The Hemispheric Review Spring 2012

T H E H E M I S P H E R I C R E V I E W
1
Issue 1
Spring 2012
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All content herein, except individual articles, copyright The Hemispheric Review 2012. All articles are
the exclusive property of their respective authors.
The Hemispheric Review
The International Student Journal for Latin American Affairs and Policy
www.hemisphericreview.org
ISSN 2167-552X
Issue 1
Spring 2012
Published exclusively online at www.hemisphericreview.org and as a Kindle ebook.
General inquiries may be directed to
Noah Koubenec
President, The Hemispheric Review
noah@hemisphericreview.org
Submissions inquiries (including article submissions) should be sent to
submissions@hemisphericreview.org
3
EDITORS
Noah Koubenec
Karin Drucker
ADVISERS
Russel Dallen
Bruce Bagley
Chad Broughton
David Fleischer
Tony Motley
LAYOUT AND DESIGN
Noah Koubenec
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CONTENTS
Rise of the New Left or Convergence to the Center?
Third-way Pragmatism as a Mechanism for Assessing Latin Americas Political
Future
pp. 5-16
Daniel Balke
Law to Nowhere
Effectiveness of Violence Against Women Legislation: Ley General De Acceso de
las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia (Law for General Access of Women to
a Life Free from Violence)
pp. 17-26
Julissa Delgado
Smoke and Mirrors
The United States elusive approach to human rights in the War on Drugs in
Mexico and why a focus on socioeconomic development could be the solution
pp. 27-43
Cristal Downing
The Role of NGOs in Preventing Illegal Logging in Latin America
An Issue Concerning Indigenous Rights and Environmental Protection
pp. 44-56
Anna Dvorak
All Roads lead to Infrastructure
Peru as a Trade Bridge between South America and Asia
pp. 57-74
Eric Toler
Sustainability in Tourism Development
Case Study: Nicaragua
pp. 75-83
Roman Yavich
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Rise of the New Left or Convergence to the Center?
Third-way Pragmatism as a Mechanism for Assessing Latin
Americas Political Future
Daniel Balke
Introduction
Analysts have conceptualized in different ways the election of numerous left-leaning presidents in Latin
America since the late 1990s. Some argue that a bifurcated left has emerged consisting of pragmatic, pro-
market social democrats, on one hand, and populist, central planners, on the other. Others oppose this rigid
categorization of Latin Americas new left, arguing that differences exist between each left-leaning leader
that give rise to important distinctions in their approach to governing. Both frameworks portray Latin Amer-
icas leftward turn evidenced by the election of twelve left-of-center presidents since 1998 (see Table 1)
- as an unavoidable consequence of the shortcomings generated by the neoliberal economic model adopted
by several Latin American countries during the 1980s-90s, namely persistent poverty, rising unemploy-
ment, and increasing inequality. A third approach rejects this idea of inevitability. Such scholars argue that
left-leaning leaders have won over a politically-independent regional electorate by articulating a cohesive
campaign rhetoric, which responds to voters underlying desire for greater social inclusion and more robust
civic participation.
Table 1. Left and Centre-Left Presidents in Latin America: 1998-2011
Country President Year
Venezuela Hugo Chvez 1998
Chile Ricardo Lagos/Michelle Bachelet 2000/2006
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Brazil Lula da Silva/Dilma Rousseff 2002-2006/2010
Argentina Nstor Kirchner/Cristina Fernan-
dez
2003/2007
Uruguay Tabar Vzquez/Jos Mujica 2004/2009
Honduras Manuel Zelaya 2005
Bolivia Evo Morales 2005-2009
Nicaragua Daniel Ortega 2006
Ecuador Rafael Correa 2006-2009
Paraguay Fernando Lugo 2008
El Salvador Mauricio Funes 2009
Peru Ollanta Humala 2011
Argument
The argument advanced in this paper rejects each of the above approaches. Instead, it contends that the old
ideological fault lines of left versus right have largely lost their relevance as a means of conceptualizing
politics in different areas of Latin America. Political developments in the region since the late 1990s suggest
that a new charter has emerged in the region in which voters demand three underlying things from national-
level political leaders: frst, they must come to oIfce via Iree and Iair elections and govern within the bounds
of democracy; second, they must maintain macroeconomic stability; and third, they must show a willingness
to use state resources to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and economic and social inequality.
The approach that corresponds to Latin Americas new political charter, to which this paper refers as third-
way pragmatism, transcends rigid party alliance. Instead, it responds to the reality that, today, voters in the
region will readily abandon parties for which they have voted in the past in order to support the candidate
that they believe will most effectively respond to their chief concerns.
Structure and Purpose
This paper begins by examining different analytical frameworks for assessing recent political trends in Latin
America. It then describes the contours oI third-way pragmatism and provides specifc examples oI how
political leaders in the region have utilized it as an effective strategy for governance. The following section
discusses the implications of third-way pragmatism for U.S.-Latin American relations and provides recom-
mendations to help oIfcials in Washington Iormulate an optimal policy response. In sum, the paper seeks
7
to show that the rise oI Latin American moderates and the region`s growing profle within the international
arena present Washington with an opportunity to build important new alliances in the promotion of core
values such as democratic governance and open market economics. As direct U.S. economic and political
power declines, these alliances will prove increasingly vital in checking the infuence oI emerging powers
that promote a political philosophy fundamentally different from that of the U.S.
Different Approaches
Jorge Castaeda explains the recent ascent of Latin American left-leaning presidents by disaggregating be-
tween a right left and a wrong left. Leaders from the right left, Castaedas framework contends, em-
brace capitalisms underlying tenets while using state resources to smooth out the shortcomings of the free
market. He describes them as modern, open-minded, reformist, and internationalist (Castaeda, 29). Lead-
ers from the wrong left, by contrast, employ a populist approach to governing that prioritizes personal popu-
larity over strong institutions and, in terms of economic policy, prefers central planning to market forces.
Castaeda places the origin of wrong left leaders in the great tradition of Latin American populism and
describes them as nationalist, strident, and close-minded (29). Although the new left has manifested it-
self in two distinct camps, Castaeda claims that its rise represents an inevitable phenomenon. He argues that
regardless of the success or failure of economic reforms in the 1990s Latin Americas extreme inequal-
ity poverty, and concentration of wealth, power, and opportunity meant that it would have to be governed
from the left of center (30). To Castaeda, then, neoliberalisms shortcomings made the rise of the left a
foregone conclusion.
Cynthia Arnson shares Castaedas viewpoint on the inevitability of Latin Americas leftward turn.
However, she views as unhelpIul his rigid classifcation oI the presidents to which this turn has given rise.
Arnson, for example, endorses the view that such a dichotomy fails to do justice to the diversity of left
expression in contemporary Latin America (4). Instead, she contends that important differences exist even
between left-leaning presidents that analysts almost invariably place in the same category. Arnson notes:
comparisons of supposedly similar regimes- the so-called radical populists of Venezuela and Bolivia- fail
to capture the unique dynamics of social mobilization in each country (4). Understanding the policy impli-
cations of Latin Americas leftward turn, then, requires a more nuanced analysis. To Arnson, such analysis
8
places the origins of the regions new left in widespread popular dissatisfaction with the failure of two
decades oI neo-liberal reIorm to deliver broadly-shared social benefts (5). Arnson clearly rejects Casta-
edas rigid categorization of Latin Americas leftist leaders. However, she shares his view that these leaders
electoral success stems from the shortcomings of neoliberalism.
Victor Armony rejects Castaeda and Arnsons contention on two counts; the reemergence of the
Latin American left represents an inevitable byproduct of neoliberalisms failings. First, he argues that the
consequences these authors ascribe to neoliberalism that is, persistent poverty, rising unemployment, and
increasing income inequality do not represent the most important factors that have driven recent voting
behavior in the region. Instead, Armony suggests that a civic left has emerged and that, after the phase
of pro-market reform, the demand for social citizenship has become the predominant basis of political iden-
tifcation and mobilization (1). He also claims that there exists nothing inevitable about the rise oI Latin
Americas new left. Instead, Armony maintains that the regions political heart remains very much up for
grabs. In particular, he notes that a recent Latinobarmetro poll, carried out in 18 Latin American countries
shows a region whose citizens, overall, place themselves at the center of the political spectrum (2).He fur-
ther argues that leItist candidates` recent surge derives primarily Irom superior electoral tactics. Specifcally,
[he] argue[s] that the left is now seen as a valid and safe option by large segments of the Latin American
population because it can now provide, on the ideological levela coherent and credible discourse that
effectively relays [t]he lefts new message of global social justice(5). Armony rejects Castaeda and
Arnsons claim that the rise of Latin Americas new left represents an inevitable consequence of neoliberal-
isms failures. Rather, he attributes it to left-leaning leaders effective articulation of a cohesive message that
responds to Latin Americans growing desire for social inclusion.
None of the above approaches provides an adequate theoretical framework for analyzing contem-
porary Latin American political trends. Rigid ideological aIfliations no longer determine elections in the
region. Today, voters will support the political leaders they deem most capable of effectively responding to
their needs. Therefore, conceptualizations that assume the rise of a new Latin American left incorrectly diag-
nose what one must do to win elections in the region. Rather, successful political candidates in Latin America
move toward the political center, stress eIfcient governance, and Iocus on responding to their constituents`
top demands.
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Latin American third-way pragmatism effectively captures this dynamic. Its main tenets, mentioned
in the introduction, bear repeating here. To wit, voters in the region appear to now demand three underly-
ing things Irom national-level political leaders: frst, they must come to oIfce via Iree and Iair elections and
govern within the bounds of democracy; second, they must maintain macroeconomic stability; and third,
they must show a willingness to use state resources to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and
economic and social inequality. But which factors gave rise to third-way pragmatism, and how do its tenets
manifest themselves as a strategy for governance? The following sections address these questions in turn.
The Contours of Third-way Pragmatism
The emergence of third-way pragmatism stems from the fact that, over the last eight to ten years, Latin
America has undergone a period of unparalleled democratic consolidation and economic stabilization. Vot-
ers increasingly view democracy as the best system of government, even as they recognize its numerous
imperfections. Outcries across the region to an unlawful coup in Honduras in 2009 and attempted overthrow
of the democratically-elected Ecuadoran president in September of this year demonstrate that voters will not
tolerate a return to the authoritarian regimes that ruled much of Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s.
On the economic front, the Latin American voting public does not want to return to the turbulence that
characterized the lost decade of the 1980s, the Tequila Crisis of 1994, and Southern Cone meltdowns in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Instead, collectively they want to steadily grow personal incomes and raise
standards of living. In general, voters have accepted that free market economics, while imperfect, represents
the best mechanism for achieving these objectives. Political and economic stability have fostered a desire for
moderation and effectiveness from Latin Americans with respect to electoral leaders.
Despite the relative embrace of open markets as the optimal strategy to achieving economic objec-
tives, democratic consolidation has enabled regional populations to demand that presidents use state resourc-
es to combat poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Latin American political leaders face severe pressure
to root out extreme poverty. Evidence appears in the fact that nearly every country in the region, whether
governed by a politician from the right, left, or center, now has some type of conditional cash transfer (CCT)
program. CCTs typically provide a base level of income to enable low-income parents to send their children
to school, purchase medical services, and take courses in family planning and healthy living. While transfer
10
programs confict with the underlying tenets oI Iree market economic doctrine, they Iorm a core component
of what Latin Americans view as constituting a just society.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) represent another facet of the regions unique political economy.
Antithetical to open market fundamentals, SOEs received heavy criticism from neoliberal purists during the
1980s-90s Ior their ineIfciency and lack oI productivity. Today, however, several Latin American SOEs-
-including Brazils Petrobras (oil), Colombias Ecopetrol (oil), and Chiles Codelco (copper)--have estab-
lished themselves as respected frms and capable oI competing with their counterparts in the private sector.
Because they exist in and receive funding from the public sector, Latin American populations demand that
SOEs channel resources toward the pursuit of important national objectives, such as education, health care,
and job training schemes, all of which serve to even out inequalities created by the free market. The decision
of Latin American political leaders from both the right and the left to maintain CCTs and SOEs illustrates the
growing consensus among regional voters that elected oIfcials should channel public resources toward the
pursuit of social objectives. Third-way pragmatism, as a framework for assessing regional political trends,
captures this consensus on the new role of federal governments in Latin America.
Third-way Pragmatism in Action
The experience of a number of countries belies the existence of the regions alleged shift to the left. Instead,
recent political trends suggest that Latin American voters demand a different kind of leader, one who com-
mits her or himselI to eIfcient, democratic governance, rather than rigid alliance to a particular party. Chil-
ean President Sebastian Piera and Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos represent effective examples
of the new Latin American pragmatist. Both leaders, normally characterized as occupying the political right,
have poised themselves on the sweet spot of third-way pragmatism. Technocrats in every sense of the word
throughout their careers, these presidents have taken oIfce with an attitude oI impatience Ior the bureaucracy
and ineIfciency that has historically characterized the Latin American state. They preach the virtues oI pri-
vate enterprise, open markets, and free trade.
At the same time, they have focused their governing programs on, and, to use Santoss word, become
obsessed with reducing poverty. Piera has established the metric for measuring the success of his admin-
istration as its ability to eradicate extreme poverty in Chile by the time he leaves oIfce. The president has
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also set a goal of achieving 6% annual GDP growth throughout the duration of his tenure, creating 200,000
jobs per year from 2010-14, and putting Chile on-track to raise per-capita income to $22,000 by 2018 (Pica).
Santos, Ior his part, has pledged to create 2.5 million jobs over the next fve years. He also recently an-
nounced a National Development Plan that will invest $260 billion in infrastructure, education, and technol-
ogy, and seeks to bring 2.5 million Colombians above the poverty line while reducing the countrys poverty
rate by 5.6% (Alsema). Clearly, Presidents Piera and Santos recognize that a pure neoliberal economic
approach has failed to adequately address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in their coun-
tries. As such, the leaders have articulated ambitious visions Ior, and committed signifcant state resources
to, overcoming these challenges.
Politically, Piera and Santos have sometimes adopted tactics typically associated with populism,
demonstrating third-way pragmatisms acknowledgement that broad-based public support represents an es-
sential element of effective governance. These tactics, and this acknowledgement, appear in Pieras per-
sonal stewardship over a recent effort to rescue thirty-three trapped miners. Piera dropped all other priori-
ties and made his way to the isolated mine sight in order to oversee every detail of the rescue. Shrewdly,
he made sure that television cameras captured each long embrace he shared with the miners as they slowly
made their way to the surface. By doing so, he hoped to convey to Chileans that he represented a man of the
people, rather than a disconnected technocrat. This tactic illustrates Pieras understanding that, ultimately,
he can pursue his broad development objectives most effectively if he enjoys the trust of, and support from,
the majority of Chileans.
Santos`s response to the 2010 fooding that devastated much oI Colombia demonstrates a similar un-
derstanding. The president has made frequent visits into rural areas to converse with and offer humanitarian
assistance to low-income food victims. Though symbolic, these trips represent Santos`s conscious eIIort to
shed his historical image as an elite technocrat with little understanding of, or concern for, the needs of the
common Colombian. Tellingly, moreover, he set aside long-standing political differences with and readily
accepted humanitarian assistance from Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa.
1
This conveys to the Colombian
people that Correa cares more about responding to the needs oI his people than adhering refexively to a po-
1 It is true that Santos and Correa have initiated a broader, and largely successful, process of rapprochement, which had seen
Colombian-Ecuadoran relations improve markedly before Correas pledge of assistance. However, the reality that
Santos has embraced the process rapprochement further bolsters his credentials as a pragmatist in that restored relations
with Ecuador could yield could open up a new export market Ior, and yield important economic benefts to, the Colom-
bian people.
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litical ideology. Piera and Santoss willingness to employ populist communications tactics in lieu of rigid
political allegiances in an attempt to court public support represents a central tenet of Latin American third-
way pragmatism.
On the economic Iront, the region`s third-way pragmatists remain fercely committed to macroeco-
nomic stability. Here, it becomes useful to expand the frame of analytical comparison beyond Piera and
Santos to include leaders traditionally associated with the ideological left. Examples include Lula da Silva in
Brazil and Tabar Vzquez in Uruguay. These leaders origins in the political left gave rise to concerns among
some analysts that they would shun free markets and redeploy a state-led economic approach along the lines
oI import-substitution industrialization (ISI). However, upon taking oIfce, Lula and Vazquez responded to
their constituents underlying demand for economic stability and pursued strategies derived largely from
the capitalist playbook. Their approaches embraced open markets, courted foreign direct investment (FDI),
and called Ior minimal state involvement in, or obstruction oI, private enterprises` ability to pursue profts.
Both sought to capitalize on relative macroeconomic stability at home and the benign international market
characterized by high global commodity prices, as well as soaring demand for their exports from burgeon-
ing middle classes in emerging Asian economies. Lula courted trade ties with China. Vzquez negotiated a
bilateral investment treaty with the United States and firted with signing a Iull-on Iree trade agreement. Both
leaders rebuffed ISI-style isolation and embraced insertion into the international economy.
Importantly, Lula and Vzquez also pursued growth-oriented microeconomic reforms aimed at boost-
ing productivity and creating formal sector jobs for low-income and unemployed constituents. Because they
reduced longstanding state guarantees for public sector workers, such as annual pay raises and unsustain-
ably high pension contributions, Lula and Vzquezs efforts occasionally put them at odds with powerful
interests of Latin Americas traditional left, namely labor unions. However, by boosting economic activity
and sustaining high levels of growth and job creation, these efforts opened up new opportunities for the Bra-
zilian and Uruguayan general public. This popularity translated into soaring approval ratings for Lula and
Vzquez, even as they lost support from ideological purists on the far left who saw their presidents embrace
of open markets as a betrayal. Recently, Jos Mujica, a former member of the Tupamaros urban guerrilla
movement, shed his purist left-wing credentials and maintained Vzquezs market friendly approach as pres-
ident of Uruguay, while Dilma Rousseff, also a former urban guerrilla, won reelection by attaching herself
13
to Lulas legacy of political and economic achievement. Third-way pragmatism is increasingly the strategy
that leaders of Brazil and Uruguay choose.
In sum, Latin Americas third-way pragmatists -- from Piera to Lula and Santos to Vzquez-- have
focused their efforts on reducing poverty and inequality, while maintaining macroeconomic stability. They
remain committed to open elections and democratic institutions but also employ populist political tactics in
order to build public support for their leading policy objectives. By doing so, these leaders, who hail from
the left, right, and center of the spectrum, show that results-oriented pragmatism now trumps rigid ideologi-
cal loyalty as a recipe for political success in the region. Perus presidential elections in spring 2011 provide
more recent support for the notion of third-way pragmatism. There, Ollanta Humala, who ran in 2006 as a
leftist, anti-system candidate, won a close electoral contest by moderating his rhetoric and convincing vot-
ers he would maintain a pro-market economic Iramework while oIIering a compelling strategy Ior fghting
Perus deep-seated poverty and inequality. Third-way pragmatism has by no means taken hold in every Latin
American country. However, it appears to represent an increasingly fashionable mode of Latin American
governance.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The rise of third-way pragmatism portends important challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy in the
region. Leaders adhering to the strategy prioritize concrete results for their constituents before strategic alli-
ances with other countries, including the United States. This shrewdness can cause, and, indeed, has already
caused, concerns in Washington. One example appears in Colombian President Santoss recent decision to
extradite drug cartel leader Walid Makled to Venezuela, in direct defance oI U.S. dictates. Some observers,
including President Chvez, celebrated Santoss move as a show of solidarity in the interest of Latin Ameri-
can unity. Others denounced it as worrying behavior from a spoiled child who has forgotten from where its
fnancial liIelines come. More rational analysts interpret Santos`s move as a shrewd, pragmatic decision by
a leader seeking to restore trade relations with a country that used to represent Colombias second largest
export destination. In terms of policy toward the region, Washington needs to come to terms with the reality
that Latin Americas third-way pragmatists will do whatever it takes to increase economic opportunities for,
and improve the welfare of, their constituencies.
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Rising incomes, robust growth, and political stability have also led some Latin American third-way
pragmatists to court a more infuential role in the international arena. An example oI the region`s increasing
boldness in geopolitical affairs appears in Lulas recent attempt, alongside his Turkish counterpart, to broker
an agreement with Iran over that countrys nuclear program. The Brazilian Presidents diplomatic foray drew
a sharp rebuke Irom Washington. U.S. oIfcials objected to Lula`s venturing into a dispute over which, to
that point, the U.S. had wielded nearly exclusive control. However, Washington should not have reacted in
such a negative way to Brazils attempt at mediating a crisis with global implications. Indeed, there exist at
least three reasons why the United States should endorse an expanded diplomatic role for Latin Americas
third-way pragmatists.
First, as U.S. hegemony declines, it will need to court new allies and build fresh alliances with lead-
ers who promote shared values and shared philosophies. Latin American third-way pragmatists ft the bill.
The region`s rising economic tide, as well as its growing profle in the international arena, presents Washing-
ton with the chance to shine a light on the path that Latin Americas moderate leaders have taken to expand
their countries prosperity that is, via a solid commitment to democratic governance and growing embrace
of open markets, free trade and private enterprise. All of these represent traits the U.S. has long championed
and highlighting them can help promote U.S. visions for democratic expansion.
Second, growing Latin American middle classes mean new opportunities for U.S. exporters. Facing
a fedgling economic recovery and the challenge oI making good on his pledge to double exports over fve
years, President Obama needs to identify and capitalize on new markets wherever possible. Latin America,
with its close geographical proximity to, and the series of free trade agreements it has already concluded
with, the United States, represents an ideal region in which to do so. Washington has long viewed the pursuit
of free trade in the region through the strategic lens of securing natural resources, institutionalizing desired
practices associated with the treatment of foreign investment, and disseminating culture via the opening of
U.S. franchises. Today, expanding trade with Latin America would afford the United States a vital opportu-
nity to boost exports and generate badly-needed employment opportunities at home.
Third, in terms of shaping international debates, Latin America can add new legitimacy to U.S. initia-
tives. As members of the developing world, countries of the region can more effectively lobby other develop-
ing countries on issues like climate change, nuclear security and the benefts oI open, transparent and truly
15
democratic governance structures. Latin American countries confront challenges similar to other emerging
economies; alliances or even aIfliation with the United States could improve the international image oI the
U.S. as a power broker trying to impose democracy. The United States has much to gain from Latin Ameri-
can third-way pragmatists` desire to expand their infuence in the international arena.
Conclusions
In responding to a Latin America that increasingly fexes its economic and political muscles, the United
States fnds itselI in unIamiliar territory. During previous decades, Washington has had its way in interac-
tions with the region. The dualism oI Cold War geopolitics made it easy Ior U.S. oIfcials to categorize Latin
American leaders along the lines of good, i.e. pro-democracy and pro-capitalism; and evil, or com-
munist and state-oriented in terms of economic approach. However, the dynamics of regional politics have
changed. Today, voters in Latin America demand eIfcient, democratic governance, macroeconomic stability,
and state-focused strategies to reduce poverty, unemployment, and inequality. They support candidates they
deem most capable in responding to these demands, whether they hail from the political left, right, or center.
Pragmatisms triumph over rigid ideological alliance as a winning strategy for political success in
Latin America has important implications for U.S. policy in the region. Third-way pragmatists political sur-
vival requires that they seek above all to promote the welfare of their constituents. At times, this may lead
them to forge alliances with countries that the United States considers adversaries. In other cases, the eco-
nomic success and political stability engendered by third-way pragmatism will likely lead regional leaders
to pursue expanded infuence in debates oI geopolitical import. Ultimately, the United States should embrace
a growing diplomatic role for countries in the region because, as I have argued, they may be valuable allies
in the promotion of democratic governance and open market economics, values that the U.S. holds as funda-
mental.
Daniel Balke holds a B.A. in international relations from the George Washington University and an M.A. in Latin American
Studies from Georgetown Universitys Center for Latin American Studies. He worked on the presidential campaign of Barack
Obama as a held organi:er in Southern New Mexico, and also served as a teacher in Navafo Nation, New Mexico, with Teach For
America. Daniel will begin doctoral studies in political science, focusing on comparative politics and Latin America, in fall 2012.
16
Works Cited
Alsema, Adriaan. Government wants 6% poverty reduction in 6 years. Colombia Reports. 13 November
2010. Newspaper online. Available from http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/12899-
government-wants-6-poverty-reduction-in-4-years.html. Internet. Accessed 18 December 2010.
Armony, Victor. The Civic Left and the demand for social citi:enship. Prepared for the Workshop on Left
turns? Progressive Parties, Insurgent Movements, and Alternative Policies in Latin America, Peter
Wall Institute for Advanced Studies, University of British Columbia, May 25-27, 2007, Session: V.
Futures.
Cynthia J. Arnson and Jose Raul Perales, Eds. The 'New Left` and Democratic Governance in Latin Amer-
ica, August 2007, available from https://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NewLeftDemocraticGover-
nance.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 December 2010.
Castaneda, Jorge G. Latin Americas Left Turn. Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, No. 3 (May-Jun., 2006), pp. 28-
43.
Pica, Carolina. Chile Piera Sees GDP Growing 6% On Year in 2011. The Wall Street Journal. 7 December
2010. Newspaper online. Available from http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20101207-708987.
html. Internet; accessed 18 December 2010.

