Proceedings of the 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference IPC2012 September 24-28, 2012, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

IPC2012-90223

FAILURE INVESTIGATION OF A NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINE

Vinod Chauhan GL Noble Denton Loughborough, UK James Gilliver GL Noble Denton Loughborough, UK Ian Thompson GL Noble Denton Newcastle, UK Arie Laksana PT. Transportasi Gas Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia Ian Fordyce GL Noble Denton Glasgow, UK Andrew Connell GL Noble Denton Loughborough, UK Paul Ng GL Noble Denton Loughborough, UK M. Komaruddin PT. Transportasi Gas Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia

Sudhakar Peravali GL Noble Denton Loughborough, UK Hadi Saleh Gl Noble Denton Loughborough, UK Dadang Lalan PT. Transportasi Gas Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia

ABSTRACT PT Transportasi Gas Indonesia (TGI) own and operate a 536 km long natural gas pipeline in South Sumatra, Indonesia which transports natural gas from ConocoPhillipss gas field in Grissik, South Sumatra to Chevron Pacific Indonesias station facilities in Duri. On 29th September 2010, an event occurred that resulted in a release of gas from the pipeline. In response to the emergency, the affected section of the pipeline was isolated by closing block valves upstream and downstream of the leak. The incident was brought under control by TGI on the same day and there were no reported injuries or fatalities. Failure was located in a girth weld on a 28 inch diameter pipe section, which had spread into the adjacent pipe material. Subsequently a failure investigation was requested by TGI. The investigation included a fracture examination and materials testing of the failed girth weld and parent pipe; a geotechnical investigation; and an engineering critical analysis (ECA) of the failure. This paper describes the multidisciplinary works undertaken to investigate the cause of the incident. The primary observation of this failure investigation is that no single factor contributed to the failure that occurred. The pipeline at the rupture location had been subjected to high

bending stresses when the pipeline was laid and the stresses were exacerbated following consolidation and creep settlement of the underlying swamp material. The field joint coating had been compromised, leading to the formation of near neutral stress corrosion cracking (SCC). Initial cracking from the SCC had then extended to the point where the remaining ligament then failed by plastic collapse. It was judged that the settlement may also have been enhanced by a recent earthquake. INTRODUCTION Girth welds form an integral part of a natural gas transmission pipeline construction and are critical in terms of design, operation and maintenance. In addition to the hoop stress acting on the girth weld due to internal pressure; its orientation makes the weld susceptible to additional external bending loads resulting from conditions such as soil settlement [1]. Although these external loads are considered during the pipeline design, operation in severe ground conditions over a period of time could result in additional loading not accounted for in the original design. PT Transportasi Gas Indonesia (TGI) own and operate a 28 inch diameter, 536 km natural gas pipeline in South Sumatra,

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Indonesia. The pipeline, designed to ASME B31.8 [2] in 1995, transports natural gas from ConocoPhillipss gas field in Grissik, South Sumatra to Chevron Pacific Indonesias station facilities in Duri. On 29th September 2010, an event occurred that resulted in a release of gas from the pipeline. In response to the emergency, the affected section of the pipeline was isolated by closing block valves upstream and downstream of the leak. The incident was brought under control by TGI on the same day and there were no reported injuries or fatalities. TGI located the failure in a girth weld on a 28 inch diameter pipe section, which had spread into the adjacent pipe material. A failure investigation was subsequently commissioned by TGI to investigate the cause of the incident. For the purpose of this failure investigation a section of pipe was cut out (3 metres either side of the failure) to assist in the determination of the cause of failure, Fig.1. The details provided in this paper address four key phases of study. Initial desktop study Geotechnical investigation Fracture examination and materials testing Engineering critical analysis (ECA) of the failure.

