THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THINGS: PART ONE

I. 1. 2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: THE SCIENCE ........................................................................................................5 NOTIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THINGS ..................5 Two philosophical principles tacitly assumed by experimental science ..................6 THE OBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THINGS ............7 The mobile existent, the object of the philosophy of nature ....................................8 Other ways of naming this part of philosophy .........................................................8 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY.9 Relationship with metaphysics.................................................................................9 The philosophy of nature as an introduction to the study of metaphysics ...............9 Relationship with psychology ..................................................................................9 The philosophy of nature: an introduction to the study of psychology ....................9 Relationship with natural theology ........................................................................10 Avoiding errors in our knowledge of God .............................................................10 Relationship to faith and to theology: Philosophical concepts employed by the Sacred Sciences and enriched in themselves .............................................10 AN HISTORIC OVERVIEW ....................................................................10 Greek cosmology ...................................................................................................10 The medieval period ..............................................................................................11 The introduction of Aristotle .................................................................................11 The 20th century .....................................................................................................12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES 13 The twofold objective of the experimental sciences ..............................................13 Realism and instrumentalism .................................................................................14 Experimental science: seeking and attaining knowledge of reality .......................14 Relationship between the philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences ....................................................................................................................15 THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: ITS METHOD............................................................................................17 THE METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 17 The nature of the object of a science......................................................................17 Abstraction and Separation ....................................................................................17 DEGREE OF IMMATERIALITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE18 The degrees of intelligibility ..................................................................................19 Intermediate levels .................................................................................................20

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The language of the experimental sciences ............................................................20 The experimental method ......................................................................................21 Theoretical and experimental knowledge: its value ...............................................21 The level of intelligibility of natural philosophy ...................................................21 THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE IN EXPERIENCE .......................................................................................................22 The use of common experience .............................................................................22 MOTION................................................................................................................24 THE QUESTION OF BECOMING...........................................................24 THE METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS OF MOTION ................................25 The elements of motion .........................................................................................25 Kinds of change .....................................................................................................26 Answering erroneous positions ..............................................................................28 THE NATURE OF MOTION....................................................................28 The definition of motion ........................................................................................28 Being and becoming...............................................................................................29 The Aristotelian analysis of motion: reconciling a things being with its becoming ....................................................................................................................29 ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY ......................................................30 Act: the designation of any perfection whatsoever of a subject .............................30 Potency: the designation of the real capacity for receiving an act .........................30 Actualized potency: still present AS POTENCY IN ITS SUBJECT ........................30 THE STUDY OF MOTION IN THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES .....31 The subject of motion ............................................................................................31 The use of mechanical models ...............................................................................32 The scope of the Aristotelian explanation of motion .............................................32 BODILY SUBSTANCE ........................................................................................34 ITS COMPOSITION: SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT .........................34 The distinction between substance and accidents in bodily existents ....................34 NOTION OF SUBSTANCE ......................................................................34 Substance: a primary reality ...................................................................................34 Analogous use of the notion of substance..............................................................35 The integrating parts of bodily substance ..............................................................37 Distinction between substance and dimensive extension ......................................37 parts ........................................................................................................................37 NOTION OF ACCIDENTS .......................................................................38 The nine supreme categories of accidents ..............................................................38 The relation between the substance and its accidents ............................................39 OUR KNOWLEDGE OF BODILY SUBSTANCES ................................39 THE MEANING OF SUBSTANCE IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES ....40 The Kantian conception of substance ....................................................................42 THE NUMERICAL AND SPECIFIC MULTIPLICITY OF BODILY SUBSTANCES ......................................................................................................43

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Application of these standards ...............................................................................45 ENERGISTIC MONISM ...........................................................................48 The scientific concept of energy ............................................................................49 The scientific relationship between mass and energy ............................................49 The wave-particle question ....................................................................................50 The uncertainty principle .......................................................................................50 The transmutation of elementary particles .............................................................52 THE COMPOSITION OF BODILY EXISTENTS: FORM AND MATTER .............................................................................53 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................53 Traits of material existents manifesting substantial unity......................................53 HYLOMORPHIC COMPOSITION ..........................................................53 Lines of reasoning that uncover the hylomorphic composition .............................54 Understanding this composition ............................................................................56 Matter and form unite as potency and act ..............................................................56 PRIMARY MATTER ................................................................................57 Primary matter is the first subject of the bodily existent .......................................57 Primary matter is pure COMPLETELY UNDETERMINED POTENCY ....................58 Primary matter is real receptive capacity ...............................................................58 Primary matter cannot exist without substantial form ...........................................58 Traits of matter .......................................................................................................59 Our knowledge of primary matter ..........................................................................59 THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM ...................................................................59 The intrinsic determining principle of bodily existents .........................................60 Various roles of the substantial form .....................................................................61 Unicity of the substantial form...............................................................................61 Degrees of perfection and stability of substantial forms ........................................62 Our knowledge of forms ........................................................................................62 The danger of logical idealism ...............................................................................63 THE INDIVIDUATION OF BODILY EXISTENTS ................................64 The principle of individuation ...............................................................................64 Quantified matter individuates ...............................................................................64 Further clarification regarding individuation .........................................................65 Other opinions ........................................................................................................65 THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE ........................................................66 The composite substance alone exists, is generated, is corrupted, and acts...........66 Primary Matter: receiving and possessing its own proper forms ...........................67 NATURE ...................................................................................................68 The physical meaning of nature.............................................................................68 The anti-natural ......................................................................................................69 Metaphysical meaning of nature ............................................................................70 PHYSICAL CAUSALITY .........................................................................70 Definition of cause in general ................................................................................70 The material and formal causes .............................................................................70

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The efficient cause .................................................................................................71 The final cause .......................................................................................................71 IV. 1. 3. COMPOUNDS AND ELEMENTS .......................................................................72 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................72 The scientific-experimental method ......................................................................72 THE ELEMENTS ......................................................................................74 Notion of element ..................................................................................................74 The existence of ultimate elements in matter ........................................................74 COMPOUNDS ..........................................................................................76 The virtual presence of the component bodies in the compound ...........................78 SUPRA-SUBSTANTIAL UNITIES ..........................................................79 SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFORMATION ...................................................79 The manner of substantial changes ........................................................................80 CONCLUDING HISTORICAL OVERVIEW...........................................83 Antiquity ................................................................................................................83 The modern period .................................................................................................84

4. 5. 6. 7.

I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: THE SCIENCE

What we first know in a spontaneous way is the material or physical world (in Greek cosmos), or natural things (in Greek physics). Man, a natural thing himself, is immersed in the things of nature. The harmony of the workings of natural things fills us with wonder; the regularity of their spontaneous cycles astonishes us. The sheer power of natural calamities provokes fear in us; we are moved to search relentlessly for the causes of the continual transformations we experience in nature. The marvels of the universe naturally arouse a desire to ponder these wonders. Through our experience and reasoning power, we seek to uncover the secrets of the physical world. At the same time, we also need to know the things of nature for our own practical utility. We can make use of them for our own benefit and also protect ourselves from the perils of the physical environment. We can, consequently, make use of our environment for our own purposes. In this way, we are not only enabled to know the things of nature or to contemplate their beauty, but we can gain dominion over them as well and, thereby, bring natural things to a higher level of perfection through the application of technology. These various ways of looking at, and dealing with, the world of natural things has been gradually developed in different civilizations. Knowledge of the physical world is progressive and can be achieved in varying degrees and distinct levels of understanding. Everyone acquires a spontaneous knowledge about the things of the natural world. This knowledge is acquired through simple experience and is enriched, to a greater or lesser extent, by circumstances. This is the way in which a seaman, a farmer, a traveler or any man knows the natural world which he observes around him. This knowledge tends to develop into a more detailed analysis of the scientific knowledge of natural things, systematically developed through methodic reasoning. Within this type of knowledge, we find the experimental sciences and the philosophy of natural things.

1.

NOTIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THINGS

Scientific knowledge seeks explanations which are more penetrating than those of ordinary experience and the art and limited technology based on this experience. This scientific knowledge, of course, uses ordinary experience and must always be drawn from it. Still it seeks a knowledge that is universal, necessary and systematic. It achieves such knowledge to the extent that it uncovers the causes of the reality that it studies. When we know a things causes, we then have an explanation of why something happens. Hence, we can positively state that a certain thing will always occur, given the same set of circumstances (universality), that the effects produced have a fixed dependence upon their causes (necessity) and that a system of statements describing this causal dependence can be set up in such a way that one follows another in logical sequence (systematically). There are two basic ways of knowing natural things scientifically: through the experimental sciences and through the philosophy of natural things. The basic distinction between them consists in the following: a) the experimental sciences seek to explain natural things through their proximate or immediate causes (e.g., they explain the properties of bodies by means of a particular kind of molecular composition), whereas, b) the philosophy of natural things seeks the first or primary causes of natural realities (e.g., it studies the way of existing of material substances and draws the conclusion that they are composed of matter and form, that they come into being from other like substances and that there must exist a first Cause of the material world (i.e., the world of natural things). The experimental sciences of nature are called particular sciences because they limit their study of natural things to determinate ways of existing, i.e., to things existing in this way or in that way. Philosophy, on the other hand, considers natural things precisely insofar as they have being or existence. The experimental sciences are also referred to as positive sciences. This is, however, an unfortunate term since it is derived from an erroneous notion of science drawn from positivistic philosophy. The

experimental sciences seek to give detailed explanations of the immediate principles and causes of diverse realms of the physical world. The body of natural science is, consequently, divided into various branches: physics, chemistry, biology, etc. Each studies a particular sector of world. Each branch, in its turn, is subdivided into more specialized branches, e.g., physics is subdivided into mechanics, optics, atomic or nuclear physics, etc. The specifying trait of each of these sciences is that each seeks the proximate and immediate principles of phenomena. These phenomena are carefully measured, described in minute detail, classified into groups and explained by means of laws regulating their way of becoming. The philosophy of natural things seeks knowledge of the first causes and principles of the world of natural things. Experience shows that the vast amount of information provided by the particular sciences does not exhaust our knowledge of the physical world. We come to a point where it is necessary to pass from a description or mathematical measuring of natural things to an interpretation about the nature of the object under study. An attitude distinct from that of scientific methodology is required. Complex apparatuses and abundant data no longer suffice. What is needed is a particular attitude in our understanding of material things, whereby we reflect upon them in order to grasp their natures. The particular sciences usually take this philosophical knowledge for granted. For it is, to some extent, implicit in all our spontaneous knowledge. For an example, a physicist in measuring the temporal relationships of certain bodies does not directly confront the question of times nature. He does not ask whether or not time is real or a substance or if it is only a mental construct. If he does pose the question, it is as a philosophical reflection upon experimental findings. He has now entered another realm of knowledge. In summary, the philosophy of natural things (like all of philosophy) seeks the ultimate whys, the first causes or principles of reality, which are not directly considered by science. Such principles, of course, cannot entirely go unnoticed by science. As it develops, science finds itself with no other choice but to introduce concepts that have metaphysical bearing into its theories concepts such as time, space, objectivity, causality, individuality, etc. Science attempts to give precise definitions to these concepts which harmonize with the methods that it employs. Furthermore, science strives to avoid all philosophical discussion regarding such concepts. Following this method, science often philosophizes metaphysically unawares of the fact. This is not the least dangerous way of philosophizing in the area of metaphysics. (L. de Broglie)1. We have advanced beyond the inflexible scientism of the 19th century with its pretensions of eliminating all philosophical questions as useless or impossible of solution. The great majority of contemporary scientists are aware of the limits of scientific knowledge. They have, themselves, posed philosophical queries in order to better understand their own discoveries2. They ask, for example, such questions as: Does the world have a transcendent origin? Is the physical universe the result of chance or does it give evidence of purposiveness? Do scientific explanations faithfully reflect reality and to what extent? In asking these questions, one leaves the domain of experimental science and enters the domain of the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of science itself. TWO PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES TACITLY ASSUMED BY EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE All experimental science assumes: 1) the existence of an objective order in nature and 2) that man has the ability to grasp this order. The various theories science employs suppose a certain notion of the reality which it studies, and this notion conditions the concepts and methods it uses in its investigation. These assumptions are, at times, incorrect. An example of this is philosophical mechanism which asserts that the whole of material reality can be explained on the basis of the local motion of portions of matter.

1 2

Au-de l des mouvantes limities de la science, Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 3 (1947), p. 278. cf. for example: N. Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Wiley, New York, 1958; P.A. Schilpp (editor), Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois) 1949; W. Heisenberg, Physik und Philosophie, Hirzel, Stuttgart, 1960. Many contemporary scientists have written works of a philosophical bent. Not infrequently they contain serious philosophical deficiencies.

In any case, the experimental sciences do seek to know reality and, for this reason, they must use ideas which to the extent that they refer to the very existence of physical bodies are philosophical ideas. From what has been said, so far, we should not suppose that the philosophy of natural things arises only from science. Science itself has its starting point in our spontaneous knowledge of the physical world. We need point out only that in studying the material world philosophical questions are unavoidable. Such questions have been raised by men in every age and place, regardless of their level of scientific development. Everyone conceives the world of nature in some way. As a science, the philosophy of nature attempts to clarify, in a more rigorous way, the content of this spontaneous knowledge.

2.

THE OBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL THINGS

Our considerations, so far, have been of a very general nature. To have knowledge of the specific nature of a science, it is necessary to clearly determine what its material and formal objects are. We will then know what the science is investigating. In our present case, we will also more clearly understand the questions properly formulated by the philosophy of nature. The material object. The material object of a science is the class of existents that come under its consideration. Some other science may also study such existents, but only in some other respect. The material object is a first and generic determination about what a given science studies. The material object of the philosophy of natural things is the whole range of material bodies in other words, the totality of all the existents comprising the physical universe. These existents are, moreover, capable of being known either directly through our senses or with the aid of instruments. Looking at each of the terms in this description of the object of the philosophy of natural things will give us a better overall grasp of its meaning: bodies: this is the word we generally use to designate extended, observable and often solid realities which possess some kind of unity allowing them to be differentiated from other numerically distinct bodies. The particular connotation of this term is that of a concrete, independent whole and not any of its aspects or properties (a color or a shape is not a body, but something pertaining to a body); material existent: an existent is anything that is, anything having the trait of existing. There is a class of existents which we call material because it is characterized as having matter. It is philosophys prerogative to determine the nature of this notion with greater precision; a physical or natural existent: the word physical comes from the Greek (physis = nature) and is equivalent to the term natural, which simply means an existent in the world of nature or in the material world. In philosophy, nature also means the essence of any being, whether or not it is material (e.g., we speak of Gods nature). In this course, when we speak of natural existents or natural phenomena, we will refer to bodily realities; a sensible existent: refers to that property of bodies by which they are perceptible to the senses. The task which the philosophy of nature sets for itself is to determine more precisely the meaning of these terms. We have, materially speaking, traced out the object of our study by this first approximation of its meaning. The formal object. The formal or proper object of a science is that particular and determinate aspect under which it considers a class of existents. The formal object specifically defines a science and distinguishes it from all others (especially from those other sciences which coincide with it in having the same material object). To give an example, man is studied by the sciences of psychology, biology and philosophical anthropology. Each of them looks at a distinct aspect of human nature mans psychic activity, his characteristic traits as a living thing or his very essence. The formal object of the philosophy of natural things must be included within that of philosophy itself. In its diverse analyzes, philosophy invariably seeks to determine the essence or the way of being of things. The philosophy of natural things is concerned with knowing the essence of physical bodies, i.e., in determining what they are, what class of reality they fit into, what place they occupy in the whole context of reality. To illustrate this last question: if we were to say that all things are bodies we would be proposing a philosophy of materialism or if we were to state that the very existence of bodies depends

upon human thought, ours would be a subjectivist philosophy. The following are types of questions belonging to the philosophy of nature: Are material things a mere flow of phenomena or do they contain a core reality and permanent aspects? Are physical bodies basically homogeneous or are they composed of certain heterogeneous elements (this is the cosmic problem of the one and the many)? How do the diverse aspects of the material world (space, time, qualities, dimensions) come together in the unity of physical existents? These questions cannot be resolved on either the basis of common sense or through the findings of science. They require a special study the methodology of philosophy. Philosophy, we must recall, is a single science even though its study is spread out in different branches according to the diverse material objects under its investigation. Philosophical wisdom aspires to know the ultimate principles of the whole breadth of reality. Hence, the formal object of philosophy, as the above questions demonstrate, is the very existence of things, analogically known in their various instances the being of creatures and the being of God, the being of material existents and the being of spiritual ones. Hence, we can conclude that the formal object of the philosophy of natural things is the physical existent as physical existent. The philosophy of nature studies the physical existent not as existent this is the object of metaphysics but as physical. It does not study physical bodies in their proximate and specific principles this is the object of the particular sciences; it studies them inasmuch as they are existents or basic ways of existing within the whole of reality. In other words, the philosophy of nature is not interested in the detailed questions of science, but in the act of being of material things. This act of being of material things is analogically similar to and different from the act of being of non-material things. Metaphysics, the science of existents as existents, is the center of philosophy. It is not an isolated branch of philosophy; it provides philosophy with its very object, its very way of questioning about reality and distinguishing it from sciences way of questioning about reality. The other branches of philosophy come about as a metaphysical reflection upon the specific sectors of the world. The act of being is attributed analogically to all things. It is a trait which everything in reality possesses, but in such a way that it is partly the same and partly different. THE MOBILE EXISTENT, THE OBJECT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE Aristotle affirmed that the proper object of the philosophy of nature (which he called Physics) was the mobile existent. This position is fully in accord with what has been said so far. The physical existent has a basic characteristic that follows upon the fact of having matter: it is mobile or changeable. By this we mean that it has the capacity of undergoing alterations and transformations. In this way it ceases to be what it is and becomes something else by acquiring a new way of existing. This changeableness distinguishes bodies as material existents, i.e., it points out their particular and exclusive way of having the act of existing. Although it possesses esse, the mobile existent is able to lose it and, in fact, loses it. This characterization of mobile existents is wholly metaphysical because our perspective is metaphysical. We view the mobile existent as existing. OTHER WAYS OF NAMING THIS PART OF PHILOSOPHY We have noted, that Aristotle called this discipline Physics, because it was concerned with physical bodies or material existents. In the modern era, when the particular sciences became separated from philosophy and, thereby, ceased to form a single body of facts and teachings, the name of physics was reserved for the scientific-experimental study of physical bodies. Christian Wolff popularized the term cosmology a study of the cosmos as applying to the philosophical analysis of physical nature. This term was almost universally accepted and was incorporated into scholastic philosophy. More recently, it has become customary to speak of the Philosophy of Nature or Natural Philosophy. This title better emphasizes the philosophical character of this discipline. It is also more clearly distinguished from scientific cosmology, a branch of modern science which studies the physical structures of the universe (cosmography) and their formation (cosmogony).

3.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy of nature is related to the other branches of philosophy both logically and pedagogically; the study of one branch of philosophy favors the study of the others. RELATIONSHIP WITH METAPHYSICS Logically speaking, the philosophy of nature depends upon metaphysics for determining just what it means to be a material existent. Still, according to our analogous and imperfect way of knowing, the philosophy of nature comes before metaphysics in our knowledge and it is fitting, therefore, to study it before studying metaphysics. We come to know the most profound realities only through things that are sensibly perceptible. Historically this is the way the first philosophers followed. Beginning with their discussions about questions of cosmology, they came to discover metaphysics. Nevertheless, once having studied metaphysics, it can be most useful to return to consider the questions of natural philosophy. These questions can then be grasped with greater depth and understanding. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF METAPHYSICS The study of nature reveals to us universal structures in things, e.g, their internal composition as substance-accidents and act-potency. We also come to know the activity of causes and their influence on the ways of existing of physical bodies. As we deepen our knowledge of the nature of physical bodies the way to the study of the entire range of reality the existent which, as such, transcends material, sensible bodies is opened to us. In other words, we enter into the realm of metaphysics the realm of the existent as existent which extends beyond the confines of mobile existents. We advance, in this way, from the sensible and most obvious things to the most profound principles which exceed the range of our senses. These purely intelligible principles are grasped only by our power of understanding. We rise, therefore, to the level of the knowledge of immaterial existents. We come to understand, for example, that the composite structure of act-potency does not belong exclusively to physical bodies, but is also to be found, in an analogous way, in spiritual existents. Still, it is appropriate for us to first understand this composition in sensible things. RELATIONSHIP WITH PSYCHOLOGY We should point out here, that living things and man himself form part of nature they are all natural things and as such they would fall under the study of our science. Nevertheless, the title of the philosophy of nature is generally applied only to the study of non-living things. Philosophical psychology refers to the study of living things and, in particular, to man. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY Logically and gnoseologically speaking, the reasons for this are: a) logically speaking material living things are also physical bodies. The varying degrees of vital perfections are added to their inorganic physical structure. It is more practical to begin a study by considering simpler things. In this way our study will start from the lowest strata, that of bodily existents, and avoid the needless repetition of such considerations when we come to living things. Furthermore, the spirituality of the human soul consists in its being independent of matter its absolute immateriality. A clear notion of immateriality presupposes a knowledge of what matter is and the properties that result from a things depending upon matter. Knowledge of the philosophy of nature is most necessary for distinguishing between what is material and what is spiritual. b) gnoseologically speaking mans natural inclination is to first know things that are external and sensible. Only later, upon reflection, does he explore the inner workings of his soul, which wholly transcend his sense life. This is just the reverse of the Cartesian method, which begins with the intuition of human thought and then afterward attempts to reconstruct the external world. RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURAL THEOLOGY This relationship is similar to the one described above. The philosophy of nature can serve as a preparation for the study of the natural knowledge of God. The study of nature reveals to us certain traits of natural things such as their mutability, contingency and finality which imply the existence of a First Immutable Cause, both necessary and intelligent. The

philosophy of nature supplies the necessary data for framing the so-called cosmological arguments for the existence of God. The contemplation of the wonders of the universe move the human heart to acknowledge the Wisdom and the Power of the Creator, as well as, making the grace of his Goodness manifest (cf. C.G., II, 2). In this way they serve as an introduction to the knowledge of the divine perfections. AVOIDING ERRORS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD Atheism erroneously attempts to give an appearance of self-sufficiency to the universe by granting it creative powers belonging to the First Cause alone. Atheism misses the distinction between the Creator and his creatures. Another mistake of atheism is to either lessen or deny the power of God or one of his attributes by confusing these absolute infinite perfections of God with the relative finite perfections of creatures. This atheism does, for instance, in subordinating God to the process of becoming or identifying his immensity with the vastness of space and so on. (cf. C.G., II, 3) RELATIONSHIP TO FAITH AND TO THEOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS EMPLOYED BY THE SACRED SCIENCES AND ENRICHED IN THEMSELVES The teachings of philosophy regarding substance, matter, physical causality, and so forth, necessarily affect the truths of theology about the Body of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, the possibility of miracles, the Holy Eucharist and the other sacraments. Revelation and theological inquiry have, in some instances, stimulated philosophy to more deeply analyze certain questions. For example, knowledge of the existence of angels has produced new light regarding the distinction between the corporeal and spiritual worlds; the doctrine of the Eucharist has led to further study concerning the accident of quantity, the accident of being in place and the core reality of substance itself.

4.

AN HISTORIC OVERVIEW

A summary of the many and varied ways of viewing the philosophy of nature simply cannot be fitted into so brief a space as a few pages. We will concentrate our attention, then, on those views which have had a special relevance in the past, and which continue to be of influence in the present. GREEK COSMOLOGY The first stage of the science of cosmology arises in ancient Greece. The thinkers composing this Pre-Socratic group were called naturalists or physicists due to their interest in the problems of nature. They sought to discover the primary elements composing material bodies. Among the Pre-Socratics are Leucippus and Democritus, who proposed the idea of a philosophical atomism in combination with mechanism. According to this theory, the whole of reality could be explained on the basis of the combinings and local motions of tiny indivisible particles of matter. Both atomism and mechanism have found many adherents throughout philosophys history. These theories have, on occasion, been made the basis of materialistic philosophies. It is important to note, that these theories are not only philosophically indefensible, but also lack any basis in experimental science. Modern physics does not subscribe to the idea that atoms are indivisible (in fact they are quite divisible), nor are any other material particles thought to be indivisible. Modern physical science has moved away from the mechanistic position implicit in certain physical theories prior to the 20th century. The thought of Socrates and Plato is predominantly centered on man. Their philosophies are mainly ethical and metaphysical. Greek cosmology reached its high point in the philosophy of Aristotle. The scientific knowledge of nature, for Aristotle, was but one body of knowledge, Physics or Natural Philosophy. Within this one science, all questions about natural things were included, whether strictly philosophical or proper to the particular sciences. Among the first class of questions are to be found teachings that continue to have great importance, e.g., those referring to substance and accidents, matter and form and the four causes. Other philosophical teachings such as that of the four elements, or the essential distinction between celestial bodies and the sub-lunar world and suchlike have been seen to be erroneous. Still they had a great influence in scientific thought for many centuries. THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

Christianity indirectly had many repercussions in the philosophy of nature. Christian revelation has always brought men to recognize the positive value of the physical world. Nevertheless, many mistaken ideas of Greek cosmology were brought to light through Christian teaching. Examples of such erroneous ideas are: matter as eternal, the worlds absolute necessity, possession of life by the heavenly bodies and their deterministic influence upon human freedom. Christianity made it easier for men to look upon the world of nature as the work of an infinitely intelligent creator God. It also recognized mans capacity, as himself made in the image and likeness of God, to understand the intelligent order of nature. The strength of these convictions, widely spread during the Middle Ages thanks to the teachings of Christianity, fostered a climate of confidence in investigating the world of nature by both philosophy and the experimental sciences3. THE INTRODUCTION OF ARISTOTLE The introduction of Aristotelianism into the West in the Middle Ages partially through Arabian thinkers stimulated interest in the study of nature. In this context, the philosophy of nature made great advances and thus prepared the way for the birth of the modern 4 experimental sciences of nature . Within the original synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas, his philosophy of nature is composed of elements of unequal value. Much of his thought is taken from Aristotle. However, these Aristotelian ideas are found re-interpreted in St. Thomas own metaphysical synthesis. St. Thomas cosmology is the part of his philosophy most closely linked to the science of his time. That part of his cosmology most closely related to his metaphysics continues to be, in the main, valid. We say that it continues to valid, in general, because his thought will need, at times, to be complemented by the findings of modern science. Other parts of his cosmology, of course, are no longer valid since they are based on outmoded scientific theories. These parts of St. Thomas cosmology more or less coincide with the outmoded elements of Aristotles cosmology. Classical science and the philosophy of nature. The systematic rise of modern experimental science came about within the context of Christian philosophy and was stimulated by it. The truth of this statement can be verified in the writings of the great scientists of the time, such as, Kepler, Galileo and Newton. At the same time, however, classical science labored under certain erroneous philosophical notions chiefly mechanism5, while, at the same time, it was vigorously opposed to the Aristotelianism of the age. The new science which arose in the 16th and 17th centuries did not have an adequate understanding of its own methods. It mistakenly thought of itself as a new natural philosophy which would replace the old one6. In the same period, starting from and under the influence of Descartes, philosophy developed along the lines of rationalism and empiricism. This further contributed to the great confusion regarding the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. At the end of the 18th century, the French encyclopedists popularized a notion of science with little relation to reality (cf. DAlembert in his opening discourse in the Encyclopedie). Occasionally these notions were openly materialistic. Newtonian physics is presented as the definitive model of natural science in the works of Kant. Even more than science, Kant sees Newtons work as the standard of philosophical methodology. This caused even greater confusion in the area of philosophy, for Kants thought greatly influenced his contemporaries.

4 5 6

cf. S. Jaki, The Road of Science and the Ways to God, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978. Jaki offers abundant examples in history of his contention that experimental science was born in the 17th century thanks to the framework of Christian culture which provided western man with the necessary philosophical principles to optimistically attempt the undertaking. The efforts of the various pagan cultures resulted in abortive attempts. It is generally recognized fact that modern science made rapid progress in the 17th century due to the great achievements made in the Middle Ages. cf. for example, P. Duhem, Le Systime du mundo, 10 vol., Hermann, Paris, 1913 - 1959. cf. S. Jaki, The Relevance of Physics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966, chap. cf. J. Maritain, The Philosophy of Nature, C. Scribner's Sons, New York, pgs. 54 - 57.

The situation in the 19th century was not much better. Classical science continued to progress in its development. In the area of philosophy, however, mistaken notions regarding the nature and limits of experimental science only increased. German idealism and Marxism are two cases in point. The positivism of August Comte, with his law of the three stages and his phenomenalistic interpretation of science has had a great impact on the thought of those who came after him. The sciences, according to Comte, merely study the relationships between observable phenomena. Furthermore, no other knowledge of reality is possible. Theology and metaphysics are but two phases or stages of human history, beyond which mankind has advanced. THE 20TH CENTURY In the very first years of the 20th century, scientific theories were advanced that represented great changes in the view of reality as compared with classical sciences view. The most important of these theories were those of relativity and quantum mechanics. These changes in scientific thought have made it easier to determine with greater precision the true nature of the methods and results of experimental science. Scientific notions that had formerly been considered absolutely essential in sciences view of the universe, were seen not to be so. This is especially true with reference to the basic laws and concepts of Newtonian physics. The philosophy of science has progressively developed to our day, to the point of becoming a distinct philosophical discipline. Nevertheless, in the field of philosophy erroneous interpretations of the nature of science have continued to come forth. To name a few: operationalism (Bridgman) maintains that the meaning of scientific concepts is but the ensemble of experimental procedures which refer to those concepts; neo-positivism proposed by the Vienna Circle (Schilick, Carnap, Neurath, Reichenbach, etc.) holds that all valid knowledge must be verifiable by the methods of experimental science, reducing philosophys role to mere logical analysis and, thereby, denying all value to metaphysics; critical rationalism (Popper) claims that all knowledge, both philosophical and scientific, is conjectural or hypothetical and is unable to achieve certainty. In these and in similar cases, we face variants of the error called scientism. Scientism offers scientific knowledge and the methods of science as the one and only or, at least, the ideal model for all knowledge of reality. The above interpretations illustrate the narrowness of such models, which reduce reality to a select thin band of things (whether of the empiricist, positivist.... thin band). In spite of the influence of erroneous views, contemporary epistemological study continues to become increasingly objective. It recognizes, generally speaking, that the views of scientism have no basis, that a metaphysical perspective in the philosophy of nature is both legitimate and necessary and that scientificphilosophical problems require, due to their complexity, a very careful study in their diverse aspects. There have been various attempts made at formulating a new philosophy of nature in agreement with advances of contemporary science. As of yet, no satisfactory formulation has been made. Nicolai Hartmann has been the most influential thinker in this attempt. In the circle of Thomism, the various writers form a consensus in acknowledging the perennial value of the chief principles of the philosophy of nature of St. Thomas. Still, there is notable disagreement in assigning a value to the knowledge provided by experimental science. This, clearly, has numerous repercussions in the questions of natural philosophy. This brief historic overview puts in relief that a crucial point for a proper understanding of the philosophy of nature is determining its relationship with experimental science. Even though we have dealt with this question already, it will be necessary to examine it more attentively.

5. THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES

The view of the world that an ordinary person has today is offered by experimental science, or, in some cases, the not always correct interpretations presented by the popularizing writers of science. As a result, many find it difficult to understand and to accept as true the teachings of philosophy. It is, therefore, necessary to know the difference in method between these forms of knowledge, as well as their relationship and mutual compatibility and, finally, the intellectual tasks that properly belong to the philosophy of nature and those that belong to the experimental sciences.