17
Law to Nowhere:
Effectiveness of Violence Against Women Legislation: Ley
General De Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Vio-
lencia (Law for General Access of Women to a Life Free
from Violence)
1
Julissa Delgado
The Lost Women
Since 1993, many young women (between the ages of 12 - 22)
1
have been victims of femicide in Jurez,
Mexico, where many cases have remained unsolved over long periods of time. Femicide is the misogynous
killing of women by men. The rising number of femicide victims, who are characteristically tortured and
sexually abused before their deaths, has caused consternation among womens groups and concerned mem-
bers of the international community, which is collectively seeking justice for these innocent victims. Due
to increasing national and international pressure, the Mexican government passed the Law for General Ac-
cess of Women to a Life Free from Violence in 2007, which was intended to prevent sanction and eradicate
violence against women.
2
Although most of the attention has been focused on Ciudad Jurez (the perceived
epicenter for femicides in Mexico), the number of femicide cases has spread across the country and is rising
at an alarming rate. Femicide has been spreading geographically, exemplifying the escalating crime against
women in Mexican society despite the new legislation. The ongoing prevalence of femicide victims relative
1 An interview was conducted by the author with Norma Ledezma Ortega, General Coordinator of Justicia
para Nuestras Hijas (Justice for our Daughters). Justicia para Nuestras Hijas is an NGO based in
Chihuahua, Mexico whose purpose is to seek justice for women who have fallen victim to femicide
as well as the implementation of the Law for General Access of Women to a Life Free from Vio-
lence.
18
to rates oI violence beIore the new legislation exemplifes that the law in Mexico has been largely ineIIectual.
As the U.S. Congress considers the possibility of passing the International Violence Against Women
Act (IVAWA), which could potentially assist countries like Mexico in combating violence against women,
examining the root causes that hinder the effectiveness of the Mexican legislation is a crucial task. In this
essay, I will suggest that factors contributing to non-compliance under the legislation are such that it is vital
to increase police enforcement in order to protect women and increase prosecution of those who commit
femicide. I will also argue that this task requires that Mexico mobilize additional economic resources to
educate the local population about the current epidemic of violence affecting women.
A Life Free of Violence around the Globe
The struggle to combat violence against women through legislation has been a long-standing issue world-
wide. A particular example of such an undertaking under international law is the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), overseen by the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women. Adopted as a convention by the UN General Assembly in 1981, the
CEDAW has been described as an international bill of rights for women. The convention (applicable only to
countries that sign and ratiIy it) is composed oI 30 articles that defne the elements constituting discrimina-
tion against women. It goes on to promote an agenda for national action to abolish it. When CEDAW was
originally ratifed it did not directly tackle the issue oI gendered violence towards women. It was not until
1992, when General Recommendation 19 was adopted, that CEDAW detailed actions toward combating
such violence. General Recommendation 19 requires countries that ratifed CEDAW to take appropriate
measures to fght gender-based violence, and calls Ior annual reports to the committee detailing the measures
taken to do so. This initiative set the foundation for the 1993 UN General Assembly Declaration on Violence
against Women (DEVAW), which unlike CEDAW, applies towards all members of the United Nations As-
sembly. The DEVAW defnes what constitutes violence against women and challenged the previously held
belief that such violence was a private domestic matter in which the state could not properly interfere. The
adoption of CEDAW and the DEVAW set the stage for growing international recognition of a womans right
to a life free of violence and encouraged individual countries to do the same.
In 1994, under the Clinton administration, the U.S. Congress passed the Violence Against Women
19
Act (VAWA), joining efforts against gender-based violence towards women. VAWA, drafted by then Senator
Joe Biden`s (D-DE) oIfce, emerged as women groups and the international community demanded tangible
recognition of a womans right to a life free of violence. The law created multiple remedies to solve the
problems. Included among VAWAs resolutions were the creation of community-based response programs to
address domestic violence, dating violence, stalking, and sexual assault. VAWA demonstrated Washingtons
intention to criminalize violence against women on a federal level.
2

Increasing condemnation of violence against women by the UN and individual countries around the
globe, such as the U.S., intensifed pressure on individual countries to condemn gender-based violence as
well. The mounting number of femicides in Jurez, along with a growing critique of the Mexican govern-
ments dramatic inability to address such crimes pressured the state to denounce these murders and take vig-
orous action. Ongoing demands for justice by NGOs and the UN led to the passage of the Law for General
Access of Women to a Life Free from Violence (LGAMVLV). By adopting LGAMVLV, the Mexican gov-
ernment fnally appeared to take a frm stand in opposition to violence against women. However, despite the
enactment of the LGAMVLV four years ago, the number of femicides in the country has increased.
3
Between
January 2009 and June 2010 alone, the NGO Observatorio Ciudadano Nacional del Feminicidio (National
Citizen Observatory of Femicide) recorded that 1,728 instances of femicides occurred in 18 states despite the
passage of the law.
4
The inability of the Mexican government to legitimately combat gender-based violence
calls into question the authenticity and substance of the governments action.
In keeping people straight, principle is not as powerful as a policeman.
- Abel Hermant
Implementing anti-violence against women legislation such as LGAMVLV has been problematic for
various reasons. The report titled an In-depth Studv on all Forms of Jiolence Against Women, issued by the
UN Secretary-General, highlights that international initiatives are not suIfcient; eradicating violence against
women will require intense political will and a higher level of commitment to such obligations.
5
One of the
most signifcant reasons Ior LGAMVLV`s ineIIectiveness is the inability oI law enIorcement oIfcials to ap-
ply the legislation. Ortega, in reference to LGAMVLV, states that The law is there but there is no one to put
it in practice [] cops are not convinced that they have to apply the law [and] for that reason is why the law
is ineffective. The article, International Jiolence Against Women. U.S. Response and Policv Issues released
2 In this, it is much like the Law for General Access of Women to a Life Free from Violence.
20
by the Congressional Research Service, discusses, national governments may pass laws that support anti-
VAW [Violence Against Women] policies, but ineffective legal, political, or law enforcement infrastructures
may hinder their ability to implement and enforce laws and provide the necessary support services to be
effective.
6
The lack oI commitment on behalI oI law enIorcement to eIIectively implement the law signif-
cantly inhibits the ability of LGAMVLV to operate.
The In-depth Studv on all Forms of Jiolence Against Women states that State inaction with regard
to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system has had particularly corrosive effects on society as
impunity for acts of violence against women encourages further violence and reinforces womens subordina-
tion.
7
In a May 2010 report, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights noted
with concern the ongoing prevalence of violence against women in Mexico despite the passage of LGAM-
VLV.
8
The ongoing indifference of the Mexican government regarding the unending violence towards Mexi-
can women has allowed such crimes to continue to occur and go unpunished.
Insufpcient Funds
InsuIfcient Iunding inevitably impedes the success oI LGAMVLV, which are intended Ior programs that
combat violence against women. An OIfce on Violence Against Women (OVAW) Iocus groupused to as-
semble input Irom both individuals and organizations associated in sexually based violence work--identifed
both a lack of resources as well as intrinsic problems within the justice systems response as existing gaps in
violence against women legislation.
9
Augmenting funds for planning and education, particularly in order to
train police oIfcers, prosecutors, and judges, would improve the eIIectiveness oI LGAMVLV.
In addition, a major source oI Iailure in LGAMVLV is the lack oI fnancial support Ior implementa-
tion. When it comes to funding, Ortega states that The topic of women is the one that has the least money.
Adequate fnancing would represent a signifcant contribution toward advancing the prospects oI legislation
relating to violence against women. Members oI the U.S. Congress agree on the signifcance oI suIfcient
funding contributing to the success of LGAMVLV. A public letter sent to Mexican president Felipe Caldern
by members of the U.S. House of Representatives on August 8, 2007 urged that he include adequate fund-
ing to implement this law |LGAMVLV| in his country`s budget Ior the next fscal year, particularly Ior the
portion of the law creating a National System to Prevent, Attend to, Sanction and Eradicate Violence Against
21
Women.
10

The signifcance oI Iunding anti-violence against women legislation is displayed through VAWA-
sponsored grant programs. For instance, the VAWA created a program titled Grants to Encourage Arrest
Policies and Enforcement of Protection Orders (Arrest Programs) which administers judicial training on do-
mestic violence to improve court response and sentencing similar to Article 38, III of the LGAMVLV. This
article states that personnel in charge of prosecution as well as policemen must be educated in human rights
in order to prevent, sanction and eliminate violence against women that, in effect, will guarantee their access
to a life free of violence. The VAWA Arrest Programs are meant to encourage state governments and courts to
treat domestic violence as a serious violation of the criminal code requiring the coordinated involvement of
the entire criminal justice system. In the 2006 Biennial Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of Grant Pro-
grams Under the Jiolence Against Women Act, the U.S. Department oI Justice OIfce on Violence Against
Women stated that OVAW-funded grantee recipients experienced increased arrest and prosecution of per-
petrators both through new programs and the extensive training of law enforcement personnel, prosecutors,
judges, probation oIfcers, magistrates, and related court personnel.
11
. OVAW states that its grant programs
promote the aggressive prosecution of alleged perpetrators and that prosecutors funded under the grants had
'fled charges in more than 134,235 cases, refecting a charging rate oI 89 percent.
12

The signifcant improvements in combating violence against women through VAWA`s Arrest Pro-
grams would not have been possible without the personnel, training and technical aid funded through the
grant program created by VAWA.
13
In regards to LGAMVLV, Norma Ledezma, the Director of Justicia Para
Nuestras Hijas, also explained, we have to put more effort more resources more time to the investigation
[of femicide cases] because impunity is what has led for this [femicides] to occur, further exemplifying
the signifcant role oI resources in incrementing the enIorcement and eIIectiveness oI anti-violence against
women legislation.
According to an article from the Mexico City daily El Universal, the National Fund for Gender Alert-
ness, a system under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, has yet to be put in place and has not
received its designated 15 million pesos in funds.
14
Without a doubt, it is imperative for both the Violence
Against Women Act and LGAMVLV to receive adequate Iunding in order to Iulfll their respective potential
legislative capacities.
22
Culture Clash
Many scholars agree that culture and the engrained ideas of female inferiority can be a factor contributing
to the ineffectiveness of anti-violence against women legislation such as LGAMVLV. Education programs
geared toward reforming socio-cultural beliefs that limit a womens ability to live a life free of violence is
yet another form of decreasing violence against women. Violence against women is a social problem that
must be attacked at its core through education, reforming the established social conditions that allow such
violence to exist, regardless of culture. For example, Ortega explained that Justicia Para Nuestras Hifas be-
lieves that the education oI Mexican youththrough plays in high school about dating violencecurrently
contributes among the most effective solutions. In Policv Makers, Practitioners, Citi:ens. Perceptions of the
Jiolence Against Women Act of 1994, Nancy Meyer-Emerick also argues that violence against women will
not be eradicated until the sociocultural system in place that allows such violence to exist is addressed.
15