It was confirmed from the above figure that the rupture occurred at the position where the pipeline assumed a curvature to suit the slope contour. However, the pipe tally listing demonstrated that a field bend was not used in the construction of the pipeline at this section. A field bend typically involves cold bending the pipe at site (work hardening) to achieve a curvature which allows the pipe to follow the slope contour during construction. Due to the absence of the field bend it was anticipated that bending stresses were generated at the rupture location. The pipeline operation and maintenance records were reviewed and it was found that the pipeline was being operated within its original design intent. The hydrotest carried out on the pipe section where failure had occurred was also in compliance with the requirements of ASME B31.8. Furthermore, there were no reported features at the ruptured girth weld section during in-line inspection carried out on the pipeline in 2004. However, it was noted that the field coating used for the pipeline and the girth weld (heat shrinkable sleeves) is susceptible to soil stressing, which could lead to loss of adhesion between the pipe and the coating. This could be followed by ground water ingress and subsequent corrosion. It was also identified that heat shrink sleeves could potentially be susceptible to cathodic protection or CP shielding. Cathodic shielding prevents the protective electric current from the CP system from reaching the underlying metal due to the very high electrical resistance of the coating. GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATION The scope of the geotechnical investigation was to ascertain if ground movements were likely to have been a contributory factor in the pipeline rupture and to undertake a soil/pipeline interaction analysis. To achieve this, a topographical survey and ground investigation was scoped out by the GL Noble Denton geotechnical engineer during the site visit and undertaken by an Indonesian geotechnical contractor, Geotindo Mitra Kencane (GMK). The topographical survey focused on the pipeline rupture location and covered an area of approximately 300 m wide (150 m either side of the pipeline) by 500 m in length (250 m upstream and 250 m downstream of the rupture). The topographical survey and as-built position obtained from the survey data showed that the rupture occurred near the toe of a 25 m high and 200 m long cutting inclined at 10 degrees. The survey also showed that the slope of the natural topography was approximately 30 degrees and that the ground adjacent to the toe of the slope was relatively flat consisted of swamp deposits. From observations made during the site visit, the natural topography showed signs of instability at 30 degrees and there was an apparent embankment that had been constructed over the swamp deposits. It was assumed that the inclined cutting

The initial desktop study, geotechnical investigation and fracture examination were carried out to identify the failure mechanism and loading conditions present on the pipeline due to the original pipeline design and subsequent change in ground conditions. The next stage of work was the ECA involved finite element analysis (FEA) and a fracture assessment to determine whether the load level were sufficient to cause failure. DESKTOP STUDY The desktop study was aimed at assessing the original pipeline design. The 28 inch diameter pipeline had a wall thickness of 10.5 mm and was constructed from API 5L Grade X65 line pipe material. The pipeline was designed to the 1995 version of ASME B31.8 [2], with a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 7.3 MPa (1060 psi). The operating pressure recorded at the compression station on the upstream side of the failed pipe section, prior to the failure was equal to 6.94 MPa (1007 psi). The first stage of the desktop study involved assessing the alignment sheets provided by TGI to determine the ground contours at the location of the rupture. Data from the alignment sheet demonstrated that the location of the weld that ruptured was near the toe of a hill. However, the alignment sheet did not demonstrate the as-laid position of the pipeline with respect to the contour. To overcome this, the contour of the hill along with the profile of the pipeline was obtained from the as-built survey and the information plotted onto a graph, Fig. 2 demonstrates the outcome of this exercise.

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had been formed in order to provide fill material to the apparent embankment. It was also assumed that the apparent embankment was constructed to provide a working platform over the soft swamp deposits at the toe of the slope in order to aid pipeline construction. The ground investigation which included a number of exploratory trial pits and boreholes, allowed a geological section to be inferred and provided geotechnical parameters. The ground investigation identified that the in situ material forming the slope was essentially formed from a reddish grey coloured, medium to high plastic, very stiff to hard clay. The SPT N values varied between 50 and 100 blows. The ground investigation also identified the following ground profile for the horizontal ground: 1. The first layer was dominated by a soft to medium stiff silty clay (Apparent Embankment Fill). This unit had a maximum thickness of 2.0m. 2. The second layer was dominated by soft to medium stiff organic clay (Swamp Deposits). This material was proven to a depth of approximately 2.0m below datum. 3. The third layer consisted of fine to coarse grained, poorly graded, grayish white, dense, uncemented quartz sand, with a trace clay (Quarts Sands). This material was proven to a depth of approximately 11.0m below datum. 4. The fourth layer a reddish grey coloured, medium to high plastic, very stiff to hard clay and was likely to be the same material identified in the slope. The inferred geological section is shown in Fig.3. The geotechnical investigation identified a number of geotechnical mechanisms that could have contributed towards ground movement and reviewed the potential for each of these occurring. From this it was concluded that the only credible geotechnical mechanism that may have contributed to the pipeline rupture was settlement of the apparent embankment fill due to consolidation of the underlying swamp deposits. Settlement and soil/pipeline interaction assessments were then undertaken. The settlement assessment only set out to prove that settlement could have been a cause and did not set out to model real time soil/pipeline settlement behaviour. A conservative one dimensional calculation [3] of the consolidation settlement indicated that consolidation settlement due to the presence of the apparent embankment would have been 100% complete within two years of the embankment construction and that vertical displacements in the order of 700mm were likely to have occurred. Using this 100% consolidation settlement profile, a soil/pipeline interaction assessment was carried out using Ple4Win Version 4.1.2 [4]. This assessment assumed a simple elastic constitutive model for the pipeline material and showed that for a design pressure of 7.93 MPa (1150 psi) the