We will take up these questions in this section and consider what properly makes up the body of knowledge of science and what is the range of philosophy. We will now look at their respective methods. SCIENTIFIC-EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE The experimental sciences achieve a knowledge of reality which, in broad strokes, refers to the existence of things, properties of things and the relationships among these properties. To illustrate our point, we see that science has enabled us to know of the existence of many distant bodies (planets, stars, etc.) that we cannot directly observe. It has also enabled us to know their material composition and the precise laws of their movement in space. The sciences have discovered the structure of matter and established the many properties of its smallest parts. This field of knowledge about the things of the universe, what their properties are and how they are related one to another, that science has opened up to man is enormous. Scientific knowledge is ordinarily expressed in terms of laws and theories. Scientific laws describe facts and their relationships which have been sufficiently verified through observation. In many cases, however, such laws describe ideal cases not found, as such, in reality and their application requires the proper technical procedures. Scientific theories comprise a system of statements logically constructed in such a way that beginning with certain fundamental ones, all the rest can be deduced. There are various kinds of theories. Some are limited to simply grouping, in a systematic fashion, statements well founded on experience and other types make reference to hypothesis not rooted in immediate experience. This latter type of theory represents a whole range of situations as regards their relationship to immediate experience. Experimental science offers us a view of the material universe that does not have a uniform relationship to truth, but rather a range of truth values. The relationship with the truth will vary with the case in question. This is logical, if we recall that the problems encountered by science are very different one from another and, hence, their solutions will also be very different. In the field of physics, for example, direct observation of elementary particles is not possible. Recourse must be had to hypothesis whose consequent value will be determined by the results which can be derived from them. On the other hand, many of the chemical properties of material substances can be determined with certainty by means of the appropriate experiments. THE TWOFOLD OBJECTIVE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES In addition to providing knowledge about reality the theoretical objective of science the sciences also allow us to make technical applications of their findings. This mastery over nature is the practical objective attained by science. Both objectives are closely connected, even intertwined, especially in our own age. Many theoretical developments of science come about as the result of trying to solve practical problems. Their scientific value, in turn, is often measured in good part by their possibility of practical application. Sometimes it is not easy to determine exactly what type of knowledge has really been achieved. REALISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM It is often not an easy task for the philosophy of nature to establish, realistically speaking, the value of scientific statements and theories. EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE: SEEKING AND ATTAINING KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY Still there are aspects of scientific knowledge that do not have, or have only in some degree, an immediate correspondence to reality. This is due, as we have already pointed out, to the very nature of the problems studied, as when the phenomena cannot be directly observed or cannot be observed even with the aid of instruments. This difficulty is also due to the use of conventional constructs which suit the practical objective of the sciences. The use of mathematical concepts is another factor adding to the difficulty of realistic evaluation in the sciences. These concepts are often very difficult to relate to physical reality. The value of scientific-experimental knowledge is the subject of much controversy, especially if one adopts an oversimplified view of science so that it adapts to some preconceived philosophical notions. Many different interpretations of the value of scientific knowledge have been offered. These range from the most simplistic realism to the most rigorous instrumentalism. We will list only the some of the more

wide spread and prominent. a) positivism: as, we have said, positivism reduces science to being an instrument for predicting phenomena (usually it is a kind of instrumentalism). Science, accordingly can know only the relationships between observable phenomena. Originally put forth by August Comte in the 19th century, it had its continuation in the neo-positivism of the Vienna Circle in the 20th century. The latter relegated the role of science to pronouncing statements which could either be verified or denied on the basis of scientific experimentation. Both positions leave philosophy with the sole value of simply analyzing the procedures of science. There is no place for a philosophy of nature in positivism: all possible knowledge of nature is encompassed by science itself. Of course, understood in this way science is incapable of posing questions about the essences, the causes or the existence of natural things7. b) a lame attempt to answer philosophical positivism is the position of those who have proposed a scientific positivism. They would claim that such a position would be compatible with acknowledging the validity of metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Pierre Duhem held this view at the beginning of the 20th century. For Duhem, all physical laws are neither strictly true nor false, they are always 8 provisional . Scientific theories are merely systematic propositions of mathematics which synthesize or join together a group of experimental laws9. Duhem believed that by denying that physical theories have any relation with metaphysics, spiritualistic metaphysics and the Catholic faith, both of which he believed to be true, were thereby reinstated10. Duhems position was taken up by later scientists, perhaps attracted by the simplicity of the apparent solution to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science11. For these men, science s field is the phenomenal (the observable, the measurable): it cannot enter into the domain of the very nature of reality. This is reserved to philosophy alone and the nature of physical reality is the proper domain of the philosophy of nature. c) according to the critical rationalism of Karl Popper, which is widely diffused in contemporary epistemology, scientific knowledge advances on the basis of formulating hypothesis incapable of verification but able to be rejected, totally or partially, by experience. All scientific knowledge is merely conjectural: in fact, Popper applies this supposition to all human knowledge12. Metaphysics and the philosophy of nature, understood as certain knowledge of reality, find no place in such a conception of reality. There are some who admit Poppers view regarding scientific knowledge, while not admitting his philosophical views. Hence, for these latter, experimental science remains in the realm of conjecture. The 13 philosophy of nature alone is a rigorous science of the physical world . d) other writers subscribe to a view of experimental science which would make it the only valid knowledge of natural things. This view goes by the name of scientific ontology. In this view of science, the philosophy of nature could only be conceived as a prolongation of the methods and results of science itself. The rational materialism or applied rationalism of Gaston Bachelard and the scientific ontologism of Mario Bunge would fit the above description. The views mentioned in this section are based on certain true aspects of scientific knowledge, but fail to give an adequate view of science as a whole. The experimental sciences do formulate laws that relate observable phenomena, but phenomenalism is not thereby justified. Some knowledge of a body s nature or essence is acquired through sensible phenomena. Science frequently employs hypotheses, but

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Concerning Comte's positivism, cf. J. J. Sanguinetti, Augusto Comte: Curso de filosofa positiva, E.M.E.S.A., Madrid, 1977. Concerning positivism, cf. M. Artigas, Karl Popper: Bdsqueda sin trmino, E.M.E.S.A., Madrid, 1979, pgs. 87 - 105. cf. P. Duhem, La thorie physique, Rivire, Paris, 1914 (2nd rev. ed.), pgs. 254 - 260. cf. ibid., pg. 24. cf. ibid., pgs. 413 - 440. cf. for example, F. Renoirte, Elementos de critica de las ciencias y cosmologa, Gredos, Madrid, 1968. cf. M. Artigas, Karl Popper: Bsqueda sin trmino, cited. cf. J. M. Petit, La filosofa de la naturaleza como saber filosfico, Acervo, Barcelona, 1980, pgs. 117 - 138.

it still achieves certain knowledge on many occasions. Science offers us a knowledge of reality beyond the possibilities of ordinary experience, but it does not explicitly ask about the existence of this reality. The philosophy of nature, on the other hand, explicitly inquire about the existence of bodies, as such, basing its knowledge on ordinary experience and scientific observation. An adequate view of the relationship between experimental science and the philosophy of nature requires that we admit that we are dealing with two diverse points of view, two distinct perspectives. We must also acknowledge the legitimacy and the complementary character of each providing us with a true knowledge of reality. Far from being opposed to one another, they are complementary and are even, in varying degrees, mutually dependent. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES We can summarize the relationships between the philosophy of nature and the experimental sciences in the following points: a) both bodies of knowledge coincide in providing genuine knowledge about the nature of material things; b) they have different reference points: the sciences seek a detailed knowledge of the structure of the material world, while the philosophy of nature inquires about the being of physical bodies and the first causes of such bodies; c) the philosophy of nature bases its knowledge upon the certain data of ordinary experience and that of science; in reflecting upon data which is hypothetical, it must limit itself to offer equally hypothetical conclusions; d) the experimental sciences are a help to the philosophy of nature in various ways: the sciences provide philosophy with detailed knowledge regarding material things, thus aiding philosophy to see that some observations of ordinary knowledge which seem certain are only hypothetical and sometimes even false. In this way science helps philosophy pose questions with logical and metaphysical rigor; e) the philosophy of nature aids experimental science to direct its investigations into material reality beginning with a correct conception of the world it will study. And so science can avoid posing hypotheses that go counter to the nature of physical bodies, at the same time that it can better fit its experimental results together to form a true picture of reality. Each of these two bodies of knowledge enjoys a relative autonomy. The philosophical method, of itself, is incapable of producing scientific discoveries. Scientific methodology is of no use in philosophizing. The two points of reference that of science and that of philosophy are simply different. At the same time, however, there exists an analogical unity of knowledge. Neither philosophy nor science can contradict one another and both bodies of knowledge complement each other. The unity of reality is the basis for this complementary function. Each body of knowledge has its own proper content. The philosophy of nature, materially speaking, depends upon science, taking sciences data as its own point of departure in certain of its reflections. The sciences, in their turn, depend upon the philosophy of nature, in a formal sense, for science gives definitive interpretation to its ultimate principles and its conclusions with the aid of philosophy. Philosophy is, after all, knowledge through ultimate causes. As has been stated, this is a topic which has generated a good deal of confusion, due in part to the complexity of the sciences and the attempts of certain scientists and philosophers to go beyond the limits of their particular field. Nevertheless, it is generally true today that, even taking into account the strong influence of positivism in science and philosophy, there is a more objective view of the relationship between both bodies of knowledge. This prevalent view is in accord with the diversity and the complementary role which is outlined above in regard to both science and philosophy14.

14

In the context of Thomistic philosophy, the questions raised are satisfactorily answered in such works as F. Selvaggi, Filosofia delle Scienze, La Civit Cattolica, Rome, 1953 and Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961. With the exception noted, the works of Maritain and Petit contain valuable insights. J. M. Aubert's Filosofia de la Naturaleza, Herder, Barcelona, 1972, offers a rather one-sided view of science, allowing for its interesting and wide ranging clarifications. A realistic view of the sciences and their relationship with philosophy are considered quite thoroughly

II.
1.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: ITS METHOD

THE METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

The various objects studied by the sciences, at times, dictate that diverse methods be employed in knowing them. The term method is not only understood as meaning the ensemble of rational or experimental operations which a science uses (e.g., the use of theorems and proofs or measurements made with mechanical devices) but the way in which a science views its proper object at the level of concepts and judgments. THE NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF A SCIENCE The nature of the object of a science dictates a corresponding attitude of mind, a particular frame of mind in which the object is known, a kind of being in time with the objects way of existing. One does not grasp a geometric theorem, a point of law or a theological question in the same way. The judgments involved in each of these cases are not only composed of concepts having diverse content, they are distinct as concepts (they are more or less abstract, some imply the light of faith and so on). Related sciences require the same frame of mind, the same kind of concepts (biology and zoology, for example). In other cases, sciences are distinguished one from another because of their specific way of conceiving ideas referring to their proper object of study. This is the way in which we can distinguish between the perspective or view point of the particular sciences and that of the philosophy of nature. ABSTRACTION AND SEPARATION The particular sciences tend to employ partial or abstract judgments. The philosophy of nature, seeking the essences of natural things employs metaphysical judgments. Expanding on these classes of judgments: a) the abstraction of the sciences: we are here using the term abstraction in the broad sense, as a procedure in our act of knowing. Through this procedure of abstraction, we detach or separate an object or an aspect of reality in order to concentrate our knowing attention upon it. It is a positive concentration of our mind on some intelligible object or aspect of a thing without considering other objects or aspects of the same thing. It belongs to the particular sciences to study physical reality in its manifold aspects. Each science singles out a specific aspect and considers this aspect apart from all others which fall outside its formal object. The science of physics does this when it restricts itself to studying the measurable and quantitative characteristics of material things. Mathematics proceeds in the same fashion in focusing upon the dimensive and numerical properties of real bodies. The particular sciences progress in knowledge on the basis of abstraction, a restricted or partial viewing of the real world. The knowledge they obtain is likewise expressed, generally speaking, in abstract statements (e.g., mathematical, chemical, physical formulas). There are two basic classifications of abstraction: 1) the simple abstraction of a universal whole (abstractio totius) such as, man, lung, heart, which leaves aside the particular individuals from which the whole or essence was drawn. This kind of abstraction is used especially by the sciences that aim at making descriptive generalizations (such as, botany and zoology). Other sciences work towards descriptions of concrete items (e.g., geography) and apply the abstracted universal wholes to concrete existents in space and time. 2) the abstraction of a form (abstractio formae) consists in considering some part or aspect of a subject as taken away from that subject. This type of abstraction is ordinarily used by the so-called abstract sciences such as mathematics, modern physical-chemistry, bio-chemistry and also formal logic and linin the work of J. J. Sanguinetti, La filosofa de la ciencia segn Santo Toms, Eunsa, Pamplona, Spain, 1977.

guistics. In general, the formally abstractive sciences serve as the basis for the sciences that describe concrete realities. b) the judgment of the philosophy of nature: the philosopher, unlike the scientist, seeks to know the basic natures of things. In order to grasp the whole nature of an existent, he must take into account the existent with its ensemble of traits. The natural philosophers consideration must be all-embracing if he is to judge conclusively regarding the existence of things. He also judges by means of abstract concepts, for this belongs to human knowledge as such, but he relates them to a knowledge that is whole and complete. This whole knowledge is the particular nature of each thing, not a mere factual summation. The conclusions of the natural philosopher may be called, for lack of a better term, metaphysical or ontological conclusions (i.e., they are judgments referring to a things way of existing). These conclusions give expression to the very nature of a thing or they show the relationship of its properties to that same nature. St. Thomas used the term separatio to describe the minds act of judging in philosophy (cf. In Boet. de Trin., q. V, a. 3), thus distinguishing this act from the minds abstracting. By this separatio the mind separates or unites what, in reality, is separated or united. When the mind separates or unites what is not separated or united in reality (such separation is logical or formal), then, strictly speaking, it is abstracting not separating. We might refer to these judgments of separation as an essential judgment, as long as we do not think of it as opposed to existential judgments which also deal with the act of existing of things. In its understanding of the physical world, the approach of the philosophy of nature is more holistic. Due to their chiefly abstractive method, the sciences enjoy a relative autonomy with regard to physical reality as it is in itself. And so the sciences employ beings of reason or schematic models (mental constructs). This is especially true the more abstractive the science is, e.g., mathematics employs the concept of infinity without entering into the philosophical analysis of the existence of the infinite. Philosophy, on the other hand, attempts to describe reality as it is in itself, making no use of models. The philosophy of nature, for example, wants to know if space is or is not real, if it is or is not a subsistent reality, hence, just an aspect of bodies. Natural philosophy will make similar inquiries regarding time, number, motion and other diverse aspects of nature. Physics and mathematics quite clearly do not directly pose such questions, although their analysis of physical nature does often raise these questions. Philosophy must then face these questions anew15.

2.

DEGREE OF IMMATERIALITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

We can advance another step in clarifying the class of concepts employed by natural philosophy relevant to its proper object. Intellectual knowledge enables us to grasp aspects of sensible things which our senses are not able to apprehend. These aspects are consequently referred to as intelligible aspects. Our senses perceive colors, shapes, movement and so forth. Upon this foundation of sensible data our intellect draws out the deeper structures of things their relationships, ends, causes, essences, etc. As an extension of intellectual knowledge, science also transcends the purely sensible in grasping the intelligibility of things. An analysis of our intellectual knowledge reveals various classes of conceptual intelligibility depending upon whether these concepts are more or less restricted by sensible matter. This statement is not easily understood until one has studied the process of intellection in detail (in psychology) together with the notion of matter as pure potentiality and the principle which inhibits intelligibility. We will later look into the inhibiting character of matter as regards the intelligibility of things. For the present, we will limit ourselves to an approximate explanation necessary to appreciate natural philosophys own way of working. Our power of understanding is exercised upon any particular reality, such as a tree or a house, when it works on dematerializing of the sensible, singular and material object before it, i.e., when it separates an intelligible aspect from its sensible material. Our understanding of a tree, for example, separates the essence of tree from all sensible, singular and material trees in which this essence exists materially. Our power of understanding is immaterial and in order for it to understand sensible things, it must

15

cf. C. Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di partezipazione, SEI, Turin, 1963, pgs. 132 - 133.

dematerialize them. This is what we do when we form the concept tree within ourselves: as a concept it is immaterial (it has no extension, it cannot be touched, etc.), although it signifies a material reality. This process of dematerialization is called abstraction in the strict sense. The previous notion of abstraction dealt with separating one aspect of a whole concept and focusing our attention only on it; the word abstraction was being used in a broad sense. Here we are using the word abstraction to mean the drawing out of the intelligibility of a thing from sensible matter. THE DEGREES OF INTELLIGIBILITY The degrees of intelligibility, therefore, correspond to the degrees of immateriality of our concepts. St. Thomas saw them as basically three, and these three degrees correspond to the sciences of physics, mathematics and metaphysics. These degrees are characteristics of the way in which the previously mentioned sciences view reality. a) the 1st degree of abstraction of physics is characteristic of the natural sciences. These sciences utilize intelligible concepts (not merely sensations) in describing the nature of physical reality. Concepts of physical things reveal aspects of bodies that exist in material reality but as universal concepts they, necessarily, leave out of consideration individuated matter. The concept of iron to a chemist, for example, does not refer to this or that particular piece of iron, but rather to iron universally. From such a common place example, it becomes clear that we are dealing with an intelligible notion, incapable of sensible perception. Through our senses we are able to perceive only this concrete piece of iron, and even then not as iron, but only as a collection of sensible traits! Of course, our concepts of physical things are ordinarily understood in a particularized instance (scientists work with particular cases), but only because we have previously abstracted these universal concepts. These notions do not go beyond the realm of sensible reality. Iron is a material and sensible object, possessing qualities that are perceivable by our external senses. Our very concept of iron is drawn from or conceived in intimate union with the data of experience, for we include observable aspects in its very definition. Iron conceived as intangible or invisible is pure fantasy. The notions belonging to the natural physical sciences have these characteristics. The concepts of physical body, chemical substance, atom, planet and such like, are unintelligible except in sensible matter for in the real world they are always to be found in such matter. We can then say that physical science views its objects from the point of view of their being observable. Hence, all of its results and its theoretical explanations must be referred to the definitive judgment of experimental verification, directly or indirectly. Metaphysical concepts also enter into the explanations of physical science, for they are implied in the very physical notions themselves. However, they are used by physical science without its directly adverting to them e.g., lung implies an existent, something that is; burning implies causing, something that contributes to another things coming into existence. b) the 2nd degree of abstraction of mathematics is found in arithmetic and geometry. Mathematics refers to things which are always found in matter, but are understood without sensible matter. This is a degree of intelligibility that goes beyond the realm of experimentation, as such. The human mind grasps mathematical figures as separated from sensible qualities, e.g., the figure of a circle as abstracted by the mind is considered or conceived of as having no sensible qualities whatsoever no color, no weight, no tangibility. This abstracted consideration, however, can exist only in our minds, for a circle exists only as a real circular thing, for a real circular thing exists in matter and, therefore, must have color, weight, hardness, etc. Aristotle used a graphic example to illustrate this point. The idea of a snub nose (taken as a physical reality) includes sensible aspects, because this idea does not refer to a simple curvature, but to a curved nose. On the other hand, however, the notion of curve (taken as a mathematical reality) no longer includes any sensible traits, even though every real curved object will necessarily be found in sensible matter. Of course, we should not suppose that basic mathematical notions are not drawn by means of induction from sensible things. The notion of a curve, after all, is abstracted from curved sensible things. We are saying only this, that an object abstracted in this manner, no longer includes sensible traits. Hence, pure mathematics makes no use of experimentation. As a science, its range is exclusively deductive reasoning. Multiplication, for example, is a rational process in which experience plays no intrinsic part. Of course, the notions employed in this process certainly have an empirical origin. Still, since logical-mathematical objects do exist materially, it is possible to empirically verify mathematical conclusions or computations. After making a particular calculation, we can readily verify whether or not

n objects exist in such and such a place by counting them one by one. c)the metaphysical manner of abstraction or separatio belongs to philosophy. Metaphysical concepts refer to aspects of things which are understood without sensible matter, and, as such, these concepts refer to things which are really independent of matter. In other words, even if these realities are found, at times, in sensible matter, they can also exist completely separated from matter. In this way, the notion of existent or of substance is purely intelligible or metaphysical, because even though there are material existents, an existent need not be necessarily a material existent. Immaterial existents can and do really exist. If mathematics goes beyond our sensible experience in the logical or cognitive order, metaphysics goes beyond it in the real order. Hence, it raises our knowledge of reality metaphysically, beyond the physical order to the human soul and, ultimately, to God. The above material is often explained in terms of the three degrees of abstraction. It would seem that for St. Thomas, only the physical and mathematical levels were types of abstraction (in the sense of a cognitive separation) insofar as the mind separates what in reality is united. At the level of metaphysics, concepts are derived through a separatio, since what the mind separates through such concepts is separated or is separable in reality. Let us note that these three levels are to be found to some extent in pre-scientific spontaneous knowledge. This also occurs in the various sciences, as different levels of concepts imply other levels of concepts. The common man employs concepts that are physical, mathematical and metaphysical. Any scientist will use some basic notions of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the three groups of sciences concentrate their investigations in but one of these levels, that which is their fundamental and characteristic methodology in terms of the notions they employ. INTERMEDIATE LEVELS This description of the three levels of immateriality should not be applied in a rigid way. It is surely possible to find cross-overs from one level to another and even more or less intermediate situations between one level and another. St. Thomas himself pointed to the existence of mixed sciences which apply the findings of mathematics to physical experiments. In his time this was being done in the fields of astronomy, surveying, optics, etc. (cf. In II Phys., lect. 3). This intermediate level could be termed physico-mathematical. Modern physics is predominantly an intermediate science. We need be forewarned, that the complexity of many theories of the experimental sciences requires a very detailed consideration of their specific terminology and scientific method when applying the notions of the three degrees of intelligibility to them. THE LANGUAGE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES The development of the experimental sciences is due, in part, to their ability to construct specialized languages. These languages allow them to pose and solve problems requiring very precise techniques, whether in the area of logic or experimentation. Each science indeed every theory within it, has its own language. Of course, the various sciences strive toward unification, inasmuch as possible, among themselves. Newtonian mechanics, for example, very precisely defines such concepts as mass, velocity, force, etc. so that by use of the proper techniques, the values of these physical traits can be calculated. These definitions change within the framework of relativistic mechanics or quantum mechanics. Something similar could be said with regard to the definitions of the state and the evolution of a system of particles. The more descriptive sciences employ concepts that approach those of ordinary experience. The greater the use of mathematical theory, the more technical and specialized is the language of the science. In conclusion, the intelligibility of scientific concepts frequently includes aspects which are not abstracted from reality but are constructed for the express purpose of facilitating the development of the science. Even though these concepts are related to the experimental data, it is not always easy to determine their precise correspondence with reality. In other instances, the concepts have a merely instrumental value. They are constructed to facilitate the work of the science. Often the very mathematical theories which are utilized are themselves constructions with no direct reference to reality. All of the above provisos do not impede the experimental sciences from referring to reality. It does bring to mind, nevertheless, that the determination of the nature of this reference will require a careful consideration, in each case, of the respective scientific language.

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD The experimental sciences, with regard to their methodology, are characterized by their systematic use of experimentation. They formulate their problems using a specialized language that allows them to solve them through the use of experimental observation. A physical or chemical law is considered to be true if the concepts involved in its formulation are so defined as to be shown, through adequate experimentation, to correspond to what the law affirms about reality. The construction of both scientific concepts and instruments requires certain theories to be accepted or, at least, implies their acceptance. Biological experimentation assumes the truth of specific chemical or physical theories. Similarly, the theories of chemistry suppose certain physical theories. Of course, not all such assumptions admit of verification. In every scientific formulation, there are certain basic suppositions that are accepted without proof. This statement is a further sign of the influence that philosophical ideas have over scientific-experimental knowledge, for these basic ideas frequently arise from the very conception one has of the sector of reality under investigation. Knowledge of reality through experimentation is often only indirect. This occurs quite clearly, when the facet of the real world under study is inaccessible (at least, for the present) to direct observation or through the use of instruments, e.g., elementary physical particles. This also happens in other cases as well. Often, what can be observed are data related to the scientific concepts used. For example, velocity cannot be directly measured. What is measured are the values of distances and times related to a bodys local motion. The interpretations of these values depends upon the physical theory being used. THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE: ITS VALUE The preceding considerations regarding the language and the method of the experimental sciences allow us to see that the results which they achieve must be viewed taking into account the construct aspect, as it is usually called, of their data. The value of scientific conclusions, from the point of view of philosophy, depends upon the conditioning factors of both the theoretical constructs employed and the instruments used in gathering data. Having said this, let us once again look at the degrees of intelligibility. THE LEVEL OF INTELLIGIBILITY OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY We will now apply to our own scientific discipline the notions we have developed above. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas divided the sciences along the lines of three levels of intelligibility. They drew this scheme from the development of the science of their day. The physical level of intelligibility corresponded to Physics as known by the ancients. It was both scientific and philosophical knowledge. The second level was that of Mathematics, and the third belonged to Metaphysics. The sum total of these fields of knowledge was called Philosophy. Metaphysics was the first philosophy. These three branches seemed to divide the whole field of philosophy. In reality, they constituted a division of the whole of knowledge, intermingled with philosophy. The present distinction between philosophy and the particular sciences poses the problem of whether or not this three fold division is valid. At present this much disputed point is seen somewhat as a dichotomy philosophy-science. The question can be asked, does this division apply only to philosophy, or to the sciences as a whole? A further question to be answered is, at what level of intelligibility is the philosophy of nature to be found? a) Some authors question the value of this division in their response to modern epistemological questions16. Still, with the proper clarifications, this division adequately explains the various ways in which knowledge rises above the sensible world. This is most important for modern science, as it becomes increasingly more abstract and removed from sensible representation. b) For those of the opinion that only philosophy has an ontological value, while the sciences merely achieve knowledge of phenomena, the triple division refers exclusively to philosophical knowledge. Natural philosophy would then be situated at the physical level. The natural sciences would remain at an infra-intelligible level, the phenomenological. This position does not seem to do justice to the true nature of so much of the knowledge provided by the experimental sciences and mathematics. c) For those who maintain that the sciences also have an ontological value, Philosophy and its various

16

cf. A. Mansion, Introduction a la Physique aristoteliciene, Vrin, Paris 1946, pgs. 169-170.

branches are to be placed at the metaphysical level of intelligibility. Their reasoning is simple: philosophy develops through the intelligible light of the metaphysical principles of being. The natural sciences are located at the physical and mathematical levels or simply the physical level of intelligibility (as is biology in its more descriptive areas). This last position seems closest to the truth. We should add, however, that the philosophy of nature is not exclusively working at the level of metaphysical intelligibility. This belongs to metaphysics alone, as the core of all philosophy. The philosophy of nature travels between the third and remaining levels of intelligibility. It works with knowledge from both physics and mathematics and, therefore, materially uses concepts from these two levels (e.g., matter, quantity, sensible qualities...). And yet it clarifies these very concepts with the use of metaphysical principles (existent, actuality and potentiality, cause...) and, hence, it formally employs the purely intelligible concepts of the third level. The conclusions of natural philosophy, consequently, cannot be subjected to experimentation nor mathematical demonstration, as no part of philosophy can. While the propositions of physics should be verified and those of mathematics proved by means of theorems or postulates as governing axioms. 3.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE IN EXPERIENCE

The fact that the philosophy of nature works with metaphysical concepts does not mean that it is an a priori science unrelated to experience. Scientific knowledge necessarily begins in sensible experience of individual existents. From this level it rises to that of the intelligible. The philosophy of nature begins with the observation of physical phenomenon. It does not linger in detailed descriptions, nor the knowledge of the proximate causes of such phenomenon, nor their measurement. It rather attempts to penetrate into their most inner natures, their ultimate causes and their very way of being. THE USE OF COMMON EXPERIENCE Common experience is within the reach of anyone. It is the spontaneous knowledge of reality without the intervention, as yet, of scientific reflection. This knowledge is, at one and the same sensible and intellectual. Through this knowledge we have an important channel of notions regarding the nature of things (e. g., existent, body, quantity, multiplicity). Ordinary knowledge can easily become mixed with error, be subject to ambiguity and imprecision. Science strives to avoid these pitfalls of knowledge. Common experience is the necessary starting point of the particular sciences. It is a limited starting point, however, due to the limited range of our senses. Hence, the sciences make use of specialized experience &detailed analysis of phenomenon using instruments for observation. SCIENTIFIC DATA The philosophy of nature assimilates the certain data provided it by science and attempts to understand it in the light of philosophy itself. Philosophy uses spontaneous knowledge, understanding it in its own light, just as it uses scientific knowledge. On the other hand, scientific data can correct certain deficiencies of spontaneous knowledge, e.g., the conclusion that the sun revolves around the earth or that the evaporation of water constitutes a specific change. These were common opinions in the ancient world. Philosophy must necessarily be abreast of the findings of science, such as knowledge of the structure and changes of physical bodies the discovery of molecules, atoms, chemical compounds, etc. Philosophys attitude toward scientific conclusions and theories confirmed by experience is one of metaphysical analysis, in order to determine what knowledge of reality they offer, what degree of certainty they possess, how narrow or broad is the perspective they take in examining their subject. The extreme degree of abstraction of some physical theories makes this analysis difficult: many times the scientists themselves attempt to determine the metaphysical outreach of their work. Still, our objective is clear; we are trying to compare a theory with integral reality, rather than an abstractive portion. Our goal is to pronounce metaphysical judgment upon this knowledge so as to situate it as clearly and soundly as possible in context of mans knowledge of reality.

I.

MOTION

Part One of the Philosophy of Nature begins with the study of the becoming of bodily existents, this is the way bodies first manifest themselves to us. These experiences present us with a further question. Given the fact that material things are constantly changing, how can they be ranked as existents? Motion the successive, gradual changes occurring in material bodies discloses to us the various aspects of the inner constitution of physical bodies. This fact leads us to examine their nature. We will first consider the question of whether or not a body is a substance. This question, at least as a first approximation, opens the way to our study of the accidental determinations of bodies. Analyzing the basic internal structure of a physical body its essence will reveal its being a composition of matter and form. Lastly, we will turn our attention to the bodys other resultant, compositions. These compositions will pave the way to our understanding of complex substances, beginning with the first elements of the material world. The outer level of the composition of material existents (their extrinsic accidents) will comprise our study of bodily or corporeal accidents, and will be taken up in the Philosophy of Nature II.

1.