Meyer-Emerick adds that this may entail discovering ways to formulate policies that combat violence against
women at its roots in the sociocultural system instead of solely relying on the state.
16
LGAMVLV already contains provisions to reform societal beliefs that allow violence against women
to occur in Mexico. One of the ways in which the law seeks to do this is through bringing specialized free
services to the aggressor[s] to eradicate violent conduct through an education to eliminate the stereotypes of
masculine supremacy and the machista bosses who generate their violence.
17
However, the Mexican gov-
ernment must also tackle socio-cultural beliefs that allow such pernicious violence against women to occur.
Ortega believes that although there has been an increasingly sustained initiative to educate police oIfcers and
justice oIfcials, it is not enough. She says, 'It is the culture, it`s an exceedingly diIfcult matter to change the
mentality of a gender... The culture sees us as inferior and it is not convinced that women are demonstrably
worth the respect or simply that they deserve to live. At the time when former U.S. Senator Joe Biden
was still in oIfce, he stated, while discussing VAWA, 'More than any other Iactor, the attitude oI our society
that this violence is not serious, stands in the way of reducing this violence, exemplifying the need for soci-
etal reform.
18
The In-depth Studv of all of its Forms of Jiolence Against Women by the Secretary-General has
also emphasized that in the case of Jurez a social and cultural phenomenon deeply rooted in the conscious-
ness and customs of the population requires a global and integrated response aimed at transforming
23
existing sociocultural patterns and eradicating the notion that gender violence is inevitable.
19
The incapacity of Mexican law to prevent, sanction and eradicate violence against women calls into
question the ability of LGAMVLV to operate. There are many other causes as to why LGAMVLV and other
legislation like it have stopped short of successfully combating the issue. An additional problem that sig-
nifcantly obstructs LGAMVLV`s success is the idea that the sole passage oI a law remedies the problem. In
Nancy Meyer-Emericks Policv Makers, Practitioners, Citi:ens. Perceptions of the Jiolence Against Women
Act of 1994, she fnds that the sole use oI law as a solution to reduce violence against women may not be the
most helpful route. She explains that, because of minimal state action to enforce legislation to an effective
level, it appears highly probable that the state performs a role in reinforcing gender inequality, albeit sec-
ondarily by not addressing the problem.
20
Meyer-Emerick believes that gendered violence towards women
will not be eradicated if it is simply addressed reactively, meaning that more should be done to prevent it. In
Congress, Svmbolic Politics and the Evolution of 1994 'Jiolence Against Women Act` Barbara Ann Stolz
observes the limits oI carelessly enacting legislation through the perspective oI symbolic politicsin which
political acts are seen as symbolsto examine the Violence Against Women Act. Stolz states that these
so-called political actsin this case the passage oI Law Ior General Access oI Women to a LiIe Free Irom
Violenceare geared towards an audience where the substance oI the act is trivial in comparison to the audi-
ences perception of and reaction to the act.
21
Conclusion
Law enIorcement oIfcials, such as police oIfcers, judges and prosecutors, are key in the anti-violence battle
against women. Their capacity to implement the law ranges from answering calls for help from the society
they vow to protect, to arresting and sanctioning violators of the law, and to maintaining the balance of so-
cial order. According to an article run by El Maana titled Urgen reformar la lev promuferes (Urging to
reform the pro-women law) civic organizations in Mexico City that have promoted the Mexican law against
femicide have urged the government to modify the LGAMVLV due to its ineffectiveness.
22
As the murders
of innocent women continue to rock Jurez and elsewhere throughout Mexico, the inability of the Mexican
government to effectively address the issue is largely because law enforcement has failed to put LGAMVLV
into practice. Ortega, believes that LGAMVLV is currently dead words, the law is there but it does not
24
operate.
Stolz analysis fnds that 'much Iederal criminal justice legislation, has been introduced or enacted
primarily in response to public outcries oI concern about a specifc crime problem and are not in reaction to
an effective interest groups tireless lobbying.
23
By passing VAWA the U.S. Congress informed the public
that such violent behavior towards women would not be tolerated. The article, Congress, Svmbolic Politics
and the Evolution of 1994, 'Jiolence Against Women Act,` establishes that criminal justice legislation, such
as VAWA, perform an educative function for the offender and the law-abiding citizen by establishing the
line between what is morally right and what is morally wrong behavior. Ortega, in regards to Mexico, states
that [The government] has not put enough interest in preparing its people and sanctioning its people that
do not obey the law. Although notable for its educative function, anti-violence against women legislation
should not end there.
As the United States Congress considers investing time and foreign aid in passing the IVAWA, rep-
resentatives should really consider the realistic impact it would have abroad. Among its many remedies,
IVAWA would provide the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator with the authority to provide as-
sistance to foreign countries for program activities intended to reduce international violence against women.
Speaking on the IVAWA in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senator John Kerry stated, This
historic vote sends a powerful message to the world that the United States stands in opposition to violence
against women and girls, anywhere and everywhere it occurs.
24
However, Ortega believes otherwise. The
General Coordinator of Justicia Para Nuestras Hifas stated that, every promising action to resolve and
eradicate violence against women.fnally concludes in a bunch oI papers and propositions, stories and
events, but there are no concrete benefcial actions that are useIul to the cases or to women in particular.
Although a political message might have an impact, addressing the legislation already in place must occur
before new initiatives can take effect.
Julissa Delgado is a senior political science mafor at the Universitv of California Davis with a minor in Chicana/o Studies and
Latin American and Hemispheric Studies. She currently works at the UC Davis Hemispheric Institute on the Americas which de-
veloped her initial interest in Latin American issues. She has studied abroad in Argentina and Chile and will soon study abroad
in Cuba. Her research interests include U.S.- Latin American relations, womens issues in Latin America and Latin American
politics.
25
Endnotes
1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.The Situation Of The Rights Of Women In Ciudad
Jurez, Mexico: The Right To Be Free From Violence And Discrimination. http://www.cidh.org/
annualrep/2002eng/chap.vi.juarez.htm.
2. Mexico. 20 January 2009 Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a Una Vida Libre de Violencia.
www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGAMVLV.pdf.
3. Alcntara, Liliana. Falla Ley Contra El Feminicidio. El Universal.mx. Jan. 31, 2011. Web. 22 Feb.
2011. http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/741199.html.
4. El Universal.mx. Jan. 31, 2011.
5. Secretary General, In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women. Rep. United Nations,
2006. Print. (Secretary General, Section F. entitled Challenges and obstacles, 23).
6. Margesson, Rhoda, Clare Seelke, Nina M. Serafno, Luisa Blanchfeld, and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther. 'Inter-
national Violence Against Women: U.S. Response and Policy Issues. Rep. no. RL34438. Congres-
sional Research Service, 2009. Print. (Blanchfeld, Margesson, Salaam-Blyther, Seelke, and Sera-
fno, 24).
7. (Secretary General, 34).
8. United Nations. International Covenant on Civil and Human Rights Concluding observations of the Hu-
man Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted bv States Parties under article 40 of the
Covenant Ninety-eighth session May, 2010.
9. Kristen J. Roe, The Violence Against Women Act and Its Impact on Sexual Violence Public Policy:
Looking Back and Looking Forward. National Alliance to End Sexual Jiolence (September 2004):
1-10.
10. Solis, Hilda. Letter to Caldern. Letter to Mexican President Felipe Caldern. 8 Aug. 2007. MS.
11. United States. U.S.Department oI Justice. OIfce on Violence Against Women. Biennial Report to Con-
gress on the Effectiveness of Grant Programs Under the Violence Against Women Act, 2006. 2007.
Print. (U.S. Department oI Justice OIfce on Violence Against Women, 142).
12. (U.S. Department oI Justice OIfce on Violence Against Women, 19).
13. (U.S. Department oI Justice OIfce on Violence Against Women, 32).
14. El Universal.mx. Jan. 31, 2011.
15. Meyer-Emerick, Nancy. Policy Makers, Practitioners, Citizens: Perceptions of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994,. Administration & Society 33.629 (2002): 629-63. Print. (Meyer-Emerick,
659).
16. (Meyer-Emerick, 659).
17. (Mexico, Article 8 Section II).
18. The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal Justice. A Maforitv Staff Report Prepared for
the use of the Committee on the Judiciarv, United States Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session.
U.S. Government Printing Ofhce. Mav 1993. Page V.
26
19. (Secretary General, 77).
20. (Meyer, 637).
21. Stolz, Barbara Ann. Congress, Symbolic Politics and the Evolution of 1994 Violence Against Women
Act. Criminal Justice Policy Review 10.3 (1999): 401-28. Print. (Stolz, 403).
22. Rea, Daniela. Urgen reformar la ley promujeres. El Maana.com.mx Jan 16, 2011. Web. 22 Feb.
2011. http://www.elmanana.com.mx/notas.asp?id=216741.
23. (Stolz, 402).
24. NSVRC. IVAWA Approved by Senate Committee. Accessed 22 Feb. 2011.
http://www.nsvrc.org/news/3326.
27
Smoke and mirrors:
The United States elusive approach to human rights in the
War on Drugs in Mexico and why a focus on socioeconomic
development could be the solution
Cristal Downing
Introduction
Discussions oI the U.S. role in the fght against Latin American drug traIfcking organizations (DTOs) have
gone on for decades. The debate has often focused on lowering demand for drugs and implementing more
arduous detection and interdiction measures on the U.S. / Mexican border. In recent years the violence
related to the War on Drugs in Mexico has deepened.
1
Discussions of U.S. contributions to the root causes
oI the confict, and the fghting itselI, have thereIore also intensifed, due to the U.S.` consumption oI drugs
and resultant fnancing oI the DTOs, and the illegal fows oI arms Irom the U.S. into the hands oI those
groups in Mexico. A statement made by Secretary of State Clinton in 2009 implies a greater acceptance of
U.S. responsibility in the confrontation:
Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade. Our inability to prevent weap-
ons from being illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals causes the
deaths oI police oIfcers, soldiers and civilians. I Ieel very strongly we have a co-responsi-
bility.
However, citizens on both sides of the border continue to wait for a U.S. domestic legislative overhaul as
well as more concrete and tangible actions to resolve the above-mentioned issues. Though both U.S. and
1 The drug-related violence currently taking place in Mexico will be referred to as the War on Drugs in
this paper as that is how U.S. and Mexican governmental oIfcials reIer to it. However, it should be
noted that there is some controversy surrounding the term, specifcally in regard to whether the vio-
lence should be classifed as a war, and who exactly is waging that war and with what motivation.
28
Mexican governments have made some strides to resolve a variety of drug-related issues in the judicial and
political arenas, the social problems that drive the drug trade and perpetuate related violence have gone
practically unaddressed. In addition, excessive militarization is leading to human rights violations and
thwarting eIIorts to suppress violence inficted by the DTOs. Militarization is in Iact exacerbating tensions
among the military, DTOs and the civilian population. Though parties in the political and judicial arenas
have led discussions and even signed agreements that acknowledge these problems, a lack of effective ac-
tion striking at the root of the organized crime and associated violence has prevented real progress, and the
War on Drugs continues.
Less than two years before Secretary Clinton verbally acknowledged U.S. responsibility in the
confict, the U.S., Mexico and all countries oI Central America signed an agreement to address the drug
trade and resultant violence plaguing countries south of the border. The Mrida Initiative, announced by
the U.S. and Mexican governments in a joint statement made on October 22, 2007, is a multi-year plan cre-
ated to provide U.S. assistance to Mexico and Central American countries. According to the relevant U.S.
Department of State Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan, the Mrida Initiative had the primary
purpose of strengthening and integrating security from the U.S. Southwest border to Panama.
1

The four primary goals of the Initiative, outlined in the same document, were to:
(1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) strengthen border, air, and
maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail
gang activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.
2

Initially set to expire on September 31, 2010, the Mrida Initiative has since expanded to include Carib-
bean countries and continue assistance in 2012 through a variety of supplemental appropriations and other
expenditures. It is the biggest foreign aid package in the Western Hemisphere since Plan Colombia, which
also supported counterdrug and anti-crime efforts. The Initiative also proposes an unprecedented regional
security pact between the US and its closest Southern neighbours.
3

In 2008, prior to the implementation of Mrida, Mexico had received $36.7 million in counter-
narcotics assistance from the U.S.; this sum was typical of support conferred by the U.S. to its Southern
neighbour in prior years. The initial sum set forth by the Mrida Initiative for assistance between FY2008
and FY2010 was $1.4 billion, and was to be issued almost entirely in the form of military equipment and
29
training. Funding wasand Ior the most part still issplit into three main U.S. government accounts:
the majority of monies are held and issued by the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account, and the rest is divided, though not equally, between Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and the Economic Support Fund (ESF). The frst $400 million was earmarked Ior in-kind support in the
form of helicopters and surveillance aircraft, non-intrusive inspection equipment, improved data collection
and storage equipment, and technical advice and training to strengthen state armed forces in counterdrug
and anticrime efforts. The initial focus of the Initiative was clearly on strengthening the military presence
in the War on Drugs in terms of manpower, training, and equipment. A 2008 request made to Congress
by the Bush administration acknowledged the criticism that excessive emphasis had been placed on mili-
tary aid and allowed for a somewhat broader focus encompassing institutional development. However, the
transition from the narrow application of funding never came into effect and the Initiatives emphasis on
military and police assistance continued.
4
Military theorist Kirk S. Bowman defnes militarization as 'the expansion or relative size oI some
integral part, scope, or mission of the armed forces, which may be observed in the size of the budget,
the number of soldiers, and the training, equipping, war-readiness and institutionalization of the armed
forces.
5
The expansion of military presence to rural areas and into social institutions such as schools is
also included in Bowman`s defnition. Indeed, an important Iactor in the ongoing trend oI militarization
of law enforcement and domestic security in Latin American countriesaside from the history of military
dictatorships shared by many of the statesis that external threats have been largely usurped by internal
ones, which are exacerbated by weak institutions and ineffectual state presence.
6
Bowman argues that this
militarization creates an economic and political drain on resources and detracts government attention from
economic health, strengthening of institutions, and other programs that would contribute to long-term de-
velopment.
7

Both beIore and aIter the approval oI the Merida Initiative, experts in the feld oI military and
security studies warned against concentration of military power on internal threats such as DTOs. Exces-
sive military presence is not effective in suppressing violence and other illegal activity perpetrated by drug
cartels and related criminal entities because those actors do not form a coherent enemy against which a
military can be trained to fght. Over-militarization oI counterdrug eIIorts has been ineIIective in the past
30
and has repeatedly hindered the economic development and progress of Latin American countries during
the last hundred years.
8
In addition, excessive militarization in Latin America and elsewhere has resulted in
human rights violations by militaries against civilian populations. Excessive use of military forces without
specialised training in situations usually handled by police forces can lead to unnecessary violence and
human rights violations. Militaries are trained to dominate opposing forces through violence, and by their
nature have the potential to pose a grave threat to civilian population.
9

In the U.S., this theory is institutionalized through Posse Comitatus. The 1878 law defning the
military as an armed Iorce to be deployed in response to external threatsexcept in a set oI narrowly
defned extenuating circumstanceshas been contested at various points throughout the twentieth century,
including in relation to counterdrug initiatives under the Reagan administration. In 1989, after much debate
about the deployment of the military in border-area counterdrug activities, Section 124 was added to Title
10 of the U.S. Code, making the military the permanent single lead agency of the Federal Government for
the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
10
Mili-
tary involvement in counterdrug efforts was restricted to 1) detection and monitoring activities, not actual
arrest and seizure; and 2) authorization for activities by the U.S. military outside the United States only.
11

Various parties have advocated that Mexico adopt a more cautious approach to employing the
military in its counterdrug efforts. For example, political scientist Raul Benitez Manaut, in his chapter The
Mexican Armed Forces. Challenges and Structures in the Face of Democracv asserted that the over-use
of the armed forces in the war against organized crime involves possible human rights violations, due to
the low education level of low-ranking soldiers, and their weak training in such matters.
12
Use of armed
forces for internal law enforcement places military personnel in a situation for which they are not properly
trained or equipped: constant contact with the population. This entails risks of authoritarian behavior and
human rights abuse.
13

Despite its own safeguards, the U.S. has not encouraged the enacting of laws similar to Posse
Comitatus outside its own borders. However, Washington has acknowledged the potential for domestically
deployed military forces to commit human rights violations, and has subsequently adopted legal measures
to prevent assistance from reaching militaries with a history of human rights abuse. The Leahy Law was
signed in 1997, prohibiting the U.S. from providing military assistance to countries whose armed forces do
31
not comply with certain human rights conditions, or who have been found to commit human rights viola-
tions with impunity. The scope of the Leahy Law was originally limited assistance provided through the
State Departments International Narcotics Control program, but the legislation was broadened in 1998 to
include all security assistance funded by the Foreign Operations Act and all training programs approved by
the Defense Department.
It is worth noting that the 2001 version of the law states that no funds may be provided to any
unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such
unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the
Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring
the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
14
It can be inferred that if a credible report
of human rights violations arises, the Secretary of State and other relevant parties should make efforts to
properly investigate the grievances in order to thoroughly ascertain whether there is reason to halt assis-
tance. However, the U.S. has rarely adhered to the Leahy Law in the Latin American context.
15
The law
was invoked to some extent in Colombia in 2000, when army units in Caquet and Putumayo were denied
assistance as a result of failing to meet human rights conditions, but for the most part the Leahy Law and
other acts placing human rights conditions on assistance to Colombia were waivered on the basis of ex-
tenuating circumstances cited in a special report from President Pastranas administration.
16
In the case of Mexico, resources from both sides of the Rio Grande are being directed towards mili-
tarization largely because oI the confuence oI the War on Drugs and the War on Terrorism in the minds oI
policymakers. With the debates over Posse Comitatus-related issues that followed 9/11, the idea of re-
sponding to an internal threat has become entrenched in U.S. domestic and foreign policy, and DTOs have
been identifed as the principal internal threat to Mexico just as Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have in
the U.S. In addition, Iollowing the classifcation oI the FARC, ELN and other illegal groups in Colombia
as terrorist organizations, the U.S. has adopted a similar view of armed groups in Mexico even though they
are starkly different than the FARC and ELN in Colombia. Secretary Clintons designation in September
2010 of Mexicos armed groups as constituting an insurgency similar to the one confronted by Colombia
in the 1980s caused tensions with Mexican oIfcials who disagreed with the statement, but is representative
of U.S. attitude towards the violence in Mexico.
17

32
This is not to say that some actions taken by the DTOs and other criminal organizations in Mexico
do not constitute terrorism; however, DTOs regardless of tactics cannot be addressed in the same manner
as terrorist organizations elsewhere in the world. The root oI the misidentifcation lies in the classifcation
oI drug traIfcking and associated violence both outside and inside the U.S. as national security concerns,
which tend to provoke a military reaction rather than one that views organised crime and drug-related vio-
lence as indicators of deeply rooted social problems.
An unintended consequence of the use of military force in the Mexican War on Drugs has been
the consolidation of criminal organizations, with previously independent gangs uniting with larger DTOs
to Iorm a more unifed Iront. Still, the confict involves multiple clashing groups, as DTOs fght with each
other and military forces. Approaching DTOs as civilian armies requiring an overwhelming military re-
sponse has not weakened them or led to a reduction in violence.
18

In fact, the opposite is true. 2010 was the most violent year since the beginning of Felipe Calde-
rons War on Drugs in 2006, with more than 15,000 people killed.
19
The number of deaths in 2011 was
reported to be more than 10,000 in November of that year.
20
As a result of these high levels of violence
threatening the civilian population and numerous reports of human rights violations by military forces,
public trust in the Mexican military and the Caldern administration has decreased. Public opinion on
security has also deteriorated considerably since the beginning of Calderns crackdown on DTOs, with
wide agreement that Mexico is more dangerous and that the population feels less safe than before the war
began.
21
Recent surveys from Latinobarmetro, a region-wide census agency, indicate that just 27% of the
Mexican population is satisfed with the state oI democracy` in the country, compared with 44 region-
wide.
22
The same source found that less than 30% of the population trusts the police, courts and other
public institutions due to fears of corruption, impunity and links to drug cartels.
23
As U.S. policymakers continue to confuse the War on Terror and the War on Drugs in Latin Amer-
ica and encourage other countries to follow this view, U.S. funding will continue to focus on militarization
of counterdrug efforts, effectively if unwittingly undermining local law in affected countries as well as
U.S. legislation like the Leahy Law. Latin American countries have had no quarrel with such assistance
despite its misguided application of military solutions to civilian problems.
24
In some cases, including that
of Mexico, the transition of the militarys focus from external to internal security and a transfer of respon-
33
sibility for rule of law from the police to the military violates domestic law.
25
As a recent report from the
Washington OIfce on Latin America (WOLA) points out, this transIer has also made the government
overly reliant on the military for law enforcement, reducing the political will to make the investments
necessary to build a functioning civilian security and justice sector.
26
In Mexico, WOLA reports that the
problem is so severe that the military is reputed to operate with almost complete impunity.
In addition to potential violations of Mexican law, funding for militarization of the War on Drugs
through the Mrida Initiative violates requirements for satisfactory progress in the area of human rights as
a condition for continued aid. On paper the Initiative addresses human rights concerns by initially stipulat-
ing that 15% of FY2008 funds from the INCLE and FMF accounts would be withheld from Mexico until
specifed eIIorts were made to improve the Mexican military`s historically weak human rights record.
These conditions were written into the Initiative in a much less restrictive format than in earlier drafts,
which had been met with hostility by Mexican government oIfcials who considered close monitoring oI
Mexican internal affairs to be a violation of Mexican sovereignty.
27
These were not the frst such restric-
tions placed by the U.S. on foreign military assistance: in 1977, when human rights was still emerging as a
topic of concern for U.S. policymakers, military aid to the Somoza administration in Nicaragua was made
contingent upon improvements in human rights. Indeed, Washington only released the funds after receiv-
ing reports Irom Amnesty International and other NGOs confrming progress.
28
Since then, human rights
have held a varying degree oI signifcance Ior U.S. policy in Latin America and the rest oI the world.
U.S. adherence to human rights and the Leahy Amendment has waned in recent years, especially
in the case oI Mexico where conditions seem more superfcial than stringent. Despite its history oI human
rights violations, the Mexican military was trusted with tasks related to internal security in the War on
Drugs because, according to Mexican and U.S. government oIfcials, military presence would increase se-
curity and deter DTO-related crime against civilians.
29
Almost 50,000 members of the military were partic-
ipating in counterdrug operations throughout Mexico in January of 2010, despite the fact that these types of
operations are traditionally assigned to police and other civilian security forces.
30
Current estimates show
that this level of military presence is the same in 2011. Even as the U.S. restricts its own militarys partici-
pation in counterdrug efforts to detection and monitoring activities, Mexican military forces funded and
equipped by the U.S. are actively involved in the arrest of persons suspected of involvement with drugs
34
traIfcking.
The increased military presence has corresponded with a rise in the number oI grievances fled
against the Mexican Department of Defense (SEDENA) of almost 1000% from 2006 to 2009 - from 182
grievances in 2006 to 1,791 in 2009. These grievances, submitted to the National Human Rights Commis-
sion (CNDH), include reports of torture, arbitrary detention, sexual abuse, forced disappearances and arbi-
trary executions. WOLA reported in 2010 that many of these are linked with the military making arrests.
Troublingly, Mexican civilians are just as frightened of suffering violence at the hands of the military and
other security forces as they are of being victimized by DTOs.
31
In Chihuahua, where the increase in com-
plaints against the military has been greatest, the CDNH reports that during detainment in military facili-
ties, arrested civilians are interrogated by military personnel who extort information by means of torture:
beatings, electric shocks, submersion in water, and covering the head with plastic bags...
32
In addition,
human rights activists and reporters of abuse have faced threats, violence and even death, as in the January
2010 shooting death oI human rights deIender Josefna Reyes. Later that month, gunmen murdered sixteen
young people at a party in Ciudad Jurez. This incident provoked widespread calls for the government to
change its security strategy, on the basis that militarization was clearly not eIIective in the fght against
DTOs.
33

