice of intention to deport shall be necessary. (2) The Federal Ministry of the Interior may assume responsibility if a special interest on the part of the Federation applies. The supreme Land authority is to be notified accordingly. Deportation orders issued by the Federation shall be enforced by the Federal Police. 45 German: Abschiebungsanordnung. 46 German: Oberste Landesbehoerde. 47 German: Sicherungshaft. 48 German: Vorbereitungshaft.
25

C H EC K S A N D B AL A NC ES
The most important checks and balances on the measures of counter-terrorism legislation have constitutional status: Articles 3 (equality principle)49 and 33 of the constitution50. According to the first subparagraph of the equality principle, all humans are equal before the law. According to the second one, men and women are equal before the law. The state fosters the effective enforcement of gender equality and works towards the elimination of existing disadvantages. Furthermore, nobody shall be discriminated against or be given preference due to sex, descent, race, language, homeland or origin, belief, religious or political views. Nobody shall face discrimination on the grounds of disability. Article 33 provides that the enjoyment of civil rights, the admission to administrative bodies as well as the rights acquired by ministration in civil services are independent from religious denominations. Thus both constitutional articles -3 and 33- are directed at governmental action. They are supposed to protect individuals rights from unreasonable interference by the state based on discriminatory decisions. Apart from these defensive rights that protect the population from discrimination by the state there is a 2006 law against discrimination, the General Act on Equal Treatment51. As with Article 3 of the constitution, it prevents discrimination against people as a consequence of their race or ethnic origin, sex, religious or political views, or disability. The inclusion of age and sexual orientation were new grounds not found in Article 33 GG. What is more, in contradistinction to Article 3 of the constitution, the AGG prevents discrimination not by the state but by employers or private persons. It is hence assigned to employment law, service law, and private contract law, and represents an encroachment upon private autonomy. The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency52 is an institution established in order to implement the law. It supports people who think they might have been victims of discrimination through the following measures; it informs on rights and legal steps, refers to information centres, and mediates between the parties involved, takes action in public relations, conducts its own research, implements antidiscrimination measures, and provides the Bundestag with four-yearly anti-discrimination reports (Cf. ADS 2012).
III. Policy and Policing Context