THE QUESTION OF BECOMING

The philosophy of nature ordinarily takes as its starting point a preliminary analysis of the motion of bodies. As seen by us, the world is a multitude of bodies, dissimilar both in kind and in number, in continuous interaction among themselves, and comprising a wonderful cosmic harmony. These traits of the universe (its multiplicity, harmony and activity) give rise to natural philosophy. The first philosophical problem posed concerning the universe, historically speaking, was the question of its continuous transformation. The pre-Socratic philosophers began in this line of thinking. From this frame of reference emerged the great metaphysical analyzes of the classical philosophers. Although this is not the only possible way of philosophically looking at the material world, this frame of reference continues to be a clear, soundly pedagogical, way to begin the study of nature and one that yields fruitful results. We begin, then, with an observable fact, one that is common to all bodies without distinction, that of becoming or coming into being (Greek = fieri) the core of all natural phenomenon. The material world: essentially changeable and becoming continuously. Only a superficial, momentary glance would suggest a relatively static world one in which bodies move only from one place to another. The passing of time shows us a world in which change profoundly affects all bodily existents. For the moment we shall consider the terms change, motion, becoming... as synonymous. Furthermore, they will not be restricted to meaning only change of place. In our world, nothing ever remains the same, nothing lasts forever. Everything wears out, corrupts or is destroyed. At the same time, countless things are coming into existence throughout the universe. In a things longer or shorter span of existence, we see it subjected to constant transformations. Even though we see the universe, on the one hand, as harmonious and stable, we are aware that its existence is also precarious. We have no idea how long it will remain in its present state. This fact uncovers a surprising trait of the material world, both as a whole and as regards each physical body in particular. It and they are mutable. Mutability is an existents lack of stability or repose in existence, for change is a kind of passing from being to non-being and vice-versa. Aristotle described the bodily existent as an ens mobile a changing existent one restless in existing. These considerations pose the metaphysical problem of change consisting in the apparent opposition between being and becoming. The various types of changes, their causes, their meaning and their regularity can be studied by the particular sciences in their own order and the philosophy of nature through its specific method. There remains, however, a thorny problem which the ancient philosophers were keenly aware of and continues to be vexing: becoming seems to exclude being . Whatever is, insofar as it is, cannot change (changing is ceasing to be). Whatever is changing, as long as it is changing, is not. If the entire world were in ceaseless flux, it would seem that we could not assert the existence of things of existents but only the existence of processes, the existence of pure becoming. Historically, this question has received two major replies.

a) The philosophies of becoming declare that becoming fieri is the supreme principle of cosmic reality. Nothing is stable and, therefore strictly speaking, nothing is. Nothing can truly be said to be this or to be that, because in the last analysis there exists only the process, becoming. At most, we could speak of the existent as a transitory moment, a fleeting stage of universal motion. Heraclitus, among the ancients, held this opinion. In the modern era, this position was revived, although in a much more complex manner, by Hegel, Bergson and, generally, all of the historicist philosophers. b) The philosophies of being or existence, on the other hand, seek the foundation of the universe in being or existing. They look for an immutable principle which alone can give consistency to things. One of the first attempts in this line was made by Parmenides, the philosopher of solid being as he has been called by some philosophers. For Parmenides as an answer to the paradox of Heraclitus becoming would be a mere illusion of the senses. Our intellect tells us that whatever exists, necessarily exists (principle of non-contradiction) and the possibility of change is thereby excluded. What is cannot cease to exist; similarly, whatever is cannot produce new existents. Consequently, the only reality is that of the existent absolutely one and immutable. Change is self-destructing because it is contradictory. Plato held that the sensible world is continuously becoming, as Heraclitus had said, but he also affirmed a world of Ideas in order to satisfy the demands of the intellect as championed by Parmenides in which there would be no process of becoming, only the truth and necessity of the abiding existent. Mathematics, for example, opens an intelligible world of changeless entities. To the mind of Plato this was no mere abstraction of the mind. These entities truly existed, but outside of rather than within this sensible, contingent world. Beside, Plato saw that the very possibility of science must be based on the existence of that which is, for science treats of what is necessary, i.e., that which needs be this way and no other way. Pure becoming would render scientific certainty impossible. The certainty of science rests on the abiding existent. Aristotle rejected the solution of Plato. He explained how the motion of natural things is compatible with their character as existents. Hence, he made possible the scientific study of nature. The Aristotelian explanation requires a study of the various ways of being, in order to determine what kind of existent the mobile existent (ens mobile) is. This we propose to do in the following pages.

2.

THE METAPHYSICAL ANALYSIS OF MOTION

The philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas is a philosophy of the existent but not one of the rigid existent, rather one of analogous existents that recognizes diverse ways of existing. Material things are truly existents, but ones that are subject to transformations, to losses and gains in the realm of being. This signifies an ontological deficiency and it is explicable ultimately by a causal dependence on Immutable Being God. If only the material world were to exist, it would be absurd and inexplicable, for in this world it would continue to be true that everything is generated and perishes. The demand for immutable and absolute being according to the analyzes of Parmenides and of Plato has an element of truth to it and is realized most excellently in God. This is also realized in created spiritual beings in a restricted sense. The mutability of the world is rooted in the immutability of Being himself. This is revealed in Natural Theology in the first and third ways of showing that God exists. In natural philosophy our scope is limited to an analysis of motion per se as related to the defining characteristic of the existence of bodily things. THE ELEMENTS OF MOTION We will first distinguish certain aspects of that are involved in motion: the mobile existent: i.e., the moving subject as a bird flying, or water being heated; the terminus a quo (from which) of motion i.e., the moving subject or the starting point. In the case of local motion this term is the precise place where the motion begins (i.e., where the body begins moving); if a person begins studying the starting point is the knowledge he possesses before he begins learning new things; the terminus ad quem (to which) or the point of arrival of the motion: e.g., the place where a train stops or ones newly acquired knowledge; the motion itself i.e., the subjects act of moving the process between the point of departure and

the point of arrival, e.g., the process of building a house, the growth of a living thing. KINDS OF CHANGE Before making a more penetrating examination of motion, we should point out the diverse kinds of change: a) Substantial change occurs when a substance ceases to be and is transformed into another distinct substance: the death of a living thing, chemical decomposition, atomic disintegration. b) Accidental change occurs when a substance, while remaining itself, undergoes certain modifications. Accordingly we have the following sub-types: alteration or qualitative change: e.g., a fruit changes its color; quantitative change occurs when a thing grows or diminishes in size: e.g., a tree growing, an organism losing body weight and becoming thinner; local motion or change occurs when a body is displaced, going from one place to another: an automobile traveling from one location to another, a ship sailing from one port to another. Change (metabole in Greek; mutatio in Latin) is a generic term which takes in many specific varieties. Mutation, transformation, modification usually indicate intrinsic changes this excludes local motion. Motion (kinesis in Greek; motus in Latin) can be understood as a synonym for change, but it is not normally used to indicate substantial change motion implies successive change. For this reason the term motion is not used for instantaneous changes. In an even more restricted sense, it signifies only change of place. THE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE
17

We will now begin with our analysis of mutation. Our first interest is to determine the intrinsic principles which explain change. These principles are found to be three: the subject, the form and privation. a) In every change there is a subject that undergoes a modification. In the propelling of an object, the subject is the moving body leaving position

A and acquiring position B. What changes is precisely the subject. When a leaf on a tree changes color from green to orange,

it is not the color that changed but the leaf (or even more precisely, the trees leaf) and its change is to be found precisely in the fact that it lost one color and acquired another. The subject of becoming loses and gains certain traits and this indicates that it can acquire and possess these determinations which we will call acts.

1) Before acquiring an act, we say that the subject is in potency with respect to this act, since it can
acquire it. An infant, for example, is in potency to becoming a mature man.

2) Once the subject has acquired the act and possesses it, we can say that its potentiality is actuated
i.e., it is no longer deprived of the act to which it is ordered. The subject has not, thereby, lost this potentiality, just as a receptacle filled with liquid continues to have its receptive capacity. b) In every change a form is acquired. There would be no change if something new was not acquired, a determined perfection that is customarily called form. It is also called act because it is in opposition to potency. The process of sculpting a statue is directed toward imparting the definitive shape that the statue will acquire. In this instance, the subject is the marble which little by little takes on a new shape until it ultimately acquires its final form e.g., that of the discus thrower and at that point the motion ceases. The form is the terminus ad quem of the motion, its intrinsic finality. Once the form is present, there is no longer any motion. It could be objected that there are changes in which the terminus ad quem is really the loss of a form, as occurs in the process of destruction or in the death of a living thing. However, a new form is always gained in every substantial change because whenever a thing is destroyed it is necessarily converted into something else. In alterations every new form acquired usually signifies the elimina-

17

cf. H. D. Gardeil, Cosmology, B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1962, pgs. 17-25.

tion of a former one. In order for a green object to become red, it must first cease to be green. For a block of marble to become a statue it must lose its original coarse, unworked shape. In some few cases of alterations the terminus ad quem is simply the privation of a quality without the acquisition of a new one, e.g., a lighted room becomes darkened or one who possesses knowledge forgets it. Our conclusion is that change occurs between contraries or between contrary forms those that are incompatible one with another. The entrance of one form demands the elimination of the previous one. A square object must cease being square if it is to become round. There are, however, some cases of alteration in which the previous form to be eliminated is merely a privation or the absence of a form. Light entering a room does away we say with the darkness, but darkness is not a positive form. It is merely the absence of light. This general scheme must be adapted analogously to the various kinds of change. In the case of substantial changes and quantitative modifications, the process is exactly as we have described it above. In changes of place, a new sitio or place is acquired which requires leaving the previous place. But we can only speak of being in place as a form in a very loose or imprecise way because it is a fact wholly extrinsic to a body. In many cases of alterations the change does not properly consist in acquiring a new form or actuality but only in intensifying or weakening (an intensio or a remissio) an existing act. For example, water heated from 50 to 70 centigrade acquires no new form, it merely intensifies its temperature, one and the same actuality. What we could call the previous form one that is incompatible with the new form to be acquired is nothing else than a distinct intensive state of this same quality. The fact of being at a temperature of X degrees, of necessity, demands not being at a temperature of non-X. c) The starting point of every change is the privation of form. Privation is the third intrinsic principle of change. Motion is passing to a new way of being, which a thing was not before. Hence, every motion supposes a transition from the state of a subject lacking an act to that of possessing that act. The point in which the act is lacking the terminus a quo of the motion and at which there is still no motion. As long as a person is still in the state of ignorance, he has not yet begun the process of learning, the process that will bring him to knowledge. When he begins to learn, he is in a state midway between ignorance and knowledge, and this precisely is motion. Schematically, we could say that motion consists in passing from a privation of non-A to a form A supported by a common subject:

THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE

Privation of form A
{NON-A} S

Common Subject S (first lacks form A and then acquires form A)

Form Aexistentially supported by a Common Subject S

S
MATERIAL EXISTENT

AS
MATERIAL EXISTENT AFTER RECEIVING PERFECTION OF FORM

MATERIAL EXISTENT BEFORE RECEIVING PERFECTION OF FORM

Privation, as such, is, of course, a being of reason, i.e., it is no positive reality. But it is, most clearly, a negative reality, for not having a perfection is a real situation. From another point of view: privation is not absolute nothingness but the absence of a perfection that a subject can have and this presents us with two distinct aspects: 1) Privation is not the absolute lack of being, as is the case of nothingness. It is privatio formae, the absence of a determined form; 2) Privation is always in subiecto, i.e., it is always found in a real subject (blindness has no

existence in itself, a real person suffers this privation a blind person is one lacking sight). Besides, the subject can have the form and in this case should have the form of which he is deprived. In consequence, a stone is not deprived of sight but a man may be so deprived. This means that the subject of the privation should be in potency to possessing the form of which it is deprived. In an alteration from black to white, the subject that receives whiteness is deprived of this form at the start of the motion (we can call this privation the state of being non-white). It is evidently also in potency to becoming white again. Allowance must be made in this description of change for the restrictions indicated above. In certain alterations, the starting point is a privation simpliciter of a quality (e.g., going from ignorance to knowledge or darkness to light). The reverse of this process, then, is a corruption consisting in passing from the possession of the form to being deprived of it a privation simpliciter (going from knowledge to ignorance, from light to darkness). In all cases, the initial privation is due to the fact that the subject possess a contrary form and this causes the privation. So we could say that a white complexion reddens (going from white to red contrary forms) or that there has been a transition from non-red (to emphasize the privation) to red. If the terminus a quo is not a contrary form, but an intensive state of a form, incompatible with other states, the example is similar. Heating or warming is the passing from a deficient temperature state to another more intensive state the change from a state of non-X to one of X temperature. ANSWERING ERRONEOUS POSITIONS To avoid the appearance of hair-splitting we should mention that these added precisions are necessary to effectively clear up the errors referred to earlier concerning motion. These errors are the result of a defective analysis of change. a) The philosophy of becoming. The becoming or fieri of things can only be adequately understood in the light of their existing. The pure change that is championed by these philosophers, is virtually meaningless. Things in motion also present us with elements of stability, viz., the permanent subject, the initial terminus or starting point and the form acquired at the end of the process. All material things in the world are in motion and yet there are also permanent states, occasions of rest or quiet during which existents enjoy the possession of a form. An animal, while he is alive, is an animal in a stable fashion. Mobility does not destroy the existent; it does place the existent in an insecure situation it is corruptible. Still its mobility, from another point of view, is a perfection; thanks to its mobility a material existent is able to perfect itself. b) Parmenides. According to his mistaken understanding motion was a transition from absolute nonexistence to absolute existence. A transition impossible to comprehend, except in a creation ex nihilo which Parmenides did not even suspect. In reality, change arises from an existent in potency or, if one prefers, a non-existent secundum quid, i.e., privation, which is not absolute nothingness. Change is not contradictory, but a transition between contrary perfections. The principle of non-contradiction requires that a thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. The principle of non-contradiction does not stand in the way of a things passing from potency to act.

3.

THE NATURE OF MOTION18

THE DEFINITION OF MOTION

Our analysis of motion yields a general conclusion about its nature. It can be stated in the celebrated Aristotelian definition adopted by Saint Thomas: Motion is the act of an existent in potency inasmuch as it is in potency. (cf. STh I, q. 18, a. 1; In III Phys. 2 & 4) In this definition we have a very precise expression of the reality of motion, based on the two elements brought to light in our analysis of motion (Latin=motus) act and potency. It is also important to point out that Aristotle, in his description, refers exclusively to motion taken in the strict sense i.e., successive and continuous change and not to the instantaneous transition from one terminus to another. This definition points to the fact that motion is a particular kind of act midway between potency and act properly speaking. In the real world some things exist in act or actually (a completed house) and others in

18

cf. P. Henen, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1956, pgs. 213-237.

potency or potentially (a heap of bricks and other materials which are potentially a house). Still, there is a kind of intermediate reality which progresses from potency to act, without being fully identified with either of these two states, i.e. potency or act (a house being constructed). This is the fluid reality called motion. An existent in motion is, at one and the same time, in act with respect to its partially actualized potency and yet in potency with respect to its terminus towards which it is directed and is its fully realized act. In not possessing full actuality, motion is somehow a mixture of potency and act, fluid act. The three elements of this definition can be explained in the following way:
ACT:

motion is a kind of actuality. But it is not a stable or fixed act, since it is not a perfection possessed unconditionally or in full. It is a fluid act, a process of actualization, a via ad actum. We call it act in a restricted sense because of its derived similarity to full acts, those integrally possessed; OF AN EXISTENT IN POTENCY: motion can only occur in an existent in potency i.e. an existent lacking some trait. Motion, therefore is a sign of imperfection, even though it is also a process for perfecting things; INASMUCH AS IT IS IN POTENCY: the mobile existent possesses other acts. A brick, inasmuch as it is a brick, is something in act but it can be put in motion only insofar as it is in potency. A brick enters into the process of construction inasmuch as it is potentially part of a house. Motion is not an act of bronze inasmuch as it is bronze but inasmuch as it is in potency to becoming a statue. Otherwise everything bronze would be in motion by the mere fact of being bronze (In III Phys., lect. 2). These words of Saint Thomas explain the definition: Some things exist only in act, others only in potency, while others are found in a state midway between potency and act. What exists only in potency is not yet in motion. What exists in perfect act is not in motion either for it has already undergone motion. A thing undergoing motion is midway between pure potency and perfect act, i.e., what exists partially in potency and partially in act. This is evident in the case of alteration. When a quantity of water is only potentially hot it is not yet in motion. When it is already hot, the process of heating has ceased. It is when the water is becoming hot, although as yet only partially so, that it is in motion (or moving) toward becoming fully hot (meaning achieving a certain temperature). Clearly what is being heated participates more and more in the perfection of heat. The imperfect act of heat that is found in something being heated is motion (In III Phys., lect. 2). Another definition expresses the same notion even more simply: motion is the imperfect act of an imperfect existent (cf. In I Phys., lect. 9). When we say it is an imperfect act we are not referring to the content of the perfection (e.g., a muted color as opposed to a vibrant one) but to the very character of the act itself the act is coming to be, it does not yet fully exist in the existent but is becoming actualized. In addition, it is the act of something imperfect because as we have pointed out it is a specific trait of an existent in potency. BEING AND BECOMING Motion is not opposed to existing in a fixed or absolute sense. Motion is a way of being or existing a deficient way of existing which is directed toward a stable way of existing. In the real world we find a determined number of categories or generic ways of existing: substance, quantity, quality, relation, time, place and so forth. These classifications or ways of existing admit of two basic states: existing in potency or existing in act. A substance or its qualities may either exist in potency or in act. For some of the categories there is also a third way of existing midway between potency and act. This is the act of becoming or motion. Experience reveals that successive motion is found in the categories of quantity, quality and change of place or local motion. (As we will come to see, substantial change is instantaneous). THE ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS OF MOTION: RECONCILING A THINGS BEING WITH ITS BECOMING In summary, the Aristotelian analysis of motion reconciles a things being with its becoming by introducing the notion of potency which his predecessors, who either expounded a philosophy of pure becoming or changeless fixed being, ignored. The physical world is always changing due to its many potentialities. At the same time, however, it is consistent and stable in its existing. This enables us to know the physical world through its universal and necessary aspects. Let us recall once again that certain alterations of a physical body that lead to a total corruption of a quality do not give rise to a corresponding process of acquiring another quality. The definition of motion applies less properly in this case. In passing from light to darkness we find a progressive loss of actuality while no other act is correspondingly acquired: we are not witnessing a genuine actualization. This

phenomenon would be more like the reverse process of motion. The process would not be one leading to actualization (via ad actum) but rather a return to potentiality with no accompanying acquisition of another act.

4.

ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY

Our study of motion has uncovered two basic ways of existing of all things existing in act and existing in potency. A fuller treatment of act and potency belongs to the science of metaphysics. Still it will be to our advantage to dwell somewhat on these notions in order to grasp them with greater precision, for they will repeatedly come up throughout our course. ACT: THE DESIGNATION OF ANY PERFECTION WHATSOEVER OF A SUBJECT The word act is usually employed to refer to the action or operations carried out by an agent (e.g. the act of taking, the act of running). The word act in philosophy designates any perfection whatever of a subject, as the color of a leaf, the shape of a statue, the nature of man or the existence of any thing. When a thing lacks such a perfection we say that the subject suffers privation of the given perfection, since act is not a subsistent thing. It is a determination or way of existing of a thing. In the created universe, acts as such do not exist. What do exist are existents in act or existents having actuality. The reality of act(s) is grammatically reflected in our use of verbs (being, being white, being a musician, being a man, running, studying, hoping and so forth). One characteristic of act or actuality is to be possessed in the present. If a man is wise in act, this signifies that he is actually wise now in the present moment rather than yesterday or tomorrow. Let us note that act does not merely imply a mere way of existing but above all it means the existent that which is or exists in the fullest sense in regard to any particular category, e.g., quality or quantity in the most strict sense is in act. Hence Peter is genuinely wise, when he is wise in act. Act as a perfection more or less stable is usually referred to technically as first act or essential act (in Greek there exists a specific term intelekeia); it is distinguished from second act (in Greek energeia) which refers to a things operation. Being white is, therefore, a first act while thinking or speaking is a second act. POTENCY: THE DESIGNATION OF THE REAL CAPACITY FOR RECEIVING AN ACT In common usage, potency (in Greek, dynamis) indicates power or the capacity for acting or realizing operations. In philosophy, on the other hand, potency is taken to mean the real capacity for receiving an act. Potency, therefore, always resides in a subject that is clearly an existent thing and the subject is precisely what we refer to as being in potency. Potency supposes a subject lacking a specific act (privation) but which is able, at the same time, to acquire it. Such a subjects situation is completely distinct from that of mere privation or absence of act. Consequently, a child is potentially a grown man, whereas, a kitten is not. It should, of course, be obvious that a subject in potency with respect to a determined act is in act with respect to many other perfections that it already has (a student may actually know history while his knowledge of geometry is still in potency). It must also be kept in mind that potency is always understood in reference to some act. Potency is always the potency to receive some act, for it always implies an intrinsic relatedness to some kind of act. As with act itself, potency is also a way of existing but a secondary or deficient way of existing. Being an architect in potency is undoubtedly a way of really existing for a man and clearly distinguished from the way of existing that lacks this potentiality. Still only he who actually is an architect can be said to be an architect in an unqualified sense. ACTUALIZED POTENCY: STILL PRESENT AS POTENCY IN ITS SUBJECT Furthermore, a potency, even when actualized does not cease to be present in the subject and it continues to be distinct from act. A glass filled with water still retains its capacity to be filled with water (a capacity that at present has been realized). In the same way, a subject which formerly was in potency to acquire an act, upon receiving it, continues to have this potency with respect to the given act. This implies a composition of act and potency in natural things. A red pencil, for example, possess at one and the same time although not in the same sense an act which is the color red and a potency for becoming red which is the subject as receiving or upholding the red color. Of course, this red pencil is more than merely the color red. There exists the two fold reality: the potentiality of the subject and the act possessed by it. The distinction, therefore, between act and potency is real and not merely one of

reason, even when an existent has had one of its determinate potencies actualized. The potency we have been dealing with up to this point is specifically passive potency or the capacity to receive a perfective act. Our experience also reveals the existence of active potency which coincides with the more common use of this word i.e., the capacity or ability to realize an action. A man with sight, for example, has the active potency to see and even when he isnt actually seeing, because he has his eyes closed, has within himself the capacity or power to carry out this action. Or again, an architect who is asleep has the active potency to design a house. Let us note the fact that passive potency is directed towards first act or perfection, while active potency is referred to second act or operation. Furthermore, an existents passing from passive potentiality to act requires a cause (a wall doesnt make itself white, a painter is needed). In the case of an existents passing from active potency to operation, the cause is the existent or agent itself (a man with the power of speech actually begins speaking by himself).

5.

THE STUDY OF MOTION IN THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES

In ancient times the scientific-experimental study of motion achieved some partial success, and most significantly in the field of astronomy. Ptolemy (2nd century) worked out a system for describing the motion of the heavenly bodies that proved useful until the time of Copernicus. It was not until the 16 th and 17th centuries, however, that this method of study began to mature. Mechanics, the science describing the movements of bodies on the earth and in the heavens, became a unified body of knowledge. It was now mathematically possible to formulate laws and theories that were experimentally applicable. Classical mechanics was born thanks to previous efforts of Copernicus (+1543), Tycho Brahe (+1601), Kepler (+1630) and Galileo (+1642). The first systematic formulation of classical mechanics was achieved by Newton (+1727) and remained unchanged in its fundamentals until the 20th century. Important theoretical advances were made through the efforts of Dalembert (+1783), and Hamilton (+1865). In the 20 th century, relativistic mechanics (Einstein) and quantum mechanics (Planck, Bohr, Born, Heisenberg, Schrdinger, etc.) have proposed new concepts and formulations. Besides accounting for micro-physical phenomena this new mechanics also allows one to obtain the same valid results of classical mechanics, which is seen as a special case or application of the relativistic and quantum theories. There are many diverse branches of physical science but, due to their relatedness, the diverse theories of mechanics are applicable to the fields of optics, electro-magnetics, atomic and nuclear physics, etc. The variety of these theories is not an obstacle to our extracting some general considerations that will allow us to evaluate the philosophical study of motion in light of the findings of experimental science. Obviously, many specific questions must needs be set aside, since they would require a much more extensive consideration. THE SUBJECT OF MOTION Mechanics in its different branches and theories, is expressed in a mathematical language that abstracts from the concrete physical body. The concepts and laws it employs are formulated to describe ideal situations. This first began to occur in the formulas of Newtonian mechanics. The law of inertia, for example, states that a body will continue in its state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion unless acted upon by some external force. Obviously these conditions are never fulfilled. Something similar can be said of the postulate of relativity which states that all the equations of physics should hold true with respect to any inertial system. Many such examples could easily be mentioned. Modern experimental physics is constructed on the basis of a system of abstractive theories. Their application to concrete questions requires a certain rule of interpretation whereby certain magnitudes are made to correspond to the experimental results. It is not at all easy indeed, it is not always even possible to determine the precise sense in which these theories reflect the existent order of the real world. In regards to this very question, scientists themselves adopt different positions. Nevertheless these difficulties of interpretation do not invalidate the philosophical analysis of motion that we have offered above. This analysis is originally based upon data drawn from spontaneous experience and, as such, is applicable to every real situation. As an example, we can state that although we are not able to intuitively represent the reality of waves and the corpuscles (energy packets) of quantum mechanics it is still evident that motion requires a subject that moves and that every change supposes the actualization of a potency. In a general way the difficulties involved when they occur in establishing the relation between the formulas of mechanics

and the real physical world are due to the fact that physics adopts a restricted or partial outlook towards its subject matter. This particular point of view of physics doubtless has its advantages. By constructing its notions, physics is able to submit them to the rigorous logic of mathematics and more easily relate these notions to the experimental results projected. At the same time that this method of physics enables it to achieve a clearer grasp of more fundamental aspects of reality inaccessible to ordinary experience, it also widens the distance between the immediate data of spontaneous knowledge and experimental conclusions. Another obvious, positive note is that the specialized starting point of physical science presupposes and utilizes the valid data of ordinary spontaneous knowledge. Without this knowledge, it would not be possible to interpret the data obtained through the use of experimental instruments and their resultant data nor make logical conclusions regarding the observed physical phenomenon. With the further advances in both scientific theories and instruments of observation there is nothing to prevent a more extensive application of the concepts drawn from ordinary experience philosophical notions to the scientific realm. THE USE OF MECHANICAL MODELS Classical mechanics tended to be identified by a particular school of thought with the ability of constructing mechanical models of reality. In other words, the real world could be adequately described by means of the spatial displacement of perfectly identified portions of matter. Relativistic and quantum mechanics do not permit such facile interpretation. This fact has at times been taken as a sign that the philosophical explanation of motion that we have been considering ought to be discarded. Our explanation of motion was seen as one very closely tied to classical mechanics. The Aristotelian explanation of motion is in no way dependent upon mechanism. It is, on the contrary, incompatible with those mechanistic theories that see all of reality as nothing more than changes of place and combinings and re-combinings of material particles. Aristotelianism further emphasizes that there are ways of existing (substantial and accidental forms) which simply cannot be reduced to mere mechanical processes. The very notions of act and potency have applications far beyond that of changes of place. THE SCOPE OF THE ARISTOTELIAN EXPLANATION OF MOTION In agreement with what we have seen so far, our explanation of motion extends to the whole of reality from the point of view of existence. Hence it must necessarily underlie every explanation of reality that attempts to uncover the very nature of things. It is understandable then that from the point of view of the experimental sciences there is need of using the abstractive precision of mathematics and technical conventions in order to study those aspects of the real world that are directly non-observable. Nevertheless, scientific technique leaves untouched the ontological validity of the explanation of real motion. This explanation will be directly applicable to the many cases in which science studies bodies that are accessible to observation. These considerations about motion are a sufficient introduction to the subject matter of the philosophy of nature. In the following pages we will take up the subject of the structure of physical bodies which the observation of motion uncovers to us. We may take note at this point, that the constitution of natural bodies is not simple but has varying levels of composition. This has already been suggested to us through the internal structure in physical bodies in terms of potency-act revealed in our analysis of motion. The following sections of this course will be taken up with the various types of composition found in natural things and which constitute those very things themselves.

II.
1.

BODILY SUBSTANCE
ITS COMPOSITION: SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

We now enter into the analysis of the first complexity which sensible things reveal to us. We observe in the world around us things that are independent and distinct one from another. But at the same time that these existents reveal a certain unity they also present themselves to us under a multiplicity of different facets, hence, they constitute unities exhibiting multiplicity. A dog is, in some way, one thing a central or core unity and not to be mistaken for the environment surrounding him. At the same time, however, it possesses numerous secondary traits or properties: it is white, of small stature, shaggy-haired, thin, etc. These central or core unities are bodily substances, and their secondary traits or properties are their accidents. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS IN BODILY EXISTENTS Our observation of change in natural things makes manifest the distinction between substance and accidents. The phenomenon of change is one of the clearest ways to differentiate these two aspects of sensible things. Material existents undergo a variety of modifications, such as, changing place, altering their color, increasing their weight, etc. Still the thing itself subsists without turning into something else another reality. The thing, in this case, retains its substantial reality but changes with respect to certain determinations which are its accidents. We refer to these changes then as accidental. The subject of this change the permanent substrate persisting throughout the change is the substance and the acquired trait is referred to as the accidental form or accidental act. Material existents also undergo more profound modifications, ones in which the thing completely changes its way of existing. An example of such a change is our digestion of food: the nutritive substance is so changed that it becomes part of our own substance. We will turn our attention to this kind of change shortly. For the present, let us examine the composition substance / accidents revealed to us in natural bodies more closely. The description of bodily existents also leads to the distinction between substance and accidents. These notions are not the technical distinctions of the philosopher. Any ordinary person is well aware of this basic distinction and uses it in his everyday speech. A description by a man in the street of the world would assert that we are surrounded by many substances or individual things and we ourselves are but one more among these many things. Of course, this description must eventually be made with greater precision and corrected by science and philosophy, but it is perfectly legitimate in its own sphere. If asked to point out these realities we would indicate autonomous unities such as an individual animal or plant, a piece of metal or quantity of water, a grain of sand, a stone or some similar thing. With respect to inorganic things, our description would probably come up against some doubtful cases. Is a mountain a substance or is it a huge heap of substances? Is the ocean a substance? At least at some level, even in these problem cases, substantiality can be found. Our problem consists in determining whether a particular something is a substance, a part of a substance or a conglomerate of substances. In contrast, we can clearly distinguish a substances accidental traits (color, weight, hardness, size, shape), which endow it with particular characteristics, without confusing these traits with the substance itself. We easily recognize that a substance is no mere collection, or sum of accidents. It is a more basic, core reality in which these accidents are both sustained and harmoniously united; with them, it constitutes one individual existent.

2.