Despite the massive increase in reports of human rights violations by the Mexican military and the
failure of the Mexican government to comply with the relevant conditions of the Mrida Initiative, and
despite calls Irom U.S. government oIfcials to withhold aid until the reports decrease, the U.S. has not en-
forced the human rights aspect of the agreement. The Mrida funds were set to expire in September 2009.
Their release was dependent on a favourable report from the U.S. State Department to Congress regarding
Mexicos efforts in four areas: adequate investigation, prosecution and punishment of human rights viola-
tions in civilian courts and judicial arenas; consultation and reporting to Mexican civil society organisa-
tions regarding the enforcement of the Mrida Initiative; further enforcement of the prohibition of the use
of testimony extracted through torture or other use of force; and improvements in the transparency and
accountability of security forces.
34
The partial resolution of some of these issues through judicial reform
is insuIfcient to resolve the issue. For example, oI the more than 4,800 reports oI human rights violations
fled with the CNDH during Calderon`s time in oIfce, only two have been tried.
35

35
The State Department was initially reluctant to submit a positive human rights report to Congress
against protests from NGOs on both sides of the border as well as doubts expressed by both Mexican and
U.S. government oIfcials. However, a suIfciently Iavourable report was eventually submitted to Con-
gress and the additional funds were made available.
36
The four human rights conditions agreed upon in the
Mrida Initiative were not directly addressed in this or subsequent reports.
37
In 2010, the State Department
once again reported to Congress that Mexico had made satisfactory progress with respect to handling hu-
man rights violations by military personnel, and approximately $36 million of conditionally withheld funds
were released.
38
On both occasions, the release of funds provoked outcry from the media, NGOs, govern-
ment oIfcials in both countries and other parties worried that continuing to support the Mexican military in
counterdrug operations will perpetuate violations of human rights.
These protests, which included references to the Leahy Amendment, have had little effect. The
U.S. has not taken concrete action to improve the safety of the region as Secretary Clintons statement and
other acknowledgements implied they would, and it is not genuinely committed to the human rights con-
ditions of its own accord with Mexico. Despite negotiations over verbiage in initial drafts of the Mrida
Initiative and the importance placed on the human rights conditions by the U.S., neither the U.S. or Mexico
acknowledged their respective responsibilities in terms oI Iulfllment or enIorcement, so support to the
Mexican military still fows. Continued abuses indicate that training has not been eIIective and reiterate the
inability of more advanced equipment to change the behaviour of the Mexican military toward civilians.
In addition, the number of civilians killed in drug-related violence has actually increased, indicating the
failure of the present strategy to defeat DTOs and end violence.
Given that human rights abuses continue, and that the civilian death toll still rises, both countries
must work toward the adoption of a broader strategy that provides for the formation of a specially trained
security force, separate from the military and complimented by institution building and other development
projects. The two areas in which change should be concentrated in a new counterdrug strategy are: 1) so-
cioeconomic development projects that deal with issues like education and poverty as drivers of drug trade
and violence, combined with a decrease in military presence; and 2) judicial reforms that both prosecute
prior human rights violations and combat impunity, discouraging future abuses by members of the military
and other special security forces regardless of the internal role they may serve.
36
Theoretically, the concept of national security is often connected with social development, the two
being equally important and mutually supportive.
39
Most political schools of thought consider socio-
economic development to be one of the best deterrents of instability and unrest.
40
A more comprehensive
approach to the War on Drugs in Mexico should take the importance of socioeconomic development into
account and move away from an emphasis on military power.
In addition, an increased focus on social institutions and development would have a long-lasting
positive impact on Mexican stability and democracy. Improvements of this variety should be especially
attractive to the U.S. given Mexicos proximity and the uniquely close (albeit frequently tense) relationship
oI the two countries. Mutual concerns like drug traIfcking, arms smuggling, and immigration could all be
greatly alleviated by economic stabilisation and a broader development-based approach aimed at eradicat-
ing the socioeconomic conditions that contribute to crime. Social welfare statistics for developing countries
also show that at times oI strong military presence, both in confict situations and in peacetime, socioeco-
nomic indicators deteriorate and the overall welfare of the population decreases.
41
Drug-related violence
may contribute to declining social welfare, but the link between militarization and worsening social condi-
tions should draw particular attention when taking into account the rise in violence that has corresponded
with increased military presence.
Counterdrug strategy should not dispense with all security and law enforcement initiatives, but it
must address socioeconomic and other causes of illegal activity and violence as well. Furthermore, argu-
ments against militarization cite improper training for internal law enforcement as one of the biggest dan-
gers of militarizing counterdrug efforts, and it may be inferred that a specially trained security force is not
precluded as long as it stands separate from the military and understands the limitations of its role.
Though the Obama administration was initially not far removed from the Bush administrations
emphasis on militarization in the Mrida Initiative, funding for FY2011 assistance to Mexico totaled $143
million and included funds directed towards institution-building and other development programs. In fact,
discussions of 2012 assistance, for which requests totaling $282 million have been made, claim to continue
this Beyond Mrida strategy with long-term objectives above ending DTO-related violence.
The frst two oI Iour pillars laid out in Beyond Merida` planning are the same as those contained in
the Mrida Initiative. The third is dubbed Building a 21
st
century border, with its roots in years of discus-
37
sions on border strengthening. The fourth pillar, however, presents a relatively new rhetoric in counterdrug
efforts. It entails Building strong and resilient communities, and acknowledges the role of socioeco-
nomic factors in drug-related violence and organized crime. Plans under discussion include job creation
and improvement to local infrastructure as safeguards against corruption. With these new objectives, the
budget request for development assistance jumped from $10 million in 2010 to $26.3 million in 2011, and
the FMF budget dropped dramatically from $262 million in 2010 to $8 million in 2011, and was not even
included in the 2012 budget request. Other accounts remained more or less the same, though there is a
notable increase in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and related programs from $3.9 million in
2010 to $5.7 million in 2011, and in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement from $117 mil-
lion to $248.5 million from 2011 to 2012.
42

This reallocation of funding recognises the link between socioeconomic factors such as poverty
levels and education and participation in drug-related crime. DTOs fnd recruits in areas with poor educa-
tion, high levels of unemployment and rampant poverty. As much as forty percent of youth in Jurez the
city with the highest per capita murder rate in the world and the most infamous battleground of the War on
Drugs have no education and/or current employment, leaving them vulnerable to ensnarement by organ-
ised crime.
43
A recent U.N. study on urban saIety and security worldwide confrms a correlation among
poverty, inequality, exclusion, youth unemployment, violence and crime and the likelihood of victimiza-
tion by state and non-state armed actors. The study even asserts that the quality of the municipal govern-
ment and the local authorities and institutions also contributes to violence, crime and victimization.
44