longitudinal bending stresses would have exceeded the Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) for the pipeline material grade. In addition to the consolidation settlement, creep settlement [5] of the organic swamp deposit material would have continued increasing the longitudinal bending stresses with time. Although not specifically modelled, creep settlement assessments have indicated that between 75mm and 248mm of settlement may have occurred since the pipeline had been constructed and an additional 96mm to 321mm of settlement could be expected over the next 40 years. Furthermore, a 4.4 magnitude (MLv) earthquake, 24km to the south of the rupture location was recorded by the Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi & Geofisika (BMKG) 7 months earlier. Although not proven, it is possible that this event may have enhanced the consolidation and creep settlement. However, this assessment was not scoped out for in this project. In summary, the site visit, topographical survey and ground investigation identified that settlement was a likely factor to the failure mechanism. The simple soil/pipeline interaction assessment then confirmed that additional stresses due to settlement were significant and the total magnitude of the stresses in the pipe wall were in excess of the SMYS of the line pipe material. METALLURGICAL INVESTIGATION The cut out section of the failed girth weld was subjected to non-destructive testing, fractography and microstructural analysis to determine the failure mechanism. In addition, testing was also carried out to determine the properties of the weld and parent material; this was undertaken to assess the properties against the original design and to use in the ECA if deemed necessary. Approach Metallurgical investigations of the fracture surface showed that the circumferential fracture occurred between 80 and 322 degrees with respect to top dead centre of the pipeline (i.e. 0 degrees), which corresponds to an approximate length of 150cm Fig. 4. In addition to the visible fracture, magnetic particle inspection (MPI) conducted in the laboratory indicated a number of crack-like indications running along the heat affected zone (HAZ) of the girth weld at the pipe outer surface. The fracture faces were separated for further examination and cleaned to reveal the underlying structure. The fracture faces were initially examined visually and with a low powered stereo optical microscope. Selected regions of the fracture faces were additionally characterised by scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Transverse through wall sections were

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taken from the girth weld at selected regions for macroexamination and microstructural analysis. The metallurgical examination of the failed pipework was also complemented by a comprehensive material property testing programme. Discussion of Metallurgical Examination Non destructive examination and visual examination of the failed girth weld identified regions of cracking along the pipe heat affected zone (HAZ) on both sides, Fig. 5. The cracks observed were all in-service defects as examination of the asbuilt radiographs of the failed girth weld provided by TGI did not indicate any significant defects during fabrication. The fracture faces were subsequently separated for further examination. Towards the outer surface, the fracture faces were covered in black corrosion products, Fig. 6. From the atomic proportions of the major elements determined by EDX analysis in the SEM, it was considered that the corrosion product was most likely to contain iron carbonate (FeCO3) in addition to oxide corrosion products. Iron carbonate is a corrosion product typically associated with stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in steel pipelines [6]. At these locations the fracture occurred in the circumferential direction on a plane lying approximately perpendicular to the inner and outer surfaces. The appearance of the fracture faces indicates that multiple crack initiation occurred at the outer surface, in the girth weld HAZ. Microstructural examination indicated a number of secondary cracks propagating from the main crack front, Fig. 7. Following the cleaning of the fracture faces a number of layer-like crack progression marks were observed aligned across the crack face in the circumferential direction, indicating a cyclic or periodic progression of the crack front through the wall thickness, Fig. 8. Further, from the outer surface there were a number of concentric arc-shaped bands radiating from a region just below the outer surface of the pipe towards the inner surface, Fig. 9. These bands are consistent with fracture progression lines where the crack may have arrested for a period of time before propagating further. This may be explained by the fact that for stress corrosion cracking of a susceptible material to occur a specific corrosive environment and sufficient tensile stress is required; if either of these is removed then propagation will discontinue [6]. The progression marks observed indicate that periodically either the stress had decreased below the threshold stress or the corrosive environment became inactive. In between the progression marks were fine striations perpendicular to the crack growth direction, further indicating that the crack growth was discontinuous. Outside of the regions where the dark corrosion products were observed the appearance of the fracture faces was consistent with ductile tearing and ductile shear failure, with bulk plastic deformation in the parent pipe being observed.