K E Y P OL IC I ES
At present, Germanys key policy in relation to counter-terrorism is, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, based on a long-term, five-pillar security strategy (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012a):
German: Gleichheitsgrundsatz. German: Grundgesetz (GG). 51 German: Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG). 52 German: Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (ADS).
49 50
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Destroying terrorist structures by increased use of search and investigative measures in order to prevent terrorism. This includes the acquisition and the assessment of information by the security services at an early stage as well as cross-linking these institutions and equipping them with adequate instruments. The internet plays a major role here (see Joint Internet Centre)53. Fighting the causes of terrorism by preventing radicalisation processes. This implies grappling with Islamist ideology as well as strengthening integration and social cohesion. An early-warning system that detects early signs of radicalisation and offers help if needed. The initiative Together against Extremism Together for Security54 come under this pillar. Protecting the population and reducing the countrys vulnerability. The Federal Government aims at making it harder for terrorists to find targets to attack. This is why measures are adopted that increase airport security; vulnerable infrastructures has to be protected as its malfunction would have unpredictable consequences. Managing the consequences of an attack. This comprises limiting the consequences of an attack as well as civil protection and aftercare of victims. Using the opportunities for European and international cooperation. The United Nations, G8, European Union and NATO play a major role in order to adopt common cross-border measures and projects. This security strategy reflects the four dimensions of the European security strategy that has been in force since 2005. It includes (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012b): Fighting the causes of terrorism and radicalisation tendencies. Protecting the population and reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Enlightening and preventing terrorist actions beforehand and destroying terrorist structures.
Counter-radicalisation (pillar 2 of the states security strategy) takes up much space in the counterterrorism policy of the Federal Government. It includes a multidimensional approach by the Ministry of the Interior; civic education and religious-political/interreligious dialogue as well as a policy of integration in general. Both the German Federal Agency for Civic Education55 and the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees56 play central roles in the field of civic education (Deutscher Bundestag 2005, p. 6). As a matter
German: Gemeinsames Internetzentrum (GIZ). German: Gemeinsam gegen Extremismus Gemeinsam fuer Sicherheit. 55 German: Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung (BPB). 56 German: Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge (BAMF).
53 54
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany of course, they cooperate with several other institutions that work in the field of integration, migration and civic education, such as the DIK. They do so with the help of educational offers (workshops, presentations, brochures, publications, and, as a core priority, internet sites such as www.bpb.de, www.bamf.de, www. deutsche-islam-konferenz.de), in which they provide information about core values in German society and constitutional democracy and information about several aspects of extremism, as well as integration courses, educational events of the BPB, central debates in society, political discussions, the handling of administrative bodies etc. Another central point of German integration and counter-radicalisation policy is the cross-linkage of civil society initiatives including those from the Muslim sphere. The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance against Extremism and Violence57 is an important forum for civil society concentration. It was brought into being on 23 May 2000 (the anniversary of the proclamation of the Grundgesetz) by the BMI and the BMJus. It is an alliance of a variety of initiatives and projects from across Germany. It aims at making civil societal engagement for democracy and tolerance in our country visible and encouraging as many fellow citizens as possible to take a stand for democracy (BfDT 2012). It serves as the central contact point and initiator for local projects in all fields of the practical promoting of democracy and tolerance (Cf. BfDT 2012). There are a number of other, more concrete initiatives, such as the programme Promoting Tolerance Strengthening Competence58, which aims at preventing right-wing extremism, and Initiative Strengthening Democracy59, the first federal programme against Islamist and left-wing extremism. It was established on 1 July 2010 by the Federal Minister for Families, Kristina Schroeder, and runs from 2011 to 2014 with a budget of 4.7 million Euros. The programme aims at reinforcing tolerant and democratic attitudes and behaviour in order to reduce the attractiveness of left-wing extremist and Islamist ideological and social offers (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2012). It currently funds 41 projects in three fields; education, local approaches, and cooperation with actors involved in the socializstion of young people (pedagogues, community workers, parents). Several ministries are involved in counter-terrorism strategy, especially in the prevention of Islamism. The Ministry of the Interior follows a universal approach which means addressing the development of extremist attitudes (via schools, education, youth welfare services) by promoting language skills, social and emotional competences, problem-solving capabilities, and integration by strengthening social and labour market participation. Furthermore, the Federal Government sees grappling Islamist ideology as critical. Educational projects aim to inform individuals about, and thus prevent, enemy stereotypes, ideologically inspired conspiracy theories, and Islamist interpretations of society. A recently-founded (2009) Centre of
German: Buendnis fuer Demokratie und Toleranz gegen Extremismus und Gewalt (BfDT). German: Toleranz foerdern Kompetenz staerken. 59 German: Initiative Demokratie staerken.
57 58
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Excellence for Islamic Studies60 within the BfV, as well as the Task Group Deradicalisation61 in the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre62 examines underlying ideologies. The Clearing Office Prevention Cooperation63, situated in the BAMF, is an institution that coordinates and promotes all cooperation projects between security services of the state and Muslim organisations basing on the idea that mutual knowledge and trust are the fundamentals of effective teamwork between police authorities and mosque societies (Bundesministerium des Innern 2012c).
C H AN G ES I N P OL IC I E S S INC E 20 01
To sum up, there have been no major changes in counter-terrorism policies. The counter-terrorism strategy of the Federal Government, inclusive of the prevention policy, has been relatively continuous since 2001. According to Peter R. Neumann, an analyst for the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES), the two security packages64 immediately adopted after 9/11 as well as the subsequent counter-terrorism legislation (TBG and TBEG) and other measures have not been excessively draconian or repressive compared to the programmes of other European countries (Neumann 2009, p. 9). Although Germany has experienced unsuccessful terrorist plots a few times, and fell prey to one successful attack, the government has not taken action for the sake of doing things. After the initial security packages were adopted, the government considered more institutionalised counter-terrorism measures and passed the TBG (2002), after its comprehensive evaluation the TBEG (2007), and then (2012) the law on the amendment of the Amending Law on the Protection of the Constitution65. These legal measures have been supported by soft measures that seem to improve contact with the Muslim community in Germany (such as the DIK), prevent radicalisation (as counter-extremism programmes and institutionalised educational offers), and advance research on Muslim culture, Islamist extremism and processes of radicalisation (as within the most recent Framework Programme Research on Civil Security 2012-201766).
K E Y I NS T I TU T IO NA L S TR UC T UR E S
In order to identify the key institutional structures responsible for counter-terrorism, it becomes apparent that we should separate counter-terrorism in a wider sense from counter-terrorism proper. The wider term comprises all initiatives and measures that are not only supposed to prevent terrorist attacks but also fight its causes located at a lower level, such as low educational levels, insufficient integration, or large scale discrimination. It thus includes measures that resemble those just mentioned. A number of governmental departments are responsible for counter-terrorism in this meaning, as it is a
German: Islamwissenschaftliches Kompetenzzentrum (IKO). German: AG Deradikalisierung. 62 German: Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ). 63 German: Clearingstelle Praeventionskooperation (CLS). 64 German: Sicherheitspakete. 65 German: Gesetz zur Aenderung des Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetzes. 66 German: Rahmenprogramm Forschung fuer die zivile Sicherheit 2012-2017.
60 61
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany multidimensional term. The Federal Ministry of the Interior67 is concerned with all questions around domestic security, civic education, integration, and the protection of the constitution. So the lions share of counter-terrorism falls to this portfolio. However, the Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth68 takes a part, too, especially in the societal fight against extremism with the help of broadbased educational programmes. Its other responsibilities concerning counter-terrorism derive from its name. The Federal Ministry of Defence69 is, in turn, concentrated on all questions around national defence, e. g. operations abroad (especially in Afghanistan). General research questions subsequently concern the Federal Ministry of Education and Research70. However, every portfolio may promote research in its own area71 in the form of concrete contract research if required (e. g in order to prepare the passing of laws). The administrative support of a general research project in turn falls within the BMBFs remit. Counter-terrorism proper includes measures that avert terrorist attacks. Hence, it usually includes institutionalised security structures of a country. Nearly all security institutions in Germany fall within the Ministry of the Interiors remit. The main exception to this is the German Armed Forces.72 Its role is to defend Germany abroad and to support the police if needed. According to emergency law, the Bundeswehr may assist the police when protecting civil objects and fighting organised and militarily armed insurgents. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr may take action in the course of administrative cooperation when terrorists have hijacked an airliner. In 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court, however, enjoined the Bundeswehr from bringing down such airlines by force of arms, as this was declared unconstitutional (BVerfGE 15. Februar 2006/466, 1 BvR 357/05).
RE SP O NS I BI L I T I ES I N C OU NT E R- T ER RO RI S M