NOTION OF SUBSTANCE

SUBSTANCE: A PRIMARY REALITY Substance cannot be strictly defined for it is a primary reality and irreducible to anything else. We certainly can make our understanding of substance more precise by describing its characteristics as revealed in our experience. These are the principal ways in which we understand substance and all of them usually are understood together. a) substance stands for essence. Our first understanding of substance is the central or core reality making a thing to be what it is. Things are no mere agglomeration of traits or characteristics. We can describe how a person, an animal or any other thing is by listing a series of properties (e.g., water is a liquid that is transparent, colorless, taste-

less, etc.) but it is also evident that there exists an indivisible and singular core within this multiplicity of traits rendering to each its uniqueness and its own proper and basic character. We call this core the essence. We attempt to express it through a definition. In this sense, substance corresponds to the question what is this? quid est?. For this reason St. Thomas usually refers to it as the principal quid of a thing, the quod quid est or quiddity. In ordinary language we often refer to a things essence using the word substance, e.g., we speak about the substance of a question, substantially, the problem is... and so forth. b) substance means the underlying support or substrate of accidents. In a second meaning, we conceive of substance as the subject, carrying and sustaining the accidents, which persists throughout the changes of its accidents. Obviously, this function is proper to the essence or principal quid (in Latin, what). The subiectum (underlying subject) is not something unknowable another reality hiding behind a things external accidents. It is a reality having a positive content, one which we can understand. Hence, the essence man or a mans substance (his principal quid) is the source supporting his accidents (his secondary quids) such as his color, weight or actions. There is no such thing as an autonomous existing reality called laughing. Laughing is an accidental act having its source in the subject man. Etymologically, substance refers to this role of being the foundation for accidents. Substance comes from substare to stand under or underlie. c) substance is the reality that subsists. We come to this third meaning by way of the former one. Accidents find their source in the substance and, therefore, exist in another (in alio). Accidents are not independent or subsistent; their way of being is to be in another. Substance, on the other hand, properly subsists (subsistire), sustaining itself and having no need of any other intrinsic foundation for maintaining its existence. Substances way of being consists in existing in its own right rather than in another (cf. De Pot., q. 9, a. 1). This notion of substance is the most proper and the most adequate. Saint Thomas describes substance as res cuius quidditati debetur esse non in alio, that thing to which by its very nature it is fitting not to be in another (De Pot., q. 7, a. 3, ad 4). This does not mean, of course, that substance is a wholly independent reality, one that would have no need of any other reality for its existence. An animal, for example, has need of its environment in order to exist as well as that cause through which it was begotten. Substance is not an existent needing nothing else for its existence, but rather that reality which exists in itself, i.e., that does not exist in another. Although this third meaning is evident, it can be demonstrated per absurdum; if accidents exist in another (a subject), the existence of these accidents demands that we come to some entity not itself an accident that is the first existential basis for all the other real aspects in an existent and this is substance. The result, of what we have said so far, is to establish this important characteristic situating substance in the context of being the sum of all existents whatsoever. Substance is the existent in the fullest and most complete sense or that which principally exists (In I Phys., 3 & 6). An accident is something (the color white is real). Still, we do not properly speak of an accident as a thing or an existent (height is not a thing) because it is not fitting for it to exist in the full sense. It exists rather in a secondary sense, inasmuch as it inheres in a substance. The trait of existing (which is analogous, i.e., it is said in many different ways, while retaining in each instance a certain common or core meaning) chiefly pertains to substance. What properly exists is a man, a dog, a tree and so on, while the various traits that these substances can possess, called accidents, exist only in a secondary way. ANALOGOUS USE OF THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE Substance is a fundamental notion in philosophy. In the philosophy of nature, most especially, its role is to permit us to identify the individual substances in the midst of the complex structures of matter, a task not easily accomplished. It is important from the outset to realize that the notion of substance is analogous. A strictly univocal definition of substance one that we could apply without further stipulation or nuance to things cannot be given. This was already insinuated in the three primary meanings of substance we have already considered. The same reality that is essence, is at one and the same time the subject of its accidents and the very reality which subsists. A substance can subsist by itself on its own by virtue of its characteristic as essence which gives it a special power to exist in itself. The quid color cannot subsist, while the quid man can. The analogy of substance can be more completely grasped considering other aspects of it:

substance is almost always understood to mean all of the existent, which also includes its accidents,
even though its explicit meaning refers to only the substance as the core reality of the existent. So it is when we commonly speak of a man or an animal we refer to the total reality in all its different aspects. Still, in the strict sense, substance is the essential part of a thing, as distinct from its accidents.

since

substance is chiefly essence as subsisting in virtue of its possessing an ontological sufficiency certainly we can expect to find substances of very different kinds corresponding to the various ways of subsisting. This is a matter of common experience. Now although it is quite easy to determine substances among animals and generally speaking among living things, this is more difficult to do in the mineral world. Within the mineral world mixtures and aggregates are the predominant situation. It is as if substances tended to diffuse themselves (especially in the cases of liquids and gases). In these cases we feel certain that there should be one or more substances but they are more difficult to identify. Their trait of substantiality is less and less clearly manifest in ordinary experience. This is an important aspect of material substance.

another similar aspect lies in the fact that some substances or essences are, in themselves,

composed since they are constituted by two substantial principles matter and form. This is the case with all bodily substances. As we shall shortly see, in contrast, there exist simple essences which are pure spirits.

there is one last classification of substance which can be mentioned, even though its nature falls into
the realm of cognitional being: first and second substance. When we speak of man, we signify the human substance in general (second substance), i.e., the essence considered apart from the individual substance the essence abstracted without precision.0 By contrast, when we say Peter we refer to the individual substance (first substance) found in the realm of real being. Substance, in the strictest and primary sense, is first substance (from which we derive the name, first substance) because it alone truly subsists. It is also referred to as the subsistent subject or the supposit (suppositum). Saint Thomas occasionally refers to it as the hoc aliquid (the concrete this). Second substance denotes the essence considered abstractly (the lion, the stone, etc.) which obviously does not subsist. At most, we can say that this second substance subsists in the individual, but it is better, for the sake of clarity, to avoid this awkward way of speaking. COMPARING SUBSTANCE WITH OTHER RELATED NOTIONS The terms we have been using such as substance, essence, existent, thing are more intensively studied by Metaphysics. Here it is to our advantage to describe them somewhat more precisely, simply to avoid undo confusion and, also, to relate them to our study of physical nature: a) existent: indicates that which is. Ordinarily, every existent is a substance, although existent connotes the act of being while substance connotes the things substare and its subsistire as has already been explained. In any case, there are realities which exist but are not substances (the accidents). These latter can be called existents, although less properly, since substance is the existent in its most proper sense. b) thing: an imprecise way to refer to the existent. In consequence, ordinarily every thing is a substance. In common speech, thing not infrequently indicates an individual substance that is not spiritual, i.e., thing is the opposite of person. Thing means a non-personal substance, a non-spiritual nature. c) essence: we have already considered that essence is the same as substance. Nevertheless, essence always refers to the substance as a part distinct from the accidents, while substance usually includes the whole. This is the reason why we never say this is an essence when referring to some object. We rather say this object has an essence, on the other hand, we will say this object is a substance. It is also common to speak of the essence or quiddity of realities that are not substances or do not subsist, e.g., when speaking of the essence of a color or of a virtue. d) individual: normally by the word individual we mean a singular substance. Still there are individual realities that are not substances this color, this hand, etc. e) supposit: (in Latin, suppositum; in Greek, hypostasis): this is the technical term denoting the

019 (Cf. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, pgs. 63 & 132).

concrete or individual substance. If the supposit is spiritual in nature, it is called a person. f) phenomenon: etymologically it signifies that which appears, what is manifested to our senses. This word has been charged with a peculiar interpretation in subjectivist philosophy. In this kind of philosophy, phenomenon is the pure datum of sensible observation (e.g,. datum such as quantity, color, motion) existing along side of the substance the existent which is declared to be either unknowable or non-existent. The phenomena of a dog, to use an example, would not be an animal of a determined species, but merely the collection of colors associated with the sound of barking, a certain shape, and so on. Philosophies that subscribe to this as the sole view of reality are called phenomenological and deny any validity to metaphysics. In the teaching of established philosophy, on the other hand, as well as in its usage by ordinary human beings, phenomenon can mean either an event or an occurrence (e.g., a chemical reaction) or the very reality of the substance as it manifests itself to both sense and intellect. g) body: this term can either indicate the essential element of a living thing which is distinct from its soul (e.g., when we say that a man has a body and a soul) or it can signify generic material substance itself. Hence, body is not synonymous with substance; it indicates only material or physical substance. Keep in mind, that the notion of substance is strictly a metaphysical notion, for matter need not enter into its conception. There can exist and there are, in fact, immaterial substances such as the human soul, angels and God. Later, we will consider that the notion of body implies composition of matter and form. For the present, we can define a body by means of a property that always accompanies it, viz., quantitative extension. A body, as belonging to the genus of substance, is that to whose nature it corresponds to have concrete dimensions (De ente et essentia, chap. 3). THE INTEGRATING PARTS OF BODILY SUBSTANCE We have already mentioned that bodily substances are not simple (i.e., their essence is not simple). They possess two substantial parts or elements, namely, matter and form. We will have more to say about this composition and its relatedness to substance. Now we will fix our attention on another more external type of composition. These are referred to as the integrating parts of a substance, e.g., in the case of man they would be arms, legs, torso, etc. These parts are the consequence of quantity and should not be considered as accidents. They certainly do not subsist separated from the whole, but they form part of the integral or whole substance. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND DIMENSIVE EXTENSION We need to clearly distinguish between the substance itself and the quantity or dimensive extension of the substance. Dimensive quantity is a bodily accident by which the substance is divided or spread out in parts, such that we can say that some of them are here and others are there they can be located as regards their position. Substance, as such, is indivisible and so it is not located in one particular place in the body. It is meaningless to ask in what part of a body the substance resides, for the substance is wholly and entirely present in the totality of the body and in each and every one of its parts, e.g., an arm, a finger or any other part are not accidents because they seem to inhere in the bodys torso imagining the torso to be the substance. The members are portions of the bodys quantity in which the whole of the substance is present (with its matter and its form) along with many accidents. In order to correctly conceive of bodily substance, we must set aside all quantitative imagery. Substance receives the accident of quantity, but substance itself is not quantitative, it is adimensional. The word part, as we have been using it, has two meanings: 1) quantitative parts and 2) non-quantitative parts sometimes referred to as elements. Quantitative parts are those which are constituted by quantity. They are recognized by the fact that they always occupy a concrete place here or there. Nonquantitative parts cover a wide range of applications, e.g., matter and form as parts of substance. We will not consider this type of part any further in our course. The question of integrating parts led Suarez to conclude that bodily substance, in itself and independently of quantity, would have distinct, organized, integrating parts. Bodily substance of itself, would have some sort of extension. Suarez called it entitative extension to distinguish it from quantitative extension. Quantity, as an accident, would only add the natural aptitude for occupying a place or being localized. This idea confuses material substance with quantity. In Suarezs thought this confusion brought him to claim that the real distinction between bodily substance and quantity cannot be naturally known with

certainty. Only by faith in the dogma of the Holy Eucharist do we have the certainty of this distinction. In St. Thomas thought, however, substance is naturally indivisible, for it has no actual parts. But substance as such is not indivisible because its parts are too tiny to be differentiated material parts never become so small as to be reduced to a point. This would be a wholly incorrect way of understanding substance by trying to imagine it. Substance has no parts simply because it is excluded from the category of quantity. In conclusion, bodily substance possesses integrating parts solely because it acquires divisibility through its being quantified (cf. In II Sent., d. 30, q. 2, a. 1).

3.

NOTION OF ACCIDENTS

As we have stated, accidents are those realities to which it naturally corresponds to be in another. In other words, accidents need a support in some other reality in order to exist. This reality is substance, which possesses the act of being in its own right. Accidents need to inhere in substance as in a subject. THE NINE SUPREME CATEGORIES OF ACCIDENTS The many accidents which can be possessed by a subject can be classified in nine supreme categories. These are: quantity, quality, relation, action, affection, the where (ubi), position (situs: a bodys disposing its parts in space), the when (quando), possession (habitus: a substances having something contiguous or immediately adjacent to it). Through the perfective modifications of these accidents, a physical body is extended (quantity), is white (quality), is referred to another body (relation), is the agent principle of motion in another as a man pushing a table (action), is the passive receptive subject of the activity of others as a table being pushed (affection), is here (the where, ubi), is now (the when, quando), is seated (position, situs) is clothed (possession, habitus). As should be obvious, we are dealing here with varying ways of existing, which have their counterpart in our ways of speaking or predicating. The way of being which is the originating way of being is clearly substance. Because a particular thing is a substance, it is a man or it is an animal, and so on. Concurrently with substance these nine supreme classes of accidents make the ten categories (in Greek) or predicaments (in Latin) or ways of existing.

THE TEN SUPREME CATEGORIES WAYS OF EXISTING

SUBSTANCE SUBSTANTIA a thingexisting in itself, not in another ACCIDENTS ACCIDENTES that to which it naturally corresponds to exist in another
Quantity Qualities Relation Action Affection Where Position When Possession

Quantitas

Qualitates
being of such and such a kind

Relatio
being referred to another

Actio
being agent or mover of motion

Passio
undergoing action of being moved

Ubi
being
located

Situs
a bodys disposing its parts in space

Quando
the measuring of motion

Habitus
being contiguous to another

being extended

in place

We can also divide the classes of accidents according to their degree of possession by the substance or the substance through its essence: a) some accidents are necessary and inseparable properties of a determined nature, although they are distinct from the substance. For example, the physical-chemical properties of substances such as their freezing or melting points, their electrical conductivity and chemical valence. b) others are random or separable properties. They belong to a given substance but may be lost through the process of corruption, e.g., man is by nature a sighted being, but contingently there are men who are blind. c) other accidents are not even properties they are merely incidental accidents and are, therefore, separable because the particular kind of substance does not require having these accidents. Within the human species, for example, a person may be fair or dark haired, seated or standing, tall or short of stature. This classification of accidents is aptly described as unimportant and is a common meaning given to the word accident and is reflected in common speech in statements such as this is merely accidental or

similar expressions. We can further distinguish between the essence considered abstractly (abstraction with precision) or an existing individual. Hence, there exist properties of the species (e.g., for man, being intelligent) and properties of the individual (e.g., for the human person, being a man or being a woman, being blond or being brunette). Among those accidents that are not properties, some are appropriate to the essence or nature (e.g., playing sports, living in a locality with a mild climate) while other are contrary to that nature (e.g., being over-weight or having spinal curvature). So our criterion for properly evaluating accidents is to compare them with a given essence. Proper accidents or properties are highly important because they make up an adequate manifestation of a things essence. So we normally have recourse to defining a thing by its specific properties for we cannot give a more rigorous definition of it. Recall that this is what we did in defining a body as that which has dimensions. This is the procedure used in science when it specifies bodily existents by their specific weight, their crystalline structure, their hardness, their color, their chemical affinity and their absorption and emission spectrum. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SUBSTANCE AND ITS ACCIDENTS Now that we have pointed out the real difference between substance and accidents, we must also consider their very close unity. Accidents and substance make up but one, sole, composite existent. Accidents are brought together and unified by the substance the unifying principle and along with substance constitute one existent composed of these two principles. Substance and accidents are naturally inseparable. An accident has no existence apart from its substance. No natural substance is ever lacking accidents, at least, those necessary to it because they arise from its nature. It is impossible for a body to exist without extensive quantity, nor a man to exist without the power of reason. A substance may, of course, lack separable accidents. Often, the substance is the cause of its accidents. We are introducing a new role of substance here. It is no longer merely a supporting subject of accidents, but also the productive cause of its accidents. Mans power of understanding, the yellow color of gold, the specific shape of a cypress arise from the principles of the substance. This is what occurs in the case of all properties, e.g., the running of a 100 meter race is caused by the runner. Accidents can also be caused by principles extrinsic to the substance as happens in every case of affection being pushed, being existent, being enlightened.

4.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF BODILY SUBSTANCES

The notion of substance has been attacked, at times, in modern philosophy on epistemological grounds. The grounds for this rejection of substance are based on merely anti-metaphysical prejudices. For this reason we will attempt to clarify, very succinctly, certain points regarding our human knowledge of material substance. SUBSTANCE, IN ITSELF, IS AN INTELLIGIBLE REALITY By direct sense perception, we perceive only the qualities and quantities of material bodies such as, color, taste, size, number, etc. We do not grasp, by direct sense perception alone, the substance or the essence of things or other aspects such as the act of being of existents, their relations, etc. We can see these realities only by our intellectual powers with our sense perceptions. These realities are intelligible, not sensible. When we see Peter and we understand that he is a person we are grasping his substantiality in a seemingly simple way. We must note, however, that this way of knowing is strictly intellectual. We are operating on the level of what St. Thomas calls particular intellect, concentrating our sense and intellectual powers on this singular thing, a person in fact, there in front of us. Peters personality traits cannot be seen by our eyes alone or by any other sense alone. With our eyes we can directly see only light, color and shape similarly with the other senses. Substance, in the strict sense of second substance, cannot possibly be imagined spatially. It would be illusory to think that we are grasping the reality of substance when we are really only imagining a vague, hazy body and thereby confusing substance with substance as quantified. This is exactly what Descartes did when he limited bodily substance to res extensa pure extendedness. It is equally erroneous to think of substance and accidents as two entities situated in different parts of the physical body thinking of them as comparable to the rind and the pulp of a piece of fruit.

Bodily substance is, nevertheless, sensible per accidens. A given bodily substance can be understood only if it is first perceived by our senses so that this sensible perception is accompanied by the corresponding intellectual apprehension of the substance. For example, any normal person who has frequently experienced seeing a certain round object of a particular red hue will immediately recognize it as an apple i.e., he is aware of a concrete, specific substance. We can say, in this case, that he sees the substance but he sees it only per accidens. What he sees per se (as such) is only the light, the color and the dimensions or shape of the apple. Language mirrors this perception of the reality of substance. We do not commonly say I saw a collection of colors but rather I saw Peter. Ordinarily our grasp of substance is an immediate intellectual knowing rather than the result of reasoning. Surely, we are mistaken in some cases about whether something is or is not a substance. But even in these cases what we grasp is understood as something which is a substance. For example, when we perceive the blue of the sky we immediately refer this to some thing after the manner of a substance in this case the sky. Analyzing this case with the help of physical science we come to realize that the sky, as a material thing, is composed of a number of substances in a gaseous state and not easily laid hold of in the concrete. At the same time, we can reason to the fact that many other substances, which we cannot directly observe, exist up there. SUBSTANCE AS A METAPHYSICAL REALITY The distinction between physical and metaphysical realities is already classical, although it is not infrequent that the two spheres of reality are confused. Saint Thomas himself did not use this terminology, but later Scholastics made this distinction based on the previous notions of the degrees of intelligibility. Physical notions include sensible matter, while metaphysical notions exclude any reference to matter. Substance is a notion of the metaphysical order and, hence, can also be said to be a metaphysical reality. Conversely, bodily substance is to be classed among physical realities. These terms would later acquire very distinct meanings. The phenomenologists consider physical reality as the world of phenomenon, viz., that which is grasped exclusively by the senses. Metaphysical reality will then become what is intelligible and, hence, bodily substance will become a metaphysical reality. Another meaning given to the term physical reality is to use it to refer to all reality, as such in complete independence of our knowledge. God, in this sense, becomes a physical reality and so do substances. Accordingly, physical reality is taken to mean the opposite of intentional, moral or mystical reality, i.e., those things which we bring into our intellect or heart. We say, for example, that someone is intentionally or morally present to us when we affectionately recall him to mind. God becomes intentionally, morally and mystically present to us in prayer.

5.

THE MEANING OF SUBSTANCE IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES

Some popularizers of the mathematical-physical sciences frequently adopt a critical attitude toward the notion of substance. The present physical model of the world they say, its no longer a substantial model. The world is not made up of static, neatly circumscribed things. The actual physical world is composed of waves and energy phenomena in continuous interaction. Similar criticisms have been made by modern Cartesian philosophers. To clarify these specific ideas is not an easy task. It requires lengthy explanations, drawing upon metaphysics, the metaphysics of knowledge and the particular sciences. Furthermore, mistakes are easily made due to the complexity of the whole question. We will consider this question in a more detailed way as we proceed through the course while recalling the fact that a more or less complete answer can be given only at the very end of our study. This criticism is due in large measure to anti-metaphysical prejudices, false epistemological principles and arguments seemingly taken from the findings of the particular sciences themselves. Some writers simply deny any validity to the notion of substance, others consider it to be a merely philosophical notion wholly out of place or unrelated to the positive sciences. We have already considered and explained how the particular sciences implicitly makes use of essential philosophical notions. Hence, if substance is a 0 reality in nature, science cannot correctly reject it, even though it does not analyze it as philosophy does . CRITICISM OF THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE This criticism began in the 14th century, with the appearance of nominalism. Nicholas of Ultricuria 020
F. Selvaggi, Scienza e Metodologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1956, pgs. 144-162.

became famous in that century for his rejection of the Aristotelian notion of substance, for as Nicholas would claim, it was wholly at odds with experience. His ideas were very influential in the English empiricism of the 17th and 18th centuries. Empiricism acknowledges nothing but sense knowledge and thereby eliminates the realm of metaphysics. Locke affirmed that substance was an unknown substrate, an unknowable supposition hiding beneath sensible accidents and which is inferred to exist via causality. Hume, reject the notion of causality and, in consequence, eliminated the very notion of substance. He explained causality on the basis of the laws of the association of ideas. For him, substance is but the stable union of simple perceptions. At the beginning of this century, Mach would take up this same thinking and claim that substance is the symbol of a complexity of sensations which we employ as a mere economy of thought. As the outset, rational philosophers, accepted the notion of substance. But for them substance was a reality to be described in an a priori fashion, independently of all experiences as a requirement of thought. For different reasons, this understanding of substance endowed it with rather special traits such as immutability, performance, passivity or a self-contained or incommunicable character. Spinoza attributed God-like properties to his notion of substance, defining it as what exists for itself and is conceived by itself. Spinoza saw all reality as but one sole substance, which is God. Kant s critiques reject the rationalist conception of substance. For Kant substance is merely a category of thought that corresponds to the notion of permanence in time of the phenomena of a changeless subject. In the 19th century, positivism banished the notion of substance charging that it was a metaphysical concept and, as such, had no positive value whatsoever. Comte held that substance was nothing more than an observable and measurable quantity of matter that remained unchanged throughout its transformations in obedience to the law of conservation of mass. Twentieth century neo-positivism again took up Comtes scientism, blending it with empiricism of Hume and Mach. Neo-positivism relegated all of metaphysics to the realm of meaninglessness. Carnap claimed that the use of the term existent represented a deterioration in the logical use of language. Obviously the notion of substance has no place in the phenomenological background of neo-positivism. As a neo-positivist, Schilick professes that it is impossible to interpret statements about reality unless they are expressed as statements relative to a string of perceptions. Other writers, of varying points of view, have attacked the notion of substance presumedly basing their criticism, at least in part, on the new discoveries of experimental science. In this vein, Bergson could be mentioned. He denied the existence of a subject of motion. For Bergson change is reality the very substance of all things. For Eddington, the concept of substance is totally absent in the world of science. Bachelard says that being is energy, to such an extent, that energy represents the thing itself. Considering positions such as those mentioned above, helps us to see that the criticism leveled at the notion of substance is really directed at deficient notions of substance. These are, concretely, the conceptions of substance of mechanism or of Kantianism. According to mechanisms conception, substance is conceived as a passive substrate of change, an extension filled with matter that remains changeless throughout the various sorts of transformations. These transformations, in turn, are basically nothing but the local motion of these substances. It should be clear that this conception of substance is purely imaginative and represents reality as a collection of machines whose parts are these substance. This conception has deeply influenced many scientific-philosophical interpretations of reality in the modern age. Let us add, it has no valid relation to the genuine notion of substance. THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE As we have said, the Kantian conception of knowledge reduces substance to an a priori category of mind. Substance becomes a subjective need to assert a permanent subject that underlies phenomenological changes. In this case, substance becomes just a mental construct made necessary by the peculiar working of our human power of understanding, but with no reference to extra-mental reality. It should be obvious that this conception, by which Kant basing himself on the physics of Newton hoped to answer the empirical criticism of Hume, is of no use in describing reality. Experimental science can offer no positive basis for these notions of substance. Whenever the attempt is made to draw a notion of substance from scientific knowledge, that knowledge is necessarily distorted and the method and results of science itself are falsified. Only from such a falsified image of science, can

mechanism, energism, empiricism and positivism claim to present a philosophical conception of reality that is scientific. The inevitable result is that their philosophical conceptions are incompatible with genuinely objective scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, positions such as these claim to have negative support from science, arguing that the notion of substance has no role to play in modern science and that it should, therefore, be abandoned. The question we will briefly pose will be: How can the notion of substance be applied to the material existents which experimental science studies? Let us now consider how the notion of substance is implicitly contained in the conception and development of scientific theories. SUBSTANCE IN SCIENTIFIC-EXPERIMENTAL KNOWLEDGE The question before us is this: Do the experimental sciences make use of the notion of substance? And if they do, in what sense do they use it and how broadly do they apply it? In order answer these questions, we must take into account the various ways in which a scientific theory may refer to reality: a) a descriptive theory makes reference to real substances and their properties by basing itself on ordinary experience, e.g., chemical theories concerning the observable properties of metals. Such theories presuppose the notion of substance and make use of it, although they do not explicitly reflect upon this fact as philosophy does since their goal is the specialized knowledge proper to experimental science. b) an abstract theory refers to idealized objects (e.g., the general theory of mechanics or the physics of fields). In order to apply these theories to real problems, they must be interpreted and the relationship between the theoretical concepts and the experimental facts must be established by means of rules of correspondence. The theory may speak of a particular entity as if it were a substance, but these entities belong to the ideal rather than the real order. c) generally speaking, scientific theories combine both descriptive and abstractive elements. Hence, their correspondence to reality needs to be determined, case by case, by studying the meanings of the concepts these theories employ. Together with the preceding epistemological considerations, we must also take into account a basic conclusion of metaphysics. In the real world, every existent is either a substance or an accident. Reality is made up of existents that have existence as either their own existence as individual substances or by participating in anothers existence as parts of these substances. These latter existents are but further determinations of these substances. These determinations are the accidents of substance; that admit of a great diversity. A third consideration is that the experimental sciences strive for genuine knowledge of reality and, consequently, they pursue a knowledge of substance and accidents. As a rule, scientific literature does not contain explicit references to substance and accidents. This, of course, does not mean that these notions are not used in science, but only that sciences manner of employing them in its work is different from that of philosophy. Science pursues a concrete, detailed knowledge of substance and accidents in their proximate causes through syllogistic reasoning derived through experimentation. We can now answer our initial questions. Scientific-experimental knowledge ultimately makes reference to substantial and accidental existents, however, the immediate reference in many scientific theories is to idealized existents. Therefore, the notions of substance and accident are presupposed in all scientific knowledge. These notions are used, however, only in their proper sense in those aspects of scientific theories which refer to real rather than idealized existents. The notions of substance and accident are not conceptual constructs or operative concepts defined by science in relation to given experimental operations. Examples are the concepts of mass, electrical resistance, wave length, elementary particle and so on. The notions of substance and accident are metaphysical; they refer to the existence of all existing bodies. Hence, experimental science cannot disprove the reality of these notions. The real problem lies elsewhere, viz., determining the depth of penetration into reality of scientific knowledge. Science doubtlessly penetrates into reality and, to the extent that it does so, it implicitly makes use of the notions of substance and accidents even though these terms may not appear in its literature. 6.

THE NUMERICAL AND SPECIFIC MULTIPLICITY OF BODILY SUBSTANCES

We have already stated that every thing in reality exits either substantially (as an individual substance) or accidentally (as part of an individual substance). Note that the word exists is necessarily applied in these two cases analogically. The dissimilarity between substance and accidents as ways of existing is far greater than their similarity. Obviously it is impossible for any thing to exist which does not either have existence as its own (substance) or have existence from and in another (accident) as a further determination of that substance. This is a statement of basic truth in perennial philosophy it is evident. It can be said to be held generally by philosophers although many do not apply it correctly. And, as we have just said, it is implicit in all scientific-experimental knowledge of reality. Contemporary Thomists are unanimous in accepting this central truth of philosophy, 0 although they vary in their judgments concerning just what concrete realities can be classed as substances. We will now take up this question. Let it be noted, at the outset, that the uncertainties and discrepancies among Thomistic philosophers concerning this issue presents no obstacle to the validity of the fundamental principles of Thomistic metaphysics. Their validity consists in their being genuine expressions of the basic ways of existing in reality. The inherent difficulty in applying the notion of substance on a case by case basis does not affect its validity. The chief reason for its validity is, as was said, the fact that reality presents itself to us as either a substance or an accident. Other reasons will emerge in the explanations that follow. These explanations contain, together with the primary affirmations of Thomistic philosophy, other affirmations not shared by those who reject the fundamental elements of Saint Thomas metaphysics, for reasons to be given later in this chapter. SUBSISTENCE AND SPECIFIC NATURE Our explanation of substance revealed three traits: 1) substance is a reality that subsists, 2) it is an essence and 3) it is the substrate (underlying support) of accidents. Its principal trait is its subsistence, for it is proper to substance to exist in itself and not to exist in another. We have also indicated that the notion of substance is analogous, i.e., its specific traits are found in very diverse realities but in varying degrees. The more perfect a material existent, the more perfectly it possesses its act of existence and the more perfectly it realizes the notion of substance. Hence, its substantial character is more prominent. Living things possess such an independence in their way of existing, and such specific perfections, that their character as substances is easily identified. When we examine inorganic matter the specific and exclusive subject matter of this course it should not be surprising to find a noticeable uncertainty in identifying concrete substances. This uncertainty will tend to increase as we turn our attention to lower and lower levels of material things. We can expect to find even primitive existents possessing a genuine substantiality, but more weakly than that of more perfect existents. We will have to conclude that there are diverse degrees of substance. Considering the analogy of the notion of substance, it is important to realize that the proportionality between a substance and its specific nature (i.e., its essence) varies according to the various classes of substances we encounter in nature. In bodies of observable size their subsistence is quite easily determined, whereas determining their specific nature is not as easy. For example, some bodies are heterogeneous mixtures of different substances. This is generally the case with naturally occurring minerals. Some process of separation is required to obtain the composing substances. Other bodies are homogeneous mixtures formed by the composition of different substances. Water, as it occurs in nature, is a mixture of different substances, in varying proportions, although the mixture in each case is homogeneous. Conversely, in the case of bodies of very small size we can usually determine their specific characteristics with precision. Nevertheless, these existents often exhibit a kind of diffused individuality. Intimately combined with other such existents, they form part of larger bodies. This is the case with the atoms and molecules that compose larger units of physical matter. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING SUBSTANTIALITY Recalling our previous comments, we can say without hesitation, that the standards for judging 021 cf. for example, R. Masi, Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961, pgs. 43-44; F. Selvaggi, Cosmologia, Gregorian
University, Rome, 1962, pg. 222.

whether or not a thing is a substance will comprise two factors: the judgment regarding its subsistence and the judgment regarding its specific nature. The judgment regarding the subsistence of a thing is easy to make in the case of observable bodies. This can be easily determined by seeing whether this thing is a separate individual or a part of an individual (in the case of solid and liquid bodies). In the case of small bodies, the determination is not difficult if the bodies are mediately observable, i.e., by the use of instruments that amplify our observation (e.g., a microscope). The same thing can be said about bodies of very large dimensions but at a great distance from us (e.g., the stars observable through the use of telescopes). In addition to these procedures, there are many ways of separating one natural substance from another when they occur together as a mixture. When we have no methods of observation available, as the ones mentioned, the judgment regarding a things subsistence must then be based on indirect evidence. In other words, the judgment must be made based on the observable consequences that can be deduced from the supposed substantiality. This judgment will, of course, be the conclusion of a reasoning process and will admit of varying degrees of certitude or probability. Strictly speaking, we can never achieve perfect certitude since the observable consequences will always admit of another conclusion by starting with other suppositions or supposed premises. Still, the greater the number and the precision of the observed consequences, and the greater the diversity of independent procedures for obtaining such data, the greater our certainty in arriving at a conclusion. We can achieve practically speaking a total certainty this way. This is the case in modern physics with regard to the existence of atoms and molecules. The judgment regarding the specific nature of a thing will depend upon the number and the characteristics of the properties of the supposed substance. In ordinary cases a simple description is enough to discover whether we are dealing with a specific nature or not. A building is, evidently, an assortment of different substances and the same would be true of many objects of our daily experience. In yet other cases, positive conclusions can be obtained by means of physical and chemical procedures. In a general way, we can say that a specific nature reveals itself through such traits as a well defined structure repeatedly producing either naturally or artificially a collection of stable properties. However, a grouping of properties is not equivalent to the essence of a material substance, even though the essence reveals itself by means of these bodily properties. Human knowledge regarding the essence of bodies is limited. The reasons for this conclusion far exceed the scope of our present subject matter. Such a study would require a detailed analysis of questions from metaphysics and psychology. Nonetheless, St. Thomas can affirm the proper object of the human intellect united to the body is the essence (quidditas) or nature existing in bodily matter (STh, I, q. 84, a. 7). This does not mean that we directly grasp the essence of each body, for the contrary is evidently the case. Through the work of science we attain the essence of a body only progressively. Even then the essence, properly speaking, simply eludes us. The word quidditas quid est res has a very broad and flexible meaning. It denotes a things nature, as confusedly and poorly as it may be grasped. For example, in apprehending an animal, a tree or an electrical generator we are grasping the quidditas of a thing21. Certainly, it would serve no purpose to attempt to formulate some absolutely precise standard for judging the specific nature of bodies. We can conclude in brief that: a) we are able, in many cases, to affirm that an entity is a subsistent reality. We can judge this with certainty in the case of immediate or mediate observations. Our judgment will be more or less probable, if our basis for judgment is indirect evidence. b) the study of the specific nature of things based on their properties, always admits of determinations which can be expanded and made more accurate. In light of all of the above remarks and considerations on the question at hand, it can easily be seen that inorganic matter fulfills the notion of substance, but in an inferior measure compared to living things: a) as regards its subsistence, inorganic things lose their individuality as existents rather easily by

