An ORDINANCE is a statute enacted by the local government.

The power to enact an ordinance is derived from the exercise of Legislative Powers exercised by the local government units as provided by the Local Government Code: Section 48. Local Legislative Power. Local legislative power shall be exercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlunsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay. An ordinance is a law, statute, or regulation enacted by a Municipal Corporation. A municipality, such as a city, town, village, or borough, is a political subdivision of a state within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide local government to a population in a defined area.1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION DEFINED Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.2 Hence, municipal corporations, in the Philippine setting constitutes the local government units namely: the barangay, municipality, city and province. It also must be noted that Legislative Powers for local government units were vested as a means to promote the autonomy of local government units. It is only logical that local government units are well aware of issues and circumstances prevailing over their particular territory and, as such, with the powers provided by the Local Government Code, address these issues with expediency thereby promoting harmony. It also addresses the need for local governments to be more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.3
1 2

Oxford Companion to the US Supreme Court West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved. 3 Angeles, The Restatement of the Law on Local Governments, p. 8 (2005)

However, ordinances enacted must be in consonance with laws of the state. For any ordinance enacted that goes against the grain with prevailing laws is not valid. EFFECTIVITY OF ORDINANCES SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances
a) Every

ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor as the case may be. If the local chief executive approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise he shall veto it and returns the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) votes of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.

b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of city or municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be approved as if he has signed it. c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members be signed by the punong barangay. An ordinance is not similar to a resolution passed by the local legislative bodies. A resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is only to have a temporary effect; and ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons and things in general. 4 One very important matter to consider is that ordinances as with any legislation, in order for it to be valid, it should follow and comply with the requisite procedures of a legislative process; a series of steps that a legislative
4

Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279

body takes to evaluate, amend, and vote on any proposed legislation, in order to arrive at its enactment.5 Otherwise the same is not valid.

MANDATORY PUBLICATION AND NOTICE OF PROVISIONS Provisions respecting publication and sufficient notice of ordinances and resolutions are mandatory, and failure to publish or give notice, or to do so substantially in the manner prescribed, renders them void.6
Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code. Held: All the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court, to wit: Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17 The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
5 6

Legal Dictionary by Farflex Angeles, The Restatement of the Law on Local Governments, p. 148 (2005) , McQuillin, The Law on Municipal Corporations

 Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and; the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. That the decision of Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional BE REVERSED but

AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. Drilon vs. Lim G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THEOPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLSAND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance. Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a Civil Case before the CFI by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a)the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. Private respondent also bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract."Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge issued an order denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the

administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code. After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered another decision, declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court. Respondent Judge denied the motion. Hence petitioners brought the matter to the Supreme Court through the a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval. Held: There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. This exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in

general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973.The law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretence bears

its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law." And one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular:

"Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises * * *." They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the

sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges .Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract."The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 is held validly enacted. BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ 74 SCRA 306 G.R. No. L-41631 December 17, 1976