The two institutional pillars that German counter-terrorism proper rests on are the intelligence services and the police authorities of the Federal Republic73 and of the Laender. They discharge crucial counterterrorism tasks and have different competences (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012e). In general, the intelligence services main task is to monitor those who legitimate violence as a general measure of a political or religious conflict. The police authorities, in turn, step in whenever these people start to take action, e. g. when they start to build bombs. This task-sharing not only follows questions of efficiency but is also a consequence of the so-called separation requirement74, a fundamental operating principle75. Accordingly, the police and the intelligence services discharge different tasks. That is the reason why no
German: Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI). German: Bundesminsiterium fuer Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (BMFSFJ). 69 German: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg). 70 German: Bundesministerium fuer Bildung und Forschung (BMBF). 71 German: Ressortforschung. 72 German: Bundeswehr. 73 German: Bund. 74 German: Trennungsgebot. 75 It has no legal status yet. The Federal Constitutional Court will probably elaborate the separation requirement in the course of a court decision on the cooperation of intelligence services and police authorities in autumn 2012. Until now it is only prohibited that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the criminal investigation departments are merged (Art. 87 GG).
67 68
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany German intelligence service may detain, interrogate and search people or confiscate property, powers reserved for police authorities. De facto, it is hard to distinguish one competence from the other, as it is not always clear which way investigations will take, and cooperation becomes necessary. Subsequently, the security services exchange information. For instance, the collection of information indicating a bomb plot is without practical use unless the intelligence services supply the police authorities with this information. Nevertheless, the legal framework applying to this informational exchange is rigid and pillared by two basic principles: The agencies are permitted to communicate only such individual-related data that the other agency absolutely needs in order to fulfil its tasks (need to know). The agencies are committed to communicate individual-related data that the other agency needs in order to fulfil its tasks (need to share). There are three intelligence services in Germany entrusted with tasks related to counter-extremism and counter-terrorism. Their areas of competence differ from each other (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012d). The core agency is the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution76 (controlling authority: BMI). Its main task is to collect data on, and monitor the development or evolution of, extremist or terrorist actions. It shall first identify and then prevent such ambitions, by informing security authorities instead of taking action itself. In doing so, it cooperates with the intelligence services of the Laender and makes use of intelligence measures such as observations, fake documents, license plates, and companies, and obtain information from financial institutions, airline companies and internet providers, within the legal limits. Since the most recent reform of counter-terrorism legislation in 2012, the G10 Committee77, as the panel empowered by the Bundestag, uses its right to control the intelligence service. It has the right to authorise telecommunication surveillance in specific circumstances. According to the separation requirement the BfV and other intelligence services may not and not even engage the police to- detain people, search accommodations, or explore the citizens general attitudes or data on private likes and dislikes, even if that may include extremist political opinions. They are, in contrast to concrete anti-constitutional effort, no cause for surveillance. Moreover, the BfV is instrumental in conducting security clearances of people working in facilities sensitive to security questions. This is supposed to ensure that secrets are kept and acts of sabotage (e. g. as a consequence of terrorist motivations) are averted. All in all, the BfV may collect data on people only in a very specific manner and as a result of certain suspicions.
76 77
German: Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV). German: G10-Kommission.
31
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Figure Five: Responsibilities of German intelligence services
Federal Ministry of the Interior
Federal Ministry of Defence
Federal Chancellery
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
Military CounterIntelligence Service
Federal Intelligence Service
Source: Own figure.
There are two more secret services in Germany, albeit their spheres of competence differ from that of the BfV. The Military Counter-Intelligence Service78 (controlling authority: BMVg) discharges the BfVs tasks in the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence, i. e. preventing extremist and terrorist ambitions in the Federal Armed Forces. The Federal Intelligence Service79 (controlling authority: Federal Chancellery), in turn, is Germanys intelligence service responsible for providing information sensitive to security and foreign policies, hence including terrorist perils from abroad. In order to facilitate cooperation between intelligence services and police authorities, a Joint CounterTerrorism Centre80 was established in 2004 (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012e and Bundesministerium des Innern 2012f). It is modelled on the US fusion centres and became necessary as German federalism posed a serious threat to an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The GTAZ concerns itself exclusively with Islamist terrorism and pools the security services professional knowledge without creating another agency and thus multiplying the number of administrative points of contact. In general, the GTAZ consists of the Intelligence Information and Analysis Office81, monitoring extremist and terrorist aspirations, and the Police Information and Analysis Office82, focusing more on criminal prosecution and averting terrorist dangers. Altogether 40 police and intelligence agencies of the Federal Republic and the Laender are represented in the GTAZ in Berlin:
78 79
Federal Criminal Police Office Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution Federal Intelligence Service
German: Militaerischer Abschirmdienst (MAD). German: Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). 80 German: Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ). 81 German: Nachrichtendienstliche Informations- und Analysestelle (NIAS). 82 German: Polizeiliche Informations- und Analysestelle (PIAS).
32
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Federal Police Customs Criminal Investigation Office Military Counter-Intelligence Service Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Representatives of the Federal Prosecutor General 16 State Offices of Criminal Investigation 16 State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution
They exchange information on the state of Islamist extremism and terrorism, as well as on specific cases, by the use of briefings. All participating agency representatives are placed in the same property in different buildings and are divided into nine working groups: Daily briefing: This is where the participating agencies share and evaluate their findings on a daily basis and with respect to necessary measures. Threat assessment: The members of this task group assess the current threat situation on the basis of incoming hints, warnings, and insights. Structural analysis: The members involved evaluate the long-term aspects of international terrorism. Operative informational exchange: The interconnection of informational exchange and operative measures. Case analysis: Here partial aspects of terrorism, such as the acquisition of money, arms, explosives or fake identity papers, are assessed in order to design counter-measures. Understanding of Islamist terrorist human potentials: Assessment of suspicious persons in order to fight the structures behind them. Accompanying measures concerning residence status: Checks whether measures related to the residence status or rights of asylum of suspicious persons are advisable. Deradicalisation: This group focuses on the exchange of experiences and information on good practices of security and political measures and approaches in order to fight Islamist radicalisation.
33
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Transnational aspects of Islamist terrorism: Identifies and assesses the conditions and trends of international Islamist terrorism.
Figure Six: The Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ)
Source: Bundesministerium des Innern 2012f.
In order to understand errors related to the right-wing terrorist actions that have taken place in the past few years, and which recently came to light (National Socialist Underground83), a Joint Defence Centre against Right-Wing Extremism84 was launched on 16 December 2011. Even though it is unconnected with the GTAZ, as it focuses on right-wing extremism, it was modelled on the GTAZ, since the work in this centre proved to be effective, preventing a number of terrorist attacks of which the Sauerland Group is probably the most prominent one. Another pivotal institution related to Germanys counter-terrorism strategy is the Joint Internet Centre.85 The centre consists of representatives of security authorities of the Federal Republic. The Laender may participate actively in it through, for example, visits. The centre has been developed in response to the fact that Islamist propaganda is substantially distributed via the internet. Here, the often foreign-language ideological contents are assessed in an interdisciplinary manner, in order to inform the security services involved. Both the GTAZ and the GIZ are not autonomous agencies; staff are supervised by, and subject to, directives of the agencies to which they belong. The police authorities also have their own responsibilities in this field; they are divided functionally and federally. In general, jurisdiction policing lies with the Laender. Consequently, the majority of German
German: Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU). German: Gemeinsames Abwehrzentrum gegen Rechtsextremismus. 85 German: Gemeinsames Internetzentrum (GIZ).
83 84
34
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany police authorities are bound by the instructions of state Ministries of the Interior86, not the Federal Ministry of the Interior. At the federal state level, state Offices of Criminal Investigation (LKA) are occupied with counterterrorism proper, i. e. with protection against terrorist threats, prosecution of terrorist crimes, and counter-terrorist investigations. They come under their respective state Ministries of the Interior (i. e. Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin, etc). The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) is the central office for the coordination of police actions of the Laender. Where (planned) terrorist events cannot be linked to a particular land, or a state Office of Criminal Investigation asks for administrative assistance, the responsibility for protection against international terrorist threats resides with the BKA (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012g). When the prosecution of terrorist crimes becomes necessary, the Federal Prosecutor General may appeal to the BKA for investigations. Unlike the intelligence services (responsible for the understanding of extremist structures), the BKA prevents concrete threats and prosecutes offences. That involves the investigation of terrorist networks, their members, their interpersonal contacts, and the quality and degree of participation. The Federal Police, the second of two police authorities of the Federal Republic, plays a decisive role in counter-terrorism only in the area of border controls and airport security checks. Figure Seven: Overview of security authorities and institutions related to counter-terrorism
Enlightenment of Extremist/Terrorist Efforts