21

R. Verneaux, Filosofia del hombre, Herder, Barcelona, 1971, pg. 100.

means of changes such as combining, decomposing, etc. or, at times, do not fully possess subsistence at all. b) in reference to its specific nature inorganic matter, being less perfect than organic or living matter, is more univocally determined. Precisely for this reason, inorganic things are seen to possess very fixed structures and certain properties that easily come about through the simple combination of its inferior parts. For these reasons, the progress of the experimental sciences can be more closely controlled and are more certain than in other fields of human knowledge. APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS Application of these standards is of real benefit, in spite of the uncertainties they contain (due to the factors mentioned). The experimental sciences benefit from being able to accurately specify the degree of reality ascribable to the entities it studies. The application of these standards involves taking into account both the data offered by ordinary experience and science. The application can be made by a scientist as well as a philosopher, since it is of interest to both. It must, however, be carried out using philosophical principles. The experimental sciences study physical reality from the point of view of its proximate causes. To make a judgment regarding the substantiality of any thing, one must see it in the light of the ultimate causes of its being. Without attempting to exhaust the immense field of possible applications of the standards for judging about substances, we will now offer some illustrative examples of this application. They will be grouped in two classes: examples from ordinary experience and those offered by modern experimental science. SUBSTANTIALITY AS SEEN IN ORDINARY EXPERIENCE In ordinary experience, natural bodies are generally considered as substances. Logically, the findings of science will have repercussions as to what is considered as natural things in any period of history. Commenting on a text from Aristotle, St. Thomas classified simple bodies such as fire, water, earth as substances. He also classified as substances bodies composed of similar parts, such as, stones, blood and flesh. Animals and their parts such as hands and feet were also included in the list of substances since they are made up of similar sensible bodies. All of these things were called substances because they were not predicated of another subject and everything said about them is predicated of them. St. Thomas listing can be considered basically valid, with the exception of what was then considered a simple body. His listing embraces bodies whose subsistence is clearly evident and whose essence is manifest as possessing a certain natural unity. The notion of substance is revealed with sufficient accuracy in things which are relatively independent and which take part in producing natural phenomenon. We can conclude, therefore, that at the level of ordinary experience there exists a natural well founded conviction that there are a multitude of substances, both in number and in species, in the world of inorganic matter. Often they are quite easily identified upon uncovering their individual subsistence and their stable natural properties. If science has a relevant, certain conclusion to offer regarding a bodys substantiality, this will add certain weight to our final conclusion. SUBSTANTIALITY AND THE PHYSICAL-CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF BODIES By necessity, we must limit our considerations to but a few of the many aspects of modern scientific theory. The complexity of the matter should serve as a forewarning that the conclusions we will offer are not completely certain due to the fact that there is not complete agreement among the experts. Chemistry employs the concept of pure substance to refer to a physical body that possess certain well defined physical and chemical properties, e.g., a determined fusion point the temperature at which a solid passes to the liquid state at a pressure of one atmosphere, a specific density the mass of a substance contained in a unit volume, etc. The great progress, however, of modern chemistry occurred when a hypothesis was proposed to explain the nature and behavior of pure substances by means of the atomic theory. The initial atomic theory proposed by Dalton in 1808 supposed that atoms were indivisible particles, which fact gave rise to their name. Some people consequently believed they could detect a similarity between modern atomic physics and the philosophical atomism of the Pre-Socrates. These similarities are, nevertheless, very superficial. Although chemistry made important progress in the 19 th century, its

decisive success in the modern age came about at the end of the 19th century with the formulation of a hypothesis regarding the very composition of the atom the discovery of sub-atomic particles. At present, more than 100 basic types of atoms are known. These are classified in the periodic table of the elements. This classification is based on the composition of these atoms and on certain directly observable properties which suggested the existence of similarities in the behavior of these atoms. The primitive models of the atom, suggested at the beginning of the 19th century, assigned a few subatomic particles or elementary particles as constituting the atom itself. These particles were believed to be the basic elements of which all matter is composed (viz., the proton, the neutron and the electron). Later developments, both theoretical and experimental, have suggested that there exists many more. These particles comprise two large groups the hadrons (comprised, in turn, of barions and mesons) and the leptons. More than 100 hadrons have been discovered and there is basis to believe that there exist many more. There are 6 types of leptons. It can be easily seen, with only this sketchy information, that the physical composition of matter, according to our present knowledge, is extremely complex. One of the great problems of contemporary physics is, precisely, to achieve a simplified, unified theory of the elementary particles. One of the ways of achieving this is to recognize that these are not really elementary particles but are, in their turn, composed. In this line of thought, the existence of quarks was proposed as a hypothesis. This hypothesis formulated in 1963 would explain the composition of hadrons and their various characteristics in a more unified way. The theories put forth, in the realm of elementary particle physics, are highly complicated in their mathematical formulation and in their experimental verification. This is not, however, an obstacle to our asserting, with a high degree of certitude, that many of these particles and their respective properties really do exist. Of course, we are dealing with theories based at least for the moment on indirect evidence. The most powerful instruments of observation presently at our disposal do not allow us to achieve sufficient precision regarding the nature and properties of these elementary particles. The imaginative models of the atom are very complex, because the elementary particles comprising them are also very complex. This complexity is also to found in formulating the laws giving their behavior. Therefore, it is not possible, at present, to offer a clear picture of the elementary atoms due to the limitations in our power of observation. We must keep in mind that the physical explanation of higher level unities of matter is based essentially upon the way we conceive of atoms and particles. From this we conclude that, at present, the physicalchemical composition of matter is based upon conclusions that do not possess the certainty of direct observation. The indirect evidence which is the basis for the existence of atoms, many of the elementary particles, and of numerous properties of both one and the other is very great. A wide variety of theories and experiments reveal a surprising convergence when through the application of their results the magnitudes of atoms and particles are calculated. Basing themselves on the theories of atoms and elementary particles, scientists are able to obtain a great number of experimental results that explain large quantities of macroscopic phenomenon. Let us simply point out that we cannot imagine the microphysical world to be like our world of ordinary experience but on a smaller scale. Still, this cannot prevent us from also speaking about substantiality in the microphysical world, insofar as, we are able to know the subsistence and the specific nature of microphysical entities. At the macro-physical level, the progress of experimental science allows us to know many properties of matter very precisely and, hence, it helps to delineate the notion of natural substance. Since we encounter material entities that subsist (since they are able to exist separately from other things) and possess a group of natural, stable and mutually related properties, it would seem logical to assert their substantial character. The fact that these things are also composed of other lesser elements is no obstacle to asserting that they are substances. Many of the properties of material entities are explainable because of their component parts, since the notion of substance does not require the existence of more properties than those resultant from the combining of its integrating parts. All that is required is that we can truly designate a specific nature. Let us repeat, once more, that a material bodys specific nature will always be grasped in a limited sense. The sheer variety of material existents is overwhelming, but the previous explanation and clarifications

will enable us to apply the notion of substance to existents such as the ones we will discuss in the following paragraphs:

those bodies known as pure substances,

which possess well defined physical and chemical properties comprise two classes: 1) elementary substances that are consider to be made up of but one type of atom (e.g., oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur, etc.) and 2) composed substances which are made up of atoms of two or more types and combined in fixed proportions (sulfuric acid, for example is composed of hydrogen, sulphur and oxygen in the respective proportion of 2-1-4). There is an immense variety of composed substances of very different types, but each is alike in having but one type of molecule. These composed substances can be further divided into: inorganic compounds (acids, bases, salts, oxides) and organic compounds (the subject matter for what is called organic chemistry: hydrocarbons, alcohols, ethers, amines, organic acids, amine acids). Several million compound substances are known to date.

the macromolecules formed by molecules of various classes the homogeneous mixtures (solutions)

and identifiable in the group but are held together by chemical bonds (proteins, carbonates, lipids). which have uniform properties and their components can be separated by processes such as evaporation (e.g., sea water is a solution of salts in water, air is a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen and trace gases). It seems evident in each of the above cases that we have a certain specific nature and an individuality which is, frequently, incomplete. In the natural state we normally find aggregations and heterogeneous mixtures of material bodies. Furthermore, it is usually necessary to recur to laboratory methods in order to extract pure substances. And yet, it would not seem inappropriate to apply the notion of substance to all of the above entities. Applying the notion of substance to the microphysical world we find:

regarding atoms

there is strong indirect evidence concerning their existence and many of their properties. We can speak of their substantiality with a high degree of probability. No attempt should be made to construct simple imaginative models.

regarding elementary particles

something similar can be said about them as has just been said regarding the situation of atoms, but keeping in mind the fact that knowledge we have of these particles varies considerably from one type to another.
General Conclusions in Applying the Notion of Substance As a general conclusion, we can apply the notion of substance through the analogy of proper proportionality to things that vary greatly in the intensity of being they possess. What they must possess, at least, is a sufficient intensity of being to exhibit a subsistent, specific nature. It makes no difference whether we encounter such entities in the macroscopic or microscopic world. The notion of substance can be applied to a very wide range of things from the elementary particles of modern physics to such common items as water, wine and a host of entities in between. Contemporary Thomists are of one mind in applying the notion of substance to the inorganic world. The way of applying the notion and the reasons they offer for doing so differ widely. And this is understandable, for they pose the whole question from very different points of view. We can offer some examples. Jolivet brings up the question to strengthen the hylomorphic composition of bodies on the basis of substantial 22 23 change . Renoirte does the same, but his explanations are not very convincing . Henen and Masi also use this approach, but in addition they make a detailed examination of the various physical and chemical theories related to our question. Henen dwells heavily on the so-called constitutive properties of compound

22 23

cf. R. Jolivet, Tratado de filosofia I: Logica y Cosmologia, Hohle, Buenos Aires, 1960, pgs. 342-344. cf. F. Renoirte, Elementos de critica de las ciencias y Cosmologia, Gredos, Madrid, 1968, pgs. 244-261.

substances . Selvaggi centers the question on a study of the elements and the compounds . Aubert poses the applicability of the notion of substance to the physical world in a very general way. These authors coincide in accepting the basic ideas we have expressed, while differing in their development and concrete applications.

24

25

7.

ENERGISTIC MONISM

Throughout the different periods of history, monistic (monism holds that all reality is but one grandiose substance) theories have attempted to explain the whole of reality as if it were one sole thing. The various components of the universe are seen as mere accidental manifestations of this one great substance. Restricting ourselves to the realm of inorganic nature, the subject of our course, we will now look at one such theory that denies the diversity of individual material substances. According to this theory, the basic substance is energy. Elementary particles would then originate from a concentration of energy in certain determined structures. Larger things (atoms, simple substances and compounds) would be similarly formed. There would then be no substances in the material world. What we have called substances would be nothing more than structures brought about by the concentration of energy. In other words, our substance would be nothing more than the accidental configurations resulting from the variations of the only one genuine material substance, energy . This interpretation of physical reality is occasionally presented as if it were demanded by certain modern scientific theories. Examples of such theories would be, 1) the conversion of mass into energy, 2) the duality of wave and corpuscle traits in physical particles, 3) modern field theory and 4) the transformation of one elementary particle into another. We will now examine the arguments that can be extracted from these scientific theories. At the same time, this will allow us to evaluate the theory of cosmological monism. Furthermore, this analysis will be useful to sharpen our understanding of the notions already studied. THE SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT OF ENERGY The first thing we need to examine is the scientific concept of energy. From the practical point of view, energy comprises four main groups (each group contains various sub-divisions): mechanical (kinetic energy or that due to movement and potential energy due to gravitation, etc); electrical (in the field of electrostatics, in the field of magnetism, etc.); thermal which is seen in temperature (the internal energy of bodies, the mechanics of gases and vapors, etc.) and chemical or binding energy due to electrical and other fields in the interior of molecules (this type is also present in nuclear energy). There are various techniques for obtaining one type of energy from another. From an intuitive point of view, energy is taken to mean a system with a capacity for doing work. It can be seen that work, in this instance, is another physical magnitude which, in its turn, is defined as a function of other magnitudes force and distance through the use of mathematical concept-models in each concrete theory. We have already briefly considered that experimental science has frequent need of constructing concepts. Even though these concepts are occasionally related to intuitive concepts they are chiefly defined by science in an operational way, i.e., their meaning is functionally dependent on the experiment for which they were constructed. This is the case with the scientific concepts of energy as well as those of mass, force and many others. As we have just seen, the scientific concept of energy can effectively be applied to four main types of phenomena. There is a certain convertibility among these various types of energy. Physical science continues its effort to more closely link these various types of energy in and through its explanations of material reality in the realm of theory as well as in practical applications. However, science offers no basis, from any point of view, for understanding the concept of energy as if it were a substance. It is clear, both from an intuitive point of view as well as in practical applications, that energy is a quality of material bodies, since it is a capacity for producing certain specified effects viz., work. Theoretically, energy is represented as a concept whose content is one almost exclusively of magnitude. Energy is very much a physical measurable a concept of the magnitude type when it is represented more abstractively in agreement with the specific scientific theory under consideration.

24 25

cf. P. Henen, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome 1949, pgs. 328-432; R. Masi, Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961, pgs. 230-297. cf. F. Selvaggi, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1962, pgs. 302-314.

THE SCIENTIFIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MASS AND ENERGY We do not mean to suggest that substance is the material body, understood as the sum of material particles or entities endowed with mass. In the notion of substance already described, there is no reference to particles or to mass as the physical sciences use these terms. Evidently, mass is also a quality and from the point of view of scientific theory it is also represented as a concept of the magnitude type. And as regards elementary particles and other such micro-physical entities it has already become clear that they cannot be represented imaginatively in a way similar to those things of our ordinary experience. This imaginative representation is only legitimate when done for the utility of scientific research. To round out our view of these questions we need to examine the phenomena and the theories of modern science which seem to lend support to the substantialization of energy: a) the equivalence between mass and energy. One of the consequences extracted from the theory of relativity proposed by Einstein is the famous equation e=mc2. In this equation e represents energy, m mass and c is the velocity of light. This equivalence has important applications in atomic physics. For example, in the atomic bomb the disappearance of a small quantity of the mass of the intervening bodies in the physical process triggers an enormous release of energy. This is quite understandable when considering the appreciable value of c some 300 million meters per second and c2 some 90,000,000,000,000,000 (meters per second)2! What this transformation means in scientific theory, is that there exists a relationship between physical magnitudes. In this case, everything seems to indicate that this relationship refers to a real phenomenon. Nevertheless, according to our previous considerations about the concepts of mass and energy, we must conclude that neither of them refer to substantial realities. Consequently, there can be no question of a substance (mass) being transformed into an accident (energy) or vice versa conceiving energy as a substance that gives rise to the accidental phenomenon of mass. Neither one or the other of these statements is suggested or required in explaining this phenomenon or its scientific formulation. We are faced with nothing but a false interpretation which ignores the accidental reality of mass as well as that of energy. Certainly it is possible that the phenomenon which this equation refers to produces substantial mutations. However, this in no way implies the substantialization of energy. There must always exist a substantial support of the energy freed or produced, even though our knowledge of the physical nature of this support remains obscure. Most assuredly, this support need not be understood as the ether, held by many scientists in the period of classical physics. THE WAVE-PARTICLE QUESTION Lastly, it should be pointed out that, at present, the concept of mass in science refers to aspects of reality which are defined in somewhat different ways. Hence, this leads us to conclude that it is erroneous to conceive of mass as if it were a direct expression of the matter or of the quantity of material bodies. This is but one more fact indicating that the phenomenon under discussion cannot be interpreted as a conversion of matter into energy or energy into matter. The error would then be to view either matter or energy or both as if they were substantial realities. b) the wave - particle duality. Classical physics held different theories based on wave models, i.e., the particular motion of waves which are propagated following specific laws. Consider, for example, the pattern of the wave crest set up in a pool of water when a stone is thrown into it. Using this model, theories about the propagation of sound in acoustics and light in optics were developed. This model was also applied to electromagnetic phenomena. Classical physics also made use of particle theories based on the study of the notion of small spheres or particles. Both types of theories existed in optics and the question arose as to whether light had the nature of a particle or of a wave each theory explaining phenomena that the other could not. During the period of modern physics, Planck formulated the hypothesis that atoms absorb or emit radiation energy wave motion in different quantity leaps rather than continuously which are multiples of the frequency of the given radiation (1900). Einstein proposed the hypothesis that light combines both the nature of a particle and a wave in photons. For this he used the ideas and quantum formula of Planck (1905). This hypothesis was confirmed experimentally in 1923 designated as the Compton effect. In 1924, Louis de Broglie extended Einsteins hypothesis to other particles, supposing that material particles have associated with themselves a material wave. This he expressed in his famous formula that relates particle traits with those of its wave. From this idea, wave mechanics developed as closely related to the quantum theories. This is one of the most important parts of modern physics which Schrdinger and Heisenberg among others extensively developed. In 1927 Schrdinger proposed his

famous indeterminacy principle, which states that it is impossible to simultaneously and precisely determine the position and velocity of a given particle of matter. This conclusion is directly applicable to the microscopic world. In larger objects the magnitudes involved in these measurements are negligible. With the mathematical development of these theories, various interpretations have been offered in order to bring theory and experimental results into line. The evolving of the theory of wave mechanics has followed a path similar to that of the phenomena of light from classical physics to the modern theory of relativity. Wave theories as well as particle theories explain many phenomena quite satisfactorily but with the restriction that modern quantum mechanics is thereby prohibited from accurately determining various measurables of the same particle simultaneously. THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE These questions, which have provoked controversies among physicists themselves, do not admit an easy or satisfactory interpretation. Many scientists and philosophers question whether this double facet of the physical world is real or merely due to our way of knowing material bodies or, more precisely, due to the limits of our ability to measure the physical world, i.e., according to the conclusion of Heisenbergs uncertainty principle. The most significant opinions are the following: the probabilistic interpretation of Heisenberg, Bohr and others. It is also known as the Copenhagen interpretation because it was in this city that these physicists first proposed it in 1927. This interpretation states: it is not possible to give a definitive interpretation in this matter due to the inherent limitations of our knowledge of the microscopic world as set forth in the indeterminacy principle. Bohr expressed this with the well known principle of complementarity: the wave and particle phenomena of matter are two complementary aspects of matter when one is more accurately determined, the others accuracy is directly reduced until it ultimately disappears. This theory was the official interpretation of quantum mechanics for 30 years. Others physicists such as Planck, Einstein, and Schrdinger rejected it in their search for a more realistic thesis and one that was less closely limited to the positivist prejudices of the Copenhagen school. The complementarity of two incompatible aspects is not very convincing when it is applied to the same object. A thing cannot simultaneously be both a wave and particle. The paradox involved is in the realm of semantics not physics. the wave interpretation held by Schrdinger, but generally unaccepted. According to this theory, the wave concept would be the basic reality. Particles would then be understood as concentrations of energy within continuous fields or discontinuous accidents of one sole continuous substance. This opinion does not safeguard the multiplicity of substances in the world. the prevalent particle interpretation (Max Born). The wave would merely be the measure of probability of encountering particles at a point in space and with a determined level of energy. the dualist interpretation seems to reconcile the two aspects through a realistic focus. This opinion is held by de Broglie who abandoned the probabilistic thesis in 1952, Bhm, Vigier and others. These physicists believed that microscopic reality is basically constituted by particles. In the particle nucleus is to be found the source of its traits. Surrounding this core a more plastic element (something like the protoplasm of a living cell) gives rise to the bodys wave phenomenon. This plastic shell surrounding the particle core is, most likely, constituted and re-constituted by the nucleus itself. The boundary of this shell would be an extremely elastic surface, endowing it with a constantly varying extension. In coming to some conclusion as far as the particle-wave question is concerned it ought to be clear that the theories which we have looked into do not imply an energistic conception of substantial reality. The wave and particle descriptions of microphysical bodies are intimately united. So too are the difficulties involved in coming to a coherent understanding involving both of them. All this underlines, once again, the fact that it is impossible to imagine the microscopic world by means of models drawn from ordinary experience. Any such imaginative models necessarily encounter various kinds of limitations. There is certainly no difficulty in admitting that, if in matters physical makeup diverse energy processes are always occurring, most logically this should happen. We can also readily admit that what we call elementary particles are the results of energy interactions. Only the atomic mechanist would find this inadmissible, since his hypothesis requires the existence of ultimate material particles that are changeless. Yet the above considerations offered as a possible understanding of material bodies have nothing to do with a monism resulting in the substantialization of energy. The existence of energy processes at every level of physical reality is perfectly compatible with the admission of substantiality in the material world, even if we admit that this substantiality is based upon processes of physical energy. In the last analysis any energy process must occur within some kind of framework involving substances. The two-fold aspect of particle and wave associated with microphysical phenomena does not negate

the substantiality of material things. It may even help avoid forming a false mechanistic conception of substances. c) Considering all that we have already seen regarding waveparticle interpretation, it would seen unnecessary for us to dwell at length on the other two aspects of modern science. They are occasionally used as the basis for monistic thinking the modern field theory and the transmutation of one elementary particles into another. A few brief clarifications should be all that is needed to avoid possible misconceptions. Field theories study matter as a function of the distribution of forces through continuous mediums, i.e., without being directly concerned with the discrete (or discontinuous) character of matter. The importance of field theories and the wide range of topics which it encompasses could incorrectly be interpreted as a scientific confirmation of dynamism that makes all physical process nothing but forces or energism which reduces all these processes to energy. Energy and force fields evidently correspond to real phenomena. Physics is seeking theories that will unify all of these possible fields. The main theories embrace the following fields: gravity, electromagnetism, and nuclear forces (at the atomic level). For our purposes, let us merely note that the existence and importance of these fields and their corresponding theories offer no obstacle to maintaining the existence of substances in the material world. As we have already pointed out, in regard to wave theories, such phenomena and their explanations can only prove contradictory to mechanistic conceptions of substance. THE TRANSMUTATION OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES The transmutations of elementary particles into one another are not at all opposed to the existence and the diversity of material substances. These very transmutations may, in fact, be a proof for the existence of substances. Hence, to the extent that molecules, atoms and elementary particles cannot be conceived of in a mechanistic manner i.e., as incorruptible and static substances only capable of changing position but reveal well defined structure and properties, to that extent they can be easily interpreted as indicative of substances capable of change. The numerous chemical and physical changes in which these particles are involved and through which they themselves are significantly changed are clearly changes in which one determined specific nature ceases to be and another begins to exist. Hence, they unquestionably indicate a change of substance.

III. THE COMPOSITION OF BODILY EXISTENTS: FORM AND MATTER

1. INTRODUCTION
Until now we have dealt with physical substance as the individual, subsistent and essential nucleus characteristic of bodies. We will proceed to an internal analysis, from philosophys point of reference, allowing us accurately to assign the precise characteristics of the nature of physical bodies as such. Our interest does not lie in knowing a particular kind of bodily substance, nor in describing its properties and physical parts in great detail. Our interest lies in the very question of the substantiality itself of bodies. With this purpose in mind we can set forth a list of traits of material existents. TRAITS OF MATERIAL EXISTENTS MANIFESTING SUBSTANTIAL UNITY a) bodies have structures that repeat themselves and are, therefore, common or universal even though realized in individuals. There is an astonishing richness of forms in nature. Nature does not reveal itself as a conglomeration of absolutely heterogeneous individuals although the things of nature have common traits and are, therefore, capable of complex classifications. This is a universal phenomenon. Countless examples could be given from the inorganic or mineral kingdom as well as from the category of living things. Science continues in making these discoveries. Natural likenesses are extremely varied and of every type. Bodily existents often have even a proper shape or dimensive form, as the regular geometric structures of crystals or the anatomical figures of the different animals and the human body itself. Due to specific forms, material individuals are placed within a species. In the physical world we observe a realm of the species and another of the individual. Those existents which have a common essential structure belong to the same species. At the same time, the species is always multiplied or realized in the individual. b) Transmutation of forms or intrinsic change occurs in all physical bodies. This is true of all physical bodies whatsoever. That is to say, all physical bodies are capable of becoming some other thing. A bodys becoming some other thing is not an haphazard occurrence, but follows very precise and orderly laws. The substance of one animal may thus be entirely assimilated by that of another animal. The first, however, is always destroyed, losing its specific structure in order for its matter to be incorporated into another structure. In this way every material existent, under the proper conditions, can be transformed into another different material existent. In the universe there exists an intimate community among all bodily things. The unifying factor is a kind of common substrate which allows one thing to be transmuted or converted into another thing. This common substrate is called matter. c) These characteristics are also analogously found in artificial bodies. In the world of artificial things the products of human technology we also find objects with a clear definite form and multiplied in many individuals. For example, the form of an automobile is different from that of a train. Among automobiles we have the different forms of the different makes and models. The transmutableness of artificial objects is based on a common substrate. In the operations of industry this substrate is usually referred to as raw material and names the natural substance used in manufacturing the end products. Iron can adopt the form of a bed frame or a knife blade, and the iron of a knife may be used in the production of a bed as long as the iron loses its form as a knife. There is an obvious analogy here between the natural and the artificial. Nevertheless, this dualism of form-matter is not drawn from artificial things, but is really present in nature itself. In summary, these observations lead us to conclude that bodily things are essentially composed, and that their basic composition is one of form and matter. Bodily substances are not simple, they contain in themselves a duality of principles which is the source of endless properties. This statement can be considered as the fundamental truth in the philosophy of nature, because this fact is what essentially defines the physical body.

2.

HYLOMORPHIC COMPOSITION

In the previous section, we studied how bodily substance is composed of substance and accident. Accordingly, this composition revealed that a substantial subject e.g., a piece of gold is the supporting basis for a determined accident the piece of gold colored yellow. Now we have come to a more interior structure or composition that affects the very substance itself. This composition consists of two essential principles, with one principle supporting the other. The matter is the subject of the form, the form determines the matter to be in a particular way. Still, this composition is very different from the previous one, because matter is not a subsistent subject and as such lacks an essence or an essential

content. In being actualized by the form, matter receives a substantial determination and not merely an accidental one. It is the form which endows a physical thing with its substantial existence e.g., it is the form which makes gold to be gold rather than silver or tin. Matter and form are two complementary principles in each physical body that conjointly make up the substances essence. Neither of these two principles is a substance or an existent. It is only in their union that they give rise to a concrete physical substance. This composition is commonly called hylomorphic [from the Greek: hyle = matter; morphe = form]. LINES OF REASONING THAT UNCOVER THE HYLOMORPHIC COMPOSITION These lines of reasoning are based on the spontaneous common conviction that the substances of the physical universe are both numerically and specifically distinct. The difficulties raised by some authors against the hylomorphic composition of bodies is due to their rejecting the plurality of substances in the physical world. Their arguments are basically two: a) substantial changes. Just as accidental changes uncover the substance-accident structure of things, so too does the reality of substantial change reveal the matter-form composition of bodies to us. We are aware that things undergo significant changes. They not only pass from being in one way to being in other way i.e., changing their being secundum quid or in some accidental sense but they even go so far as to cease to be in an absolute sense they lose their esse simpliciter or they come to be also in an absolute sense they acquire their esse simpliciter. It is also evident that these substantial modifications called generations and corruptions are not cases of creation and annihilation. An animal that dies certainly is destroyed as an animal the very suppositum or individual substance is wholly corrupted but it is not reduced to absolute nothingness. The animal is transformed into other inorganic substances. But is this transformation real, we may ask? What is it, in fact, that is really transformed? If the subject of this transformation were a substance, then the death of a animal would be a mere accidental change because no more than accidental determinations can be added to a fully constituted substance; for example, if someone were to maintain that the substantial subject of the death of a living thing were the water, the hydrogen, the energy, and so forth, we would then have to conclude that the animal is no more than an accidental state of the water, the hydrogen or the energy. Since an animal is a true substance, we therefore infer that the subject of this transformation of death is something that is not a substance but is as a substantial part of the animal which we refer to as primary matter. In this case, primary matter ceases to be informed by one substantial form and begins to be informed by another. An analogous line of reasoning applies to generation. A new substance is not produced from nothing. It arises through the transformation of another substance or other substances and this transformation requires a common subject that is not substance otherwise, generation would then be but an accidental change. The value of this argument hinges on the recognition that the inanimate world contains diverse substances that can be changed one into another. We have already concluded that there exists a multitude of numerically and specifically distinct inanimate substances. Still, the objection might be raised that we have been working with an excessively broad notion of substance and, that it would be possible to apply our notion to mere conglomerates of inferior substances. Furthermore, that there are no conclusive experimental criteria to determine the substantiality of a concrete thing. Therefore, we need to formulate a stricter notion of substance that would avoid these pitfalls. Some Thomists have attempted to find a stricter formula in the sense indicated. Henen, for example, emphasizes the difference between constitutive properties of a compound and additive properties. The first could not be deduced from a mere aggregate of components. The second type, however, could be explained on the basis of simple aggregation of parts and simpler properties. In this case, the discovery of constitutive properties would permit us to bring to light the existence of a true substance. 0 Henens way of posing the problem is interesting and, possibly, useful. Nevertheless, it does not have a strict demonstrative value, since our knowledge of the properties of physical bodies is always partial. Thus, our effort to come to a definitive conclusion about whether a property is genuinely constitutive rather than just additive is resolutely blocked. Sometimes Thomists have followed a negative approach in their line of reasoning, criticizing mechanism, in its several variations, for trying to explain the whole of physical reality within the very limited framework of raw extension. The criticisms of Masi, Selvaggi, Remer and Henen, for

026 cf. P. Henen, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome 1949, pgs. 369-379.

example,27 are important. These critiques, however, offer no help in positively formulating a strict definition of substance capable of being applied to physical existents through a simple examination of its properties. Other Thomists prefer to base hylomorphism on other types of arguments, 28 simply setting aside the above difficulties, but it is not very easy to separate the proofs for hylomorphism from the fact of substantial changes. Furthermore, it would seem capable of being demonstrated that the various proofs for hylomorphism presuppose the conceptual and real distinction between substantial and accidental changes. We will not dwell upon this question any further. If we take into account the conclusions we drew in considering the question of substantiality, it would appear most clear that we cannot give a definition of the concept of substance univocally applicable to all physical things through an analysis of their physical properties, and still it is possible appropriately to apply the notion of substance to many things in the inorganic world. In reality, we are up against the same problem we faced earlier, however, now we have a new element to take into account, viz., how to apply the notion of substance to the explanation of substantial change. The objection could be raised that lacking, as we do, an absolutely clear standard of substantiality, we can never state with certainty that a particular change is substantial rather than accidental. Nonetheless, the reasoning we used earlier in applying the notion of substance to inorganic, physical bodies can also be used to corroborate the occurrence of substantial changes in nature (cf. previous chapter II.
Bodily Substance; 6. The Numerical and Specific Multiplicity of Bodily Substances, section heading GENERAL CONCLUSION IN APPLYING THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE). It is enough to show that in a given transformation a group of natural properties

have been so altered as to clearly indicate a change of specific subsistent nature. Ordinary knowledge, as well as science, offer examples of the fact of such transformations occurring. We can even go further and say that the advances in scientific findings show that substantial changes are much more numerous and profound than we are able to appreciate through ordinary experience. In accepting these conclusions, we must also recall that just as the notion of substance is analogously applied to physical things due to their varying degrees of perfection so too, is the notion of substantial change. Every substantial change affects the essence of the material existent. Some substantial changes may be relatively insignificant while others would be quite striking. There is, however, an enormous diversity within the range of substantial change corresponding to the vast variety of material bodies. b) the multiplication of individuals in the same species. The essential structures of things can be likened to basic models which are then reproduced by the process of mass production in an indefinite multiplicity of individuals. This phenomenon indicates that this structure, the form or formal act, enters into composition with another element, in which it is actualized or materialized. This element is primary matter, the passively receptive element in every material body. This composition offers us an explanation of the similarity-dissimilarity between individuals. This water which is chemically expressed in its molecular formula is similar to that water as because of its form. One body of water is different from another because this water is not that water. So we can say that two molecules of water differ materially but are identical formally. If there were no common matter, there could not be this appropriateness between individuals. Lacking this common matter, we would be unable to distinguish one material body from another of a similar kind. Indeed, the deeper question to ask in this case is what would differentiate one body of a kind from another! Individuals of a species would not then be possible. The value of this line of reasoning also seems to depend upon our notion of substance. Although the concept doesnt explicitly appear in the argument, the form that we deal with would only strictly be a substantial form if the individuals under consideration are themselves substances and the species common to them is a specific substantial nature. Hence, we come to similar conclusions in this argument as we did with the former. It would seem to be unnecessary to bring in the consideration of substantial changes. Still this does not seem to simplify the question very much, for, as already seen, once the notion of substance is restricted in its application, there is no new conceptual difficulty in admitting substantial changes. All we have left is a simple question of fact rather than one of principle and ordinary and