Research like this confrms the need Ior the U.S. and Mexico to concentrate more keenly on developing a
positive state presence at the local level and address violence through social programs as well as traditional
security measures.
While the Beyond Mrida strategy does represent a step in a wiser policymaking direction, both
countries have yet to base substantial action on these principles. Improvements to local infrastructure
should include state projects with neighbourhood clean-up objectives: the broken windows theory ap-
plied in New York City by police commissioner William Bratton contends that disorder creates fear among
citizens and they withdraw from the streets, allowing criminals free reign.
45
While clean-up is not the sole
solution to the War on Drugs indeed, there is no single answer to the scourge of DTOs it can be com-
38
bined with other socioeconomic measures to form an effective barrier to criminal activity.
The socioeconomic focus of Beyond Merida is rightly making efforts to resolve the societal issues
that contribute to illegal activity and violence, but Iew specifcs oI the program have been released and its
ultimate scope is still uncertain. Details of one initiative - the Todos Somos Jurez 2010 pilot program
are readily available; the program included increased support for health programs in the city and tack-
led youth education, among other issues.
46
With Jurez poor school system and high levels of violence,
education has become a top priority. New schools were opened in 2010 and 2011 as part of neighbourhood
improvement initiatives; these new schools must be supported by the enforcement of attendance laws and
the implementation of incentives to encourage at-risk youth to remain in schools. Improved education in
Jurez and throughout Mexico will result in a more modern and skilled workforce, contributing to higher
salaries and reducing the allure of criminal activity. In addition, targeted programs for at-risk youth have
been initiated to prevent involvement in organized crime before it begins.
47
Such programs are welcome
shifts toward addressing the root causes of drug-related violence and other crime.
Todos Somos Jurez has received support from USAID, an indicator that Washingtons under-
standing of appropriate assistance in the War on Drugs is expanding to include socioeconomic develop-
ment initiatives. However, within the Todos Somos Jurez program, only fve out oI 160 projects Iocus
on job creation. Another ten projects aim to improve the citys economic sector but they focus on busi-
ness modernization and training rather than on the rapid creation of jobs needed to provide an option for
those at-risk for involvement with DTOs. A more concerted effort at job creation should be combined with
education initiatives to achieve real progress in lifting people out of poverty. The approximately 280,000
currently unemployed young people in Jurez could move off the streets and into legitimate employment,
and job creation would be a similarly effective remedy for swelling DTO membership throughout Mexico.
Todos Somos Jurez was designed as a series of short-term projects for 2010 with long-term
goals, and though many of the projects have ended, violence in the city remains at an all-time high.
48
In
fact, a 31 January 2011 article in the Mexican newspaper El Universal declares that the Todos Somos
Jurez plan was a failure, with levels of violence remaining high and education or job creation projects
remaining incomplete.
49
The focus on socioeconomic factors must be strengthened and expanded not only
in Jurez but also in other cities and regions no solution to the nationwide problem of DTOs can be re-
39
stricted to one city because of the geographically extensive network of the Jurez cartel.
Another issue indirectly affected by the Beyond Mrida strategy is that of the human rights
abuses committed by the Mexican military. Though Beyond Merida` does not specifcally entail a de-
creased military presence, it does involve development projects on a municipal level, which are a precur-
sor for military withdrawal. The implementation of local development projects requires the trained local
implementers whose strengthening of state institutions could, if carefully planned and carried out, also
increase transparency. Training of local police forces and the introduction of specially trained counterdrug
forces would render the military presence unnecessary and would remove that entity from law enforcement
and other internal roles. In combination with the strengthened state presence, special security forces could
be maintained if human rights training were rigorous and mandatory.
To achieve transparency, more defnitive eIIorts must be made in the area oI judicial reIorm. Recent
reforms by the Caldern administration transferred the bulk of military prosecutions to civilian courts, but
as of November 2011 this has yet to be put into practice. NGOs and government agencies on both sides of
the border have agreed that it is essential that military jurisdiction be limited to violations of military disci-
pline and that all other charges be prosecuted in civilian court. International bodies have called on Mexico
to make reform in the area for years. In 1998, the then-U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture declared,
Military personnel appear to be immune from civilian justice and generally protected by military justice,
and suggested that Cases of serious crimes committed by military personnel against civilians [should] be
subject to civilian justice.
50
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights has made similar observations in
its role as advocate for the limitation of military jurisdiction throughout the region.
51
Despite the response
to these frequent calls for change, the most recent reform has yet to bring a case of human rights abuse to
trial, thereby failing to contribute to a decrease in military human rights abuses. Reports of these abuses
continue to be made.
52
But as important as (and perhaps more fundamental than) improvements in transparency and the
strengthening of the state is a commitment by the U.S. to enforce the conditions it has set on Mrida
Initiative Iunds and to do the same Ior Iuture accords. Without a U.S. commitment to Iulflling its side oI
the bargain with respect to assistance and monitoring, discussions of change will remain just that and need-
ed institutional change will not be achieved. If the Mexican government is unable to comply with agreed-
40
upon conditions, assistance should not be proffered, especially when the lives and safety of citizens of both
countries are at stake, and to deliver aid in such a situation is to send an informal message of acceptance of
the status quo in Mexico.
For the human rights violations to end, the U.S. must work with Mexico in the pursuit of two
objectives: 1) decrease the military presence and implement a series of long-term initiatives that deal with
education, poverty and state-strengthening across the board rather than just in the area of violence; and 2)
promote Mexicos compliance with human rights conditions so that prior violations can be properly pros-
ecuted and to dissuade further violations. These two objectives can be achieved if the U.S. takes a strong
stance both in terms of making changes to law and implementing and enforcing those changes in practice.
Until Washington accepts its responsibility as a partner in bilateral agreements and as the country offering
assistance, there will be little positive progress in the War on Drugs in Mexico.
41
Endnotes
1. U.S. Department of State. FY 2008 Supplemental Appropriations Spending Plan: Mexico, Central
America, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, September 9, 2008. Pp. 15.
2. Ibid, Pp. 16.
3. Ribando Seelke, Clare. Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America. Funding and Policv Issues.
Lexington, KY: Congressional Research Service, BiblioGov., 2009. Print, Pp. 2-4.
4. Ribando Seelke, Clare. Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America, Pp. 2-4.
5. Bowman, Kirk S. Militari:ation, Democracv and Development. The perils of Praetorianism in Latin
America. University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University, 2002, Pp. 19.
6. Ibid, Pp. 36-37.
7. Bowman, Kirk S. Militari:ation, Democracv and Development, Pp. 187.
8. Ibid.
9. Withers, George, Santos Lucila, and Isacson Adam. Preach what you Practice: The Separation of Mili-
tary and Police Roles in the Americas. Washington DC: WOLA, 2010. http://www.wola.org/im-
ages/stories/Security%20Policy/preachwhatyoupractice.pdf, Pp. 25.
10. Withers, George, Santos Lucila, and Isacson Adam. Preach what you Practice, Pp. 7.
11. Withers, George, Santos Lucila, and Isacson Adam. Preach what you Practice, Pp. 7.
12. Benitez Manaut, Raul. The Mexican Armed Forces. Challenges and Structures in the Face of Democ-
racv, in Donadio, Marcela, and Maria de la Paz Tibiletti (coord.). Atlas comparativo de la defensa
en Amrica Latina. Buenos Aires, Argentina: 2008, Pp. 243.
13. Withers, George, Santos Lucila, and Isacson Adam. Preach what you Practice, Pp.14.
14. Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces (The Leahy Law) Washington DC: Center for Interna-
tional Policy, 2003. http://www.ciponline.org/facts/leahy.htm.
15. Youngers, Coletta, and Rosin, Eileen. Drugs and Democracv in Latin America, Pp. 38.
16. Colombia (2001 narrative). Washington DC: Center for International Policy, 2001. http://www.cipon-
line.org/facts/co01.htm.
17. Peter, Tom. Mexico denies Hillary Clintons insurgency comparison. Christian Science Monitor,
September 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0909/Mexico-denies-
Hillary-Clinton-s-insurgency-comparison
18. Castaeda, Jorge and Aguilar V., Rubn. El Narco. La Guerra Fallida. Mexico D.F., Mexico. Santil-
lana Ediciones Generales, SA de CV, 2009, Pp. 41.
19. Ramos Prez, Jorge. La lucha anticrimen dj 34 mil muertos en 4 aos. El Universal, Mexico: Janu-
ary, 2011.
20. Borderland Beat, Mexico Drug-War Deaths May Have Peaked, November 2011. http://www.border-
landbeat.com/2011/11/mexico-drug-war-deaths-may-have-peaked.html
42
21. Castaeda, Jorge and Aguilar V., Rubn. El Narco, Pp. 44.
22. Young, Kevin. Latinobarometro 2010: Latin American Public Opinion : ZNet, 2010. http://www.
zcommunications.org/latinobarometro-2010-latin-american-public-opinion-by-kevin-young.
23. http://www.latinobarometro.org/
24. Youngers, Coletta, and Rosin, Eileen. Drugs and Democracy in Latin America, Pp. 33.
25. Flores Olea, Victor. Militarizacin de la sociedad. Mexico: Casa de las Americas, 2007 http://www.
casadelasamericas.org/publicaciones/revistacasa/248/paramilitarizacion.pdf.
26. Withers, George, Santos Lucila, and Isacson Adam. Preach what you Practice, Pp.14.
27. Grayson, George. Mexico. Narco-violence and a failed state? New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction Pub-
lishers, 2010, Pp. 237.
28. Pastor, Robert. Not Condemned to Repitition. The United States and Nicaragua. Boulder, CO. West-
view Press, 1987, Pp. 45.
29. Meyer, Maureen. Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by
the Military in Mexico. Washington, D.C.: WOLA, 2010, Pp. 4.
30. Mosso, Ruben. Seguir reservado el nmero de militares en estados: Sedena. Mexico: Milenio On-
line, 2010.
31. Meyer, Maureen. Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez, Pp. 8.
32. Ballinas, Victor. Chihuahua, primer lugar en abusos militares: CNDH. Mexico: La Jornada, 2008.
33. Meyer, Maureen. Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez, Pp. 10.
34. Human Rights Watch World Report 2010. United States of America. Human Rights Watch, 2010, Pg.
243.
35. Johnson, Jenny, Vanessa Kritzer, and Ben Leiter. Reform in Mexico Fails to Deliver for Victims of
Military Abuses : Just the Facts, October 2010. http://justf.org/blog/2010/10/21/reform-mexico-
fails-deliver-victims-military-abuses
36. Ribando Seelke, Clare. Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America, Pg. 10-12.
37. Human Rights Watch World Report 2010, Pg. 243.
38. WOLA Letter to Congress, September 14, 2010: Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to
Human Rights Performance. http.//www.wola.org/images/stories/microsoft20word20-20
sept20201020merida20hr20req20memo20to20congress20logo20version20
hnal.pdf
39. Varas, Augusto. Militari:ation and the International Arms Race in Latin America. Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 1985, Pp. 19.
40. Varas, Augusto. Militari:ation and the International Arms Race in Latin America, Pp. 19.
41. Miles, Wolpin. Militari:ation, Internal Repression and Social Welfare in the Third World. New York,
NY: St Martins Press, 1986, Pp. 69-71.
43
42. Olson, Eric and Wilson, Christopher. Beyond Mrida: The Evolving Approach to Security Coopera-
tion. San Diego, CA: University of San Diego Trans-Border Institute, May 2010. http://www.
wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Beyond%20Merida.pdf
43. ONeil, Shannon. Moving Beyond Merida in U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation. New York, NY.
Council on Foreign Relations, 2010.
44. Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt. Megacities. The politics of urban exclusion and violence in the
global South. London, UK: Zed Books, 2009, Pp. 21.
45. Causes of Crime - Broken Windows. : Law Libraryn.d. http://law.jrank.org/pages/12000/Causes-Crime-
Broken-Windows.html.
46. Roberts, Timothy. From Guns to Butter in Juarez. El Paso, TX: El Paso Inc., 2010. http://elpasoinc.
com/readArticle.aspx?issueid=289&xrec=5328.
47. ONeil, Shannon. Moving Beyond Merida in U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.
48. Castaneda, C. Todos Somos Juarez Program, Explained : Justice in Mexico, 2010. http://justicein-
mexico.org/2010/03/18/todos-somos-juarez-program-explained/.
49. Corresponsala. Falla Plan Todos Somos Jurez. El Universal, Mexico. January 31, 2011.
50. Military Jurisdiction and Human Rights Violations Committed by Mexicos Armed Forces. Mexico:
Centro ProDH, 2010.
51. Ibid.
52. Human Rights Watch. Mexico: Widespread Rights Abuses in War on Drugs. November 2011. http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/09/mexico-widespread-rights-abuses-war-drugs
44
The Role of NGOs in Preventing Illegal Logging in Latin
America: An Issue Concerning Indigenous Rights and Envi-
ronmental Protection
Anna Dvorak
Introduction
Human-centered environmental ethics (Baxter 1974 and Norton 1988) may be applied to a scenario, which
qualifes as a moral issue in that 'it enters into ethical evaluation in its own right (Elliot in Singer, 2006,
286) regardless of its end result or product (i.e. furniture).
A tropical evergreen tree valued by furniture-makers for its hard, strong reddish-brown wood,
Mahogany has been at the heart of recent debates over sustainable use and access to resources. The debates
have grown to encompass not only general environmental concerns but also confict within environmen-
tal groups on illegal logging. The prospect oI loggers` profts overpowering concerns oI deIorestation and
imperiled indigenous groups has given rise to an urgent question of environmental ethics.
In addition to environmental concerns, illegal logging has sparked violence, exasperated develop-
ment issues, and enabled the violation of indigenous peoples natural rights. Environmental policies and
their implications for indigenous groups must be evaluated in Latin America.
The nonproft sector has worked to mitigate some oI the threats oI illegal logging, but Non Govern-
mental Organizations (NGOs) are inhibited by a general lack of awareness of the problem.
Large international organizations are poorly informed on the issue. Fergus MacKay, coordinator of
the Legal and Human Rights Programme for the Forest Peoples Programme, explains (2001) that the World
Bank tends to neglect community support for human and environmental issues as a factor in its position.
45
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an interna-
tional agreement between governments that aims to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild
animals and plants does not threaten their survival (www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php). Few organizations
are aware that uncertifed mahogany is illegal under CITES Appendix II which requires that shipments oI
mahogany timber be accompanied by a CITES export permit. ParksWatch is one oI the frst NGOs to con-
sider CITES in its approach to the problem of illegal logging in Central and South America. ParksWatch
appears to be active in both of these regions.
I will discuss the role of NGOs (placing particular emphasis on ParksWatch) and the World Bank
in attempting to solve the problem of illegal logging, why their efforts have not lead to success, and how
cooperation as well as awareness could lead to indigenous rights and environmental protection in South
America (i.e. the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua).
Illegal Logging
Illegal logging is considered a clandestine endeavor by people living in South America (MacKay, 2001).
Clandestine economies usually develop out of economic desperation or necessity (as when a particular
crop loses its value and consequently its ability to provide income). Clandestine economies typically take
place in neoliberal societies and should require security apparatuses. Furthermore, due to the remoteness
and underdevelopment of areas where the industry usually emerges (which often includes reservations and
indigenous territory), loggers are able to engage in various illegal practices such as the use of false permits.
Even the classifcation oI tropical timber as a product presents a problem oI conservation ethics when Ma-
hogany becomes a use-value product defned mainly by its useIulness Ior humans (Marshall, 1999).
As forests in Southeast Asia and central Africa are depleted, mahogany forests elsewhere in the
world are being targeted by illegal loggers. These illegal undertakings are often small-scale operations that
take advantage of the remote location and weak regulatory or enforcement institutions of their areas of
operation. Logging also entails a complex chain-of-custody in the cutting, hauling and transporting of the
timber, which further complicates efforts to track and punish illegal loggers. Legally-approved forest op-
erations may prove cover for illegal logging, as when logs are cut illegally upriver from legitimate opera-
tions and clandestinely foated by the approved companies downstream. When these logs pass an approved
46
operation, they are formally legalized with forged documents that claim these logs were cut on the prop-
erty of the legal forestry operation.
Illegal logging operations are pursued by small traders who access lumber yards via a chain of
corrupt oIfcials and exporters. According to a ParksWatch`s report 'An Investigation oI Illegal Mahogany
Logging in Purus Alto Purus National Park and its Surroundings (2005), corruption in Peru is such that
illegal loggers are extracting mahogany from Alto Purus, a national park. If allowed to continue, illegal
logging in the Peruvian Amazon could lead to the endangerment of mahogany trees. These loggers are
basically having a free-for-all in these forests. Hopefully this report will spur action, (Fagan, Shoobridge,
2005) stated former ParksWatch Director Chris Fagan. In response to the report Peru imposed a 10-year
ban on mahogany and cedar timbering in 2004. The ban also encompassed various watersheds such as the
Alto Purus, bringing some protection for the indigenous people like the Mashco Piro who live there in
voluntary isolation.
The other form of illegal logging occurring in Peru presently is country illegal logging where in-
dividuals do not have licenses as reported by the Manatee Forest Reserve. However, even some licensed
loggers illegally remove trees from areas adjacent to their own land. To combat these forms of mahogany
logging, stricter monitoring and enforcement including cancellation of licenses is essential.
Although illegal logging occurs in the informal sector, it is very much the responsibility of the
government and NGOs. The implications of illegal logging for indigenous water supplies are an effec-
tive example oI the urgent need Ior government and nonproft action. Logging systems are aIIecting water
sources by blocking streams at crossing and causing water pollution. As a result, some logging licenses
have been suspended and committees such as The Equilibrium Fund are working to reissue licenses with
conditions designed to address the concerns of indigenous groups. Other scenarios have brought the court
into play to facilitate this issue, such as the (2001) case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.
Nicaragua, when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights with legally-binding authority ruled in favor
of indigenous peoples collective rights.
47
Indigenous People
The Maya
Indigenous injustices and exploitation have permeated the histories of three Mayan groups: the Yucatec,
Mopan, and Kekchi, all of which moved from various highlands in Central America (Yucatan, Peten, and
Guatemala respectively) to the Belizian lowlands at the end of the nineteenth century to escape disparity
resulting from caste war, taxation, forced labor and enslavement.
The Yucatec, originally from the Yucatan peninsula, migrated to Belize in the mid nineteenth cen-
tury to escape the Guerra de Castes. They presently reside in the Corozal and Orange Walk Districts and
were forced to assimilate, losing their native language to English and Spanish.
The Mopan Mayans arrived in Belize in 1886, feeing Irom taxation and Iorced labor in Peten. The
Kekchi Mayans moved to Belize in the 1870s, escaping enslavement by German coffee growers in Vera-
paz, Guatemala. Settling in the lowland areas along rivers and streams, the Mopan formed small isolated
villages throughout Toledo. As a result of their isolation, the Kekchi have become the most independent
ethnic group in Belize. This distinction has been tainted by loggers who have not only disturbed coopera-
tive practices in farming and cultural development, but also violated their communities by exploiting the
indigenous people through forced labor or expelling them from their lands.
Awas Tingni
Awas Tingni is an indigenous Mayangna community consisting of approximately 1,100 members (Anaya,
2002) who reside in a densely forested area in the isolated Atlantic coastal region of Nicaragua. The Awas
Tingni v. Nicaragua case aIfrmed the right oI indigenous people to their traditional lands and resources.
In the case, the Inter-American Court decided that the government of Nicaragua had violated the rights of
the Mayangna community of Awas Tingni by granting a logging concession on the communitys traditional
territory without its consent. The logging company ignored the objections of the indigenous community
through marking their territory as the companys own. When the decision of the Inter-American Court
was issued, the government publicly declared its intent to comply, but further advocacy and lobbying was
ultimately necessary to advance the implementation process.
Professor S. James Anaya, a professor of Human Rights Law and Policy at the University of Ari-
zona, worked with attorneys and researchers to provide ongoing support to the Awas Tingni community in
48
the effort to implement the decision of the Inter-American Court. In A New Step in the International Law
of Indigenous Peoples Anaya and Claudio Grossman (2002) state that The people of Awas Tingni did
not set about to forge an international legal precedent with implications for indigenous people throughout
the world, yet that is what they have done. Indeed, the Inter-American Courts decision on the general
indigenous right to property is unprecedented in its abandonment oI past discrimination, and it signifcantly
furthered indigenous rights.
Michael Wells et al (1993) discuss how government revenues from activities such as logging should
be substantially increased through higher fees and charges to state-owned protected areas or through tourist
taxes to increase governmental aid for indigenous groups. Boris Kozolchyk, a professor of law at the Uni-
versity of Arizona (2006) offers his thoughts on best practices for development and indigenous groups.
Incorporating the issues of illegal logging, he believes that the behavior of logging companies is tied to the
idea of indigenous people as the other.
Role of the World Bank in Indigenous Rights Issues
In The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on indigenous peoples: Progress or more of the same?,
Fergus MacKay, the Coordinator of the Legal and Human Rights Programme, an NGO that supports
indigenous rights, discusses a document (2006) which contributes to the World Banks mission of poverty
reduction and sustainable development. The Operational Policy is intended to ensure that the develop-
ment process fully respects the dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of Indigenous Peoples
(MacKay, 2006, 10). Starting in the 1980s, the World Bank Group (WBG) adopted several polices, referred
to by MacKay as safeguard policies, which are designed to mitigate harm to indigenous people in World
Bank Group (WBG) fnanced projects. MacKay argues that although through this policy, the Bank aims to
provide project fnancing only where prior inIormed consultation results in broad community support, the
term 'community support is not defned and will thereIore not be able to generate an eIIective outcome
of the process of free, prior, and informaed consultation (FPICon-process). Every undertaking that affects
indigenous peoples requires a FPICon which leads to broad community support. He explains that without
prompt and eIIective grievance, compliants |sic| and verifcation mechanisms, adherence to OP 4.10 is
largely dependant on the good will of the borrower and the Bank. (MacKay, 2006, 10).
49
Role of NGOs in Indigenous Rights Issues
In 'The Role oI Eco-Labels in International Trade: Can Timber Certifcation Be Implemented as a Means
to Slowing Deforestation? (2001) Teresa Hock describes the role of NGOs. She traces how the issue of il-
legal mahogany trade has spurred the involvement of NGOs, explaining that not only have they intervened
through investigation and action, but also through strategies such as promotion of the ban and boycott of
the international trade of tropical timber. She mentions that many view this as the only solution to stop the
exploitation of the rainforests and indigenous people.
ParksWatch
ParksWatch works to protect biodiversity in Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, and
Argentina. In summer 2004 the NGO conducted a research project on illegal logging in Peru, the worlds
largest producer of mahogany. Led by Chris Fagan and Diego Shoobridge, the report prompted the reclas-
sifcation oI the Alto Purus Reserved Zone at the time in Peru as a national park in 2004.
The 2004 ParksWatch expeditions aim was to investigate reports of loggers laundering mahog-
any illegally cut within the protected zone. Informants told ParksWatch that wood was being transported
from the Alto Purus watershed to other watersheds outside park boundaries, where timber companies held
legal concessions to cut mahogany. There, legal and illegal mahogany timber was mixed. Loggers were
exploiting a Peruvian law that allows local indigenous residents living in or around Alto Purs to buy tim-
ber cutting permits. Chris Fagan (2005) discovered that loggers purchase permits on behalf of communities
that cannot afford the travel costs to buy their own. Under this arrangement, the loggers may then harvest
mahogany Irom within local indigenous territories Ior the purpose oI selling it elsewhere Ior large profts.
In exchange for access to valuable wood, indigenous communities may only receive vastly overvalued
goods such as soap, salt, sugar, machetes and shotgun shells (Fagan, Shoobridge, 2005). Fagan also noted
that if loggers bought wood from indigenous communities, they offered low prices. In exchange for a ma-
ture mahogany tree, which sells for thousands of dollars on the international market, an indigenous leader
may receive overvalued goods worth about 30 to 60 dollars.
The ParksWatch report also makes note of the mahogany trade violating international law under
CITES. Internationally agreed-upon trade regulations Ior big-leaI mahogany were frst enIorced on No-
vember 15, 2003. This tropical timber generates over 100 million dollars a year in export sales, making
50
it one of the worlds most valuable forest products (http://www.cites.org/common/com/PC/17/E-PC17-
Inf-03.pdf). Martha Martinez (ParksWatchs director) proposed the ParksWatch report as a way of inform-
ing the public in consumer countries like the U.S. that unless it is CITES certifed, any mahogany imported
Irom Peru is illegal. She also addresses some oI the shortIalls oI CITES, especially Iailure to conduct feld
research to verify sources of both legal and illegal timber. CITES provides a framework to monitor trade
but does not considering policies affecting the root causes of over-extraction or social justice in mahogany
harvesting and sales and indigenous rights.
Although the 2004 ParksWatch expedition and report was a de jure step toward enhanced protection
for tress, wildlife, and uncontacted indigenous tribes within the new national park, the declaration did not
translate to de facto protection. The lack of enforcement was partially due to the parks remoteness. Bound-
aries were not enforced to preserve the land and protect indigenous people living in voluntary isolation.
ParksWatch was largely unaware of the hazards posed by illegal logging to indigenous groups inside the
park. The poor or nonexistent relationships of indigenous communities with the government, institutions,
and donors also contributed to the policys ineffectiveness.
An understanding of NGOs attempts to tackle illegal logging requires a comparison with govern-
mental policies in order to ascertain what efforts have been most successful and conducive with environ-
mental ethics. Factors in such an examination are numerous; the World Bank, for example, should be ex-
amined in the context of its safeguard policies, which are designed to protect indigenous people affected by
World Bank Group (WBG) fnanced projects. CITES` proposal to develop a regional strategic action plan
on managing sustainable mahogany populations should also be considered, and ParksWatch produced a re-
port criticizing CITES. Campaigns organized by other groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council
and Greenpeace have also factored into the illegal logging and indigenous rights debate.
Illegal loggers work in some areas which are inhabited by uncontacted indigenous groups, who
avoid contact with outside individuals and communities. ParksWatch has documented an increase in vio-
lent encounters between illegal loggers and these indigenous groups. Incidentally, there have been more
documentations of the killings of indigenous victims than the deaths of loggers. This is partially due to no
match of indigenous arrows to the guns of the illegal loggers.
ParksWatch is working for the eviction of illegal loggers from the Alto Purus National Park, where
51
uncontacted groups reside, and to prevent access to areas of the park where these indigenous communities
live in voluntary isolation. The organization is also pressing Ior the installation oI guard posts along fve
rivers that serve as entry routes to the park. ParksWatch advocates tighter monitoring of forestry conces-
sions near the park and technical assistance to help indigenous communities develop sustainable-forestry
plans.
Campaigns
The environmental, economic, and social impacts of illegal logging on indigenous people have inspired
groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace to take action. The NRDC
mobilizes public support through letter-writing campaigns and other activities to press for the protection of
endangered areas and the defense of indigenous rights. In 2006, the NRDC named the Tahuamanu Rainfor-
est, located near Alto Purus, one of its 12 BioGerms, biologically diverse wild lands stressed for being
threatened by logging. Ani Youatt, (Illegal Logging Indicators Country Report Card, 2007) NRDC ad-
vocate for Latin American BioGems, stated that Its a particularly sensitive area where there are isolated
[indigenous] groups as well as mahogany, and the rate of extraction has been increasing.
In addition, U.S green groups concerned with illegal logging in Latin America are lobbying for the
increased involvement of the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the government agency respon-
sible for overseeing U.S compliance with CITES. U.S. green groups have called on the agency to suspend
Peruvian mahogany imports until it can be proven scientifcally that logging is not threatening mahogany`s
survival, but USFWS is reluctant to consider the option.
In order to document criminal activity in the Brazilian logging sector, Greenpeace established an
oIfce in the heart oI the Amazon basin in 1999. Since this move, Greenpeace has played a major role in
fghting Latin America`s lucrative and illicit mahogany trade and in protecting indigenous people in aI-
fected areas. In fact, the Brazilian government did not take substantial action until Greenpeace made an
effort to provide conclusive information on criminal logging activities as well as support for stopping
crimes against uncontacted indigenous communities. After several years of on-the-ground investigation,
Greenpeace published documentation of large-scale illegal mahogany logging on public and indigenous
lands. On September 26, 2001, the organization presented information about the state of Par to the Brazil-
52
ian Federal Prosecutor`s oIfce, to the Minister oI Environment, and to the president oI the Brazilian Gov-
ernment Institute for Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA). Greenpeace also asserted that all the
mahogany trade in Par was controlled by enterprises accused of a variety of illegalities and headed by two
mahogany kingpins: Moiss Carvalho Pereira and Osmar Alves Ferreira.
In reaction to the Greenpeace report, the Brazilian government conducted its own investigation into
mahogany forest management, which prompted the closing of all mahogany operations and transportation
in October 2001. Specifc areas where illegal logging was taking place were identifed, particular illegal
activities were cited, and actors as well as accomplices were named.
With regard to the environmental facet of illegal logging, many Latin American countries can not
afford to conduct forest inventories to determine regeneration patterns. They can not determine the yearly
quota that must be set by exporting countries to assure that sustainable levels are not surpassed. Although
some advances have been made towards reducing illegal mahogany Irom fltering into the international
market, the limited capacity of governments to manage their forests and logging industries must also be
remedied. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network (aims
to ensure that trade in wild plants and animals is not a threat to the conservation of nature) are addressing
Perus approach to improving governance, management, and technical challenges to this effort.
CITES delegates contributed to states progress toward managing sustainable mahogany popula-
tions by proposing to develop a regional strategic action plan to address ongoing issues and enforcement
problems. Furthermore, the issue was addressed at the CITES Standing Committee in October 2006 in
Geneva, Switzerland, where it was featured prominently on the agenda. This issue was once again brought
to the forefront by delegates at the CITES Conference of the Parties (CoP14) in Hague, The Netherlands in
June 2007.
More recently, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, in Geneva, April 15-19 2008 assessed data on biology, threats, management and risk status (PC 17
Doc. 5.5) including CITES Appendices I and II (2004) in which the Scientifc Authority is continuing to
review.
53
Solutions/Recommendations
Several NGOs have played the role of intermediary between governments and indigenous groups and have
even provided Iunding Ior specifc programs (i.e. Forum on Indigenous Issues) to aid indigenous communi-
ties (Brundtland 1987). The Brundtland Commission, convened by the United Nations in 1983, focus on
sustainable development and raising awareness of issues relating to the human and physical environment
and how those issues affect the social and economic development. Because of their history of involvement,
nongovernmental organizations have the ability to advocate for and defend the rights of indigenous people
in the illegal logging debate.
In addition to the nonproft sector, community-level actors can play a signifcant role in address-
ing the unique threat posed to indigenous communities by illegal logging. Raymond Victurine, the direc-
tor of Conservation Finance for the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS ) (2001, 1) takes what he calls
a dynamic approach for building capacity among players in a much-ignored [community-based] sector
of the industry. He believes that countries should develop their conservation programs so that the focus
on communities benefts those most proximate to protected areas and, ultimately, the industry as a whole
(2001, 1). He suggests that training for community-based operations must be institutionalized, with pro-
grams tailored to unique qualities of the targeted local businesses, community organizations need to be
better organized and represented at the national level [with] small amounts of investment capital, encour-
agement and support 'lack oI a quick fx and 'budgetary and programmatic fexibility built in (Victur-
nine 2000, 8). As a result, participants can learn that a traditional experience [incorporating indigenous
liIestyle while economically benefting| can be marketed successIully. (8).
According to Valerio Grefa, president of the Congressional Commission on Indigenous Affairs,
self-determination is an alternative model of autonomous development for indigenous people. In the indig-
enous context, self-determination means a peoples capacity to decide its own political system and its eco-
nomic, social and cultural development (Grefa, 72). Under the conditions of illegal logging, indigenous
peoples right to property is violated and therefore disrupts their own development practices. These ways
of development concern indigenous peoples lives, beliefs, institutions, and spiritual well-being. (Grefa,
72). These also may include control over their own 'economic, political, scientifc, social and cultural
development. (Grefa, 72). One of the only ways to ensure the protection of indigenous rights could be
54
giving these groups larger roles in applying, evaluating, and preparing regional as well as national develop-
ment plans and programs.
Margaret Satterthwaite, director of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at
NYU School of Law and Deena Hurwitz, director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic and Hu-
man Rights Program at Virginia School of Law (2001, 5) discuss indigenous rights to meaningful consent
in extractive industry projects. The scholars argue that the power of free, prior, and informed consent lies
in its potential to transform oppressive conditions by introducing processes which would require negoti-
ated agreements amongst indigenous people and the broader society. Satterthwaite and Hurwitz (2001, 7)
state that It requires relationships of respect and understanding among the interested and affected parties
in a development process whose outcome lies in the hands of the parties themselves. While activists and
scholars work toward negotiated agreements with indigenous people, illegal loggers also seek relationships
with them. However, the latter relationships focus on striking harmful deals with indigenous communities
to extract mahogany Irom state-owned natural protected areas. These arrangements are made where oIfcial
controls are particularly weak.
To institutionalize indigenous rights, the government must make an effort to appreciate indigenous
culture Ior its value and signifcance rather than dismiss it as 'Iorms oI Iolklore (Demetrio Cojti Cuxil,
51). Governments must recognize and incorporate indigenous cultural practices, beliefs, traditions, and
customs into oIfcial policy. Existing laws stifing indigenous cultural practices must be amended. Deme-
trio Cojti Cuxil, a Mayan rights activist, specifes that 'channels and rules oI negotiation, administrative
procedures, impact measurement systems have to be changed or devised (Cuxil, 51). Cooperation agen-
cies and donors can also play a role in indigenous development not only by supporting indigenous rights,
but also through understanding the importance of preserving indigenous culture. In the context of eco-
nomic development, the right of indigenous people to manage their own economy and natural assets and
resources should be protected. The particularly intimate relation of indigenous people to the natural envi-
ronment must also be understood and protected, especially from harmful actors such as illegal loggers. The
right of indigenous people to rely on their own knowledge of the natural world is a crucial component of
their autonomous economic development. Only through stronger relationships with governments, nonprof-
its, and other entities can indigenous people combat social and cultural discrepancies and promote ethnic
55
diversity. Crucial to the achievement of these objectives is the receptiveness of the state and all sectors of
society to the concept oI indigenous territory as a 'space in nature that is under the cultural infuence or
political control of a people (Grefa, 72).
Conclusion
In order to create a fair and sustainable socio-cultural environment that is conducive to the preservation of
indigenous lifestyles,
the environment needs to be managed according to accepted standards where the needs and pref-
erences of all groups are respected. If approaches are adopted that stem from the philosophical ideals
inherent to ecotourism (Wearing and Neil 1999) all local interest groups in perfect circumstances should
be provided with the opportunity to have their say early in any policy, management or planning process
(Wearing 2001, 13).
Developments in indigenous political activism and empowerment in Guatemala are worthy of emu-
lation for other groups who are confronted with issues like illegal logging. The Maya in that country have
made impressive strides in recent decades in the pursuit of cultural and political rights. They have forged
powerful cultural-political organizations, battled racism, and demanded recognition from dominant institu-
tions which have historically espoused a naturalized scorn for lo indio (Hale 2005, 5) In a dictionary
of cultural geography, Geographers David Sibley, Peter Jackson, David Atkinson, and Neil Washbourne
discuss how illegal logging act[s] to turn the landscape and people encountered into objects, (Atkinson
et al 2005, 39) indigenous people must set boundaries, defend their land and refuse to take participate in
the illegal logging industry. Indigenous groups must reemphasize the ethical values of their economic and
spiritual landscape and rely upon an awareness that illegal logging has not only scarred their land, but also
endangered their traditional identities.
Anna Dvorak is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography at UCLA. She received her BA from UC Berkeley and her
research focuses on environmental issues, indigenous rights, and cultural identitv in Central and South America. Anna has done
heldwork in Beli:e and Guatemala for her Masters thesis and is currentlv working on European immigration and environmen-
tal issues in southern Bra:il. She has recentlv published her work on Panama and geographv education.
56
Works Cited
Anaya, James, and Claudio Grossman. 2002. A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peo-
ples. Ari:ona Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol. 19, Number 1.
Atkinson, D, D. Sibley, P. Jackson, and N. Washbourne. 2005. Cultural Geography: Critical Dictionary of
Key Concepts.London: I.B.Tauris.
Bray, David, and Richard Primack. 1997. Timber, Tourists, and Temples. Conservation and Development In
The Mava Forest Of Beli:e Guatemala And Mexico. Island Press.
Cuxil, Demetrio Cojti. 2002. Educational Reform in Guatemala: Lessons from Negotiations between
Indigenous Civil Society and the State in Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous rights,
diversity, and democracy Rachel Sieder, 2002: Institute of Latin American Studies. Palgrave: Bas-
ingstoke and New York.
Fagan, Chris and Diego Shoobridge 2005. An Investigation of Illegal Mahogany Logging in Perus Alto
Purus National Park and its Surroundings. ParksWatch.
Granoff, Ilmi, Carrie Magee, and Ramsay Ravenel. 2005. Illegal Logging In The Tropics. Strategies For
Cutting Crime. Haworth Press.
Grefa, Valerio. 1996. Indigenous Development and Sustainability. In Diego Iturralde and Esteban Krotz.
Indigenous Peoples and Development. Povertv, Democracv and Sustainabilitv. Washington DC:
Inter-American Development Bank.
Hurwitz, Deena, and Margaret Satterthwaite. 2001. The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Meaningful Con-
sent In Extractive Industry Projects: Symposium Introduction. Colorado Journal of International
Environment Law and Policy Vol. 12, Num. 2.
Hock, Teresa. 2001. 'The Role oI Eco-Labels in International Trade: Can Timber Certifcation Be Imple-
mented as a Means to Slowing Deforestation? Colorado Journal of International Environment
Law and Policy Vol. 12, Number 2.
Kometter, Roberto and Edgar Maravi, 2007. Methodology for Developing National Volume Conversion
Tables (Standing Volume & Export Grade Sawnwood). The World Bank.
Kloven, Kristen. 1999. Eco-Labeling of Sustainably Harvested Wood Under the Forest Stewardship
Council: Seeing the Forest for the Trees. International Law and Policy 1998 Year Book 48. 53.
Kozolchyk, Boris. 2006. A Roadmap to Economic Development Through Law: Third Parties and Com-
parative. Ari:ona Journal of International and Comparative Law Vol 23, Number 1 A.
MacKay, Fergus. 2001. The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples: Progress
or More of the Same? Colorado Jorunal of International Environmental Law and Policy Vol 12,
Number 2.
Singer, Peter. 2006. A Companion to Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Marshall, Allen. 1999. The Unity of Nature: Deconstructing a Contemporary Environmental Metanarrative.
University of Wollongong. Doctoral Thesis.
Victurine, R. 2000. Building Tourism Excellence at the Community Level: Capacity Building for Com-
munity-Based Entrepreneurs in Uganda. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
Reports: CITES Appendix I and II, PC 17 Doc. 5.5, www.cites.org.
57
All Roads lead to Infrastructure:
Peru as a Trade Bridge between South America and Asia
Eric Toler
Introduction
In March 2010, Jorge Len, Executive Director of Perus Private Investment Promotion Agency (ProInver-
sin), revealed his countrys goal of becoming a commercial bridge between South America and Asia.
1