National Level: Federal Intelligence Services (BfV, MAD, BND)
Cooperation of Intelligence Services and Police Authorities

Joint CounterTerrorism Centre (GTAZ)
Protection against, Prosecution and Investigation of Terrorist Crimes

National Level: Federal Police Authorithies (BKA, BP)
Federal State Level: State Intelligence Services (LfVs)
Joint Internet Centre (GIZ)
Federal State Level: State Offices of Criminal Investigation
Counter-TerrorismFile
Source: Own figure.
86
German: Staatsministerien fuer Inneres.
35
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany TRUST IN THE POLICE There is limited data on minorities trust in institutions of the state. However, several social surveys exploring attitudes and opinions of German society towards various questions of politics, social life, the environment, the economy, media use, and religion include questions on trust in public institutions such as the police. The German General Social Survey87 has monitored public opinions since 1980. In the 2008 edition -the most recent survey- it asked questions on trust in the police authorities. The survey results are disaggregated by respondents religion and nationality. The level of distrust in the police among people from Turkey was slightly higher than within the German group (19.6 percent versus 15.9 percent). However, Turkish respondents also had higher levels of trust in the police (67.3 percent) than Germans (63.4 percent). It therefore seems Turkish immigrants are more polarised in their view towards police than people of German nationality. This fact is mirrored in the percentage of respondents represented in the neither-nor-category: 13.1 (Turkish) versus 20.7 percent (German). Table Ten: Trust in the police (respondents of German and Turkish nationality) Respondents' citizenship Trust in the Police Force No trust at all .. .. .. .. .. Great deal of trust Total N=
Source: GESIS 2008.
German citizens
Turkish citizens
Total
2.4 401.0 9.4 20.7 31.2 24.4 7.8 100.0 3218
4.9 4.9 9.8 13.1 14.8 29.5 23.0 100.0 61
2.4 4.1 9.4 20.6 30.9 24.5 8.1 100.0 3279
A similar polarisation is found among Muslims, when the answers are disaggregated by religion. Muslims have both higher levels of trust and mistrust of the police compared to Protestants, Catholics and those of no religion. The intermediate categories (neither trust nor mistrust, a little trust) have fewer Muslim respondents compared to the respondents from the other groups. Confidence in the police is also explored in the European Values Survey 2008. Analysis of this data finds that the majority of Muslims have quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in the police. Muslims are more likely than Protestants or those of no religion to have a great deal of trust in the police. At the
87
German: Allgemeine Bevoelkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS).
36
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany same time, they are more likely than other groups to have no confidence at all in the police. All in all, the findings suggest that the question of trust in police authorities polarises the Muslim group. Compared to others, they have either very positive or very negative opinions on police. Figure Eight: Trust in the police
35.00 30.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 no trust at all Muslim Protestant Roman-Catholic No Religion
"neither-nor"
great trust
Source: Own figure basing on GESIS 2008.
Figure Nine: Confidence in the police

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 none at all not very much quite a lot a great deal Muslim Protestant Roman-Catholic No Religion
Source: Own figure based on EVS 2010.
IN C ID E NT S R EL A T ED TO TR US T I N TH E P O L IC E
Even though it is hard to say which concrete incidents may have caused the slightly wider spread of mistrust among Muslims in the police, one issue can be suggested with caution; police checks. Police checks are envisaged by law only to avert danger. Concerning counter-terrorism, they are conducted in
37
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany the form of identity checks at mosques (mosque checks88). They were a phenomenon of the first decade of the 21st Century, as a generally increased level of threat -after the attacks in New York, London, and Madrid- justified them. Several of these checks were noticed with fierce opposition by some politicians and Muslims (see for instance IGMG 2010, Deutschsprachiger Muslimkreis Braunschweig 2004, Bundesministerium des Innern 2007, p. 451), as they were suspected of constituting so-called ethnic profiling. Today, however, police checks of Muslims without suspicion have become rare, as they are regarded as an indication of discrimination. Unfortunately, there are no social surveys that measure levels of perceived discrimination of Muslims, or people from predominantly Muslim countries, by the police. Even the exploration of general discrimination levels is unusual in Germanys research landscape. In addition, the only surveys that take discrimination levels of Muslims into account are studies ordered by the state. Research related to this topic has not yet been conducted by university institutes or independent polling agencies.
M E ASU R ES OF NO N- D ISC R IM I N AT IO N
A number of measures have been instituted to prevent discrimination by policemen (Cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2011a, pp. 1f.). Police training covers constitutional principles, human rights, fundamental rights, and anti-discrimination law. Furthermore, the polices awareness of behaviour free of prejudice and discrimination is raised in interdisciplinary situational trainings, which include the consideration of social and cultural diversity (Cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2011a, pp. 1f.). In a 2012 response to questions by Green MPs, the Federal Government reasserted that the complex of human rights, fundamental rights, and the prohibition of discrimination takes up much space in the qualification of officials of the Federal Police (who are responsible, amongst other things, for police checks in trains, at borders, in and before properties of the Federal Republic, in aircrafts etc), as they are necessary in a constitutional democracy (Cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2012a, p. 4). Self-evidently, this includes the consideration of the equality principle written down in Article 3 of the constitution. What is more, according to the government the recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) are taken into account during the vocational education and training of officials of the Federal Police. Human rights, fundamental rights, and prohibition of discrimination form part of several upgrade training courses. Furthermore, there are institutionalised opportunities to complain in the case of discrimination by a police officer (Cf. Deutscher Bundestag 2011b, pp. 7-9). According to 158 subparagraph 1 of the code of criminal procedure89, individuals may complain to the Department of Public Prosecution, to agencies and officials of the police service, to the district court or even to the Federal Police via an online contact form
88 89
German: Moscheekontrollen. German: Strafprozessordnung.
38
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany (www.bundespolizei.de), if they think they might have been the victim of unjustified discrimination. The concrete proceedings in case of a complaint are delineated in the abovementioned reply of the government to a major intervention by the parliamentary party of the Greens.
M EC H AN IS MS AU TH OR I T I ES
F OR
C OOP E R AT IO N
B E T W E EN
M I NOR I T I ES
A ND
P OL IC E
In 2011, the Federal Government established the Initiative Security Partnership Together with Muslims for Security90 as one form of institutionalised dialogue between Muslims and the security services. The Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) is the institution in charge. The Initiative aims to fight radicalisation, violence, and Islamism through annual summits and funding of partnership projects between the security services and representatives of the Muslim community. Those involved in this initiative include the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the BfV, and the BKA on the one side, and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, DITIB, and the Alevite Community of Germany on the other (Cf. BAMF 2012). For that reason, a project competition has recently been launched. It is still in progress at the time of writing. The project requirements for funding are continuity, engagement, and mutuality. Following this, successful projects are supported by the BMI. Examples of ongoing projects are an information centre on radicalisation and the Violence Prevention Network.
IV.
Security Context
Apart from sensational cases of offences related to terrorism and the support and incitement of terrorism, there are numerous ongoing investigations against Islamist criminals. Their number has been increasing in recent years from 67 in 2003 to 108 in 2006 to 160 in 2009.
Figure Ten: Number of ongoing BKA investigations against Islamist offenders in Germany
180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Bundeskriminalamt 2012.
90
German: Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft Gemeinsam mit Muslimen fuer Sicherheit.
39