27 28

cf. R. Masi, Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961, pgs. 211-218 and pgs. 221-224; F. Selvaggi, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1962, pgs. 292-314; V. Remer, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1949, pgs. 32-47. cf. for example, F. Renoirte, Elementos de critica de las ciencias y Cosmologia, Gredos, Madrid, 1968, pgs. 256261. Renoirte's argument is based upon the spatio-temporal characteristic of all material existents.

scientific experience offer us an abundance of such facts. UNDERSTANDING THIS COMPOSITION From the two lines of reasoning regarding substances which we have just considered we need to be very clear about the fact that the form we constantly referred to is the substantial form which is characteristic of a specific substantial nature. This form is to be distinguished from the accidental form which is an accidental way of existing. The matter that enters into composition with the substantial form is called primary matter. It is the basic substrate of all substantial changes and of the individuation of substance itself. Primary matter and substantial form jointly make up the essence of all bodily substances. In virtue of the form, a thing is such and such a thing e.g., gold, silver, iron while matter makes it to be an individual distinct from others of the same species this gold, this silver, this iron. We are dealing here with two essential elements of substance or two essential co-principles. They are two elements of an essence: they should not be understood as entitative parts, nor as if their way of existing was complete like the whole substance itself exists. They cannot be situated in a determined place within a body. Neither should matter be thought of as the visible body and the form as an invisible entity situated within the body. They are two realities intelligible per se and per accidens just as substance itself is. Hence, they are both present in the whole of the physical body and in each of its parts. Form and matter constitute two principles, i.e., two realities that determine the being of a physical body. Since they are complementary and inseparable, they can also be called co-principles for each carries out its function in union with the other. They must not be understood as complete things or existents. They are not realties that can be referred to as a quod a what or concrete existent. They are principles by which something is, while they themselves, by themselves, are not things in the sense of substantial existents. They cannot be isolated nor discovered in a chemical laboratory, because only concrete existents can be separated; principles of things cannot be separated. MATTER AND FORM UNITE AS POTENCY AND ACT Their mutual union is not a mere juxtaposing by contact or by virtue of some third force keeping them together. This kind of unity only holds between complete existents or the quantitative parts of a substance0. Because they failed to understand thoroughly the genuine meaning of hylomorphism, some philosophers raised the question as to the bond of the union of matter and form. Some even went so far as so attempt to locate the place within the body where this union occurs. The unity existing between the form and the matter must be understood in light of the notions of act and potency. Matter is the potency of the form, the receptive subject of formal act and, in its turn, form is the act of matter. Form and matter unite immediately, by their very selves, inasmuch as one of them is in the other. Illustrating what we have just said with an analogical comparison, one might ask how precisely the form of a statue unites itself to the marble of which it is made. We can answer by saying that the form is in the marble as its act an accidental act in our illustration and the marble is in the form of the statue as its potential matter secondary matter. To describe this situation a bit further, we will use the analogy of primary matter and substantial form. Setting up the analogy, we will say that the material substance of marble or secondary matter is likened to primary matter, just as the shape given to the marble or its accidental form making it this statue is likened to substantial form. The complete and subsistent reality is the synthesis of these co-principles, i.e., the informed matter or the materialized form. The substance is the composite existent [in Greek, synolon] of matter and form, which corresponds to the entire statue in our comparison. Consequently, this composition is different from that of the substance-accident structure. The union of substance and accident is, however, another instance of a potency-act relationship. The substance is as the potency with respect to its accidental acts. Nevertheless, in the bonding of matter-form, there is no substantial subject at all. The substance arises from the union of these two hylomorphic principles. We ought not to imagine that the form is in the matter in the same way that an accident is in its substance, nor that matter or form can subsist by themselves even though matter is the receiving subject and form is the received act. Subsistence belongs to the compound of matter and form30.

3.

PRIMARY MATTER

The task of grasping the nature of primary matter is not an easy one, because in itself it has no nature in

029 cf. I. Gredt, Elementa philosophiae, Herder, Barcelona, 1953, pgs. 280-282. 30 cf. A. Millan Puelles, Fundamentos de Filosofia, Rialp, Madrid, 1959, pgs. 280-282.

that it lacks all determination. We only understand primary matter through a metaphysical analysis of the structure of physical bodies as well as with the aid of the analogy of artificial things. In a way similar to the producing of artifacts which are always made starting from some previously existing material as a knife is made from iron or silver so natural things are substantially transformed starting from a primordial matter, out of which all material things are made. This primordial matter itself is a wholly undetermined element of reality. Let us recall once more that if we were to identify this primordial or primary matter with some determinate reality e.g., water, hydrogen then all the significant changes in the world would be merely accidental modifications of this substance. PRIMARY MATTER IS THE FIRST SUBJECT OF THE BODILY EXISTENT It is the essential principle from which a physical body is generated, but intrinsic to the thing generated (cf. In I Phys., lect. 15). Primary matter is the subject or substrate that persists throughout a substantial change in which something is either generated or corrupted. It is the first subject, since there is no prior subject from which matter itself could be made. If there were such a prior subject, matter would be a kind of determinate being, composed, in turn, of a form and matter and the problem would be re-posed interminably. This is why it is called primary matter, while the subject of accidental change is called secondary matter. Hence, secondary matter is a substance. Primary matter, on the other hand, can be compared to what is commonly called raw material in industry that first stuff from which a product is made. Primary matter is the first subject ex quo, out of which something is made. It is the starting point, a quo or initial principle of fieri simpliciter, of the substantial coming to be of a thing. For example, when a man dies his body is converted into a multiplicity of organic substances which have been generated. In this case, we can say that these substances came from the man who died. In this way we make reference to the primary matter with the form which it possessed before. It would be more exact to say that these organic chemicals came from the primary matter of this man, as analogously a statue can be made from another statue insofar as it can be made from the marble of the other statue. However, primary matter not only comes into play in the fieri or becoming of something. It is also present in the esse of the constituted thing. It is not like privation, a principle of generation which disappears with the coming of the new form. Primary matter remains in the generated existent as an essential and constitutive element, making possible the later destruction of this existent and the generation of another. Therefore, primary matter is not only the principle ex quo or that from which but also the principle in quo or that in which the form acts. PRIMARY MATTER IS PURE COMPLETELY UNDETERMINED POTENCY Any reality that receives an act behaves as a potency with reference to that act. Therefore, substance is potential with respect to its accidents. Something may, in itself, be in act with regard to some perfection while being in potency as regards another. Hence, a child is an actual existent, while in potency with respect to the condition of a grown man. Yet this is not the case with primary matter. Primary matter is not the simple potency of a form, but pure potency, lacking, in itself, all actuality. If primary matter were to have any act, it would already be constituted as a substance, and the form of gold, or silver, or water would be related to it as accidental forms. This state of pure potentiality is required of matter because it is nothing in the realm of substance. In the realm of accident, primary matter is with even greater reason nothing, since the realm of accident comes after that of substance. As a comparison between primary matter and substantial form, we may think of wax that is capable of taking on many shapes that of a cube, or a sphere, or a triangle or any other with the sole condition that in the realm of shape wax is completely undetermined. The same is to be said of primary matter in reference to substance. In order for it to be the substrate capable of acquiring one or another substantial form, it must be devoid of any and every substantial determination It has neither essence, nor quality, nor quantity nor any other determination of being neque quid, neque quale, neque quantum (cf. In Metaph., lect. 2). Primary matter is absolutely indeterminate: in act it is no thing, because in potency it is every thing in reference to bodily perfections. It is not something that has potency, it is potency itself. PRIMARY MATTER IS REAL RECEPTIVE CAPACITY Nevertheless, primary matter is real receptive capacity and not merely a privation or a logical possibility. The fact that it is devoid of all actuality does not mean that it is reduced to being a privation of form a non-form as it seems to have been understood by the Platonists. Primary matter is real. It possesses the diminished and hidden reality of passive potency, the capacity for acquiring act. It is, but it is potentially. We should not think of it, consequently, as a logical possibility or a possible thing that doesnt, as yet,

exist. Before being created by God, the world was a possible reality and existed in the Divine Mind as a possible thing. And yet this possible world was not primary matter, because it is within the realm of real things or existents, but with the attribute of potentiality. Duns Scotus held that if primary matter were something really existent, it must necessarily be an actual reality. He, thereby, blurred the distinction between reality and actuality. Similarly, he asserted that true privations existed in act. Suarez followed this opinion and added that matter had the character of being real and substantial but distinct from form. According to Suarez, whatever refers to existence is something and, hence, primary matter has its own proper essence, having entitative existence. These two aspects matter and form- would be only a distinction of reason. He went so far as to maintain that by a miracle of Divine Omnipotence, primary matter could exist without form. It is evident that matter here is being taken as a thing quod [that which (is)], not as a principle quo [that by which (something is)]. These opinions highlight the difficulty of properly understanding the reality of potency which our imagination very easily tends to represent as an actual thing. PRIMARY MATTER CANNOT EXIST WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL FORM A purely potential entity cannot have existence. Every existent thing possesses an act of being and, by this fact, cannot be potential. This implies that primary matter can share in existence only as a co-principle actualized by form. To admit the separate existence of a purely potential reality is an blatant contradiction. Primary matter is always found informed under the actualization of a form. The form makes this matter to be in act or to be participating in an act. If matter is, it is because it shares in existence [habet esse]; it participates in the act of existing through form. Matter is because it receives form that actualizes it. Saint Thomas explains this in the following way. Every thing that is in act, is either act itself, or is a potency participating in an act. Matter, as such, is opposed to being in act. In itself it is potency. Hence, matter cannot be in act except insofar as it participates in an act. The act in which matter participates is none other than form. Therefore, it is the same to say that matter is in act, as it is to say that it has form. To assert that matter is in act without form is to posit two contradictory realities simultaneously and this God cannot do (Quodl., III, g. 1, a. 1). This is to say, that not even God can produce subsistent matter, because this would presuppose that he would bring to be in act what in itself is devoid of all act, and this is clearly contradictory. TRAITS OF MATTER We are now in a position to list some traits of primary matter which follow from the previous discussion: a) primary matter cannot be generated or corrupted. If primary matter could arise through a change from something else, it would already have the composition of form and matter, with the resultant matter of matter and we would be faced with the same problem ad infinitum, indefinitely. Matter, therefore, cannot be generated and for a similar reason cannot be destroyed. Aristotle, who was ignorant of the fact of creation, thought it was eternal. Saint Thomas, who knew of creation in time in tempore through faith, demonstrated that to hold that primary matter was not eternal was not a contradiction for natural reason, even if it could not be rationally demonstrated. And so he explained how primary matter was created: strictly speaking, it was con-created with form. God created bodily substances with this composition. The primary matter of the world could only cease to exist through divine annihilation. b) Primary matter is completely passive. Primary matter is pure passivity itself, being nothing but the receptive capacity of substance. It is the principle of a physical body that can undergo; it can be influenced by other substances, which means it has potentiality. In the realm of substance this is nothing else than being capable of corruption and generation. It is not the principle of what a thing can do. It is not the source of any of a bodys activities. A bodys actions stem from its act [the actuality of form]. The notion of matter in physical science is not to be confused with the philosophical notion of primary matter. Physicists, at times, understand matter as the physical body endowed with mass or the property of mass itself. The transformation of matter [mass] into energy does not, therefore, mean the disappearance of primary matter. This transformation demands, on the contrary, a substrate common to its termini a starting point and an ending, or finishing point and this is genuine primordial matter. In addition, matter is often understood both in common usage and scientific terminology, as what in philosophy is called secondary matter, i.e., concrete physical bodies. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF PRIMARY MATTER Primary matter is in no way sensible nor imaginable; it is purely intelligible know only intellectually. Even its very intelligibility is elusive; it is a reality difficult to conceive. It can be understood to be and in some sense it is. Nothing is wholly unknowable in itself, because it is not absolutely devoid of any being.

Potency, insofar as it is a diminished way of being, is less intelligible than act, because to be, strictly and most properly, is to be in act. More precisely, potency is only understood by its relation to act. For example: the potency to become white is understood only in its relatedness to the act of being white. As pure potency, primary matter is the most elusive or least intelligible aspect of the universe and it is always understood in its reference to form, i.e., as the potency of a substantial form. It is unknowable in itself and is known only through its form (In III Metaph., lect, 10). It should also be added that we know the composition of matter and form through its analogy with the substance-accident composition. Especially as this relationship can be seen in artificial objects: what substance is to accidents, primary matter is to substantial forms (cf. In Phys. lect. 13). These facts have important consequences in analyzing intellectual knowledge. Psychology studies the process of knowledge in general, especially the act of intellectual knowledge as one of de-materialization abstraction. Through this process a form is abstracted from, i.e., considered apart from, its matter and so grasped in a fuller intelligibility. This process requires the trait of immateriality in the knowing subject.

4.

THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM

In every day speech, form connotes a geometric figure such as when we say that an object has the form of a sphere or a triangle. In philosophy the substantial form is an intelligible principle neither sensible nor imaginable by which a physical body has a determined essence or way of being simpliciter solely by being. THE INTRINSIC DETERMINING PRINCIPLE OF BODILY EXISTENTS The substantial form is the intrinsic principle of a bodily thing by which it has a determinate substantial way of being. In order to understand this definition we should start by recognizing the determinate ways of being of things something is white, is round, is tall, is rabbit... Still, the being something of every day speech does not always correspond to a perfection or act. If we say, for example, that a person is blind, it is obvious that the blindness is not an act. It is, on the contrary, precisely the privation of act [the active power of sight]. It belongs to metaphysics to analyze the diverse analogous meanings of being real being and being of reason, actually being and potentially being, substantial being and accidental being, the act of being simpliciter. The philosophy of nature lays ground work for this task by discovering some of the fundamental ways of being in physical reality. In studying bodies, we may ask: what specifically is this body? Or in a more concrete fashion: what is uranium? what is potassium? or what is man? If we were to consider these realities as nothing but a collection of properties or aggregates of particles [setting aside the fact that in this way we do not explain the intrinsic unity of these substances] the problem would repeat itself at more basic levels of analysis. These questions point to the essence of the existents we have inquired after. This essence should be expressed in a definition and even if a definition were not possible, at least we could say that those objects possess some unifying, real act, like some internal energy whereby they are what they are. We call this act the substantial form. Besides, these existents also are according to accidental ways of being and we can call these accidents, accidental acts or accidental forms, such as color, hardness, or quantity0. We will clarify this explanation by the following points: a) things have an intrinsic principle of unity and organization, when they are genuinely individual substances and not merely aggregates. A multitude of men, even when organized into a society will always be a collection of independent substances both in their act of being and in their operations. The unity of a society does not require the presence of a substantial form of society. It is explainable by the sum of the relations among the individuals. On the other hand, an individual body offers us clearly defined, specific traits, a constant way of acting, a variety of coordinated parts within a structured whole that is irreducible to the sum of those parts. These facts reveal the existence, in such an individual, of an internal and sole principle of substantiality, of unity and of species, that is its form. The form then is an intrinsic and essential act by which a physical body is organized and operates in a determinate and constant way. b) The form is the determining element of the essence of a body. In the previous paragraphs we described the form almost as if it were a synonym for essence. This is reasonable, in a sense, because the essence or nature of a thing arises from its form, by which a body is specifically such a body and not another. Nevertheless, we have seen that there exists another substantial principle in physical bodies

031 cf. J. A. McWilliams, Cosmology, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1956, pgs. 203-210.

which is primary matter. The form is the act of matter and, strictly speaking, both make up the essence or substance of material things. Recall, for claritys sake, every thing that we said regarding the distinctions between essence and substance. The essence of physical bodies is composed: it is made up of two substantial principles, one actual and the other potential. An existent that was only form would be a simple essence and would, therefore, be immaterial. This is the case with spiritual, angelic substances. With respect to bodies, it is inexact to say that their essence is their form as the Platonists thought because matter is also a part of its essence. c) The form is not merely a structure. Coming to know the specific structures of bodies is a quick and effective way to determine the substantiality and the presence of a form because it constitutes adequate and often unmistakable signs of a things essence. Nevertheless, the form is not the things structure. In itself, the structure of a thing consists in a collection of unifying and harmonizing relationships, while its substantial form is the act from which the very organizational structure of matter flows. VARIOUS ROLES OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM The following can be listed as the most significant: a) the form is the specifying and determining principle of the existence of bodily things0. This being in such a way is what places bodily things in a determined species. There are as many types of substantial forms in the world as there are species [the species of horse, cypress, mercury, and so forth]. In virtue of their primary matter each species is multiplied in numerous individuals. Note the bond between form and the act of being. A thing is inasmuch as it has a form. It is generated or corrupted it comes into being or ceases in being in the measure in which it acquires or loses its substantial form. The act of being [esse] of itself follows upon the form, for each thing has being according to its own proper form. A form cannot in any way be separated from an act of being (De anima, a. 14). A more detailed study of how the form is distinguished from the act of being is made in metaphysics. Form specifies or determines the act of being so that it is not the pure act of being but rather a restricted or limited act of being. The act of being is confined to one exclusive way of being, e.g., being an apple. The form determines the act of being itself forma est determinativa ipsius esse (De Hebd., I, II). b) The form gives being to the matter and to the whole composite: forma dat esse (cf., De ente et essentia, c. 4; C.G. II, 68). The substantial form is the originating nucleus from which being is transmitted to the whole physical body. The form communicates esse to the composite according to a specific way of being, making the physical body to be simpliciter and to be of such a species. Concretely, the substantial form confers being upon matter: it does not produce the matters potentiality, rather it actualizes it so that it can exist. Seen from another angle, the substantial form is the source from which the accidental structure of the substance arises. In this sense, the form is as we have seen the organizing principle of the physical complexity of the material existent. It is also the dynamic principle within the physical body and from it flow all of the substances activities. Every thing that the substance does in its physical environment is attributable to its form. These roles do not make the form a substance. The substantial form is not a thing quod [that which (is)], but a principle quo [that by which (something is)], which by actualizing some matter, constitutes a substance. Hence, the very esse of the form which it invests in matter, is the esse of the composite. The physical being is one and has but one act of being. The very esse of the form is the esse of the matter which is the esse of the composite (STh, I-II, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2). c) The substantial form is the first act of the body, not in a temporal sense but by its very nature. Metaphysical analysis concludes that the first fundamental act of an existent is its act of being or existing actus essendi. The act of being is prior to even the essential form itself inasmuch as it is the very act of the essence itself i.e., the form is in potency potentia essendi with respect to the act of being. Setting this notion aside for the moment, it can be said that the first act of a physical body is its substantial form. In other words, there can be no formal perfection or formality prior to the substantial act. From this act flow all the rest of a things formal perfections, which will all be accidental. Furthermore, no accident can be prior to the substantial form, since every accident exists in the substance. It is impossible for matter to be simultaneously actualized by more than one substantial form. The reason is simple: this prior act could neither be an accidental act which is posterior to substance

032 cf. R. Masi, Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961, pgs. 110-115.

nor a substantial act [as we would already have a constituted substance]. Every new act coming upon a complete existent, except in the case of corruption, is, necessarily, accidental to it. Hence, the specific form of a substance can be but one. UNICITY OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM The individual substance has but one substantial form: this is the conclusion to be drawn from our prior considerations. To suppose the contrary would undermine the intrinsic structural and functional unity of the substance. It is this unity of structure and function that leads us to the knowledge of substantial form. It would be impossible for an existent with a determined substantial form to simultaneously possess another substantial form, just as it would be impossible for a round body to be triangular at the same time. This teaching was defended by Saint Thomas against the almost unanimous opinion of his contemporaries and predecessors. The neo-Platonists held the theory of a plurality of substantial forms in one existent e.g., a horse would have the specific form of a horse, but also the generic forms of animal, living thing, etc. There was vast confusion between the logical realm and the real realm. We will shortly look into this question. Others held this bizarre opinion because they did not understand how simpler substances that enter into a substances physical composition remain in a more complex physical body e.g., the physical and chemical elements in a living organism. We will also investigate this point. In order to make this theory compatible with the unity of a body they spoke of perfect and imperfect substantial forms or principal and subordinate substantial forms. They thus threatened the indivisibility and stability of essential act. We will look into this matter presently. DEGREES OF PERFECTION AND STABILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL FORMS Observing nature reveals the fact that specific substances and, therefore their essential forms are arranged hierarchically according to degrees of greater or less perfection. Forms are ordered according to degrees of essential perfection. The more perfect form contains, in its own way, the perfections of its inferiors and surpasses them. In this way, Aristotle compared forms with the series of numbers four contains 3 plus 1 or the progression of geometric shapes the hexagon contains the pentagon and goes beyond it. This means there is a relative continuity among species. This is not opposed to the essential difference between one and another species. The inferior species are somewhat similar to those immediately superior to them e.g., the most perfect minerals begin to hint at the perfections of life. The substantial form organizes its matter in an increasingly complex and organic way. 0 The substantial form, as such, does not admit of degrees of intensity . We know this by experience. A man or a bird is not more or less man or bird throughout its life span or in comparison with other individuals of its species. Each individual is or is not of such and such a species. There are no intermediate states nor are there mixtures. Hence, birth and death are instantaneous changes of essence. In other words, the substantial form is not an intensive act, as are qualities which allow a wide range of possible variations or contrary states [e.g., strong-weak; hot-cold]. The comparison with natural numbers, for example, can be of help here. They are arranged according to a discontinuous scale: the step from 3 to 4 is not done gradually but by a specific jump, as it were (cf. STh, I, q. 118, a. 2). If essential forms intermixed chaos would reign in the universe, for nothing would be determined and no thing would exist. This supposed possibility is clearly impossibility. The form man signifies the privation of all other substantial forms. Man is necessarily non-bird, non-tree. Nothing can exist in act and contain within itself contradictory realties. Only potentially can a thing simultaneously contain contradictory perfections. So primary matter, precisely because of its indetermination is potentially all bodily forms. For similar reasons, there can be no intermediate forms between substantial being and accidental being, for a thing either exists in itself or exists in another: there is no possibility of some midterm reality (cf. De mixtione elementorum). OUR KNOWLEDGE OF FORMS Since all things are known by what they are in act, we necessarily conclude that the substantial form is the principle of intelligibility of every thing. Just as a chair is determinately known when its structure is grasped, rather than when it is known as something made of wood, so too bodily things are known through their forms rather than their matter. Psychology studies the process of abstraction in human knowledge. Through this process the form is separated from matter by the mind. It is grasped, however, as the form of this matter and not as a subsistent form.

033 cf. D. Nys, Cosmologie, Lovain, 1928, pgs. 22-24.

This supposes that in itself the form is something immaterial precisely because it is not matter. Nevertheless, the forms of physical bodies, with the exception of the human soul, are intrinsically dependent upon matter. These acts can then be called, in a wide sense, material forms, as long as we do not mistakenly conceive of them as quasi-bodies or identify them with matter itself. When speaking about abstraction, we must always keep in mind that the forms of material things are known a posteriori, i.e., inductively and not by a priori definitions. Whenever we have difficulty in determining whether or not there exists substantiality, then it will also be harder for us to identify the substantial form. In any case, the standards for determining substantiality [cf. the previous section] are the same for determining the form. To avoid a mistaken understanding, we should recall that the form is not the species, since the species includes both the form and matter in general. The matter-form distinction is not equivalent to the individual-species distinction. The individual includes the individual form and matter, while the species as also the genus includes both but in a general way, leaving aside individuality. Consequently, the universal concept species of man does not refer to the form the human soul but to the composite of form and matter, i.e, soul and body. Abstraction can be divided into two classes: a) abstraction of a whole [abstraction without precision]. Individual matter is left out of consideration but matter in general common matter is not excluded. This is the abstraction of universal concepts taken from individuals, e.g., the concept of man leaves out of consideration this flesh and blood individual matter but not flesh and blood in general common matter. b) abstraction of a form [abstraction with precision]. Here we set aside the very notion of matter individual matter and only consider the form itself accidental or substantial as distinct from its subject matter. For example when we conceive of a triangular form an accident or the essential form of a body for instance, the soul of a living body we positively exclude all non-common traits from our concept. In this case triangular shape becomes triangularity and human nature, humanity, neither of which can be attributed to an individual since all non-common traits are positively excluded from the conception. THE DANGER OF LOGICAL IDEALISM By ignoring these distinctions, the Platonists thought that only universal concepts, both of species and of genus were the very substantial forms of reality. Hence, the notions of lion, animal, living thing, body would indicate the existence of equally many forms in the individual existent. In this case, they would all subsist in the lion. Working from this context, other Platonists held that the genus corresponded to matter and the specific difference to form. Avicebron, for example, claimed that in the definition of artificial things, the genus referred to second matter and the difference to the artificial form. In speaking of a golden ring: the generic object gold would be the matter and the structure or shape ring would be the form. In turn, the gold could be defined as a body with certain differentiating characteristics. The trait of body would refer to some matter and these differentiating characteristics to the form. This procedure would successively applied until one arrived to the genus of substance which would constitute a universal matter common to all creatures. Any determinate body would therefore have numerous forms, from the most general to the most particular, and each of them would be as matter with respect to the more concrete form. This line of reasoning confuses the realm of knowledge cognitional being with the realm of existence real being. In the case of artifacts, it is true that the definition can be made up of a genus that means the natural substance second matter and of a specific difference that signifies the artificial structure added to it. If we recur to our much used example; the statue of the discus thrower can be defined as an material object that represents the shape of a discus thrower, but the same type of definition cannot be applied to natural things. When we say that man is a rational animal, it is not true that animal genus is the matter and rational specific difference its form. Here the genus and the specific difference refer to the complete essence, which includes matter and form but in another realm of determinateness. The composition of genus and difference that gives rise to the species in natural bodies is a logical distinction, not a real one. To say this does not deny that the form is the principle of specification. A lion is a lion, and not a horse, by virtue of its substantial form and because of its primary matter. Therefore, we can say that universal concepts genus, species imply the form more than the matter, in greater or lesser determination, although they always refer to the whole composite. The birth of this erroneous view goes back to Plato himself. Thinking that the material world was the pure instability of change, he separated the essences of things from it and considered them as separated

substances The ideas or the Forms. These Ideas univocally corresponded to the universal concepts of things: Man, Animal, Living Thing, etc. The method of logic is clearly inappropriate for determining the nature of the composition of matter and form. The distinction of universal concepts, the classification of genus and species, the structure of subject and predicate in propositions cannot be used to analyze the real, metaphysical composition of things. These logical tools can provide leads. The realm of logic, after all, has its source in reality and, in its own way, represents it. It cannot, however, be used as a sufficient standard of analysis, since logic often needs to rely upon distinctions of reason. These distinctions do not exist in the physical existents but only in our limited way of knowing. Platonism does not take this basic distinctions between cognitional and real being into account. It merely degenerates into a complicated hierarchy and multiplicity of forms, which are no more than a conglomeration of ideas.

5.

THE INDIVIDUATION OF BODILY EXISTENTS

Every thing that exists is an individual. Universality is a property of our concepts, which can be said or predicated of many individual existents man can be said of Peter, Paul and Thomas. Individuation, as such, is not, therefore, a problem but a fact. Furthermore, it is clear to us that there are traits common to many things because of which they are similar or, in some way, identical. Hence, all men are equal inasmuch as they share in human nature. The question arises: just what is the differentiating principle in things that singularizes them? In other words, how is it that Peter and John are two distinct subjects though they are equal as men. The question we are posing is the problem of the principle of individuation. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION The principle of individuation is primary matter. We have already seen that the substantial form is the principle of specification. All of the atoms of copper are of such a nature because they possessed the substantial form of copper. In what, then, do they differ one from another? It is true that we can always find accidental differences between individuals, but these cannot explain their difference as substances, since the fact remains, that these accidents are also common to other individuals. These accidental differences are not infrequently quite irrelevant and variable, e.g., the different temperatures of two drops of water. Even if they allow us to discern substances, they are not the cause of their distinction as individual substances. The individualizing principle will necessarily be found at the level of substance and is none other than primary matter. The multiplicity of individuals within a species was precisely one of the arguments that lead to the discovery of primary matter. One and the same form is communicated to many individuals because they also possess matter. It is the receptive substantial principle that makes the form to be this individual rather than that other. Matter receives form and individuates it, thereby constituting the singular individual. Matter has the role of multiplying in the realm of number not species. It causes one form to come to be in many specifically identical individuals. For this same reason it has the role of individuating in the realm substance. If a form is capable of subsisting by itself alone as is the case with angels then it individualizes itself. But then, of course, the individual-species distinction does not arise. For each individual is its own species; there is no other like it. Each angel makes up a distinct species. This does not mean that the individual traits and the personality of each individual are, without further distinction, the result of matter, which is passive and lacks all essential content. Matter is limited to individuating the form. Form, once individuated, is the source of the singular richness of each existent. QUANTIFIED MATTER INDIVIDUATES 0 The principle of individuation, to be more precise, is matter quantitate signata or quantified. To say that matter individuates form is not sufficient, because the question would still arise: what causes this matter to be different from that matter? Or to push the question further, is the matter of the entire universe numerically one or many? We will proceed to answer this question step by step: a) The unity of matter is purely negative. In itself, primary matter has neither form nor quantity because it is pure potency. Hence, we cannot say that it is either one or many in number, because numerical distinction presupposes quantity. We can say that the matter of the universe is one as the potential principle common to all physical bodies. This unity, however, is a negative unity insofar as matter is nothing but formless receptive capacity. Its unity is neither that of a genus, which implies conceptual indetermination plus a certain essential content, nor that of a species.