There are two principal types of SCC that cause failures in steel pipelines. These are referred to as near neutral pH (or low pH) SCC and high pH SCC. The names refer to the degree to which the environment in contact with the pipe surface is acidic or alkaline. The most significant difference in the appearance of near-neutral SCC to high pH SCC is that near-neutral cracks are transgranular and typically fairly wide and filled with corrosion product, whereas high pH cracks are typically narrow with no evidence of secondary corrosion to the crack wall. As was observed from the metallurgical examination of the failure, the dark-coloured crack sections were concluded to be transgranular and for the most part were covered in thick corrosion product layers. The mechanism of near-neutral pH SCC is not as well understood as high pH SCC. It appears to involve selective corrosion with cracks typically initiated at corrosion pits where the local environment has a pH low enough to produce atomic hydrogen in the pit. Carbon dioxide present in ground water is an essential component in generating the near-neutral pH required to promote near-neutral SCC (the higher the level of CO2 the lower the pH) [6]. Some of the atomic hydrogen discharged as a result of the corrosion process enters the steel and causes embrittlement of the material immediately ahead of the crack tip allowing crack initiation and growth. The failure in the pipeline initiated in the outer surface within the coarse grained heat affected zone (CGHAZ) adjacent to the cap of the girth weld. It has been observed in previous instances of near neutral SCC in Canada that the CGHAZ adjacent to the weld may be more susceptible to cracking than the base material in the near-neutral pH environment [7], however the greater susceptibility of the CGHAZ has yet to be confirmed. MATERIALS PROPERTY ASPECTS Parent Material Materials testing of the parent pipe materials consisted of chemical analysis, tensile testing, Charpy impact energy testing and drop weight tear testing. The parent pipe materials met the requirements of API 5L [8] grade X65 in terms of Charpy impact testing and drop weight tear testing. The chemical composition of the pipe material complies with the requirements of API 5L for grade X65 seam welded pipe in terms of limits specified for carbon, silicon, manganese, phosphorous and sulphur. Carbon equivalent is not a requirement from the API 5L 1995 edition, however in the more recent versions carbon equivalent (CE) is used as a quality requirement for the pipe chemical composition. The calculated CE (Pcm) for the two pipes were 0.17 and 0.16 and would therefore be acceptable in accordance with API 5L (2007) [9] which specifies a maximum of 0.25. The tensile properties were

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at the low end of the requirements in API 5L however, this was judged not to have been a factor in the failure. Girth Weld Materials testing showed that the girth weld met the requirements of API 1104 [10] with respect to macro examination, hardness testing, Charpy impact testing, cross weld tensile testing, crack tip opening displacement (CTOD) fracture toughness testing, face bend testing and nick break testing. However, the root bend specimen failed the testing requirements of API 1104 [10] with the maximum defect observed being 3.40 mm (3 mm maximum permitted). Prior to the rupture of the girth weld a significant amount of strain would have occurred in the weld which may well have affected the result of the root bend specimen. ENGINEERING CRITICAL ANALYSIS The ECA of the original pipeline was carried out using the information obtained during the metallurgical investigation, materials testing and the geotechnical investigation. As the this assessment only set out to investigate if settlement could have been a cause and did not set out to model real time settlement behaviour, the magnitude of the consolidation settlement loading was applied to the finite element analysis (FEA) model to determine the stress levels in the vicinity of the girth weld. The stresses predicted by the FEA were subsequently used as an input into a fracture assessment using API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 [11]. Finite Element Modelling The approach adopted for the finite element (FE) modelling was to construct a half symmetry global model of the failed pipe section without the girth weld detail, analyse the behaviour of this model due to the imposed loads and then carry out a detailed analysis using a sub-model of the pipe section that included a detailed representation of the girth weld. The geometry of the girth weld was obtained by reviewing the weld procedure specification records provided and the macrographs obtained as part of the metallurgical analysis/materials testing , Fig. 10. The length of pipe considered in the global model was a 2000mm section either side of the weld, giving a combined length of the FE model equal to 4000mm. The FE modelling, analyses and post processing was carried out using the commercially available non-linear FE code, ABAQUS [12]. The total length of the pipe section used for the sub-model was equal to 1000mm, with the weld modelled at the centre position. Meshing for the sub-model was carried out using 20-node reduced integration brick elements; ABAQUS type C3D20R, as shown in Fig. 11. A reference node was also created on the pipe