AR R ES T S AN D C ON V I C T IO NS
According to Europol the number of arrests related to actions of terrorism has increased over the past few years, from 11 in 2006 to 19 in 2011. The use of Europols data for terrorist acts within Germany is without problems, as their definition of terrorism resembles that of the German authorities, a fact that is unsurprising, as the Federal Government updated its terrorism definition in 2003 in order to implement the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism of the European Council in 2002. Over the years, the number of convictions has tended to be lower than the number of arrests. However, the trends are similar; whereas there was a decrease of arrests (four) and convictions (three) in 2009, the trend is clearly towards a growth of both, as they are moving in the double-digit range now. With this data, Germany seems to be situated in the average of EU countries. Figure Eleven: Number of arrests and convictions related to Islamist terrorism 2006-2012
20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 19
11 7 3 2006 2007 2008 8 4 3 2009
12 10 9
2010
2011
Number of Arrests
Number of Convictions
Source: Own figure based on data from Europol 2007-2012.
H IG H-P ROF IL E T E RR OR IS T OF F ENC E A T T E MP TS
Over the past decade, Germany has been the target of several high-profile attempted terrorist attacks. All of these attempted offences can be subsumed under the term terrorist attack. There have also been several trials that were related to the 9/11 attack.
40
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Table Eleven: High-profile events related to terrorism in Germany
Terrorist Plot 9/11 Trial 9/11 Trial Strasbourg Christmas Market Persons involved Mounir el Motassadeq Abdelghani Mzoudi Salim Boukhari, Fouhad Sabour, Lamine Maroni, Djillali Benali Youssef Mohamad El Hajdib (+ Djihad Hamad) Fritz Gelowicz, Daniel Schneider, Adem Yilmaz, Atilla Selek Duration of trial 2001-2007 2003-2005 2000-2003
Trolley Bomb Case Cologne
2006-2010
Sauerland Group
2007-2010
Frankfurt Airport Attack
Arid Uka
2011-2012
Source: Own compilation.
The first worldwide lawsuit relating to 9/11 was against the Moroccan Mounir el Motassadeq. In November 2001, he was accused of having been an accomplice of the hijackers who attached the World Trade Centre in New York. Motassadeq, born in Marrakesh in 1974, had lived in Munster (since 1993) and in Hamburgs south (since 1995), where he had taken up his studies in electrical engineering. In the course of this, he was an acquaintance of Mohammed Atta, the pilot of one of the 9/11 aeroplanes. Motassadeq went to an Al Qaeda terror camp in Afghanistan in 2000, and has taken the load off the aeroplane bombers of 9/11 by managing their bureaucratic and financial affairs and assuaging relatives sorrows. On 19 February 2003, he was sent to prison for 15 years on account of complicity to murder in 3066 cases and membership of a terrorist group (Al Qaeda); the maximum sentence. On 4 March 2004, the Federal Court of Justice91 suspended the first verdict due to the insufficient consideration of evidence. The second trial lasted until November 2006. On 16 November, the judges pronounced Motassadeq guilty of membership of a terrorist organisation, and complicity to murder in 246 cases (the number of occupants in the planes). The sentence of 15 years in prison remained. He was issued with a final sentence in 2007, when the Federal Court of Justice disallowed Motassadeqs appeal. He maintained his innocence until the end, and reasserted that he did not expect such a large number of people to be killed by the attacks. He is married to a Russian woman and is the father of two children.
91
German: Bundesgerichtshof (BGH).
41
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany The second trial relating to the 9/11 attacks involved Abdelghani Mzoudi, a friend of Motassadeq and also a Moroccan citizen. He was born in Marrakesh in 1972, and arrived in Germany in 1993, subsequently living in Bochum. Like Motassadeq, he moved to Hamburg in 1995, where he studied electrical engineering at the University of Technology and became friends with Mohammed Atta. On 9 May 2003 he was -like his friend- accused of complicity to murder in at least 3066 cases, and of membership of a terrorist organisation. After an exculpatory document of the BKA appeared in December 2003, Mzoudi was released. During the proceedings, he claimed asylum in Germany, since he was afraid of falling into the hands of the USA. On 5 February 2004, the defendant was discharged due to lack of evidence; the benefit of the doubt. He had, however, financially supported the terrorist cell around Atta, as has been proved. This fact was, however, insufficient for convicting him. At the same time, he lost his permission to continue his studies in Hamburg. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed the verdict in June 2005. In the same month, Mzoudi announced that he wanted to leave the country. In general, it proved difficult to elucidate information about Mzoudi, as he only provided the absolutely necessary information before the court. The Hamburg Terrorist Cell however -that consisted of Mzoudi, Motassadeq, and other Islamist terrorists related to 9/11- got to know each other in the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg. The mosque, as well as the associated cultural society, were closed in 2010, as they were regarded a nucleus of Islamist terrorism in Germany. In 2003, four Algerian Muslims were sent to prison for sentences of between ten to 12 years in Frankfurt on the Main, due to a failed bomb plot in Strasbourg in 2000. In that year, foreign intelligence services had provided the German police authorities with decisive indication; subsequently, police could detain the four Algerians residing in Frankfurt on the Main. According to the defendants, they meant to attack an empty synagogue; they were sentenced for aiming to kill people at the Christmas market. The attack was, however, not instigated by the four terrorists themselves, but by a group of Islamists around Abu Doha, residing in London. All four attended terrorist camps in Afghanistan where they learned -among other things- how to build effective bombs with a pressure cooker. Due to the sensational proceedings related to 9/11 at the same time, the public did not keep an eye on this trial. Another sensational trial ended on 9 December 2008. Youssef Mohamad El Hajdib and Djihad Hamad, two young Muslim Lebanese individuals, had tried to detonate a trolley bomb on a regional train in the station in Cologne on 31 July 2006. The failure of the bombs to explode was pure luck. Such an attack would have been the first one of its sort on German territory, and shocked the population as the attacks in Madrid and London did only months before. El Hajdib, one of 13 children, was born in 1985 and moved to Germany in 2004, where he -the bright hope of his family- studied mechatronics at the University of Applied Sciences in Kiel. After the bomb plot was revealed and he had escaped, he was finally detained in the same city. El Hajdib received a life sentence at the end of the court proceedings. His accomplice Djihad Hamad (b. 1986) had moved from Cologne to Kiel in the spring of 2006, in order to study. Soon he became friends with Hamad, whose family was on friendly terms with his in Tripoli
42
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany (Lebanon). Only a few weeks later, both had started the preparation of a terrorist attack. After an escape through Europe, Hamad gave himself up to the Lebanese police. He, too, received a life sentence. The state authorities suspicion that both terrorists were part of an international terrorist network was not substantiated. According to the statements of El Hajdib and Hamad, they wanted to take vengeance for the Mohammed cartoons in the Danish daily Jyllands Posten. The Sauerland Group (Sauerlandgruppe) was a terrorist cell of the Uzbek Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). It included four young Muslims (two converts of German descent, Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider, plus Adem Yilmaz and Atilla Selek) and was based in the Sauerland region (North Rhine-Westphalia). The group differs from others as the central individuals were not people with a migration background, but socalled home-grown terrorists. Gelowicz, head and coordinator of the cell, was born in Munich in 1979 and moved to Ulm when he was a child. His parents were divorced when he was 15 (1994). He converted to Islam in adolescence (1995) and attended the Multi-Kultur-Haus (since dissolved due to extremism) in Neu-Ulm, where strict Wahhabism was preached, and he got to know Islamist Tolga Duerbin and Attila Selek. Gelowicz was radicalised thereafter and had been in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. He was married in January 2007. He and Schneider (b. 1985), the other convert in the cell, come from upper middle-class homes, have divorced parents, and made friends with Turkish young men. Schneider had lived in Saarbruecken and converted to Islam in 2004. He radicalised after the abominations of Abu Ghraib became known to the public. He made Gelowiczs and Yilmazs acquaintance in an IJU training camp. The other two members, Yilmaz and Selek, were Turkish. Yilmaz, Muslim from the beginning, was born in Anatolia in 1979 and has moved to Hesse in 1993 with his parents, two sisters and one brother. He trained with Deutsche Bahn. Due to the wars in Iraq and Chechnya, he decided to go to war himself. Selek (b. 1985), the auxiliary of the cell, was born in Germany as a child of Turkish immigrants. However, during his naturalisation process in 2005, he suppressed the fact that investigation proceedings were initiated against him due to gun possession. He was thus denaturalised in 2011 by the city of Ulm, after he served his prison term. The group had stockpiled 700 kg of highly-concentrated hydrogen peroxide; mixed with other substances it could have led to the manufacture of explosives equivalent to 500 kg of dynamite (Europol 2011, p. 13). Whereas in March 2010 Selek was sentenced to five years in prison for supporting a terrorist organisation, and the offence of preparation to cause an explosion, the three remaining accused persons received 11 and 12 years imprisonment. They were alleged to have been preparing bomb attacks against members of the American armed forces in 2006 and 2007 which, if they succeeded, could have led to Germanys 9/11 (BBC News 22 April 2009). The previously-launched Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (GTAZ) made significant contributions to the prevention of the bombings. Until now, only one Islamist terrorist attack has been successful in Germany: Arid Uka, born in Kosovo in 1990, fired at five unarmed US soldiers in a bus at Frankfurt Airport in March 2011. Two of them were killed, and three were seriously injured. The first successful Islamist terrorist on German territory received
43
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany a life sentence. An early prison release after 15 years is virtually out of the question, given the severity of the offenders culpability. He wanted to take vengeance for the ongoing military operation in Afghanistan and is a paramount example of a single perpetrator not part of an international network; no autonomous group, not even auxiliaries. Instead, he was radicalised by internet fora and Islamist propaganda films on YouTube. He had lived in Germany since 1991 in a Muslim, but predominantly secular, family with two brothers in Frankfurt on the Main. Arid Uka, however, was a practicing Muslim, praying five times a day. He was a good student, yet had psychological problems. He dropped out of school -without having informed his parents- and was isolated months before the crime.
TH R EA T L E V EL
The level of threat by Islamist extremism and terrorism is hard to quantify. Regarding extremism (the more general term, taking into account hostility towards constitutional democracy), the BfV estimates the potential number of Islamist people at 38,080 in 2011. Their number has thus been constantly escalating in the past four years, starting with 33,170 in 2008 (Bundesministerium des Innern 2011b, p. 207). Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of Islamist immigrants have their origins in Turkey, the country the majority of Muslim immigrants come from. According to the Ministry of the Interior, Islamism represents a sort of political extremism that -as distinguished from Islam- wants to enforce the Sharia in a very rigorous manner, as the only possible social order (Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2012j). It thus cannot admit any other man-made rule, such as constitutional democracy. The number of Islamist groups has been fairly constant in recent years; 29 to 30, with Hizb Allah and the Muslim Brotherhood as the largest organisations by far. Table Twelve: Islamism potential in Germany 2009-2011
Islamism potential (1)