034 cf. V. Remer, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1949, pgs. 67-75.

b) But matter, in fact, is multiplied for each individual existent as its own proper matter. The principle of this multiplicity cannot be found either in form, which is common to all the individuals of the same species, nor in primary matter, present in all physical bodies. This principle is quantity or the dimensions of the existent, or still more precisely, matter itself as arranged according to dimensions materia quantitate signata: matter stamped or individualized by quantity. c) Dimensive quantity determines a portion of matter materia signata so that we can then designate this or that matter. Quantity individuates itself because its essential trait is indivisibility by which it spreads out its parts in space in diverse concrete positions and so differentiates itself. What distinguishes one point from another along a straight line is its position. The cause of one portion of matters being distinct from another is its extension, i.e., the fact that it is localized in diverse parts of the universe (cf. CG. IV, 65). Individuating dimensions are not a concrete kind of dimensions that are continually varying but simply dimensiveness or dimensions in general. What produces individuation is matter becoming dimensive, abstracting from the variable determinations of its quantity (cf. In Boeth. de Trin., q. 4, a. 2). FURTHER CLARIFICATION REGARDING INDIVIDUATION It is not easy to understand how individuation is accomplished through quantified matter. One can mistakenly think of matter acquiring quantity prior to its reception of substantial form. This is, of course, impossible because quantity is an accident presupposing a substance complete with its form and matter. But then we ask, how can quantity individuate matter and form if it comes into being only afterward? We must keep in mind that individuation is not a temporal process. Form is always individuated, because quantified matter is always individuating it. Besides, to individuate is not to produce or to cause. Matter stamped by quantity individuates the form brought into being by the agent cause, as a pail of such and such dimensions contains a certain volume of water, but it does not cause the being of the water it contains. The difference is that the pail can exist without water, but quantified matter can never exist without form and matter and quantity, which are mutually dependent for their existence. Our pictorial representation cannot be carried any further. The water in a receptacle does not bring about the dimensions of its container, while the form is the source of the actuality of an existent and, therefore, the source of its quantity. But once it is brought into being, quantity simultaneously exercises its individuating effects. We can say that the existent form maintains its individuality by means of the dimensions it causes in its own matter. Furthermore, these dimensions were ultimately brought about by the agent cause who prepared the matter to receive the new form and its effective individuation. OTHER OPINIONS A topic as difficult as that of individuation has given rise to many controversies and various opinions. The great complexity of these opinions prohibits any brief analysis. Each position is only fully understandable in the context of the metaphysical supposition from which it springs. Averroes held a position similar to that of Saint Thomas except that he placed quantified matter in a position logically prior to the form. Averroes position was articulated in a brief work entitled De natura materia. The Platonists who were contemporaries of the Angelic Doctor, had recourse to the theory of the plurality of forms. They distinguished between the forma corporeitas form of corporeity or bodiliness and the form of the species. Duns Scotus follows this school. His solution is that a substances haecceitas or thisness is its ultimate individuating determination. Godfrey of Fontaine thought individualization was caused by the form alone. Suarez, some nominalists, and Leibniz thought that individuation was due to each things own reality. For the philosophical nominalist, the problem, for all intents and purposes, does not exist. Nominalism does not recognize forms as common to individuals. Pure Platonism sees no problem here either, because it considers the form itself to be the genuine individual. Our disputed question arises in the context of Aristotelian principles. The difficulty is to assign proper causality to the essential principles of the physical existent so as to reconcile the reality of concrete individuals with the presence of an identical essential form in each one of them.

6.

THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE

We have already seen that primary matter and substantial form unite as potency and act in the constitution of a composite substance. Now we will explain some aspects of this union: THE COMPOSITE SUBSTANCE ALONE EXISTS, IS GENERATED, IS CORRUPTED, AND ACTS a) Strictly speaking only the composite substance exists, is generated, is corrupted, and acts. The act of being belongs properly and per se to the complete individual substance, not to its essential parts. Neither the substantial form nor the primary matter are substances and they do not, properly speaking,

exist, or they exist to the extent that the composite exists. The same thing can be said of a substances actions. The substantial form is the active principle, but the form itself does not act. What does act or exercise operations is the composite substance on account of its substantial form. Actiones sunt suppositorum actions are realized by the supposit or integral substance. Analogously, we can say that it is the substance per se that is generated or corrupted and not the primary matter or the substantial form. The new substantial form that comes to be in the process of generation can be said to be generated only per accidens. If it really were generated it would have an element in common with its principle a quo and would, therefore, be composed of matter and form. The same would have to be said, in turn, of the new substantial form of the substantial form and so on indefinitely! An analogous example taken from accidental change may help to make the point clearer: the sculptor does not chisel the shape of the statue as if this shape were a thing he chisels the statues marble in giving a shape to the statue. b) Matter: essentially directed or ordered to all bodily forms. This directedness or ordering ordo consists in the fact that matter does not exist nor can it be understood apart from form. Matter is, after all, nothing else than a capacity for acquiring form. This directedness or ordering extends universally to the whole range of physical bodies. Matter is the substrate that can be invested with any form which is a form of a physical body. Still, this is not an active ordering, for matter cannot endow itself with form, because it is entirely passive. Even though matter has no power to draw form out of itself without the intervention of a cause, we may say that matter has a natural appetite or longing for form an appetitus materialis. Every potency has its act as its own end. This appetitus naturalis or natural desire does not necessarily imply actuality. On the contrary, in itself, it supposes the absence of actuality and, at the same time, an ordering to actuality as its end. The appetite of matter for form is nothing other than its ordering toward form as a potency to its act (In I Phys., lect. 15). Following St. Augustine, St. Thomas used this doctrine as an argument against the Manicheans, who held that matter was the principle of evil. Matter is not act, but it can be said to be good it has ontological goodness due to its being ordered toward act, and thereby aspiring to the good (cf. CG. III, 20). The Angelic Doctor comes to say that matter tends toward the most perfect and noble act of the physical world, which is the human form or mans soul (cf. CG. III, 23). This means that in the gradation of more or less perfect things we see in nature which is an ordering of less perfect species to the more perfect the whole material world is ordered to man as its proximate end. Were not saying that the human soul arises from matter but that matter is placed at the souls service. Therefore, the material of which a ship is made is not the producing cause of the ship, but it is ordered to the broader aims for which the ship was constructed. PRIMARY MATTER: RECEIVING AND POSSESSING ITS OWN PROPER FORMS c) Primary Matter is disposed or adapted to receiving and possessing its own proper forms. Let us now explain this somewhat paradoxical statement. The fact that primary matter is the capacity to receive every bodily form does not mean that it is immediately capable of acquiring any form whatsoever. It is obvious that a block of marble [in this case we are speaking of secondary matter] is not able to be transformed into a gold ingot just like that, or that an animal can digest just any thing it swallows. Matter either primary or secondary is always clothed in some form, and the fact remains that each substance has its own collection of quantitative and qualitative properties. The sum of these conditions shapes a dispositio materiae a disposition of matter toward certain, more or less remote, transformations. This is true, in the first instance, for generation and corruption; the appropriate modifications of place, time, certain alterations, and so on give primary matter a disposition to acquire or to lose a form. This also applies to the actual possession of a form, which is only possible while the matter either primary or secondary is properly disposed. Not just any secondary matter will sustain a particular form; the matter must always be disposed to receive or to retain a given form. There must exist a fitting proportio between the matter and the form e.g., only the human body can house a human soul. Disposed or apt matter is not primary matter pure and simple, but primary matter together with a series of dispositions that establish its potentiality for certain proximate forms. The Platonists did not understand this proportion of matter in reference to form. They thought that the form was a substance which assumed a body only by virtue of a dynamic union rather than a union of substance, much as a helmsman was united to his vessel. Hence, they believed that forms came and went indistinctly from one body to another e.g., souls transmigrated to different bodies. d) Matter restricts or limits substantial form. This is the other important aspect of the relation between matter and form. Potency limits act, allowing it a greater or lesser perfective expansion, as the

receptacle determines the amount of water contained. Hence, as we said earlier, primary matter can continue to receive superior, more perfective acts arriving all the way up to the human soul, but only on the condition that it receives a very complex organization that properly disposes or prepares it. As matter restricts or limits form, so an individual is restricted or limited by its species. Even though an essence does not admit of degrees of intensity, it is a fact that individuals develop the perfections of their species; some individuals do so more than others. A human embryo is already a complete person; nevertheless, as it develops with growth, its substantial form will be enabled to unfold its latent capacity. This phenomenon is due, among other causal factors, to the restrictions or conditions which matter imposes according to how well or ill it is disposed. The matter of a human embryo does not as yet allow a man to see, to think, to will, etc. Of course, the development of the species in the individual occurs at the level of accidents, but this does not lessen its decisive importance for the individual. Needless to say, this conditioning factor imposed by matter upon the form which will come to actualize it which also includes the conditions imposed by the environment, the factor of heredity in living things, as well as other factors is extrinsic to the spiritual operations of man. This question is studied in Rational Psychology. e) Primary matter subordinate to substantial form; substantial form dependent upon primary 0 matter . Form and matter are the principles of physical bodies. Nevertheless, they do not have the same ontological standing they are not on the same level. Form is actuality and matter is pure potentiality. Substantial form has dominion over matter, for it organizes, enriches, and draws matter out of its passivity. The more perfect the substantial form the more perfectly does it actualize matter, in all the above mentioned ways. The more noble or perfect a substance is, the more varied its activities, and the wider the scope of its properties and the less dependent it is upon matter. Nevertheless, all bodily forms, with the exception of the human soul, depend essentially upon primary matter in their existence and in their generative processes. As matter can never be without form, still there is nothing contradictory in forms that are independent of matter. The forms of physical bodies depend upon matter not because they are forms but because they are this kind of form. That is to say, they are dependent because their formal content or kind of actuality is not powerful enough to insure its own subsistence (cf. De ente et essentia, c. IV). We come, therefore, to the conclusion that the composition of matter and form defines, as such, physical or bodily existents. This composition is the source of all their substantial and accidental properties. Although the standard for immediately describing a bodily object is its spatio-temporal situation the hic et nunc, its circumstances here and now the definitive standard of metaphysics is the bodys hylomorphic structure. This structure reveals the very nature of physical bodies. The subsistence of forms corresponding to spiritual substances is studied in Psychology. These forms represent a degree of being above that of bodily substances.

7.

NATURE

Understanding the hylomorphic composition of bodies allows us to better understand the subject matter of our course, namely, the notion of nature. This is an analogous notion; its has a range of meanings with diverse implications. We can properly group these implications around two basic meanings: the physical meaning and the metaphysical meaning of nature. THE PHYSICAL MEANING OF NATURE Physical sense of nature restricts its meaning to physical or bodily existents. Nature with a capital N often refers to the sum total of all physical bodies and is synonymous with the physical world; this is a derivative meaning. Nature, in the primary and widest sense, is the internal principle of bodily existents. This is why bodily existents are called natural or physical. Natural phenomena are the actions of natural existents e.g., rain, fire, the animals thirst and so on. Taken together, all natural existents and their activities make up the world of nature. Nature is the first intrinsic principle of the activity of a bodily existent (cf. In II Phys., lect. 1). Artifacts do not have an internal principle of their strictly artificial activity, and, hence, they have no nature. An automobile is moved extrinsically it is driven by a human operator. Natural phenomena are spontaneous, as the growth of a tree or the movement of the heavenly bodies. These characteristics are revealed in the etymology of the word. Nature comes from nascor = to be born; the Greek word physis comes from the verb phyomai = to be generated. It originally signified the spontaneous process of generation. Later the meaning was transferred to the internal principle of those processes that provoked mans wonder. The

035 cf. V. Remer, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1949, pgs. 83-84.

products of these forces are said to be a natura, by nature or natural e.g., a beehive is a product of nature. But exactly in what does this principle consist? For materialists nature is basically matter. For Platonists, the physical world is passive and nature is found in the Forms or Ideas outside the confines of the material universe. Aristotle accurately pointed out that nature is as much matter as form, both of which are intrinsic to the physical body. However, form is more nature than matter, for the specific activity of each existent originates in it (cf. In II Phys., lect. 2). To sum up, nature is the substance or the essence of the physical body in as much as it is the principle of operations and affections. The definition of nature also includes the natural affections. The tides, for example, are natural phenomenon that originate ab extrinseco. The oceans do not rise or fall by themselves; this is due to the effect of lunar attraction. In this case, nature also includes passivity or receptivity or the natural aptitude to be effected by external influences. Furthermore, nature according to the above-mentioned physical meaning, is distinguished from what is spiritual, and what is artificial. a) As distinguished from what is spiritual. The physical notion of nature includes matter. Therefore, everything that is in any way more than or beyond the physical or material is not natural. Natural facts always occur in the same way except for chance events because they obey the necessitas materiae, i.e., the univocal conditioning imposed by matter. By contrast, the phenomena of a spirits life and activities are greatly varied and free. The fact that a person gives a conference for example is not taken to be a phenomenon of Nature. b) As distinguished from what is artificial. Artifacts are the product of human work or ingenuity the ancients referred to this as ars art. These artificial objects are moved wholly ab extrinseco, as a chair, a hammer, or a computer. Obviously these objects possess natural powers which man uses to his advantage to produce effects unforeseen by nature. The essence of an artificial object can be found in its formally arising from the human mind which conceives its structure, as happens with a watch or a bridge. On the other hand, natural effects that man can unleash through his intervention are not considered artificial e.g., a rain shower, a chemical product or the healing of an living organism through medication. These effects are produced through artificial means, but in themselves they are natural. Since the physical sense of nature, includes matter, mathematical entities are not usually referred to as natural, for the mind positively excludes matter in their conception, formulation and association. We do not commonly say that the properties of a circle are natural. As can be seen, the notion of nature which we have been describing readily adapts to our description of the degree of physical abstraction since it retains sensible matter in its content and leaves out of consideration only what is strictly individual. Naturalism. The way of understanding nature is different in the various currents of philosophical thought. Some philosophies eliminate the notion altogether or greatly restrict its meaning. This is the case with mechanism, which explains all natural phenomena on the basis of the local motion and quantitative changes of bodies. Mechanism does away with the distinction between what is natural and what is artificial, since physical bodies behave like machines. Hence, there would be no essential difference between a computer, for example, and a rabbit. Platonism also eliminates the adequate consistency of nature. The same is true of idealism and those doctrines that reduce nature to a product of the human mind, or which in some way deny that nature is independent of human reason. Opposed to these interpretations is that of a positive naturalism that stresses the autonomy of nature, its internal finality and its proper value. The metaphysics of Aristotle, St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great, and others of like mind, espouse this kind of naturalism. There are other styles of naturalism, however, which are mistaken avenues of thought, such as, pantheism, hylezoism Nature is here taken to be one great Living Thing and animism Nature is animated by a cosmic soul. Generally speaking, any doctrine that proposes that physical nature is an intimate autonomous principle, independent of God and above human reason e.g., Rousseau, Marx in some way, Nietzsche affirms this mistaken view of Nature. Ultimately, physical nature leads back to an Uncreated Intelligence, to a God, as its supreme Craftsman. Natures ultimate basis is transcendent; it can be considered as a great work of Divine Art (cf. In II Phys., lect. 14), the creation of an intelligent Maker. THE ANTI-NATURAL There exists in nature opposing forces that bring about destructive results. These are anti-natural phenomena, since they go contrary to a given nature, by either weakening or destroying it. For example, it is anti-natural to die, to become ill, to ingest something poisonous, to live in a area with an inhospitable climate and so on. The physical world, as a whole, is in harmony. Hence, these phenomena, from the vantage point of universal nature, are natural even though they run counter to a particular nature. No

physical body naturally tends toward its own destruction. It does, on the contrary, resist any efforts aimed at its own dissolution. Anti-natural phenomena are due, in many instances, to a violent agent. Violence is an external principle contrary to the inclinations of a being, impeding the exercise of a natural operation e.g., caging an animal or forcing a thing to carry out an anti-natural action e.g., prodding a lame animal to walk. With respect to animals, violence is directly opposed to its appetites. With regard to man, violence cannot be applied directly to his will (it is an inviolable faculty), but can be applied only to his bodily actions. METAPHYSICAL MEANING OF NATURE The notion of nature can be stripped of its material connotation and so be applied to all beings. From this perspective, nature is the essence in as much as it is the principle of operations. Hence, we can speak of the nature of angels, and about the Divine Nature as well. For example, we can speak of the Blessed Trinity as being Three Persons in one nature or of Christ possessing two natures, one human the other divine. In a restricted sense, natural can be taken to mean everything proportionate to the nature of created things. In this sense, natural is distinguished from supernatural which exceeds all created powers and is, concretely, the realm of grace [i.e., the reality of Gods graciousness or good pleasure; therefore, an act of faith is not natural, but supernatural]. Even in this limited sense, what is natural is still the opposite of what is artificial. For instance, the inclination toward social life is natural in man, even though it gives rise to an artificial fact, such as the building of a particular city. Speech is natural, but speaking in a certain language is artificial. Finally, in this present usage, natural is also opposed to what is antinatural. Sin and error are anti-natural, for they are contrary to the rational nature of man.

8.

PHYSICAL CAUSALITY

The study of causality belongs to metaphysics. A few summary remarks about it are needed, however, for a proper understanding of natural philosophy. There exists in the physical world an obvious and intense causal activity. Every single phenomenon produced is always the effect of a determined cause. If an individual is born or dies, or if a piece of paper yellows, it is due to some causes. There exist complex causal series (the suns radiation, the gestation of an anima, the producing of a mountain range, etc.), each of which demands a first cause relative to this order. Besides, the totality of the cosmic universe in its harmony and unity presupposes a first absolute cause, who is God the Creator. DEFINITION OF CAUSE IN GENERAL Cause is the principle upon which a thing depends for its first coming into existence or for its coming to exist in some way. The ways of causing are extremely varied. There are remote and proximate causes, principal and instrumental causes, extrinsic and intrinsic causes, proper and merely occasioning causes. In each of these cases, the cause indicates the why of a things being or being produced. Let it be noted, that although many causal processes taken as a whole are successive or temporal, the actuation of the immediate cause needs to be simultaneous with its effect although it does not necessarily have to be simultaneous with the consequences following this effect. The action of the builder is simultaneous to the construction of a house. One body strikes another at the same time that the other receives the impulse of being struck. The teaching of the professor takes place together with the learning of the pupil. In other words, any causal action is exercised simultaneously with the corresponding affection in the effect. This manner of relatedness between a cause and its effect can be found in any of the four basic causalities encountered in nature: the material, formal, efficient and final causes. THE MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSES The first two are always intrinsic causes and are already known to us. Nevertheless, material and formal causality is far broader than its instance in primary matter and substantial form, because it also includes the realm of accidents. The material cause is that from which a thing comes to be and is intrinsic to the thing both in the substantial as well as the accidental order, e.g., the wood from which a door is made or the glass from which an ashtray is made. The formal cause, in turn, is that by which a thing is what it is, either in the order of substance or accident. In this way, the binomial of matter-form, always related in terms of potency-act, is applicable to many sectors of reality. Substance is the material cause of its accidents. In any compound, the parts are the material cause, and the whole or structure is the formal cause, e.g., the bricks and their building, the letters and their word, the notes and their melody, men and their society, these are but illustrative examples. These last illustrative examples should not lead us to a misunderstanding of hylomorphic composition.

The relationship of whole to parts is distinct from the relationship of form to matter. When the whole is a unity of order e.g., an athletic team its parts are individual substances i.e., the players. These two aspects are formal and material cause respectively. But in a bodily substance the integrating parts and the integral whole e.g., the organic composition of the human body correspond to dimensive quantity by which each part is localized in a distinct position. The whole cannot be called the form and the parts the matter, since form and matter in themselves are not quantitative and are present in their entirety throughout the whole of the substance and in each of its parts. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE The efficient cause is that from which an action primarily arises which makes something exist or be in a certain way. This definition corresponds to the most common notion of cause, viz., that which produces something new i.e, something which did not exist before. Physical efficient causes do not strictly speaking determine the being of a thing this is due to the intrinsic causes and, in particular, to the substantial form. Physical efficient causes determine the becoming fieri of a thing, i.e., they cause a change or a determined modification of some apt matter so that it acquires a determined form, as a sculptor chisels and cuts the marble block to produce the statue. Efficient causality presupposes the distinction between agent the existent that acts causally and the patient the existent that is submitted to this causal influence. For instance, the sun enlightens and heats those bodies reached by its radiation, one animal begets another, one physical body is attracted by another. At times, the efficient cause may be intrinsic to the existent itself e.g., the heart causes the circulation of blood but it is, in any case, extrinsic to the effect produced and it arises from the substantial form, the source of all bodily activity. THE FINAL CAUSE The final cause is that for the sake of which something is done. There is always a correlation between efficient causality and final causality, since every action is directed toward an end except for definitive actions. It is not necessary that the agent know or foresee that its action will produce an end which as yet does not exist. For example, teeth are for the purpose of biting or chewing food, the stomach for digesting and so on. Finality can be extrinsic e.g., the sun shines to make life on earth possible or intrinsic which, in the last analysis, is the substantial form e.g., the end of an act of generation is the form generated. In the inanimate world we find intrinsic and extrinsic finality. Some things are for the sake of others and all of the internal processes of a substance tend towards keeping it in existence and carrying out its proper activities. There is harmony in the world because there is finality. The principal and chemical sciences particularly study the material and agent causes. Philosophy pays more attention to final and formal causality. These make the universe more intelligible and lead to knowledge of an Intelligent Creator.

IV. COMPOUNDS AND ELEMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION The hylomorphic composition of corporeal things does not exhaust their essential structure. Experience shows us that material bodies, existing in many species, are able to decompose into lesser and lesser species. Material bodies are seen, therefore, to be composed or complex substances. Among all the natures of the physical world, the highest is human nature. Human nature joins in itself the perfections found in animal, vegetable and mineral natures. Furthermore, corporeal substances make up ordered unities of greater scale a mountain, an entire mountain range, a planet and these ordered unities ultimately make up the entire universe. From the very beginning of Western philosophy, the question arose as to whether the elementary substances the elements exist which would be the ultimate products of the decomposition of complex substances. The Pre-socratic philosophers gave affirmative answers which varied with respect to what they thought the elementary substances were. This opinion was widely accepted until the modern era. As the experimental sciences systematically were born, the notion of elementary substances became a popular view among their pioneers. By the 19th century it was believed to have been scientifically determined that these elements were none other than the atoms of modern chemistry. The discoveries made since then have progressively complicated the issue. The question as to the nature of the most elementary existents is now seen as a vexing and complex question, in light of the progress made by the experimental sciences in the 20th century. Another question related to the above has also been asked since antiquity: are composed substances mere aggregates of lesser substances or substances changed when they enter into composition and how far reaching are these changes? These questions arise out of the problem that has come to be referred to as the problem of mixtures. It has also received many different solutions. From the philosophy of ancient Greece there have been those who have held for a mechanism that would reduce all matter to states of pure aggregates. This view finds adherents still in our era who claim to base this opinion on the findings of experimental science. The development of these questions will round out our considerations on hylomorphism. It will allow us to penetrate further into the problems related with the substantiality of bodies in the inorganic world, and will provide a more precise analysis of substantial changes. It is not at all easy to interpret with certainty scientific findings concerning the composition of matter. Hence, it should not be surprising to find diverse opinions regarding these questions. We will attempt to evaluate the various opinions and to point out that the various positions regarding the more difficult questions do not invalidate the basic concepts of natural philosophy actuality and potentiality, substance and accidents, matter and form, etc.. These concepts apply to the existents of material reality and give us an adequate understanding of the new findings of experimental science. 2. THE COMPOSITION OF MATTER ACCORDING TO THE EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCES In our preceding considerations we have pointed out various aspects of the scientific-experimental method and the value of the conclusions drawn from it. Now we will briefly refer to some of these aspects which are of particular interest for the questions yet to be looked into. THE SCIENTIFIC-EXPERIMENTAL METHOD The various sciences have developed a variety of methods of inquiry, specific to the observational requirements of the material bodies which they study. Nevertheless, these methods have a basic scheme in common involving various steps: a) The posing of a specific problem. Scientific problems arise from ordinary experience, e.g., the interest in calculating the motion of a projectile or determining the composition of a rock. They also arise in the application of a theory to a particular case, e.g., explaining the motion of electrons according to the laws of classical mechanics. Or, a scientist may attempt to find a unifying explanation for various experimental laws or several partial theories, e.g., a theory which would explain the experimental laws concerning the behavior of electricity or a more general theory regarding electromagnetic forces which would embrace all the theories on electricity and magnetism, etc. The problems arising may be of a more theoretical than experimental nature. They may be soluble by means of present knowledge or require a re-thinking of an entire question. A number of theories within a

given field might be employed in a particular solution, or theories from various fields could be necessary. There is an almost endless variety of problems which arise in the probings of science. b) Formulation of a hypothesis to solve a concrete problem. Hypotheses are varied according to the type of problem posed; a hypothesis may consist in formulating a simple law that synthesizes experimental data, developing a new theory and so forth. c) Verifying the hypothesis through theoretical and experimental studies. Sometimes hypotheses can be proven with certainty e.g., when a predicted substance is observed to exist or an assumed property is manifested. Many times, however, the evidence does not provide certain verification of a hypothesis. This is especially true when dealing with complex systems of theories. Normally, only a hypothesis usefulness will be confirmed, based on indirect evidence. In other words, the hypothesis will be shown to have consequential value. d) Acquisition of new knowledge and the posing of new problems this is the result of the verification of hypotheses. Science continues to acquire partial knowledge about determined areas of reality. The new knowledge raises new questions. It is seldom easy to synthesize scientific results, since they are partial and their value varies according to the specific case. CLASSICAL AND MODERN SCIENCE Classical physics was considered to be a completed science near the year 1880. All that was thought left to be done was to develop it and apply it to individual problems. Within a short time, however, the discoveries and theories regarding the atom and elementary particles completely changed the physicists view of the physical world. The development of the theory of relativity united to the theories of particle physics provided the theoretical basis for modern physics, as well as serving as the foundation for further progress in the sciences of chemistry and biology. Physical bodies and their properties are increasingly being explained in terms of micro-physical realities. Since these entities atoms, particles, etc. cannot be observed directly, modern science has come to explain the constitution of material things by turning, in good measure, to theoretical constructs which cannot be pictured using the imagination. This, of course, had also been done in classical physics as a consequence of its use of complex mathematical formulas and concepts that did not correspond to those of ordinary experience. Still, in many cases it was possible to use ones imagination to picture both the problem and its solution because one was dealing with observable bodies and their properties. In modern science, however, since one studies or uses as a basis for study micro-physical realities, imaginative representations are frequently necessary tools to aid the human mind in better understanding material bodies, but do not directly present reality to us. With this in mind plus the considerations made about the scientific method, we are led to the following conclusions: statements concerning the micro-physical constitution of matter are based upon indirect evidence although very great, in many cases so that in all scientific rigor we must consider, in each case, such statements in the context of the concrete scientific problems and of the value of the hypotheses formulated to solve them; these affirmations are subject to possible revision, even as to their bases, in the light of new theoretical and experimental discoveries. Hence, they are not definitive, even though they may be based on very strong indirect evidence; taking into account what we have just said, these scientific statements provide us with genuine knowledge about the material world, even though it may be but partial and to some extent hypothetical. Consequently, scientific statements are a valid basis for philosophical reflection that asks about the degree of reality of micro-physical entities; the advances of micro-physics do not invalidate the well founded knowledge of ordinary experience, nor the philosophical knowledge drawn from this ordinary experience. Modern science itself is based upon ordinary knowledge. Were this not so, science could not even carry out experiments or interpret their results, for every experiment is interpreted by means of observation and the notions taken from ordinary knowledge. These epistemological distinctions must be taken into account in order to correctly evaluate the philosophical problems we will pose and their solutions in the following pages. 3. THE ELEMENTS

NOTION OF ELEMENT Aristotle, who was followed by St. Thomas in this thinking, defined the elements by three traits: a) the elements of other bodies are those realities into which these bodies can be divided or into which they can be broken down. They are, therefore, bodies that enter into the formation of other bodies called compounds; b) the elements are present in the compound. They are physical parts obtained by dividing the compound. They are not metaphysical principles as are primary matter and substantial form which are not parts of the substance into which it can be physically divided; c) the elements cannot be divided into other parts of a diverse nature or species. Physically speaking, they are simple. If these elements are found as isolated substances, they themselves are composed of primary matter and substantial form. According to this view, therefore, the elements are the very last species of nature. They may be able to exist as isolated substances, but when they combine to form compounds, they lose their substantiality. The Aristotelian notion of element summarizes what all authors basically understand by this concept. The problem arises in a closer examination of the last trait, that of being the ultimate. Do there really exist such ultimate elements of matter, bodies so simple that they cannot be broken down into other bodies of a different nature or species? THE EXISTENCE OF ULTIMATE ELEMENTS IN MATTER Greek philosophy was born, to some extent, in the quest to find the ultimate elements, which the philosopher thought would be the principles of nature. The Pre-socratic philosophers proposed various theories according to which these elements were thought to be one, several, or infinite in number, combining in different ways. This element was water for Thales, air for Anaximenes, the indeterminate peiron for Anaximander and fire for Heraclitus. Later Democritus held that these elements were atoms. These atoms were thought to be finite in number, quantitatively indivisible, differentiated only by dimensive characteristics and their location in space, and with an inner excitation causing their continual local motion. The elements for Anaxagoras were infinite seeds of things called homeomeras. These seeds were qualitatively different one from another and made up the ultimate particles of each species of existent. The prevalence, numerically, of one or another seed explained why each object appeared as it does as a substance. Empedocles specified four principle elements: air, water, earth and fire which make up all bodies by varying their combinations. Aristotle proposed the hylomorphic theory to explain the metaphysical constitution of substances, but he still held to the four elements named by Empedocles. This opinion was the prevalent one until the modern era, even though in different moments of history there were those who defended philosophical atomism as well as other opinions. Dalton formulated his atomic theory in 1808 at the beginnings of modern chemistry. According to Dalton, the elements were the chemical atoms, whose quantitative and qualitative properties were progressively being discovered. Dalton thought that these chemical atoms were truly indivisible and, hence, truly the ultimate elements of nature. Then, towards the end of the 19 th century, the existence of elementary particles were discovered protons, electrons, neutrons, etc. as composing the atom. It was thought that these particles were finally the ultimate elements of matter. The name elementary indicates this. Afterward, the number and variety of properties of these new particles suggested that there may be other even more elementary particles. These were considered sub-particles, and were called quarks. This hypothesis has been developed in great detail. It would explain in a much more simple fashion many of the properties of a good group of elementary particles. Still, the existence of quarks has not been confirmed experimentally. The opinion is also held that these quarks may exist, though they are not experimentally observable. Among modern Thomists, there are a number of different opinions regarding the many questions involved in the riddle of elementary particles. Selvaggi, for example, holds the opinion that physical reality is composed of specifically diverse elements that are produced one from another. He clearly puts the reader on his guard, however, pointing out that given the state of science presently, one cannot specify with certainty just what these elements are. Furthermore, he concludes this inability to determine

concretely just what these elements are, in no way affects the basic notions of Thomistic philosophy. 36 The two topics implied in the riddle of elementary particles will be considered separately. The two topics restated are these: 1) Do such bodies as elements really exist? and 2) As regards natural philosophy, what philosophical implications does this riddle contain? a) Concerning the real existence of elements, it is clear that the knowledge presently provided by science does not permit us to give an unequivocal answer regarding the existential status of these ultimate components of material substances. Besides what has already been stated with respect to this topic, we should also point out again: that it is not possible to imaginatively picture microphysical realities and our knowledge of them is very limited. Our knowledge of them is enough, in some cases like atoms or certain of the elementary particles, that we can apply, in some way, the notion of substance to them. Nevertheless, our knowledge is insufficient for us to affirm that they are the ultimate components of matter; the progress of the experimental sciences seems to suggest that our knowledge of the micro-physical structure of matter will never be able to be considered definitive. It would seem that our progress whether theoretical or experimental can continue on indefinitely. For example, progress can continue to be made in such broad areas as: increasing our possibilities for observation through better instrumentation, extending the field of our exploration to as yet unknown regions of the universe, developing wholly new theoretical concepts. Perhaps we would be justified in speaking of elements to a certain degree but not of ultimate elements. In this sense, the elements at the chemical level would be atoms. Even this terminology, however, would not be very exact, for the boundaries between the sciences is increasingly hazy. Chemistry often deals with the atoms as elements, yet it explains a good bit of chemical phenomenon by having recourse to the particles that compose the atoms. Molecules are considered to be the smallest particles of each substance that can exist freely and still conserve all of the properties of that substance. Still the concept of molecule loses its meaning in many physical bodies. The notion of molecule is inapplicable to ionic and atomic crystals. An atomic crystal, such as a diamond, is so structured that any fragment of it is like one sole molecule. Hence, we face the question of whether or not we can say that all bodies are composed of molecules. Something similar occurs with the concept of atoms. An ionic crystal such as sodium chloride is not, strictly speaking, made up of atoms but of ions. A metallic crystal is formed by positive ions, with free electrons found between them; therefore, it would seem that we cannot say that all bodies are composed of atoms. In regard to the existence of elementary particles, there are very few that are stable. Many of them disintegrate after a very short time. There are many physical phenomena that are explained by postulating the existence of new particles, but this happens to such an extent that the concept of particle loses its intuitive significance and cannot be considered as the ultimate element of matter. It would seem, therefore, that although we can speak of elements in a limited context and restricted sense, the very concept of element as the ultimate component of matter ought to be abandoned. b) The implications of this question in other areas of natural philosophy are two-fold. In a negative sense, it is clear that any defense of atomic mechanism is impossible, because it presupposes the existence of ultimate elements at the atomic level. With respect to the reality of substance, and related topics such as hylomorphism, the non-existence of ultimate elements in no way affects these notions. If anything, it frees them i.e., the Thomistic notions from the unwarranted criticism of atomic mechanism. We have already mentioned that various Thomistic authors uphold the existence of ultimate elements in matter, although they recognize the difficulty involved in determining just what they are. Although the integrity of Thomistic natural philosophy is thus maintained, the arguments given above regarding the molecular and atomic composition of material bodies tend to suggest that the teaching regarding the ultimate elements is a part of Thomistic physics that is drawn from, and hence dependent upon, the state