axis at the centre of the weld in order to apply the necessary boundary conditions to the sub-model. The material properties used in the FE analyses were the lower bound values obtained from the tensile tests on the parent pipe and weld metal. It is necessary to specify the true stress versus true strain of the parent and the weld metal in a non-linear FE analysis. Therefore lower bound engineering stress versus strain curves for both the parent and the weld metal were converted to true stress versus true strain curves and subsequently input into the FE analyses, Fig. 12. The measured yield strength and ultimate tensile strength for the parent pipe material was equal to 440 MPa and 520 MPa respectively. For the weld metal the respective values increased to 484 MPa and 575 MPa. The Youngs Modulus (E) for these specimens obtained from tests data were equal to 212 GPa and 238 GPa for parent and weld material respectively. A Poissons ratio of 0.3 was used for both the parent pipe and the weld metal in the FE analyses; this is a typical value for ferritic steels. Symmetry boundary conditions where applied to the submodel as appropriate, i.e. the ABAQUS XSYMM option was used for all nodes with an x coordinate of zero Fig.11. In addition, the behavior of all the nodes on the plane perpendicular to the pipe axis at the weld section were constrained to the behavior of the respective reference nodes defined along the pipe axis, using the *COUPLING constraint definition in ABAQUS, as shown in Fig. 11. This definition allows the pipe to deform about the centre of the pipe axis. The loads applied to the pipe section were the internal pressure loading and the bending loads due to the original pipe profile as well as settlement due to soil consolidation during the operating life of the pipeline. The internal pressure applied to the FE models was the operating pressure of the pipeline at the time of failure. This was equal to 6.943 MPa (1007 psi). The vertical displacements and axial extensions along the length of the pipeline due to consolidation settlement over its operating life were obtained from geotechnical investigations. These results showed the combined relative vertical displacement between the ends of the pipe at the 2000mm position and the girth weld to be equal to 19.3mm. This comprised a 5.4mm vertical displacement from the as-built profile and a 13.9mm vertical displacement from the consolidation settlement. The relative axial extension between the downstream end of the pipe section at the 2000mm position and the girth weld due to ground settlement was equal to 0.4mm. These loads were first applied to the global model. Since the sub-model is driven by the displacements from the global model, the only loading applied to the sub-model is the internal pressure of 6.94 MPa. Displacements at nodes 500mm distance away from the centre position on the global model were imported into the sub-model to simulate the response of the remaining section which was not included in the sub-model. The reference node on the pipe axis of the sub-model at the weld section was completely fixed

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during the course of analysis and only radial expansion was permitted at this position, Fig.11. The key stress component for the load conditions described above is the axial or longitudinal stress along the length of the pipeline. These stress contours on the sub-model are presented in Fig. 13. The presence of regions of stress concentration, such as the weld root and the weld cap within the model, results in high local stresses. These high local stresses are not meaningful for presentation purpose and therefore the maximum contour level on the plot in Fig.13 has been fixed to the ultimate tensile strength (UTS) of the parent pipe material, 520 MPa. The grey contours show regions with stress levels predicted to be above the UTS of the parent metal. From the stress contour plot it can be inferred that for the applied internal pressure and bending loads, the membrane stress through the pipe wall thickness will reach the UTS value, inferring failure by plastic collapse. An isometric view of the sub-model with the weld showing the axial stress contours is presented in Fig.14 to allow comparison with the photograph of the failed girth weld section. The plot shows that that the regions of high stress predicted by the FE model are consistent with the regions where fracture has occurred. The axial strain contours on the sub-model are presented in Fig.15. As with the stress contours presented above, the maximum contour level for the strain plot was set to the maximum value of true strain obtained from the tensile tests on the parent pipe metal (see Fig.12). This value was equal to 4.25%. The strain contours show that in the vicinity of the parent-weld metal interface at the bottom dead centre of the pipe the axial strains are around 2.3%. The stress-strain tensile test curve shows that for this strain level the stresses would be around 500 MPa. This is within the range of the axial stress values reported in the above paragraph Fracture Assessment At the onset of the project it was considered that a fracture assessment would be required to determine the size of defects in the girth weld that would have led to the observed failure; this assessment would be undertaken using the Part 9-Assessment of Crack-Like Flaws Level 2 procedure detailed in API 5791/ASME FFS-1 [11]. The stresses required for a fracture assessment are the membrane and bending stresses in the region of interest. In this case, results from the FE presented in Fig.14 show that the axial stresses in the vicinity of the girth weld at the bottom dead centre of the pipe for the settlement loading are in excess of the measured ultimate tensile strength of the material (520 MPa). Thus, it was concluded that the dominant failure mode would be by plastic collapse and hence a detailed fracture assessment was not required. The conclusion was self-evident, i.e. that failure at