2009 2010 Groups Persons Groups Persons Of Arab Origin (2) 14 3.790 14 3.730 Of Turkish Origin (2) 5 30.340 5 31.370 Other 10 2.140 10 2.370 Total 29 36.270 29 37.470 1) The figures relate to Germany and are partially estimated and approximated 2)This also includes banned groups 2011 Persons 3.590 32.270 2.220 38.080
Groups 15 5 10 30
Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2012k, p. 191.
Key officials have made similar assessments on the levels of threat; Joerg Ziercke, president of the Federal Criminal Police Office, has noted a high level of threat over the past few years. In June 2012, he warned of the danger from individuals acting alone and small groups. (Cf. dpa 2012a). In 2009, he estimated the Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
44
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany terrorist potential in the following way; 60 people who attended a terrorist camp in Afghanistan/Pakistan, and 90 individuals seen as threats92 with a network located in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, in the RhineRuhr and the Rhine-Main area, and in Ulm (Cf. BKA-Chef warnt vor erhoehter Anschlagsgefahr im Wahljahr). Heinz Fromm, who was president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution from 2002 until 2012, and thus the former key official entrusted with understanding terrorist structures in Germany, concurred with Zierckes opinion. Considering the most recent confrontational violence between members of the PRO movement (a legalist right-wing extremist party with its heartland in the west of Germany) and Islamists in the course of demonstrations in Solingen and Bonn in Spring 2012, Fromm regarded the danger that emanates from Islamist extremists as enormous, even though the security services were not in the possession of indications of the concrete planning of an attack (Cf. dapd 2012). Hans-Peter Friedrich, the Minister, to whom both Ziercke and Fromm are answerable, defers to their judgments. According to him, there are no indications of a reduction in the terrorist threat, given the existence of at least 130 Islamist endangerers (2012). Identifying the individuals is more difficult, as they tend to act autonomously, without contact with terrorist organisations abroad such as Al Qaeda (Cf. dpa 2012b). He assumes that the Salafist movement is the nucleus of Islamist extremism and terrorism, with around 2500 followers in Germany (Cf. dpa 2012c). This perception of the threat posed by Salafist groups underpins the measures taken by German police against Salafist Islamism. In 2012, the police raided three Salafist societies, of which Millatu Ibrahim has subsequently been required to close down (Cf. Reimann 2012).
IN D I VI DU AL S A N D O RG AN IS A T IO NS U N D E R SU RV E IL L A NC E
Although the BfV publishes an annual report on its activities, including data on Islamist potential in Germany, it is not possible to identify the number of people under the offices surveillance. However, all organisations that appear in the BfVs annual report are under surveillance; 30 Islamist organisations at present.
P E RC EP T IO NS O F T E R ROR IS T TH R E AT A ND OP I N IO NS ON C O U N T ER -T E RR OR IS M
Unfortunately, there is little research and data on opinions and perceptions held by Muslims of terrorist threats and counter-terrorist measures. There has been only one minor study in 2006 that focused on Muslim perceptions of the level of terrorist threats (Cf. Hodjati 2006, pp. 79f.). Accordingly, only six percent of Muslims thought there was likely to be an Islamist terror attack in Germany; 57 percent of the
92
German: Gefaehrder (people the security services think are capable of conducting a terrorist attack).
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Muslims believed they could be a victim of a terrorist attack, while 28 percent said they felt threatened by terrorism. The same study found out that only 33 percent of the Muslims surveyed (and 41 percent of the nonMuslims) favoured military action against Islamist terrorists abroad. Furthermore, a majority of Muslims (60 percent) and non-Muslims (80 percent) supported the deportation of Islamist extremists (Cf. Hodjati, p. 81). The ALLBUS survey assessed the number of people speaking in favour of a military operation against Islamist terrorists abroad at 65.5 percent in 2008 (Cf. Gesis 2008).
V.
Political and Wider Context
Various social and political actors are concerned with the issues of terrorism/counter-terrorism. The states willingness to cooperate with Muslim associations, its broad preventive approach, and the comprehensiveness of the strategy in general may have contributed to the apparent absence of controversy in the debate surrounding the states counter-terrorism package, including the TBG and its successor laws or the various initiatives with Muslims. The Federal Government is seen to proceed cautiously and adopt measures moderately. Criticism focuses on particular aspects of the states strategy. For instance, the Greens and the SPD both in the opposition camp at the present usually defend the rights of minorities against state infringement. They can be viewed as giving the most voice to the concerns of Muslims and minorities in the political sphere. While the CDU and CSU focus more on security, this does not mean that they ignore the position of Muslims. However, they tend to prioritise public security concerns over the interests or concerns of minorities. This conflict is seen in the debate on police checks without suspicion in the course of counter-terrorism. The SPD and the Greens raised concern about the experience of minorities and asked questions concerning the rights of minorities; the CDU/CSU spoke in favour of security. In this respect, the parliamentarian control mechanism seems to work rather well (not least due to political staging) as, from a distance, it achieves a balance between public security and the consideration of minorities rights. All in all, the democratic parties appear to be open to cooperation and the improvement of existing proceedings, more so as the evaluation of counterterrorism measures regarding their impact on minorities is insufficient. Another important area where there is political disagreement in relation to counter-terrorism is around questions of data gathering. The views of the government on this differ from the views of the opposition and privacy groups. This, and other causes, have given rise to new political formations such as the Pirate Party, FoeBud93 (Society for the Promotion of Moved and Unmoved Public Data Traffic), or the CCC94, that take a stand for data protection, which sometimes may collide with the states security interests. There are also tensions within the ruling coalition, as the liberal party FDP also seeks to reduce the powers of the state to a minimal amount whereas its coalition partner, the Christian-democratic
93 94
German: Verein zur Foerderung des oeffentlichen bewegten und unbewegten Datenverkehrs. German: Chaos Computer Club.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany CDU/CSU, argues in favour of effective counter-terrorism which would make data pooling inevitable. The conflict erupted recently during the process of the implementation of an EU Directive concerning data retention. Whereas the Federal Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) argues in favour of an expeditious implementation, the Federal Minister of Justice Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger opposed groundless retaining of six-month data without any reason. There has also been a very lively discussion on the relation between Islam and Germany. A speech by former Federal President Christian Wulff during the celebration of the 20th anniversary of German reunification in October 2010, in which he said that Islam belonged to Germany, triggered a nationwide discussion. The parliamentary party leader of the CDU/CSU, Volker Kauder, dissented publicly in 2011, when he said that, while Muslims belonged to Germany, Islam did not, as this religion was not part of the establishment of identity for German society (Cf. Pfister/Schwennicke 2011). The current Federal President Joachim Gauck appeared to agree when, in 2012, he declared that he would have said that Muslims, instead of Islam, belonged to Germany. Cem Oezdemir, a politician of the Greens, as well as representatives of Muslims associations, such as Aiman Mayzek (chair of the Central Council of Muslims), disagreed. Those who are in the public eye treat Islam like a hot potato, for they know that they may burn their fingers. Most are afraid of being stigmatised as racists or Islamophobes in public, because there is only a thin line between criticism and Islamophobia. Thilo Sarrazins sensational book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abandons itself), from 2010, embodies an exceptional appearance in this respect. The former Senator of Finance in Berlin and member of the board of the German Central Bank hypothesised provocatively on the integration of immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, causing a sensation in the media, in politics and in the general public. To put it in a nutshell, he sees the cause of deficient integration of Muslims in the Muslims themselves, not in the policy of past and present governments. The subsequent integration debate within politics and society sparked off opposite positions. Whereas supporters opined that Sarrazin only expressed what used to be common sense but which nobody had the courage to say aloud, opponents regarded SPD member Sarrazin as a right-wing populist. Fifty percent of the German public believed that Sarrazins sequestration from the Central Bank (which has indeed taken place) and from the SPD (which was hindered) was wrong (Cf. Groe Rueckendeckung fuer Sarrazin 2010). The general public seems to be deeply divided in its opinion on Islam. One half thinks that Islam belongs to Germany, the other half does not. Unsurprisingly, the share of people who think Islam belongs to the country is largest among followers of the Greens (70 percent) and the SPD (55 percent), and lowest among those who feel affiliated with the party The Left (43 percent).
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Figure Twelve: Does Islam belong to Germany?
Do you think that, besides Christianity and Judaisim, Islam is a part of Germany? 80 60 40 20 0 Agree Disagree
Source: Infratest dimap 2010.
Both society and politicians do not seem to have yet found a satisfying approach to Islam and Muslims. In some respect, they create the impression of being a little over-challenged; for a long time, the population and political parties have ignored the question of immigration, integration and problems of the clash of different cultures and religions, including immigrants from predominantly Muslim regions. However, since the 1950s, people from South East Europe and West Asia (especially Turkey) have immigrated to Germany in the course of the recruitment agreements of the Federal Republic with their countries of origin. Despite this, for a long time neither the German population nor politicians viewed Germany as an immigration country, until immigration figures clearly created the need to have integration policies, even if they became effective 40 years too late. Simultaneously, the set of problems related to 9/11 -Islamism, international terrorism, vulnerability- has caught society off guard. According to Johannes Urban, Islamist extremism was not taken seriously until it manifested in terrorism and claimed the lives of people (Cf. Urban 2006, p. 20). Within one decade, Germany had to find answers to all these questions which was a task it had put on the shelf for years and which came up suddenly. Due to their lack of experience with integration and terrorism questions -following from the decades-long omission of a consistent integration policy and due to National-Socialist history- German politicians proceed tentatively.
VI.
Research Context