36

cf. F. Selvaggi, Cosmologia, Gregorian University, Rome, 1962, pgs. 276-291; R. Masi, Cosmologia, Desclee, Rome, 1961, pgs. 136-138.

of science of that period of history. Hence, it can be simply abandoned, for it is not intimately related to the basic metaphysical concepts of natural philosophy. 4. COMPOUNDS There exists an extremely wide variety of bodies whose physical composition is known in significant detail thanks to the findings of experimental science. From this knowledge it is evident that many properties of the composing bodies remain in the compound. The question is, therefore, raised of determining whether these compounded bodies are merely aggregates of the compounding, more simple, bodies. This question has been raised in almost every period. If this view of compounds were true, it would then seem that the notion of substance applied to physical bodies would lose its meaning, and with it the hylomorphic theory would be lost. At least, this would seem to be the case in the inorganic world, on which most of our present considerations are focused. SUBSTANTIALITY AND AGGREGATION In the question now under study, we need to distinguish two meanings of the concept of aggregation: a) in the first sense, we have a simple aggregation when the individual bodies composing the aggregation retain all of their individual properties so that we have a mere juxtaposition. In this case, obviously we cannot properly speak of a new specific nature nor of a new substance. A collection of books lined up on a shelf or the mechanical union of different distinct parts a chair, or some other artifact, etc. would be instances of mere juxtapositioning. b) a second meaning of aggregation is that of a substance formed through the aggregation of other substances in such a way that a transformation of the components occurs, resulting in a new specific nature. Water, for example, is obtained from oxygen and hydrogen. This transformation is of such a nature that a compound with specific properties comes about. Given the great variety of combinations among physical bodies, there are varying degrees of transformation. Some are quite insignificant or superficial while others are quite profound. Hence, it is not always easy to determine concretely if a new specific nature has come through the combining of several components. It is important to note that in order to have a new specific nature come into being and, hence, a new substance specific properties of the compound need to be found which are not found in the compounding bodies without implying that these new properties have necessarily come about by some causality other than the combining of the component bodies. For example: let us suppose that we could explain all of the properties of sodium chloride in terms of the combinations of properties of chlorine and sodium. We could still speak of a new specific nature and also of a new substance if we find that the compound has new specific properties. The specific nature of a compound is not something super-added to the resultant of the natural processes. We refer here to only the inorganic world. SUBSTANCES AND AGGREGATIONS IN THE INORGANIC WORLD When we dealt with the topic of substance, we applied this notion to the pure substances of chemistry, to macromolecules, to homogenous mixtures and to atoms, and to some other elementary particles. We note, however, that this notion of substance could be applied to many larger composed bodies which have a specific, well-defined nature. In all these cases, we are clearly dealing with composed substances in the case of elementary particles, the bodies are, at least, potentially composed. The topic that now confronts us offers us more reasons for applying the notion of substance to bodies in the inorganic world. Let us note, once again, that there is not unanimity among Thomists with regard to this question. In assessing whether an existent possesses a specific nature, a decisive factor in our judgment, logically, will be its dependence upon natural processes and forces: We can consider the case of the minerals of the earths crust. The earths crust is made up of rocks and these, in turn, are composed of minerals. Among these minerals, there is a surprising uniformity which we have come to know thanks to the advances of modern science. Almost all of the minerals have a crystalline structure, which is the same for each species of mineral. They are formed by chemical combinations, in which almost all of the components are various types of silicates. These are substances made up basically of combinations of silicon and oxygen, in the form of a tetrahedron. These different structures have been formed naturally. At the very least, science has been able to explain how they could have been formed from other substances, given determinate conditions of pressure, temperature, etc. Obviously, it can never be shown that the actual processes occurred in this way. A more detailed

examination of the question reveals regular, well-defined structures even at the microphysical level. Consequently, we have reason to apply the notion of substance in this area much more extensively than would seem possible through ordinary experience; Hence, many material entities which are described in ordinary experience and in scientific terminology as aggregations, philosophically speaking, can be considered as true substances, for they have a specific, well-defined nature. They have been produced by natural forces and natural things. In order to change the natures of these things, they must be subjected to profound processes of alteration; These considerations can be extended, without much difficulty, to substances obtained by means of artificial procedures that employ natural things and give rise to compounds that possess specific welldefined natures, e.g., synthetic chemical compounds which are widely used at present. Evidently, these are not cases of artifacts, as would be true with a radio or a television set which have, in some sense, a nature, but not in a strict sense. In the case of artifacts, the things and properties found in them have to be structured and arranged in a precise fashion in each case by an agent who plans each artifact and assembles it piece by piece and must care for its maintenance. It is, therefore, possible to apply the notion of substance to more things in the inorganic world than those which are called substances by experimental science: In modern chemistry, the word substance is usually reserved for the so-called pure substances which have a fixed and invariable chemical composition. These are the 103 elements, the atomic, ionic and molecular compounds. According to what we have been saying, we can consider as substances many mixtures formed by the combining of pure substances and also many aggregations as we saw in speaking about minerals. Analogously, we saw that the notion of substance can be applied as well to amorphous solids, liquids, and gases; It would seem possible, in consequence, not only to restore to ordinary experience its ability to judge about the substantiality of material bodies, but even to increase it. The progress of science shows, in many cases, that specific, well-defined natures are to be found in much greater abundance than we can know through our ordinary experience. We may say, then, that scientific-experimental knowledge not only validates our ordinary estimation of substantiality in some cases it may correct it, it considerably increases the possibility of rigorously applying the notion of substance to the organic world. In any case, it should be understood that the various opinions about this topic do not affect the basic concepts of Thomistic natural philosophy. THE VIRTUAL PRESENCE OF THE COMPONENT BODIES IN THE COMPOUND Clearly, the component bodies are in some way present and active in compound substances. The compounds, in turn, can decompose into their components in different ways. For instance, hydrogen and oxygen partially maintain their properties in water. When water decomposes, these properties are then present in an individualized way. Natural philosophy is faced with the question of explaining how this presence of the composing bodies is compatible with the substantial unity of the compound. The explanation is to be found in what is called the virtual presence of the composing bodies in the compound. Virtual presence means that the components undergo a change in their specific nature, but in such a way that their qualities remain in the compound in varying degrees, as the case may be. The components are substantially changed their substantial form does not remain in the compound, but this substantial change is wholly compatible with several or many of their properties remaining in the compound, though integrated in the specific nature of the compound which has its own substantial form. We have a mixture mixtio when the combining elements are not wholly corrupted, but neither do they remain identical as they were, but being corrupted as to their forms, their active potencies remain (De Gener., I, lect. 25). Let us point out some of the characteristics of this virtual presence: The state of virtual presence is midway between pure potency and act. There are degrees of potentiality the greater or lesser proximity or disposition to actuality. When the change worked in the components is more profound, their virtual presence in the compound will be less. This virtual presence accounts for the fact that in some cases it will be relatively easy to decompose a substance into its components, while in other cases it will be difficult. The virtual presence of the components entails that their qualities remain but are now

coordinated by the new substantial form. Even though the qualities of the components can be detected in the compound, these qualities are coordinated through the functioning of the specific nature of the compound. In other words, these qualities are found integrated in a new whole that possesses properties that are not to be found in the separate components. The substantial form of the compound contains the inferior components forms virtually. The higher degrees of being, or existents, assume the lower ones and transcend them. The forms of the components are assumed in the capacities of the compounds own form. In the very same substance there cannot be a plurality of substantial forms in act. If such were the case, we would not have one substance, but would have a mere aggregation a juxtaposing of substances. The new substantial form contains the qualities left over from the components. This does not mean that the compound retains the inferior forms. The compound, as a superior species, simply assumes certain qualities of the inferior species. Although, it need not retain all of these qualities, nor need it retain them in the same way. These general characteristics allow for a wide diversity and variety in the way components are virtually present in their respective compounds. The degrees of virtual presence of the components can vary according to the greater or lesser cohesiveness of the compound, its resistance to decay, the greater or lesser depth of change of properties, etc. The virtual presence of its components among the various types of compounds also explains the heterogeneity of many compounds. Having but one specific nature, they have different properties in their various quantitative parts. Concrete examples of the point in question, could be multiplied indefinitely, given the enormous variety of compounds that exist in nature, e.g., the common compound of water H2O . Still, their principle value lies in their contribution to the scientific knowledge about bodies. As far as philosophical knowledge is concerned, what has been said to this point is sufficient to answer the questions concerning compounds and the virtual presence of their components. 5. SUPRA-SUBSTANTIAL UNITIES Corporeal substances can be related to one another, so as to form many different types of ordered unities. In a sense, ordered unities compensate for the limitedness of inorganic beings. These inorganic existents tend to group together to form sizable structures which are generally more powerful and active than the original bodies which have come together to form them because of summation of the countless individuals composing them, e.g., an ocean, a continent, a planet. At the level of inert substances, the individuals existence is quite precarious. Hence, the species and aggregations of individuals tend to predominate over the singular existents. These singular existents seldom act independently and are, therefore, much less able to be observed directly or without the aid of observational instruments. Ordinary experience puts us in contact with enormous aggregations of inorganic individuals. Detailed knowledge of inorganic individuals requires patient effort like that which is required for scientific investigation. In studying ordered unities, their varying structures must be taken into account. Some are simply unordered aggregations a heap of stones, while others maintain a fixed structure the solar system. Still, there are always some kinds of connections and laws that regulate the relationships among the individuals. A heap of stones is subject to the laws of gravitation. Pure disorder or an absolute lack of order does not exist. Supra-substantial unities are the result of various causes. These causes are sought by science and are discovered by studying the composition and processes of formation of such unities. Chance, in the strictest sense, does not exist. Nevertheless, we can speak of chance inasmuch as many natural unions come about as the result of the interplay of various forces and properties that are relatively independent and that admit of the possibility of diverse combinations. As regards the substances that integrate these unities of order, we have already referred to the many types there are when we dealt with the substantiality of compounds. Their detailed study is the object of the experimental sciences of nature. These ordered unities are combined in larger and larger structures. The ultimate unity ordered is the very universe itself. Living things occupy an especially important place here, for they often constitute the highest kinds of ordered unities, according to their own proper natures. 6. SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFORMATION Now that we are aware of the various levels of corporeal existents in their inner constitution, we can

explain substantial change, the most profound change produced in nature. We should note that the manner of human investigation of substantial changes is just the reverse of our present method of study. Substantial changes have been the stimulus for the advances of science and the inquiries of philosophy. Substantial change is the process by which a specific substance, or at least some part of it, is converted into another substance or substances of the same or of a different species. As we have seen, this process of substantial change is possible because of primary matter, which, as the ultimate substantial substrate, loses a specific form at the same time as it gains another. Hence, a substantial change can proceed in one of two directions: production of a new substance, i.e., generation via ad esse, or destruction of a substance, i.e., corruption via ad non esse. The two processes go hand in hand, because the acquisition of a specific form implies the destruction of another. The generation of one thing entails the corruption of another generatio unius, corruptio alterius. In the strict sense, this occurs only in inorganic existents. The substance a quo gives all of its matter to the newly generated substances and is thereby completely destroyed in the change. Water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen, ceasing to be water. In living things, one substance does not properly become another, except in the case of nutrition and death. One living thing begets another without destroying itself. The parent produces the offspring by means of its own matter. The corruption previous to generation affects only one bodily part of the living thing, which is organically disposed for this corruption. Substantial change is not a case of creation and annihilation, for it starts from a potency subject to privation and not from absolutely nothing. Ex nihilo, nihil fit: from nothing, nothing comes. In making this statement, we must be wary, for even knowing better, we can easily imagine nothingness to be a kind of material cause. Only God can create, i.e., produce a thing without starting from some previous matter. Created agents are limited to transforming. Their efficient causality must concur with a properly disposed material causality. For this very reason, the substance that is destroyed under a creatures causality is not annihilated the reverse process to creation but transformed into something else. Physicists, at times, speak of the phenomenon of creation and annihilation in the processes of the transmutation of certain particles into others or by means of the equivalency of mass-energy. Philosophically speaking, these terms are not exact. Such changes are really generations and corruptions, either in the order of substance or accidents. THE MANNER OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES Let us see the principal traits of substantial changes.37 Substantial transformations are prepared for by a series of previous accidental changes, especially those of alteration which make the primary matter unfit slowly or quickly for possessing its present substantial form and prepare it to receive a new one. Modifications in a things quantity or local motion, changes of energy or temperature are examples of such preparatory accidental modifications. The loss of given form does not occur without some violence, for every substance tends toward continuing in its existence. Substantial changes are produced instantaneously, even though the previous qualitative preparation takes place over a longer or shorter period of time. This previous preparation is the only change subject to empirical observation. The reason is that primary matter cannot be deprived of a substantial form for even an instant. The moment that the prior form is lost, the new form is actualized. We may also add that, as we have already noted, the substantial form is not intensive; it cannot come to be or cease to be little by little. This tells us that substantial change is not motion in the strict sense. It is not a successive process, but a sharp jump from potentiality to actuality. The accidents do not remain as a subject in the substantial change, even though they seem to be practically the same accidents before and after the change. The accidents are subject to continuous variations in respect to generation. Before the change they are subject to the influence of old form; after the change, they are dependent upon the new one. They are, therefore, numerically distinct. In the first case, they belong to this individual; afterward, they belong to another individual. Substantial generation is very different in living things and in inorganic things: a) Living things are generated by means of reproduction, as they have the vital power of

37

cf. R. P. Phillips, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, The Newman Press, West Minister, 1950, pgs. 128-140.

transmitting their species. The agent of organic reproduction is the parent or parents. The parent possesses a specific form and has the spontaneous tendency to transmit this form by producing a properly prepared portion of matter of its own organism and, thereby, making it possible for the generation of a new individual of the same species. If two parents are necessary, one parent only produces what is, in part, necessary for the generation of a new individual of the same species. Inorganic things lack this ability or power. b) Inorganic substances are generated through composition and decomposition, through profound alterations or through simply quantitative divisions and unions. Experience shows that inanimate substances are transformed through changes in their material composition, as we explained earlier regarding compounds. Only if there existed ultimate elements possessing a capacity for transmutation and being completely simple could they be changed from one into another exclusively by alterations. Simple quantitative division or union can produce substantial changes. In this case, there is no change of species we cannot call these changes transformations only a multiplication of an individual from one thing into many or vice-versa. Of course, our opinion about these changes will depend upon the view that we hold regarding the individuality of corporeal things. For example, if the water in a glass is considered but one substance, then, evidently its distribution into other receptacles, its evaporation will multiply the individuals of this specific substance. CAUSALITY IN SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES The first question we will consider is that of the origin of the substantial form. Ancient philosophers disputed over this point a great deal and fell into two extreme positions: a) The forms come about extrinsically through creation- according to many Platonic philosophers, the potency of matter is no more than a disposition to receive forms, which are created by a universal Agent e.g., for Avicenna, he was the Separated Intellect, Dator Formarum or Giver of Forms. The proximate causes were restricted to preparing the matter to receive the influx of this universal causality. This view effectively eliminated real causality from proximate agents and considered the substantial form as existent and having to be produced as such. b) The forms are hidden or latent in matter this opinion can be traced back to Anaxagoras; in the Middle Ages it was known as the theory of latitudo formarum. According to this theory, the external agent would merely pre-dispose matter so that the matter would free the forms which it carried hidden inside. Accordingly, the newness of the change would be only apparent, since the new form already preexisted in this thing now it simply is able to show itself. This view, even though mistaken, drew its inspiration from the principle of causality, which prohibits the affirmation that new forms arise from nothing or that by itself matter can come to possess a new form. Hence, the need to explain substantial change by probing the causality of the agent in a fitting manner arises, as does the need for some sort of pre-existence of corporeal forms in an exemplary intellect. In any case, the correct explanation of the origin of substantial forms must preserve the originating character of change and the genuine efficacy of proximate agents. According to Thomistic teaching, the substantial form is educed by the agent from the potentiality of matter (cf. De Ver., q. 11, a. 1; STh, I, q. 45, a. 8). The intervention of the agent cause is necessary in order to educe or lead to actuality the potentiality of matter. Matter, of itself, is passive and cannot actualize itself, but the new form pre-exists in matter, not as some hidden or implicit reality, but potentially. The efficient cause, by means of opportune accidental modifications, brings about by educing or leading out the form from the potentiality of the matter. Educe is the opposite of introduce i.e., to bring something extrinsic to a thing into the something. To educe means to draw out or provoke the actual emergence of something that before was merely potential. Of all the natural forms, the human soul alone, being spiritual, is not educed from the potentiality of matter. It is directly created by God as the actuality of the human body generated by the human parents. A graphic example may help us to understand the nature of accidental change. A sculptor has no separated form which he transfers to the marble he works on. What he does, is to work the marble so that in this material substance the statue takes shape or is informed by this shape. Take note, however, that in this example the agent is intellectual and works with a model in mind the exemplary cause which is the idea of the form in his intellect. It is this form which he desires to draw out of the matter. The exemplary form is not numerically the same as that which will appear in the marble after the physical change; they are specifically the same, but not numerically. The exemplary form in the intellectual agent

is immaterial, belonging to the spiritual order, while corporeal forms depend on matter. Physical causes, obviously, do not work by pre-conceiving an exemplary cause, because they lack the power of understanding. Let us apply this teaching to the substantial changes of the non-living material world. We need to determine what are the agents of these changes, as well as the extent of their power. The proximate agents of inorganic substantial changes are real and external. There is always an external agent in these changes that acts upon the potentiality of a patient, which is about to be converted into another substance. The efficient causality exercised here is real and proceeds from without. These agents produce accidental changes e.g., of burning, of cutting, of moving locally which destroys the qualitative equilibrium of the substance being altered. This provokes a substantial corruption and a consequent generation. The very substance altered spontaneously reacts to the action of such agents by modifying its own internal structure, thereby contributing to the determination of its own substantial change. Hence, substantial changes in the inorganic world are very different from the generation of living things. The agents of such changes do not possess the form that they are going to educe and do not, therefore, cause it in the same manner as a living generating cause. Its active tendency is very different. In atoms, for example, there are various levels of stability. The maximum stability is possessed by the noble gases. Radioactive substances are capable of producing important effects spontaneously. Other material substances are rarely able to do this and, then, almost always, through some external agent. In cases of decomposition, the forms of the original composing bodies pass from the state of potentiality to that of actuality. In the case of a synthesis or, more generally speaking, of the transition to a more complex species, the birth of the new form is brought about by the natural dynamism of the material existents entering into the process. Of course, man can also intervene as an agent in the eduction of specific inorganic forms, as experience shows e.g., the great number of material substances produced by modern industrial chemistry. In producing new chemical compounds by utilizing natural potentialities, man brings about artificial compounds e.g., plastics, medicines, synthetic fibers, that with great probability are truly new substances. The principle of causality demands the existence of a suitable universal cause of the changes in the inanimate world. The principle of causality requires that the transition from potentiality to actuality be caused, at least remotely, by a being that possesses, either identically or eminently, the perfection it produces. We observe no such cause in the inanimate world. Hence, the causality observed in the physical world is insufficient to explain its harmonious order and its stability. The fact of the suns heating, for example, does not explain the countless physico-chemical and biological changes caused by the suns action. What tends toward a goal or is purposively directed and is not the work of chance must be directed in an intelligent fashion. At the very least, it must act under the direction of an intelligent being. The causal order of the universe demands a higher, intelligent Cause, in which the forms of all things are found in an immaterial and eminent way, as in the supreme exemplar cause. This cause is God, in whom all created perfections are found. This does not mean that God moves things in a mechanical fashion. On the contrary, he imparts to his creatures a spontaneous tendency toward their own ends. To use a comparison of the ancient philosophers, he directs all things as the archer directs the arrow towards the bulls eye the arrow is directed, but moves towards the target under its own impulse. Nature shows itself to us as a work of art of a most perfect Artist. Nature is nothing else than the conception of a divine artist ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, impressed upon things indita rebus, by which these very things are moved to their specific ends, as if an architect of a ship could endow the timbers with the capacity to move of themselves and so form the structure of the vessel (In II Phys., lect. 14). 7. CONCLUDING HISTORICAL OVERVIEW Among the ancient philosophers we find many interpretations of the reality of matter and its structure which have been revived in our own day, although the modern interpretations are more complex. Aristotles thinking concerning the matterform composition of material things attempted to make up for the deficiencies of these other theories, by avoiding their excessively partial view and its consequent confusion. ANTIQUITY

The map of ancient thought on nature can be traced by following the degrees of immateriality of the thought of these philosophers. Many of the erroneous theories were the result of losing sight of the metaphysical foundations of the problem. a) The physicists: they tended to consider nature from the purely physical level and disregarded the legitimacy of a metaphysical perspective. In this view, the science of physics becomes the absolute science. It is not surprising, then, to find the revival of this way of thinking in our own day, arising in the area of science itself. The first physicists were among the Pre-socratic philosophers. They sought to find the physical elements, thinking that these elements would be the basic principles of nature. They believed that all things were merely modifications, accidental modifications, of some elementary principle such as water, fire, air, etc. that was the one and only substance. A similar view was that of ancient atomism Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, Lucretius. They held that the atoms were the only substances of the universe. The atoms, the smallest parcels of matter, were indestructible. Their combining with one another gave rise to all the various kinds of physical bodies. Democritus ideas were also mechanistic. The only real traits he acknowledged in his atoms were their size and change of place all qualitative differences are resolved to those of quantity and local motion. These theories are basically materialistic, because they reduce all reality to the causality of matter, i.e., to the elements, and matter, ultimately, becomes the only substance. Man, living things and all physical reality is but a manifestation or different way of matter structuring itself (cf. In I Metaph., lect. 4). b) The mathematicians: the study of the arithmetical harmonies that regulate the activity of physical bodies led the ancient Pythagoreans to make mathematics the absolute norm for understanding physical reality. This level of thinking did not stop at the level of purely sensible experience. It rose to the level of supra-sensible intelligibility mathematical, however, not metaphysical (cf. In I Metaph., lect. 7). In this it is linked to Platonism, the third view of ancient philosophy concerning nature. Platonism was ultra-logical in its interpretation of physical reality. c) The Platonic forms: Platonic thought rose above the level of mathematics to metaphysics itself, declaring that the being and becoming of physical bodies is due to their participation in their Forms or Essences. These Forms or Essences are not sensible, nor are they merely mathematical ideas. Platonism, however, forgot about the physical aspects of material world and the necessary starting point of experience, even though it approached an understanding of the essences of things. The Neo-Platonists later acknowledged that the forms were intrinsic to things not separated as Plato had thought. Still they confused metaphysical method with logical procedures and their analysis of intelligible forms degenerated into a purely logical methodology of dividing and classifying ideas having no link with concrete reality logicism. The thought of Aristotle and St. Thomas concerning nature, which we presented in these notes and centered on the key topic of hylomorphism, admits the validity of physics and mathematics in the study of physical bodies. In the last analysis, however, they require a metaphysical understanding of material reality in order to reach the most profound aspects of sensible existents. THE MODERN PERIOD With the birth of modern positive science, the ways of thinking about natural things reviewed above again come to the fore, although in new guises. The advances of science, logically, posed new philosophical problems, while they replaced the ancient scientific picture of the world. Some few scientists and philosophers seeing the development of the sciences, presented these advances in an argumentative way. Hylomorphism was severely criticized in the 17th and 18th centuries. The concept of the substantial form was summarily dismissed as lacking all experimental basis, as having no scientific usefulness, etc. These attacks were often due to a misunderstanding of the perspective of metaphysics or inaccurate presentations of Aristotelian philosophy. This gave rise to new philosophical conceptions of the natural world. Generally speaking, these new conceptions were cultural developments based on the evolution of the particular sciences. We can see in them a representation of ancient forms of thought foreign to hylomorphism. In a somewhat simplified way, we can say that in modern times the physical and mathematical theories were revived but now fused into one sole theory. This is easily understood considering the development of the new science of mathematical physics. Within this framework of thought, three main

currents are generally distinguished: mechanism, dynamism and atomism.38 We must be alert to the fact that these terms are quite ambiguous. It is not easy accurately to classify thinkers using these terms. In any case, this terminology has been widely used throughout the history of science in the last centuries to indicate positions that are, at times, vaguely philosophical, while at other times the terms refer to specific scientific stances or methodological criteria. These philosophical theories, of course, are partially based on the truth. Hence, they are able to describe, with certain accuracy, the genuine findings of science. Scientific research into the motions, the forces, and the structure of the atom have been fruitful. It is only when one attempts to reduce all of reality to this partial knowledge of the world that a philosophy antagonistic to hylomorphism s fundamental tenets arises. a) Mechanism tries to explain all natural phenomenon by means of the local motion of small physical bodies, having the traits of mass and extension. Mechanism denies the specific natures of bodies as well as the reality of qualities except those that are directly reducible to quantity, such as density or shape. Consequently, it also denies substantial and qualitative changes. These are but apparent changes, mechanism claims, adding that such changes are really mechanical modifications. Mechanism is a kind of extrapolation of mechanics, a branch of physics which studies the motions of bodies. In classical physics, mechanics comprised three areas: kinematics, which described local motion geometrically; dynamics, which analyzed the forces giving rise to movement; and statics, which concerned itself with forces in equilibrium. Modern mechanism came about in the 16th and 17th centuries, together with the birth of classical mechanics Galileo, Descartes. Its spirit practically dominated the development of classical physics. The crisis of classical physics arose at the beginning of the 20 th century. The rigid mechanism of Descartes was softened somewhat in its genuinely scientific application. It was necessary to admit the existence of forces e.g., gravitational attraction, the affinity of substances.... These traits were simply inexplicable for a rigorous mechanism and no less mysterious certainly anything but clear and distinct than the forms and qualities of Aristotelianism which it criticized so highly. The mechanist model enjoyed relative success in physics in its ability partially to explain the phenomenon of sound, light, heat and the atomic structure of material existents. The mechanist interpretation began to lose favor in the last century as it became highly inadequate for explaining the findings of electromagnetism and modern thermodynamics. In this century, mechanism has all but been abandoned, due in great part to the theories of quantum mechanics and relativity.39 b) Dynamism attempted to reduce all physical reality to a system of forces and energy. Occasionally it denied the reality of extension and, generally speaking, all the inert aspects of corporeal things. This orientation is an exaggerated application of dynamism and later of the studies carried out concerning energy. A strictly philosophical application of dynamism is to be found in Leibnitz, who was followed by Wolff, the pre-critical Kant, and Boscovich in the 18th century. In the area of science, the spirit of dynamism was a tempering factor for rigid mechanism, through the study of forces as explaining the local motion of bodies. Later it took on a more important role with the local motion of bodies. Later it look on a more important role with the discovery of forces that qualitatively were not mechanical magnetic, electrical ... The study of such forces brought with it the collapse of mechanism, as we have already noted. In the second half of the 19 th century, a number of scientists formulated the theory of energism. Ostwald was its foremost proponent. Energism claimed that all matter was but a manifestation of energy and this not merely in a scientific sense, but also and even emphatically in a philosophical sense. Science presently offers an understanding of the physical world that lends itself to an overall dynamistic interpretation. This makes a philosophical overview all the more necessary, so that the knowledge of energetic qualities be integrated into a complete picture of the nature of bodily entities.

38 39

cf. R. Jolivet, Tratado de filosofia I: Logica y Cosmologia, Hohle, Buenos Aires, 1960, pgs. 327-339. cf. A. Einstein and L. Infeld, L'evolution des idees en physique, Petite Bibliotheque Payot, Paris, 1974; W. Heisenberg, Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik, Rohwolt, Hamburg, 1955.

c) Philosophical atomism claims that the only real substances in the physical world are atoms, or the elementary components of macroscopic bodies. This is a more concrete orientation than the other two preceding ones. In fact, atomism can be interpreted in either a mechanistic or dynamistic manner. This rather skewed point of view mechanism was adopted by many scientists in past centuries, as they delved more deeply into the physical composition of material reality. The atomist hypothesis was adopted by Galileo, Bacon, Newton and Gassendi; Gassendi preferred an epicurean atomism. Descartes was a staunch foe of these theories, since he rejected the possibility of the existence of a vacuum. But scientific atomism came into its own with the advent of modern chemistry at the beginning of the last century. Daltons work was largely responsible for this. Atomism was confined to the realm of chemistry until the end of the 19th century. It was understood in a predominantly mechanistic way. For this reason at least to some extent some dynamists rejected the atomic hypothesis Mach, Duhem; the other motive for their rejection was their positivistic leanings. The positivism of the last century and the beginnings of the present one, was largely opposed to atomism on the prejudicial grounds that observable data alone can be scientifically accepted. The atomic theory was finally experimentally confirmed at the beginning of this century, overcoming its mechanistic interpretation and receiving full acceptance in the field of physics. It was in the field of physics that the internal structure of the atom was finally explored. From this point of on, modern atomism shed its previous philosophical implications. The reductionist trend of these three philosophical interpretations of material reality is very clearly a kind of physicism, linked to a mathematicizing of physical phenomenon. To round out our presentation of the natural philosophies of the modern period, we need to add the idealist concept concerning the material universe Kant, Hegel ... which present the world as a construct or mere correlate of the human spirit. We must also note, that in the present century there has come about a view of the world that could be described as a mathematical-logical interpretation. Its principle representatives are the neo-positivists. The great complexity of scientific methods gave rise to this thinking. It has a close affinity with the critical idealism of Kant. Its proponents maintain that what science really studies is its own logical constructs. Science never penetrates into the objective structures of things. Some scientists see mathematical logic as the only way of escaping the truncated view of reality offered by experimental physicism. And yet, mathematical logic closely resembles the ancient Platonic conception of the world of nature. Many important scientists have rejected this position40. Sciences constant advances offer philosophy a simultaneous posing of questions to be answered. Many times these very advances require the correcting of earlier theses or provoke crises in accepting the formerly held interpretations of the universe. This has, in fact, occurred frequently in the history of modern science. The Thomistic philosophy of nature, in light of all we have considered, is a most valuable aid in achieving a philosophically consistent understanding of the material universe, both for its balanced realism and its depth of analysis of the material world.

40

Cf. M. Planck, La conoscenza del mondo fisico, Einaudi, Turin, 1942, pgs. 11-43.