the girth weld was due to the presence of SCC followed by a rupture of the pipeline. DISCUSSION The primary purpose of this study was to determine the cause(s) that led to the final rupture of the 28-inch pipeline. The failure is consistent with near neutral SCC and final ductile rupture of the remaining reduced wall thickness. For SCC three contributory factors are required: i. Susceptible material; ii. Sufficient tensile stress; and, iii. Corrosive environment. Susceptible Material It is generally accepted that steel pipe is susceptible to near neutral SCC, however, the metallurgical factors influencing the susceptibility of steel pipe are not well understood. The materials testing programme indicated that the yield strength of the pipes was below the specified API 5L minimum although this is not considered to have been a factor in the failure. The metallurgical investigation found that the failure occurred in the coarse grain heat affected zone which suggests that this location is more susceptible to near neutral SCC than the parent pipe material. From the materials testing the girth weld complied with the requirements of API 1104 and the appearance was typical of that seen in other pipeline girth welds, it is therefore unknown as to the extent that susceptibility could be mitigated by the welding parameters. The key materials factors is that the crack growth in the heat effected zone region near the weld (CGHAZ) is more susceptible to SCC however this is not a local factor to the ruptured girth weld and would in fact apply to all the girth welds along the pipeline. Tensile Stress As noted above a sufficient tensile stress is also required for near neutral stress corrosion cracking. The cracking occurred in the circumferential direction towards the bottom of the pipe. In SCC the general plane of crack growth is perpendicular to the maximum principal stress. Therefore the principal stress that caused the cracking was not as a result of internal pressure i.e. hoop stress. The factors that typically promote axial stress at the bottom of the pipe are typically due to sagging or bending. Significantly the desktop study revealed that bending stresses were generated at the rupture location due to the absence of a field bend during the construction phase. Furthermore, the geotechnical investigation identified additional bending stresses due to consolidation settlement of the swamp deposits underlying the apparent embankment fill. Although the geotechnical parameters indicate that consolidation settlement

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would have completed within two years following construction of the apparent embankment fill, creep settlement of the organic swamp materials would have continued. Settlement and seasonal fluctuation in the swamp material such as wet season (flood) and dry season (no flood) would have contributed to cyclic movements of the soil, causing periodic progression of the crack. Pipe/soil interaction investigations were carried out to determine the displacements and stresses in the vicinity of the failure. The results indicated that following 100% consolidation of the swamp deposits, vertical displacements in the order of 700mm were predicted near the ruptured girth weld. Furthermore, the simple elastic analysis indicated that the longitudinal bending stress in the pipeline is expected to exceed the specified minimum yield strength (SMYS). The settlement loading was subsequently applied in a separate study that involved detailed 3D Finite Element Analysis to model the pipeline at the facture location. The results from the engineering analysis confirmed high axial stresses in the pipe prior to failure as a result of consolidation settlement. Further the maximum stresses were predicted to be at the 5 oclock position to the 7 oclock position i.e. within the areas affected by the stress corrosion cracks. In addition to the bending stresses the overmatching weld strength and the high reinforcement of the cap may have acted as stress raising features, however this is not a local feature and would be present at other girth welds in the pipeline. The key factors that contributed to the high stress state of the pipeline were the ground movement as a result of consolidation of the soil and high bending stresses due to the absence of a field bend during construction at the bottom of the slope. Corrosive Environment The corrosive environment that results in near neutral SCC results from carbon dioxide present in the ground water which assists in generating the near neutral pH required. SCC can only occur where the coating has been damaged or disbonded and in the absence of cathodic protection (CP), thereby allowing the corrosive environment to exist at the pipe surface. To prevent corrosion of the pipeline, heat shrink field joint coatings and a cathodic protection system were installed according to the required specification during construction. Results of a close interval potential survey (CIPS) indicated that the CP was working within the design intent and was therefore not considered to be a factor in the failure. However, heat shrinkable sleeves are known to be susceptible to soil stressing which may lead to loss of adhesion between the pipe and the coating. The coating is also prone to cathodic shielding.