Leon`s announcement comes at a propitious moment Ior Peru. The collapse in global trade fows during the
2008-09 recession proved short-lived for the Andean country, whose export performance rebounded quickly
after only a brief contraction. Due largely to Chinas insatiable appetite for raw materials, Perus global ex-
ports in 2010 reached a record US $35.4 billion, far surpassing its pre-recession level of US $27.9 billion in
2007.
2
Along with exports, the countrys GDP also continues to post remarkable growth. While Brazils ris-
ing economic star dominates international headlines on the region, Perus economic engine has quietly gen-
erated its own impressive results: in the seven years leading up to the recession, GDP growth averaged 6.7
percent.
3
Forecasts predict that this expansion will continue at around 7.1 percent over the next two years.
4
Yet even in light of Perus surging exports and favorable macroeconomic position, several basic ques-
tions loom large over the countrys ambitious new goal. First, what exactly does it mean for Peru to become
a bridge for trade between South America and Asia? More pertinent for Len and Peruvian policy makers, is
it a realistic goal and if so what obstacles stand in the way? The idea of Peru as a commercial bridge must be
evaluated by outlining the factors that weigh in its favor and addressing the challenges and obstacles it faces.
Perus future as a bridge for South American trade with Asia hinges on its ability to overcome weaknesses
in infrastructure. This will require a rebalanced trade agenda that recognizes transportation infrastructure as
58
critical to increasing trade and responds with decisive action to expand and modernize the countrys inad-
equate, dilapidated roads and ports as well as the continued promotion of regional infrastructure integration.
The history oI Peruvian trade policy since the 1950s has been shaped as much by dramatic fuctua-
tions in the country`s economic perIormance as by the demands oI politically infuential domestic constitu-
ents. By all outward appearances, it seems that Perus openness to trade is here to stay. But Perus ability
to become a trade bridge lies less in its liberalized stance toward trade than in the capacity oI goods to fow
freely in and out of the country. As a recent study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank
points out, transportation costs historically unassociated with trade policy have replaced tariffs as the
greatest obstacle to trade in the region.
5

An examination of trade in Peru should include an assessment of the efforts made to overcome the
formidable challenges of geography within the domestic context and the regional context of South America.
Perus hope of becoming a bridge for South American goods destined for Asian markets depends not only on
the extent to which it addresses transportation infrastructure within its borders, but also its ability to shape
the regional agenda with infrastructure as a priority. Also deserving of attention is the potential for Chile to
serve as an alternative trade bridge, as well as the political feasibility of adopting a rebalanced trade agenda.
Uncertainty surrounding the future policy priorities of the recently elected Humala administration holds sig-
nifcant implications Ior the revitalization oI Peru`s trade policy.
The Evolution of Trade Policy in Peru
Perus global trade has grown exponentially since the beginning of the new millennium; between 2000 and
2010, exports increased nearly six fold. The contraction of trade in 2009 represented only a minor hiccup in
a consistent upward trend that has defed economists` expectations Ior the Andean country. For most oI the
past decade, Perus exports have grown faster than the regional average. With regard to the balance of trade,
Peru has maintained surpluses since 2002. Yet as observers of the region are well aware, macroeconomic
stability and robust, liberalized trade have for much of the 21
st
century been the exception rather than the
norm. This holds especially true for Peru, a country that has held an inconsistent trade policy throughout the
twentieth century.
As is the case with its overall economic perIormance, Peru`s trade policy has fuctuated markedly
59
over the past several decades. Unlike the rest of Latin America, Peru adopted a relatively liberal trade regime
in the aftermath of the Second World War. At least initially, tariffs were used as a source of government rev-
enue rather than a means to increase the welfare of domestic import-competing industries.
6
However, this
open trade posture did not last long as the mismanagement of macroeconomic policy eroded the competitive
position of domestic manufacturers and gave rise to protectionist sentiment. Policymakers confronted a 30
percent appreciation of the currency with the adoption of the Industrial Promotion Law of 1959, which grant-
ed the government the power to raise tariffs and, more broadly, to protect and promote national industry.
7

Peruvian authorities wasted no time in exercising this authority; by the mid-1960s, the average tariff rate had
increased by 40 percent from the previous decade, largely in response to the growing balance-of-payment
crisis.
8
Protectionist trade policy reached its peak in Peru in 1972 as the average tariff rate that year ap-
proached 80 percent.
9
Nontariff barriers to trade were also employed; imports of products similar to those
listed on the National Register of Manufactures (NRM) were banned. Nevertheless, changing economic
conditions prompted another dramatic shift in trade policy. In response to the combination of favorable
export prices and increasing oil output, the government began to phase out quantitative import restrictions,
culminating in the elimination of the NRM in 1979. In addition, the new tariff schedule adopted that year
reduced the average rate to 39 percent, while the maximum ad valorem rate was reduced from 355 percent
to 155 percent.
10

Yet at the beginning oI the 1980s, unchecked monetary expansion and deepening fscal defcits pro-
duced yet another fuctuation in trade policy. As many countries throughout the region came to realize, the
import-substituting model of economic development proved unsustainable. Though Peru succeeded in less-
ening its dependence on certain foreign goods through the promotion of national industry, it remained heav-
ily reliant on capital-intensive imports (i.e. machinery) as domestic industries Iocused primarily on the fnal,
value-added stages of manufacturing. Infrastructure projects, including roads and telecommunications, also
required external fnancing. Import-substituting growth was thus achieved at a high cost.
Those sectors of the economy that were hurt most by an overvalued exchange rate and open trade lob-
bied the government to reinstate protective tariffs. Thus in 1984 ad valorem tariff rates were increased by be-
tween 5 and 40 percentage points, with the average rate jumping to 57 percent. The reversal of liberalization
60
was crystallized with the reintroduction of import bans on 172 items.
11
Alan Garcia`s frst administration,
which began in 1985, expanded the number of banned items to 539. Remarkably, there were 56 different
tariII rates by the end oI his term in 1990, refecting the infuence oI interest group politics in trade policy.
12
History repeated itself in Peru in the 1980s, as protectionist trade measures (and overall economic
mismanagement) were yet again followed by crisis. Peru was just one of several Latin American countries
ravaged by economic chaos in the so-called 'lost decade. The problems oI hyperinfation and unsustain-
able debt experienced across the region were compounded in Peru by natural disasters and the socially and
economically destructive violence of the Sendero Luminoso. Promising to reverse his countrys precipitous
economic downfall, Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1990 with the broad support of the lower and middle
classes. In the months leading up to the election, he emphasized a centrist approach to economic stabiliza-
tion, with a view towards minimizing the potential for recession and job loss.
13
Once in oIfce, however,
Fujimori adopted a staunchly neoliberal approach to the economy. Under the guidance of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, Peru undertook a program of sweeping macroeconomic reform that
included a systematic dismantling of trade barriers.
In 1990 the average applied tariff dropped from 66 to 32 percent, and the bound rate was lowered
from 84 to 50 percent. Just one year later, the 50 percent bound rate was removed, leaving only two tariff
levels: 15 and 25 percent. Aside from tariffs, the institutions administering customs were modernized, allow-
ing the clearance process to be trimmed from several weeks to just one or two days.
14
The scope and speed
of liberalization during this decade was unrivaled in Peruvian history; by the dawn of the new millennium,
the IMF had labeled Peru one of the most open economies in the world.
15
Another notable development in Perus trade policy over the course of the 1990s was the revitaliza-
tion of the stagnant Andean Pact, founded in 1969 and modernized in 1996 as the Andean Community of
Nations. The Andean Community is a customs union consisting of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia.
Although trade within the region expanded, the impact of the agreement has been limited. To this day mem-
ber countries fail to agree on a common external tariff. The Andean Community may also be characterized
by a lack of coordination, as member states have failed to adopt key aspects of the founding Cartagena agree-
ment into national law.
Trade policy at the turn of the century advanced liberalization primarily through efforts at broaden-
61
ing Perus commercial ties beyond the bounds of the South American continent. Indeed, trade promotion at
the start of the 21
st
century sought to forge strategic bilateral agreements with North American and Asian
markets. Peru in the 2000s signed individual free trade agreements with the countries that comprise NAFTA
(United States, Canada, and Mexico), as well as key Asian economies including Thailand, China, and South
Korea. The story of Peruvian trade over the past decade may be summarized by a precipitous take-off in
commodity exports to fast-growing Asian markets.
The evolution oI Peru`s trade policy since the 1950s may be characterized by sharp fuctuations be-
tween liberalization and protectionism. Nevertheless, with unprecedented growth and stability underpinned
by sound macroeconomic policies and openness to trade, one has reason to hope that dramatic reversals of
liberalized trade policy are a thing oI the past. As outlined above, Peru maintains signifcant trade relation-
ships, including a variety of free trade agreements and informal pacts with its South American neighbors, key
Asian economies, and North America. In fact, through its membership in the Andean Community, associate
membership in MERCOSUR, and FTA with Chile, Peru enjoys free trade in all of South America. Moreover,
goods from Peru enjoy easy access to many of the countries among which it seeks to serve as a trade bridge.
But the question again arises: What exactly does it mean for Peru to be a trade bridge? Perus open stance to
trade is necessary for the realization of its goal, but it is not the sole requirement.
Bridging Trade is Facilitating Trade
Liberalized trade and global connectivity are among the indicators to the world that Peru is open for cross-
border business. Perus historical integration with its South American neighbors as well as its nascent but
deepening commercial ties with Asia and North America also serve as important indicators of the Andean
countrys strategic position. As is common with preferential trade deals, however, Perus free trade agree-
ments contain stipulations on rules of origin, requiring that a certain percentage of the inputs of a product
originate in Peru for it to qualify for free trade. What this means is that while Bolivia may use Peruvian ports
to send its goods to China, for instance, it does not operate under the tariff schedule negotiated between Peru
and China.
In a highly politicized process, different rules of origin for individual industries (and often for indi-
vidual products) are devised between the negotiating parties. International trade theory holds that import-
62
competing industries will prefer higher levels of protection, and as a result, more stringent rules of origin.
In essence, rules of origin prevent third countries from taking advantage of tariff concessions made between
two countries. Thus to the extent that they do not grant greater market access in terms of tariff rates, Perus
bilateral trade deals are irrelevant for other South American countries looking to send their goods to Asian
markets, and vice versa. While free trade agreements are important indicators of Perus openness to trade,
rules of origin mean that liberalized trade alone does not guarantee a suitable climate for bridging trade.
To better understand Peru as a trade bridge, it is helpIul to briefy consider the simplistic defnition
of a bridge as a physical structure built to span an obstacle between two locations. Though in Perus case
there are more than just two points of connection involved, this visual nonetheless illustrates the fundamental
purpose of a bridge, trade or otherwise: to facilitate the movement of people or goods across some obstacle.
Perus goal of becoming a trade bridge between South America and Asia thus lies in its ability to facilitate
trade. Transport infrastructure therefore takes center stage in an evaluation of Peru as a trade bridge.
In keeping with the concept oI a bridge, we fnd that its useIulness is not only a Iunction oI its abil-
ity to span an obstacle, but also of its convenience and ease of access. Just as a physical bridge spanning a
river is rendered useless if it is inaccessible, Peru will be unviable as a trade bridge without clear paths (i.e.
road and ports) into and out of the country. Not only should there be unobstructed access, but transportation
inIrastructure in Peru must be highly developed, eIfcient, and cost-eIIective so as to represent a competi-
tive option if countries are to choose Peru as the point of entry into South America or the point of departure
for Asia. Currently, however, Peru offers neither convenience nor ease of access to any external customers,
except for the landlocked countries of Bolivia and Paraguay which have no other option but to utilize foreign
ports Ior their exports. UnIortunately Ior Peru, insuIfcient and congested inIrastructure remains the most
formidable barrier to trade not just within its own territory, but in all of South America.
Transportation Infrastructure as a Barrier to Trade
A study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank that sheds important light on the impact of
transportation inIrastructure Ior trade is a useIul precursor to consideration oI Peru`s specifc inIrastructure
challenges. Entitled Unclogging the Arteries, the 2008 report argues that transportation costs have reached
an unprecedented level of strategic importance for the region. Perhaps the most remarkable conclusion is
63
that lower transportation costs would do more than lower tariffs to stimulate Latin American trade. A 10 per-
cent reduction in freight costs in nine Latin America countries, including Peru, would result in a 39 percent
increase in exports to the United States.
16
A 10 percent reduction in import tariffs, by contrast, would mean
only a 2 percent increase in exports.
17
Transportation infrastructure, not tariff lines or free trade agreements,
hold the key to Peru facilitating trade as a bridge between South America and Asia.
But what is the state of Perus infrastructure? The World Economic Forums Global Competitive-
ness Report provides some indication of the poor condition of transport infrastructure in Peru. Highlighting
the strategic importance of infrastructure as a key pillar of economic development and competitiveness, the
report states that effective modes of transport, including quality roads, railroads, ports, and air transport,
enable entrepreneurs to get their goods and services to market in a secure and timely manner.
18
According
to the recently released 2011-2012 edition, an inadequate supply of infrastructure was the 5
th
(out of 15) most
problematic factor for doing business in Peru. Overall, Perus infrastructure ranks 88
th
out of 139 countries.
19