The current state of research in Germany concerning the impact and evaluation of counter-terrorism strategies in general and particular counter-terrorism measures is disheartening. It can be split into three subfields. The first and prevalent research branch on the evaluation of counter-terrorist measures is dominated by jurisprudence. First and foremost, it looks at the consequences of counter-terrorism for constitutional democracy (Cf. for a similar finding Urban 2006, p. 371) and argues for measures to protect constitutional rights (see for instance the contributions in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B44/2004, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 36/2006, and Denninger 2002). Several of these studies on particular impacts of counterInstitute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany terrorism had their origin in the German Institute for Human Rights95 in Berlin; Sebastian Mueller took a closer look at the constitutional limits for the preventive detainment of foreigners as a particular aspect of counter-terrorism (See Mueller 2006). The report The Fight against International Terrorism and the Development of Human Rights 2003/200496 by Wolfgang S. Heinz and Jan-Michael Arend focuses on human rights violations in the international frame, and concludes with a few recommendations for the German Federal Governments international fight against terrorism; it should -among other things- regard it as a struggle against international criminality instead of a war, and support initiatives for the systematic monitoring of compliance with human rights in international organisations (see Heinz, Arend 2005). Marion Albers contribution in Menschenrechte Innere Sicherheit Rechtsstaat illuminates the meaning of an evaluation of legal powers of security services, which she derives from the rules of a constitutional state (See Albers 2006). However, it does not evaluate one of these legal powers itself. The only publication that does evaluate the efficacy of such a measure is a paper that emerged out of the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law under the direction of Hans-Joerg Albrecht, Claudia Dorsch, and Christiane Kruepe: Rechtswirklichkeit und Effizienz der Ueberwachung der Telekommunikation nach den 100a, 100b StPO und anderer verdeckter Ermittlungsmanahmen (see Albrecht, Dorsch, Kruepe 2003). The second important branch comes from political science. Apart from root cause analyses, it consists mainly of overviews of both terrorism and counter-terrorism. A key political science publication which asks for impacts of counter-terrorism is by Johannes Urban who, in 2006, published a study that aimed at the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of German counter-terrorism (in a wider sense), the development of recommendations based on the analysis, and the facilitation of comparative studies (Cf. Urban 2006, pp. 20f.). He designed a strategy-goal-model in order to evaluate a countrys general counter-terrorism strategy, and concludes with some recommendations to the Federal Government. However, the study did not look at the impacts on minorities and communities. This holds true for other standard references such as Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus by Kai Hirschmann and Christian Leggemann, Herausforderung Terrorismus Die Zukunft der Sicherheit, edited by Werner Weidenfeld, and Terrorismusforschung in Deutschland, by Spencer, Kocks and Harbrich. The third large research branch considering the impact of counter-terrorism examines the adequacy, advantages and disadvantages of military operations as counter-terrorism initiatives abroad (see for instance Heinz, Arend 2005, Niklaus 2006, Loefflmann 2008, Rose 2007). Therefore it does not look at the impacts on minorities within German society. Research on discrimination does not cover the impacts of counter-terrorism on minorities; such research focuses on discrimination against minorities in general. The most active institution in this field is Amnesty
95 96
German: Deutsches Institut fuer Menschenrechte. German: Internationale Terrorismusbekaempfung und Menschenrechte. Entwicklungen.
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany International, with its annual country reports and studies of particular aspects of human rights. However, sometimes they lack a clear distinction of governmental action and societal behaviour (Cf. epd/HA 2009). Thus, apart from overview publications, the research on the impact of Germanys counter-terrorism focuses exclusively on the efficacy of legal measures, on the question of military operations abroad, and on the impact on the basic principles of the constitutional democracy from a juridical perspective. Though the latter may give rise to the assumption that further research on the impact of counterterrorism is unnecessary, the opposite is true; the jurisprudential discussion is widely limited to the de jure impacts of the mere legal text on articles of the German constitution. In doing so, it omits the consideration of the de facto impact of measures on real people belonging to minorities. It is thus strongly advised to foster research on impacts of counter-terrorism practice on minority groups; not only from a jurisprudential, but from an interdisciplinary perspective focusing on compliance with the equality principle (see Weinzierl 2006).
This paper was written by Prof Eckard Jessa and Dr. Tom Mannewitz of Chemnitz University of Technology, Department of Political Science
List of Abbreviations
ADS AGG ALLBUS AufenthG BAMF BPB BfV BGH BKA BMBF BMFSFJ BMI BMJus BmVg Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency General Act on Equal Treatment German General Social Survey Residence Act Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees Federal Agency for Civic Education Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution Federal Court of Justice Federal Criminal Police Office Federal Ministry of Education and Research Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth Federal Ministry of the Interior Federal Ministry of Justice Federal Ministry of Defence
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany BP CDU CSU DJI DIK DITIB FDP GESIS GG GIZ GTAZ IfD IRD LfV LKA MAD NIAS NSU PIAS RAF StGB TBG TBEG VIKZ WaffG WaffKontrG ZKA ZMD Federal Police Christian Democratic Union Christian Social Union German Youth Institute German Islam Conference Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs Free Democratic Party Society of Social Science Infrastructural Facilities German Constitution Joint Internet Centre Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre Institute for Opinion Surveys Allensbach Muslim Council for the Federal Republic of Germany State Office for the Protection of the Constitution State Offices of Criminal Investigations Military Counter-Intelligence Service Intelligence Information and Analysis Office National Socialist Underground Police Information and Analysis Office Red Army Faction Penal Code Law on Counter-Terrorism Complementary Law on Counter-Terrorism Association of Muslim Cultural Centres Gun Control Law Weapons Control Act Customs Criminal Investigation Office Central Council of Muslims in Germany
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Bundesministerium des Innern, 2012i, Terrorismus, Berlin, at: http://www.bmi.bund.de /DE/Service/Glossar/Functions/glossar.html?nn=105094&lv2=296452&lv3=151976 (2 July 2012). [TERRORISM] Bundesministerium des Innern, 2012j, Islamismus, Berlin, at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/ Themen/Sicherheit/Extremismus/Islamismus/islamismus_node.html (18 July 2012). [Islamism] Bundesministerium des Innern, 2012k, Bundesverfassungsschutzbericht 2011, Berlin, at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/vsb_vorabfassung_2011.p df;jsessionid=7DFB4D205B790DCC944B8FD9E8A5A384.2_cid231?__blob=publicationFile (19 July 2012). [ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2011] Bundesministerium fuer Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2012, Initiative Demokratie staerken Zahlen und Fakten, Berlin, at: http://www.demokratie-staerken.de/ids_zahlen_und_fakten.html (22 June 2012). [INITATIVE STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY FACTS AND FIGURES] Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2006, 1 BvR 357/05 vom 15. Februar 2006, at: http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705en.html (25 June 2012). [VERDICT 1 BVR 357/05 from 15 February 2006] dapd, 2012, Sicherheitsbehoerden alarmiert wegen islamistischem Mordaufruf, in: Freie Presse from 22 May 2012, at: http://www.freiepresse.de/NACHRICHTEN/ DEUTSCHLAND/Sicherheitsbehoerdenalarmiert-wegen-islamistischen-Mordaufruf-artikel7994857.php (2 July 2012). [SECURITY SERVICES ALARMED BECAUSE OF ISLAMIST CALL FOR MURDER] Denninger, Erhard, 2002, Freiheit durch Sicherheit? Anmerkungen zum Terrorismusbekaempfungsgesetz, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B10-11/2002, Bonn, pp. 22-30, at: http://www.bpb.de/apuz/27046/freiheit-durch-sicherheit (3 July 2012). [LIBERTY THROUGH SECURITY? COMMENTS ON THE TBG] Deutsche Islam Konferenz, 2009, Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland, Berlin, at: http://www.deutscheislam-konferenz.de/cln_101/nn_1883496/SharedDocs/Anlagen/ EN/DIK/Downloads/Plenum/MLD-Vollversion-eng-dik,templateId=raw,property=pub licationFile.pdf/MLD-Vollversion-eng-dik.pdf (28 June 2012). [MUSLIM LIFE IN GERMANY] Deutsche Islam Konferenz, 2012, Islamisches Gemeindeleben in Deutschland, Berlin, at: http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_092/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/DIK/Downl oads/WissenschaftPublikationen/islamisches-gemeindeleben-in-deutschland-lang-dik,te mplateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/islamisches-gemeindeleben-in-deutschland-lang-dik.pdf (2 July 2012). [MUSLIM COMMUNITY LIFE IN GERMANY] Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Deutsche Telekom/T-Systems, 2011, Sicherheitsreport 2011. Eine repraesentative Studie zum Thema Sicherheit in Deutschland im Auftrag von T-Systems, Bonn, at: http://www.tsystems.de/tsip/servlet/contentblob/t-systems-2012.de/de/755638_1/blobBinary/Sicher heitsreport2011-ps.pdf;jsessionid=BE30B7ED5EB5CD09EAD23F580E60E9B0?ts_ layoutId=755498 (2 July 2012). [SECURITY REPORT 2011. A REPRESENTATIVE STUDY ON THE SECURITY ISSUE IN GERMANY ON BEHALF OF T-SYSTEMS] Deutscher Bundestag, 2005, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auswaertigen Ausschusses zu dem Antrag der Bundesregierung Drucksache 14/7296 (BT-Dr. 14/7747), Berlin, at: http://www.bits.de/public/documents/US_Terrorist_Attacks/ Beschlussempfehlung141101.pdf (3 July 2012). [RECOMMENDATION FOR A DECISION AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE MOTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT] Deutscher Bundestag, 2011a, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Memet Kilic, Volker Beck (Koeln), Ingrid Hoenlinger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN (BT-Dr. 17/6778), Berlin, at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/067/1706778 (28 June 2012). [REPLY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO A MINOR INTERPELLATION OF THE MPS MEMET KILIC, VOLKER BECK (COLOGNE), INGRID HOENLINGER, FURTHER MPS, AND THE FRACTION BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN] Deutscher Bundestag, 2011b, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Groe Anfrage der Abgeordneten Volker Beck (Koeln), Kai Gehring, Ingrid Hoenlinger, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN (BT-Dr. 17/6736), Berlin, at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/067/1706736.pdf (28 June 2012). ). [REPLY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO A MAJOR INTERPELLATION OF THE MPS VOLKER BECK (COLOGNE), KAI GEHRING, INGRID HOENLINGER, FURTHER MPS, AND THE FRACTION BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN] Deutscher Bundestag, 2012a, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Memet Kilic, Josef Philip Winkler, Wolfgang Wieland, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN (BT-Dr. 17/10007), Berlin, at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/100/1710007.pdf (28 June 2012). [REPLY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO A MINOR INTERPELLATION OF THE MPS MEMET KILIC, JOSEF PHILIP WINKLER, WOLFGANG WIELAND, FURTHER MPS, AND THE FRACTION BUENDNIS 90/DIE GRUENEN] Deutscher Bundestag, 2012b, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Nicole Gohlke, Halina Wawzyniak und der Fraktion DIE LINKE (BT-Dr. 17/9523), Berlin,
56