Cathodic shielding occurs due to the electrical resistivity of the coating shielding the protective current from the CP system from the underlying pipe material allowing conditions to develop conducive to corrosion. Disbondment of the field joint coating most likely occurred due to poor application for example inadequate surface preparation or poor temperature control during the application process or due to the lack of a field bend which may have stressed the field joint coating during construction. Soil loading/stressing on the field joint coating may also have contributed to loss of adhesion of the heat shrink sleeve. It is considered that the coating disbonded at the failure location allowing ingress of ground water. It is unknown as to whether the ground water at this location was specific to the failure or whether this is likely to be a factor at other locations on the pipeline. From the previous CIPs survey the CP was known to be working, therefore cathodic shielding occurred preventing the CP from protecting the underlying steel pipe. Soil type can also have an affect on the susceptibility to SCC. From the exploratory trial pits, at the rupture location, the soils were described as a soft silty clay (0.00 0.20 m) and organic clay (0.20 to 2.00 m) which have poor drainage. Industry has demonstrated that locations in poorly drained environments correlate to SCC features [13]. The geotechnical investigation also found that the ground water levels were around 1.50 to 1.70m below ground level, indicating that ground water was present around the pipe. Summary The overriding observation of this study is that a combination of factors contributed to the failure that occurred. The girth weld failure was the due to a combination of excessive stresses and near neutral stress corrosion cracking defects. As discussed above for near neutral stress corrosion cracking to occur there are three requirements, a susceptible material, sufficient tensile stress and a corrosive environment. The key point of note is that all three of these conditions must be present in order for cracking to occur. Therefore, if any one of these three conditions can be eliminated or reduced to a point where cracking will not occur, then SCC can be prevented. To reduce the risk of SCC on new pipeline projects, liquid epoxy or polyurethane girth weld coating could be considered CONCLUSIONS 1. The mode of failure of the girth weld was circumferential, near-neutral stress corrosion cracking followed by final ductile rupture. The SCC had initiated in the outer surface of the X65

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grade pipe material within the HAZ adjacent to the cap of a girth weld. 2. Multiple layered bands were present aligned along the SCC faces in the circumferential direction; these markings are considered consistent with progression marks often seen in SCC failures. The presence of these markings indicates that the cracks grew in a cyclic or episodic manner. SCC occurs perpendicular to the plane of maximum stress therefore indicating that the maximum stresses in the pipeline were due to axial loads which was confirmed by the ECA. The as-built survey of the pipeline revealed that the pipeline at the rupture location was in a high stress state due to the absence of a field bend. Settlement of the swamp material resulted in higher bending stresses being generated in the pipe as a result of differential displacement. The initial soil/pipeline assessment which assumed a simple elastic constitutive model for the pipeline indicated that the stresses exceeded the SMYS. The FE analyses of the failed girth weld section predicted that where 100% consolidation of the soil in the vicinity of the girth weld was assumed, the resulting longitudinal stresses were predicted to be of a magnitude approaching the ultimate tensile strength of the parent pipe material, 520 MPa Although not proven, it is possible that a 4.4 magnitude (MLv) earthquake, 24km to the south of the rupture location may have enhanced the settlement effects. Near neutral stress corrosion cracking only occurs at areas of coating damage/disbondment and in the absence of CP. It was considered that the heat shrink field joint coating disbonded and shielded the pipe from the CP. The field joint coating most likely failed as a result of poor application for example inadequate surface preparation or poor temperature control during the application process.

REFERENCES [1]. Scrivner, R., Exley, GB. and Alexander C, October 2010, Girth Weld Failure in a Large Diameter Gas Transmission Pipeline, Proceedings of the 8th International Pipeline Conference (IPC 2010), Calgary, Canada. [2].The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME 31.8, Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems, New York, United States. [3].Terzaghi, K., Peck, R, and Mesri, G. (1996), Soil Mechanics in Engineering Practice, John Wiley and sons, New York. [4].Ple4Win Version 4.1.2. Expert Design Systems b.v. Geestbrugweg 44.2281 CM Rijswijk, The Netherlands. [5].Mesri, G (1973), Coefficient of Secondary Compression, Proc. ASCE, 99, SM1, p123-137. [6].National Energy Board, MH-2-95, November 1996, Public Enquiry Concerning Stress Corrosion Cracking on Canadian Oil and Gas Pipelines, Calgary, Canada. [7].National Energy Board, MH-2-95, December 2006, Stress Corrosion Cracking on Canadian Oil and Gas Pipelines, Calgary, Canada. [8].American Petroleum Industry, API 5L 41st Edition, April 1995, Specification for Line Pipe, Washington, United States. [9].American Petroleum Industry, API 5L 44th Edition, October 2008, Specification for Line Pipe, Washington, United States. [10]. American Petroleum Institute, API 1104 20th Edition, October 2005, Welding of Pipelines and Related Facilities, Washington, United States. [11]. American Petroleum Industry and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, June 2007, Fitness For Service, Washington and New York, United States. [12]. ABAQUS/Standard Version 6.9.1, SIMULIA, Dassault Systemes, 2009. [13]. Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, December 2007, Stress Corrosion Cracking Recommended Practices, 2nd Edition An Industry Leasing Document Detailing the Management of Transgranular SCC, Calgary, Canada.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors wish to thank the management of PT Transportasi Gas Indonesia for their permission to release the findings of the failure investigation described in this paper.