Another useful snapshot of the state of Perus transportation infrastructure is found in the 2010 Global En-
abling Trade Report, also published by the World Economic Forum. This report assesses the extent to which
countries enjoy the Iactors Iacilitating the Iree fow oI goods by identiIying country-specifc obstacles to
trade. On the measure of the availability and quality of transport infrastructure, Peru ranks 91
st
out of 125
countries.
20
What is behind Perus low ranking? A closer look at the World Economic Forums assessments
reveals that with the exception of the transshipment connectivity index, Peru is at a disadvantage on every
measure of infrastructure: airport density, paved roads, quality of air transportation, quality of railroads,
quality of roads, and quality of ports. As the primary channels through which goods make their way from
South America to Asian markets and vice versa, the quality of roads and ports merit further investigation,
especially in the context of Perus booming exports.
Although the global recovery remains tenuous, the volume of exports leaving Peru continues to
rise precipitously. In the new decade Latin America and Asia are forging ever-stronger economic linkages.
Commodity-rich South America has beneftted enormously Irom China`s economic rise; between 2000 and
2009, the regions exports to China increased nine-fold.
21
Yet while the Peruvian government has certainly
encouraged export-led growth through its formal trade policy, it has not made a commensurate commitment
64
to the infrastructure that facilitates trade. The result, as revealed by the World Economic Forums data, is that
Perus roads and ports are not only in poor condition but are increasingly unable to keep up with demand.
Perus network of ports is comprised of 23 docks, 20 of which are located in maritime port terminals
and 3 of which are found in river port terminals.
22
The port of Callao, considered part of the Lima metropoli-
tan area, is Peru`s largest and busiest port. TraIfc at Callao is expected to grow by 14 percent per year over
the course of the decade, requiring an investment of US $2 billion in infrastructure improvements. Despite
the opening of a new port terminal in Callao last year, the Chamber of Commerce in Lima fears that the port
will reach its maximum capacity in 2016.
23
This would not be the frst time capacity has been reached at
Callao, which handles 85 percent oI Peru`s traIfc. In 2008, ships were diverted to neighboring countries as
Callao was unable to meet all docking requests.
24

As the Global Enabling Trade Report points out, not only is the availability of port infrastructure a
problem, but its quality is also a concern. The fndings oI the Executive Opinion Survev, also published by
the World Economic Forum, provide additional cause for concern in this respect. Business leaders from Peru
rated their countrys ports a 3 on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely inaccessible; 7 = extremely accessible).
25

The aforementioned IDB study provides a concrete sense of the effect of port quality on exporters across the
region: the authors fnd that on average, increasing port eIfciency in Latin America to the level oI US ports
would lower transportation costs by about 20 percent.
26
The authors measure port eIfciency using a broad
array of variables including the quality of facilities, support activities (pilotage, towing and tug assistance,
cargo handling, etc.), and administrative tasks (clarity of procedures, licensing, etc.).
While recognizing the work to be done, Maciek Kwiatkowski, general manager of the Callao ter-
minal operated by Dubai Ports World, looks beyond the scale and urgency of the infrastructure challenges
the port faces, stating that there is a competition going on for the title of the regional hub, and we believe
that Callao could have a very good run in that race.
27
Recent progress in the modernization of Perus ports
combined with ambitious plans Ior the Iuture has prompted public declarations Irom government oIfcials,
private enterprises, and port operators of Callaos potential to become a regional hub. Fortunately for Peru,
the daunting geographic obstacles that complicate the construction of roads and railroads are a non-issue
for ports. After decades of neglect, serious efforts are being made by APN (Autoridad Portuaria Nacional),
Perus national port authority, to attract investment in the countrys congested and outdated ports. US $2.03
65
billion will be invested in Peru`s port sector by 2015, according to APN. Most recently, a Dutch frm was
awarded a concession to invest US $749 million in the northern terminal at Callao.
28
It is important to recognize that ports are only part of the broader consideration of Peru as a trade
bridge. Returning to the visual of a physical bridge: just as a bridge is only useful to the extent that it can be
accessed, Peru`s ports are useless iI imported goods cannot be eIfciently dispersed around the continent, and
likewise if goods from Perus South American neighbors cannot reach its coastal ports. While geography
gives Perus ports a competitive edge, it simultaneously represents the most formidable obstacle to Perus
network of roads.
Overcoming the Challenges of Geography
The very geographical extremes that draw tourists to South America are also the source of headache and
frustration for businesses seeking to move goods around the region. For Peru, geography has proved to be
both a blessing and a curse; while its strategic position along the northwest edge of South America makes
it a prime candidate Ior bridging the Pacifc divide, Iormidable barriers to the east have complicated the de-
velopment oI eIfcient transportation linkages. Regional trade in South America has long been hampered by
insuIfcient inIrastructure, most notably in terms oI roads. This has proven especially true Ior Peru, a country
whose territory is divided by soaring peaks of the Andes.
Roads are critical for regional integration and to Perus ability to serve as a trade bridge. In spite of
a historical neglect of road networks, there are promising signs that Peru and the region as a whole have not
only recognized the tremendous impact of transportation infrastructure on trade and competitiveness, but are
actually taking action. Coordinated regional efforts at tackling infrastructure began to take shape in the late
1990s, when the majority of South American countries liberalized their trade regimes.
Launched on September 1, 2000 at a conference of the regions presidents, the South American In-
frastructure Integration Initiative (Iniciativa para la Infraestructura Regional de Sur Amrica or IIRSA) was
founded as the principal forum and institutional mechanism for intergovernmental action on infrastructure
development among the 12 countries of South America. With the stated purpose of creating a common
agenda related to actions and projects of infrastructure integration, IIRSA seeks to develop an interconnect-
ed network of roads, dams, airports, and other projects throughout the continent that will link the regions
66
major cities, ports, and resource hubs.
29
The specifc priorities oI the initiative are: upgrading inIrastructure
in high-traIfc areas; inIrastructure planning and construction in areas with high development potential;
identifcation oI bottlenecks and crucial non-existent connections; and preservation oI the environment and
social resources.
IIRSA has divided its work among nine geographic axes, two of which include Peruvian territory.
The crown jewel of the Southern Amazon Axis, and perhaps of IIRSAs entire portfolio of work, is the
Transoceanic Highway. Also called the Interoceania, this project will connect the three southern Peruvian
ports of San Juan de Marcona, Matarani, and Ilo with the Brazilian ports of Rio de Janeiro and Santos. This
enormous undertaking involves the construction and rehabilitation of 22 bridges and over 3,300 miles of
road that traverse the unforgiving Amazonian basin and the Andes mountains. Seven years after Peruvian
President Alejandro Toledo and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva signed an agreement in 2004,
the Transoceanic Highway was completed in the second half of 2011.
30
Though coordinated by IIRSA, the
project has been fnanced in large part by Brazil`s National Development Bank, the Andean Development
Corporation, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
31
Costs have reached nearly US $2 billion, more
than double the projected amount.
32

The Transoceanic Highway represents a welcome alternative for Brazilian goods destined for Asian
markets. Upon completion of the Highway, Brazil will no longer have to choose between a lengthy naviga-
tion through the Panama Canal or around the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of the continent. Brazils
booming trade with China continues to increase the potential benefts oI the project. The Financial Times
reported last year that Brazil has become something of a one-stop shop for China; as the worlds largest ex-
porter of iron ore and agricultural products including sugar, coffee, and soybeans, Brazils exports to China
have increased 18-fold since 2000,
33
a fgure that clearly demonstrates why a link to the Pacifc is oI such
strategic importance to Brazil. Indeed, the South American giant`s willingness to fnance lagging Peruvian
sections of the highway is indicative of the potential economic gains for Brazil.
The project is highly benefcial Ior both countries, as noted by Juan Carlos Zevallos, President oI
Ositran, Perus transportation regulation body: Brazil is getting a strategic presence in Peru for its orienta-
tion towards Asia...and Peru is getting a historic geopolitical opportunity to link to the future of the world
economy, which is Asia.
34
Constructing a direct path of connection from Brazil, South Americas largest
67
exporter, to Peruvian ports is, to date, the most important milestone on Perus path to becoming a bridge
for South American goods destined for Asian markets. As one of the four countries responsible for over 90
percent of Latin Americas exports to China (the others are Chile, Argentina, and Peru), Brazil must have a
direct link to Peru.
35
The implications of the Transoceanic Highway for trade are not lost on ordinary citizens,
who refer to the project as the road to China.
36
What remains to be seen is the extent to which Brazilian exporters will use the Transoceanic High-
way. Studies assessing the impact of the highway have focused primarily on human displacement and the
associated environmental costs. With respect to its impact on trade, however, this will likely be a function
of multiple variables, including the type of good being exported, the condition and capacity of the ports on
the Peruvian end, and the condition of the roads. Some port operators and shippers maintain that trade with
Asia via the new highway will be limited to value-added goods. James Hall of Galbraiths, an international
shipbroker in London, maintains that bulky goods like soy, iron ore, and grains are better and cheaper to
send by rail (and boat).
37
Still others report that the highway will facilitate the transport of beef, wood and
wood pulp, soya, and in the future, manufactured goods.
38
What is certain is that the planned modernization
and expansion of Perus ports will increase the incentive to use the Transoceanic Highway.
Putting it in Perspective
While the recent completion of the Transoceanic Highway and forthcoming port development projects are
important steps toward Peru becoming a South American bridge for trade with Asia, there remains much
work to be done. For a sense of perspective, it is well to recall Perus ranking as 91
st
out of 125 countries on
the Global Enabling Trade Index. Even more troubling are comparisons between Peru and Chile. Consider-
ation of Peru as a trade bridge and the barriers to that goal would not be complete without an assessment of
Chile, the country most likely to challenge Peru as a trade bridge in South America.
Also situated along the continents east coast, Chile has for several decades been an outlier in the
region in terms oI economic and social development. Chile was one oI the frst countries in the region to
liberalize its trade regime; by 1979, Chile had adopted a uniform 10 percent ad-valorem tariff rate.
39
Un-
like Peru, its trade policy did not fuctuate wildly in the Iace oI economic crisis. The 1982-1983 recession
in Chile prompted only an abbreviated 25-percent increase in tariffs. Today, Chile enjoys a number of free
68
trade agreements with Asian countries, as does Peru. Though the two countries share similar trade policies,
how do they stack up in a comparison of transportation infrastructure?
A handful of indicators suggest that exporters from Argentina and Brazil are likely to choose Chil-
ean ports over ones in Peru. Chilean transportation infrastructure clearly gives it the upper hand in terms
of bridging trade. Chile ranks 41
st
on infrastructure rankings in the Global Competitiveness Report, 47
spots ahead of Peru. Chile maintains an equal distance of 47 places ahead of Peru on the Global Enabling
Trade Reports measure of the availability and quality of transport infrastructure, coming in at 44
th
of 139
countries. According to the World Banks annual Doing Business report, exporting from Peru (US $860 per
container) is more costly than exporting from Chile (US $745 per container).
40
At the moment, the only glimmers of hope for Peru are its advantages in terms of geographic prox-
imity to Asia and the time it takes to export. Perus main port (Callao) is 1,263 miles closer to Shanghai (the
busiest port in China and the world) than Chiles main port in Valparaiso.
41
Still, this advantage is in danger of
vanishingas Chile is soon to beneft Irom a direct link to Brazil via its own transcontinental highway, known
as the Bioceanic corridor.
42
Scheduled to be inaugurated in January 2012, this highway will link Chiles
northern ports of Arica and Iquique with the port of Santos in Brazil. Spanning 2,900 miles, the Chile-Brazil
link will be considerably shorter than the 3,400 mile-long Peru-Brazil highway.
43
Fortunately for exporters,
there are roads that diverge from the Transoceanic Highway (which leads to the countrys southern ports) in
the direction of Callao. Assuming this route is taken, the total distance Brazilian goods must travel to get to
Shanghai, China through Peru is 13,785 miles. Using the Chilean route, Brazilian exports must travel 14,310
miles to reach China.
Though this advantage in terms oI distance may seem negligible it is amplifed by the speedy pro-
cessing time at Perus ports. Doing Business reports that it takes an average of 21 days to export from Chile,
while exporters only waited an average of 12 days in Peru.
44
This refects the Iact that Peru improved the
ease of trading across borders the most in 2011, according to the World Bank. Among other reforms, Peru
instituted a new web-based electronic data interchange system is helping to speed up document submission
as well as clearance time. Fewer physical inspections oI cargo are now needed at customs oIfces thanks to
further implementation of risk-based inspections.
45
Yet an eIfcient customs administration at ports means
nothing iI exporters can`t get their goods there in the frst place. A comparison oI Chile and Peru serves to
69
underscore the case for developing transportation infrastructure.
Rebalancing the Trade Agenda
However ambitious they may be, these piecemeal projects are unlikely to improve Perus rankings to the ex-
tent that it can claim to be an eIfcient Iacilitator oI trade. Adequately addressing the challenges oI transpor-
tation infrastructure will require coordinated efforts at the highest level of government, meaning Peru must
rebalance its formal trade policy to include and prioritize the modernization of transportation infrastructure.
If Peru is serious about its goal of bridging trade between South America and Asia, the federal government
must devote adequate resources to coordinating the work of the myriad parties involved, including the na-
tional port authority (APN), the state-owned port company ENAPU, the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, the Supervising Agency of Investment in Public Transport Infrastructure (Ositran), and
the countrys investment promotion agency (ProInversin).
At the same time, Perus goal of becoming a trade bridge necessitates the development of transpor-
tation infrastructure across the continent. That is, Perus rebalanced trade policy must also incorporate the
promotion of regional infrastructure integration. Though Peru has its most immediate ties with the Andean
Community, this is unlikely to be the proper forum for engagement, not only because of the weak political
will among the member countries for cooperation but also due to the fact that the majority of South American
exports to Asia originate in the southern cone countries. Nevertheless, the Andean Development Corpora-
tion (CAF), originally an Andean Community institution but increasingly global in its orientation, plays a
critical role in the fnancing and development oI large-scale inIrastructure projects and is thus a key ally Ior
Peru. Another source oI project assistance and fnancing is the Inter-American Development Bank, which
has created the Infrastructure Fund (InfraFund), dedicated to assisting public, private and mixed-capital
entities in LAC in the identifcation, development and preparation oI bankable and sustainable inIrastructure
projects.
46

Though CAF and the IDB are certainly important partners, the principal vehicle for the implementa-
tion of regional infrastructure integration remains the South American Infrastructure Integration Initiative
(IIRSA). Backed by technical expertise, on-the-ground experience, and a broad portfolio of completed and
planned projects (as outlined in the organizations Strategic Vision for South America 2020), IIRSA is the
driving force behind regional transportation infrastructure integration today. Within IIRSAs institutional
70
planning mechanisms, which give equal representation to ministers and national representatives from par-
ticipating countries, Peru must advocate projects like the Transoceanic Highway that contribute to Peru
meeting its goal of becoming South Americas trade bridge.
Outside of IIRSA, there are promising signs that Peru is already seeking to promote a coordinated
infrastructure agenda at the international level. This past June, the Peruvian government, in partnership with
the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), hosted the 20th Congress of Latin American Ports in
Lima. Entitled 'Challenges Ior Ports in Latin America: Competitiveness and EIfciency to Adjust to the new
International Economic Situation, the events goals were to promote interaction, sharing of best practices
and strengthening the integration of port logistics at the global level.
47

