De Castro v.

JBC
FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THE Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUES Justification of the Supreme Court: 1.W/N the petitioners have legal standing? 2.W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination? 3.W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice? 4.W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC? There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive. Given As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict: JUDICIARY. constitutional experts, as may be needed. II. There is a justiciable issue . RULING I. Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.

the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant FACTS This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well asthose generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the DENR seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber licenseagreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts,so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. ISSUE Did the children have the legal standing to file the case? RULING Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environmentfor the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

SALONGA VS. CRUZ-PANO

Facts: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On 6September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO

Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.

Angeles, California, almost killedhimself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building inManila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wifewere among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of theserious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system

Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col.

Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, headof the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. On 12 September 1980, bombs onceagain exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan'sSupermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. On 20 September 1980, the President's anniversarytelevision radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference.The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, on 25 September 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit andtransferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for sometime. On the night of 4 October 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the GeneralMilitary Council was called for 6 October 1980. On 19 October 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, asmall bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, includingSalonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. On 21 October 1980, elementsof the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent andchronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form whichhowever did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, Salonga's lawyers were not permitted to visit him in hishospital room until the Supreme Court in the case of Ordoez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (GR 55345, 28 October 1980) issued an order directing that Salonga's right to be visited by counsel be respected. On 2 November 1980, Salonga was transferred against hisobjections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Salongastated that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority. Subsequently, on 27 November 1980, Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed"under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On 10 December 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (whichincluded Salonga as a co-accused). Up to the time martial law was lifted on 17 January 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary,Salonga has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence. On 9 February1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice. On 24

February1981, the City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing Salonga, among others of having violated RA 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for 17 March 1981. On 6March 1981, Salonga was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive medicalexaminations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga,along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the

counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie caseagainst him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII,Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of theRevised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie casehas been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today. Issue: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga. Held: The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts ,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisionsever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of

dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records

stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation o f positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request

Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs.Commission on Human Rights

Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for SpecialProvisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fisc al Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the Commissionon Human Rights (CHR). These special provisions tackles OrganizationalStructure and the Use of Savings. On the strength of these special provisions,the CHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P. NavaretteRecia andCommissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P.Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047 n 04 September1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the propose dcreation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No.A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of certain positions in the Commission. It, likewise, provided for the creation andu pgrading of other positions. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of acom mensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposedpe rsonnel modification scheme, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)NationalCapital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 Marc h 1999,recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights Employe es'Association (CHREA), in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA

in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-

Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC,CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's fiscal autonomy. The CHREA filed the petition for review.

Issue : Whether CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court. Held: The doctrine of locus standi was used. It has been held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, CHREA, which consists of rank and file employees of CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR' supgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up th eCommission's savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of the CHREA to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC- National Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.