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FIGURE 1: PIPE SECTION IN FIELD SHOWING THE RUPTURED GIRTH WELD

Original As-built Data (circa 1998)
45
Ref: Area 12 Survey Section: 15/BL16-CPS4 (MPCC, 1998).

40

35 Sag 4deg

30

25

20

Top of Pipeline at Weld Ground Level at Weld Rupture (MM1855) M-361 (SS2 0134)
Weld Type: Special Section (SS) Weld Type: Mainline Manual (MM)

15

10

M-362 (SS2 0134T1)

277550

277500

277450

277400

277350

277300 Chainage (m)

277250

277200

277150

277100

0 277050

FIGURE 2: CROSS SECTION SHOWING GROUND LEVEL AND PIPELINE LEVEL BASED ON AS BUILT DATA

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Elevation (mAD)

FIGURE 3: GEOLOGICAL SECTION ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE PIPELINE

FIGURE 4: SKETCH OF RUPTURED GIRTH WELD

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FIGURE 5: STEREO MICROSCOPE IMAGES OF THE PITTING AND CRACKING ADJACENT TO THE WELD CAP TOE BETWEEN 161 AND 201 DEGREES

FIGURE 6: BLACK SURFACE DEPOSIT ON THE FRACTURE FACE 136 WITH RESPECT TO TOP DEAD CENTRE (85 CM POSITION FROM RADIOGRAPHS).

FIGURE 7: SECONDARY CRACKS RUNNING FROM THE FRACTURE FACE IN TO THE PARENT PIPE MATERIAL (128 DEGREES WITH RESPECT TO TOP DEAD CENTRE). THE CRACKS CONTAINED BLACK CORROSION PRODUCT SIMILAR TO THOSE OBSERVED ON THE FRACTURE FACE

11

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FIGURE 8: HORIZONTAL SPLITS AND COARSE HORIZONTAL MARKINGS CONSISTENT WITH FRACTURE PROGRESSION MARKINGS INDICATING A CYCLIC OR PERIODIC PROGRESSION OF THE CRACK FRONT

FIGURE 9: SECONDARY ELECTRON IMAGE, ARC SHAPED BANDS RADIATING FROM THE PIPE OUTER SURFACE (TOP OF IMAGE), TOWARD THE INNER SURFACE AT 266 DEGREE LOCATION.

FIGURE 10: MACROGRAPH OF THE WELD TAKEN AT 90 DEGREE POSITION, SHOWING THE WELD DIMENSIONS

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FIGURE 11: SUB-MODEL OF THE PIPE SECTION SHOWING THE REGIONS USED FOR SPECIFYING THE COUPLING CONSTRAINTS AND THE DETAILED MESH AT THE WELD REGION

700 600

True Stress, N/mm

500 400 300 200 100 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Weld metal Parent metal

True Strain, %

FIGURE 12: TRUE STRESS VS TRUE STRAIN CURVES OF THE WELD AND PARENT METAL FROM MATERIAL TESTING USED FOR THE ECA

13

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FIGURE 13: AXIAL STRESS CONTOURS ON THE SUB-MODEL PIPE SECTION AFTER APPLYING THE INTERNAL PRESSURE AND BENDING LOADS DUE TO THE AS-BUILT PROFILE AND GROUND SETTLEMENT

FIGURE 14: ISOMETRIC VIEW SHOWING THE AXIAL STRESS CONTOURS ON THE SUB-MODEL PIPE SECTION IN RELATION TO THE CRACKING ON THE FAILED SECTION (FE DISPLACED SHAPE OF THE PIPE HAS BEEN MAGNIFIED BY A FACTOR OF 25 TO AID VISUALIZATION)

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FIGURE 15: AXIAL STRAIN CONTOURS ON THE SUB-MODEL PIPE SECTION AFTER APPLYING THE INTERNAL PRESSURE AND BENDING LOADS DUE TO THE AS-BUILT PROFILE AND GROUND SETTLEMENT

15

Copyright 2012 by ASME