Peru`s transport inIrastructure modernization eIIorts also stand to beneft Irom engagement with the
Asian countries with which it seeks to bridge trade. Peru might propose and take a leadership role in the de-
velopment oI a similar conIerence or ministerial meeting among key members oI the Asian Pacifc Economic
Cooperation (APEC) to discuss best practices and investment opportunities in infrastructure development.
The 21 countries oI APEC seek to promote Iree trade and economic cooperation along the Pacifc Rim, so
trade facilitation is an area of particular interest to all members. China in particular has both a vested interest
in, and the fnancial resources Ior, the development oI transportation inIrastructure in South America, whose
raw materials and IoodstuIIs are a critical input oI China`s economic engine. Facing the depletion oI fnite
quantities of natural resources, Peru together with Brazil can make a strong appeal to China for investment
in the continents transportation infrastructure.
Due to the magnitude and costs of infrastructure reform, ProInversins goal for Peru to become a
trade bridge will require support and concerted action from the highest levels of government. On a regional
and international level, Peru must take initiative if it is to consolidate its position as the point of departure
from South America and the point of entry from Asia. Perus future as a trade bridge hinges on a rebalanced
trade agenda that recognizes transportation infrastructure as a critical barrier to trade.
How likely is it that this revamped trade agenda will be adopted? The countrys recent transition of
government makes this question diIfcult to answer with any degree oI confdence. Despite Peru`s impressive
economic performance over the past decade, the unequal distribution of this new wealth and the nagging per-
sistence of poverty all but ensured a victory for an opposition party candidate. For many, the prospect of Ol-
71
lanta Humala, a former leftist army commander who espoused a populist platform in previous campaigns, as
president injected an uncomfortable degree of uncertainty into the future orientation of Peruvian economic
policy. Leading up to the 2011 election, however, Humala reinvented himself as a moderate, vowing to keep
existing Iree-market economic policies intact. Since taking oIfce, Humala has Ior the most part remained on
a centrist path.
Humalas active participation in the APEC summit in Honolulu, Hawaii in November 2011 gives
strong reason to believe that his trade policy will pick up where former President Garcia left off. Eager to
continue the spectacular economic growth seen over the past half-decade, President Humala held bilateral
meetings at the summit with the leaders of Canada, China, Japan, Russia, the United States, and Vietnam, in
which he underscored Perus potential to be a gateway into Latin America for Asia.
48
He also touted benefts
of investment in Peru, which offers access to all of South America.
49
What is more, in his meeting with
Russian President Dimitri Medvedev, Humala discussed the countries expanding trade relationship, specif-
cally in the areas of hydrocarbons, mining, aviation, and railroad and port infrastructure.
50
Attracting foreign
investment in infrastructure may prove to be a key strategy for the administration, whose resources will
increasingly be spent on social programs. Thus while these early steps are encouraging, the extent to which
domestic and regional infrastructure improvements are included in trade policy remains unknown.
Eric Toler is a Profect Analvst for the Latin America and Caribbean Region at the U.S. Trade and Development Agencv (USTDA)
in Washington, DC. He holds an M.A. in Latin American Studies and International Business Diplomacv Certihcate from George-
town Universitvs School of Foreign Service. Prior to foining USTDA, he interned at the Ofhce of Market Access and Compliance
at the U.S. Department of Commerce and at the U.S. Commercial Service in Mexico Citv. He speaks Spanish and Portuguese.
72
Endnotes
1. Nuevos puertos convertirn al Per en un hub regional. ProInversin Notas de Prensa. March 31, 2010.
2. Peru exports rise 31.1 percent in 2010 to record level. Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times. January 29
2011; WTO Trade Statistics.
3. World Bank Development Indicators.
4. Global Forecast Update. Scotiabank Group. April 1, 2011.
5. Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, Christian Volpe, and Juan S. Blyde. Unclogging the Arteries. The Impact of
Transportation Costs on Latin American and Caribbean Trade. Washington, DC: The Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank, 2008.
6. Renzo G. Rossini and Jeffrey Carlos E. Paredes. Foreign Trade Policy in Perus Path to Recoverv. A
Plan for Economic Stabili:ation and Growth. The Brookings Institution: Washington, DC, 1991. Pg.
276.
7. Ibid., pg. 277.
8. Rex A. Hudson, ed. Peru. A Countrv Studv. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1992.
9. Rossini and Paredes, pg. 279
10. Ibid, pg. 280
11. Ibid., pg. 284
12. Ibid., page 285
13. Stokes, Susan C. Democratic Accountability and Policy Change: Economic Policy in Fujimoris Peru.
Comparative Politics. 29.2 (1997), 209-226.
14. Finger, Michael J. and Julio J. Nogues. Safeguards and Antidumping In Latin American Trade Liberal-
i:ation. Fighting Fire With Fire. The World Bank, Washington DC, 2005.
15. Peru Selected Issues IMF country report No. 01/5. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 2001.
16. Moreira et. al, pgs. 98-99.
17. Ibid.
18. The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012. The World Economic Forum. Geneva, Switzerland
2011, pg 5.
19. Ibid., pg 33.
20. Global Enabling Trade Report 2010. The World Economic Forum. Geneva Switzerland. 2010. Pg. 220.
21. Gallagher, Kevin. The Fragile Bit of Bric. The Guardian. October 2, 2010.
22. Infrastructure - Airports, Ports & Roads -Opportunities in Peru. UK Trade and Investment Sector Brief-
ing 2010.
23. Global port operator DP World opened what is now South Americas largest and most modern container
73
terminal in October 2010.
Port Development Close to Saturation. The Lima Chamber of Commerce. February 25, 2010. Article re-
trieved from the Commerce International Website.
24. Ibid.
25. 'Quality oI Port InIrastructure, WEF. The World Bank Data. Results accessed Irom the 'Indicators
section, May 7, 2011.
26. Moreira, et. al., pg. 66.
27. Naomi Mapstone. Infrastructure: Effort to rival Panama as regional hub The Financial Times. Sep-
tember 21, 2010.
28. Catherine Setterfeld. 'Muelle Norte Contract Due to Close in 1-2 Months APM Terminal-Peru. Busi-
ness News Americas. April 1, 2011.
29. What is IIRSA? http://www.iirsa.org/Institucional_ENG.asp?CodIdioma=ENG
Kass, Stephen. Assessing South Americas Interoceania Highway. New York Law Journal. August 28,
2009.
30. Rathbone, John Paul. Pristine Forest is Finite Resource. The Financial Times, November 28, 2011.
31. 'Interoceanica Sur ha creado nuevas oportunidades de negocios con Brasil, afrma Maximixe. Andina
Agencia Peruana de Noticias. December 10, 2010.
32. Peru Civil Society Calls for Greater Governance in new CAF Loan to IIRSA Sur Highway. Bank In-
formation Center. December 14, 2010.
33. Wheatley, Jonathan. China and Brazil: A one-stop shop for food and industrial commodities. Financial
Times. November 14, 2010.
34. Wade, Terry. Highways open new trade routes in South America. Reuters. January 27, 2011.
35. Castaneda, Sebastian. South America awake to risks of China ties. Asia Times. April 21, 2011.
36. Babbitt, Bruce. Manifest Destiny in the Amazon Basin. Americas Quarterly. 3.3 (2009): 28-34.
37. Ibid.
38. Butler, Tina. Chinese economy drives road-building and deforestation in the Amazon. Mongaba.com.
April 17, 2005
39. Pavcnik, Nina. Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements: Evidence from Chilean
Plants. Review of Economic Studies. 69.1 (2002), 245-276.
40. Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs. The World Bank, 2011.
41. City Distance Tool. Accessed May 13, 2011. http://www.geobytes.com/citydistancetool.htm Shanghai
Surpasses Singapore as Worlds Busiest Port as Trade Volumes Jump. Bloomberg News. January 7,
2011.
42. 'President Piera confrms the Brazilian President will visit Chile in January. Government oI Chile
website: http://www.gob.cl/english/Ieatured/2011/09/21/president-pinera-confrms-the-brazilian-
president-will-visit-chile-in-january.htm. September 21, 2011.
74
43. Bi-oceanic corridor due to be ready in 2011. Business News Americas. July 6, 2009.
44. Doing Business 2011.
45. Trading Across Borders. Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs. The World
Bank, 2011
46. Transportation Initiative InfraFund. IDB website accessed May 9, 2011. http://www.iadb.org/en/top-
ics/transportation/infrafund,1635.html
47. Peru to Host 2011 Congress of Latin American Ports. Andina Agencia Peruana de Noticias. April 27,
2011.
48. Glickhouse, Rachel. 'At APEC, Latin America Courts Asia-Pacifc Trade. Americas Society Website,
November 14, 2011.
49. Amrica Latina apuesta al nuevo eje que pasa por Asia. InfoLatam website, November 13, 2011.
50. Glickhouse 2011.
75
Sustainability in Tourism Development
Case Study: Nicaragua
Roman Yavich
Introduction
The tourism industry in Nicaragua has seen rapid growth for more than a decade. According to the latest
fgures available Irom the National Tourism Institute (INTUR), the average rate oI annual growth in Ior-
eign arrivals was 13% from 1989 (117,666) to 2003 (646,743). Approximately 81% of foreign arrivals in
2003 were tourists. In 2004 the growth rate increased to 16%. Tourism has eclipsed coffee as the biggest
export and the biggest industry in the Nicaraguan economy, bringing in $151.8 million and accounting for
25.1% of total income generated from exports in 2003.
12
Nicaraguan lawmakers have welcomed the growth of the tourism industry, enacting tax breaks and
other incentives for large-scale and, more recently, medium-scale tourism projects. INTUR, charged with
promotion and development of national and regional tourism, has seen its budget expanded over the last
decade and, with the arrival of the Ortega administration, has become a branch of the federal government.
Considering the growth of tourism, regulation of this industry has become more urgent than its promotion.
The left-leaning administration of President Ortega, which came to power in 2006, has emphasized
sustainability in its tourism policy. Many large-scale tourism developments have had to invest in public
areas, housing projects and other types oI benefts to the local communities as a part oI their agreement
with the Nicaraguan government. Still, the impact of tourism has been mixed, and often negative in terms
of environmental and social impact.
1 is was the last year for which consistent data was available from INTUR at the time the research was conducted.
2 Research for this project was conducted under a Fulbright Grant during 2006-2007 in Managua, San Juan del Sur, Leon, Omete-
pe Island, and other locations in Nicaragua.
76
Sustainability: More Than a Buzzword
The United Nations defnes sustainable development as 'development that meets the needs oI the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainability principles
refer to the environmental, sociocultural, and economic aspects of development; a suitable balance must be
established between these three dimensions.
The World Tourism Organization specifes that sustainable tourism should:
make optimal use of environmental resources
respect the socio-cultural authenticity of host communities
ensure viable, long-term economic operations
provide Iairly distributed socio-economic benefts to all stakeholders, including stable employment,
income-earning opportunities, and social services to host communities
contribute to poverty alleviation
require the informed participation of all relevant stakeholders under a framework of strong political
leadership
maintain a high level of tourist satisfaction
Building a sustainable tourism industry is a continuous process requiring constant monitoring of
environmental, sociocultural, and economic impact as well as commitment to appropriate preventive and/
or corrective measures.
Evidence From Around the World
An idea of the problems caused by tourism development may be gained from examinations of countries
further along the development curve than Nicaragua, a relatively new tourism destination. A study by Hall
(2003), published in The Journal of Sustainable Tourism, of the Montenegro and the Adriatic region re-
veals the principal concerns with coastal tourism over-development: visual pollution Irom housing, traIfc
congestion, air and water pollution, and the seasonality of the economic cycle. Each of these problems can
be mitigated through diversifcation, as the author explains, towards maritime, cultural, health, and historic
tourism.
3
3 Hall, Derek. Rejuvenation, Diversication and Imagery: sustainability conicts for tourism policy in the Eastern Adriatic.
Journal of Sustainable Tourism Vol. 11, No. 2&3, 2003
77
One method of preventing over-development is capacity management, which restricts the num-
ber of visitors to a particular location or the number of participants in a particular activity. This policy is
implemented in Peru on the Machu Picchu trail, where the local government limits the number of hikers
on the trail to 500 on any one day.
4
Buckley (2002), also publishing in the Journal of Sustainable Tourism,
Iound that capacity management by government authorities in Indo-Pacifc islands is more eIIective than
voluntary measures taken by tour operators, who often do not have an incentive to limit supply.
5
Involving
private sector and other stakeholders, however, was found to be essential in the success of sustainable tour-
ism development objectives in Morocco and Tunisia by Caffyn and Jobbins (2003). A horizontal frame-
work bringing together government oIfcials with tour operators and local residents Iacilitated inIormation
transIer which was diIfcult to achieve in a vertical decision-making environment.
6
Research Methodology
Thirty four semi-structured interviews were conducted over a 10 month period in San Juan del Sur, Nicara-
gua in 2006-2007, to understand the stakeholders perceptions of tourism development. Seventeen tourism
business owners , 11 local residents, and six government oIfcials were interviewed. In addition 39 tourists
completed a written questionnaire. The town of San Juan del Sur was selected as the main geographic fo-
cus of the research due to its rapid tourism-driven growth and its corresponding ability to serve as a model
for the industrys expansion in other Nicaraguan communities. Other locations for data collection in Nica-
ragua included the Pacifc Southwest, Ometepe Island, and the Pacifc Northwest oI the country.
Summary of Collected Data
Tourists
Tourists are drawn to Nicaragua by cultural and natural attractions that can be experienced at a fraction of
the cost of other destinations. Despite the countrys growing popularity with tourists, there are a number of
obstacles which may detract Irom the tourist experience. Survey respondents were highly satisfed with the
Iriendliness oI locals and the aesthetic qualities oI Nicaragua, two Iactors they identifed as most impor-
4 Resolution N 02- 2003-UGM-CD.http://www.chemin-inca.com/trek/regulations.php?lg=en
5 Buckley, Ralf. Surf Tourism and Sustainable Development in Indo-Pacic Islands. e Industry and the Islands.Journal of
Sustainable Tourism Vol. 10, No. 5, 2002
6 Cayn, Alison and Jobbins, Guy. Governance Capacity and Stakeholder Interactions in the Development and Management of
Coastal Tourism: examples from Morocco and Tunisia. Journal of Sustainable Tourism Vol. 11, No. 2&3, 2003 (226)
78
tant in questionnaires. They were not satisfed, however, with the ease oI travel within Nicaragua, another
Iactor they rated as very important to their overall experience. Other diIfculties noted by tourists included
problems with infrastructure, especially water and electricity, and excessive garbage on road ways. Tourist
satisfaction is, of course, essential to sustaining and expanding tourism growth.
Many tourists seem to be aware of both positive and negative impacts of the industry. Most see the
benefts oI tourism development as largely economic, while the detriments as largely socio-environmental,
a view shared by local residents and government oIfcials. Most tourists said they would be willing to pay a
premium to service providers they knew to be operating with more sustainable practices. This willingness
to accept higher costs in exchange Ior more sustainable goods and services has signifcance Ior tour opera-
tors, suggesting that investments in sustainability do not have solely ethical or environmental benefts.
Local Residents
Local residents of San Juan del Sur and several other tourist destinations have mixed feelings about tour-
ism development. They fnd themselves balancing the economic benefts oI job creation with socio-cultural
detriments such as the deterioration of culture, environmental degradation, and social marginalization. Few
place faith in the government to address these issues effectively. Education and technical training are seen
by most as the path to taking a more active role in the development process and reaping more of the ben-
efts oI development. The marginalization oI the local residents by the development process is an espe-
cially signifcant concern in the context oI the tourism industry given that tourists rated 'Iriendliness oI the
locals as one of the most important factors contributing to their satisfaction.
Business Owners
Not surprisingly, business owners in Nicaragua have a more economically-oriented view of sustainability
than the other stakeholders in the sustainable tourism equation. They have a limited and often unpleasant
interaction with government, and many would like to see more support from the public sector. Some pro-
prietors understand the importance of positive interaction between locals and tourists, invest in hospitality
and language training of their staff, and provide ample opportunity for tourists to interact with employees.
Some take the time to educate tourists on sustainability issues. The sustainability practices of interviewed
businesses varied but generally Iell short oI international certifcation benchmarks. Education and stronger
enforcement of regulations topped the list of suggestions from owners for improvement in sustainability.
79
Government Ofhcials
OIfcials generally had a wider interpretation oI sustainability than their private sector counterparts, un-
derstanding the importance of monitoring and regulating the environmental and social impact of tourism.
Like most government activities, these measures depend on the availability of funding. INTUR and many
municipal governments have budget defcits due to the ineIfcient and loophole-ridden tax code. For exam-
ple, the Tourism Investment Incentive Law 306 exempts large development projects from paying national
and municipal taxes. This law has attracted a large number of foreign investors to Nicaragua, but has also
reduced the tax base available to fund the monitoring of these and other developments. Tax evasion, com-
mitted by various businesses but especially by smaller commercial entities, compounds the problem. With
an insuIfcient tax revenue, the government can do little more than prioritize spending and cut the budgets
of important agencies. INTUR, for example, receives only a fraction of the 4% of the Value Added Tax
revenue that it is entitled to. Chronically underfunded, INTUR and the municipalities of Nicaragua are left
to depend on outside agencies and development organizations to achieve many of their goals, including
sustainability improvements.
Interviewed oIfcials said that directly engaging the private sector is one way to reduce Iunding
shortfalls and ensure long-term sustainability. Large developments are strongly encouraged through the
permitting process to set aside a certain percentage of their budget for community projects and public
areas. Small businesses, which comprise as much as 80% of the tourism sector in Nicaragua, are less likely
to evade taxes iI they beneft signifcantly Irom government programs, such technical training, fnancing
and promotion. In an effort to support and empower small tourism businesses INTUR has created several
industry associations such as the National Tourism Chamber of Commerce (CANTUR). Such organiza-
tions help unify small businesses and give them a stronger voice on issues of national policy and resource
allocation.
The importance of consensus building in tourism development is increasingly acknowledged, but
the practice has been slow to catch on. In San Juan del Sur, the recently created Municipal Tourism Com-
mission (COTUR) was founded by a foreign development organization with the help of local authorities
to engage the private sector and the local population in direct dialogue. The commission is comprised of
representatives of the municipal government and its service arms, most major industries, local residents,
80
and foreign investors. The main goals of COTUR are to promote private investment and tourism, protect
local culture, and provide support to small- and medium-sized tourism businesses. It also serves as a joint
decision-making forum. The effectiveness of this body has yet to be proven, in part because many impor-
tant decisions are often made by the municipal government without proper collaboration with COTUR.
With regard to other sustainability initiatives, government oIfcials see service quality standards in
small business operation as especially important. Efforts to improve quality include training for employees,
gathering customer Ieedback, and certifcation. Nevertheless, not a single business in the Rivas Depart-
ment (where San Juan del Sur is located) took advantage of a free training program provided by INTUR in
2005. Certifcation procedures and standards are still in development. Complimenting technical training,
improvements in general education Ior the local population were identifed unanimously by interviewed
oIfcials as essential Ior sustainability. Just as with other measures, educational improvements are hard to
achieve in an environment oI budget defcits. While government oIfcials at the local level are conscious oI
the need for sustainability improvements, actual implementation has proven to be a challenge.
At the national level, promotion, and not regulation, topped oIfcials` priority list. National oIfcials
often view monitoring, regulation and enforcement as best handled at the local level, where they can be
more directly and eIfciently carried out. UnIortunately, municipal governments are oIten plagued by the
same fnancial and bureaucratic obstacles Iound at the national level.
In addition to consistent international promotion, INTUR has recently increased its focus on the
domestic market. In 2006 the agency spent an unprecedented15% of its annual budget on marketing within
Nicaragua. While most Nicaraguans visit coastal towns during the week of Easter, they seldom visit their
countrys tourist hotspots at other times of the year. Increasing domestic tourism during other times of the
year could be a viable sustainable development strategy as it would decrease the stress on destinations
during peak season and augment income during low season. Geographic diversifcation is another priority
for INTUR. In the near future the agency hopes to develop the Northern Highlands, the Rio San Juan, and
Ometepe Island as primary destinations, decreasing the stress on more popular destinations like Masaya/
Granada and San Juan del Sur while increasing the overall size of the tourism industry.
81
Recommendations for Advancing Sustainable Tourism Development in Nicaragua
Sustainability is not a state but rather a process by which companies, governments, and individuals are able
to minimize the negative effects and maximize the positive effects of a particular activity. Tourism devel-
opment in Nicaragua is not yet sustainable based on this defnition. The most eIIective way to increase sus-
tainability is through joint decision-making among all the stakeholders of the Nicaraguan tourism industry.
Empower Local-level Dialogue Forums
Dialogue forums such as COTUR in San Juan del Sur are essential for sustainable tourism. An important
beneft oI these Iorums is in the participation private sector in direct dialogue with the public sector. To be
successful, the decisions made in these forums should form the basis for relevant government policies and
regulations. Government oIfcials` commitment to heeding the recommendations oI dialogue Iorums would
lead to greater trust from constituents. Further, the public sector should serve as the facilitator among
stakeholder groups at local, departmental, and national levels of decision making.
Develop and Promote Training Workshops
To encourage public-private cooperation, training workshops should be created for business employees as
well as residents of tourism destinations. Residents could be educated on waste management, for example,
resulting in a reduction of litter and leading to higher tourist satisfaction. English and computer skills
classes would make the labor force more competitive, promoting local hiring practices. Training for small
business owners and managers could focus on customer service and marketing to build better understand-
ing of foreign market demand and make locally-owned businesses more competitive. Financing workshops
with both public and private funds would solidify inter-sector cooperation.
Invest in Other Types of Education
All stakeholder groups identifed education as a priority in achieving sustainability. Increased educational
attainment is perhaps the only way to shift Nicaragua out of a cycle of economic stagnation and debt. A
more educated population means a more skilled labor force and a stronger economy, investing in the Nica-
raguan education system is a logical move for tour operators and other private sector companies. Financ-
ing teachers salaries, providing school supplies, and helping build new classrooms are a few of the ways
through which businesses can begin to make improvements in the Nicaraguan community and economy.
82
Encourage Sustainable Investment
Nicaraguan tourism incentive law (Ley 306) has been successful in attracting a growing amount of invest-
ment activity. Now the focus must shift to encouraging responsible and sustainable investment. With this
goal, incentives may still be applied but should be restricted to businesses operating within predefned
margins oI social responsibility and environmental ethics. Sustainability certifcation can play an important
part in this process. Companies taking the extra step of adhering to international standards could receive
additional government incentives in addition to improving the effects of their operation on on their com-
munities and environments.
Improve Policy Enforcement
Coupled with the need for sustainability incentives, is the need for stronger social and environmental
policy enforcement. This means a reassignment of government funds away from promotion and toward
institutions such as MARENA, the ministry of natural resources, which grants environmental permits and
monitors development activity, or the Coast Guard, which enforces the protection of endangered species.
In addition, companies must be held accountable for their tax paying duty. Without tightening and enforce-
ment of tax law, the cycle of low budgets and limited institutional capacity cannot be broken. A stronger
tax base would also allow the government to fnance inIrastructure development, essential Ior maintaining
tourism growth.
Sustainability Branding Can Translate into Increased Revenues
The need Ior certifcation programs in Nicaragua is underscored by the fnding that tourists are willing to
pay more money for businesses they know to be more sustainable. This allows businesses with a brand of
sustainability to charge higher prices and attract a larger segment of the market though differentiation. Cer-
tifcation processes are oIten coupled with training, which increases the quality oI service oIIered by local
businesses.
Educate Tourists
Finally, to encourage more sustainable behavior from tourists, informative brochures may be given to all
tourists entering the country. The brochures could explain the importance of sustainable tourism and the
role of the tourist in this process. They could also provide publicity for the businesses cooperating with the
public sector in achieving more sustainable operations. Finally, brochures could serve as feedback forms to
83
provide information to be used in local and national decision-making processes and advertisement.
Conclusion
Like any other industry, tourism has both positive and negative effects. The key to sustainable tourism
development is maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative effects, especially when the latter can
undermine the industrys long term success. Strategies to this end have to include the variety of stakehold-
ers of the tourism industry in order to leverage their unique resources and align their unique interests. The
public sector has to take the lead in this processes, bringing the other stakeholders to the table and holding
them accountable for commitments to sustainable tourism development.
Roman Yavich developed an interest in Latin American affairs after studving abroad in Chile in 2003 and researching the causes
of income inequalitv in Buenos Aires in 2004. In 2006 Roman researched the sustainabilitv of tourism in Nicaragua on the Ful-
bright grant. He founded Comunidad Connect, a Nicaraguan communitv development nonproht in 2007. Roman holds bachelors
degrees in economics and hnance from the Universitv of Colorado and a Masters in Public Administration from the Maxwell
School at Svracuse Universitv. He is currentlv completing a Masters in Environmental Science at SUNY College of Environmen-
tal Science and Forestrv and serves as the Treasurer for Comunidad Connect.

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