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany at: http://www.linksfraktion.de/kleine-anfragen/angriffe-moscheen-deutschland/ (4 July 2012). [REPLY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO A MINOR INTERPELLATION OF THE MPS ULLA JELPKE, NICOLE GOHLKE, HALINA WAWZYNIAK AND THE FRACTION DIE LINKE] Deutschsprachiger Muslimkreis Braunschweig, 2004, Polizeikontrolle nach Freitagsgebet in Braunschweig, Braunschweig (17 September 2004), at: http://islam.de/2561 (27 June 2007). [POLICE CHEK AFTER FRIDAY PRAYER IN BRUNSWICK] dpa, 2012a, BKA-Chef Ziercke haelt Anschlagsgefahr weiter fuer hoch, in: Stern from 24 June 2012, at: http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/bka-chef-ziercke-haelt-anschlagsgefah r-weiter-fuer-hoch1845193.html (2 July 2012). [HEAD OF BKA ZIERCKE REGARDS DANGER OF AN ATTACK AS HIGH] dpa, 2012b, In Deutschland sollen 130 potenzielle Attentaeter leben, in: Handelsblatt from 27 March 2012, at: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/islamistischer-terror-in-deutschland-sollen130-potenzielle-attentaeter-leben/6443492.html (2 July 2012). [130 POTENTIAL ASSASSINS IN GERMANY] dpa, 2012c, Friedrich: Salafisten sind Keimzelle des Islamisten-Terrors, in: merkur-online.de from 5 May 2012, at: http://www.merkur-online.de/nachrichten/politik/hans-peter-friedrich-salafisten-sindkeimzelle-islamisten-terrors-2305256.html (2 July 2012). [FRIEDRICH: SALAFISTS ARE THE NUCLEUS OF ISLAMIST TERROR] epd/HA, 2009, Menschenrechtsrat: Deutschland diskriminiert Muslime, in: Hamburger Abendblatt from 2 February 2009, at: http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/ deutschland/article149655/Menschenrechtsrat-Deutschland-diskriminiert-Muslime.html (4 July 2012). [HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: GERMANY DISCRIMINATES MUSLIMS] Europol, 2007-2012, TE-SAT 2007-2012, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, The Hague, at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/29 (29 June 2012). [EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT] EVS, 2010, European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, ZA4753 Data File Version 1.1.0 (2010-11-30), Koeln, at: http://zacat.gesis.org/ (27 June 2012). [EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY] Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2011, ZDF Politbarometer, at: http://de.statista.com/statistik/ daten/studie/185381/umfrage/meinung-zur-verlaengerung-der-anti-terror-gesetze/ (2 July 2012). [ZDF POLITBAROMETER] Heinz, Wolfgang S., Arend, Jan-Michael, 2005, Internationale Terrorismusbekaempfung und Menschenrechte. Entwicklungen 2003/2004, Berlin, at: http://www.institut-fuer-
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany menschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/studie_internationale_terrorismusbekaempfung_u_menschen rechte_entwicklungen_2003_2004.pdf (3 July 2012). [INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS. TREND 2003/2004] Hirschmann, Kai, Leggemann, Christian, 2003, Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus. Strategien und Handlungserfordernisse in Deutschland, Berlin. [THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. STRATEGIES AND NEEDS TO ACT] Hodjati, Sascha, 2006, Die Einstellung der muslimischen und der nicht-muslimischen Wohnbevoelkerung in Deutschland zum Terrrorismus, Norderstedt, at: http://books. google.de/books?id=tEJUtA2X2WIC&pg=PA28&lpg=PA28&dq=wahrnehmung+terrorismus+muslime &source=bl&ots=j8D9-znidc&sig=areVxxelSYojr_1tFi40ThHKRBw& hl=de&sa=X&ei=w2XxTyoLcTtsgaioK3zDg&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=wahrnehm ung%20terrorismus%20muslime&f=false (2 July 2012). [ATTITUDES OF THE MUSLIM AND OF THE NON-MUSLIM RESIDENT POPULATION TOWARDS TERRORISM ] GESIS Leibniz-Institut fuer Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, ALLBUS 2008 Allgemeine Bevoelkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ZA4600 Datenfile Vers. 2.0.0 (2011-08-03), Koeln, at: http://zacat.gesis.org/ (27 June 2012). [ALLBUS 2008 GERMAN GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY] Groe Rueckendeckung fuer Sarrazin, in: Stern from 8 September 2010, at: http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-fuer-den-stern-grosse-rueckendeckung -fuer-thilosarrazin-1601305.html (2 July 2012). [LARGE SUPPORT FOR SARRAZIN] Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goerue, 2010, Kein Generalverdacht Moscheekontrollen in Niedersachsen werden eingestellt, at: http://www.igmg.de/nachrichten/artikel /2010/02/04/11585.html?L=.html.html.html%2Fphprojekt%2Flib%2Flib.inc.phppath_pre.html (27 June 2012). [NO GENERAL SUSPICION MOSQUE CHECKS ARE ABANDONED IN LOWER SAXONY] Islamkonferenz von Kontroversen ueberschattet, 2011, in: Migration-Info.de (ed.), Migration und Bevoelkerung 04/11 (Newsletter), at: http://www.migration-info.de/mub_ artikel.php?Id=110402 (29 June 2012). [ISLAM CONFERENCE OVERSHADOWED BY CONTROVERSIES] Islamrat fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2009, Stellungnahme des Islamrats zum ZwischenResuemee der Deutschen Islamkonferenz fuer das 4. Plenum am 25. Juni 2009 in Berlin, Berlin, at: http://www.islamrat.de/index.php?option=com _content&view=arti cle&id=59:stellungnahme-desislamrats-zum-zwischen-resuemee-der-deutschen-islamkonferenz-fuer-das-4-plenum-am-25-juni-2009-inberlin&catid =34:pressemitteilungen& Itemid=58 (2 July 2012). [STATEMENT OF THE MUSLIM
58
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany COUNCIL ON THE INTERIM CONCLUSION OF THE GERMAN ISLAM CONFERENCE FOR THE 4TH PLENUM ON 25 JUNE 2009] Infratest dimap, 2010, ARD-DeutschlandTREND, at: http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/ studie/165006/umfrage/meinung-zur-aussage-dass-der-islam-teil-von-deutschland-ist/ (2 July 2012). [ARD-GERMANY TREND] Infratest dimap, 2011, Ansichten zur Terrorbekaempfung in Deutschland, at: http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/166448/umfrage/ansichten-zur-terrorbekae mpfung-indeutschland/ (28 June 2012). [ATTITUDES TOWARDS COUNTER-TERRORISM IN GERMANY] Institut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach, 2006, Terroranschlaege in Deutschland? Die Mehrheit ist besorgt, Allensbach am Bodensee, at: http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/uploads/ tx_reportsndocs/prd_0614.pdf (2 July 2012). [TERRORIST ATTACKS IN GERMANY? MAJORTY AFRAID] Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, 2012, Glossar, Stuttgart, at: http://www.verfassungsschutz-bw.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =136&Itemid=153 (21 June 2012). [GLOSSARY] Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Bremen, 2012, Glossar, Bremen, at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.bremen.de/sixcms/detail.php?gsid=bremen77.c.2076.de&template=20_gl ossar_d&lang=de&begriff=T (21 June 2012). [GLOSSARY] Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 2012, Glossar Terrorismus, Dresden, at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.sachsen.de/280.htm (21 June 2012). [GLOSSARY TERRORISM] Loefflmann, Georg, 2008, Verteidigung am Hindukusch? Die Zivilmacht Deutschland und der Krieg in Afghanistan, Hamburg. [DEFENCE AT THE HINDU KUSH? THE CIVIL POWER GERMANY AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN] Muehlbauer, Peter, 2011, Deutsche lehnen Vorratsdatenspeicherung mit Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit ab. Auch Unionsanhaenger befuerworten mehrheitlich eine Begrenzung auf Strafverdachtsfaelle, at: http://www.heise.de/tp/blogs/8/150430 (3 July 2012). [TWO OUT OF THREE GERMANS REJECT DATA RETENTION. UNION SUPPORTERS PREDOMINANTLY IN FAVOUR OF A LIMITATION TO CASES OF CRIME SUSPICION, TOO] Mueller, Sebastian, 2006, Praeventive Sicherungshaft? Zu den rechtsstaatlichen Grenzen der Terrorismusabwehr, Berlin, at: http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/uploads/ tx_commerce/essay_no_4_praeventive_sicherungshaft.pdf (3 July 2012). [PREVENTIVE DETAINMENT? ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM]
59
Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany Muslime gegen Terror e. V. 2012, Homepage, at: http://www.muslime-gegen-terror. de/index.php?stopper=ja (2 July 2012). [HOMEPAGE OF MUSLIMS AGAINST TERROR] Neumann, Peter, 2009, Terrorismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Der Rechtsstaat als Leitlinie fuer die deutsche Politik (Kompass 2020 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), at: http://www.fes.de /kompass2020/pdf/Terrorismus.pdf (22 June 2012). [TERRORISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AS THE GUIDELINE FOR GERMAN POLITICS] Niklaus, Ren, 2006, Zum Abschuss freigegeben? Eine interpretative Mikro-Policy-Analyse des Sicherheitskonzeptes zur Abwehr terroristischer Gefahren aus dem Luftraum. [OPEN SEASON? AN INTERPRETATIVE MICRO-POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT FOR AVERTIG TERRORIST DANGERS FROM AIRSPACE] Oezdemir, Cem, et al., 2004, AUFRUF!, Berlin, at: http://www.muslime-gegenterror.de/erklaerungen_orgatext.php?text=1103549117 (2 July 2012). [CALL-UP!] Peucker, Mario, 2010, Diskriminierung aufgrund der islamischen Religionszugehoerigkeit im Kontext Arbeitsleben Erkenntnisse, Fragen und Handlungsempfehlungen, Bamberg, at: http://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/publikationen/ sozialwissenschaftlich_expertise.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (4 July 2012). Pfister, Ren, Schwennicke, Christoph, 2011, Das schmerzt, in SPIEGEL ONLINE from 7 May 2011, at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-78413704.html (2 July 2012). [THAT HURTS!] Reimann, Anna, 2012, Innemninister Friedrich verbietet Salafistenverein, in: SPIEGEL ONLINE from 14 June 2012, at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/salafisten-verbot-friedrich-verbietet-millatuibrahim-a-838592.html (2 July 2012). [MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR FRIEDRICH BANS SALAFIST SOCIETIY] Rose, Juergen, 2007, Mission Impossible: die Bundeswehr am Hindukusch, in: Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik (52/2007 Vol. 10), pp. 1237-1244. [MISSION IMPOSSIBLE: THE BUNDESWEHR AT THE HINDU KUSCH] Sahinoez, Cemil, 2011, 1000 islamistische Terroristen, in: Deutsch-Tuerkische Nachrichten from 7 September 2011, at: http://www.deutsch-tuerkische-nachrichten.de/2011/09/ 186580/1000islamistische-terroristen/ (29 June 2012). [1000 ISLAMIST TERRORISTS] Spencer, Alexander, Kocks, Alexander, Harbrich, Kai (eds.), 2011, Terrorismusforschung in Deutschland, Wiesbaden. [GERMAN RESEARCH ON TERRORISM] Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012a, Bevoelkerung Deutsche und Auslaender nach Geschlecht (ab 1970), Wiesbaden, at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/ Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report
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Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities | Germany LangeReihen/Bevoelkerung/lrbev02.html (21 June 2012). [POPULATION GERMANS AND FOREIGNERS BY SEX (SINCE 1970)] Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012b, Bevoelkerungsstand nach Geschlecht und Staatsangehoerigkeit, Wiesbaden, at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Gesell schaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsstand/Tabellen/GeschlechtStaatsangehoerigkeit.html (21 June 2012). [POPULATION BY SEX AND NATIONALITY] Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012c, Personen mit Migrationshintergrund Methodische Erlaeuterungen, at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoel kerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund/Aktuell.html (22 June 2012). [PERSONS WITH MIGRATION BACKGROUND METHODICAL ELUCIDATIONS] Urban, Johannes, 2006, Die Bekaempfung des Internationalen Islamistischen Terrorismus, Wiesbaden. [THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIST TERRORISM] Taz, 2007, Islamische Verbaende, Berlin, at: http://www.taz.de/1/archiv/archivstart/?ressort=sw&dig=2007%2F04%2F12%2Fa0124&cHash=90c68ac46a (16 July 2012) [MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS]. Weidenfeld, Werner (ed.), 2004, Herausforderung Terrorismus Die Zukunft der Sicherheit, Wiesbaden. [CHALLENGE TERRORISM THE FUTURE OF SECURITY] Weinzierl, Ruth, 2006, Die Evaluierung von Sicherheitsgesetzen. Anregungen aus menschenrechtlicher Perspektive, Berlin, at: http://www.institut-fuermenschenrechte.de/uploads/tx_commerce/policy_paper_6_die_evaluierung_von_sicherheitsgesetzen.pd f (3 July 2012). [THE EVALUATION OF SECURITY LEGISLATION. SUGGESTIONS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE]
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Appendix- Counter-terrorist legal measures in Germany 2001-2008
Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste 2009, p. 2.
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ECKARD JESSA AND TOM MANNEWITZ

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Population and Community Context

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior 2011a, p. 191.

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 81.

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Without Migratory Background

Total Male Female

81,715 40,059 41,657

65,970 32,138 33,832

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2012b

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 202.

German: Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland.

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 215.

Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 220.

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Source: Deutsche Islam Konferenz 2009, p. 102

German: Laender (sg.: Land).

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report

Institute for Strategic Dialogue | Country Background Report